The

Buddhist

Monastic

Code I

The Pāṭimokkha Rules

Translated & Explained

by Ṭhānissaro Bhikkhu

(Geoffrey DeGraff)

third edition, revised: 2013 Ṭhānissaro Bhikkhu

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“Now, Ānanda, if it occurs to any of you—‘The teaching has lost its arbitrator; we are without a Teacher’—do not view it in that way. Whatever Dhamma and Vinaya I have pointed out and formulated for you, that will be your Teacher when I am gone.”

—DN 16

Abbreviations

AN | Aṅguttara Nikāya
As | Adhikaraṇa-samatha
Ay | Aniyata
BD | Book of Discipline
BMC1 | The Buddhist Monastic Code, vol. I
BMC2 | The Buddhist Monastic Code, vol. II
C | Commentary
Cp | Cariyāpiṭaka
Cv | Cullavagga
DN | Dīgha Nikāya
Dhp | Dhammapada
Iti | Itivuttaka
K | Kaṅkhāvitaraṇī
Khp | Khuddakapāṭha
MN | Majjhima Nikāya
Mv | Mahāvagga
NP | Nissaggiya Pācittiya
Pc | Pācittiya
Pd | Pāṭidesanīya
Pr | Pārājika
Pv | Parivāra
SN | Saṁyutta Nikāya
Sn | Sutta Nipāta
SC | Sub-commentary
Sg | Saṅghādisesa
Sk | Sekhiya
Thag | Theragāthā
V | Vimati-vinodanī
Vism | Visuddhimagga

Numbers in the references to Mv, Cv, and Pv denote chapter, section and sub-section; in the references to DN, Iti, Khp, and MN, discourse (sutta); in the references to AN, Cp, SN, and Sn, section (saṁyutta or nipāta) and discourse; in the references to Dhp, verse.

Preface

This volume is the first in a two-volume book that attempts to give an organized, detailed account of the Vinaya training rules and the traditions that have grown up around them. The Pāṭimokkha training rules as explained in the Sutta Vibhaṅga are the topic of the first volume; the rules found in the Khandhakas, the topic of the second. The book as a whole is aimed primarily at those whose lives are affected by the rules—bhikkhus who live by them, and other people who have dealings with the bhikkhus—so that they will be able to find gathered in one location as much essential information as possible on just what the rules do and do not entail. Students of Early Buddhism, Theravādin history, or contemporary Theravādin issues should also find this book interesting, as should anyone who is serious about the practice of the Dhamma and wants to see how the Buddha worked out the ramifications of Dhamma practice in daily life.

The amount of information offered here is both the book’s strength and its weakness. On the one hand, it encompasses material that in some cases is otherwise unavailable in English or even in romanized Pali, and should be sufficient to serve as a life-long companion to any bhikkhu who seriously wants to benefit from the precise and thorough training the rules have to offer. On the other hand, the sheer size of the book and the mass of details to be remembered might prove daunting or discouraging to anyone just embarking on the bhikkhu’s life.

To overcome this drawback, I have tried to organize the material in as clear-cut a manner as possible. In particular, in volume one I have analyzed each rule into its component factors so as to show not only the rule’s precise range but also how it connects to the general pattern of mindfully analyzing one’s own actions in terms of such factors as intention, perception, object, effort, and result—a system that plays an important role in the training of the mind. In volume two, I have gathered rules by subject so as to give a clear sense of how rules scattered randomly in the texts actually relate to one another in a coherent way.

Secondly, in volume one I have provided short summaries for the Pāṭimokkha rules and have gathered them, organized by topic, in the Rule Index at the back of the volume. If you are new to the subject of Buddhist monastic discipline, I suggest that you read the Rule Index first, to grasp the gist of the main rules and their relationship to the Buddhist path, before going on to the more detailed discussions in the body of the book. This should help you keep the general purpose of the rules in mind, and keep you from getting lost in the mass of details.

I am indebted to the many people who helped directly and indirectly in the writing of this book. Phra Ajaan Fuang Jotiko (Phra Khru Ñāṇavisitth) and Phra Ajaan Thawng Candasiri (Phra Ñāṇavisitth), my first teachers in Vinaya, gave me a thorough grounding in the subject. Ven. Brahmavaṁso Bhikkhu gave many hours of his time to writing detailed criticisms of early versions of the manuscript for the first edition of volume one, forcing me to deepen my knowledge and sharpen my presentation of the topic. As the manuscript of the first edition of that volume approached its final form, Ven. Phra Ñāṇavarodom, Bhikkhu Bodhi, Thiradhammo Bhikkhu, Amaro Bhikkhu, Suviro Bhikkhu, Bill Weir, and Doris Weir all read copies of it and offered valuable suggestions for improvement.

In the original conception of this book I planned only one volume, explaining the Pāṭimokkha rules. However, in 1997, Phra Ajaan Suwat Suvaco (Phra Bodhidhammācariya Thera) convinced me that my work would not be complete until I had added the second volume, on the Khandhaka rules, as well. In the course of researching that volume, I had the opportunity to deepen my knowledge not only of the Khandhakas but also of areas in the Sutta Vibhaṅga that I had previously overlooked or misapprehended. Thus was born the idea for the current revision. My aim in carrying it out has been twofold, both to correct errors and deficiencies in the first edition and to shape the two volumes into a more coherent whole. This second aim has involved reorganizing the material and adopting a more consistent and accurate translation scheme for technical terms. The revision was given added impetus from the questions I received from my students during Vinaya classes here at the monastery, and from a series of critiques and questions I received from bhikkhus in other locations. In addition to critiques from an anonymous group of bhikkhus in Sri Lanka, I also received critiques from Ven. Jotipālo Bhikkhu, Brahmavaṁso Bhikkhu, Brahmāli Bhikkhu, and the late Paññāvuḍḍho Bhikkhu on volume one, and an extended critique from Ven. Bhikkhu Ñāṇatusita on volume two. All of these critiques, even in the many areas in which I disagreed with them, have helped sharpen the focus of the book and made the presentation more accurate and complete. I am grateful for the time that my fellow bhikkhus have devoted to making this work more useful and reliable. Many lay people have provided help as well, in particular Thomas Patton, who provided references to the Burmese edition of the Canon, and Olivia Vaz and V.A. Ospovat, who helped with the proofreading. I, of course, remain responsible for any errors it may still contain.

For anyone familiar with the first edition of this book, the most obvious change will be the book’s increased size. This is the result of a felt need to make its coverage more comprehensive. In the first instance, this has meant providing a more detailed account of the material in the Canon and commentaries. This in turn has uncovered more points where the commentaries conflict with the Canon, all of which required determining what seemed to be the most correct interpretation of the points in question. I have also found it necessary to take into account the variant readings found in the four major editions of the Canon: Thai, Sri Lankan, Burmese, and European PTS. In the first edition of this book I limited my attention to the Thai edition, but I have since come to realize the need to sift through all four editions to find the best readings for the rules and their explanatory material. This point I discuss in detail in the Introduction to volume one. What it means in practice is that when the variant readings touch on important issues and would clearly make a practical difference, I have had to devote a fair amount of space to explaining my preference for one over the others. At first I wanted to avoid dealing with these issues in the body of the book, but given the still unsettled nature of our current knowledge of the Canon, I found them unavoidable. I hope that these discussions will not interfere with understanding the general thrust of each rule. Again, if you are new to the subject of Buddhist monastic discipline, you can skip over these scholarly discussions during your first read-through. Then, when your knowledge of the Vinaya is more solid and you feel so inclined, you can return to them at a later time.

Although my general policy has been to accept the most coherent reading regardless of which edition it appears in, I have had to depart from this policy in one area, that of the transaction statements used in Community meetings. Each edition has its own standards for determining word order and orthography for these statements, and in almost all cases these variant standards make no practical difference. Thus, instead of trying to establish a preferred reading in every case, I have—for consistency’s sake—followed the Thai standard throughout, and have noted variants only where they seem important.

One last practical note: Even though I have consulted all four major editions of the Canon, I have provided reference numbers only to one—the PTS edition—as that is the edition most readily available to my readers. References to the commentaries have been handled as follows: When, in the course of discussing rule x, I cite the Commentary to rule x, I simply say, “The Commentary says ....” When I augment the discussion of rule x with a citation from the Commentary to rule y, I say, “The Commentary to rule y says ....” These references may then be easily found in the area of the Commentary devoted to the relevant rule, x or y, regardless of the edition consulted.

When the first editions of volumes one and two were printed, the primary dedicatees were still alive. Both, however, have since passed away, but my respect and gratitude to them have not diminished. So I now dedicate the volumes to their memory. In the case of this first volume, that dedication is to the memory of my preceptor, Phra Debmoli (Samrong Guṇavuḍḍho) of Wat Asokaram, Samut Prakaan, Thailand, as well as to all my other teachers in the path of the Dhamma-Vinaya.

Ṭhānissaro Bhikkhu

(Geoffrey DeGraff)

Metta Forest Monastery

Valley Center, CA 92082-1409 U.S.A.

May, 2007

This third revised edition was inspired by questions from many of my fellow bhikkhus, in particular Vens. Nyanadhammo, Jotipālo, Khematto, and Kusalī.

November, 2013

INTRODUCTION

Dhamma-Vinaya

Dhamma-Vinaya was the Buddha’s own name for the religion he founded. Dhamma—the truth—is what he discovered and pointed out as advice for all who want to gain release from suffering. Vinaya—discipline—is what he formulated as rules, ideals, and standards of behavior for those of his followers who go forth from home life to take up the quest for release in greater earnestness. Although this book deals primarily with discipline, we should note at the outset that total training in the Buddha’s path requires that Dhamma and Vinaya function together. In theory they may be separate, but in the person who practices them they merge as qualities developed in the mind and character.

“Gotamī, the qualities of which you may know, ‘These qualities lead to dispassion, not to passion; to being unfettered and not to being fettered; to shedding and not to accumulating; to modesty and not to self-aggrandizement; to contentment and not to discontent; to seclusion and not to entanglement; to aroused energy and not to laziness; to being unburdensome and not to being burdensome’: You may definitely hold, ‘This is the Dhamma, this is the Vinaya, this is the Teacher’s instruction.’”—Cv.X.5

Ultimately, the Buddha said, just as the sea has a single taste, that of salt, so too the Dhamma and Vinaya have a single taste: that of release. The connection between discipline and release is spelled out in a passage that recurs at several points in the Canon:

“Discipline is for the sake of restraint, restraint for the sake of freedom from remorse, freedom from remorse for the sake of joy, joy for the sake of rapture, rapture for the sake of tranquility, tranquility for the sake of pleasure, pleasure for the sake of concentration, concentration for the sake of knowledge and vision of things as they have come to be, knowledge and vision of things as they have come to be for the sake of disenchantment, disenchantment for the sake of dispassion, dispassion for the sake of release, release for the sake of knowledge and vision of release, knowledge and vision of release for the sake of total unbinding through non-clinging.”—Pv.XII.2

In establishing his religion of release, though, the Buddha did not simply set out a body of recommendations and rules. He also founded a company (parisā) of followers. This company falls into four main groups: bhikkhus (monks), bhikkhunīs (nuns), lay men, and lay women. Although the Buddha saw no need to organize the laity in any manner, he arranged for the bhikkhus and bhikkhunīs—who had given up the entanglements of the household life to devote themselves more fully to the goal of release—to develop into communities. And he saw that they needed, as all communities do, ideals and standards, rules and customs to ensure their stability. This need is what gave rise to the Vinaya.

In the early years of the Buddha’s career, the texts tell us, there was no need to formulate monastic disciplinary rules. All of the bhikkhus in his following—the Community of bhikkhunīs had not yet been started—were men of high personal attainments who had succeeded in subduing many or all of their mental defilements. They knew his teachings well and behaved accordingly. The Canon tells of how Ven. Sāriputta, one of the Buddha’s foremost disciples, asked the Buddha at an early date to formulate a Pāṭimokkha, or code of rules, to ensure that the celibate life the Buddha had founded would last long, just as a thread holding together a floral arrangement ensures that the flowers are not scattered by the wind. The Buddha replied that the time for such a code had not yet come, for even the most backward of the men in the Community at that time had already had their first glimpse of the goal. Only when mental effluents (āsava) made themselves felt in the Community would there be a need for a Pāṭimokkha.

As time passed, the conditions that provided an opening for the effluents within the Community eventually began to appear. The Bhaddāli Sutta (MN 65) presents the Buddha at a later point in his career listing these conditions as five:

Ven. Bhaddāli: “Why is it, venerable sir, that there used to be fewer training rules and more bhikkhus established in the knowledge of Awakening? And why is it that there are now more training rules and fewer bhikkhus established in the knowledge of Awakening?” [Bhaddāli, who has been unwilling to abide by the training rules, seems to be suggesting that the rise in the number of training rules is itself the cause for fewer bhikkhus’ attaining Awakening. The Buddha, however, offers a different explanation.]

The Buddha: “So it is, Bhaddāli. When beings have begun to degenerate and the true Dhamma has begun to disappear, there are more training rules and fewer bhikkhus established in the knowledge of Awakening. The Teacher does not lay down a training rule for his disciples as long as there are no cases where the conditions that offer a foothold for the effluents have arisen in the Community. But when there are cases where the conditions that offer a foothold for the effluents have arisen in the Community, then the Teacher lays down a training rule for his disciples so as to counteract those very conditions.

“There are no cases where the conditions that offer a foothold for the effluents have arisen in the Community as long as the Community has not become large. But when the Community has become large, then there are cases where the conditions that offer a foothold for the effluents arise in the Community, and the Teacher then lays down a training rule for his disciples so as to counteract those very conditions.... When the Community possesses great material gains... great status... a large body of learning… When the Community is long-standing, then there are cases where the conditions that offer a foothold for the effluents arise in the Community, and the Teacher then lays down a training rule for his disciples so as to counteract those very conditions.”

Thus the rules themselves were not the cause for degeneracy in the Community, and the conditions that provided a foothold for the effluents were not themselves effluents. Rather, the growing complexity of the Community provided the opportunity for bhikkhus to act on the basis of their defilements in a growing variety of ways, and the rules—although they could not prevent any of the five conditions—had to become correspondingly complex to counteract the opportunities those conditions provided for unenlightened behavior.

Even when these conditions did arise, though, the Buddha did not set out a full code at once. Instead, he formulated rules one at a time in response to events. The considerations that went into formulating each rule are best illustrated by the events surrounding the formulation of the first.

Ven. Sudinna, the story goes, had strong faith in the Buddha and had ordained after receiving his parents’ grudging consent. He was their only child and, though married, was childless. His parents, fearing that the government would confiscate their property at their death if it had no heir, devised various schemes to lure Ven. Sudinna back to the lay life, but to no avail. Finally, his mother realized that he was firm in his intention to stay a bhikkhu and so asked him at least to have intercourse with his former wife so that their property would have an heir. Ven. Sudinna consented, took his wife into the forest, and had intercourse three times.

Immediately he felt remorse and eventually confessed his deed to his fellow bhikkhus. Word reached the Buddha, who called a meeting of the Community, questioned Ven. Sudinna, and gave him a rebuke. The rebuke fell into two major parts. In the first part, the Buddha reminded Ven. Sudinna of his position as a samaṇa—a monk or contemplative—and that his behavior was unworthy of his position. Also, the Buddha pointed out to him the aims of the teaching and noted that his behavior ran counter to them. The implication here was that Ven. Sudinna had not only acted inconsistently with the content of the teaching, but had also shown callous disregard for the Buddha’s compassionate aims in making the Dhamma known.

“‘Worthless man, it is unseemly, out of line, unsuitable, and unworthy of a contemplative; improper and not to be done…. Haven’t I taught the Dhamma in many ways for the sake of dispassion and not for passion; for unfettering and not for fettering; for freedom from clinging and not for clinging? Yet here, while I have taught the Dhamma for dispassion, you set your heart on passion; while I have taught the Dhamma for unfettering, you set your heart on being fettered; while I have taught the Dhamma for freedom from clinging, you set your heart on clinging.

“‘Worthless man, haven’t I taught the Dhamma in many ways for the fading of passion, the sobering of intoxication, the subduing of thirst, the destruction of attachment, the severing of the round, the ending of craving, dispassion, cessation, unbinding? Haven’t I in many ways advocated abandoning sensual pleasures, comprehending sensual perceptions, subduing sensual thirst, destroying sensual thoughts, calming sensual fevers? Worthless man, it would be better that your penis be stuck into the mouth of a poisonous snake than into a woman’s vagina. It would be better that your penis be stuck into the mouth of a black viper than into a woman’s vagina. It would be better that your penis be stuck into a pit of burning embers, blazing and glowing, than into a woman’s vagina. Why is that? For that reason you would undergo death or death-like suffering, but you would not on that account, at the break-up of the body, after death, fall into a plane of deprivation, a bad destination, a lower realm, hell. But for this reason you would, at the break-up of the body, after death, fall into a plane of deprivation, a bad destination, a lower realm, hell….

“‘Worthless man, this neither inspires faith in the faithless nor increases the faithful. Rather, it inspires lack of faith in the faithless and wavering in some of the faithful.’”

The second part of the rebuke dealt in terms of personal qualities: those that a bhikkhu practicing discipline is to abandon, and those he is to develop.

“Then the Blessed One, having in many ways rebuked Ven. Sudinna, having spoken in dispraise of being burdensome, demanding, arrogant, discontented, entangled, and indolent; in various ways having spoken in praise of being unburdensome, undemanding, modest, content, scrupulous, austere, gracious, self-effacing, and energetic; having given a Dhamma talk on what is seemly and becoming for bhikkhus, addressed the bhikkhus.”

This was where the Buddha formulated the training rule, after first stating his reasons for doing so.

“‘In that case, bhikkhus, I will formulate a training rule for the bhikkhus with ten aims in mind: the excellence of the Community, the comfort of the Community, the curbing of the impudent, the comfort of well-behaved bhikkhus, the restraint of effluents related to the present life, the prevention of effluents related to the next life, the arousing of faith in the faithless, the increase of the faithful, the establishment of the true Dhamma, and the fostering of discipline.’”

These reasons fall into three main types. The first two are external: 1) to ensure peace and well being within the Community itself, and 2) to foster and protect faith among the laity, on whom the bhikkhus depend for their support. (The origin stories of the various rules depict the laity as being very quick to generalize. One bhikkhu misbehaves, and they complain, “How can these Sakyan-son monks do that?”) The third type of reason, though, is internal: The rule is to help restrain and prevent mental effluents within the individual bhikkhus. Thus the rules aim not only at the external well being of the Community but also at the internal well being of the individual. This latter point soon becomes apparent to anyone who seriously tries to keep to the rules, for they foster mindfulness and circumspection in one’s actions, qualities that carry over into the training of the mind.

Over the course of time the Buddha formulated more than 200 major and minor rules, forming the Pāṭimokkha that was recited fortnightly in each Community of bhikkhus. In addition, he formulated many other minor rules that were memorized by those of his followers who specialized in the subject of discipline, but nothing is known for sure of what format they used to organize this body of knowledge during his lifetime.

After his total nibbāna, though, his followers made a concerted effort to establish a standard canon of Dhamma and Vinaya, and the Pali Canon as we know it began to take shape. The Vinaya was organized into two main parts: 1) the Sutta Vibhaṅga, the ‘Exposition of the Text’ (which from here on we will refer to simply as the Vibhaṅga), containing almost all the material dealing with the Pāṭimokkha rules; and 2) the Khandhakas, or Groupings, which contain the remaining material organized loosely according to subject matter. The Khandhakas themselves are divided into two parts, the Mahāvagga, or Greater Chapter, and the Cullavagga, or Lesser Chapter. Historians estimate that the Vibhaṅga and Khandhakas reached their present form in approximately the 2nd century B.C.E., and that the Parivāra, or Addenda—a summary and study guide—was added a few centuries later, closing the Vinaya Piṭaka, the part of the Canon dealing with discipline.

Because the purpose of this volume is to translate and explain the Pāṭimokkha, we are most directly concerned with the Vibhaṅga. It is organized as follows: The rules in the Pāṭimokkha are presented one by one, each rule preceded by an origin story relating the events leading up to its formulation. In some instances a rule went through one or more reformulations, in which case an additional story is provided for each amendment to show what prompted it. With each new formulation of a rule, any previous formulations were automatically rescinded. Otherwise, the added restrictions or allowances contained in the reformulations would have been rendered meaningless. Thus, the final formulation of the rule is the authoritative one, with the earlier formulations holding only historical interest.

After the final statement of the rule is a word-analysis (pada-bhājaniya), which explains in detail most of the important terms in the rule. For many of the rules this analysis includes one or more “wheels,” or tables, giving the contingencies connected with the rule, working out all their possible permutations and passing judgment as to what penalty, if any, each permutation entails. For example, the discussion of the first rule contains a wheel that gives all the objects with which a person might have sexual intercourse, lists them against the variables of the sort of intercourse and whether or not the bhikkhu involved gives his consent, and announces the penalty for each possible combination of factors.

Following the word-analysis for each rule is a section of non-offense clauses, listing extenuating circumstances under which a bhikkhu would be exempted from the penalty imposed by the rule.

Finally, for the major rules, there is the Vinīta-vatthu, or Precedents, listing various cases related to the rule and giving verdicts as to what penalty, if any, they entail.

The Vibhaṅga forms the basis for most of the explanations of the training rules given in this volume. However, there are many questions on which the Vibhaṅga is silent or unclear. To answer these questions, I have turned either to the Khandhakas or to the commentarial literature that has grown up around the Vinaya over the course of the centuries. The primary works I have consulted are these:

1) The Samanta-pāsādikā—“The Thoroughly Inspiring”—(from here on referred to as the Commentary), a commentary on the Vinaya Piṭaka compiled in the 5th century C.E. by Bhadantācariya Buddhaghosa, who based his work on ancient commentaries. The originals for these ancient commentaries may have been brought to Sri Lanka from India and translated into Sinhalese, but frequent references throughout the commentaries to places and people in Sri Lanka show that much of the material in the commentaries was composed in Sri Lanka. From internal evidence in Buddhaghosa’s writings—he compiled commentaries on a major portion of the Canon—historians have estimated that the ancient commentaries were collected over a span of several centuries and closed in approximately the 4th century C.E. Buddhaghosa’s work thus contains material much older than his date would indicate.

By Buddhaghosa’s time a belief had grown up that the ancient commentaries were the work of the Buddha’s immediate disciples and thus indisputably conveyed the true intent of the Canon. However, as we shall see below, the ancient commentaries themselves did not make such exalted claims for themselves.

Still, the existence of this belief in the 5th century placed certain constraints on Buddhaghosa’s work. At points where the ancient commentaries conflicted with the Canon, he had to write the discrepancies off as copier’s mistakes or else side with the commentaries against the Canon. At a few points, such as his explanation of Pc 9, he provides arguments effectively demolishing the ancient commentaries’ interpretation but then backs off, saying that the ancient commentaries must be right because their authors knew the Buddha’s intentions. Perhaps pressure from the elder bhikkhus at the Mahāvihāra in Anurādhapura—the place where the ancient commentaries had been preserved and where Buddhaghosa was allowed to do his work—was what made him back off in this way. At any rate, only on points where the different ancient commentaries were silent or gave divergent opinions did he feel free to express his own.

2) The Kaṅkhā-vitaraṇī—“The Subjugator of Uncertainty”—(the K/Commentary), a commentary on the Pāṭimokkha also compiled by Buddhaghosa. Although this work is largely a synopsis of material in the Commentary, it contains some independent material, in particular a system of classifying the offenses under each training rule into their component factors. It also contradicts the Commentary from time to time, suggesting that it may have been based on a commentarial tradition different from the one underlying the Commentary.

3) The Sārattha-dīpanī—“The Essence-Meaning Illustrator”—(the Sub-commentary), a sub-commentary on the Commentary, written in Sri Lanka in the 12th century C.E. by a Ven. Sāriputta, the first Mahāsāmin, or head of the Sri Lankan Saṅgha, after that Saṅgha was reformed and unified under the patronage of King Parakrāmabāhu I. This work not only explains the Commentary but also deals with points in the Canon itself, sometimes indicating passages where the Commentary has deviated from the Canon. It also quotes as authoritative the judgments of three ancient texts—the Gaṇṭhipadas, which are no longer extant—and of Ven. Buddhadatta, a scholar of the 4th century C.E. who wrote two extant Vinaya guides.

4) The Vimati-vinodanī—“The Remover of Perplexity”—(the V/Sub-commentary), another 12th-century sub-commentary, written in southern India by a Ven. Kassapa, who also wrote the Mohavicchedanī, a synopsis of the Abhidhamma Piṭaka and Buddhaghosa’s commentaries on it.

5) The Kaṅkhā-vitaraṇī-purāṇa-ṭīkā and the Kaṅkhā-vitaraṇī-abhinava-ṭīkā—the old and new sub-commentaries to the K/Commentary—(Old K/Sub-commentary and New K/Sub-commentary). The first, which appears to be missing some passages, was written by an unnamed author during the Anurādhapura period, which predates the time of the Ven. Sāriputta mentioned above. The second—whose full name is the Vinayattha-mañjūsā Līnapakāsanī, “The Chest for the Meaning of the Discipline, the Clarifier of Subtle Meaning”—was written by Ven. Buddhanāga, a student of Ven. Sāriputta. Both works comment not only on the K/Commentary but also on the Commentary and the Canon.

6) The Attha-yojanā—“The Interpretation of the Meaning”—(the A/Sub-commentary), a sub-commentary that—unlike the works of Vens. Sāriputta, Kassapa, and Buddhanāga—does little more than analyze the language of the Commentary. This was written in the 15th century C.E. by a Chieng Mai grammarian named Ven. Ñāṇakitti.

From here on “the ancient commentaries” will denote the original commentaries that Buddhaghosa had to work with, and “the commentaries” all seven works listed above.

In addition to the Canon and the commentaries, I have referred to the texts listed in the Bibliography. Three of these deserve special mention here.

1) The Pubbasikkhā-vaṇṇanā, a large compendium of rules from the Canon and the Commentary, compiled in 1860 by Phra Amarabhirakkhit (Amaro Koed), a pupil of King Rāma IV. This was the first comprehensive Vinaya guide compiled for use in the Dhammayut sect, which was founded by Rāma IV while he was still a monk. Although this book was officially supplanted by the Vinaya-mukha (see below), many Communities in Thailand, especially among the Kammaṭṭhāna forest tradition, still prefer it as more authoritative. The book contains a minimum of explanatory material, but it does occasionally provide interpretations of the Canon that cannot be traced directly to the Commentary. Many of these interpretations were carried over into the Vinaya-mukha, so a bhikkhu practicing in Thailand would be well advised to know them. Thus I have made reference to them wherever relevant.

2) The Vinaya-mukha, a guide to the Vinaya written in Thai in the early 20th century by Prince Vajirañāṇavarorasa, a son of King Rāma IV who ordained as a bhikkhu and eventually held the position of Supreme Patriarch of the Thai Saṅgha for many years. This work he wrote as part of his attempt both to create a centralized, bhikkhu-administered ecclesiastical organization for the Thai Saṅgha and to unite its two major sects. The attempt at unification failed, but the attempt at centralization succeeded, and the book is still used as the official textbook on Vinaya for the examinations run by the Thai Council of Elders. Prince Vajirañāṇa in his interpretations often disagrees openly not only with the commentaries, but also with the Vibhaṅga itself. Some of his disagreements with the commentaries are well taken, some not.

I include the book here both for the valuable suggestions it makes for dealing with unclear points in the older texts and because it is taken as authoritative through much of Thailand. It has been translated into English, as The Entrance to the Vinaya, but the translation is so flawed that I have chosen to translate anew all the passages I quote from it.

3) The Book of Discipline, a translation of almost the entire Vinaya Piṭaka into English by Miss I. B. Horner. Although I have learned much from Miss Horner’s work, there are points where my translations and conclusions differ from hers. Because many readers will want to check the information in this book against hers, I have marked these points with a “(§).” Anyone curious as to which interpretation is correct should check the passages in question against the primary sources listed in the Bibliography at the back of this book.

Disagreements among the texts

There are two levels of difficulty in trying to collate all these various texts. The first is that the Canon and Commentary, in Pali, exist in four major printed editions: Thai, Burmese, Sri Lankan, and European (printed by the Pali Text Society (PTS)). Although these editions are largely in agreement, they occasionally differ in ways that can have an important practical impact. Thus, where the editions differ, I have had to choose the reading that seems most reasonable and consistent with the rest of the Canon. In some cases, this has meant adopting a reading followed in only one edition against a reading followed in all the others (see, for example, the discussions under Sg 3 & 4). Where different readings seem equally reasonable, I have given the alternative readings as well.

In using the principle of internal consistency here, I am following the Great Standards that—as the Mahāparinibbāna Sutta (DN 16) reports—the Buddha formulated at Bhoganagara shortly before his passing away:

“There is the case where a bhikkhu says this: ‘Face-to-face with the Blessed One have I heard this, face-to-face have I received this: This is the Dhamma, this is the Vinaya, this is the Teacher’s instruction.’ His statement is neither to be approved nor scorned. Without approval or scorn, take careful note of his words and make them stand against the Suttas and tally them against the Vinaya. If, on making them stand against the Suttas and tallying them against the Vinaya, you find that they don’t stand with the Suttas or tally with the Vinaya, you may conclude: ‘This is not the word of the Blessed One; this bhikkhu has misunderstood it’—and you should reject it. But if… they stand with the Suttas and tally with the Vinaya, you may conclude: ‘This is the word of the Blessed One; this bhikkhu has understood it rightly.’”

[The same criteria are to be used when the bhikkhu cites as his authority a Community with well-known leading elders; a monastery with many learned elders who know the tradition, who have memorized the Dhamma, the Vinaya, and the Mātikā (the precursor to the Abhidhamma as we know it); or a single elder who knows the tradition.]

In other words, the determining factor in deciding a correct understanding is not personal authority but consistency. Only if a statement stands up under comparison with what is known of the Canon should it be accepted as true Dhamma or Vinaya. This standard was enunciated when the texts were still orally transmitted, but applied to our situation at present it means that we cannot take the assumed reliability of a particular printed edition as definitive. If a certain reading seems more consistent than its alternatives with what is known of the rest of the Canon, then—regardless of the edition in which it is found—it should be preferred. If two variant readings seem equally consistent with the known Canon, they may both be treated with respect.

The second level of difficulty in dealing with differences among the texts is that there are points on which the Vibhaṅga is at variance with the wording of the Pāṭimokkha rules, and the commentaries are at variance with the Canon. This forces us to decide which strata of the texts to take as definitive. As far as discrepancies between the Vibhaṅga and the rules are concerned, the following passage in the Cullavagga (X.4) suggests that the Buddha himself gave preference to the way the bhikkhus worked out the rules in the Vibhaṅga:

“As she was standing to one side, Mahāpajāpatī Gotamī said to the Blessed One: ‘Venerable sir, those rules of training for the bhikkhunīs that are in common with those for the bhikkhus: What line of conduct should we follow in regard to them?’

“‘Those rules of training for the bhikkhunīs, Gotamī, that are in common with those for the bhikkhus: As the bhikkhus train themselves, so should you train yourselves.’… (emphasis added).

“‘And those rules of training for bhikkhunīs that are not in common with those for bhikkhus, venerable sir: What line of conduct should we follow in regard to them?’

“‘Those rules of training for the bhikkhunīs, Gotamī, that are not in common with those for the bhikkhus: Train yourselves in them as they are formulated.’”

This passage implies that already in the time of the Buddha the bhikkhus had begun working out a way to interpret the rules that in some cases was not exactly in line with the way the Buddha had originally formulated them. Some people have read this passage as suggesting that the Buddha, though resigned to this development, was displeased with it. This, however, would contradict the many passages in the Canon where the Buddha speaks in high praise of Ven. Upāli, the foremost of his bhikkhu disciples in terms of his knowledge of Vinaya, who was responsible for teaching the rules to the other bhikkhus and who was largely responsible for the shape of the Vinaya as we now have it. It seems more likely that the Buddha in this passage is simply saying that, to avoid unnecessary controversy, the way the bhikkhus had worked out the implications of the rules was to be accepted as is.

Because this development eventually led to the Vibhaṅga, we can be fairly confident that in adhering to the Vibhaṅga we are acting as the Buddha would have us do. And when we check the few places where the Vibhaṅga deviates from the wording of the rules, we find that almost invariably it has tried to reconcile contradictions among the rules themselves, and between the rules and the Khandhakas, so as to make the Vinaya a more coherent whole. This is particularly true with rules that touch on Community transactions. Apparently, many of these rules were formulated before the general patterns for transactions were finalized in the Khandhakas. Thus, after the patterns were established, the compilers of the Vibhaṅga were sometimes forced to deviate from the wording of the original rules to bring them into line with the patterns.

As for contradictions between the Commentary and the Vibhaṅga, this is a more controversial area, with two extremes of thought. One is to reject the Commentary entirely, as it is not the Buddha’s word, for modern historical scholarship has shown decisively that it contains material dating many hundreds of years after the Buddha’s passing away. The other extreme is to accept the Commentary as superseding the Vibhaṅga entirely, in line with the traditional belief that grew up around it: that it was composed at the First Council to express the true intent of those who composed the Vibhaṅga and yet somehow were unable to put what they really meant to say into the Canon itself. Although exponents of each extreme can cite traditional sources in their defense, neither extreme complies with the two sets of Great Standards—the one mentioned above, the other below—that the Buddha formulated for judging what is and is not allowable under the Vinaya, and what does and does not count as Dhamma-Vinaya in the first place.

In support of the first extreme, it is possible to cite the origin story to NP 15, which quotes the Buddha as saying, “What has not been formulated (as a rule) should not be formulated, and what has been formulated should not be rescinded, but one should dwell in conformity and in accordance with the rules that have been formulated.”

From this statement, it is possible to argue that the Commentary has no legislative authority at all. One of its most controversial aspects—and this applies to the Sub-commentary as well—is a tendency not only to explain passages in the Canon but also to extrapolate from them, assigning prohibitions and allowances in areas that the Canon did not cover. This would appear to be in violation of the above statement. However, we must remember that the rules formulated by the Buddha include not only prohibitions but also allowances. As the Dhamma-Vinaya has spread to many nations, encountering new cultures, and has endured over time, encountering new technologies, the question has often arisen: Is everything not allowed prohibited? Is everything not prohibited allowed? Either position carried to its extreme would create huge problems in the practice. To say that everything not allowed is prohibited would prevent bhikkhus from utilizing many harmless conveniences; to say that everything not prohibited is allowed would give countless defilements free rein.

The Buddha, however, had enough foresight to see that, over the course of many centuries, new situations would arise that had not existed in his lifetime, and there would be a need to extend the principles of the Vinaya to cover those situations as well. Thus, Mv.VI.40.1 reports that he established the following four guidelines for judgment—called the Great Standards (not to be confused with the Great Standards given in DN 16 and mentioned above)—for judging cases not mentioned in the rules:

“Bhikkhus, whatever I have not objected to, saying, ‘This is not allowable,’ if it conforms with what is not allowable, if it goes against [literally, “preempts”] what is allowable, that is not allowable for you.

“Whatever I have not objected to, saying, ‘This is not allowable,’ if it conforms with what is allowable, if it goes against what is not allowable, that is allowable for you.

“And whatever I have not permitted, saying, ‘This is allowable,’ if it conforms with what is not allowable, if it goes against what is allowable, that is not allowable for you.

“And whatever I have not permitted, saying, ‘This is allowable,’ if it conforms with what is allowable, if it goes against what is not allowable, that is allowable for you.”—Mv.VI.40.1

Thus it is easy to see that the Commentary and Sub-commentary, in extrapolating from the rules in the Canon to assign new prohibitions and allowances, are simply exercising their right to apply these Great Standards. The question in weighing these commentaries, then, is not whether they have the right to extrapolate from the Canon to formulate prohibitions and allowances, but whether they have applied these Standards in a wise and appropriate way. We ourselves will have recourse to these Standards in the course of this book, both to evaluate the judgments of the commentaries and to determine how the principles of Vinaya apply to new situations today.

The second extreme, however, argues that we have no right to pass judgment on the authority of the Commentary at all. This position, however, runs counter to the principle of consistency espoused in the Great Standards mentioned in DN 16 (and discussed above) for judging what is and isn’t the word of the Buddha. Just as variant readings in the Canon should be judged for consistency with what is already known of the Canon, explanations of the Canon given by later teachers have to be judged for their consistency with the known Canon as well.

This point is borne out by three important passages in the texts. One is the narrative of the Second Council, during which the bhikkhus of Vesālī defended ten practices on the grounds that they had learned them from their teachers. The elders who judged the case, though, insisted on evaluating the practices in terms of whether they adhered to the Canon. The primary point of controversy—the question of whose authority was greater, the Canon’s or the teachers’—was point six:

“‘The practice of what is habitual, sir—is it allowable?’

“‘What is the practice of what is habitual, my friend?’

“‘To practice (thinking), this is the way my preceptor habitually practiced; this is the way my teacher habitually practiced—is this allowable?’

“‘The practice of what is habitual is sometimes allowable, sometimes not.’”—Cv.XII.2.8

What this means, as the elders showed in their conduct of the meeting, is that one’s teacher’s and preceptor’s practices are to be followed only when in accordance with the Canon.

The second passage is the discussion of the Great Standards in the Commentary to DN 16, which concludes that the commentaries are to be accepted only where they are in agreement with the Canon. Apparently the teachers who compiled the ancient commentaries took a more modest view of their authority than did the elders of the Mahāvihāra at the time of Buddhaghosa, and did not pretend to supersede the Canon as the final word on what is and is not true Dhamma and Vinaya.

The third passage, a discussion in the Commentary to Pr 1, further elaborates this point by listing four levels of Vinaya, in descending order of authority: the level found in the Canon, the level based on the four Great Standards given in Mv.VI.40.1, the level found in the Commentary, and the level based on one’s personal opinion. Any disagreement among these sources, this passage notes, should be settled by siding with the opinion of the higher authority. Thus the Commentary to the Vinaya puts itself only on the third level of authority, adding that not all of the Commentary qualifies even for that level. The opinions of Vinaya experts after the first generation of commentators, even though included in the Commentary, count only as personal opinion. At present there is no way of knowing for sure which opinions are first-generation and which are not, although the opinions of Sri Lankan Vinaya experts named in the Commentary would obviously fall in the latter category.

Some may object that to pass judgment on the Commentary is to lack respect for the tradition, but actually it is because of respect for the compilers of the Vibhaṅga that I make the following assumptions in checking the Commentary against the Vibhaṅga:

1) The compilers of the Vibhaṅga were intelligent enough to be consistent within the discussion of each rule. Any explanation based on the premise that they were not consistent should give way to an explanation showing that they were.

2) The compilers were well enough acquainted with the contingencies surrounding each rule that they knew which factors were and were not crucial in determining what is and is not an offense. Any explanation that adds or subtracts factors from those mentioned in the Vibhaṅga should give way to one that follows the Vibhaṅga’s analysis. Also, any attempt to use the Great Standards in taking the explanations for one rule and applying them to override the explanations given for another rule should be rejected, inasmuch as those Standards are meant solely for issues where nothing has already been explicitly forbidden or allowed.

3) The compilers, in reporting the precedents in the Vinīta-vatthu—the cases the Buddha judged against an existing rule—were careful enough to include all the important factors bearing on the judgment. Any explanation that requires rewriting the precedents, adding extra details extraneous to the Vibhaṅga to account for the judgment, should give way to an explanation that can make sense out of the precedents as they are reported and in terms of the analyses presented elsewhere in the Vibhaṅga.

It’s not that I take any joy in arguing with the Commentary. In fact, wherever possible, I have been happy to give it the benefit of the doubt, and on many points I am very much in its debt. Still, now that Buddhism is coming to the West, I feel it is time to stop and take stock of the commentarial tradition and to check it against the earliest sources. This is especially important in a way of thought and life that, from the very beginning, has appealed to reason and investigation rather than to blindly accepted authority. In doing this, I am simply following a pattern that has repeated itself through the history of the Theravādin tradition: that of returning to the original principles whenever the religion reaches an historic turning point.

There is, of course, a danger in being too independent in interpreting the tradition, in that strongly held opinions can lead to disharmony in the Community. Thus in evaluating the Commentary against the Canon, I do not want to imply that my conclusions are the only ones possible. Important points may have slipped my attention or escaped my grasp. For this reason, even in instances where I think that the Commentary does not do justice to the Vibhaṅga, I have tried to give a faithful account of the important points from the Commentary so that those who wish to take it as their authority may still use this book as a guide. If there are any points on which I am mistaken, I would be pleased if knowledgeable people would correct me.

At the same time, I hope that this book will show that there are many areas on which the Vibhaṅga is unclear and lends itself to a variety of equally valid interpretations. For proof of this, we need only look at the various traditions that have developed in the different Theravādin countries, and even within each country. For some reason, people who may be very tolerant of different interpretations of the Dhamma can be very intolerant of different interpretations of the Vinaya, getting into heated arguments over minor issues having very little to do with the training of the mind.

I have tried to make the point throughout this book that any interpretation based on a sound reading of the Canon should be respected: that each bhikkhu should follow the interpretations of the Community in which he is living, as long as they do not conflict with the Canon, so as to avoid conflict over minor matters in daily life; and that he should also show respect for the differing interpretations of other Communities where they too do not conflict with the Canon, so as to avoid the pitfalls of pride and narrow-mindedness.

This is especially true now that monasteries of different nationalities are taking root in close proximity to one another in the West. In the past, Thais, Burmese, and Sri Lankans could look down on one another’s traditions without causing friction, as they lived in separate countries and spoke different languages. Now, however, we have become neighbors and have begun to speak common languages, so we must be especially careful not to waste what little time we have in the celibate life on minor disagreements.

My aim throughout this book has been practical. I have avoided dealing with academic issues concerning the authenticity and reliability of the tradition, and instead have tried simply to report and explain what the tradition has to say. Of course, I have had to be selective. Whatever the unconscious factors that have influenced my choice of material, the conscious considerations shaping this book are briefly as follows:

We are dealing primarily with rules, but rules are not the only way to express disciplinary norms, and the texts we are surveying express their norms in a variety of forms: as rules, principles, models, and virtues. The different forms are best suited for different purposes. Principles, models, and virtues are meant as personal, subjective standards and tend to be loosely defined. Their interpretation and application are left to the judgment of the individual. Rules are meant to serve as more objective standards. To work, they must be precisely defined in a way acceptable to the Community at large. The compilers of the Canon, recognizing this need, provided definitions for most of the terms in the rules, and the authors of the commentaries continued this task, carrying it out with even greater thoroughness. Thus much of this book, in reporting these texts, is concerned with the definition of terms.

This need for precision, though, accounts for the weakness of rules in general as universal guides to behavior. First, there is the question of where to draw the line between what is and is not an infraction of the rule. A clear break-off point is needed because rules—unlike principles—deal in two colors: black and white. In some cases, it is difficult to find a clear break-off point that corresponds exactly to one’s sense of what is right and wrong, and so it is necessary to include the areas of gray either with the white or the black. In general, but not always, the Vibhaṅga’s position is to include the gray with the white, and to rely on the principles of the Dhamma to encourage the individual bhikkhu to stay away from the gray.

Take, for instance, the rule against masturbation. The Vibhaṅga limits this rule to forbidding only those forms of masturbation that aim at ejaculation, for if it had drawn the line anywhere else, it would have become an offense for a bhikkhu simply to scratch himself. Thus self-stimulation that does not aim at ejaculation is not an offense, although in many cases it is clearly against the spirit of the Dhamma. The Vinaya-mukha notes, disapprovingly, a number of older Vinaya guides that like to dwell on these areas of gray and seem to delight in figuring out ways to avoid an offense by working around the letter of the rules. In this book I am taking a different tack: Under those rules that include large areas of gray with the white, I have noted a few relevant principles from the Dhamma to spell out a wise policy with regard to the gray areas—not to reformulate the rule, but simply as a reminder that, as noted above, the Vinaya without the Dhamma does not suffice as a guide to the goal.

Second, there is the drawback that a large body of rules demands two tactics of interpretation that can, on occasion, prove mutually exclusive. On the one hand there is the need for logical consistency in applying basic principles across all the rules so as to lend authority to the system as a whole, at the same time making it easy to understand and memorize. On the other hand there is the need to give reasonable weight to the particular constellation of factors surrounding each individual rule. The first approach runs the risk of sacrificing common sense and the human context of the rules; the second, the risk of appearing inconsistent and arbitrary. Although the compilers of the Vibhaṅga are consistent within the discussion of each rule, they take each rule on a case-by-case basis and do not always come to the same conclusions when analyzing rules that, on the surface, might seem to merit parallel treatment. In other words, when the demands of reasonableness conflict with the demands of logical consistency in a narrow sense, their consistency lies in consistently choosing the reasonable approach. Under the major rules, they provide enough examples in the Vinīta-vatthu to bolster the case for their interpretive strategy. Under the minor rules, they leave it to the reader to ponder their strategy for himself. This approach places heavy demands on each bhikkhu, in that a reasonable system is harder to memorize than a narrowly logical one, but in the long run it aids in the maturity and sensitivity of the bhikkhu who is willing to learn from the Vibhaṅga, and in the livability of the Vinaya as a whole.

A third drawback resulting from the need for precision in rules is that the more precisely a rule is defined to suit a particular time and place, the less well it may fit other times and places. The compilers of the Canon, in order to make up for this weakness, thus provided the origin stories and precedents to show the type of situation the rule was intended to prevent, providing principles and models that indicate the spirit of the rule and aid in applying it to differing contexts. In writing this book I have often made reference to these stories, to give this added dimension.

However, I have also found it important not to make the origin stories the principle guide in interpreting the rules, for in many cases the range of circumstances they cover is narrow, whereas the range of the rules they introduce is much broader. The first rule, for instance, was formulated when a bhikkhu had sex with a former wife, and was amended when another bhikkhu had sex with a monkey, but the rule is not limited to cases where monkeys and former wives are a bhikkhu’s partner in sex. In some instances—such as the origin story dealing with the establishment of the Invitation ceremony—the incidents leading up to the formulation of a rule were only tangentially connected to the rule; in others—such as the origin story for the establishment of the kaṭhina ceremony—the story reports no wrong-doing on anyone’s part. These indicate that in some cases the Buddha had specific rules in mind and was simply waiting for the slightest pretext to formulate them. Thus the origin stories can at most help fill in the blanks in the explanatory material. They can never be trusted as guides for overriding the explicit information that that material provides.

Admittedly, the stories do not always make for inspiring reading. For example, instead of reading about bhikkhus accepting a meal at a donor’s house and then uplifting the donor with a talk on Dhamma, we read about Ven. Udāyin accepting a meal at the dwelling of a bhikkhunī who was his former wife, and the two of them sitting there exposing their genitals to each other. Still, the stories do remind us that the more inspiring stories we read in the discourses took place in a very real human world, and they also reveal the insight and understated wit of those who framed and interpreted the rules. The element of wit here is especially important, for without it there is no true understanding of human nature, and no intelligent system of discipline.

Finally, in compiling this book, I have tried to include whatever seems most worth knowing for the bhikkhu who aims at fostering the qualities of discipline in his life—so as to help train his mind and live in peace with his fellow bhikkhus—and for anyone who wants to support and encourage the bhikkhus in that aim.

CHAPTER ONE

Pāṭimokkha

The Pāṭimokkha is available to us in several recensions, some in Indic languages, others in Tibetan or Chinese translations. However, of the Indic recensions, only one—the Pali—is still a living tradition, recited fortnightly and put into practice by Theravādin bhikkhus throughout the world. This is the recension translated and explained in this book.

The meaning of the term pāṭimokkha is a matter of conjecture. According to the Mahāvagga it means “the beginning, the head (or entrance—mukha), the foremost (pamukha) of skillful qualities” (Mv.II.3.4). The term serves as the name not only of the basic code of training rules, but also of a sermon in which the Buddha enumerated the basic principles common to the teachings of all Buddhas: “The non-doing of all evil, the performance of what is skillful, and the purification of one’s mind: This is the Buddhas’ message” (Dhp 183). Thus whatever the etymology of the term pāṭimokkha, it denotes a set of principles basic to the practice of the religion.

The basic code of training rules for bhikkhus, in its Pali recension, contains 227 rules divided into eight sections in accordance with the penalty assigned by each rule: pārājika, defeat; saṅghādisesa, formal meeting; aniyata, indefinite; nissaggiya pācittiya, forfeiture and confession; pācittiya, confession; pāṭidesanīya, acknowledgement; sekhiya, training; and adhikaraṇa-samatha, settling of issues. The following chapters will discuss the precise meanings of these terms.

Three of these terms, though, do not denote penalties. The aniyata rules give directions for judging uncertain cases; the sekhiya rules simply say, “(This is) a training to be followed,” without assigning a particular penalty for not following them; and the adhikaraṇa-samatha rules give procedures to follow in settling issues that may arise in the Community. Thus there are only five types of penalty mentioned in the Pāṭimokkha rules themselves, ranging from permanent expulsion from the Community to simple confession in the presence of another bhikkhu. None of the penalties, we should note, involve physical punishment of any kind. And we should further note that the purpose of undergoing the penalties is not somehow to absolve one from guilt or to erase any bad kamma one may incur by breaking the rules. Rather, the purpose is both personal and social: to strengthen one’s resolve to refrain from such behavior in the future, and to reassure one’s fellow bhikkhus that one is still serious about following the training.

In addition to the penalties directly mentioned in the rules, there are also penalties derived from the rules by the Vibhaṅga and commentaries. These derived penalties deal with two sorts of cases: 1) A bhikkhu tries to commit an action mentioned in one of the rules, but the action for one reason or another does not reach completion (e.g., he tries to kill a person, but the person doesn’t die). 2) A bhikkhu commits an action not directly covered in any rule, but similar to one that is (e.g., he strikes an unordained person, which is not directly covered in a rule, while the act of striking a bhikkhu is).

Penalties of this sort, when derived from the pārājika and saṅghādisesa rules, include thullaccaya (grave offense) and dukkaṭa (wrong doing); those derived from the nissaggiya pācittiya, pācittiya, and pāṭidesanīya rules—except for the rule against insults—include only the dukkaṭa. The penalties derived from the rule against insults include dubbhāsita (wrong speech) as well. As for the sekhiya rules, the Vibhaṅga states that to disobey any of them out of disrespect entails a dukkaṭa. All of these derived penalties may be cleared through confession.

There may, of course, be times when the assigned penalties are not enough to deter an unconscientious bhikkhu from committing an offense repeatedly. In such cases, the Community in which he is living may, if it sees fit, formally impose additional penalties on him as a means of bringing him into line. These transactions range from stripping him of some of the privileges of seniority, to banishment from that particular Community, and on to suspension from the Bhikkhu Saṅgha as a whole. In each case the punishment is temporary; if the bhikkhu realizes his errors and mends his ways, the Community is to revoke the act against him and return him to his former status. These punishments are treated in detail in BMC2, Chapter 20.

Thus, taken as a whole, the Vinaya’s system of penalties makes use of three basic principles—confession, forfeiture, and various degrees of ostracism from the Community—as means of enforcing the rules. To understand the wisdom of this system, it is important to realize how each of these principles is related to the practice of the Dhamma and the training of the mind.

Confession: There are several spots in the discourses (e.g., DN 2, MN 140) where the Buddha states, “It is a cause of growth in the Dhamma and discipline of the noble ones when, seeing a transgression (of one’s own) as a transgression, one makes amends in accordance with the Dhamma and exercises restraint in the future.” From the context each time the Buddha makes this statement, it is clear that “makes amends” means confessing one’s mistakes. In another passage (MN 61), the Buddha informs his son, Rāhula, that if one sees that one’s words or deeds have harmed oneself or others, one should confess them to a knowledgeable companion in the celibate life. All those who have purified their thoughts, words, and deeds in the past, all those who are doing so in the present, and all those who will do so in the future, he adds, have acted, are acting, and will act in just this way. In addition, one of the basic requisites for exerting oneself in the practice is that one not be fraudulent or deceitful, and that one declare oneself to one’s knowledgeable companions in the celibate life in line with one’s actual behavior (AN 5:53). Thus a willingness to confess one’s misdeeds is an essential factor in progress along the path.

Forfeiture, in most cases, is simply a symbolic adjunct to confession. One forfeits the object in question, confesses the offense, and then receives the object in return. In a few cases, though—where the object is improper for a bhikkhu to use or own—one must break it or forfeit it for good. In these cases, forfeiture serves as a check against greed and as a reminder of two essential principles—contentment with little and modesty—that the Buddha extolled to Mahāpajāpatī Gotamī (AN 8:53) as absolutely basic to the practice. In particular, AN 4:28 identifies contentment as one of the basic traditions of the noble ones, the essential culture of the religion as a whole.

Ostracism: In a famous passage (SN 45:2), the Buddha tells Ven. Ānanda, “Admirable friendship, admirable companionship, admirable camaraderie is the entirety of the celibate life. When a bhikkhu has admirable people as friends, companions, and comrades, he can be expected to develop and pursue the noble eightfold path.” Thus one of the few things a bhikkhu serious about the practice would naturally fear would be to be ostracized by the well-behaved members of the Community, for that would be a true barrier to his spiritual progress. This fear would then help deter him from any action that might entail such ostracism.

In this way, the Vinaya’s system of penalties provides rehabilitation for offenders and deterrence against offenses—with confession the means of rehabilitation, and ostracism the deterrent—growing directly out of principles basic to the practice of the Dhamma.

Offenses

In analyzing offenses for the purpose of determining penalties, the Vibhaṅga divides an action into five factors: the effort, the perception under which it is made, the intention motivating it, the object at which it is aimed, and the result. In some of the rules, all five factors play a role in determining what is and is not a full offense. In others, only two, three, or four play a role. For example, under the pārājika rule forbidding murder, all five factors have to be present for a full offense: The object has to be a human being, the bhikkhu has to perceive him/her as a living being, he has to have murderous intent, he has to make an effort for the person to die, and the person has to die.

If any of these factors is missing, the penalty changes. For instance, object: If the bhikkhu kills a dog, the penalty is a pācittiya. Perception: If he cremates a friend, thinking that the friend is dead, then even if the friend is actually alive but severely comatose, the bhikkhu incurs no penalty. Intention: If he accidentally drops a rock on a person standing below him, he incurs no penalty even if the person dies. Effort: If he sees a person fall into the river but makes no effort to save the person, he incurs no penalty even if the person drowns. Result: If he tries to kill a person, but only succeeds in injuring him, he incurs a thullaccaya.

In some rules, though, the factors of intention, perception, and result do not make any difference in determining offenses. For example, if a bhikkhu is sleeping alone in a room and a woman comes in and lies down in the room with him, he incurs the pācittiya for lying down in the same lodging as a woman even though his intention was to lie down alone and he was unaware of her presence. A bhikkhu who drinks a glass of wine, thinking it to be grape juice, incurs the pācittiya for taking an intoxicant all the same. A bhikkhu who tries to frighten another bhikkhu incurs a pācittiya regardless of whether the other bhikkhu is actually frightened.

Of these factors, intention is the most variable. Under some rules, it deals simply with the issue of whether the bhikkhu’s action was fully deliberate. In others, it deals with the impulse, the mental state, e.g., anger or lust, impelling his action. In others, it deals with the immediate aim of this action; in others, with the underlying motive that the immediate aim is intended to serve. In still others, it deals with combinations of any of these four.

Another variation is that in rules where a bhikkhu may be put into a passive role in committing an act that would fulfill the factor of effort, the factor of intention is changed to consent: mental acquiescence to the act combined with a physical or verbal expression of that acquiescence. Under some rules, such as the rule against sexual intercourse, simply letting the act happen counts as physical acquiescence even if one lies perfectly still, and the question of whether one incurs a penalty depends entirely on the state of one’s mind. Under other rules, though—such as the rule against lustful contact with a woman, which includes cases where the woman is the agent making the contact—simply lying still is not enough to count as a physical sign of acquiescence, and even if one consents mentally, say, to a woman’s fondling, one would incur a penalty only if one says something or responds with a physical movement to her action.

Because of the many variations possible in the factor of intention, it might be argued that it should be consistently divided into such sub-factors as presence or absence of deliberation, impulse, immediate aim, and motive. However, the Vibhaṅga itself is not consistent in distinguishing among these four. Under Pr 3 and Sg 1, for instance, it clearly distinguishes among them, in that impulse and motive play no part in determining the offense in question, whereas deliberation and immediate aim do. Under Sg 8 and 9, however, the impulse—anger—is conflated under motive: the desire to see another bhikkhu expelled from the Saṅgha. In fact, under most rules the Vibhaṅga does not make a clear distinction among these sub-factors, so it seems artificial to force a consistent distinction throughout. Thus the approach followed here is to place these considerations under one heading—intention—and to alert the reader to the distinctions among them only when important.

The factor of effort is basic to every rule and is also used to determine offenses in cases where a bhikkhu intends to break a rule but does not complete the action. For instance, in the case of stealing, the efforts involved are said to begin when, acting under the intent to steal, a bhikkhu gets dressed and starts walking to the object. With each of these preliminary efforts—literally, with every step—he incurs a dukkaṭa. At first glance, this may seem extreme, but when we view his state of mind as having ultimate importance, this system of assigning penalties is appropriate. Every step intentionally taken toward an offense reinforces an unskillful state of mind; the knowledge that each of these steps incurs an additional offense may help deter a bhikkhu from his original plans.

Thus it is important, when reading about each training rule, to pay attention to what role these five factors play in determining the offenses related to the rule. And, of course, it is important for each bhikkhu to pay attention to all five of these factors in all of his actions to make sure that he does not fall at any time into an offense. This is where training in discipline becomes part of the training of the mind leading to Awakening. A bhikkhu who is mindful to analyze his actions into these five factors, to be alert to them as they arise, and to behave consistently in such a manner that he avoids committing any offenses, is developing three qualities: mindfulness; an analytical attitude toward phenomena in his thoughts, words, and deeds; and persistence in abandoning unskillful qualities and developing skillful ones within himself. These are the first three of the seven factors for Awakening, and form the basis for the remaining four: rapture, tranquility, concentration, and equanimity.

Pv.VI.4, in reviewing the Vibhaṅga’s five factors for analyzing offenses, devises a number of categories for classifying offenses, the most important being the distinction between rules carrying a penalty only when broken intentionally through correct perception (sacittaka), and those carrying a penalty even when broken unintentionally or through misperception (acittaka).

Although it may seem harsh to impose penalties for unintentional actions, we must again reflect on the state of mind that leads to such actions. In some acts, of course, the intention makes all the difference between guilt and innocence. Taking an article with intent to return it, for example, is something else entirely from taking it with intent to steal. There are, however, other acts with damaging consequences that, when performed unintentionally, reveal carelessness and lack of circumspection in areas where a person may reasonably be held responsible. Many of the rules dealing with the proper care of Community property and one’s basic requisites fall in this category. Except for one very unlikely situation, though, none of the major rules carry a penalty if broken unintentionally, while the minor rules that do carry such penalties may be regarded as useful lessons in mindfulness.

Another scheme introduced in the ancient commentaries for classifying offenses is the distinction between those that the world criticizes (loka-vajja) and those that only the rules criticize (paṇṇati-vajja). The Commentary defines this distinction by saying that the term loka-vajja applies to rules that can be broken only with an unskillful state of mind (i.e., greed, anger, or delusion), whereas paṇṇati-vajja applies to rules that can be broken with a skillful state of mind. It notes that one way to classify a particular rule under either category is to note how the Buddha changed it if he took the opportunity to amend it. If he made the rule more stringent—as in the case of Pr 3, against killing human beings—offenses against the rule are loka-vajja. If he made the rule more lax—as in the case of Pc 57, against overly frequent bathing—offenses against the rule are paṇṇati-vajja.

The Vinaya-mukha redefines the terms as follows:

“Some offenses are faults as far as the world is concerned—wrong and damaging even if committed by ordinary people who are not bhikkhus—examples being robbery and murder, as well as such lesser faults as assault and verbal abuse. Offenses of this sort are termed loka-vajja. There are also offenses that are faults only as far as the Buddha’s ordinances are concerned—neither wrong nor damaging if committed by ordinary people; wrong only if committed by bhikkhus, on the grounds that they run counter to the Buddha’s ordinances. Offenses of this sort are termed paṇṇati-vajja.”

Even a cursory glance at the Pāṭimokkha rules will show that many of them deal with the latter sort of offense, and that such offenses concern relatively minor matters. The question often arises, then: Why this concern with minutiae? The answer is that the rules deal with social relationships—among the bhikkhus themselves and between the bhikkhus and the laity—and that social relationships are often defined by seemingly minor points of behavior.

Take, for instance, the rule that a bhikkhu not eat food unless it is handed to him or to a fellow bhikkhu by an unordained person on that day. This rule has wide-ranging ramifications. It means, among other things, that a bhikkhu may not leave human society to lead a solitary hermit’s existence, foraging for food on his own. He must have frequent contact with humanity, however minimal, and in that contact he performs a service to others, even if simply offering them a noble example of conduct and giving them an opportunity to develop the virtue of generosity. Many of the other seemingly trivial rules—such as those forbidding digging in the soil and damaging plant life—will reveal, on reflection, implications of a similar scope.

Thus the extremely detailed nature of the rules cannot be attributed to a strictly legalist temperament. And from what we have seen of the way in which the Buddha formulated the rules—dealing with cases as they arose—there is reason to doubt that he himself wanted them to form an airtight system. This impression is explicitly borne out by several passages in the Canon. Take, for instance, this discourse:

“On one occasion the Blessed One was living in Vesālī, in the Great Wood. Then a certain Vajjian bhikkhu went to him… and said: ‘Venerable sir, this recitation of more than 150 training rules comes every fortnight. I cannot train in reference to them.’

“‘Bhikkhu, can you train in reference to the three trainings: the training in heightened virtue, the training in heightened mind, the training in heightened discernment?’

“‘Yes, venerable sir, I can….’

“‘Then train in reference to those three trainings…. Your passion, aversion, and delusion—when trained in heightened virtue, heightened mind, and heightened discernment will be abandoned. You—with the abandoning of passion… aversion… delusion—will not do anything unskillful or engage in any evil.’

“Later on, that bhikkhu trained in heightened virtue… heightened mind… heightened discernment…. His passion… aversion… delusion were abandoned…. He did not do anything unskillful or engage in any evil.”—AN 3:85

Another discourse with a similar point:

“‘Bhikkhus, this recitation of more than 150 training rules comes every fortnight, in reference to which sons of good families desiring the goal train themselves. There are these three trainings under which all that is gathered. Which three? The training in heightened virtue, the training in heightened mind, the training in heightened discernment….

“‘There is the case, bhikkhus, where a bhikkhu is wholly accomplished in virtue, concentration, and discernment (i.e., is an arahant). With reference to the lesser and minor training rules, he falls into offenses and rehabilitates himself. Why is that? Because I have not declared that to be a disqualification in these circumstances. But as for the training rules that are basic to the celibate life and proper to the celibate life, he is one whose virtue is permanent, whose virtue is steadfast. Having undertaken them, he trains in reference to the training rules. With the ending of (mental) effluents, he dwells in the effluent-free awareness-release and discernment-release, having directly known and realized them for himself right in the here-and-now.

“‘Those who are partially accomplished attain a part; those who are wholly accomplished, the whole. The training rules, I tell you, are not in vain.’”—AN 3:88

CHAPTER TWO

Nissaya

The Dhamma and Vinaya impinge in such detail on so many areas of one’s life that no new bhikkhu can be expected to master them in a short time. For this reason, the Buddha arranged for a period of apprenticeship—called nissaya, or dependence—in which every newly ordained bhikkhu must train under the guidance of an experienced bhikkhu for at least five years before he can be considered competent to look after himself.

This apprenticeship has formed the human context in which the practice of the Buddha’s teachings has been passed down for the past 2,600 years. To overlook it is to miss one of the basic parameters of the life of the Dhamma and Vinaya. Thus we will discuss it here first, before going on to the individual training rules of the Pāṭimokkha.

Dependence is of two sorts: dependence on one’s preceptor (upajjhāya) and dependence on a teacher (ācariya). The relationships are similar—and in many details, identical—so the following discussion will use the word mentor to cover both preceptor and teacher wherever the pattern applies to both, and will distinguish them only where the patterns differ.

Choosing a mentor

Before ordination, one must choose a bhikkhu to act as one’s preceptor. The Mahāvagga (I.36-37) gives a long list of qualifications a bhikkhu must meet before he can act as a preceptor, while the Commentary divides the list into two levels: ideal and minimal qualifications. A bhikkhu who lacks the minimal qualifications incurs a dukkaṭa if he acts as a preceptor; a bhikkhu who meets the minimal but lacks the ideal qualifications is not an ideal person to give guidance, but he incurs no penalty in doing so.

The ideal qualifications: The preceptor should have an arahant’s virtue, concentration, discernment, release, and knowledge and vision of release; and should be able to train another person to the same level of attainment. He should have faith, a sense of shame, a sense of compunction (in the American sense of the term, i.e., an reluctance to do wrong for fear of its consequences), persistence in the practice, and quick mindfulness (according to the Sub-commentary, this means that he is constantly mindful of whatever mental object is before the mind). He should be free of heavy and light offenses, and be possessed of right view. (This last point, the Commentary says, means that he does not adhere to the extremes of eternalism or annihilationism.) He should be competent to tend to a sick pupil or to find someone who will tend to him, and to dispel dissatisfaction in a pupil who wants to leave the celibate life.

The Mahāvagga does not say outright that these are ideal, as opposed to minimal, qualifications, but the Commentary offers as proof the fact that one of a pupil’s duties is to try to allay any dissatisfaction that may arise in his preceptor. If all preceptors were arahants, no case of this sort would ever arise and there would be no need to mention it. Thus the Commentary concludes that arahantship, although ideal in a preceptor, is not necessary.

The minimal qualifications: The preceptor must be learned and competent. According to the Commentary, this means that he knows enough of the Dhamma and Vinaya to govern a following and is competent enough to know what is and is not an offense. He must also be competent enough to allay, in line with the Dhamma, any anxiety that has arisen in his pupil; must know what is and is not an offense, what is a light offense, what is a heavy offense, and how an offense may be removed. He must have detailed knowledge of both Pāṭimokkhas (the one for the bhikkhus and the one for the bhikkhunīs) and be able to train the pupil in the bhikkhus’ customs (Com.: this means that he knows the Khandhakas), in the basic rules of the chaste life (Sub-com.: he knows both Vibhaṅgas), the higher Dhamma, and the higher Vinaya. He must be able, in line with the Dhamma, to pry his pupil away from a wrong view or to find someone who will help pry him away. And—the most basic requirement—he must have been ordained as a bhikkhu for ten years or more.

If, for some reason, the new bhikkhu lives in a separate monastery from his preceptor, he must take dependence under a teacher, whose qualifications are precisely the same as those for a preceptor. Because the Mahāvagga (I.72.1) gives a dukkaṭa for taking dependence under an unconscientious bhikkhu, the new bhikkhu is allowed four to five days to observe his potential teacher’s conduct before taking dependence under him (Mv.I.72.2).

Taking dependence

Prior to his ordination—and usually, as part of the ceremony itself—the candidate must make a formal request for dependence from his preceptor. The procedure is as follows:

Arranging his upper robe over his left shoulder, leaving his right shoulder bare, he bows down to the preceptor and then, kneeling with his hands palm-to-palm over his heart, repeats the following passage three times:

Upajjhāyo me bhante hohi,

which means, “Venerable sir, be my preceptor.”

If the preceptor responds with any of these words—sāhu (very well), lahu (certainly), opāyikaṁ (all right), paṭirūpaṁ (it is proper), or pāsādikena sampādehi (attain consummation (in the practice) in an amicable way)—the dependence has taken hold. Mv.I.25.7 adds that if the preceptor indicates any of these meanings by gesture, that also counts; and according to the Commentary, the same holds true if he makes any equivalent statement.

If, after his ordination, the new bhikkhu needs to request dependence from a teacher, the procedure is the same, except that the request he makes three times is this:

Ācariyo me bhante hohi; āyasmato nissāya vacchāmi,

which means, “Venerable sir, be my teacher; I will live in dependence on you.” (Mv.I.32.2)

Duties

The Mahāvagga (I.25.6; 32.1) states that a pupil should regard his mentor as a father; and the mentor, the pupil as his son. It then goes on to delineate this relationship as a set of reciprocal duties.

The pupil’s duties to his mentor

The pupil’s duties to his mentor fall into the following five categories:

 1. Attending to the mentor’s personal needs. The Mahāvagga goes into great detail on this topic, giving precise instructions dealing with every conceivable way a pupil can be of service to his mentor. The Vinaya-mukha tries to reduce these duties to a few general principles, but this misses much of what the Mahāvagga has to offer, for the details are what show fine examples of mindfulness in action—the best way to fold a robe, clean a dwelling, and so forth—as well as indications of how one can use this aspect of one’s training to develop sensitivity to the needs of others. Still, the detailed instructions are so extensive that they would overburden the discussion in this chapter, so I have saved them for Appendix X. Here I will simply give them in outline form. The pupil should:

a. Arrange his mentor’s toiletries for his morning wash-up.

b. Arrange his seat and food for his morning conjey (if he has any) and clean up after he is finished.

c. Arrange his robes and bowl for his alms round.

d. Follow him on his alms round, if the mentor so desires, and take his robes and bowl when he returns.

e. Arrange his seat and food for his alms meal and clean up afterwards.

f. Prepare his bath. If he goes to the sauna, go with him and attend to his needs.

g. Study the Dhamma and Vinaya from him when he is prepared to teach. (The Mahāvagga describes this as “recitation” and “interrogation.” Recitation, according to the Commentary, means learning to memorize passages; interrogation, learning to investigate their meaning.)

h. Clean his dwelling and other parts of his dwelling complex, such as the restroom and storage rooms, when they get dirty.

2. Assisting the mentor in any problems he may have with regard to the Dhamma and Vinaya. The Mahāvagga lists the following examples:

a. If the mentor begins to feel dissatisfaction with the celibate life, the pupil should try to allay that dissatisfaction or find someone else who can, or give him a Dhamma talk.

b. If the preceptor begins to feel anxiety over his conduct with regard to the rules, the pupil should try to dispel that anxiety or find someone else who can, or give him a Dhamma talk.

c. If the preceptor begins to hold to wrong views, the pupil should try to pry him away from those views or find someone else who can, or give him a Dhamma talk.

d. If the preceptor has committed a saṅghādisesa offense, the pupil should—to the best of his ability—help with the arrangements for penance, probation, and rehabilitation, or find someone else who can.

e. If the Community is going to carry out a transaction against the mentor, the pupil should try to dissuade them from it. According to the Commentary, this means that he should go to the various members of the Community individually before the meeting and try to dissuade them from going through with the transaction. If he can’t dissuade them, he should try to get them to lessen its severity (say, from banishment to censure). If they are justified in carrying out the transaction, though, he should not object while the meeting is in progress. Once they have carried out the transaction, he should concentrate on helping his mentor behave so that they will rescind the transaction as quickly as possible.

3. Washing, making, and dyeing the mentor’s robes.

4. Showing loyalty and respect for the mentor.

a. The pupil should neither give nor receive gifts, nor give or receive services to/from others without first obtaining the mentor’s permission. According to the Commentary, others here means people who are on bad terms with the mentor.

b. The pupil should obtain his mentor’s permission before entering a village, going to a cemetery (to meditate, says, the Commentary), or leaving the district in which they live. The Commentary notes, though, that if the mentor refuses one’s request the first time, one should ask up to two more times, presenting one’s reasons as best one can. If the mentor still refuses, the pupil should reflect on his situation. If staying with the mentor is not helping his education and meditation, and if the mentor seems to want him to stay simply to have someone to look after his (the mentor’s) needs, the pupil is justified in leaving and taking dependence with a new mentor in his new residence.

5. Caring for the mentor when he falls ill, not leaving him until he either recovers or passes away (Mv.I.25).

According to the Commentary, a pupil is freed from these duties when he is ill. Otherwise, he should observe all the above duties to his preceptor as long as he is in dependence on him. It adds that the duties in sections 1-3 are incumbent on the pupil even after he is released from dependence, as long as both he and the preceptor are alive and still ordained, although not every Community follows the Commentary on this point.

As for the duties to one’s teacher, the Commentary lists four types of teachers: the going-forth teacher (the one who gives one the ten precepts during one’s ordination ceremony); the acceptance teacher (the one who chants the motion and proclamations during the ceremony); the Dhamma teacher (the one who teaches one the Pali language and Canon); and the dependence teacher (the one with whom one lives in dependence). With the dependence teacher and Dhamma teacher, one must observe all the above duties only as long as one is living in dependence on him. As for the other two, the Commentary adds that one should observe sections 1-3 as long as both parties are alive and still ordained—although, again, not all Communities follow the Commentary on this point.

The Commentary adds that if the mentor already has a pupil performing these duties for him, he may inform his remaining pupils that they need not take them on. This exempts them from having to observe them. If he neglects to do this, the pupil who is performing the duties may inform his fellows that he will take responsibility for looking after the mentor. This also exempts them. Otherwise, they incur a dukkaṭa for every duty they neglect to perform.

The mentor’s duties to his pupil

1. Furthering the pupil’s education, teaching him the Dhamma and Vinaya through recitation, interrogation, exhortation, and instruction.

2. Providing requisites for the pupil. If the pupil lacks any of his basic requisites, and the mentor has any to spare, he should make up the lack.

3. Attending to the pupil’s personal needs when he is ill, performing the services mentioned in section 1 under the pupil’s duties to his mentor.

4. Assisting the pupil in any problems he may have with regard to the Dhamma and Vinaya, performing the services mentioned in section 2 under the pupil’s duties to his mentor.

5. Teaching the pupil how to wash, make, and dye robes. If for some reason the pupil is unable to handle these skills, the mentor should try to find some way to get these tasks done.

6. Caring for the pupil when he falls ill, not leaving him until he either recovers or passes away (Mv.I.26).

According to the Commentary, the preceptor, going-forth teacher, and acceptance teacher must observe these duties toward the pupil as long as both parties are alive and still ordained. As for the Dhamma and dependence teachers, they must observe these duties only as long as the pupil is living with them.

Dismissal

If the pupil does not observe his duties to his mentor, the mentor is empowered to dismiss him. In fact, if the pupil deserves dismissal, the mentor incurs a dukkaṭa if for some reason he does not dismiss him, just as he would for dismissing a pupil who did not deserve it (Mv.I.27.5-8). The grounds for dismissal are any of the following five:

1. The pupil has no affection for his mentor—i.e., he shows him no kindness.

2. He has no faith in his mentor—i.e., he does not regard him as an example to follow.

3. He has no shame in front of his mentor—i.e., he openly disregards the training rules in his mentor’s presence.

4. He has no respect for his mentor—i.e., he does not listen to what the mentor has to say and openly disobeys him.

5. He is not developing under his mentor—the Commentary translates developing here as developing a sense of good will for his mentor, but it could also mean developing in his general education and practice of the Dhamma and Vinaya.

The Vinaya-mukha notes that the mentor should reflect on his own conduct before dismissing such a pupil. If he has done anything that would give the pupil valid reason for losing affection, etc., he should first correct his own conduct. Only after reflecting that there is no longer anything in his own conduct that would give the pupil valid reason to disregard him should he go ahead with the dismissal.

The Mahāvagga mentions each of the following statements as a valid means of dismissal: “I dismiss you.” “Don’t come back here.” “Take away your robes and bowl.” “Don’t attend to me.” It also states that if the mentor makes any of these meanings known by gesture—e.g., he evicts the pupil from his quarters and throws his robes and bowl out after him—that also counts as a valid means of dismissal (Mv.I.27.2). The Commentary to Mv.I.32 adds that any statement conveying the same basic meaning as those above would count as well.

Once a pupil has been dismissed, his duty is to apologize. If he doesn’t, he incurs a dukkaṭa (Mv.I.27.3). Once the pupil has apologized, the mentor’s duty is to forgive him (Mv.I.27.4). If, however, he sees that the pupil is still unconscientious, he should not take him back, for a mentor who takes on an unconscientious pupil incurs a dukkaṭa (Mv.I.72.1). Thus the mentor may, if he sees fit, inflict a non-physical punishment on the pupil before taking him back on the original footing, to make sure that he has actually seen the error of his ways. An example of such punishment, mentioned in the Vinaya-mukha, is simply asking to wait to observe the pupil’s behavior for a while to test whether his apology is sincere.

The Commentary to Mv.I.32 recommends that if the mentor refuses to forgive the pupil, the latter should try to get other bhikkhus in the monastery to intercede for him. If that doesn’t work, he should go stay in another monastery and take dependence under a senior bhikkhu there who is on congenial terms with the mentor, in hopes that the mentor will take this as a sign of the pupil’s good intentions and will eventually grant his forgiveness. If for some reason the pupil cannot stay at that other monastery, he may return to his original monastery and take dependence under another teacher.

Dependence lapses

Mv.I.36.1 says that if a pupil is staying in dependence with his preceptor, the dependence lapses in any of the following scenarios:

1. He leaves. According to the Commentary, this means that he moves from the monastery, and that dependence lapses regardless of whether he gives notice of his move. The Sub-commentary adds that “moving” here can mean even spending one night outside the monastery, and that dependence lapses regardless of whether he plans to return.

2. He disrobes.

3. He dies.

4. He goes over to another side—according to the Commentary, this means that he joins another religion.

In all of the above cases, the commentaries interpret “he” as referring to the preceptor, although it would seem to refer to the pupil as well. This would fit with the passages from the Mahāvagga, to be mentioned below, that refer to a new bhikkhu on a journey as not being in dependence. In such cases, the new bhikkhu is most likely the one who has left the preceptor, and his leaving is what has caused the dependence to lapse.

5. He gives a command. This is the one alternative where “he” clearly refers only to the preceptor. The Commentary to Mv.I.34 interprets command here as dismissal, as discussed above, but also as including cases where the preceptor sees that the pupil qualifies to be released from dependence (see below) and tells him so.

In each of these cases, a pupil who is not yet released from dependence must find someone else to take dependence under on that very day, except in the following instances (taken from the Commentary):

—The preceptor leaves, saying that he will be away only for a day or two, and that the pupil need not ask anyone else for dependence in the meantime. If the preceptor’s return is delayed, he should send word to his pupil, saying that he still intends to come back. If, however, the pupil receives word from his preceptor that the latter no longer intends to return, he should immediately look for a teacher under whom to take dependence.

—The preceptor leaves, and the only other senior bhikkhu in the monastery is one whom the pupil does not know well. In this case, the pupil is allowed four or five days to observe the senior bhikkhu’s behavior (as mentioned above) before requesting dependence from him. If, though, the pupil already knows the senior bhikkhu well enough to feel confident in his conduct, he should take dependence with him on the day of his preceptor’s departure.

If the pupil is staying in dependence on a teacher, the dependence can lapse for any of six reasons. The first five are identical with those above, although even the Commentary states that “he leaves,” the first reason, applies not only to cases where the teacher leaves but also to cases where the pupil leaves. The sixth reason is:

6. The pupil rejoins his preceptor. The Commentary explains this by saying that, in effect, the pupil’s original dependence on his preceptor always overrides his dependence on a teacher. If the pupil happens to see his preceptor and recognize him, or to hear and recognize his voice—even if they just happen to pass on the street—his dependence on his teacher automatically lapses, and his dependence on his preceptor is reinstated. If he then returns to live with his teacher, he must ask for dependence from the teacher all over again.

The Vinaya-mukha objects to this judgment, saying that “rejoins the preceptor” should refer to the pupil’s actually living with the preceptor, either in another monastery or in the same monastery where the teacher lives. This, however, is an area where different Communities differ in their interpretation, and the wise policy is to follow the interpretation of the Community in which one lives.

Temporary exemption from dependence

Normally a junior bhikkhu is required to live in dependence under a mentor at all times. However, Mv.I.73 allows him not to take dependence when living in any of the following situations if no qualified bhikkhu is available as a mentor:

1. He is on a journey.

2. He is ill.

3. He is caring for an ill person who has requested his help (§).

4. He is living alone in the wilderness, meditating comfortably, intending to take dependence if a qualified mentor comes along.

The Commentary, in discussing these allowances, makes the following points:

A bhikkhu on a journey is said to have no mentor available if no qualified senior bhikkhu is traveling with him. In other words, the fact that he happens to pass by a monastery containing a qualified mentor does not mean that a mentor is available, and he is allowed to continue traveling without taking dependence. If, however, he spends the night in a place where he has taken dependence before, he should take dependence on the day of his arrival. If he reaches a place where he has never been before and plans to spend only two or three days, he need not take dependence; but if he plans to spend a week, he must. If the senior bhikkhu he requests dependence from says, “What’s the use of taking dependence for only a week?” that exempts him from this requirement.

As for the bhikkhu living alone in the wilderness, the Commentary says that “meditating comfortably” means that his tranquility and insight meditation are going smoothly. For some reason, though, it says that this allowance applies only to bhikkhus whose meditation is at a tender stage and might deteriorate if they were to leave the wilderness; if a bhikkhu has attained any of the noble attainments—beginning with stream-entry—he may not make use of this allowance. Why the Commentary limits the allowance in this way, it doesn’t say.

At any rate, once the month before the Rains-residence (vassa) arrives and no suitable mentor appears, the junior bhikkhu must leave his wilderness abode and look for a place with a suitable mentor under whom he can take dependence for the Rains.

Release from dependence

According to Mv.I.53.4, a bhikkhu may be released from dependence after he has been ordained for five years, on the condition that he be experienced and competent. If he is not yet experienced and competent, he must remain under dependency until he is. If he never becomes experienced and competent, he must remain in dependence for his entire life as a bhikkhu. The Commentary adds that, in the last case, if he cannot find a competent experienced bhikkhu who is senior to him, he must take dependence with a competent, experienced bhikkhu who is his junior.

To be considered competent and experienced enough to deserve release from dependence, a bhikkhu must meet many of the same general qualifications as those for a mentor, except that he need not possess the competence to look after a pupil, and the minimum number of years he needs as a bhikkhu is five. None of the texts divide the qualifications here into ideal and minimal qualifications, as they do for the mentor, but it seems reasonable that the same division would apply here as well. This would give us the following list:

The ideal qualifications: The bhikkhu should have an arahant’s virtue, concentration, discernment, release, and knowledge and vision of release. He should have faith, a sense of shame, compunction, persistence in the practice, and quick mindfulness. He should be free of heavy and light offenses, and possess right view.

The minimal qualifications: The bhikkhu must be learned and intelligent, knowing both Pāṭimokkhas in detail, understanding what is and is not an offense, what is a light offense, what is a heavy offense, and how an offense may be removed. And—the most basic requirement—he must have been ordained as a bhikkhu for at least five years (Mv.I.53.5-13).

The Commentary to Mv.I.53, in explaining learned, refers to the definition of the term given by the Commentary to Pc 21, which says that a learned bhikkhu must have memorized:

1. Both Pāṭimokkhas (for the bhikkhus and bhikkhunīs).

2. The Four Bhāṇavāras—a set of auspicious chants that are still regularly memorized in Sri Lanka as the Mahā-parit poṭha.

3. A discourse that is helpful as a guide for sermon-giving. (The Commentary lists as examples the Mahā-Rāhulovāda Sutta (MN 62), the Andhakavinda Sutta (AN 5:114), and the Ambaṭṭha Sutta (DN 3).)

4. Three kinds of anumodanā (rejoicing in the merit of others) chants: for meals; for auspicious merit-making ceremonies, such as blessing a house; and for non-auspicious ceremonies, i.e., any relating to a death.

The Commentary adds that he must also know the rules for such Community transactions as the Pāṭimokkha recitation and the Invitation at the end of the Rains-residence, and be acquainted with themes for tranquility and insight meditation leading to arahantship.

This definition of learned is not universally accepted, and some traditions have reworked it. As this is another area where different Communities have different interpretations, the wise policy is to adhere to the practice followed in one’s Community, as long as it follows the basic requirements in the Canon, mentioned above.

Once a pupil has been released from dependence, the Commentary states that he need no longer perform the duties mentioned in sections 4 and 5 under the pupil’s duties to his mentor.

Return to dependence

The Cullavagga (I.9-12) states that a bhikkhu released from dependence may be forced, by a Community transaction—called either a demotion transaction (niyasa-kamma) or a dependence transaction (nissaya-kamma)—to return to dependence if his conduct is so bad as to warrant it. The qualifying factors are:

1. He is ignorant and inexperienced.

2. He is indiscriminately full of offenses (§).

3. He lives in unbecoming association with lay people.

If these factors apply to a bhikkhu to the extent that the Community is “fed up with granting him probation, sending him back to the beginning, imposing penance, and rehabilitating him”—these terms refer to the procedures for dealing with a bhikkhu who has committed repeated saṅghādisesa offenses (see Chapter 5)—then the Community is justified in imposing a demotion (or dependence) transaction (see BMC2, Chapter 20). This is similar to a “further punishment” transaction, to be discussed in Chapter 11 of this volume, and carries the same penalties with the additional penalty that the bhikkhu must live in dependence under a mentor as long as the transaction is in effect. If he mends his ways to the Community’s satisfaction, they may rescind the transaction and return his independence.

*    *    *

As mentioned above, the Commentary states that regardless of whether a pupil is under dependence or released from it, he is still expected to observe certain duties to his preceptor—and his preceptor, certain duties to him—as long as both are alive and ordained. This is in line with the fact that they are always to regard each other as father and son: The preceptor is to take a continuing interest in his pupil’s welfare, and the pupil is to show his continuing gratitude for the initiation his preceptor has given him into the bhikkhu’s life.

CHAPTER THREE

Disrobing

The first rule in the Pāṭimokkha opens with the statement that it—and, by extension, every other rule in the Pāṭimokkha—applies to all bhikkhus who have not disrobed by renouncing the training and returning to the lay life. Thus the Vibhaṅga begins its explanations by discussing what does and does not count as a valid act of disrobing. Because this is, in effect, the escape clause for all the rules, I am discussing it first as a separate chapter, for if a bhikkhu disrobes in an invalid manner, he still counts as a bhikkhu and is subject to the rules whether he realizes it or not. If he then were to break any of the pārājika rules, he would be disqualified from ever becoming a bhikkhu again in this lifetime.

To disrobe, a bhikkhu with firm intent states in the presence of a witness words to the effect that he is renouncing the training. The validity of the act depends on four factors:

1. The bhikkhu’s state of mind.

2. His intention.

3. His statement.

4. The witness to his statement.

State of mind

The bhikkhu must be in his right mind. Any statement he makes while insane, delirious with pain, or possessed by spirits does not count.

Intention

He must seriously desire to leave the Community. If, without actually intending to disrobe, he makes any of the statements usually used for disrobing, it does not count as an act of disrobing. For example, if he makes the statement in jest or is telling someone else how to disrobe, the fact that he mentions the words does not mean that he has disrobed. Also, if he is forced against his will to make a statement of disrobing, or if he says one thing and means something else—e.g., he makes a slip of the tongue—that too does not count.

The statement

The Vibhaṅga lists a wide variety of statements that one may use to renounce the training, following two basic patterns. The first pattern follows the form, “I renounce x,” where x may be replaced with the Buddha, the Dhamma, the Saṅgha, the training, the discipline (vinaya), the Pāṭimokkha, the celibate life, one’s preceptor, one’s teacher, one’s fellow bhikkhus, or any equivalent terms. Variants on this pattern include such statements as, “I am tired of x,” “What is x to me?” “X means nothing to me,” or “I am well freed of x.” The second pattern follows the form, “Consider me to be y,” where y may be replaced with a householder, a lay follower, a novice, a member of another sect, an adherent of another sect, or any other equivalent term.

The Vibhaṅga stipulates that the statement not be put in the conditional tense—or, in terms of English grammar, the subjunctive mood—(“Suppose I were to renounce the training”). Nor should it be expressed as a wish (“If only I were to renounce the training (§)”; “May I renounce the training (§)”) or as a question (“Should I renounce the training?” (§—reading apāhaṁ with the Burmese and PTS editions)). The Commentary further stipulates that the “x” statements must be in the present tense. Thus to say, “I have renounced the training,” or “I will renounce the training,” would not be a valid statement of disrobing.

The witness

The witness must be a human being in his or her right mind, and must understand what the bhikkhu says. This rules out the legendary practice of bhikkhus who disrobe by taking a Buddha image as their witness, or who disrobe in front of a Bodhi tree on the assumption that the tree deva counts.

These four factors cover all that is absolutely necessary for an act of disrobing to be valid. However, each of the different national traditions has developed a set of formal ceremonies to surround the act—such as making a final confession of all one’s offenses and reciting the passage for reflection on one’s past use of the four requisites—to give psychological weight to the occasion and to help minimize any remorse one might feel afterwards.

Because disrobing is a serious act with strong consequences for one’s mental and spiritual well being, it should be done only after due consideration. Once a bhikkhu decides that he does want to disrobe, he would be wise to follow not only the stipulations given in the texts but also any additional customs observed in his particular Community, as a sign to himself and to others that he is acting seriously and with due respect for the religion, for the Community, and for himself.

CHAPTER FOUR

Pārājika

This term, according to the Parivāra, derives from a verb meaning to lose or be defeated. A bhikkhu who commits any of the four following offenses has surrendered to his own mental defilements to such an extent that he defeats the purpose of his having become a bhikkhu in the first place. The irrevocable nature of this defeat is illustrated in the Vibhaṅga with a number of similes: “as a man with his head cut off… as a withered leaf freed from its stem… as a flat stone that has been broken in half cannot be put together again… as a palmyra tree cut off at the crown is incapable of further growth.” A bhikkhu who commits any of these offenses severs himself irrevocably from the life of the Saṅgha and is no longer considered a bhikkhu.

1

Should any bhikkhu—participating in the training and livelihood of the bhikkhus, without having renounced the training, without having declared his weakness—engage in sexual intercourse, even with a female animal, he is defeated and no longer in affiliation.

As we noted in the Introduction, the first formulation of this rule followed on Ven. Sudinna’s having had sex with one of his former wives. His motives, by worldly standards, were relatively noble: He was complying with his parents’ desire that he provide them with an heir. However, in the incident leading to the second formulation of this rule—in which the Buddha added the phrase “even with a female animal”—the instigator’s motives were considerably less so.

“Now at that time, a certain bhikkhu living in the Great Wood at Vesālī, having befriended a monkey with food (§), engaged in sexual intercourse with it. Then, dressing (§) early in the morning and carrying his bowl and outer robe, the bhikkhu went into Vesālī for alms. A number of bhikkhus wandering on a tour of the lodgings went to the bhikkhu’s dwelling. The monkey saw them coming from afar and, on seeing them, went up to them and wiggled its rear and wiggled its tail and offered its rear and made a sign (§). The thought occurred to the bhikkhus, ‘Undoubtedly this bhikkhu is engaging in sexual intercourse with this monkey.’ So they hid off to one side.

“Then the bhikkhu, having gone for alms in Vesālī, returned bringing almsfood. The monkey went up to him. The bhikkhu, having eaten a portion of the almsfood, gave a portion to the monkey. The monkey, having eaten the almsfood, offered its rear to the bhikkhu, and the bhikkhu engaged in sexual intercourse with it (§).

“Then the bhikkhus said to the bhikkhu, ‘Hasn’t a training rule been formulated by the Blessed One? How can you engage in sexual intercourse with this monkey?’

“‘It’s true, friends, that a training rule has been formulated by the Blessed One, but that’s with regard to a human female, not to a female animal.’”

The full offense here is composed of four factors: effort, object, knowledge, and consent.

Effort

The term sexual intercourse refers to all kinds of sexual intercourse involving genitals (literally, the “urine path” (passāva-magga)—i.e., a woman’s vagina or a man’s penis); the anus (vacca-magga); or the mouth (mukha). The Vibhaṅga summarizes the various possible combinations of these orifices, and concludes that all of them—except for mouth-to-mouth penetration, which is treated under Derived Offenses, below—fulfill the factor of effort here. Unfortunately, the Vibhaṅga’s summary is couched in technical terminology, using magga (path) to mean either the genitals or the anal orifice, and amagga (not-path) to mean the mouth. The Commentary, in discussing the summary, mistakenly classifies the mouth as a magga as well, and so has to invent a different meaning for amagga: a wound bordering on one of the three maggas. Because the Commentary’s discussion of this point is based on a misunderstanding, there is no need to pursue it in further detail.

The Vibhaṅga states that sexual intercourse has been performed when, in any of the possible combinations covered by this rule, one organ enters the other even if just to “the extent of a sesame seed.” This means that a bhikkhu engaging in genital, oral, or anal intercourse is subject to this rule regardless of which role he plays. The question of whether there is a covering, such as a condom, between the organs is irrelevant, as are the questions of whether the bhikkhu is actively or passively involved, and whether any of the parties involved reaches orgasm.

Object

The full penalty under this rule applies to any voluntary sexual intercourse with a human being, a “non-human” being (a yakkha, nāga, or peta), or a common animal, whether female, male, neuter, or hermaphrodite.

Performing sexual intercourse with a dead body—even a decapitated head—also entails the full penalty if the remains of the body are intact enough for the act to be accomplished.

In addition, the Vinīta-vatthu lists two examples of “self-intercourse”: A bhikkhu with a supple back takes his penis into his mouth, and a bhikkhu with an unusually long penis inserts it into his anus. Both cases carry the full penalty.

Knowledge & consent

For sexual intercourse to count as an offense, the bhikkhu must know that it is happening and give his consent. Thus if he is sexually assaulted while asleep or otherwise unconscious and remains oblivious to what is happening, he incurs no penalty. If, however, he becomes conscious during the assault or was conscious right from the start, then whether he incurs a penalty depends on whether he gives his consent during any part of the act.

Strangely enough, neither the Canon nor the Commentary discusses the factor of consent in any detail, except to mention by way of passing that it can apply to the stage of inserting, being fully inserted, staying in place, or pulling out. From the examples in the Vinīta-vatthu, it would appear that consent refers to a mental state of acquiescence, together with its physical or verbal expression. Mere physical compliance does not count, as there are cases where bhikkhus forced into intercourse comply physically but without consenting mentally and so are absolved of any offense. However, there is also a case in which a woman invites a bhikkhu to engage in sexual intercourse, saying that she will do all the work while he can avoid an offense by doing nothing. The bhikkhu does as she tells him to, but when the case comes to the Buddha’s attention, the Buddha imposes a pārājika on the act without even asking the bhikkhu whether he consented or not. The assumption is that complying with a request like this indicates consent, regardless of whether one makes any physical or verbal movement at all.

Taken together, these cases imply that if one is sexually assaulted, one is completely absolved from an offense only if (1) one does not give one’s mental consent at any time during the act or (2) one does feel mental consent during at least part of the act but puts up a struggle so as not to express that consent physically or verbally in any way. (As the Commentary notes, drawing a general principle from the Vinīta-vatthu to Pr 2, mere mental consent without physical expression is not enough to count as a factor of an offense, for there is no offense simply in the arising of a thought or mental state.) If one puts up no struggle and feels mental consent, even if only fleetingly during the stage of inserting, being fully inserted, staying in place, or pulling out, one incurs the full penalty. This would seem to be the basis for the Commentary’s warning in its discussion of the Vinīta-vatthu case in which a bhikkhu wakes up to find himself being sexually assaulted by a woman, gives her a kick, and sends her rolling. The warning: This is how a bhikkhu still subject to sensual lust should act if he wants to protect his state of mind.

The Vinīta-vatthu contains a case in which a bhikkhu with “impaired faculties”—one who feels neither pleasure nor pain during intercourse—engages in intercourse under the assumption that his impairment exempts him from the rule. The case is brought to the Buddha, who states, “Whether this worthless man did or didn’t feel [anything], it is a case involving defeat.” From this ruling it can be argued that a bhikkhu indulging in intercourse as part of a tantric ritual incurs the full penalty even if he doesn’t feel pleasure in the course of the act.

Derived offenses

Two thullaccaya offenses are directly related to this rule. The first is for mouth-to-mouth penetration— i.e., the act of inserting any part of one’s mouth into the mouth of another person, or consenting to the insertion of another person’s mouth in one’s own—regardless of whether the other person is a man, a woman, or a common animal. When this act occurs under the influence of lust, as in an intense kiss, the thullaccaya here would be incurred in addition to whatever penalty is assigned for lustful bodily contact under Sg 2.

The second thullaccaya is for the unlikely case of a bhikkhu who attempts intercourse with the decomposed mouth, anus, or genitals of a corpse. To attempt intercourse with any other part of a dead body or with any part of an insentient object, such as an inflatable doll or mannequin, incurs a dukkaṭa. (If this led to an ejaculation, however, the case would be treated under Sg 1.)

The Vibhaṅga states that if a bhikkhu attempts intercourse with any part of a living being’s body apart from the three orifices, the case falls under the saṅghādisesa rules—either Sg 1 for intentional ejaculation or Sg 2 for lustful bodily contact. As we shall see below, the penalties assigned in the latter case are as follows: if the partner is a woman, a saṅghādisesa; if a paṇḍaka (see Sg 2), a thullaccaya; if a man or a common animal, a dukkaṭa. We can infer from the Vibhaṅga’s ruling here that if a bhikkhu has an orgasm while attempting intercourse with the decomposed mouth, anus, or genitals of a corpse, with any other part of a dead body, or with any part of an insentient object, the case would come under Sg 1.

The Commentary disagrees with the Vibhaṅga on these points, however, saying that the derived offenses under this rule can include only dukkaṭa and thullaccaya penalties. In its explanation of Sg 1, it sets forth a system of eleven types of lust in which the lust for the pleasure of bringing about an ejaculation, lust for the pleasure of bodily contact, and lust for the pleasure of intercourse are treated as completely separate things that must be treated under separate rules. Thus, it says, if a bhikkhu aiming at intercourse takes hold of a woman’s body, it is simply a preliminary to intercourse and thus entails only a dukkaṭa, rather than a saṅghādisesa for lustful bodily contact. Similarly, if he has a premature ejaculation before beginning intercourse, there is no offense at all.

These are fine academic distinctions and are clearly motivated by a desire to draw neat lines between the rules, but they lead to practical problems. As the Commentary itself points out, if a bhikkhu commits an act that falls near the borderline between these rules but cannot later report precisely which type of lust he was feeling in the heat of the moment, there is no way his case can be judged and a penalty assigned. At any rate, though, there is no basis in the Canon for the Commentary’s system, and in fact it contradicts not only the Vibhaṅga’s ruling mentioned above, but also its definition of lustful under Sg 2, 3, & 4, which is exactly the same for all three rules and places no limits on the type of lust involved. All of this leads to the conclusion that the Commentary’s neat system for classifying lust is invalid, and that the Vibhaṅga’s judgment holds: If a bhikkhu attempts intercourse with any part of a living being’s body apart from the three orifices, the case falls under the saṅghādisesa rules—either Sg 1 for intentional ejaculation or Sg 2 for lustful bodily contact—rather than here.

Blanket exemptions

In addition to bhikkhus who do not know they are being assaulted or do not give their consent when they do know, the Vibhaṅga states that there are four special categories of bhikkhus exempted from a penalty under this rule: any bhikkhu who is insane, possessed by spirits, delirious with pain, or the first offender(s) (in this case, Ven. Sudinna and the bhikkhu with the monkey) whose actions prompted the Buddha to formulate the rule. The Commentary defines as insane anyone who “goes about in an unseemly way, with deranged perceptions, having cast away all sense of shame and compunction, not knowing whether he has transgressed major or minor training rules.” It recognizes this as a medical condition, which it blames on the bile. A bhikkhu under the influence of a severe psychosis-inducing drug would apparently fall under this exemption, but one under the influence of a more common intoxicant would not. As for spirit possession, the Commentary says that this can happen either when spirits frighten one or when, by distracting one with sensory images, they insert their hands into one’s heart by way of one’s mouth (!). Whatever the cause, it notes that insane and possessed bhikkhus are exempt from penalties they incur only when their perceptions are deranged (“when their mindfulness is entirely forgotten and they don’t know what fire, gold, excrement, and sandalwood are”) and not from any they incur during their lucid moments. As for a bhikkhu delirious with pain, he is exempt from penalties he incurs only during periods when the pain is so great that he does not know what he is doing.

These four categories are exempted from penalties under nearly all of the rules, although the first offender for each rule is exempted only for the one time he acted in such a way as to provoke the Buddha into formulating the rule. I will only rarely mention these categories again, and—except where expressly stated otherwise—the reader should bear them in mind as exempt in every case.

Lastly, the Vinīta-vatthu to this rule includes an interesting case that formed the basis for an additional rule:

“At that time a certain bhikkhu had gone to the Gabled Hall in the Great Wood at Vesālī to pass the day and was sleeping, having left the door open. His various limbs were stiff with the ‘wind forces’ (i.e., he had an erection) (§). Now at that time a large company of women bearing garlands and scents came to the park, headed for the dwelling. Seeing the bhikkhu, they sat down on his male organ (§) and, having taken their pleasure and remarking, ‘What a bull of a man, this one!’ they picked up their garlands and scents, and left.”

The bhikkhu incurred no penalty, but the Buddha gave formal permission to close the door when resting during the day. From this permission, the Commentary formulates a prohibition—that a bhikkhu incurs a dukkaṭa if he does not close the door when sleeping during the day—but if the Buddha had intended a prohibition, he surely would have stated the rule in that form himself. In other words, one may sleep during the day without being penalized for whether the door is open or not.

Summary: Voluntary sexual intercourse—genital, anal, or oral—with a human being, non-human being, or common animal is a pārājika offense.

*    *    *

2

Should any bhikkhu, in what is reckoned a theft, take what is not given from an inhabited area or from the wilderness—just as when, in the taking of what is not given, kings arresting the criminal would flog, imprison, or banish him, saying, “You are a robber, you are a fool, you are benighted, you are a thief”—a bhikkhu in the same way taking what is not given also is defeated and no longer in affiliation.

This rule against stealing is, in the working out of its details, the most complex in the Pāṭimokkha and requires the most explanation—not because stealing is a concept especially hard to understand, but because it can take so many forms. The Canon treats the issue in a case-by-case fashion that resists easy summary. To further complicate matters, the Commentary’s discussion of this rule is extremely prolix and deviates frequently from the Canon’s in both major and minor ways. Because the deviations are so numerous, we will focus solely on the major ones.

The Vibhaṅga defines the act of stealing in terms of four factors.

1) Object: anything belonging to another human being or a group of human beings.

2) Perception: One perceives the object as belonging to another human being or a group of human beings.

3) Intention: One decides to steal it.

4) Effort: One takes it.

Stealing under any circumstances is always an offense. However, the severity of the offense depends on another factor, which is—

5) The value of the object.

Object

For an object to qualify as what is not given—the rule’s term for anything that may be the object of a theft—it must belong to someone else: “not given, not forfeited, not abandoned/discarded; guarded, protected, claimed (§—literally, ‘viewed as “mine”’), possessed by someone else.” In all of the Vibhaṅga’s cases under this rule, that “someone else” is either an individual human being or a group of human beings. The question of property belonging to the Saṅgha logically fits here, but because the topic is fairly complex we will discuss it as a special case below.

Because items that have been given away or discarded do not fulfil the factor of object here, there is no offense for a bhikkhu who takes a discarded object—such as rags from a pile of refuse—or unclaimed items from a wilderness. The Commentary, in some of its examples, includes items given up for lost under “abandoned,” but this interpretation has to be heavily qualified. If the owner retains a sense of ownership for the lost item, it would fall under the term claimed, and thus would still count as not given. Only if the owner abandons all sense of ownership would it genuinely count as abandoned.

The Vinīta-vatthu mentions an interesting case in which the groundskeeper in an orchard permits bhikkhus to take fruit from the orchard, even though he was not authorized to do so. The bhikkhus committed no offense.

The Commentary adds that if people are guarding an object as the property of a location—for example, an offering to a Buddha image, cetiya, or other sacred place—the object would also qualify as “not given” under this rule. Although the Vibhaṅga mentions property of this sort under NP 30 and Pc 82, for some reason it doesn’t mention it here. Nevertheless, the Commentary’s judgment on this point reflects a custom that had become widespread by its time, that of giving valuable items to a cetiya (this includes Buddha images) and dedicating them not to the Saṅgha but to the cetiya. Some medieval Indian Buddhist inscriptions express the idea that the cetiya or the Buddha relics (if any) within the cetiya actually own such objects, but the Commentary states that these objects have an owner simply in the sense that human beings are watching over them for the purpose of the cetiya. The jewels decorating the reliquary of the Sacred Tooth in Kandy or the offerings to the Emerald Buddha in Bangkok, for example, would fall under this category. According to the Commentary, the Saṅgha is duty-bound to care for such items but has no rights of ownership over them. In its discussion both of this rule and of Pv.XIX, it states that items given to the Saṅgha may be used for the purpose of the cetiya—for example, to contribute to its decoration or upkeep—but items given to the cetiya may not be used for the purpose of the Saṅgha.

From the Commentary’s discussion of this type of ownership, it would appear that if there are no longer any human beings watching over a cetiya, the items donated to it would no longer count as having an owner and thus could be removed for safekeeping, preferably to another cetiya. Any bhikkhu who took such items for himself, however, would be risking the wrath of the devas who might be guarding the cetiya. This is why it is traditional in such cases to conduct a ceremony formally requesting the permission of any guardian devas, at the same time promising not to take such items for one’s own use.

The Vibhaṅga states that items belonging to common animals or petas are not covered by this rule. On this point, see the discussion under Non-offenses, below.

Perception

For the act of taking what is not given to count as theft, one must also perceive the object as not given. Thus there is no offense if one takes an object, even if it is not given, if one sincerely believes that it is ownerless or thrown away. Similarly, if a bhikkhu takes an object mistaking it for his own or as belonging to a friend who has given him permission to take his things on trust, there is no offense even if the assumption about the trust proves to be a misperception. Also, a bhikkhu who takes things from the Community’s common stores, on the assumption that he has the right to help himself, commits no offense even if the assumption proves false.

The Vinīta-vatthu contains a case in which a bhikkhu, spotting some objects during the day, returns to steal them at night. However, instead of taking the objects he spotted, he ends up taking some possessions of his own. He earns a dukkaṭa for his efforts.  

None of the texts discuss the possible case in which one might be in doubt as to whether the object in question is not given, perhaps because the compilers felt that the factor of intention, discussed next, would not apply in such cases. Thus it would not be an offense under this rule. However, the wise policy when one is in doubt about an item’s ownership would be not to take the item for one’s own, or at most to take it on loan, as explained below.

Intention

The act of taking what is not given, even when one perceives it as not given, counts as theft only if one’s intention is to steal it. Thus, as the non-offense clauses say, a bhikkhu incurs no offense if he takes an object temporarily or on trust. On these points, see the discussion under Non-offenses, below. Also, the Vinīta-vatthu rules that a bhikkhu who, seeing an article left in a place where it might be damaged, puts it in safe keeping for the owner, commits no offense.

The Commentary discusses two cases of taking an item with a conditional intent (parikappāvahāra): placing a condition on the article, and placing a condition on the place. It illustrates the first case with the example of a bhikkhu entering a dark storeroom and taking a sack full of items, thinking, “If the sack contains cloth, I’ll steal it; if it contains just thread, I won’t.” In this case, if the sack does indeed contain cloth, then it was stolen the moment the bhikkhu moved the sack from its place (see below). If it contains just thread, and he returns it to its place, he commits no offense. If, however, the bhikkhu takes the sack thinking, “I’ll steal whatever is in the sack,” the Commentary maintains that he is not guilty of stealing until he finds out what the sack contains and then picks it up again, but this case does not really fit under this category, as the bhikkhu has actually placed no condition on the article and so stole it when he first picked it up.

Placing a condition on the place means thinking, “If I can take this item past such-and-such a place (such as a gateway), I’ll steal it; if anyone sees me beforehand, I’ll pretend that I’m just looking at it and will return it to its place.” Because one has not definitely decided to steal it when first picking it up, the theft is committed only when one takes the item past the determined place.

Effort

Assuming that all of the above conditions are met—the object belongs to someone else, one perceives it as belonging to someone else, and one intends to steal it—if one then takes it, that constitutes stealing. The question then arises as to precisely what acts constitute taking.

The Vibhaṅga, instead of giving a systematic answer to this question, provides a long list of possible situations and then defines how taking is defined in each case. Simply reading through the list can require some patience, and it’s easy to sympathize with the bhikkhus in the past who had to memorize it. Here, to shorten the discussion, we will reverse its order, listing first the actions that qualify as taking and then the situations to which the actions apply. Actions requiring only minor clarification will be explained in the list; those requiring extended discussion will be explained below.

Moving the object from its place: objects buried in the ground; sitting on the ground; sitting on another object sitting on the ground; hanging from a place above ground, such as a peg or clothesline; floating, flying, or dropping in mid-air; sitting in a boat; sitting in a vehicle; an object that one has caused another person to drop; footless animals, animals that one might pick up or push from their place (according to the Commentary, this also covers larger footed animals that are lying down); objects that one has been asked to guard. The Vibhaṅga makes clear that items in a vehicle also count as taken when the vehicle is moved from its place.

“Cutting off” a fistful: objects inside a container. According to the Commentary, this means reaching into the container and grabbing, say, a fistful of coins in such a way that the coins in the fist do not touch any of the other coins in the container. In this case, the taking would be accomplished before the object was removed from the container.

Sticking a vessel into a pool of liquid or pile of objects and causing some of the pool or pile to enter the vessel: objects inside a container; water or any liquid, whether in a container or not. Again, the Commentary states that the objects or liquid in one’s vessel must not touch the remaining objects or liquid outside the vessel. And, again, in the case of taking objects or liquid situated in a container in this way, the taking would be accomplished before the objects or liquid were removed from the container.

Removing entirely from the mouth of a container: objects too long or large to be taken from a container in a vessel or fistful.

Drinking liquid from a container: This would apply to drinking from the container without moving the container from its place. If the container is moved from its place, that would constitute the taking. As with the fistful, the Commentary argues that the liquid is taken only when the liquid ingested does not make contact with the liquid not ingested. This can be done either by swallowing, by closing one’s lips, or by removing one’s mouth from the container.

Moving the object from one part of one’s body to another: an object that one is already carrying before deciding to steal it. The Vibhaṅga recognizes five body parts here: head, upper torso, hip, and each of the hands. The Commentary defines head as anything above the neck; upper torso as anything below the head down, on the torso, to the level of the sternum, and on the arm, to the elbow; hip as the remainder of the body below the upper torso; and hand as the arm from the elbow on down. The Commentary notes that this definition applies only to cases where the owners have not asked one to carry the article for them. Neither the Commentary nor the Sub-commentary explains this condition, but a possible reason might be that if they have asked a bhikkhu to carry the article for them, without their intending for him to give it to someone else, it would count as guarded by him or deposited with him for safe keeping, and thus would fall under another category. If, on the other hand, they asked him to carry the object to give to someone else and he decided to take it for himself, the case would come under Deceit, discussed below.

Dropping the object: an object one is already carrying before deciding to steal it.

Causing the object to move a hairbreadth upstream, downstream, or across a body of water: a boat or any similar vessel floating in water.

Breaking an embankment so that water flows out: water in a lake, canal, or reservoir.

Causing an animal to move all its feet: two-footed (this includes human beings, i.e., slaves), four-footed, many-footed animals. According to the Commentary, this applies whether one touches the animal or simply lures it or threatens it without touching it. If the animal is lying down, simply getting it to get up on its feet counts as taking it. In the case of helping a slave to escape from slavery, if the slave follows one’s order or advice to escape, one is guilty of taking; but if one simply informs the slave of good ways to reach freedom or offers food or protection along the way, one incurs no offense.

Cutting down: plants growing in place, whether on dry land or in a body of water. The Commentary states that once the plant is cut totally through, then even though it doesn’t yet fall down—as when a tree is entangled in the branches of neighboring trees—it is nevertheless taken.

Causing the owner to give up efforts (§) to regain possession: pieces of land (fields, orchards, building sites), buildings, objects deposited with a bhikkhu for safekeeping. (According to the Commentary, items loaned to a bhikkhu also fall into this category.) According to the Vibhaṅga, if a case of this sort goes to court, this type of taking is completed when the owner finally loses the case. The Vinaya-mukha adds that if the owner appeals the case after the first hearing, the taking is accomplished when the owner loses in the highest court to which he/she makes an appeal.

The discussion in the Commentary and Sub-commentary indicates that the two categories of “objects a bhikkhu has been asked to guard,” and “objects deposited with a bhikkhu for safe keeping” differ in that in the latter case the object has been handed to the bhikkhu, whereas in the former it hasn’t. This, however, does not fit with the Vibhaṅga, which in defining “deposited” uses the word upanikkhitaṁ, which in NP 18 means “placed down next to.” A way to distinguish the two categories more closely in line with the Vibhaṅga would be to say that, in the latter case, the object is in such a location that the owner, in order to retrieve it, would have to ask the bhikkhu’s permission to do so, whereas in the former he/she wouldn’t. For example, an item placed in the bhikkhu’s hut or a monastery storeroom would count as deposited with the bhikkhu—regardless of whether it had been handed to him—whereas an item set by the side of a public road—with the bhikkhu simply asked to watch over it for a short period of time—would count as an object he has been asked to guard.

Shifting a boundary marker: pieces of land. The Vinaya-mukha notes that this contradicts the preceding definition of how one takes a piece of land, as the owner might not even know that the marker had been moved, and would not necessarily give up ownership even if he/she saw a bhikkhu moving it. The Sub-commentary tries to explain the discrepancy by maintaining that shifting a boundary marker fulfils the factor of effort here only if the act of shifting the marker, in and of itself, induces the owner to give up any efforts to reclaim the land, but that would make this category superfluous. A better explanation would be that this definition of taking applies to attempts to lay claim to Saṅgha land, for otherwise—if land can be stolen only when the owner abandons ownership—then Saṅgha land could not be stolen, because there is no one acting for the Saṅgha of the Four Directions who could renounce once and for all any efforts to reclaim the land.

Exchanging lottery tickets: See Swindling, below.

Taking a dutiable item through a customs area without paying duty: See Smuggling, below.

Of these various ways of taking, the Commentary devotes the most space to the first, “moving the object from its place.” Its discussion is at odds with the Canon on many points, most notably in striking out the separate categories for taking large objects from a container (removing it entirely from the mouth of a container) and boats (causing them to move a hair-breadth upstream, downstream, or across a body of water), and simply subsuming them under this category. Although it may have regarded these separate categories as arbitrary, it introduces many arbitrary distinctions and inconsistencies of its own. Apparently its distinctions come from the ancient commentaries, for even Buddhaghosa expresses despair at trying to commit them all to writing. Here we will stick with the Canon’s scheme for defining the act of taking, and focus on the parts of the Commentary’s discussion that accord with the Canon. As for those that deviate from the Canon, only important deviations will be noted.

In general, the Commentary defines an object’s place in terms of the directions in which it can be moved: up, down (as when an object sitting on sand can be pushed down into the sand), left, right, forward (toward the person taking it), and away. With reference to the last five of these actions, the place of the object is defined in three-dimensional terms: the space it occupies. Thus to take an object in any of these directions, one must push or pull it entirely outside of the coordinates of the space it initially occupied. However, with reference to lifting the object up, the place is defined in two-dimensional terms: the area of contact between the object and its support, whether that support is another object or the ground. Thus to take an object by lifting it, one only need lift it a hairbreadth from its support.

For example, a television set on a shelf is taken either when it is slid left along the shelf to the point where its right side is just left of where the left side used to be, or slid right to the point where its left side is just right of where the right side used to be, or lifted a hairbreadth off the shelf.

Because objects in the air have no support, the Commentary defines their space in three-dimensional terms no matter which direction they are moved. For instance, if one catches a piece of cloth being blown by the wind, its place is the three-dimensional space it occupies at the moment one catches it. If one stops a flying peacock without touching it, its place is the three-dimensional space it occupies at the moment it stops to hover. In either case, the object is taken when displaced any direction outside the coordinates of that space. In the case of the cloth, this could be done simply by dropping it. In the case of the peacock, it could be done by waving one’s hands and getting it to fly in the desired direction. If the peacock happens to land on one’s arm, it is taken when one moves it to another part of one’s body or puts it down.

For animals swimming in water, it would make sense to define place in the same terms as birds flying in the air, but the Commentary insists that the entire body of water in which they are kept constitutes their place.

Objects on a living person—such as a bracelet on the person’s arm—have the person’s body as their place. Thus if, in trying to remove the bracelet, one pulls it up and down the arm, it is not yet taken. It is taken only when one removes it entirely from the hand. If one is stealing the person’s clothes, they are taken only when removed from his/her body. If the person, stripped of the clothes, is still holding onto them, they are taken only when pulled from his/her hand.

For some objects, the Commentary defines place in terms that seem rather arbitrary. For instance, a robe on a line is taken when it is lifted a hairbreadth off the line, but for some reason if it is moved along the line it is not taken until it is ten or twelve fingerbreadths away from the area it originally occupied on the line. An object leaning against a wall has two places: the spot where it sits on the ground and the spot it touches on the wall. A vehicle’s place is defined two-dimensionally: the spots where its wheels touch the ground (perhaps this is defined on analogy with the feet of an animal). An object tied to a post has that connection as an extra part of its place. Thus a pot tied by a chain to a post is not taken until it is removed from the area it occupied under the general definition above and either the chain is cut or the post pulled up. Although there is a certain logic to each of these cases, the added distinctions seem unnecessary complications added to an already complicated issue. For simplicity’s sake there would seem every reason to stick with the general definition of place even in these special cases, although there is nothing in the Vibhaṅga to prove or disprove the Commentary here.

However, as noted above, several of the Commentary’s definitions of place clearly contradict the Vibhaṅga. In some cases, the contradiction is simple, as when the Commentary insists that an animal kept in an enclosure—a cow in a pen, a peacock in a garden—is taken not when its feet are moved, but only when removed from the enclosure. In other cases, the contradiction is more complex, in that the Commentary tries to define taking as “moving the object from its place” in cases where the Vibhaṅga defines the act of taking in other terms. For example, with an object sitting in the bottom of a container, it says that the object is taken when lifted a hairbreadth from the bottom, there being no need to remove the object from the container before it is considered taken. In the case of a boat, the Commentary defines the place of the boat in modified three-dimensional terms: the entire space where the boat displaces water. To take it by pushing it down in the water, the top of the boat has to sink lower than the level where the keel originally was; to take it by lifting it up, one need only lift it a hairbreadth above the water, there being no need to lift the keel to a point higher than where the highest point of the boat was. However, because the Vibhaṅga does not define the taking of boats or objects in containers in terms of “moving the object from its place,” the Commentary’s analysis of these possibilities is beside the point.

Other special cases in the Vibhaṅga include the following:

a. Swindling: Objects are being distributed by lot to the Community, and a bhikkhu takes the portion rightfully going to another bhikkhu. The Vibhaṅga offers no further explanation, but the Commentary states that the taking can be accomplished in various ways. If, after the drawing of the tickets, X puts his ticket in the place of Y’s ticket before picking up Y’s, the taking is accomplished when he picks up Y’s. If he picks up Y’s before putting his own ticket in its place, the taking is accomplished when he lets go of his own. If both tickets don’t appear (they’ve been concealed?) and X gets Y to take X’s portion, the taking is accomplished when he then picks up Y’s portion. The underlying assumption in all this is that Y’s portion belongs to him as soon as he has drawn the ticket for it. The Commentary adds that this exchange counts as theft regardless of whether X’s portion is worth more than Y’s, less than Y’s, or the two portions are of equal value.

The Commentary to Mv.I.62 adds that if a bhikkhu claims higher seniority than is actually his in order to obtain better donations, he should be treated under this rule when, through this ruse, he obtains donations that should have gone to another bhikkhu. However, this type of action would appear to fall under Deceit, discussed below.

b. Smuggling: A bhikkhu carrying items subject to an import duty hides them as he goes through customs. The taking is accomplished when the item leaves the customs area. The Vibhaṅga calculates the value of the object here, for the purpose of determining the seriousness of the offense, by the duty owed on it, and not its actual selling price.

The Vinīta-vatthu states that there is no penalty if the bhikkhu goes through customs not knowing that he has an item subject to import duties among his effects. The relevant cases show that this can mean one of two things: Either he knows that he has the item with him but not that it is subject to import duties; or he does not know that he has the item with him at all. The Commentary adds that if a bhikkhu informs the customs official that he has an item subject to import duties and yet the official decides not to collect the duty, the bhikkhu incurs no penalty. It also states that if a bhikkhu goes through customs with a conditional intent—“If they ask to see my belongings, I’ll pay the fee, but if they wave me through I won’t”—then if the officials do wave him through without asking to see his belongings, he incurs no offense. At present, when people entering a country are asked to choose different passageways through a customs area, marked “Goods to declare” and “Nothing to declare,” a bhikkhu with goods to declare who enters the “Nothing to declare” passageway cannot take advantage of this allowance for conditional intent, as he has already indicated an unconditional intent through his choice of a passageway.

The Vibhaṅga states that if, to avoid paying an import duty at a frontier, one crosses the frontier in such a way as to evade the customs area (§), one incurs only a dukkaṭa. At present, the civil law judges this sort of behavior as more reprehensible than slipping an item through customs, but from the point of view of the Vinaya the lesser penalty still holds. The Commentary says that this allowance applies only in cases when one evades the customs area by a distance of more than two leḍḍupātas—approximately 36 meters. (A leḍḍupāta is a unit of measure that appears frequently in the Canon and is defined as the distance a man of average stature can throw a clod of dirt underarm.)

The Vibhaṅga’s position here is important to understand, for it has implications concerning the extent to which the evasion of other government fees and taxes would fall under this rule. The underlying assumption here seems to be that a dutiable item carried into a customs area is impounded by the king (or government). The payment of the duty is thus an act of recovering full ownership of the item. An item carried across the frontier without entering the customs area would not count as impounded, even though the king would probably claim the right to impound or even confiscate it if his agents apprehended the smuggler. Translated into modern terms, this would indicate that the evasion of other taxes claimed by the government—such as inheritance taxes—would incur the full penalty here only if the item being taxed was impounded on government property, and one evaded the tax by taking the item out of impoundment without paying the required fee. Otherwise, the penalty for tax evasion would be a dukkaṭa.

None of the texts discuss the question of contraband, i.e., articles that a customs official would confiscate outright rather than allow into a country after the payment of a fee. Apparently, such goods smuggled through a customs house would fall into this category, although—as even the payment of a fee would not legally get them through customs—their selling value would be the determining factor in calculating the seriousness of the offense.

c. Malfeasance: The Vinīta-vatthu includes an unusual case in which a wealthy man with two heirs—a son and a nephew—tells Ven. Ajjuka, “When I am gone, show the place (where my treasure is buried) (§) to whichever of my heirs has the greater faith.” After the man’s death, Ven. Ajjuka sees that the nephew has the greater faith and so shows the place of the treasure to him. The nephew awards the Saṅgha with a large donation; the son accuses Ven. Ajjuka of having wrongfully deprived him of his rightful inheritance. On hearing this, Ven. Ānanda first accuses Ven. Ajjuka of a pārājika, but when the wealthy man’s wishes are revealed, Ven. Upāli convinces Ven. Ānanda that Ven. Ajjuka committed no offense.

None of the texts discuss the details of this case, which seems to have postdated the Buddha’s parinibbāna. The apparent assumption underlying the ruling is that when X dies, the inheritance he leaves to Y belongs to Y from the moment of X’s death. Otherwise, the items in question would be ownerless until apportioned out among the heirs, and thus would not fulfill the factor of object under this rule. Also, the taking in this case would be accomplished in line with the Vibhaṅga’s standard definition for taking with regard to the objects involved—and not necessarily when the cheated heir gives up trying to reclaim the inheritance—for in Ven. Ajjuka’s case Ven. Ānanda was ready to impose a pārājika even though the son had not abandoned his claim.

d. Destruction of property: The Vibhaṅga states that if a bhikkhu breaks, scatters, burns, or otherwise renders unusable the property of another person, he incurs a dukkaṭa. Thus the simple destruction of property does not fulfill the factor of effort under this rule. The Vinīta-vatthu contains a case in which a bhikkhu intends to steal some grass belonging to the Community but ends up setting fire to it instead, thus incurring a dukkaṭa. The Commentary notes that this ruling applies only because the bhikkhu did not move the grass from its place. What this means is that if he had first taken the grass from its place and then destroyed it in any way, the factor of effort under this rule would have been fulfilled and—all other factors of a pārājika offense being present—he would have been guilty of the full offense.

Special cases cited in the Commentary include the following:

a. False dealing: A bhikkhu makes counterfeit money or uses counterfeit weights. The taking is accomplished when the counterfeit is accepted. This case, however, would seem to fall under the category of Deceit (see below), in that the counterfeit is a form of a lie. If the owner of an object accepts the counterfeit and hands over an object in return, the object cannot be described as stolen. However, the object obtained in trade in this way would have to be forfeited under NP 20, and the Community, if it felt so inclined, could impose a disciplinary transaction on the offender (see BMC2, Chapter 20).

b. Robbery: Using threats, a bhikkhu compels the owner of an object to give it to him. The taking is accomplished when the owner complies. This would not count as giving because the owner is not giving the item willingly.

c. Concealing: A bhikkhu finds an object left on the ground and, to deceive the owner, covers it with dirt or leaves with the intent of stealing it later. If the owner, after searching for the item, temporarily abandons the search and the bhikkhu then picks it up, it is stolen when removed from its base. If the owner, deciding that the item is lost, abandons it for good before the bhikkhu picks it up, the Commentary says that the bhikkhu is not guilty of theft but owes the owner compensation. We have discussed the topic of lost items above, under Object, and will discuss the topic of compensation below.

The value of the object

As stated above, any case of stealing counts as an offense, but the gravity of the offense is determined by the value of the object. This is the point of the phrase in the rule reading, “just as when there is the taking of what is not given, kings… would banish him, saying… ‘You are a thief.’” In other words, for a theft to entail a pārājika it must be a criminal case, which in the time of the Buddha meant that the goods involved were worth at least five māsakas, a unit of money used at the time. Goods valued collectively at more than one māsaka but less than five are grounds for a thullaccaya; goods valued collectively at one māsaka or less, grounds for a dukkaṭa. As the Commentary notes, the value of the articles is determined by the price they would have fetched at the time and place of the theft. As stated above, in the case of smuggling the Vibhaṅga measures the value of the object, for the purpose of this rule, as the duty owed on it, not the value of the object itself.

This leaves us with the question of how a māsaka would translate into current monetary rates. No one can answer this question with any certainty, for the oldest attempt to peg the māsaka to the gold standard dates from the V/Sub-commentary, which sets one māsaka as equal to 4 rice grains’ weight of gold. At this rate, the theft of an item worth 20 rice grains’ (1/24 troy ounce) weight of gold or more would be a pārājika offense.

One objection to this method of calculation is that some of the items mentioned in the Vinīta-vatthu as grounds for a pārājika when stolen—e.g., a pillow, a bundle of laundry, a raft, a handful of rice during a famine—would seem to be worth much less than 1/24 troy ounce of gold. However, we must remember that many items regarded as commonplace now may have been viewed as expensive luxuries at the time.

In addition, there is one very good reason for adopting the standard set by the V/Sub-commentary: It sets a high value for the least article whose theft would result in a pārājika. Thus when a bhikkhu steals an item worth 1/24 troy ounce of gold or more, there can be no doubt that he has committed the full offense. When the item is of lesser value, there will be inescapable doubt—and when there is any doubt concerning a pārājika, the tradition of the Vinaya consistently gives the bhikkhu the benefit of the doubt: He is not expelled. A basic principle operating throughout the texts is that it is better to risk letting an offender go unpunished than to risk punishing an innocent bhikkhu.

There is a second advantage to the V/Sub-commentary’s method of calculation: its precision and clarity. Some people have recommended adopting the standard expressed in the rule itself—that if the theft would result in flogging, imprisonment, or banishment by the authorities in that time and at that place, then the theft would constitute a pārājika—but this standard creates more problems than it would solve. In most countries the sentence is largely at the discretion of the judge or magistrate, and the factor of value is only one among many taken into account when determining the penalty. This opens a whole Pandora’s box of issues, many of which have nothing to do with the bhikkhu or the object he has taken—the judge’s mood, his social philosophy, his religious background, and so forth—issues that the Buddha never allowed to enter into the consideration of how to determine the penalty for a theft.

Thus the V/Sub-commentary’s method of calculation has the benefits that it is a quick and easy method for determining the boundaries between the different levels of offense in any modern currency; it involves no factors extraneous to the tradition of the Vinaya, and—as noted above—it draws the line at a value above which there can be no doubt that the penalty is a pārājika.

The Commentary, arguing from two cases in the Vinīta-vatthu, states that if a bhikkhu steals several items on different occasions, the values of the different items are added together to determine the severity of the offense only if they were stolen as part of a single plan or intention. If they are stolen as a result of separate intentions, each act of stealing is treated as a separate offense whose severity depends on the value of the individual item(s) stolen in that act. This point is best explained with examples:

In one of the Vinīta-vatthu cases, a bhikkhu steals ghee from a jar “little by little.” This, according to the Commentary, means that first he decides to steal a spoonful of ghee from a jar. After swallowing the spoonful, he decides to steal one more. After that he decides to steal another, and so on until he has finished the jar. Because each spoonful was stolen as a consequence of a separate plan or intention, he incurs several dukkaṭas, each for the theft of one spoonful of ghee.

If, however, he decides at one point to steal enough lumber to build himself a hut and then steals a plank from here and a rafter from there, taking lumber over many days at different places from various owners, he commits one offense in accordance with the total value of all the lumber stolen, inasmuch as he took all the pieces of wood as a consequence of one prior plan.

Derived offenses

In addition to the lesser offenses related to the value of the object, the Vibhaṅga also lists lesser offenses related to two factors of the full offense under this rule: effort and perception.

With regard to effort, the Vibhaṅga states that the derived offenses begin when one walks toward the object with the intent of stealing it, with each separate act—and in the case of walking toward the object, each step—incurring a dukkaṭa, up to a point just prior to the actual stealing where the offenses turn into thullaccayas. Where this point occurs depends on the act constituting the actual taking, as follows:

Moving the object from its place: all steps up through touching the object: dukkaṭas. Making the object budge without fully moving it from its place: a thullaccaya.

“Cutting off” a fistful: all steps up through touching the object: dukkaṭas. Making the object budge without fully cutting off a fistful: a thullaccaya.

Sticking a vessel into a pool of liquid or pile of objects and causing some of the pool or pile to enter the vessel: all steps up through touching the pool or pile: dukkaṭas. Making the pool or pile budge without fully getting five māsakas worth separated from the pool or pile and inside the vessel: a thullaccaya.

Removing entirely from the mouth of a container: all steps up through touching the object: dukkaṭas. Lifting the object: a thullaccaya. Bringing it up to the level of the mouth of the container: another thullaccaya.

Drinking liquid from a container: all steps up through drinking one māsaka worth of liquid as part of one prior plan (§): dukkaṭas. Drinking between one and five māsakas’ worth of liquid: a thullaccaya.

Moving the object from one part of one’s body to another or dropping it: all steps up through touching the object with the intent to move it or drop it: dukkaṭas. Moving it but not to the point of putting it on another part of the body or dropping it: a thullaccaya.

Causing a boat to move a hair-breadth upstream, downstream, or across a body of water: all steps up through loosening the moorings and/or touching it: dukkaṭas. Making the boat rock without causing it to move a hair-breadth upstream, downstream, or across a body of water: a thullaccaya.

Breaking an embankment so that water flows out: all steps up through breaking the embankment and letting up to one māsaka’s worth of water flow out: dukkaṭas. Letting between one and five māsakas’ worth of water flow out: a thullaccaya.

Causing an animal to move all its feet: all steps up through touching the animal: dukkaṭas. Getting it to move any of its feet prior to its moving its last foot: a thullaccaya for each step.

Cutting down: all steps prior to the next to the last chop needed to cut the plant through: dukkaṭas. The next to the last chop: a thullaccaya.

Causing the owner to give up efforts (§) to regain possession of objects handed to one for safe keeping: all steps up through telling the owner, “I didn’t receive (§) it”: dukkaṭas. Inducing doubt in the owner’s mind as to whether he/she will get the object back: a thullaccaya. If the case goes to court and the bhikkhu loses, he incurs another thullaccaya.

Causing the owner to give up efforts (§) to regain possession of land: all steps up to laying claim to the land: dukkaṭas. Inducing doubt in the owner’s mind as to whether he/she will lose the land: a thullaccaya. Again, if the case goes to court and the bhikkhu loses, he incurs another thullaccaya.

Shifting a boundary marker: all steps up through removing the boundary marker from its original place: dukkaṭas. Any steps between that and putting the boundary marker in a new place: thullaccayas.

Taking a dutiable item through a customs area without paying duty: all steps up through touching the object with the intent of taking it out of the customs area: dukkaṭas. Making the object move without fully moving it from the customs area: a thullaccaya.

The commentaries state that when a heavier penalty is incurred in offenses of this sort, only that penalty is counted, and the preceding lighter ones are nullified. They derive this principle from a passage in the Vibhaṅga to Sg 10-13 and, using the Great Standards, apply it to all the rules. Thus, for example, if a bhikkhu trying to steal a book simply touches it, he incurs a string of dukkaṭas for each step in walking up to the book and taking hold of it. If he budges the book slightly but not so much as to move it completely from its place, the dukkaṭas are nullified and replaced with a thullaccaya. If he actually takes the book, that nullifies the thullaccaya and replaces it with a pārājika.

There is some question, though, as to whether the compilers of the Canon intended the passage under Sg 10-13 to be taken as a general principle. They don’t mention it under any of the other saṅghādisesa rules or in the otherwise parallel passage in the Vibhaṅga to Pc 68. Thus, the principle seems intended only for those four rules. To be on the strict side, it seems best to say that, unless otherwise noted, a bhikkhu who completes an act must make amends for all the offenses incurred in leading up to it. Under the pārājika rules this is a moot point, for once the pārājika is committed the offender is no longer a bhikkhu. But under the lesser rules this principle is still relevant.

As for the derived offenses related to the factor of perception, these deal with the situation in which an article does not qualify as not given under this rule—e.g., it has no owner, or the owner has given it up or thrown it away—and yet the bhikkhu perceives it as not given. If he takes it with intent to steal, he incurs a dukkaṭa for each of the three stages of effort. In the case of an object that can be stolen by moving it from its place, these would be: touching the object, making it budge, moving it from its place. A similar set of offenses would apply in the stages appropriate for taking any of the other types of objects listed above.

Accomplices

A bhikkhu can commit an offense not only if he himself steals an object, but also if he incites another to steal. The offenses involved in the acts leading up to the theft are as follows:

If a bhikkhu tells an accomplice to take an object that would be grounds for a pārājika, he incurs a dukkaṭa. When the accomplice agrees to do so, the instigator incurs a thullaccaya. Once the accomplice succeeds in taking the object as instructed—regardless of whether he gets away with it, and of whether he shares it with the instigator—the instigator incurs a pārājika. If the accomplice is a bhikkhu, he too incurs a pārājika. If the object would be grounds for a thullaccaya or a dukkaṭa, the only penalties incurred prior to the actual theft would be dukkaṭas.

The Commentary insists that if the accomplice is sure to take the item, the bhikkhu incurs a pārājika as soon as the accomplice agrees to take it. However, as the Vinaya-mukha notes, this contradicts the Canon, and there is no way to measure whether a proposed theft is a sure thing or not.

If there is any confusion in carrying out the instructions—e.g., if the accomplice, instead of taking the object specified by the instigator, takes something else instead; or if he is told to take it in the afternoon but instead takes it in the morning—the instigator incurs only the penalties for proposing the theft and persuading the accomplice, and not the penalty for the theft itself. The same holds true if the instigator rescinds his order before the theft takes place, but the accomplice goes ahead and takes the object anyway.

According to the Vibhaṅga, an instigator who wishes to call off the theft before it is carried out but who for one reason or another cannot get his message to the accomplice in time, incurs the full penalty for the completed theft.

The Commentary also adds that the factor of the thief’s perception does not affect the penalties. In other words, if Bhikkhu A tells Bhikkhu B to steal object X, and B takes Y, thinking it to be X, A is absolved of any responsibility for the theft. Conversely, if B takes X, thinking it to be Y, A is guilty of the theft.

The Vibhaṅga also notes that if an instigator tells his accomplice to take an item when he (the instigator) makes a sign—such as winking (§) his eye, lifting his eyebrow, or lifting his head—he incurs a dukkaṭa in making this order, a thullaccaya if the accomplice agrees to do as told, and the full offense when the accomplice actually takes the item at the time of the sign. If the accomplice takes the item before or after the sign, though, the instigator incurs no offense. The Sub-commentary, noting that the signs mentioned in the Vibhaṅga are so fleeting that it would be impossible to take the item at the very moment of the sign, interprets this last statement as follows: If the accomplice starts trying to take the item right after the sign, then regardless of how much time that takes, it counts as “at the time of the sign.” Only if he makes an appreciable delay before attempting the theft does it count as “after the sign.”

We can extrapolate from this discussion and say that any physical gesture that, from the context of events, is intended and understood as an order to take an item, would count under the factor of effort here. This extrapolation will be useful when treating the unauthorized use of credit cards, below.

The Vibhaṅga states that if there is a chain of command involving two or more bhikkhus (not counting the instigator)—for example, Bhikkhu A telling Bhikkhu B to tell Bhikkhu C to tell Bhikkhu D to commit the theft—then when D agrees to commit the theft, the instigator incurs a thullaccaya. Once D takes the object as instructed, all four incur the penalty coming from the theft. If there is any confusion in the chain of command—e.g., Bhikkhu B instead of telling C tells D directly—neither A nor C incurs the penalty for the theft itself. Bhikkhu A would incur a dukkaṭa for telling B, whereas C would incur no penalty at all.

The Commentary notes that the instigator in any of these cases incurs the penalty only if he gives an explicit command to take the item (although this statement has to be qualified to include signs meant as commands, as mentioned above). If he simply tells his accomplice that such-and-such an item is located in such-and-such a place and would be easy to steal, he incurs no penalty even if the accomplice actually commits the theft. This point applies to many of the rules in which giving a command to do an action that would break the rule would also fulfil the factor of effort: A statement counts as a command only if it is a clear imperative to do the action. Under the few rules where this is not the case, we will note the exception.

None of the texts mention the scenario in which Bhikkhu A tells Bhikkhu B to take an item for him without letting B know that he is committing a theft—for instance, telling B that the item belongs to him (A), that it is ownerless, or letting B come to either conclusion on his own. Nevertheless, it would appear that if B then actually takes the item as told, all of the factors for an offense would be fulfilled for A: He gives the command to take (the imperative the Vibhaṅga uses in illustrating commands to “steal”—avahara—can also simply mean to “take”), he knows that the item belongs to someone else, he intends to have it taken, and it is taken as a result of his command. As for B, he would not be committing an offense, as his state of mind would not fulfil the factors of perception and intention for a theft.

Cases of this sort would not fall under Deceit, discussed below, because that category covers only cases where one deceives the owner of the item, or his agent, into giving the item, and thus technically the item counts as given. Here the item is not given, for the person deceived into taking it is not responsible for it at all.

As with the extrapolation from the discussion of signs, this application of the Great Standards will also be useful when we discuss unauthorized use of credit cards, below. It will also prove useful in our discussion of the following rule.

Shared responsibility

If bhikkhus go in a group to commit a theft but only one of them does the actual taking, all still incur the penalty coming from the theft. Similarly, if they steal valuables worth collectively more than five māsakas but which when divided among them yield shares worth less than five māsakas each, all incur a pārājika. According to the Commentary, any bhikkhus who assist a bhikkhu in a fraudulent case also incur the same offense he does: a pārājika if he wins, a thullaccaya if he loses. This judgment, however, must be qualified by noting that the assistant incurs these penalties only if he perceives the case to be fraudulent.

Special cases

As mentioned above, the notion of stealing covers a wide range of actions. To delineate this range, the texts discuss a variety of actions that border on stealing, some of them coming under this rule, some of them not.

Belongings of the Saṅgha. According to the Commentary to NP 30, an item belongs to the Saṅgha when donors, intending for it to be Saṅgha property, offer it to one or more bhikkhus representing the Saṅgha, and those bhikkhus receive it, although not necessarily into their hands. Saṅgha property thus counts as “what is not given” as far as individual bhikkhus are concerned, for it has an owner—the Saṅgha of all times and places—and is guarded by the individual Community of bhikkhus.

The Canon divides Saṅgha property into two sorts: light/inexpensive (lahu-bhaṇḍa) and heavy/expensive (garu-bhaṇḍa). Light property includes such things as robes, bowls, medicine, and food; heavy property, such things as monastery land, buildings, and furnishings (see BMC2, Chapter 7). The Buddha gave permission for individual Communities to appoint officials to be responsible for the proper use of Saṅgha property. The officials responsible for light property are to distribute it among the members of the Community, following set procedures to ensure that the distribution is fair (see BMC2, Chapter 18). Once an individual member has received such property, he may regard it as his own and use it as he sees fit.

In the case of heavy property, though, the officials are responsible for seeing that it is allotted for proper use in the Community, but the individual bhikkhus allowed to use it may not regard it as their own personal property. This is an important point. At most, such items may be taken on loan or exchanged—with the approval of the Community—for other heavy property of equal value. A bhikkhu who gives such items away to anyone—ordained or not—perceiving it as his to give, incurs a thullaccaya no matter what the value of the object (Cv.VI.15.2—see BMC2, Chapter 7). Of course, if he knows that it is not his to give or take, then in appropriating it as his own he incurs the penalty for stealing.

The Buddha was highly critical of any bhikkhu who gives away heavy property of the Saṅgha. In the origin story to Pr 4, he cites the case of a bhikkhu who, hoping to find favor with a lay person, gives that person some of the Saṅgha’s heavy property. Such a bhikkhu, he says, is one of the five great thieves of the world.

However, the Vinīta-vatthu includes a case where bhikkhus visiting a monastery arrange for a lay person to pick and give them some of the fruit growing in the monastery. The Buddha, in judging the case, states that they committed no offense as they were taking the fruit just for their own consumption. This implies that if they were to take the fruit for other purposes—to have it sold, for instance—they would be guilty of an offense. The Commentary adds that visiting bhikkhus have this right only if the resident bhikkhus are not caring for the fruit trees, if the trees had not been donated to provide funds for a particular purpose in the monastery, or if the resident bhikkhus eat from the trees as if they alone were the owners and are not willing to share. In other words, the visiting bhikkhus, as a matter of courtesy, should ask the residents first. If the residents share, one may take what they offer. If they don’t, and the trees are not dedicated to another purpose, one may take just enough for one’s own consumption. The Commentary also adds that if the monastery is vacant, one may go ahead and take the fruit, for it is meant for all bhikkhus who come.

The Vinīta-vatthu also notes that a bhikkhu who takes heavy property of the Saṅgha donated for use in a particular monastery and uses it elsewhere incurs a dukkaṭa. If he takes it on loan, he commits no offense.

Deceit. If a bhikkhu uses a deliberate lie to deceive another person into giving an item to him, the transgression is treated not as a case of stealing—because, after all, the item is given to him—but rather as a case of lying. If the lie involves making false claims to superior meditative attainments, it is treated under Pr 4. If not, it is treated under Pc 1. The Vinīta-vatthu gives seven examples: five cases where, during a distribution of requisites in the Community, a bhikkhu asks for and is given an extra portion for a non-existent bhikkhu; and two where a bhikkhunī approaches her teacher’s lay supporter and asks for medicines, saying that they will be for her teacher, although she actually ends up using them herself. In all of these cases, the penalty is a pācittiya for lying under Pc 1.

The Commentary, in its discussion of the bhikkhus taking an extra portion for a non-existent bhikkhu, insists that the penalty for lying applies only to cases where donors have already given the requisites to the Community. If, prior to their giving the requisites to the Community, a bhikkhu asks them directly for a portion for a non-existent bhikkhu, the Commentary says that he has committed a theft under this rule. This, however, contradicts the ruling in the two cases involving the bhikkhunī, who asks directly from the donor. Thus it would appear that in any case where a bhikkhu obtains an article from a donor through deceit, the penalty would be the pācittiya for lying.

The question arises, what about a bhikkhu who, given an item to take to someone else, originally plans to take it to the intended recipient but later changes his mind? It does not seem right to impose a heavier penalty on him than on a person who uses deceit to get the item to begin with, so it seems best to impose on him the dukkaṭa for a broken promise (Mv.III.14.1-14—see the discussion under Pc 1). For the principles surrounding the courier’s right to take an item on trust in the donor or the recipient, see the discussion of trust under the non-offense clauses.

Receiving stolen goods. Accepting a gift of goods or purchasing them very cheaply, knowing that they were stolen, would in Western criminal law result in a penalty similar to stealing itself. However, neither the Canon nor the commentaries mention this case. The closest they come is in the Vinīta-vatthu, where a groundskeeper gives bhikkhus fruit from the orchard under his care, even though it was not his to give, and there was no offense for the bhikkhus. From this it can be inferred that there is no offense for receiving stolen goods, even knowingly, although a bhikkhu who does so would not be exempt from the civil law and the consequent proceedings, in the course of which the Community would probably urge him to disrobe.

Compensation owed. The Commentary introduces the concept of bhaṇḍadeyya, or compensation owed, to cover cases where a bhikkhu is responsible for the loss or destruction of another person’s property. It defines this concept by saying that the bhikkhu must pay the price of the object to the owner or give the owner another object of equal value to the one lost or destroyed; if the bhikkhu does not give compensation, and the owner gives up his/her efforts to receive compensation, the bhikkhu incurs a pārājika. The Commentary applies this concept not only to cases where the bhikkhu knowingly and intentionally destroys the object, but also to cases where he borrows or agrees to look after something that then gets lost, stolen, or destroyed through his negligence; or where he takes an item mistakenly thinking that it was discarded or that he was in a position to take it on trust.

To cite a few examples: A bhikkhu breaks another person’s jar of oil or places excrement in the oil to spoil it. A bhikkhu charged with guarding the Community storeroom lets a group of other bhikkhus into the storeroom to fetch belongings they have left there; they forget to close the door and, before he remembers to check it, thieves slip in to steal things. A group of thieves steal a bundle of mangoes but, being chased by the owners, drop it and run; a bhikkhu sees the mangoes, thinks that they have been thrown away, and so eats them after getting someone to present them to him. A bhikkhu sees a wild boar caught in a trap and, out of compassion, sets it free but cannot reconcile the owner of the trap to what he has done. In each of these cases, the Commentary says, the bhikkhu in question owes compensation to the owner of the goods. (In the case of the mangoes, he must compensate not only the owners but also the thieves if it turns out that they had planned to come back and fetch the fruit.) If he abandons his responsibility to the owner(s), he incurs a pārājika.

In making these judgments, the Commentary is probably following the civil law of its day, for the Canon contains no reference at all to the concept of bhaṇḍadeyya, and some of its judgments contradict the Commentary’s. As we noted above, the Vibhaṅga states that if a bhikkhu breaks, scatters, burns, or otherwise renders unusable the property of another person, he incurs a dukkaṭa. When the Vinīta-vatthu discusses cases where a bhikkhu takes an item on mistaken assumptions, or where he feels compassion for an animal caught in a trap and so sets it free, it says that there is no offense. Thus it seems strange for the Commentary to assign a pārājika to an action that, according to the Canon, carries a dukkaṭa or no penalty at all. Of course, it would be a generous policy to offer the owner reasonable compensation, but it is by no means certain that a bhikkhu would have the wherewithal or liberty to do so. Because the Canon does not allow a bhikkhu to ask his supporters for donations to pay to another lay person—except for his parents (Mv.VIII.22; see BMC2, Chapter 10)—there is no way a bhikkhu could raise the needed funds. The Canon places only one responsibility on a bhikkhu who causes material loss to a lay person: The Community, if it sees fit, can force him to apologize to the owner (Cv.I.20; see BMC2, Chapter 20). Beyond that, the Canon does not require that he make material compensation of any kind. Thus, as the Commentary’s concept of bhaṇḍadeyya is clearly foreign to the Canon, there seems no reason to adopt it.

Enforcement of rules. There is one important area in which even the Commentary does not require compensation, and that is when a bhikkhu sees another bhikkhu using an inappropriate object and arranges to have it destroyed. Here the Commentary draws its argument from the origin story to this rule, in which the Buddha orders the bhikkhus to destroy an inappropriately made hut—a “potter’s hut,” which was made from earth and then fired like a pot. From this example, the Commentary draws the following judgment: If a bhikkhu starts to build an inappropriate hut in a certain territory, the “owners” of the territory (i.e., the resident senior bhikkhus) should tell him to stop. If he does not heed their decision and actually builds the hut there, then when they are able to assemble a sufficient number of righteous bhikkhus, the resident senior bhikkhus can send him an order to remove it. If, after the order has been sent three times, the hut is still not removed, the bhikkhus are to dismantle it in such a way that the materials can be reused. The original builder is then to be told to remove the materials. If he doesn’t, then the resident bhikkhus are not responsible for any loss or damage they may undergo.

The Commentary then derives a further principle from this example to say that if Bhikkhu X, who is knowledgeable in the Vinaya, sees Bhikkhu Y using inappropriate requisites of any sort, he is entitled to get them destroyed or reduced to an appropriate form. He is also not obligated to compensate Y for any loss or inconvenience incurred.

Court actions. As stated above, if a bhikkhu knowingly starts an unfair court case against someone else and then wins it in the final court to which the accused makes appeal, he incurs a pārājika. The Commentary to the Bhikkhunīs’ Sg 1, however, states that even if a bhikkhu is actually mistreated by someone—defamed, physically injured, robbed, etc.—and then tries to take a just court action against the guilty party, he incurs a pārājika if he wins. Again, this is an instance where the Commentary has no support from the Canon and, as the Vinaya-mukha points out, its assertion cannot stand. However, the training of a bhikkhu requires that he view all losses in the light of kamma and focus on looking after the state of his mind rather than on seeking compensation in social or material terms.

There is no question in any of the texts that if a bhikkhu is asked to give evidence in a courtroom and does so, speaking in accordance with the facts, he commits no offense no matter what the outcome for the others involved. However, Pc 9 would require that he first be authorized to do so by the Community if his testimony involves reporting the wrongdoing of others. See that rule for further details.

Modern cases

The modern world contains many forms of ownership and monetary exchange that did not exist in the time of the Buddha, and so contains many forms of stealing that did not exist then either. Here are a handful of cases that come to mind as examples of ways in which the standards of this rule might be applied to modern situations.

Infringement of copyright. The international standards for copyright advocated by UNESCO state that infringement of copyright is tantamount to theft. However, in practice, an accusation of copyright infringement is judged not as a case of theft but as one of “fair use,” the issue being the extent to which a person in possession of an item may fairly copy that item for his/her own use or to give or sell to another person without compensating the copyright owner. Thus even a case of “unfair use” would not fulfill the factors of effort and object under this rule, in that—in creating a copy—one is not taking possession of an item that does not belong to one, and one is not depriving the owners of something already theirs. At most, the copyright owners might claim that they are being deprived of compensation owed to them, but as we have argued above, the principle of compensation owed does not rightly belong under this rule. In the terminology of the Canon, a case of unfair use would fall under either of two categories—acting for the material loss of the copyright owners or wrong livelihood—categories that entail a dukkaṭa under the general rule against misbehavior (Cv.V.36). They would also make one eligible for a disciplinary transaction, such as reconciliation or banishment (see BMC2, Chapter 20), which the Community could impose if it saw the infringement as serious enough to merit such a punishment.

Copying computer software. The agreement made when installing software on a computer, by which one agrees not to give the software to anyone else, comes under contract law. As such, a breach of that contract would be treated under the category of “deceit,” described above, which means that a bhikkhu who gives software to a friend in defiance of this contract would incur the penalty for a broken promise. As for the friend—assuming that he is a bhikkhu—the act of receiving the software and putting it on his computer would be treated under the precedent, mentioned above, of the bhikkhus receiving fruit from an orchard groundkeeper not authorized to give it away: He would incur no offense. However, as he must agree to the contract before installing the software on his computer, he would incur a penalty for a broken promise if he then gave the software to someone else in defiance of the contract.

Credit cards. The theft of a credit card would of course be an offense. Because the owner of the card, in most cases, would not be required to pay for the stolen card, the seriousness of a theft of this sort would be determined by how the thief used the card. NP 20 would forbid a bhikkhu from using a credit card to buy anything even if the card were his to use, although a bhikkhu who had gone to the extent of stealing a card would probably not be dissuaded by that rule from using it or having someone else use it for him. In any event, the use of the card would be equivalent to using a stolen key to open a safe. If the thief hands the credit card to a store clerk to make a purchase, that would count as a gesture telling the clerk to transfer funds from the account of the credit card company. Because such operations are automated, the clerk’s attempt to have the funds transferred would count not as an act of deceit but an act of taking. If the credit card company’s machines authorize the transaction, then the theft occurs as soon as funds are transferred from one account to another. The seriousness of the theft would be calculated in line with the principle of the “prior plan” mentioned above.

In a situation where the funds, if transferred, would entail a pārājika, then if the machines do not authorize the transaction, the bhikkhu trying to use the card would incur a thullaccaya for getting the clerk to attempt the transfer. If the clerk, doubting the bhikkhu’s right to use the card, refuses to attempt the transfer, the bhikkhu would incur a dukkaṭa in making the gesture of command.

Similar considerations would apply to the unauthorized use of debit cards, ATM cards, phone cards, personal identification numbers, or any other means by which funds would be transferred from the owner’s account by automated means.

A forged check drawn on a bank where the scanning and approval of checks is fully automated would fall under this category. If drawn on a bank where an employee would be responsible for approving the check, the entire case would come under false dealing, discussed above.

Unauthorized telephone or Internet use would count as theft only if the charges were automatically transferred from the owner’s account. If the owner is simply billed for the charges, he/she could refuse to pay, and so no theft would have occurred. This would count, not as a theft, but as promise made in bad faith, which would incur a pācittiya. If, however, the case seemed serious enough, and the pācittiya too light a punishment, the Community could impose a disciplinary transaction on the offender.

Impounded items—such as a repaired automobile kept in a mechanic’s shop—would apparently be treated in a similar way to smuggled goods.

Non-offenses

In addition to the blanket exemptions mentioned under the preceding rule, the Vibhaṅga’s non-offense clauses here list six exemptions to this rule. Two relate to the status of the object, two to the factor of perception, and two to the factor of intention.

Object

There is no offense if a bhikkhu takes an object belonging (1) to a peta (§) or (2) to an animal (§). Thus there is no offense in taking the remains of a lion’s kill, regardless of how possessive the lion may feel, although the Commentary wisely advises waiting until the lion has eaten enough of its kill no longer to be hungry, for otherwise the bhikkhu may become lion’s kill himself.

The term peta, as used in the Canon, includes not only hungry ghosts, but also human corpses. In the early days of the religion, bhikkhus were expected to make their robes from discarded cloth, one source being the cloths used to wrap corpses laid in charnel grounds. (The bhikkhus would wash and boil the cloth before using it themselves.) However, they were not to take cloth from undecomposed bodies, and here is why:

“Now at that time a certain bhikkhu went to the charnel ground and took hold of discarded cloth on a body not yet decomposed. But the spirit of the dead one was (still) dwelling in that body. Then it said to the bhikkhu, ‘Venerable sir, don’t take hold of my cloak.’ The bhikkhu, disregarding it, went off (with the cloak). Then the body, rising up, followed right behind the bhikkhu. Then the bhikkhu, entering his dwelling, closed the door. Then the body fell down right there.”

The story gives no further details, and we are left to imagine for ourselves both the bhikkhu’s state of mind while being chased by the body and his friends’ reaction to the event. As is usual with the stories in the Vibhaṅga, the more outrageous the event, the more matter-of-fact is its telling, and the more its humor lies in the understatement.

At any rate, as a result of this incident the Buddha laid down a dukkaṭa for taking cloth from an undecomposed body—which, according to the Commentary, means one that is still warm.

The Commentary also classes devas under petas here and states that a bhikkhu may take a deva’s belongings with no penalty. It illustrates this point with two examples. In the first, a bhikkhu takes a piece of cloth left hanging on a tree as an offering to a deva. In the second, a bhikkhu with clairvoyant powers gains a vision of Sakka, the king of the devas, who is wearing an expensive cloth. The bhikkhu takes the cloth with the intention of making a robe for himself, even though Sakka keeps screaming, “Don’t take it! Don’t take it!” This latter example may have been included in the Commentary simply for its shock value in order to wake up sleepy students in the back of the room. Even if the Commentary is right in saying that the bhikkhu in question did not incur an offense, there’s no denying he’s a fool.

Perception

There is no offense if a bhikkhu takes an object perceiving it (1) to be his own or (2) to have been thrown away (§). The Commentary states that if the bhikkhu finds out that the object does indeed have an owner, he owes the owner compensation and would be guilty of an offense when the owner abandons his efforts to gain that compensation. As we have already noted, the concept of compensation owed has no basis in the Canon, but if the object still lies in the bhikkhu’s possession and he decides not to return it, that decision would count as a thieving intention. The theft of the object could then be treated under the category of a borrowed object, which in practice has the same effect as the Commentary’s notion of compensation owed: The theft would be accomplished when the owner abandons his/her efforts to regain possession. However, if the object no longer exists (it was consumed by the bhikkhu or destroyed) or is no longer in the bhikkhu’s possession (he lost it or gave it away), the resolution of the issue is purely a individual matter between the bhikkhu and the owner, although as we noted above, the Community, if it sees fit, could force the bhikkhu to apologize to the owner.

Intention

There is no offense if a bhikkhu takes an object (1) on trust or (2) temporarily.

To rightly take an object on trust, Mv.VIII.19.1 states that five conditions must be met:

a. The owner is an acquaintance.

b. He/she is an intimate.

c. He/she has spoken of the matter. (According to the Commentary, this means that he/she has said, “You may take any of my property you want.”)

d. He/she is still alive.

e. One knows that he/she will be pleased at one’s taking it.

The Commentary to this rule states that in practice only three of these conditions need to be met: the fourth, the fifth, and any one of the first three. As the Vinaya-mukha notes, there are good practical reasons for adopting the Commentary’s interpretation here. There is also the formal reason that otherwise the first two conditions would be redundant.

Mv.VIII.31.2-3 discusses how an item can be rightly taken on trust if a bhikkhu, as courier, is conveying it from a donor to an intended recipient. The deciding factor is what the donor says while handing over the item, which apparently determines who exercises rights of ownership over the item while it is in transit. If the donor says, “Give this to so-and-so” (which means that ownership has not yet been transferred to the recipient), one may rightly take the item on trust in the donor but not in the recipient. If he/she says, “I give this to so-and-so” (which transfers ownership to the recipient), one may rightly take the item on trust in the recipient but not in the donor. If, before the courier can convey the item to the intended the recipient, he learns that the owner—as determined by the donor’s statement—happens to die, he may determine the item as an inheritance from the owner.

In both cases where the item may be legitimately taken on trust, none of the texts discuss whether the factors listed in Mv.VIII.19.1 also have to be met or whether the allowances here are a special exemption to those factors granted specifically to couriers. However, because the allowances are so particular about who maintains ownership over the article while it is in transit, it would seem that the owner would have the right to express satisfaction or dissatisfaction over the courier’s taking the item on trust. This further suggests that the courier would have to take the owner’s perceived wishes into account, which implies that the factors listed in Mv.VIII.19.1 still hold here.

The Vinīta-vatthu treats the case of a bhikkhu who takes an item mistakenly thinking that he had the right to take it on trust; the Buddha termed this a “misconception as to trust” and did not impose a penalty. The Commentary to this rule adds that if the original owner informs one that he is displeased because he sincerely wanted to keep the item for another use, one should return it to him; but, in line with the Vinīta-vatthu, it does not indicate a penalty for not returning it. If the owner is displeased with one for other reasons, the Commentary says, there is no need to return the item.

As for taking an item temporarily, the Commentary says this means taking it with the intention that (a) “I’ll return it” or (b) “I’ll make compensation.” There is support in the Vibhaṅga for including (a) here, but none for (b). If the Commentary included (b) to cover cases where a bhikkhu borrows an object but then happens to lose or destroy it, there is no need to include it, for as we have already explained, a bhikkhu is under no compulsion to compensate people for items lost or destroyed. If the Commentary meant it to cover cases where a bhikkhu takes ownership of an object belonging to a person with whom he has not established trust and with whom he plans to discuss compensation later, it doesn’t really fit under this exemption, for one is taking permanent possession of the item. Given the strict conditions that the Canon places on the exemption for taking an item on trust, it seems unlikely that its compilers would have countenanced an exemption for a bhikkhu to go around imposing unilateral trades, taking possession of items on the unfounded assumption that the owners would gladly accept compensation at a later time. If there is any place for this sort of exemption in the Vibhaṅga’s framework, it would be as a variant on taking on trust. Thus it would have to meet the following factors: The owner is an acquaintance or an intimate or has spoken of the matter; he/she is still alive; and one knows that he/she would be pleased if one takes the item and gives compensation later.

In addition to the exemptions listed under the non-offense clauses, the Vinīta-vatthu contains ten other types of cases that involve no offense under this rule. Some of these have already been mentioned in the above discussions, but it is convenient to have them gathered in one place.

—A bhikkhu, seeing an expensive garment, feels a desire to steal it but does not act on the desire. The commentaries take this as a general principle for all rules, that the mere arising of a mind state does not constitute an offense.

—A bhikkhu, seeing a cloak blown up by a whirlwind, catches it to return it to the owners.

—A bhikkhu takes an item on trust but later discovers that the trust is misconceived.

—A bhikkhu goes through a customs house, not knowing that a dutiable item is among his belongings.

—Visiting bhikkhus, for the sake of food, take fruit from a tree belonging to the Saṅgha.

—Bhikkhus receive fruit from the guardian of an orchard, even though the guardian is not entitled to give the fruit away.

—A bhikkhu, seeing an item left lying about, puts it away so that it won’t get lost. The owner comes looking for the item and asks, “Who stole it?” The bhikkhu, perhaps ironically, responds, “I stole it.” The owner then charges him with a theft. The case goes to the Buddha, who says that the bhikkhu committed no offense, in that his answer was just a manner of speaking and not an actual acknowledgement of a theft.

—A bhikkhu, out of compassion, releases an animal caught in a hunter’s snare.

—Ven. Ajjuka points out a bequest to an heir in line with the original owner’s wishes.

—Ven. Pilindavaccha uses his psychic powers to retrieve a pair of kidnapped children. The Buddha states that this entails no penalty because such a thing lies in the province of those with psychic power. The Vinaya-mukha, in discussing this case, takes it as a precedent for saying that if a bhikkhu returns a stolen article to its legal owner, there is no offense. The Buddha’s statement, though, was probably meant to discourage bhikkhus without psychic powers from getting directly involved in righting wrongs of this sort. If a bhikkhu without psychic powers happens to learn of the whereabouts of stolen goods, kidnapped children, etc., he may inform the authorities, if he sees fit, and let them handle the situation themselves. However, for safety’s sake, a bhikkhu living in a wilderness frequented by thieves would be wise not to be perceived as siding either with the thieves or the authorities.

Summary: The theft of anything worth 1/24 ounce troy of gold or more is a pārājika offense.

*    *    *

3

Should any bhikkhu intentionally deprive a human being of life, or search for an assassin for him, or praise the advantages of death, or incite him to die (saying): “My good man, what use is this evil, miserable life to you? Death would be better for you than life,” or with such an idea in mind, such a purpose in mind, should in various ways praise the advantages of death or incite him to die, he also is defeated and no longer in affiliation.

This rule against intentionally causing the death of a human being is best understood in terms of five factors, all of which must be present for there to be the full offense.

1) Object: a human being, which according to the Vibhaṅga includes human fetuses as well, counting from the time consciousness first arises in the womb immediately after conception up to the time of death.

2) Intention: knowingly, consciously, deliberately, and purposefully wanting to cause that person’s death. “Knowingly” also includes the factor of—

3) Perception: perceiving the person as a living being.

4) Effort: whatever one does with the purpose of causing that person to die.

5) Result: The life-faculty of the person is cut as the result of one’s act.

Object

The Vibhaṅga defines a human being as a person “from the time consciousness first becomes manifest in a mother’s womb, up to its death-time.” As DN 15 makes clear, the presence of the new being’s consciousness is necessary for the embryo to survive in the womb. Thus the survival of the embryo in the womb is a clear sign that consciousness is present. This means that consciousness is manifest from the moment of conception.

From this it follows that a bhikkhu who intentionally causes an abortion—by arranging for the operation, supplying the medicines, or advising a woman to get an abortion and she follows through—incurs a pārājika. A bhikkhu who encourages a woman to use a means of contraception that works after the point of conception would be guilty of a pārājika if she were to follow his advice.

There is a series of cases in the Vinīta-vatthu in which bhikkhus provide medicines for women seeking an abortion, followed by two cases in which a bhikkhu provides medicines to a barren woman who wants to become fertile and to a fertile woman who wants to become barren. In neither of these two latter cases does anyone die or suffer pain, but in both cases the bhikkhu incurs a dukkaṭa. From this, the Commentary infers that bhikkhus are not to act as doctors to lay people, an inference supported by the Vibhaṅga to Sg 13. (The Commentary, though, gives a number of exceptions to this principle. See the discussion in BMC2, Chapter 5.)

The question arises as to whether one’s own life would qualify as “object” under this rule—in other words, the extent to which attempted suicides are covered here. The Vibhaṅga to this rule mentions three types of suicide, treating each of them differently.

a) In the origin story, bhikkhus search for assassins, i.e., get other people to take their lives. That action is directly mentioned in the rule and explained in the Vibhaṅga, so it does come under the rule.

b) The Vinīta-vatthu includes a case in which a bhikkhu tries to commit suicide by throwing himself over a cliff, and the Buddha formulates a separate rule to cover that case. The penalty assigned by the rule, however, does not fit the pattern for derived offenses under this rule, which shows that an attempted suicide of that sort would not be treated here.

c) The origin story also tells of bhikkhus who take their own lives, but the main rule here does not mention that action, nor does the Vibhaṅga discuss it. The Commentary extrapolates from the rule in case (b) to cover almost all attempts at suicide, but there are reasons for questioning the Commentary’s reasoning on this issue. For a discussion, see “Special cases,” below.

The Vibhaṅga states that a bhikkhu who kills a “non-human being”—a yakkha, nāga, or peta—incurs a thullaccaya. The Commentary adds a devatā to this list, and goes on to say that a spirit possessing a human being or an animal can be exorcised in either of two ways. The first is to command it to leave: This causes no injury to the spirit and results in no offense. The second is to make a doll out of flour paste or clay and then to cut off various of its parts (!). If one cuts off the hands and feet, the spirit loses its hands and feet. If one cuts off the head, the spirit dies, which is grounds for a thullaccaya.

A bhikkhu who intentionally kills a common animal is treated under Pc 61.

Intention & perception

The Vibhaṅga defines the factor of intention in three contexts—the word-analysis, the non-offense clauses, and the Vinīta-vatthu—analyzing it with one set of terms in the first context, and another set in the last two. There are two ways of interpreting the discrepancy: Either the two sets differ only in language but not in substance, or they actually differ in substance. The Commentary, without seeming to notice what it is doing, adopts the second interpretation. In other words, it defines the factors of intention in markedly different ways in the different contexts, yet does not assert that one set of terms is more authoritative than the other or even take note of the differences between them. In fact, it takes one of the terms common to the non-offense clauses and the Vinīta-vatthu and defines it in one way in one context and another in the other. All of this creates a great deal of confusion.

A more fruitful way of analyzing the two sets of terms, which we will adopt here, is to assume that they differ only in language but not in substance. We will take as our framework the set of terms used in the non-offense clauses and the Vinīta-vatthu, as it is clearer and more amply illustrated than the other set, and then refer to the other set, along with some of the explanations from the Commentary, when these help to give a more refined understanding of what the non-offense clauses and Vinīta-vatthu are saying.

The non-offense clauses state that there is no offense for a bhikkhu who acts unintentionally, not knowing, or without aiming at death. In the Vinīta-vatthu, unintentionally is used to describe cases in which a bhikkhu acts accidentally, such as dropping a poorly held stone, brick, or adze; removing a pestle from a shelf and accidentally knocking off another one. Not knowing is used in cases in which the bhikkhu deliberately does an action but without knowing that his action could cause death. An example would be giving food to a friend not knowing that it is poisoned. Not aiming at death is used in cases where the bhikkhu deliberately does an action but does not intend that action to result in death. Relevant examples include trying to help a bhikkhu who is choking on food by slapping him on the back and inadvertently causing his death; telling a bhikkhu to stand on a piece of scaffolding while helping with construction work, only to see the scaffolding collapse; describing the joys of heaven to an audience, only to have a member of the audience decide to commit suicide in hopes of going there.

Thus, to fulfill the factor of intention here, a bhikkhu must be acting intentionally, knowingly, and aiming at death.

The word-analysis covers all the same points—although it shuffles the terms around—when it defines intentionally as “having willed, having made the decision knowingly and consciously.” Without teasing out the differences in terminology, we may simply note the important point added in its analysis, which is that an act of manslaughter counts as intentional here only when the bhikkhu has made a clear decision to kill. Thus if he were to strike a person unthinkingly in a sudden fit of rage, without being clear about what his intention was, it would not qualify as “intentional” here. The Commentary seconds this point when it defines having made the decision as “having summoned up a reckless mind state, ‘crushing’ through the power of an attack.” The Sub-commentary does not explain crushing or attack here, but apparently they mean aggressively overcoming, through a brute act of will, any contrary or hesitant thoughts in the mind.

The Vinīta-vatthu contains a few cases where bhikkhus kill people in situations where they did not even know that there was a person there: throwing a stone over a precipice, not knowing that there was a person standing below; sitting down on a pile of cloth on a chair, not knowing that a child was underneath the cloth; and setting fire to a grove, not knowing that there were people in the grove. The Buddha dismisses the first two cases without explanation as not coming under this rule. The last he classifies as an example of not aiming at death. We can conclude from this example that aiming at death must include the perception that there was someone there who could die. The Commentary seconds this conclusion in its analysis of the phrase knowingly and consciously in the word-analysis’s definition of intentionally. Although it again shuffles the terms around—using consciously to describe what the Vinīta-vatthu describes as knowingly—the important point in its conclusion is that an essential element in the factor of intention is the factor of perception: In its words, one must be aware that, “This is a living being.”

Note that, given this definition, one need not know that the living being is a human being for the factor of perception to be fulfilled. The Commentary illustrates this point with an example in which a bhikkhu who, seeing a goat lying down in a certain spot during the day, decides to return to that spot to kill the goat that night. In the meantime, however, the goat gets up and a man comes to lie down in its place. The bhikkhu approaches the man in the dark, still thinking him to be a goat, and kills him. The verdict: a pārājika.

Although this judgment may seem strange, there is nothing in the Canon to contradict it. The closest case in the Vinīta-vatthu concerns a bhikkhu who digs a pitfall with the intention that whatever living beings fall into it will perish. The penalty, if an animal dies as a result, is a pācittiya; if a human being, a pārājika. In this case, the intention/perception of killing a living being is broad enough to include a human being, and so fulfills the relevant factors here.

In discussing this last case, the Commentary notes that if one digs the pitfall but then renounces one’s intention to cause death, one has to completely fill in the pitfall in such a way that it cannot cause injury—even to the extent of causing someone to stumble—if one wants to avoid the penalty coming from any injury the pitfall might cause. If the pitfall is only partially filled in and a person stumbles into it and later dies from his injuries, the bhikkhu incurs the full offense under this rule. The same judgment applies to any other attempt to kill not aimed at a particular victim. For instance, if a bhikkhu harboring this sort of general intention builds a trap but then changes his mind, he has to destroy the trap so thoroughly that it cannot be reassembled. Similarly, when a bhikkhu writes a passage describing the advantages of dying (see below) with the thought that anyone who reads it might decide to commit suicide, if he then changes his mind he has to destroy the writing so thoroughly that it cannot be pieced together. If, instead of writing the passage himself, he simply picks up a pre-existing written passage of this sort and then—with a similar intention—puts it in a place where it might be easily seen, he can avoid any penalty simply by returning the passage to the place where he found it.

In discussing the topic of pitfalls, the Commentary also treats the issue of how much of an intention counts when setting up a situation that might cause death. Specifically, it asks whether—while one is digging a hole for another purpose—a passing thought that “this hole could kill anyone who fell into it” would fulfil the factor of intention under this rule, or whether this factor would be fulfilled only if the original purpose for digging the hole was to cause death. The Commentary notes that opinions are divided on this point, but it sides with the latter position.

The Vinīta-vatthu contains an unusual case of a bhikkhu who uses a friend as a guinea pig for testing poison. The friend dies, and the bhikkhu incurs only a thullaccaya. The Commentary explains this by distinguishing two types of test: one to see if a particular poison is strong enough to kill a person; the other, to see if a particular person is strong enough to survive the poison. In either of these cases, the bhikkhu incurs a thullaccaya regardless of whether the victim dies. If, though, the bhikkhu gives poison to a person with the desire that it cause that person’s death, he incurs a pārājika if the victim dies, and a thullaccaya if not.

The Vinīta-vatthu also includes a case in which bhikkhus, out of compassion for an ill friend, hasten his death and thus incur the full offense under this rule. This shows that impulse and motive are irrelevant in defining the factor of intention here.

Effort

This factor covers four types of action: taking life, arranging an assassin, describing the advantages of dying, and inciting a person to die.

a) Taking life

The Vibhaṅga defines taking life as “the cutting off, the ending, of the life faculty; interrupting the continuity.” The Vibhaṅga lists a variety of means by which one might try to do this, which the Commentary divides into four categories:

—One’s own person: hitting with one’s hands or feet; using weapons such as knives, sticks, clubs, etc.; handing poison to a person; giving a pregnant woman medicine that would cause an abortion; moving an ill person.

—Throwing: hurling a stone, shooting an arrow. At present, shooting a gun or hurling a grenade would come under this category.

—Stationary devices: setting a trap, digging a pitfall, placing a weapon in a place where a victim may fall, sit, or lie down on it; placing poison in food, etc. At present, setting out a land mine would come under this category.

—Commanding: telling another person to commit a murder. This category includes recommendations expressed in the imperative as well as express commands. A few examples:

Telling B to kill C. The way in which a bhikkhu is penalized for getting another person to commit a murder—through sign or verbal command—can be inferred from the discussion of accomplices under the preceding rule. The Vibhaṅga here, as under that rule, states that if one’s accomplice does not follow one’s instructions precisely, one is absolved of an offense. In discussing this point, the Commentary goes into great detail concerning the six ways the command to kill can be specified: the object [the person to be killed], the time, the place, the weapon to use, the action by which the weapon is to be used [e.g., “Stab him in the neck”], and the position the victim should be in [sitting, standing, lying down] when the act is to be done. If the instigator specifies any of these things and yet his accomplice does not carry them out to the letter, the instigator does not incur the penalty for the actual murder. For instance, Bhikkhu A tells his student B to kill C while C is sitting in meditation at midnight. The student gets into C’s room at midnight, only to find C asleep in bed, which is where he kills him. Bhikkhu A thus incurs only the thullaccaya for convincing his student to accept the command.

As under the preceding rule, the Commentary tries to argue that if B will certainly succeed in killing C in line with A’s command, A incurs a pārājika when giving the command, but again, this opinion does not conform with the Vibhaṅga.

The case of the innocent accomplice—one who does not know that the action he is being told to do will result in death—also seems relevant here, as in the case where a bhikkhu prepares a syringe of poison and tells his accomplice, who thinks the syringe contains medicine, to inject it into a patient. There seems every reason to impose a pārājika on the bhikkhu if the patient then dies, but the accomplice would incur no offense.

Recommending means of abortion.

Recommending means of euthanasia. The Vinīta-vatthu includes a case of a criminal who has just been punished by having his hands and feet cut off. A bhikkhu asks the man’s relatives, “Do you want him to die? Then make him drink buttermilk (§) (!).” The relatives follow the bhikkhu’s recommendation, the man dies, and the bhikkhu incurs a pārājika.

Recommending means of capital punishment. Again from the Vinīta-vatthu: A bhikkhu tells an executioner to kill his victims mercifully with a single blow, rather than torturing them. The executioner follows his advice and the bhikkhu incurs a pārājika, for the recommendation to kill mercifully is still a recommendation to kill. According to the Vinīta-vatthu, if the executioner says that he will not follow the bhikkhu’s advice and then kills his victims as he pleases, the bhikkhu incurs no penalty. The Commentary adds that if the executioner tries to follow the bhikkhu’s advice and yet needs more than one blow to do the job, the bhikkhu incurs a thullaccaya.

Indirect statements. The Canon and Commentary differ as to whether indirect statements that are not imperatives would also qualify as commands or recommendations under this rule. The Commentary maintains that a bhikkhu cannot get around a penalty by phrasing his wish for a murder in more roundabout ways, and gives an example in which a bhikkhu tells people, “In such-and-such a place a bandit is staying. Whoever cuts off his head will receive great honor from the King.” If any of the bhikkhu’s listeners kills the bandit as a result of his instigation, the Commentary says, the bhikkhu incurs a pārājika.

Examples of commands and recommendations in the Canon, however, are all expressed as imperatives: “Do this!” “If you want him to die, do this.” The only examples of indirect statements are those in which a bhikkhu expresses a wish, “O, if only so-and-so were murdered.” According to the Vibhaṅga, this statement incurs a dukkaṭa regardless of whether it is made in public or private, and regardless of whether one knows that anyone else is overhearing it or not. There is no discussion, however, of what one’s intention might be in making the statement, nor of the consequences for the speaker if anyone, inspired by his remark, actually kills the person in question. This implies that the authors of the Vibhaṅga did not regard statements of this sort as fulfilling the factor of effort under this rule. This may seem unduly lenient, but given that a bhikkhu whose express command to kill is followed but not to the letter would also incur only a thullaccaya, this judgment seems consistent with the Vibhaṅga’s pattern of assigning penalties.

In addition to the four above categories of means of killing, the Commentary includes two of its own:

—Magical formulae: reciting passages that call on malevolent spirits to bring about a person’s death, using voodoo, etc.

—Psychic powers: using the “evil eye” or other similar innate powers.

The Canon contains a number of passages—MN 56 is one example—describing people who, “developed in mind,” use their powers to kill. The Commentary notes the existence of these passages and of “some teachers” who cite them as proof that meditative powers can be used in this way, but it dismisses the idea on the grounds that meditative powers are skillful and based on pleasant mental states, whereas the act of killing is unskillful and based on painful mental states. The Sub-commentary adds that the powers described in the Canon are actually based on magical formulae. Still, because the success of these formulae depends on a certain level of concentration, it would seem that using one’s powers of concentration to kill would fulfil the factor of effort here.

b) Arranging an assassin

As the rule indicates, a bhikkhu may commit an offense under this rule not only by using any of the six above-mentioned means of taking life but also by “searching for an assassin.” The Vibhaṅga explains this phrase in the rule simply with a list of weapons: a sword, a spear, a harpoon (§—BD omits this item), a skewer/stake, a club, a stone, a knife, poison, or a rope. There are two ways of making sense of this list. One is that, because the Pali word for assassin is literally “knife-carrier” (satthahāraka), the Vibhaṅga is taking pains to explain that an assassin might also use other weapons aside from a knife. The other way of interpreting the list, favored by the Commentary, is to view the Vibhaṅga’s list as an attempt to define the word satthahāraka—which, according to the Commentary, is a general term for a murderous weapon. The Commentary then goes on to say that the entire phrase searching for an assassin means setting up a stationary device, as described above. There are two problems with this interpretation, the first being that the word satthahāraka clearly means “assassin” in other parts of the Canon (see, for example, MN 145); the second being that this interpretation makes the phrase entirely superfluous: setting up a stationary device is already covered by another part of the rule. Thus we will follow the first interpretation of the Vibhaṅga’s explanation of the phrase: It is indicating that an assassin may use any weapon at all.

The question remains, however, as to how this interpretation is not redundant with commanding under the explanation of the ways of taking life. The answer appears to be this: The word satthahāraka is most commonly used in the Canon in the context of an assisted suicide, in which a person who wants to die but cannot bring himself to commit suicide arranges for someone else, a satthahāraka, to kill him. Thus the inclusion of this phrase in the rule means that a bhikkhu intent on dying who arranges for someone else to do the job for him would incur all the derived offenses leading up to the actual death. At present, this would rule out trying to get a doctor to arrange an assisted suicide for oneself. If one were to help arrange an assisted suicide for someone else, the case would come under commanding, above, as would the case of arranging an assassin for someone else not at that person’s request.

As we will see below, cases where one tries to kill oneself without arranging for someone else to do the job would not come under this rule. The apparent reason for making a distinction and including the act of “searching for an assassin” to kill oneself under this rule is that, in doing so, one would be asking another person to take on the seriously unskillful kamma of taking a human life.

The Commentary’s most useful comment in this context is its assertion that searching here must mean actually arranging, because the simple act of looking for an assassin without actually finding one would not incur any of the offenses under this rule.

c) Describing the advantages of dying

This, the third type of act covered by this rule, can include berating a sick person (“Why do you keep hanging on to life like this? Don’t you realize what a burden you are to others?”) or simply telling a person of the miseries of life or the bliss of dying and going to heaven in such a way that he/she might feel inspired to commit suicide or simply pine away to death. The Vinīta-vatthu also includes under this type of act any statements that a nurse might make out of compassion to shorten the miseries of an illness by encouraging a patient to let go of life so as not to dawdle in the face of death. Thus, the Commentary notes, a bhikkhu talking to a dying patient should be very circumspect in how he chooses his words, focusing not on how to speed up the dying process but on how to inspire the patient with the following thoughts: “The attainment of the paths and fruitions is not out of the ordinary for a virtuous person. So, having formed no attachment for such things as your dwelling, and establishing mindfulness in the Buddha, Dhamma, Saṅgha, or the body, you should be heedful in your attention.” The Vinīta-vatthu to Pr 4 contains a number of stories in which bhikkhus comfort a dying bhikkhu by asking him to reflect on what he has attained through the practice, which was apparently a common way of encouraging a dying bhikkhu to focus his thoughts on the best object possible. The suttas also contain advice on how to encourage patients facing death. See, for example, MN 143, SN 36:7, SN 55:54, and AN 6:16. In all of these cases, the advice is aimed not at precipitating death but at inspiring calm and insight.

The Vibhaṅga notes that a statement describing the advantages of dying would fulfill the factor of effort regardless of whether delivered by gesture, by voice, by writing, or by means of a messenger. The same holds true for any statements under the next type of act.

d) Inciting a person to die

Inciting a person to die, the fourth type of act, covers:

—Recommending suicide. This includes not only telling a person to commit suicide but also giving advice—whether requested or not—on the best ways to commit the act.

—Telling a person to go to a dangerous place where he/she might die of the dangers.

—Arranging a terrible sight, sound, etc., to frighten a person to death, or a beautiful, “heart-stirring” one to attract a person who will then pine away to death when it fades.

Four issues arise in relation to the above ways of killing:

Command. Giving a command or recommendation to get another person to perform any of these last three types of action—arranging an assassin, describing the advantages of dying, or inciting another person to die—would also fulfill the factor of effort under this rule.

Inaction. Given the Vibhaṅga’s definition of taking life, we can infer that inaction does not fulfill the factor of effort here, for it does not cut off the life faculty. Thus if a bhikkhu sits idly when seeing a flood sweep a person downstream, he commits no offense—regardless of his feelings about the person’s death—even if the person then drowns. Recommending that another person sit idly as well would also not fulfill the factor of effort here, because the category of command covers only the act of inciting the listener to do any of the four actions that would fulfill the factor of effort under this rule.

Medical care and life-support. The same holds true if a bhikkhu decides not to give a patient a treatment—or to discontinue treatment—that might conceivably extend the patient’s life: It does not fulfill the factor of effort, for such acts do not cut off the life faculty. At most they simply allow it to end on its own. The Canon supports this inference by treating such actions not under this rule but under Mv.VIII.26.3-4, where it imposes only a dukkaṭa on the act of refusing to give any treatment at all to an ill bhikkhu, or of discontinuing all care for an ill bhikkhu prior to his recovery or death. This shows that the compilers of the Canon did not regard these acts as cutting off the life faculty. (Mv.VIII.26.8 lists the ideal characteristics of a bhikkhu who tends to the sick, but does not impose a penalty on a bhikkhu who cares for the sick but lacks the ideal qualities; at no point does the Canon impose a required level of care for the sick. The compilers’ refusal to mandate a level of care is wise. If there were a case in which the bhikkhus did not feel that that level of care was appropriate for their patient, they would have only one option: to abandon the patient, so as to incur only a dukkaṭa and not the potentially higher penalty for not measuring up to the mandated care. Thus, instead of protecting the patient, a higher level of mandated care would expose the patient to abandonment.) For this reason, deciding to withhold or discontinue a particular treatment—while still continuing otherwise to care for the patient—would not be grounds for an offense.

If, however, a bhikkhu caring for a patient acts in a way to cut off the patient’s life faculty, that would fulfill the factor of effort here. The Vinīta-vatthu makes this point with a set of cases in which bhikkhus give patients treatments that are actually harmful for the patients. In the instances where the other factors for an offense are present—the bhikkhus mean to kill the patient, and the patient dies—the bhikkhus incur the full offense. In another set of cases, a bhikkhu feeling pity for a friend in severe pain praises the pleasures that await him after death. Again, in the instances where the bhikkhu intends to bring about the patient’s death and the patient dies, the bhikkhu incurs a pārājika.

For more on the topic of medical care, see BMC2, Chapter 5.

Shared responsibility. Unlike the Vibhaṅga to the preceding rule, the Vibhaṅga here does not explicitly discuss the issue of how to allot penalties when a group of bhikkhus acts together to commit a murder but only one of them delivers the fatal blow. However, the Vinīta-vatthu contains a series of cases in which bhikkhus act as a group to give a treatment to a sick bhikkhu with the aim of ending his life. When the bhikkhu dies, all of them incur a pārājika. In one of the cases the bhikkhu dies from a medical treatment to the nose, in another he dies from eating food. None of the texts discuss whether all the bhikkhus in question took turns giving the fatal dosage, or if only one of the bhikkhus did while the others helped to prepare it. Given that arranging an assassin would fulfil the factor of effort under this rule, it seems reasonable to infer that actively assisting in a murder would also fulfil the factor, even if one does not deliver the fatal blow. From this inference we can conclude that the discussion of shared responsibility under the preceding rule would also apply here.

Result

This factor is fulfilled if, as a result of the bhikkhu’s action, the victim dies through the cutting of his/her life-faculty. Because the life-faculty is something that inevitably ends, there is a need to define clearly how far the influences of a bhikkhu’s actions should be traced for him to be considered responsible for a death.

The Commentary treats this issue by posing two scenarios under its discussion of pitfalls. In the first, an intended victim survives a fall into a pitfall, manages to climb out, but later dies of a disease incurred from the fall. In this case, the Commentary says, the factor of result is fulfilled. The same holds true if the disease goes into remission only to return and take the victim’s life many years later. If complications arise from the disease, however, and the victim dies from a combination of the disease and its complications, then if the original disease was the predominant factor in the death, the bhikkhu would be responsible for the victim’s death; if the complications were the predominant factor, he would not.

In the second scenario, an intended victim falls into the pitfall while being chased by thieves but does not die in the fall. Instead, the thieves catch up with him, drag him out of the pitfall, and kill him. In this case, the bhikkhu is still responsible for the victim’s death because his pitfall was instrumental in enabling the thieves to catch and kill the victim.

The Commentary also considers a different sort of case related to the factor of result: If a bhikkhu means to cause the death of a group of people, then when any member of the group dies as a result of his efforts, the Commentary says that he incurs a pārājika. In other words, he does not have to fulfill his intention of killing the whole group in order to fulfill the factor of result here.

Derived penalties

The Canon assigns lesser penalties in cases where a bhikkhu tries to cause a person’s death through any of the four means mentioned in this rule and yet the person does not die. If the person experiences pain or injury as a result of the bhikkhu’s efforts, the penalty is a thullaccaya. If the bhikkhu’s efforts result in neither pain nor death, the penalty is a dukkaṭa for each separate action involved in the attempt.

If a bhikkhu intends simply to injure the victim or cause him/her pain, and yet the victim dies as a result of the bhikkhu’s actions, the case is treated under Pc 74.

There is an apparent contradiction in the Vinīta-vatthu concerning the penalty for a bhikkhu who tries to kill one person but ends up killing another instead. In one case it says that a bhikkhu who means to kill X but kills Y instead incurs a pārājika. In another case it tells of a bhikkhu who gives medicine to a woman who wants to commit an abortion near the end of a full-term pregnancy. The woman takes the medicine but, instead of the fetus’ aborting, the woman dies and the infant survives. In this case, the bhikkhu incurs a thullaccaya, presumably for the pain he caused the infant.

The Commentary tries to resolve this contradiction with an illustration: A bhikkhu with a grudge against A decides to ambush him. He sees B coming down the road and, mistaking him for A, shoots him dead on the spot. Because his intention was to kill the person he was aiming at, he incurs a pārājika. We can call this a case of mistaken identity. In cases of this sort, whether the “right” or the “wrong” person dies is of no consequence to the offense.

If, however, the bhikkhu is a poor shot, takes aim at B but misses him, and inadvertently kills C instead, he does not incur a pārājika, for he did not intend to kill C during any part of his action. His only penalties are the dukkaṭas he incurs while preparing for B’s murder.

Special cases

The Vinīta-vatthu includes three special cases that touch on this rule but inspired the Buddha to formulate separate rules to deal specifically with them:

1) A bhikkhu, sitting down hard in a chair without first checking it carefully, kills a child lying in the chair and covered with a blanket—no penalty for the death, but a dukkaṭa for sitting down without first checking carefully.

2) Some group-of-six bhikkhus, for the fun of it, throw a rock from a mountaintop and accidentally kill a young cowherd standing below—again, no penalty for the death, but a dukkaṭa for throwing a rock in fun. (The Commentary states that rock here also covers sticks, bricks, and other similar objects; and that throwing also includes rolling. It also states that if a bhikkhu has a valid reason for throwing or rolling a rock not in fun—for example, he is engaged in construction work and rolls a piece of rock to someone else on the job; he is eating his meal and throws a piece of wood to chase away crows or dogs—he incurs no offense.)

3) A bhikkhu, feeling oppressed and discontented, throws himself over a cliff. Instead of dying, he lands on and kills a hapless basket-maker standing at the foot of the cliff—again, no offense for the death, but a dukkaṭa for throwing oneself from a high place. This rule shows that attempts to kill oneself—aside from searching for an assassin, as mentioned above—would not come under the main rule here, because the bhikkhu would have apparently felt pain when landing on the basket-maker, and yet the penalty is only a dukkaṭa. If the case had been treated under the main rule, he would have been penalized with a thullaccaya instead.

The Commentary extrapolates from this case to apply the dukkaṭa to all attempts at suicide, including even the decision not to take food when motivated by a desire to die. However, it then runs into the question of how far this penalty applies to a bhikkhu who is ill. Its verdict: As long as medicine and attendants are available to him, the penalty would still apply. But then it lists two cases where the penalty would not apply: (a) A bhikkhu is suffering from a long and serious illness, and the attendant bhikkhus are fed up with caring for him, thinking, “When will we be free of this sick one?” If the bhikkhu reflects that, even with medical care, his body won’t last and that the bhikkhus are being put to difficulties, he incurs no penalty in refusing food and medicine. (b) A bhikkhu—reflecting that his illness is harsh, the forces of life are running out, and yet the noble attainments appear to be within his reach—may refuse food and medicine without penalty.

The Commentary’s deliberations here show how difficult it is to legislate in this area, and there are reasons to question the way it applies the Great Standards here. Case (b) is apparently derived from SN 4:23, where Ven. Godhika takes his life and gains arahantship just moments before death; and from SN 35:87, where the Buddha says that one who puts down this body without taking up another body dies blamelessly. However, in arriving at its verdict in this case, the Commentary has to add the factors of motivation and perception to the equation, factors that are absent from the rule on which the judgment is based. It also leaves unanswered the question of how harsh the disease has to be, and how near the anticipated attainments, to qualify for this exemption.

This same holds true for case (a), which entails even more dubious reasoning. The Commentary’s judgment here has no clear precedent in the Canon; there is no clear line for deciding exactly how bad the illness and how fed up the attendants have to be for this case to apply; and why should the feelings of other people determine when it is or is not allowable to refuse food?

It is worth noting that the origin story to the original rule here gave the Buddha the opportunity, had he wanted it, to formulate a general rule against attempted suicides, but he chose not to. He later formulated this subsidiary rule only when a bhikkhu attempted a suicide in a way that endangered the life and safety of another person. Thus a more appropriate way of applying the Great Standards to this subsidiary rule would be to extend it only to cases of that sort: where a bhikkhu’s attempts at suicide would bring danger to another person’s life and limb.

As for ways of attempting suicide that do not endanger others, it seems better to follow the Buddha’s wisdom in not legislating about this issue at all, and to treat it as a matter of Dhamma rather than Vinaya. In other words, one should keep in mind his comment in SN 35:87 that the only blameless death is an arahant’s. If, lacking that attainment, one chooses to refuse food when ill to speed up one’s death, one should be heedful of the risks that death and rebirth can involve.

Non-offenses

As stated above, there is no offense for a bhikkhu who kills a person unintentionally, not knowing, or not aiming at death.

As for the standard exemptions, the Thai edition lists all four under this rule: a bhikkhu who is insane, possessed by spirits, delirious with pain, and the first offenders (in this case, some group-of-six bhikkhus who, in a follow-up to the origin story, described the advantages of death to a man with a beautiful wife, in hopes that he would commit suicide so that she could be theirs; he did commit suicide, but she denounced them). Other editions of the Canon omit exemptions for a bhikkhu possessed by spirits or delirious with pain. The Commentary refers to the standard exemptions as a set simply with the word, “insane, etc.” There is reason to believe that if these two exemptions were missing in the time of the Commentary, it would have noted their absence.

Summary: Intentionally bringing about the death of a human being, even if it is still an embryo—whether by killing the person, arranging for an assassin to kill the person, inciting the person to die, or describing the advantages of death—is a pārājika offense.

*    *    *

4

Should any bhikkhu, without direct knowledge, claim a superior human state, a truly noble knowledge and vision, as present in himself, saying, “Thus do I know; thus do I see,” such that regardless of whether or not he is cross-examined on a later occasion, he—being remorseful and desirous of purification—might say, “Friends, not knowing, I said I know; not seeing, I said I see—vainly, falsely, idly,” unless it was from over-estimation, he also is defeated and no longer in affiliation.

All conscious lies are forbidden by the first pācittiya rule, but knowingly to make a false claim to a superior human state is one of the most heinous lies a bhikkhu can tell, so here it receives its own rule and the heaviest possible penalty.

The seriousness with which the Buddha regarded a breach of this training rule is indicated by his statements to the original instigators:

“You worthless men, how can you for the sake of your stomachs speak praise of one another’s superior human states to householders? It would be better for you that your bellies be slashed open with a sharp butcher’s knife than that you should for the sake of your stomachs speak praise of one another’s superior human states to householders. Why is that? For that reason you would undergo death or death-like suffering, but you would not on that account, at the break-up of the body, after death, fall into a plane of deprivation, a bad destination, a lower realm, hell. But for this reason you would, at the break-up of the body, after death, fall into a plane of deprivation, a bad destination, a lower realm, hell…. Bhikkhus, in this world with its devas, māras, and brahmās, its generations with brahmans and contemplatives, princes and men, this is the ultimate great thief: he who claims an unfactual, non-existent superior human state. Why is that? You have consumed the nation’s almsfood through theft.”

The full offense under this rule has four factors.

1) Object: a superior human state.

2) Perception: One perceives it as not present in oneself.

3) Effort: One addresses a human being, mentioning that state in connection with oneself—either the state as within oneself, or oneself as in the state.

4) Intention: with the intent to misrepresent the truth, motivated by an evil desire.

The commentaries add a fifth factor—result—saying that one’s listener must understand what one is saying for there to be the full offense, but as we will see below, this factor appears to be based on a misreading of the Vibhaṅga.

Object

The Vibhaṅga lists many superior human states, defining them as follows:

meditative absorption (jhāna): the four jhānas;

emancipation (vimokkha): the emptiness (suññatā) emancipation, the theme-less (animitta) emancipation, and the non-directed (appaṇihita) emancipation;

concentration (samādhi): the emptiness concentration, the theme-less concentration, and the non-directed concentration;

meditative attainments (samāpatti): the emptiness attainment, the theme-less attainment, and the non-directed attainment;

knowledge-and-vision (ñāṇa-dassanā): knowledge of past lives, knowledge of the passing away and arising of beings, and knowledge of the ending of mental effluents (āsava); 

path-development (magga-bhāvanā): the 37 Wings to Awakening (bodhipakkhiya-dhamma)—the four establishings of mindfulness, the four right exertions, the four bases of power, the five faculties, the five strengths, the seven factors for Awakening, and the noble eightfold path;

the realization of the noble fruits (phala-sacchikiriya): the fruit of stream-entry, the fruit of once-returning, the fruit of non-returning, and the fruit of arahantship;

the abandoning of defilements (kilesappahāna): the abandoning of passion, aversion, and delusion;

the mind’s freedom from hindrance (vinīvaraṇatā cittassa): the mind unhindered by passion, aversion, and delusion; and

delight in an empty dwelling (suññāgāre abhirati): the delight in an empty dwelling stemming from the four jhānas.

The Commentary classifies these states into two broad categories: mahaggata dhamma—“enlarged” or “expanded” states—related to the practice of meditative absorption; and lokuttara dhamma—transcendent states—related to the absolute eradication of the mental fetters that bind the mind to the cycle of rebirth.

a. Mahaggata dhamma

The discourses describe the four jhānas as follows:

“There is the case where a bhikkhu—quite secluded from sensuality, secluded from unskillful qualities—enters and remains in the first jhāna: rapture and pleasure born of seclusion, accompanied by directed thought and evaluation. He permeates and pervades, suffuses and fills this very body with the rapture and pleasure born of seclusion….

“And furthermore, with the stilling of directed thoughts and evaluations, he enters and remains in the second jhāna: rapture and pleasure born of concentration, unity of awareness free from directed thought and evaluation—internal assurance. He permeates and pervades, suffuses and fills this very body with the rapture and pleasure born of concentration….

“And furthermore, with the fading of rapture, he remains equanimous, mindful, and alert, and senses pleasure with the body. He enters and remains in the third jhāna, and of him the noble ones declare, ‘Equanimous and mindful, he has a pleasant abiding.’ He permeates and pervades, suffuses and fills this very body with the pleasure divested of rapture….

“And furthermore, with the abandoning of pleasure and pain—as with the earlier disappearance of elation and distress—he enters and remains in the fourth jhāna: purity of equanimity and mindfulness, neither pleasure nor pain. He sits permeating the body with a pure, bright awareness, so that nothing of his entire body is unpervaded by pure, bright awareness.”—DN 2; MN 119; AN 5:28

The Commentary notes that four formless states—what the Canon calls “formlessnesses beyond form,” and the Commentary calls “formless jhānas”—are based on the fourth jhāna, and so would count as superior human states as well. The Canon describes them as follows:

“With the complete transcending of perceptions of form, and the passing away of perceptions of resistance, and not heeding perceptions of diversity, (perceiving,) ‘Infinite space,’ one enters and remains in the dimension of the infinitude of space….

“With the complete transcending of the dimension of the infinitude of space, (perceiving,) ‘Infinite consciousness,’ one enters and remains in the dimension of the infinitude of consciousness….

“With the complete transcending of the dimension of the infinitude of consciousness, (perceiving,) ‘There is nothing,’ one enters and remains in the dimension of nothingness….

“With the complete transcending of the dimension of nothingness, one enters and remains in the dimension of neither perception nor non-perception.”—DN 15

A fifth state, the cessation of perception and feeling, is reached by transcending the dimension of neither perception nor non-perception, and all who reach it become either non-returners or arahants. The Commentary argues that this state does not count as a superior human state, on the technical grounds that it is neither worldly (lokiya) nor transcendent, but nothing in the Canon indicates that a superior human state has to be clearly one or the other. Using the Commentary’s own reasoning with regard to the four formless states—that they are based on the fourth jhāna—the same argument can be used to include the cessation of perception and feeling as a superior human state as well.

From the inclusion of the three knowledges in the Vibhaṅga’s list, the Commentary takes up the issue of whether the remaining five of the eight knowledges should be included as well. The three knowledges, as described in DN 2, are:

Recollection of past lives (pubbenivāsānusati-ñāṇa): “He recollects his manifold past lives, i.e., one birth, two births, three births, four, five, ten, twenty, thirty, forty, fifty, one hundred, one thousand, one hundred thousand, many eons of cosmic contraction, many eons of cosmic expansion, many eons of cosmic contraction and expansion, (recollecting,) ‘There I had such a name, belonged to such a clan, had such an appearance. Such was my food, such my experience of pleasure and pain, such the end of my life. Passing away from that state, I re-arose there. There too I had such a name, belonged to such a clan, had such an appearance. Such was my food, such my experience of pleasure and pain, such the end of my life. Passing away from that state, I re-arose here.’ Thus he recollects his manifold past lives in their modes and details.”

Knowledge of the passing away and reappearing of beings (cutūpapāta-ñāṇa): “He sees—by means of the divine eye, purified and surpassing the human—beings passing away and re-appearing, and he discerns how they are inferior and superior, beautiful and ugly, fortunate and unfortunate in accordance with their kamma: ‘These beings—who were endowed with bad conduct of body, speech, and mind, who reviled the noble ones, who held wrong views and undertook actions under the influence of wrong views—with the break-up of the body, after death, have re-appeared in a plane of deprivation, a bad destination, a lower realm, hell. But these beings—who were endowed with good conduct of body, speech, and mind, who did not revile the noble ones, who held right views and undertook actions under the influence of right views—with the break-up of the body, after death, have re-appeared in a good destination, a heavenly world.’ Thus—by means of the divine eye, purified and surpassing the human—he sees beings passing away and re-appearing, and he discerns how they are inferior and superior, beautiful and ugly, fortunate and unfortunate in accordance with their kamma.”

Knowledge of the ending of mental effluents (āsavakkhaya-ñāṇa): “He discerns, as it has actually come to be, that ‘This is stress…. This is the origination of stress…. This is the cessation of stress…. This is the way leading to the cessation of stress…. These are (mental) effluents…. This is the origination of effluents…. This is the cessation of effluents…. This is the way leading to the cessation of effluents.’ His heart, thus knowing, thus seeing, is released from the effluent of sensuality, the effluent of becoming, the effluent of ignorance. With release, there is the knowledge, ‘Released.’ He discerns that ‘Birth is ended, the holy life fulfilled, the task done. There is nothing further for this world.’”

The first two of these knowledges, even though they comprised part of the Buddha’s Awakening, are mundane, in that people may develop them without necessarily attaining any of the transcendent paths and fruitions. Thus they belong under the category of mahaggata dhamma, as they are based on the attainment of jhāna either in this or in a previous life. The third knowledge, however—because it describes the arising of the transcendent paths and fruitions—comes under the category of lokuttara dhamma, and is the only one of the eight knowledges to do so.

DN 2 describes the remaining five knowledges as:

Insight knowledge (vipassanā-ñāṇa): “He discerns: ‘This body of mine is endowed with form, composed of the four primary elements, born from mother and father, nourished with rice and porridge, subject to inconstancy, rubbing, pressing, dissolution, and dispersion. And this consciousness of mine is supported here and bound up here.’”

Mind-made body (manomayiddhi): “From this body he creates another body, endowed with form, made of the mind, complete in all its parts, not inferior in its faculties, just as if a man were to draw a reed from its sheath.”

Supranormal powers (iddhividhī): “He wields manifold supranormal powers. Having been one he becomes many; having been many he becomes one. He appears. He vanishes. He goes unimpeded through walls, ramparts, and mountains as if through space. He dives in and out of the earth as if it were water. He walks on water without sinking as if it were dry land. Sitting cross-legged he flies through the air like a winged bird. With his hand he touches and strokes even the sun and moon, so mighty and powerful. He exercises influence with his body even as far as the Brahmā worlds.”

 Clairaudience (dibba-sota): “He hears—by means of the divine ear-property, purified and surpassing the human—both kinds of sounds: divine and human, whether near or far.”

Mind-reading (cetopariya-ñāṇa): “He knows the awareness of other beings, other individuals, having encompassed it with his own awareness. He discerns a mind with passion as a mind with passion, and a mind without passion as a mind without passion (etc.).”

The Commentary argues that all of these knowledges except vipassanā-ñāṇa count as superior human states. It does not explain why it excludes vipassanā-ñāṇa from the list, although it is probably following the belief current in its time, that vipassanā-ñāṇa does not require jhāna as a basis, even though the Canon clearly lists this ñāṇa—as distinct from vipassanā as a more general mental quality of clear-seeing—as dependent on jhāna.

There are other occult abilities that are not based on jhāna and for this reason do not count as mahaggata dhamma: such things as divination, giving protective charms, casting malevolent spells, psychic healing, practicing as a medium, etc. The discourses list these and other similar activities as tiracchāna-vijjā, animal knowledge, which—as the name implies—is far removed from superior human states. (See BMC2, Chapter 10.)

b. Lokuttara dhamma

Lokuttara dhamma in its fullest sense, refers to the series of mental states, called paths and fruitions, in which the fetters that bind the mind to the cycle of rebirth are eradicated; and to the ultimate state of nibbāna, or liberation.

The paths and fruitions occur in four pairs. In the first pair, the path to and fruition of stream-entry, three fetters are abandoned: self-identity views (sakkāya-diṭṭhi), uncertainty (vicikicchā), and grasping at precepts and practices (silabbata-parāmāsa). In the second pair—the path to and fruition of once-returning—passion aversion, and delusion are weakened, but no additional fetters are cut. In the third pair, the path to and fruition of non-returning, two additional fetters are abandoned: sensual passion (kāma-rāga) and irritation (paṭigha); and in the fourth pair, the path to and fruition of arahantship, five: rūpa-rāga—passion for forms (e.g., the objects of rūpa jhāna); arūpa-rāga—passion for formless phenomena (e.g., the objects of arūpa jhāna); māna—conceit; uddhacca—restlessness; and avijjā—ignorance. With the cutting of this last set of fetters, all bonds with the cycle of rebirth are cut for good, and the mind attains nibbāna.

The term nibbāna literally means extinguishing, as of a fire. The commentarial explanation of this term that best fits the way it is used in the Canon is found at Vism.VIII,247, where Buddhaghosa derives it etymologically from nir, a negative prefix, and vāna, binding: thus, unbinding or liberation. In the physics of the Buddha’s time, fire as it burned was said to be in a state of agitation, dependence, attachment, and entrapment—both clinging to and being trapped by its sustenance. Extinguished, it was said to become calm, independent, and unattached. It let go of its sustenance and was released. In the mind’s extinguishing, or unbinding, a parallel change occurs.

Nibbāna is one; the paths and their fruitions, eight. Thus there are nine lokuttara dhammas. Although the Vibhaṅga explicitly mentions only the four transcendent fruitions in its list of superior human states, the Commentary argues that the remaining five implicitly qualify as well. There is support for the Commentary’s argument in that the Vibhaṅga includes the noble eightfold path in its list, and SN 55:5 equates this path with the stream.

The Commentary classifies the three types of concentration and emancipation in the Vibhaṅga’s list—emptiness, theme-less, and non-directed—as equivalent to the transcendent paths, and the three corresponding attainments as transcendent fruitions. A passage in MN 121, however, indicates that at least the theme-less concentration would count as a mahaggata dhamma because it can be attained without full insight into its fabricated nature, and the same classification might hold for all three of these concentrations and emancipations. Regardless of which class they fall into, however, they are all superior human states. As for the Wings to Awakening, the Commentary maintains that they count as superior human states only when developed to the level of any of the transcendent paths. It also adds that any other attainment equivalent to a lokuttara dhamma—such as complete comprehension of the four noble truths—would fulfill the factor of object here as well.

Perception

Claiming a superior human state that one mistakenly thinks one has achieved is no offense under this rule, although if addressed to a lay person the claim would come under Pc 8. The same holds for a claim that is actually true.

There is the question, however, of what offense there would be for a bhikkhu who has attained a superior human state—such as the first jhāna—without realizing the fact, and then claims to have attained it, thinking his statement to be false. The Vibhaṅga defines non-existent as “not to be found; not knowing, not seeing a skillful state within oneself, (yet saying,) ‘There is a skillful state within me.’” Also, under the factor of intention, it states that misrepresenting one’s view or opinion would fulfill that factor. This implies that a superior human state would count as non-existent if one did not see it as existent. If one then misrepresented one’s view to another person, claiming the state to be existent, one would fulfill the factors of the full offense here.

Unlike the Vibhaṅga to Pc 1, the Vibhaṅga to this rule does not consider the case where a bhikkhu, doubtful of his attainment, states it as an undoubted fact. This suggests that the compilers of the Vibhaṅga saw the full offense here as applying only to cases where a bhikkhu knows without a doubt that his claim to a superior human state is untrue. From this it would follow that if one is in doubt about one’s attainment of such a state and yet makes a definite claim to it, one would incur a pācittiya under Pc 1.

Effort

According to the Vibhaṅga, a statement mentioning oneself in connection with a superior human state is one indicating either that the state is present in oneself or that one is present in the state. Such a statement fulfils this factor only if it explicitly mentions oneself, although the reference to the state may be either explicit or implicit. Explicit mention of the state would include saying such things as, “I have attained the first jhāna,” “I have seen the heavenly realms,” “I know my previous lifetimes.” The Vibhaṅga’s example of an implicit mention of a state is the statement, “I delight in an empty dwelling,” the implication being that one’s delight comes from the attainment of jhāna. At present, many meditation communities have developed their own idioms for describing superior human attainments—one being “I have no doubts about the Buddha’s teaching” as a way of claiming stream-entry—and, in the context of such communities, idioms of this sort would count as implicit mention as well. As we will see under the discussion of intention, this sort of statement would incur an offense only if one intended the implicit meaning.

A statement in which one mentions oneself—rather than the state—implicitly in connection with a superior human state is not grounds for a pārājika. If it is a deliberate lie, it constitutes either a thullaccaya or a dukkaṭa. Because the grounds for determining the offense in this case are a matter of controversy, we will discuss them separately, under Understanding, below.

The word statement here covers not only spoken statements but also written statements and physical gestures. An example of a claim by gesture occurs in the Vibhaṅga: A group of bhikkhus makes an agreement that the first to set out from their dwelling would, by that very gesture, be known to the rest as an arahant. One of the group, who was not an arahant but wanted to be regarded as one, set out first from the dwelling and in so doing committed a pārājika. At present, a claim made in writing would also fulfil the factor of effort here.

The Vibhaṅga specifies that the statement fulfills this factor whether it is addressed to a man or a woman, lay or ordained. The Vinīta-vatthu contains two cases in which bhikkhus, sitting in private, make false statements laying claim to superior human states. In the first case, the offender is rebuked by another bhikkhu who could read minds; in the second, the offender is rebuked by a devatā. In both cases, the Buddha imposes a dukkaṭa on the offenders. Thus the Commentary and K/Commentary conclude that a statement mentioning oneself in connection with a superior human state must be directed at a human listener for it to fulfil the factor of effort here. If one makes such a statement in private or directs it to a common animal or a deva, one incurs only a dukkaṭa.

The original instigators of this rule, instead of each making claims about his own attainments, made false claims about one another’s attainments. This case is not mentioned in the rule, the Vibhaṅga, or the commentaries, and so is not an offense under this rule, but it would come under Pc 1.

The Commentary raises a question not addressed in the Vibhaṅga: Does mentioning a state in connection with oneself include claims about attainments in one’s previous lives? Without explaining its reasoning, it simply says No: In connection with oneself applies only to the present aggregates and not to past ones. With regard to the mahaggata dhammas, it would be possible to make a claim about an attainment in a past life that would not apply to one’s present state, because the simple fact that one may have attained jhāna in a previous lifetime has no implications bearing on the present lifetime. That sort of attainment doesn’t necessarily carry over from one lifetime to the next. With regard to lokuttara dhammas, however, the fact that one may have achieved stream-entry in a previous lifetime would have implications for the present lifetime: One is destined to achieve at least stream-entry again at some point before death, which puts one on the level of a faith-follower or a Dhamma-follower, “one who has entered the orderliness of rightness, entered the plane of people of integrity, transcended the plane of the run-of-the-mill” (SN 25:1). This is equivalent to the path to stream-entry. So it would seem reasonable to say that a claim to a mahaggata dhamma attained in a previous lifetime would not fulfill the factor of effort here, whereas a claim to a lokuttara dhamma attained in a previous lifetime would. And, of course, if a bhikkhu falsely claims present knowledge of previous lifetimes, that would unequivocally fulfil this factor.

Intention

To incur an offense under this rule, the statement must be (1) meant to misrepresent the truth and (2) motivated by evil desire.

According to the Vibhaṅga a statement meant to misrepresent the truth can be characterized in any of seven ways (§): Before making it, one knows that it is a lie; while making it, one knows that it is a lie; after making it, one knows that it was a lie; one misrepresents one’s view; one misrepresents one’s opinion; one misrepresents one’s approval; and one misrepresents one’s state. The Commentary focuses on the first of these characteristics as essential: One must know before making the statement that it will be a lie. If one doesn’t realize it beforehand but notices it only while making it or just after making it, it would count simply as a slip of the tongue, and thus—as discussed under Pc 1—not as a deliberate lie. When the intention to misrepresent the truth is absent, the statement does not come under this rule. For example, if one means to say one thing that does not bear on a superior human state but accidentally says something else that comes out as a claim to such a state, one commits no offense.

Other examples of not intending to misrepresent the truth appear in a series of cases in the Vinīta-vatthu where bhikkhus are absolved of an offense under this rule because they “did not intend to boast.” The Vibhaṅga gives no precise definition of this phrase, but the cases in question give a fair idea of what it means. They all involve statements where the reference to a superior human state is only implicit. In some of them, ill bhikkhus are asked—as was common in the time of the Buddha—“Do you have any superior human states (§)?” the purpose being—if they had such an attainment—to focus their minds on it; and if not, to direct their efforts to gaining such an attainment before their illness worsened. The ill bhikkhus respond in a variety of ways which, on the surface, look like equivocation. They don’t have any superior human attainments, yet don’t want to give the impression that they’ve achieved nothing at all, so they say such things as, “A state to be aroused through the arousing of energy,” or, “A state to be aroused through committed commitment.” In other cases, the ill bhikkhus are told not to fear death and they respond, “I’m not afraid of death,” or, “He who has remorse might be afraid of death.” In still other cases, ill bhikkhus are asked how they are bearing up under their illnesses and they respond, “This could not be borne by any old person (§),” or, “This could not be borne by an ordinary person (§).” There are also cases where bhikkhus are being pressured by their relatives to disrobe and they respond with such statements as, “It’s impossible for a person like me to live in a house,” or, “I have blocked off sensual passions.”

In each of these cases, the bhikkhus later felt conscience-stricken that their words might be construed as a boast, and so went to the Buddha, who stated that, because their purpose was not to boast—apparently, they were simply trying to avoid difficult situations, and the Commentary shows how they could easily have been thinking of something beside superior human states—they incurred no penalty.

Strangely enough—given its explanations of these cases—when the Commentary discusses the factor of “not intending to boast” under the non-offense clauses, it defines it as applying to a bhikkhu who, not motivated by desire, makes a non-deceptive claim of knowledge to his fellow bhikkhus. The Sub-commentary, however, notes that the Commentary’s definition does not fit the Vinīta-vatthu cases and so gives its own definition of “not intending to boast”: saying something that would fulfil the factor of effort yet without desiring to speak of a superior human state, and without being aware that one’s words imply such a state. Drawing on the examples in the Vinīta-vatthu, we can qualify the Sub-commentary’s explanation by noting that this exemption applies even if the reference to oneself is explicit, but not if the reference to the superior human state is.

Thus, if one makes an innocent statement that could be construed as implying a claim to a superior human state without explicitly mentioning such as state, then regardless of how other people might interpret it, if one’s purpose is not to boast or lay claim to that state then there is no offense. However, if the inference was intended—and a deliberate misrepresentation—the factor of intention here would be fulfilled. As for untrue statements that make explicit reference to a superior human state—e.g., “I have reached the fourth jhāna”—the inference is obviously intended, and so these automatically fulfil the factor of “intending to misrepresent the truth.”

As for evil desire: The Commentary—citing a passage from an Abhidhamma text, the Vibhaṅga, which in turn is based on MN 5—defines evil desire here as the wish to have others believe that skillful states not present within oneself are actually there. In other words, one must want one’s statement to be taken seriously. This means that motive is an essential part of this factor. To make a self-deprecating, sarcastic joke referring to one’s non-existent superior human attainments as if they were existent, but not intending to be taken seriously, would not fulfil the factor of intention here, regardless of how one‘s listeners took the remark. However, because such a remark is a falsehood, it would fall under Pc 1, even though made in jest. For this reason, cases of this sort are not mentioned in the non-offense clauses under this rule because they do carry a pācittiya offense. However, even though the penalty they carry is relatively minor, jokes of this sort should not be viewed lightly. Not only can they lead to serious misunderstandings among one’s listeners, but they also betray an off-handed disrespect for the Dhamma, and in particular for the attainments that a bhikkhu should view as among the highest means and ends of his training.

Understanding

The Vibhaṅga discusses two sets of cases in which the factor of understanding plays a role in determining the offense. In the first set, bhikkhus intend to lie about attaining one superior human state (such as the second jhāna) but actually lie about attaining another one (such as the third). In the second set, they make claims about attainments, explicitly mentioning an attainment but not explicitly mentioning themselves (e.g., a bhikkhu, referring to the dwelling in which he lives, says, “Those who live in this dwelling are arahants”). Given that understanding plays a role here, the question is: Whose understanding is at issue here, the speaker’s or the listener’s? The Commentary assumes the listener’s understanding to be at issue. Furthermore—despite the Vibhaṅga’s applying this factor only to these two sets—the Commentary extrapolates from them to say that this condition applies to all cases covered by this rule: The listener must understand what the bhikkhu is saying for there to be a full offense.

This interpretation, however, appears to be based on a misreading of the Canon. Under other rules where the question of the listener’s understanding is a factor—such as the rules for disrobing and Saṅghādisesa 3—the pattern in the Vibhaṅga is to state explicitly, “If he understands,” “If he doesn’t understand,” “She didn’t understand,” with the “he” or “she” in a different case than that of the participles describing the bhikkhu. Here, however, when the Vibhaṅga mentions the factor of understanding, it uses a present participle in the same case as the participle describing the person speaking: sampajāna-musā bhaṇantassa paṭivijānantassa āpatti pārājikassa—“For the one speaking a deliberate lie and understanding (it as such), an offense of defeat” and so forth. (Some have suggested that the paṭivijānantassa in this phrase is an example of the genitive absolute, which would apply to a different agent than the main agent of the sentence. However, the syntax of the sentence and the placement of the word do not follow the pattern for the genitive absolute, which has to be composed of a noun and a participle set apart from the rest of the sentence.) This means that the participle for “understanding” refers to the same person referred to as “speaking”: In other words, it refers to the bhikkhu, and not to the listener, who is nowhere mentioned in the passage.

This, of course, raises the question of why the speaker’s understanding of his own statement would be an issue, and the answer is this:

In the first set of cases—where the bhikkhu means to lay false claim to one superior human state but actually lays false claim to another—if he does not realize that he has made a slip of the tongue, the statement would not normally count as a conscious lie, as he is not aware of what he is saying at the moment he is saying it. Because he is not paying attention to his words, he should not receive the full penalty. However, if he is alert enough to know what he is saying, then—as the Commentary points out—all the factors of an offense are present. Because both his intended and his actual statements are corrupt, he should not be allowed to avoid the penalty simply because of a brief slip of the tongue. Thus, the Vibhaṅga assigns a pārājika in cases of this sort if the bhikkhu is aware of what he is saying, and a thullaccaya if not.

In the second set of cases, where the bhikkhu’s remarks concern a superior human state explicitly but himself only implicitly, he deserves a heavier penalty if he is aware of the implicit connection than if he is not. Thus the Vibhaṅga assigns a thullaccaya if he is, and a dukkaṭa if not.

For those interested in the Commentary’s interpretation—that the understanding is the duty of the listener, and that it must be present in all cases for there to be the full offense under this rule—here it is:

Understanding, according to the Commentary, means simply that the listener hears the statement clearly enough to know that it is a claim. Whether he/she understands the names for the states claimed—jhāna, clairvoyance, clairaudience, or whatever—is not an issue. The same is true of whether he/she believes the statement to be true or false. If the listener to whom an explicit claim to a superior human state is directed does not understand it, but a passer-by does, the penalty is still a pārājika.

The Commentary adds that if the listener does not hear the bhikkhu clearly enough to catch all he says, the penalty is a thullaccaya. If the listener at first has some doubt as to what the bhikkhu said but later realizes that it was a claim to a superior human state, the offense is still a thullaccaya. If the listener does not hear the bhikkhu at all, the Commentary—probably extrapolating from the Vinīta-vatthu cases concerning bhikkhus speaking in private—gives the bhikkhu a dukkaṭa.

If the bhikkhu makes a claim to a superior human state in which he mentions himself only implicitly—e.g., “The bhikkhus you support are non-returners”—the Commentary follows a similar pattern in assigning offenses: a thullaccaya if the listener understands, a dukkaṭa if he/she doesn’t, a dukkaṭa if he/she doesn’t even hear the claim.

As noted above, however, the Commentary’s judgments on this issue appear to be based on a misreading of the Vibhaṅga.

Special cases

Special cases in the Vinīta-vatthu:

1) Brahmans speaking with exaggerated faith or politeness address bhikkhus of no particular attainments as if they were arahants (“May the arahants come…. May the arahants be seated”). This puts the bhikkhus in a quandary and so they ask the Buddha how to behave in such a situation. His response: There is no offense in accepting invitations such as these from a “speaker with faith”—the point being that there is no offense in coming, sitting, etc., as long as the intention is just to accept the invitation and not to imply a claim.

2) Bhikkhus, hoping that people will esteem them, engage in special practices—the examples given in the Vinīta-vatthu include living in the jungle, going for alms, sitting, standing, walking, and lying down (apparently in meditation for long periods of time), but from them we can extrapolate to other practices such as any of the ascetic (dhutaṅga) practices or vegetarianism, etc., followed so as to impress others. The penalty: a dukkaṭa. Because this ruling might give the mistaken impression that one should not adopt the dhutaṅga practices or engage in long periods of sitting, etc., the Commentary includes a list of blameless reasons for living in the wilderness: seeing that village-dwelling makes one’s mind restless, desiring seclusion, desiring to attain arahantship, reflecting that the Buddha praised living in the wilderness, anticipating that one will be a good example to one’s fellows in the holy life. A bhikkhu who undertakes any of the dhutaṅga practices for these or similar reasons would incur no offense.

Non-offenses

In addition to the standard non-offenses, the Vibhaṅga lists two that we have already covered in connection with perception and intention: There is no offense if one makes a claim out of a mistaken and exaggerated understanding of one’s attainment; and no offense if one is not intending to boast, i.e., one makes a claim that may sound like an implicit reference to a superior human state but is not intended as such.

Summary: Deliberately lying to another person that one has attained a superior human state is a pārājika offense.

*    *    *

A bhikkhu who violates any of these four pārājika rules is automatically no longer a bhikkhu. There is no need for him to go through a formal ceremony of disrobing, for the act of violating the rule is an act of disrobing in and of itself. As each of the rules states, he is no longer in affiliation, which the word-analysis defines as no longer having a single transaction (i.e., he can no longer participate in any Community meetings), no longer having a single recitation (i.e., he can no longer participate in the uposatha (see BMC2, Chapter 15)), no longer having a training in common with the bhikkhus.

Even if a bhikkhu who has violated any of these rules continues to pretend to be a bhikkhu, he does not really count as one; as soon as the facts are known he must be expelled from the Saṅgha. He can never again properly ordain as a bhikkhu in this life. If he tries to ordain in a Community that does not know of his offense, his ordination is invalid, and he must be expelled as soon as the truth is found out.

The Commentary to Pr 1 maintains that he is allowed to “go forth” as a novice, but because the Vibhaṅga does not clearly support this position, not all Communities accept it.

Ignorance of these rules does not exempt an offender from the penalty, which is why the Buddha ordered that they be taught to each new bhikkhu as soon as possible after ordination (Mv.I.78.2-5). Because the rules cover a number of cases that are legal in present-day society (e.g., recommending abortion, proving to oneself how supple one has become through yoga by inserting one’s penis in one’s mouth) or that are common practice among people who see nothing wrong with flirting with the edges of the law (e.g., hiding an article subject to customs duties when entering a country), it is especially important to inform each new bhikkhu of the rules’ full implications from the very start.

If a bhikkhu suspects that he has committed a pārājika, he should immediately inform a senior bhikkhu well versed in the rules. The way the senior bhikkhu should handle the case is well-illustrated by an incident reported in the Commentary to Pr 2: A king together with an enormous crowd once went to worship the Great Stūpa at a certain monastery in Sri Lanka. Among the crowd was a visiting bhikkhu from the South of the country who was carrying an expensive roll of cloth. The commotion of the event was so great that he dropped the cloth, was unable to retrieve it, and soon gave it up for lost. One of the resident bhikkhus happened to come across it and, desiring to steal it, quickly put it away before the owner might see it. Eventually, of course, he became tormented by guilt and went to the resident Vinaya expert to admit a pārājika and disrobe.

The Vinaya expert, though, wouldn’t let him disrobe until he had found the owner of the cloth and inquired about it more fully. Eventually, after a long search, the bhikkhu was able to track down the original owner at a monastery back South, who told him that at the time of the theft he had given the cloth up for lost and had abandoned all mental attachment for it. Thus, as the cloth was ownerless, the resident bhikkhu had incurred not a pārājika, but simply some dukkaṭas for the preliminary efforts with intention to steal.

This example shows several things: the great thoroughness with which a senior bhikkhu should investigate a possible pārājika, the compassion he should show to the offender, and the fact that the offender should be given the benefit of the doubt wherever possible: He is to be considered innocent until the facts prove him guilty.

There are, however, cases of another sort, in which a bhikkhu commits a pārājika and refuses to acknowledge the fact. If his fellow bhikkhus see, hear, or have any suspicions that this has happened, they are duty-bound to bring up the issue with him. If they are not satisfied with his assertions of his innocence, the case becomes an accusation issue, which must be resolved in line with the procedures outlined in Sg 8 and Chapter 11.

Finally, the Commentary concludes its discussion of the pārājikas by noticing that there are altogether 24—eight actual, twelve equivalent, and four derived—pārājikas for bhikkhus and bhikkhunīs.

The eight actual pārājikas are:

the four for bhikkhus (also observed by the bhikkhunīs), and

the four additional pārājikas for bhikkhunīs alone.

The twelve equivalent pārājikas include the eleven disqualified types who should not be ordained as bhikkhus in the first place. If they happen to be ordained, their ordination is invalid; once they are found out they must be expelled for life (Mv.I.61-68; see BMC2, Chapter 14 for details). They are—

a paṇḍaka (essentially, a eunuch or a person born neuter—see Saṅghādisesa 2),

a “non-human” being, (this includes nāgas, petas, devas, and yakkhas),

a hermaphrodite,

a person who poses as a bhikkhu without having been ordained,

a bhikkhu who has ordained in another religion without first giving up his status as a bhikkhu,

a person who has murdered his father,

a person who has murdered his mother,

a person who has murdered an arahant,

a person who has sexually molested a bhikkhunī,

a person who has maliciously injured a Buddha to the point of causing him to bleed, and

a person who has dishonestly caused a schism in the Saṅgha, knowing or suspecting that his position was contrary to the Dhamma-Vinaya.

These eleven equivalent pārājikas apply to bhikkhunīs as well.

The twelfth equivalent pārājika, which applies only to bhikkhunīs, is the case where a bhikkhunī leaves the Bhikkhunī Saṅgha and takes up the role of a lay woman (Cv.X.26.1). Unlike the bhikkhus, the bhikkhunīs have no formal procedure for disrobing. If they leave the Saṅgha, they are not allowed to reordain for the rest of this lifetime.

In addition to the twenty actual and equivalent pārājikas, the Commentary gives separate listing to the four anulomika (derived) pārājikas, which are actually four cases included under Pr 1: the bhikkhu with a supple back who sticks his penis in his mouth, the bhikkhu with a long penis who inserts it into his anus, the bhikkhu who performs oral intercourse with someone else, and the bhikkhu who receives anal intercourse. Of these, three can be extrapolated to apply to bhikkhunīs, too. Why the Commentary lists these cases as separate pārājikas is hard to tell, unless it’s simply to ensure that these permutations of Pr 1 don’t get overlooked. Still, the entire list of 24 is important, for under the rules dealing with falsely accusing another bhikkhu of having committed a pārājika (Sg 8 & 9) or the rule dealing with concealing another bhikkhu’s pārājika offense (Pc 64), the Commentary defines pārājika as including equivalent and derived pārājikas as well.

CHAPTER FIVE

Saṅghādisesa

This term means “involving the Community in the initial (ādi) and subsequent (sesa) acts.” It derives from the fact that the Community is the agent that initially calls on the bhikkhu who breaks any of the rules in this category to undergo the penalty (of mānatta, penance, and parivāsa, probation), subsequently reimposes the penalty if he does not properly carry it out, and finally lifts the penalty when he does. There are thirteen training rules here, the first nine entailing a saṅghādisesa immediately on transgression, the last four only after the offender has been rebuked three times as part of a Community transaction.

1

Intentional emission of semen, except while dreaming, entails initial and subsequent meetings of the Community.

The origin story to this rule is as follows:

“Now at that time Ven. Seyyasaka was leading the celibate life dissatisfied. Because of this, he was thin, wretched, unattractive, and pale, his body covered with veins. Ven. Udāyin saw that Ven. Seyyasaka was thin… his body covered with veins. On seeing him, he said to him, ‘Seyyasaka, my friend, why are you thin… your body covered with veins? Could it be that you’re leading the celibate life dissatisfied?’

“‘Yes, friend.’

“‘In that case, eat as you like and sleep as you like and bathe as you like; and having eaten, slept, and bathed as you like, when dissatisfaction arises and lust assails the mind, emit semen having attacked (!) with your hand.’

“‘But is it okay to do that?’

“‘Of course. I do it myself.’

“So then Ven. Seyyasaka ate as he liked and slept as he liked… and when dissatisfaction arose and lust assailed his mind, he would emit semen having attacked with his hand. Then it wasn’t long before he became attractive, with rounded features, a clear complexion, and very bright skin. So the bhikkhus who were his friends said to him, ‘Before, friend Seyyasaka, you were thin… your body covered with veins. But now you are attractive, with rounded features, a clear complexion, and very bright skin. Could it be that you’re taking medicine?’

“‘No, I’m not taking medicine, my friends. I just eat as I like and sleep as I like… and when dissatisfaction arises and lust assails my mind, I emit semen having attacked with my hand.’

“‘But do you emit semen having attacked with the same hand you use to eat the gifts of the faithful?’

“‘Yes, my friends.’”

This rule, in its outline form, is one of the simplest to explain. In its details, though, it is one of the most complex, not only because the subject is a sensitive matter but also because the Commentary deviates from the Vibhaṅga in its explanations of two of the three factors that constitute the full offense.

The three factors are result, intention, and effort: emission of semen caused by an intentional effort. When all three factors are present, the offense is a saṅghādisesa. If the last two—intention and effort—are present, the offense is a thullaccaya. Any single factor or any other combination of two factors—i.e., intention and result without making a physical effort, or effort and result without intention—is not grounds for an offense.

It may seem strange to list the factor of result first, but I want to explain it first partly because, in understanding the types of intention and effort covered by this rule, it is necessary to know what they are aimed at, and also because result is the one factor where the Vibhaṅga and Commentary are in basic agreement.

Result

The Vibhaṅga states that semen can come in ten colors—a classification derived from a diagnostic practice in ancient Indian medicine in which a doctor would examine his male patients’ ejaculates as a way of diagnosing their health. After presenting a long series of wheels based on these ten colors of semen, the Vibhaṅga arrives at the simple conclusion that the color and quality of the semen are irrelevant to the offense. This suggests that a bhikkhu who has had a vasectomy can still commit an offense under this rule, because he can still discharge the various components that go into seminal fluid—minus only the sperm—at orgasm.

Although the Vibhaṅga adds that semen is discharged when it “falls from its base,” it does not discuss this point in any detail. The Commentary discusses three opinions as to precisely when this happens in the course of sexual stimulation. Although its discussion is framed in terms of the physiology of ejaculation as understood at the time, its conclusion is clear: Semen moves from its base when “having made the whole body shake, it is released and descends into the urinary tract”—in other words, at the point of orgasm. The Commentary further explains that semen falls from its base when it enters the urinary tract, because from that point on the process is irreversible. Thus if the process of sexual stimulation has reached this point, the factor of result has been fulfilled even if one tries to prevent the semen from leaving the body at orgasm by pinching the end of one’s penis. Once in the urinary tract, it has already fallen from its base, so whether it then leaves the body is irrelevant as far as the factors of the offense are concerned.

Although some sub-sub-commentaries have ventured a more cautious opinion than the Commentary’s—saying that semen counts as having fallen from its base when there appears a small amount of the clear alkaline fluid produced by the prostate and Cowper’s glands prior to ejaculation—there is nothing in the Vibhaṅga to prove the Commentary wrong.

Intention

The Vibhaṅga defines intentionally as “having willed, having made the decision knowingly and consciously.” The Commentary explains these terms as follows: Having willed means having willed, having planned, with the intention of enjoying bringing about an emission. Having made the decision means having summoned up a reckless mind state, “crushing” through the power of an attack. (These are the same terms it uses to explain the same phrase under Pr 3, Pc 61, and Pc 77. The meaning is that one is not simply toying with the idea. One has definitely made up one’s mind to overcome all hesitation by aggressively setting upon an action aimed at causing emission.) Knowingly means knowing that, “I am making an exertion”—which the Sub-commentary explains as knowing that, “I am making an exertion for the sake of an emission.” Consciously means being aware that one’s efforts are bringing about an emission of semen.

The Commentary’s definition of “having willed” is where it deviates from the Vibhaṅga’s discussion of the factor of intention. The Vibhaṅga, throughout its analysis, expresses this factor simply as “aiming at causing an emission,” and it lists ten possible motives for wanting to bring the emission about:

for the sake of health,

for the sake of pleasure,

for the sake of a medicine,

for the sake of a gift (to insects, says the Commentary, although producing semen as a gift to one‘s partner in a tantric ritual would also come under this category),

for the sake of merit,

for the sake of a sacrifice,

for the sake of heaven,

for the sake of seed (to produce a child—a bhikkhu who gave semen to be used in artificial insemination would fit in this category),

for the sake of investigating (e.g., to diagnose one’s health), or

for the sake of playfulness or fun.

Each of these motives, the Vibhaṅga says, fulfills the factor of intention here. Thus for the Commentary to limit the question of “deliberate intention” strictly to the enjoyment of the act of bringing about an emission (numbers 2 and 10 in the Vibhaṅga’s list) has no basis in the Canon. This means that the factor of intention under this rule is defined by deliberateness and immediate aim—causing an emission of semen—regardless of impulse or motive.

Given the way intention is defined, there is no offense for a bhikkhu who brings on an emission of semen—

accidentally—e.g., toying with his penis simply for the pleasure of the contact, when it suddenly and unexpectedly goes off;

not knowing that he is making an effort—e.g., when he is dreaming or in a semi-conscious state before fully waking up from sleep;

not conscious that his efforts are bringing about an emission of semen—e.g., when he is so engrossed in applying medicine to a sore on his penis that he doesn’t realize that he is bringing on an ejaculation;

or when his efforts are motivated by a purpose other than that of causing an emission—e.g., when he wakes up, finds that he is about to have a spontaneous ejaculation, and grabs hold of his penis to keep the semen from soiling his robes or bedding.

Effort

The Vibhaṅga defines four types of effort that fulfill this factor: A bhikkhu causes an emission making an effort (1) at an internal object, (2) at an external object, (3) at both an internal and an external object, or (4) by shaking his pelvis in the air. It then goes on to explain these terms: The internal object is one’s own living body. External objects can either be animate or inanimate objects. The third type of effort involves a combination of the first two, and the fourth covers cases when one makes one’s penis erect (“workable”) by making an effort in the air.

The extremely general nature of these definitions gives the impression that the compilers of the Vibhaṅga wanted them to cover every imaginable type of bodily effort aimed at arousing oneself sexually, and this impression is borne out by the wide variety of cases covered in the Vinīta-vatthu. They include, among others, a bhikkhu who squeezes his penis with his fist, one who rubs his penis with his thumb, one who rubs his penis against his bed, one who inserts his penis into sand, one who bathes against the current in a stream, one who rubs his preceptor’s back in the bathing room, one who gets an erection from the friction of his thighs and robes while walking along, one who has his belly heated in the bathing room, and one who stretches his body. In each of these cases, if the bhikkhu aims at and succeeds in causing an emission, he incurs a saṅghādisesa.

The Vinīta-vatthu also includes a case in which a bhikkhu, desiring to cause an emission, orders a novice to take hold of his (the bhikkhu’s) penis. He gets his emission and a saṅghādisesa to boot, which shows that getting someone else to make the effort for one fulfills the factor of effort here. Under the factor of consent, below, we will discuss a similar case from the Vinīta-vatthu to Pr 1 which indicates that simply lying still while allowing someone else to bring one to an orgasm fulfills the factor of effort here as well.

In discussing the factor of effort, though, the Commentary adds an additional sub-factor: that the effort must be directed at one’s own penis. If this were so, then a bhikkhu who succeeded in causing an emission by stimulating any of the erogenous zones of his body aside from his penis would incur no penalty. The Commentary itself actually makes this point, and the Sub-commentary seconds it, although the V/Sub-commentary says that such a bhikkhu would incur a dukkaṭa—what it bases this opinion on, it doesn’t say: perhaps a misreading of the Case of the Sleeping Novice, which we will discuss below.

At any rate, the Commentary in adding this last factor runs up against a number of cases in the Vinīta-vatthu in which the effort does not involve the penis: the bhikkhu warming his belly, the bhikkhu rubbing his preceptor’s back, a bhikkhu having his thighs massaged, and others. The Commentary deals with these cases by rewriting them, stating in most cases that the effort somehow had to involve the penis. This in itself is questionable, but when the Commentary actually contradicts the Vinīta-vatthu in the case of the bhikkhu who warms his belly, saying that this sort of effort could not involve an offense at all, even if one aims at and succeeds in causing an emission, the commentators have moved beyond the realm of commenting into the realm of rewriting the rule.

As stated in the Introduction, we have to go on the assumption that the compilers of the Vibhaṅga knew the crucial factors of each offense well enough to know what is and is not an offense, and were careful enough to include all the relevant facts when describing the precedents in the Vinīta-vatthu in order to show how the Buddha arrived at his judgments. Because the Commentary’s position—adding the extra factor that the physical effort has to involve one’s own penis—directly contradicts the Vibhaṅga on this point, the extra factor cannot stand.

The question then is why the commentators added the extra factor in the first place. An answer may be found in one of the cases in the Vinīta-vatthu: the Case of the Sleeping Novice.

“On that occasion a certain bhikkhu grabbed hold of the penis of a sleeping novice. His semen was emitted. He felt conscience-stricken…. ‘Bhikkhu, there is no saṅghādisesa offense. There is a dukkaṭa offense.’”

The issue here is whose semen was emitted. Pali syntax, unlike English, doesn’t give us a clue, for there is no syntactical rule that the pronoun in one sentence should refer to the subject of the preceding sentence. There are many cases under Pr 3 that follow the form, “A stone badly held by the bhikkhu standing above hit the bhikkhu standing below on the head. The bhikkhu died. He felt conscience-stricken.” In these cases it is obvious from the context within the story which bhikkhu died and which one felt conscience-stricken, while with the sleeping novice we have to look for the context in other parts of the Vibhaṅga.

If the bhikkhu was the one who emitted semen, then perhaps there is a contradiction in the Vibhaṅga, and the Commentary is justified in saying that the effort must involve one’s penis, for otherwise the case would seem to fulfill the Vibhaṅga’s general definition for the factor of effort: The bhikkhu is making an effort at an outside body and has an emission. Following the general pattern of the rule, he would incur a saṅghādisesa if he intended emission, and no penalty at all if he didn’t. Yet—deviating from the standard pattern for the Vinīta-vatthu cases—the Buddha does not ask whether he aimed at emitting semen, and simply gives the bhikkhu a dukkaṭa, which suggests an inconsistency.

If, however, the novice was the one who emitted, there is no inconsistency at all: The bhikkhu incurs his dukkaṭa for making lustful bodily contact with another man (see the discussion under Sg 2, below), and the case is included here to show that the full offense under this rule concerns instances where one makes oneself emit semen, and not where one makes others emit. (Other than this case, there is nothing in the rule or the Vibhaṅga that expressly makes this point. The rule simply mentions bringing about the emission of semen, without explicitly mentioning whose. This would explain the bhikkhu’s uncertainty as to whether or not he had committed a saṅghādisesa.) And the reason there is no mention of whether or not the bhikkhu intended to emit semen is because—as it comes under another rule—it is irrelevant to the case.

Thus, inasmuch as the second reading—the novice was the one who had an emission—does no violence to the rest of the Vibhaṅga, it seems to be the preferable one. If this was the case that led the commentators to add their extra factor, we can see that they misread it and that the Vibhaṅga’s original definition for the factor of effort still stands: Any bodily effort made at one’s own body, at another body or physical object, at both, or any effort made in the air—like shaking one’s pelvis or stretching one’s body—fulfills the factor of effort here.

One case that does not fulfill the factor of effort, according to the Vinīta-vatthu, is when one is filled with lust and stares at the private parts of a woman or girl. In the case dealing with this contingency, the bhikkhu emits semen, but again the Buddha does not ask whether he intended to. Instead, he lays down a separate rule, imposing a dukkaṭa for staring lustfully at a woman’s private parts. This suggests that efforts with one’s eyes do not count as bodily efforts under this saṅghādisesa rule, for otherwise the penalty would have been a saṅghādisesa if the bhikkhu had intended emission, and no offense—not a dukkaṭa—if he hadn’t. And this also suggests that the dukkaṭa under this separate rule holds regardless of intention or result. The Commentary adds that this dukkaṭa applies also to staring lustfully at the genitals of a female animal or at the area of a fully-clothed woman’s body where her sexual organ is, thinking, “Her sexual organ is there.” At present we would impose the penalty on a bhikkhu who stares lustfully at a woman’s private parts in a pornographic photograph.

As we will see under the non-offense clauses, there is no offense in a nocturnal emission. The Commentary, however, discusses the question of conscious efforts made prior to sleep aimed at a nocturnal emission, and arrives at the following verdicts: If a bhikkhu, “usurped” with lust while lying down, grabs his penis with his fist or thighs and drops off to sleep maintaining that position in hopes of inducing an emission, he incurs the full offense if the emission takes place. If, however, he suppresses his “lust-usurpation” by reflecting on the foulness of the body and then dozes off with a pure mind, he incurs no offense even if an emission later occurs. The analysis here seems to be that the bhikkhu’s change of mind would separate the emission from the earlier effort enough so that it would not be regarded as a direct result of that effort. The Sub-commentary adds that, in addition to suppressing the lust in his mind, he also has to discontinue his effort to be free of an offense in this way. And both texts have to be qualified by saying that the “no offense” would apply only to the emission, for the earlier intentional effort would incur a thullaccaya.

Consent

A special contingency covered by this rule occurs in two nearly identical cases in the Vinīta-vatthu for Pr 1: A woman approaches a bhikkhu and offers to make him emit semen by attacking with her hand (§). In both cases the bhikkhu lets her go ahead, and the Buddha says that he incurs a saṅghādisesa in doing so. The commentaries treat the cases as self-evident and offer no extra details. Thus, given the facts as we have them, it would seem that consent under this rule can be expressed physically simply by letting the act happen. A bhikkhu who acquiesces mentally when someone tries and succeeds in making him emit semen is not absolved from the full offense here even if he otherwise lies perfectly still throughout the event.

Derived offenses

As stated above, a bhikkhu who fulfills all three factors—result, intention, and effort—incurs a saṅghādisesa. One who fulfills only the last two—intention and effort—incurs a thullaccaya.

In discussing the case of a bhikkhu with fat thighs who develops an erection simply by walking along, the Commentary mentions that if one finds sensual “fever” arising in such a case, one must immediately stop walking and start contemplating the foulness of the body so as to purify the mind before continuing on one’s way. Otherwise, one would incur a thullaccaya simply for moving one’s legs. Sensual fever, here, probably refers to the desire to cause an emission, for there are several spots where the Commentary discusses bhikkhus who stimulate an erection simply for the enjoyment of the contact rather than to cause an emission, and the judgment is that they incur no penalty, even if an emission does inadvertently result.

Aside from the thullaccaya, the Vibhaṅga assigns no other derived offenses under this rule. A bhikkhu who has an ejaculation while thinking sensual thoughts but without making any physical effort to cause it, incurs no penalty regardless of whether the idea crosses his mind that he would like to have an emission, and regardless of whether he enjoys it when it occurs. However, the Commentary notes here that even though there is no offense involved, one should not let oneself be overcome by sensual thoughts in this way. This point is borne out by the famous simile that occurred to Prince Siddhattha before his Awakening and that later, as Buddha, he related to a number of listeners:

“‘Suppose there were a wet sappy piece of timber lying on dry ground far from water, and a man were to come along with an upper fire-stick, thinking, “I’ll light a fire. I’ll produce heat.” Now what do you think? Would he be able to light a fire and produce heat by rubbing the upper fire-stick in the wet sappy timber…?’

“‘No, Master Gotama. And why is that? Because the wood is wet and sappy, even though it is lying on dry ground far from water. The man would reap only his share of weariness and disappointment.’

“‘So it is with any brahman or contemplative who lives withdrawn from sensuality only in body, but whose desire, infatuation, urge, thirst, and fever for sensuality is not relinquished and stilled within him: Whether or not he feels painful, racking, piercing feelings due to his striving (for Awakening), he is incapable of knowledge, vision, and unexcelled self-awakening.’”—MN 36

Non-offenses

In addition to the cases already mentioned—the bhikkhus who bring about emissions accidentally, not knowing that they are making an effort, not conscious that their efforts are bringing about an emission, whose efforts are motivated by a purpose other than that of causing an emission, or who without making any physical effort have an ejaculation while overcome by sensual thoughts—there is no offense for a bhikkhu who has an ejaculation while dreaming.

The Commentary notes that some interpreters had taken the idiomatic term in the rule translated as, “while dreaming (supinantā),” and read it as a compound meaning literally “at the end of a dream (supin’antā),” thus opening an allowance for intentional effort and emission when awakening from a soon-to-be-wet dream. However, the Commentary goes on to rule out this overly literal interpretation, stating that what happens in the mind while one is sleeping falls in the bounds of the Abhidhamma, but what happens after one awakens falls within the bounds of the Vinaya; and that there is no such thing as a misdeed performed when one is in a “non-negligible” state of mind that does not count as an offense. (Non-negligible, according to the Sub-commentary, means “normal.”)

In making the exception for what happens while asleep, the Buddha states that even though there may be the intention to cause an emission, it doesn’t count. The Commentary goes on to say, however, that if a bhikkhu fully awakens in the course of a wet dream, he should lie still and be extremely careful not to make a move that would fulfill the factor of effort under this rule. If the process has reached the point where it is irreversible and the ejaculation occurs spontaneously, he incurs no penalty regardless of whether he enjoys it. And as the Commentary quotes from the Kurundī, one of the ancient Sinhalese commentaries on which it is based, if he wakes up in the course of a wet dream and grabs hold of his penis to prevent the ejaculation from soiling his robes or bedding, there is no offense.

However, the Commentary’s two cases concerning nocturnal emissions, mentioned above, indicate that if a nocturnal emission occurs after a bhikkhu made a fully intentional effort toward an emission before falling asleep, he would incur the full offense under this rule unless the effort and intent were clearly stopped with a clear change of heart while he was still awake. This is because all three factors under this rule would be fully present: a conscious, unhesitating decision to cause an emission; a conscious effort based on that decision; and the resulting emission. Whether or not one was conscious while it occurred is of no account.

Summary: Intentionally causing oneself to emit semen, or getting someone else to cause one to emit semen—except during a dream—is a saṅghādisesa offense.

*    *    *

2

Should any bhikkhu, overcome by lust, with altered mind, engage in bodily contact with a woman, or in holding her hand, holding a lock of her hair, or caressing any of her limbs, it entails initial and subsequent meetings of the Community.

This rule has sometimes been viewed as a sign of prejudice against women. But, as the origin story makes clear, the Buddha formulated the rule not because women are bad, but because bhikkhus sometimes can be.

“Now at that time, Ven. Udāyin was living in the wilderness. His dwelling was beautiful, attractive, and appealing. The inner chamber was in the middle, entirely surrounded by the outer chamber. The bed and bench, the mattress and pillow were well arranged, the water for washing and drinking well placed, the surrounding area well swept. Many people came to look at it. Even a certain brahman together with his wife went to Ven. Udāyin and on arrival said, ‘We would like to look at your dwelling.’

“‘Very well then, brahman, have a look.’ Taking the key, unfastening the lock, and opening the door, he entered the dwelling. The brahman entered after Ven. Udāyin; the brahman lady after the brahman. Then Ven. Udāyin, opening some of the windows and closing others, walking around the inner room and coming up from behind, rubbed up against the brahman lady limb by limb.

“Then, after exchanging pleasantries with Ven. Udāyin, the brahman left. Delighted, he burst out with words of delight: ‘How grand are these Sakyan contemplatives who live in the wilderness like this! And how grand is Ven. Udāyin who lives in the wilderness like this!’

“When this was said, his wife said to him, ‘From where does he get his grandeur? He rubbed up against me limb by limb just the way you do!’

“So the brahman criticized and complained and spread it about: ‘They’re shameless, these bhikkhus—immoral, liars!… How can this contemplative Udāyin rub up against my wife limb by limb? It isn’t possible to go with your family wives, daughters, girls, daughters-in-law, and female slaves to a monastery or dwelling. If family wives, daughters, girls, daughters-in-law, and female slaves go to a monastery or dwelling, the Sakyan-son monks will molest them!’”

There are two ways in which a bhikkhu can come into contact with a woman: either actively (the bhikkhu makes the contact) or passively (the woman does). Because the Vibhaṅga uses different terms to analyze these two possibilities, we will discuss them separately.

Active contact

The full offense for active contact here is composed of four factors.

1) Object: a living woman—“even one born on that very day, all the more an older one.” Whether she is awake enough to realize what is going on is irrelevant to the offense.

2) Perception: The bhikkhu correctly perceives her to be a woman.

3) Intention: He is impelled by lust.

4) Effort: He comes into physical contact with her.

Of these four factors, only two—intention and effort—require detailed explanation.

Intention

The Vibhaṅga explains the term overcome with lust as meaning “impassioned, desiring, a mind bound by attraction.” Altered, it says, can refer in general to one of three states of mind—passion, aversion, or delusion—but here it refers specifically to passion.

The Commentary adds a piece of Abhidhamma analysis at this point, saying that altered refers to the moment when the mind leaves its state of pure neutrality in the bhavaṅga under the influence of desire. Thus the factor of intention here can be fulfilled not only by a prolonged or intense feeling of desire, but also by a momentary attraction.

The Commentary also tries to limit the range of passion to which this rule applies, saying that it covers only desire for the enjoyment of contact. As we noted under Pr 1, the ancient commentators formulated a list of eleven types of lust, each mutually exclusive, and the question of which rule applies to a particular case depends on which type of lust provokes the bhikkhu’s actions. Thus if a bhikkhu lusting for intercourse touches a woman, it says, he incurs only a dukkaṭa as a preliminary to sexual intercourse under Pr 1. If he touches her through his lust for an ejaculation, he incurs a thullaccaya as a preliminary to causing an emission under Sg 1. Only if he touches her with the simple desire to enjoy the sensation of contact does he incur a saṅghādisesa under this rule.

This system, though very neat and orderly, flies in the face of common sense and, as we noted under Pr 1, contradicts the Vibhaṅga as well, so there is no need to adopt it. We can stick with the Vibhaṅga to this rule and say that any state of passion fulfills the factor of intention here. The Commentary’s discussion, though, is useful in showing that the passion needn’t be full-scale sexual lust. Even a momentary desire to enjoy the sensation of physical contact—overwhelming enough that one acts on it—is enough to fulfill this factor.

Effort

The Vibhaṅga illustrates the effort of making physical contact with a list of activities: rubbing, rubbing up against, rubbing downwards, rubbing upwards, bending down, pulling up, drawing to, pushing away, seizing hold (restraining or pinning down—abhiniggaṇhanā), squeezing, grasping, or touching. The Vinīta-vatthu includes a case of a bhikkhu giving a woman a blow with his shoulder: He too incurs a saṅghādisesa, which shows that the Vibhaṅga’s list is meant to cover all similar actions as well. If a bhikkhu with lustful mind does anything of this sort to a living woman’s body, perceiving her to be a woman, he incurs the full penalty under this rule. As noted under Pr 1, mouth-to-mouth penetration with any human being or common animal would incur a thullaccaya. If this act is accompanied by other lustful bodily contact, the thullaccaya would be incurred in addition to any other penalty imposed here.

Derived offenses

Each of the factors of an offense allows a number of permutations that admit for different classes of offenses. Taken together, they form a complex system. Here we will consider each factor in turn.

Object

Assuming that the bhikkhu is acting with lustful intentions and is perceiving his object correctly, he incurs a thullaccaya for making bodily contact with a paṇḍaka, a female yakkha, or a dead woman; and a dukkaṭa for bodily contact with a man (or boy), a wooden doll, or a male or female animal.

Paṇḍaka is usually translated as eunuch, but eunuchs are only one of five types of paṇḍakas recognized by the Commentary to Mv.I.61:

1) An āsitta (literally, a “sprinkled one”)—a man whose sexual desire is allayed by performing fellatio on another man and bringing him to climax. (Some have read this as classing all homosexual males as paṇḍakas, but there are two reasons for not accepting this interpretation: (a) It seems unlikely that many homosexuals would allay their sexual desire simply by bringing someone else to climax through oral sex; (b) other homosexual acts, even though they were known in ancient India, are not included under this type or under any of the types in this list.)

2) A voyeur—a man whose sexual desire is allayed by watching other people commit sexual indiscretions.

3) A eunuch—one who has been castrated.

4) A half-time paṇḍaka—one who is a paṇḍaka only during the waning moon. (! — The Sub-commentary’s discussion of this point shows that its author and his contemporaries were as unfamiliar with this type as we are today. Perhaps this was how bisexuals were understood in ancient times.)

5) A neuter—a person born without sexual organs.

This passage in the Commentary further states that the last three types cannot take the Going-forth, while the first two can (although it also quotes from the Kurundī that the half-time paṇḍaka is forbidden from going-forth only during the waning moon (!).) As for the prohibition in Mv.I.61, that paṇḍakas cannot receive full ordination, the Commentary states that that refers only to those who cannot take the Going-forth.

However, in the context of this rule, and other rules in the Pāṭimokkha where paṇḍakas enter into the calculation of an offense, the Commentary does not say whether paṇḍaka covers all five types of paṇḍakas or only those not allowed to ordain. In other words, in the context of these rules do “sprinkled ones” and voyeurs count as paṇḍakas or men? In the context of this rule the practical implications of the distinction are minor: If counted as men, they would be grounds for a dukkaṭa; if paṇḍakas, grounds for a thullaccaya. However, under Pc 6, 44, 45, & 67, the distinction makes the difference between an offense and a non-offense, and so it is an important one to draw. There seems good reason to count them as men under all rules, for if they could ordain and yet were considered paṇḍakas under these rules, the texts would have been obliged to deal with the issue of how bhikkhus were to treat validly ordained paṇḍakas in their midst in the context of these rules. But they don’t. This shows that the issue never arose, which means that, for the purposes of all the rules, these two types of individuals count as men.

As for female yakkhas, the Commentary says that this also includes female devas. There is an ancient story in Chieng Mai of a bhikkhu who was visited by a dazzling heavenly maiden late one night while he was meditating alone in a cave at Wat Umong. She told him not to touch her, but he did—and went immediately out of his mind. The moral: This is one thullaccaya not to be taken lightly.

There is one exception to the dukkaṭa for lustful contact with an animal: Mv.V.9.3 states that a bhikkhu who touches the genitals of cattle incurs a thullaccaya.

Other information from the Commentary:

1) The thullaccaya for lustfully touching female corpses applies only to those that would be grounds for a full offense under Pr 1, i.e., those with an anal, oral, or genital orifice intact enough for one to perform the sexual act. Female corpses decomposed beyond that point are grounds for a dukkaṭa here.

2) The dukkaṭa for lustfully touching wooden dolls (mannequins) applies also to any female form made out of other materials, and even to any picture of a woman.

3) Female animals include female nāgas as well as any female offspring of a union between a human being and an animal.

For some reason, male yakkhas and devas slipped out of the list. Perhaps they should come under men.

Perception

The Vibhaṅga shows that misperception affects the severity of the offense only in the cases of women and paṇḍakas. A bhikkhu who makes lustful bodily contact with a woman while under the impression that she is something else—a paṇḍaka, a man, or an animal—incurs a thullaccaya. If he makes lustful bodily contact with a paṇḍaka while under the impression that the paṇḍaka is a woman, a man, or an animal, the penalty is a dukkaṭa. In the cases of men and animals, misperception has no effect on the severity of the case: Lustful bodily contact—e.g., with a male transvestite whom one thinks to be a woman—still results in a dukkaṭa.

Intention

The Vinīta-vatthu contains cases of a bhikkhu who caresses his mother out of filial affection, one who caresses his daughter out of fatherly affection, and one who caresses his sister out of brotherly affection. In each case the penalty is a dukkaṭa.

A bhikkhu who strikes a woman—or anyone else—out of anger would be treated under Pc 74. Both under that rule and in the context of Passive Contact under this rule, below, a bhikkhu who strikes or otherwise touches a woman out of a desire to escape from her commits no offense.

Otherwise, the Vibhaṅga does not discuss the issue of bhikkhus who intentionally make active contact with women for purposes other than lust or affection—e.g., helping a woman who has fallen into a raging river—but the Commentary does. It introduces the concept of anāmāsa, things carrying a dukkaṭa penalty when touched; women and women’s clothing top the list. (See BMC2, Appendix V for the entire list.) It then goes into great detail to tell how one should behave when one’s mother falls into a raging river. Under no circumstances, it says, should one grab hold of her, although one may extend a rope, a board, etc., in her direction. If she happens to grab hold of her son the bhikkhu, he should not shake her off but should simply let her hold on as he swims back to shore.

Where the Commentary gets the concept of anāmāsa is hard to say. Perhaps it came from the practices of the brahman caste, who are very careful not to touch certain things and people of certain lower castes. At any rate, there is no direct basis for it in the Canon. Although the concept has received wide acceptance in Theravādin Communities, many highly respected Vinaya experts have made an exception right here, saying that there is nothing wrong in touching a woman when one’s action is based not on lust but on a desire to save her from danger. Even if there is an offense in doing so, there are other places where Buddhaghosa recommends that one be willing to incur a minor penalty for the sake of compassion (e.g., digging a person out of a hole into which he has fallen), and the same principle surely holds here.

The Vibhaṅga assigns no offense for touching a being other than a woman if one’s intentions are not lustful, although tickling is an offense under Pc 52.

Effort

Acts of lustful but indirect bodily contact with a woman one perceives to be a woman and a paṇḍaka one perceives to be a woman carry the following penalties:

For the woman: Using one’s body to make contact with an article connected to her body—e.g., using one’s hand to touch a rope or stick she is holding: a thullaccaya.

Using an item connected with one’s body to make contact with her body—e.g., using a flower one is holding to brush along her arm: a thullaccaya.

Using an item connected with one’s body to make contact with an item connected with her body: a dukkaṭa.

Taking an object—such as a flower—and tossing it against her body, an object connected with her body, or an object she has tossed: a dukkaṭa.

Taking hold of something she is standing or sitting on—a bridge, a tree, a boat, etc.—and giving it a shake: a dukkaṭa.

For the paṇḍaka one assumes to be a woman, the penalty in all the above cases is a dukkaṭa.

These penalties for indirect contact have inspired the Commentary to say that if a bhikkhu makes contact with a clothed portion of a woman’s body or uses a clothed portion of his body to make contact with hers, and the cloth is so thick that neither his body hairs nor hers can penetrate it, the penalty is only a thullaccaya because he is not making direct contact. Only if the contact is skin-to-skin, skin-to-hair, or hair-to-hair (as might be possible through thin cloth) does he commit the full offense. Thus a bhikkhu who fondles the breasts, buttocks, or crotch of a fully clothed woman would incur only a thullaccaya because the contact was indirect.

There is a certain logic to the commentators’ assertion here, but why they adopted it is unclear. Perhaps they drew a parallel to the following rule—concerning lustful remarks made to a woman—which also contains derived offenses for remarks directed at items “connected with the body.” In that case, defining connected with the body to include clothing worn by the woman does no violence to the nature of the activity covered by the rule, for it is possible to make remarks about a woman’s clothing without using words that touch on her body at all.

Here, however, the nature of the activity is different. If one pushes a woman, it does not matter how many layers of cloth lie between her body and one’s hand: One is pushing both the cloth and her. If one squeezes her fully clothed breasts, again, one is squeezing both the cloth and the breasts. To say that one is pushing or squeezing only the cloth is a denial of the true nature of the action. Also, if one stroked a woman’s fully clothed thigh, it is unlikely that the strength of her reaction would depend on whether her body hairs penetrated the cloth, or if one was wearing latex gloves that prevented her hair from touching one’s skin. Common linguistic usage reflects these facts, as does the law.

The question is, does the Vibhaṅga follow this common linguistic usage, and the answer appears to be Yes. In none of the Vinīta-vatthu cases concerning physical contact with women does the Buddha ever ask the bhikkhu if he made contact with the clothed or unclothed portions of the woman’s body. This suggests that the question of whether she was clothed or unclothed is irrelevant to the offense. In one of the cases, “a certain bhikkhu, seeing a woman he encountered coming in the opposite direction, was impassioned and gave her a blow with his shoulder.” Now, bhikkhus sometimes have their shoulders bared and sometimes robed; women walking along a road may have different parts of their body clothed or bared. If the presence or absence of a layer or two of cloth between the bhikkhu’s shoulder and the woman’s body were relevant to the severity of the offense, then given the Buddha’s usual thoroughness in cases like this he would have asked about the amount, location, and thickness of clothing on both the bhikkhu and the woman, to determine if the offense was a dukkaṭa, a thullaccaya, or a saṅghādisesa. But he didn’t. He simply penalized the bhikkhu with a saṅghādisesa, which again suggests that the presence or absence of cloth between the bhikkhu and the woman is irrelevant in all cases under this rule.

The only cases of indirect contact mentioned in the Vinīta-vatthu refer to contact of a much more remote sort: A bhikkhu pulls a cord of which a woman is holding the other end, pulls a stick of which she is holding the other end, or gives her a playful push with his bowl.

Thus in the context of this rule the Vibhaṅga defines “object connected to the body,” through which indirect contact is made, with examples of things that the person is holding. The Vinaya-mukha adds things that are hanging from the person, like the hem of a robe or a dress. In this context, contact made through cloth that the person is wearing would be classed as direct. This would parallel Pr 1, in which the question of whether there is anything covering either of the organs involved in intercourse is completely irrelevant to the offense. Thus the concept of direct and indirect contact here would seem to follow general linguistic usage: If a woman is wearing a long-sleeved shirt, for instance, grabbing her by the arm and grabbing her by the cuff of her shirt are two different things, and would receive different penalties under this rule.

According to the Vibhaṅga, if a bhikkhu feels desire for contact with a woman and makes an effort that does not achieve even indirect contact—e.g., making a squeezing motion in the air near one of her breasts—the penalty is a dukkaṭa.

Passive contact

The Vibhaṅga’s analysis of passive contact—when the bhikkhu is the object rather than the agent making the contact—deals with only a limited number of variables.

Agent:

Either a woman the bhikkhu perceives to be a woman, or a paṇḍaka he perceives to be a woman.

The agent’s effort:

Any of the actions that fulfill the factor of effort for the full offense under active contact—rubbing, pulling, pushing, squeezing, etc.

The bhikkhu’s aim

The Vibhaṅga lists only two possibilities here: the desire to partake (of the contact) and the desire to escape (§). The Sub-commentary explains the first as desiring the pleasurable feeling of contact. It also states that if, in the course of receiving contact, one’s motives change from desiring contact to desiring escape, the second motive is what counts.

Effort

The bhikkhu either makes a physical effort or he doesn’t. The Commentary includes under this factor even the slightest physical movements, such as winking, raising one’s eyebrows, or rolling one’s eyes.

Result

The bhikkhu either detects the contact or he doesn’t.

The most important factor here is the bhikkhu’s aim: If he desires to escape from the contact, then no matter who the person making the contact is, whether or not the bhikkhu makes an effort, or whether or not he detects the contact, there is no offense. The Vinīta-vatthu gives an example:

“Now at that time, many women, pressing up to a certain bhikkhu, led him about arm-in-arm. He felt conscience-stricken…. ‘Did you consent, bhikkhu?’ (the Buddha) asked.

‘No, venerable sir, I did not.’

‘Then there was no offense, bhikkhu, as you did not consent.’”

The Commentary mentions another example, in which a bhikkhu not desiring the contact is molested by a lustful woman. He remains perfectly still, with the thought, “When she realizes I’m not interested, she’ll go away.” He too commits no offense.

However, if the bhikkhu desires the contact, then the Vibhaṅga assigns offenses as follows:

The agent is a woman, the bhikkhu makes an effort and detects contact: a saṅghādisesa. He makes an effort but detects no contact: a dukkaṭa. He makes no effort (e.g., he remains perfectly still as she grasps, squeezes, and rubs his body): no offense regardless of whether or not he detects contact. One exception here, though, would be the special case mentioned under “Consent” in the preceding rule, in which a bhikkhu lets a woman—or anyone at all, for that matter—make him have an emission and he incurs a saṅghādisesa under that rule as a result.

The agent is a paṇḍaka whom the bhikkhu perceives to be a woman, the bhikkhu makes an effort and detects contact: a dukkaṭa. He doesn’t detect contact: a dukkaṭa (this point is included in the PTS edition, but not in the Sri Lankan or the Thai). Other possibilities—detected contact but no effort, no effort and no detected contact: no offense.

Other derived offenses for passive contact

Other derived offenses for passive contact all deal with cases in which the bhikkhu desires contact and makes an effort. The variables focus on the agent, the agent’s effort, and the question of whether the bhikkhu detects contact or not, with the pattern of offenses following the pattern of derived offenses for active contact. In other words:

If the agent is a woman whom the bhikkhu perceives to be a woman, then if she makes an effort at the bhikkhu’s body using something connected to her body, and the bhikkhu detects contact: a thullaccaya. If she makes an effort at something connected to the bhikkhu’s body using her body, and the bhikkhu detects contact: a thullaccaya. If she makes contact at something connected to the bhikkhu’s body using something connected to her body, and the bhikkhu detects contact: a dukkaṭa. If, in any of these cases, the bhikkhu does not detect contact, the offense is a dukkaṭa.

If she tosses something at or on his body, something connected with his body, or something he has tossed, then the offense is a dukkaṭa regardless of whether he detects contact or not.

If the agent is a paṇḍaka whom the bhikkhu perceives to be a woman, the offense is a dukkaṭa in each of the above cases.

Counting offenses

According to the Vibhaṅga, if a bhikkhu has lustful bodily contact with x number of people in any of the ways that constitute an offense here, he commits x number of offenses. For example, if he lustfully rubs up against two women in a bus, he incurs two saṅghādisesas. If, out of fatherly affection, he hugs his two daughters and three sons, he incurs two dukkaṭas for hugging his daughters and no penalty for hugging his sons.

The Commentary adds that if he makes lustful contact with a person x number of times, he commits x number of offenses. For instance, he hugs a woman from behind, she fights him off, and he strikes her out of lust: two saṅghādisesas.

The question of counting saṅghādisesas, though, is somewhat academic because the penalty for multiple offenses is almost identical with the penalty for one. The only difference is in the formal proclamations in the community transactions that accompany the penalty—e.g., when the Community places the offender under probation, when he informs others bhikkhus of why he is under probation, etc. For more on this point, see the concluding section of this chapter.

Non-offenses

There is no offense for a bhikkhu who makes contact with a woman—

unintentionally—as when accidentally touching a woman while she is putting food in his bowl;

unthinkingly—as when a woman runs into him and, startled, he pushes her away;

unknowingly—as when, without lust, he touches a tomboy he thinks to be a boy (this example is from the Commentary), when he doesn’t even know that he has run into a woman in a crowd, or when a woman touches him while he is asleep; or

when he doesn’t give his consent—as in the case of the bhikkhu led around arm-in-arm by a crowd of women.

For some reason, the non-offense clauses omit the non-offenses the Vibhaṅga lists under passive contact—i.e., there is no offense if:

the bhikkhu does not desire contact or

he does desire contact and yet makes no effort.

Summary: Lustful bodily contact with a woman whom one perceives to be a woman is a saṅghādisesa offense.

*    *    *

3

Should any bhikkhu, overcome by lust, with altered mind, address lewd words to a woman in the manner of young men to a young woman alluding to sexual intercourse, it entails initial and subsequent meetings of the Community.

“Now at that time Ven. Udāyin was living in the wilderness. And on that occasion many women came to the monastery to look at his dwelling. They went to him and on arrival said to him, ‘Venerable sir, we would like to look at your dwelling.’ Then Ven. Udāyin, showing the dwelling to the women and referring to their genital and anal orifices, praised and criticized and begged and implored and asked and quizzed and advised and instructed and insulted them. Those of the women who were brazen, mischievous, and shameless giggled along with Ven. Udāyin, coaxed him on, laughed aloud, and teased him; while those of the women who had a sense of shame complained to the bhikkhus as they left: ‘It’s improper, venerable sirs, and unbecoming! Even by our husbands we wouldn’t want (to hear) this sort of thing said, much less by Master Udāyin.’”

The K/Commentary, summarizing the Vibhaṅga’s discussion, lists five factors for a full breach of this rule.

1) Object: a woman, i.e., any female human being experienced enough to know what is properly said and improperly said, what is lewd and not lewd.

2) Perception: The bhikkhu perceives her to be a woman.

3) Intention: He is impelled by lust. As in the preceding rule, we can take the Commentary’s definition of lust here as the minimum amount of lust to fulfill this factor: He wants to enjoy saying something lewd or improper.

4) Effort: He makes remarks praising, criticizing, begging, imploring, asking, quizzing, advising, instructing, or insulting with reference to her genitals or anus, or to her performing sexual intercourse.

5) Result: The woman immediately understands.

The only factors requiring detailed explanation here are object, intention, effort, and result.

Object

As the Commentary notes, a woman who does not know what is properly and improperly said, what is lewd and not lewd, may either be too young to know or, if she is an adult, too innocent or retarded to know. A woman who does not know the language in which one is speaking would also not fulfill the factor of object here.

Intention

The minimum level of desire required to fulfill this factor means that this rule covers cases where a bhikkhu simply gets a charge out of referring to a woman’s genitals, etc., in her presence, without necessarily having any desire actually to have sex with her.

The Vibhaṅga makes clear that this rule does not cover statements made in anger. Thus any insults a bhikkhu may direct at a woman out of anger rather than out of desire—even if they refer to her genitals, etc.—would come under Pc 2, rather than here.

Effort

The Vibhaṅga states that to incur the full penalty here when speaking to a woman, one must refer to her genitals, anus, or performing sexual intercourse (§).

The Commentary goes further and asserts that to incur the full penalty one must make direct mention of one of these three things, or accuse her of being sexually deformed in a way that refers directly to her genitals. Otherwise, if one refers lustfully to these matters without directly mentioning them, there is no saṅghādisesa, although the Sub-commentary quotes ancient texts called the Gaṇṭhipadas as assigning a dukkaṭa for such an act.

However, these assertions from the commentaries contradict the Vibhaṅga. After listing the ways of referring to the woman’s anus, genitals, and sexual intercourse that would entail the full penalty under this rule, it illustrates them with examples. Many of the examples, although referring to the woman’s private parts or to her performing sexual intercourse, do not actually mention those words: “How do you give to your husband?” “How do you give to your lover?” “When will your mother be reconciled (to our having sex)?” “When will you have a good opportunity?” Although all of these statements refer to sexual intercourse, and people in those days would have understood them in that light, none of them actually mentions it.

Thus the Vibhaṅga’s examples indicate that if a bhikkhu is using slang expressions, euphemisms, or indirect statements to refer lustfully to the woman’s private parts or to her performing sexual intercourse, he fulfills this factor. There is no need for the euphemisms to be well known. If the speaker intends it as a reference to the forbidden topics, that fulfills the factor of effort. If his listener understands it as such, that fulfills the factor of result. Whether anyone else understands it as such is irrelevant to the offense.

The K/Commentary notes that a hand gesture denoting the genitals, anus, or sexual intercourse of the person to whom it is directed would fulfill the factor of effort here as well.

None of the texts mention the case in which a bhikkhu talks to one person about another person’s private parts, etc. Thus it is apparently not an offense.

Result

The K/Commentary insists that the factor of result is fulfilled only if the woman immediately understands. As the Vibhaṅga points out, if she does not understand, the bhikkhu incurs a lesser offense, which will be discussed below. If she understands only later, that does not turn the lesser offense into a saṅghādisesa. The examples from the Vinīta-vatthu indicate that the woman’s immediate understanding can be known by her immediate response to one’s comments.

Derived offenses

The factors of effort, object, perception, and result, taken together, yield a number of permutations to which the Vibhaṅga assigns lesser offenses. As for the permutations of intention, see the section on non-offenses, below.

Effort

A bhikkhu speaks to a woman he perceives to be a woman and refers lustfully to parts of her body—aside from her private parts—below her collarbones and above her knees, such as her breasts, buttocks, or thighs: a thullaccaya. He refers to parts of her body outside of that area, such as her face or hairdo, or to clothing or jewelry she is wearing: a dukkaṭa.

Object

A bhikkhu speaks to a paṇḍaka (in this and the following cases we are assuming that he perceives his object correctly) and refers lustfully to his private parts or to his performing sexual intercourse: a thullaccaya (§). He refers lustfully to other parts of the paṇḍaka’s body, his clothing, etc.: a dukkaṭa (§).

A bhikkhu speaks to a man (or boy) and refers lustfully to any part of his listener’s body, clothing, etc.: a dukkaṭa (§). The same penalty holds for speaking lustfully to an animal—e.g., a nāga—about his/her body, ornaments, etc. (§).

For some reason the PTS edition of the Canon omits these derived offenses related to object under this rule. The Burmese and Sri Lankan editions are non-committal on the topic, for the relevant paragraphs are filled with ellipses that have been read in two ways. The PTS edition of the K/Commentary reads the ellipses as including the thullaccaya and dukkaṭa for speaking lustfully to a paṇḍaka, but not the dukkaṭas for speaking lustfully to a man or animal. The editors of the Thai edition of the Canon have interpreted the parallelism with the similar paragraph in Sg 2 as indicating that “man” and “animal” would come under the ellipses, and so have included these cases in the text. This interpretation closes an important loophole and thus seems the more correct, so I have followed it here.

None of the texts make any mention of speaking lustfully to a woman/girl too inexperienced to understand what is and is not lewd. Using the Great Standards, though, we might argue from the cases included in the Vinīta-vatthu—where bhikkhus make punning references to women’s private parts, and the women do not understand—that a bhikkhu incurs a thullaccaya for referring directly to her genitals, anus, or performing sexual intercourse in her presence, and a dukkaṭa for referring indirectly in her presence to such things.

Perception

A bhikkhu speaking to a woman whom he perceives to be something else—a paṇḍaka, a man, an animal—incurs a thullaccaya if he refers lustfully to her genitals, anus, or performing sexual intercourse. If he is speaking to a paṇḍaka, a man, or an animal he misperceives—e.g., he thinks the paṇḍaka is a woman, the man is a paṇḍaka, the animal is a man—he incurs a dukkaṭa if he refers lustfully to those topics (§). (Again, the PTS edition omits most of the cases in this last sentence and includes only the case of a bhikkhu speaking lustfully to a paṇḍaka he perceives to be a woman; the Thai edition seems more correct in including the remaining cases as well.)

Result

As mentioned above, the Vinīta-vatthu contains a number of cases where bhikkhus speaking to women make punning references to the women’s genitals that the women do not understand. In one case the penalty is a thullaccaya; in the others, a dukkaṭa. The Commentary takes no note of the difference; the Sub-commentary notes it but has trouble making sense of it. In fact, it maintains that the bhikkhu in the thullaccaya case should receive a thullaccaya if the woman does understand his pun, which—given the explicit nature of the pun—makes no sense at all.

There is, however, a pattern to the Vinīta-vatthu cases. The thullaccaya case is the only one in which the bhikkhu actually mentions a word for genitals or anus (magga, which also means road, the meaning the woman understood). In the dukkaṭa cases, bhikkhus either use euphemisms for sexual intercourse (“plowing,” “working”) or else they make statements in which the words genitals or anus are implied but not actually stated. From this pattern we can argue that if a bhikkhu speaking to a woman makes direct reference to her genitals or anus, and the woman doesn’t immediately understand that he is referring to those things, he incurs a thullaccaya. If he makes a euphemistic reference to sexual intercourse or an implied reference to her genitals or anus, and she doesn’t immediately understand what he is referring to, he incurs a dukkaṭa.

Counting offenses

A bhikkhu making a remark of the sort covered by this rule to x number of people commits x number of offenses, the type of offense being determined by the factors discussed above. Thus for a lustful remark to two women referring to their breasts, he would incur two thullaccayas; for a lustful remark to three men concerning their bodies, three dukkaṭas; for teasing a group of twenty old ladies about how their time for sexual performance is past, twenty saṅghādisesas.

Non-offenses

The Vibhaṅga states that there is no offense for a bhikkhu who speaks aiming at (spiritual) welfare (attha—this can also mean the “meaning of the Dhamma”), aiming at Dhamma, or aiming at teaching. Thus, for example, if one is talking in front of women and has no lustful intent, one may recite or explain this training rule or go into detail on the topic of the loathsomeness of the body as a topic of meditation, all without incurring a penalty. The Commentary here adds an example of a bhikkhu addressing a sexually deformed woman, telling her to be heedful in her practice so as not to be born that way again. If, however, one were to broach any of these topics out of a desire to enjoy saying something lewd to one’s listeners, one would not be immune from an offense. The New K/Sub-commentary illustrates this point with an example: A bhikkhu, teaching the Vibhaṅga of this rule to a bhikkhunī, departs from a normal tone of voice and keeps sniggering while reciting the examples of lewd speech. This sort of behavior, it says, incurs the full offense here.

A bhikkhu who without intending to be lewd makes innocent remarks that his listener takes to be lewd commits no offense.

Summary: Making a lustful remark to a woman about her genitals, anus, or about performing sexual intercourse is a saṅghādisesa offense.

*    *    *

4

Should any bhikkhu, overcome by lust, with altered mind, speak in the presence of a woman in praise of ministering to his own sensuality thus: “This, sister, is the foremost ministration, that of ministering to a virtuous, fine-natured follower of the celibate life such as myself with this act”—alluding to sexual intercourse—it entails initial and subsequent meetings of the Community.

“Now at that time a certain woman, a widow, was beautiful, attractive, and appealing. So Ven. Udāyin, dressing (§) early in the morning, taking his robe and bowl, went to her residence. On arrival, he sat on an appointed seat. Then the woman went to him and, having bowed down to him, sat to one side. As she was sitting there, Ven. Udāyin instructed, urged, roused, and encouraged her with a talk on Dhamma. Then the woman—instructed, urged, roused, and encouraged with Ven. Udāyin’s talk on Dhamma—said to him, ‘Tell me, venerable sir, what I would be capable of giving you that you need: Robe-cloth? Almsfood? Lodgings? Medicines for the sick?’

“‘Those things aren’t hard for us to come by, sister…. Give just what is hard for us to come by.’

“‘What, venerable sir?’

“‘Sexual intercourse.’

“‘Is it a need, venerable sir?’

“‘A need, sister.’

“‘Then come, venerable sir.’ Entering into an inner room, taking off her cloak, she lay back on a bed. Then Ven. Udāyin went to the woman and, on arrival, said, ‘Who would touch this vile, stinking thing?’ And he departed, spitting.

“So the woman criticized and complained and spread it about… ‘How can this monk Udāyin, when he himself begged me for sexual intercourse, say, “Who would touch this vile, stinking thing?” and depart spitting? What’s evil about me? What’s stinking about me? In what am I inferior to whom?’”

At first glance this rule might seem redundant with the preceding one, for what we have here is another case of a bhikkhu advising, begging, or imploring a woman to perform sexual intercourse. The Sub-commentary, borrowing the Commentary’s classification of types of lust, states that the rules differ in terms of the lust involved. According to it, only the desire to say something lewd would fall under the preceding rule; only the desire for sexual intercourse would fall here. However, as we have seen, the Commentary’s neat system for classifying desires contradicts some important passages in the Vibhaṅga, and so the Sub-commentary’s explanation has no ground on which to stand.

A more likely explanation for the need for this rule derives from some facts about language and belief in the Buddha’s time that might have led some people to feel that the behavior in the origin story here was a special case not covered by the preceding rule. To prevent this sort of misunderstanding, it gets separate treatment under this rule.

“Giving,” in the Buddha’s time, was a common euphemism for having sex. If a woman “gave” to a man, that meant that she willingly engaged in sexual intercourse with him. Now, Buddhism was not the only religion of the time to teach that gifts—of a more innocent sort—given to contemplatives produced great reward to those who gave them, and ultimately somebody somewhere came up with the idea that because sex was the highest gift, giving it to a contemplative would produce the highest reward. Whether this idea was first formulated by faithful women or by clever contemplatives is hard to say. Several cases in the Vinīta-vatthu to Pr 1 tell of bhikkhus approached or attacked by women professing this belief, which shows that it had some currency: Sex was somehow seen as a way to higher benefits through the law of kamma.

Because the preceding rule gives exemptions for bhikkhus speaking “aiming at (spiritual) welfare (attha), aiming at Dhamma,” some misguided souls who did not comprehend the Buddha’s teachings on sensuality might believe that welfare of this sort might fit under the exemption. The origin story alludes to this point in a punning way, in that the word for “need” is also attha, and perhaps the widow, in using the word, had both its meanings in mind: Her spiritual welfare would be enhanced by meeting a bhikkhu’s needs. Even today, although the rationale might be different, there are people who believe that having sex with spiritual teachers is beneficial for one’s spiritual well being. Thus we have this separate rule to show that the Buddha would have no part in such a notion, and that a bhikkhu who tries to suggest that his listener would benefit from having sex with him is not exempt from an offense.

The K/Commentary lists five factors for the full offense here, but only four of them have a basis in the Vibhaṅga: object, perception, intention, and effort.

Object:

A woman experienced enough to know what is properly or improperly said, what is lewd and not lewd.

Perception

The bhikkhu perceives her to be a woman.

Intention

He is impelled by lust. According to the K/Commentary, this means he is lustful for his listener to minister to his desire for sexual intercourse. However, the Vibhaṅga defines overcome with lust here in the same broad terms it uses under Sg 2 & 3. This suggests that the factor of intention here can be fulfilled simply by the desire to enjoy making such remarks in a woman’s presence—say, getting a charge out of testing her reaction, which appears to have been Ven. Udāyin’s impulse in the origin story—regardless of how one feels about actually having sex with her.

Effort

The bhikkhu speaks to the woman in praise of her ministering to his sensual needs, referring to sexual intercourse as a meritorious gift. The Commentary maintains that his remarks must directly mention sexual intercourse for this factor to be fulfilled, but the examples in the rule itself and in the Vibhaṅga contradict its assertion. Some of the examples in the Vibhaṅga state simply, “This is foremost. This is best. This is the utmost. This is highest. This is excellent.” These statements are followed by the explanation that they have to allude to or be connected with sexual intercourse. It does not say that the allusion has to be explicit.

Also, the Vinīta-vatthu contains a number of cases in which bhikkhus simply tell women to give the highest gift, sexual intercourse—and one in which a bhikkhu simply tells a woman that sexual intercourse is the highest gift—without explicitly saying to whom it should be given. The bhikkhus all earn saṅghādisesas for their efforts, which shows that the reference to oneself need not be explicit, either.

Both the Commentary and the K/Commentary state that a physical gesture—this would include writing a letter—can fulfill the factor of effort here as well.

The K/Commentary adds result as a fifth factor, saying that the woman must immediately understand one’s remark, but there is no basis for this in the Canon.

Derived offenses

The only factors with permutations leading to lesser offenses are object and perception.

Object

A bhikkhu, correctly perceiving his object and impelled by lust, makes such a remark to a paṇḍaka: a thullaccaya. To a man or animal: a dukkaṭa (§). (As under the preceding rule, the PTS edition of the Canon omits all of these cases, and the K/Commentary omits the man and the animal. The Burmese and Sri Lankan editions of the Canon put the relevant passages in ellipses; the Thai edition seems to be correct in mentioning all of these cases explicitly.)

Perception

A bhikkhu, impelled by lust, makes such a remark to a woman he perceives to be something else—a paṇḍaka, man, or animal: a thullaccaya. To a paṇḍaka, a man, or an animal he perceives to be something else: a dukkaṭa (§). (Again, as under the preceding rule, the PTS edition omits most of the cases in this last sentence, including only the case of a bhikkhu speaking lustfully to a paṇḍaka he perceives to be a woman; the Thai edition seems more correct in including the remaining cases as well.)

Counting offenses

Offenses are counted by the number of people to whom one makes such a remark.

Non-offenses

The non-offense clauses in the Vibhaṅga, in addition to the blanket exemptions mentioned under Pr 1, read simply: “There is no offense if he speaks saying, ‘Support us with the requisites of robe-cloth, almsfood, lodgings, or medicines for the sick.’” The K/Commentary explains this as meaning that if one is motivated by a sensual desire for robe-cloth, etc., one may speak to a potential donor in praise of giving these things. In other words, given this sort of desire, this sort of statement is allowable. From this interpretation it can be argued that when a bhikkhu is speaking without any lust or sensual desire of any sort, he may make any of the remarks that would fulfill the factor of effort here in the presence of others without incurring an offense. A prime example would be when, while explaining this rule, he quotes examples of the remarks it forbids.

Summary: Telling a woman that having sexual intercourse with a bhikkhu would be beneficial is a saṅghādisesa offense.

*    *    *

5

Should any bhikkhu engage in conveying a man’s intentions to a woman or a woman’s intentions to a man, proposing marriage or paramourage—even if only for a momentary liaison—it entails initial and subsequent meetings of the Community.

There are two factors for a full offense under this rule: effort and object.

Effort

The Commentary says that to engage in conveying means to take on the role of a go-between. This includes helping to arrange not only marriages and affairs but also “momentary associations” that, from the way it describes them, could include anything from appointments with a prostitute to arrangements for X to be Y’s date.

The Vibhaṅga sets the component factors of a go-between’s role at three:

1) accepting the request of one party to convey a proposal;

2) inquiring, i.e., informing the second party and learning his/her/their reaction; and

3) reporting what one has learned to the first party.

The penalties for these actions are: a dukkaṭa for performing any one of them, a thullaccaya for any two, and a saṅghādisesa for the full set of three. Thus a bhikkhu acting on his own initiative to sound out the possibility of a date between a man and a woman would incur a thullaccaya for inquiring and reporting. A bhikkhu planning to disrobe who asks a woman if she would be interested in marrying him after his return to lay life would incur a dukkaṭa for inquiring. If, on the way to inquire about a woman after accepting a man’s request to inquire about her, a bhikkhu asks people along the way of her whereabouts, that does not count as inquiring. If he goes no further in acting as a go-between, he incurs only a dukkaṭa.

The penalties are the same if the bhikkhu, instead of acting as a go-between himself, gets someone else to act for him. Thus a bhikkhu who agrees to convey such a proposal but then gets a lay follower or another bhikkhu to do the inquiring and reporting would incur a saṅghādisesa all the same.

If a bhikkhu agrees to a man’s request to inquire about a woman, gets his student (§) to do the inquiring, and then the student of his own accord reports to the man, both the original bhikkhu and his student—assuming that he, too, is a bhikkhu—incur thullaccayas.

If a group of bhikkhus are asked to act as go-betweens and they all accept, then even if only one of them performs any or all of the actions of a go-between, all the bhikkhus in the group incur the penalty for his actions.

“Result” is not a factor here, so the Commentary mentions that whether the arrangements succeed has no bearing on the offense.

“Intention” is also not a factor, which leads the Sub-commentary to raise the issue of a man who writes his proposal in a letter and then, without disclosing the contents, gets a bhikkhu to deliver it. Its conclusion, though, is that this case would not qualify as an offense under this rule, in that both the Vibhaṅga and the Commentary define the action of conveying as “telling”: Only if the bhikkhu himself tells the proposal—whether repeating it orally, making a gesture, or writing a letter—does he commit an offense here. Simply carrying a letter, not knowing its contents, would not fulfill the factor of effort under this rule.

Object

The full offense is for acting as a go-between between a man and a woman who are not married to each other. If, instead of dealing directly with the man and woman, one deals with people speaking on their behalf (their parents, a pimp), one incurs the full penalty all the same.

There is no offense for a bhikkhu who tries to effect a reconciliation between an estranged couple who are not divorced, but a full offense for one who tries to effect a reconciliation between a couple who are. “Perception” is also not a factor here, which inspires the Commentary to note that even an arahant could commit an offense under this rule if he tried to effect a reconciliation between his parents whom he assumed to be separated when they were actually divorced.

Elsewhere, in its discussion of the five precepts, the Commentary includes couples who live as husband and wife without having gone through a formal ceremony under its definition of married, and the same definition would seem to apply here.

The Vibhaṅga assigns a thullaccaya for acting as a go-between for a paṇḍaka; according to the Commentary, the same penalty applies for acting as a go-between for a female yakkha or peta (!).

Non-offenses

The Vibhaṅga states that, in addition to the usual exemptions, there is no offense if a bhikkhu conveys a message from a man to a woman or vice versa dealing with “business of the Community, of a shrine, or of a sick person.” The Commentary illustrates the first two instances with cases of a bhikkhu conveying a message dealing with construction work for the Community or a shrine; and the third with a case where a bhikkhu, acting on behalf of a fellow bhikkhu who is sick, is sent by a male lay follower to a female lay follower for medicine.

The Sub-commentary adds that any similar errand—i.e., not involving any sort of romantic liaison—is also exempt from penalty as long as it is not a form of subservience to lay people (see Sg 13, below).

Summary: Acting as a go-between to arrange a marriage, an affair, or a date between a man and a woman not married to each other is a saṅghādisesa offense.

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6

When a bhikkhu is having a hut built from (gains acquired by) his own begging (§)—having no sponsor and destined for himself—he is to have it built to the standard measurement. Here the standard is this: twelve spans, using the sugata span, in length (measuring outside); seven in width, (measuring) inside. Bhikkhus are to be assembled to designate the site. The site the bhikkhus designate should be without disturbances and with adequate space. If the bhikkhu should have a hut built from his own begging on a site with disturbances and without adequate space, or if he should not assemble the bhikkhus to designate the site, or if he should have the standard exceeded, it entails initial and subsequent meetings of the Community.

“At that time the bhikkhus of Āḷavī were having huts built from their own begging—having no sponsors, destined for themselves, not to any standard measurement—that did not come to completion. They were continually begging, continually hinting: ‘Give a man, give labor, give an ox, give a wagon, give a knife, give an ax, give an adze, give a hoe, give a chisel, give rushes, give bamboo, give reeds, give grass, give clay.’ People, harassed with the begging, harassed with the hinting, on seeing bhikkhus would feel apprehensive, alarmed, would run away; would take another route, face another direction, close the door. Even on seeing cows, they would run away, imagining them to be bhikkhus.”

There are three factors for a full offense under this rule.

Effort: One completes, or gets someone else to complete, through begging for its materials,

Object: a hut that exceeds the standard mentioned in the rule or whose site has not been designated by the Community.

Intention: One intends the hut for one’s own use.

We will discuss these factors in reverse order.

Intention

The Canon repeatedly refers to two arrangements for the ownership of dwellings used by bhikkhus: They belong either to the Community or to an individual (or group of individuals). From the point of view of Community governance, the prior arrangement is preferable, for the Community can then allot the dwelling as it sees fit (see BMC2, Chapter 18). Also, a number of the rules governing the care and use of huts—such as Pc 15, 16, & 17—apply only to dwellings belonging to the Community.

The Vibhaṅga to this rule defines destined for himself as “for his own use.” On the surface this could mean that one plans to use the hut after handing ownership over to the Community, but the Commentary states that this is not so. To dedicate something for one’s own use, it says, is to claim ownership over it: In this case, one regards the dwelling as “mine.” The Commentary’s position is supported by the protocols followed by the lodging bestower and lodging assignor (see BMC2, Chapter 18) in allotting dwellings belonging to the Community: Outside of the Rains-residence, a bhikkhu could be moved from a Community dwelling at any time; during the Rains-residence, the bhikkhu who built a particular dwelling might find himself unable to stay there because many bhikkhus with more seniority or more pressing needs had decided to spend the Rains in that location. Thus if a bhikkhu planned the dwelling for his own use, he would not want it to be subject to the protocols governing Community dwellings.

The Commentary’s interpretation thus suggests that this rule and the following one were intended to discourage bhikkhus from maintaining ownership over the huts they build, for as the non-offense clauses state, the stipulations in this rule do not apply to huts built for the use of others. As the Commentary notes, this exemption applies both to huts built for other people—such as one’s preceptor or mentor—or for the Community. This would open a loophole for one to build a hut for another bhikkhu and for him to claim ownership over it independently of the Community, all without following the stipulations under the rules, but apparently the compilers of the Vibhaṅga did not regard the act of building a hut as a gift for another bhikkhu as something they had the right to forbid.

Object

This factor is divided into two main sub-factors: the hut and the procedures that need to be followed to get the Community’s permission for its construction.

The hut. The Vibhaṅga defines a hut as “plastered inside, outside, or both.” It also states that this rule does not apply to a leṇa, a guhā, or to a grass hut. A leṇa, according to the Commentary, is a cave. A guhā it doesn’t define, except to say that guhās may be built out of wood, stone, or earth. And as for a grass hut, the Commentary says that this refers to any building with a grass roof, which means that even a dwelling with plastered walls but a grass roof would not count as a hut under this rule (although a hut whose roof has been plastered and then covered with grass would count as a hut here).

The Commentary goes on to stipulate that the plastering mentioned in the Vibhaṅga refers to a plastered roof, that the plaster must be either clay or white lime (plastering with cow dung or mud doesn’t count, although cement would probably come under “white lime” here), and that the plastering on the inside or outside of the roof must be contiguous with the plastering on the inside or outside of the walls. Thus if the builder leaves a gap in the plastering around the top of the wall so that the plastering of the roof and the plastering of the walls don’t touch at any point, the building doesn’t qualify as a hut and so doesn’t come under the rule.

The Sub-commentary treats the question raised by the Commentary’s emphasis on the plastering of the roof: Does this mean that a dwelling with a plastered roof but unplastered walls would also count as a hut? Arguing from the Commentary’s many references to making the roof-plastering contiguous with the wall-plastering, the Sub-commentary concludes that the answer is No: Both the roof and the walls must be plastered.

The commentaries’ stipulations on these points may seem like attempts to create gaping loopholes in the rule, but there is nothing in the Vibhaṅga to prove them wrong. Perhaps in those days only buildings that were fully plastered, roof and all, were considered to be finished, permanent structures, while everything else was considered makeshift and temporary and thus not worth the fuss and bother of the procedures we will discuss below.

At another point in its discussions, the Commentary adds that any building three sugata spans wide or less is not big enough to move a bed around in and so does not count as a hut under this rule. The Commentary itself defines a sugata span as three times the span of a normal person, which would put it at approximately 75 cm. More recent calculations based on the fact that the Buddha was not abnormally tall set the sugata span at 25 cm.

The maximum size of the hut, as the rule states, is no more than twelve spans long and seven spans wide, or approximately 3 x 1.75 meters. For some reason the Vibhaṅga states that the length of the hut is measured from the outside (excluding the plastering, says the Commentary), while the width is measured from the inside. Neither of these measurements may be exceeded even by the breadth of a hair. Thus a hut measuring ten by eight spans, even though it has less floor area than a twelve-by-seven-span hut, would exceed the standard width and so would be a violation of this rule.

The procedures. If, for his own use, a bhikkhu is planning to build a hut as defined in this rule, he must choose a site, clear it, and ask for a Community to inspect and approve it before he can go ahead with the actual construction.

—The site must be free of disturbances and have adequate space.

The Vibhaṅga gives a long list of “disturbances,” which for ease of understanding we can divide into three categories: A site free of disturbances is (1) not the abode of such creatures as termites, ants, or rats who might do harm to the building. (2) It is not the abode of those—such as snakes, scorpions, tigers, lions, elephants, or bears—who might do harm to its inhabitant. The Commentary states that the Vibhaṅga’s purpose in forbidding a bhikkhu from building on a site where termites and other small animals have their home is to show compassion to these and other small creatures like them by not destroying their nests. As for the stipulation against building where snakes and other dangerous animals live, this also extends, it says, to the areas where they regularly forage for food.

(3) The site is not near any places that will disturb the bhikkhu’s peace and quiet. Examples given in the Vibhaṅga are: fields, orchards, places of execution, cemeteries, pleasure groves, royal property, elephant stables, horse stables, prisons, taverns, slaughterhouses, highways, crossroads, public rest-houses, and meeting places.

Adequate space means that there is enough room on the site for a yoked wagon or a man carrying a ladder to go around the proposed hut. The question arises as to whether this means that all trees within that radius of the hut must be cut down or simply that there must be enough land around the hut so that if the trees were not there it would be possible to go around the hut in the ways mentioned. The Sub-commentary states that the stipulation for adequate space is so that the hut will not be built on the edge of a precipice or next to a cliff wall, and the Vinaya-mukha notes that the Vibhaṅga here is following the Laws of Manu (an ancient Indian legal text) in ensuring that the dwelling not be built right against someone else’s property. Both of these statements suggest that there is no need to cut the trees down.

The Vinaya-mukha deduces further from the Vibhaṅga’s discussion that the procedures for getting the site approved are concerned basically with laying claim to unclaimed land and thus don’t need to be followed in locations where the Community already owns the land, such as in a monastery; if a bhikkhu in such Communities wishes to build a hut for his own use on monastery land, he need only get the approval of the abbot. Nothing in the ancient texts, however, supports this opinion.

—Clearing the site. Before notifying the local Community, the bhikkhu must get the site cleared—so says the Vibhaṅga, and the Commentary adds that he should get it leveled as well. In both cases, he should arrange to have this done in such a way that does not violate Pc 10 & 11. If one is planning to build the hut on monastery grounds, the wise policy would be to obtain permission from the abbot before clearing the site. Again, the question arises as to whether clearing the site means cutting down the trees on the spot where one proposes building the hut. In the origin story to the following rule, Ven. Channa caused an uproar by cutting down a venerated tree on a site where he planned to build, which led the Buddha to formulate the rule that the Community must inspect and approve the site to prevent uproars of this sort. This suggests that clearing the site here means clearing the underbrush so that the presence or absence of termites, etc., can be clearly determined. Only after the Community has approved the site should the necessary trees be cut down.

—Getting the site inspected. The bhikkhu then goes to the Community and formally asks them to inspect the site. (The Pali passages for this and the remaining formal requests and proclamations are in the Vibhaṅga.) If all the members of the Community are able to go and inspect the site, they should all go. If not, the Community should select some of its members to go and inspect the site in its stead. The Vibhaṅga says that these inspectors should know what does and does not constitute a disturbance and adequate space, and requires that they be chosen by a formal motion with one proclamation. The Commentary says that they may also be chosen by a simple announcement (apalokana), but this opinion violates the principle set forth in Mv.IX.3.3 that if a shorter form is used for a transaction requiring a longer form, the transaction is invalid. Thus the Commentary’s opinion here cannot stand.

The inspectors then visit the site. If they find any disturbances or see that the site has inadequate space, they should tell the bhikkhu not to build there. If the site passes inspection, though, they should return and inform the Community that the site is free of disturbances and has adequate space.

—Getting the site approved. The bhikkhu returns to the Community and formally asks it to approve the site. The transaction statement involves a motion and one proclamation. Once this has passed, the bhikkhu may start construction.

Offenses. The Vibhaṅga allots the penalties related to the factor of object—a hut without a sponsor, for one’s own use, built without regard for the stipulations in this rule—as follows:

an oversized hut—a saṅghādisesa;

a hut on an unapproved site—a saṅghādisesa;

a hut on a site without adequate space—a dukkaṭa;

a hut on a site with disturbances—a dukkaṭa.

These penalties are additive. Thus, for example, an oversized hut on an unapproved site would entail a double saṅghādisesa.

The wording of the training rule, though, suggests that building a hut without a sponsor, for one’s own use, on a site with disturbances and without adequate space would entail a saṅghādisesa; but the Sub-commentary says—without offering explanation—that to read the rule in this way is to misinterpret it. Because the penalty for a multiple saṅghādisesa is the same as that for a single one, there is only one case where this would make an appreciable difference: a hut of the proper size, built on an approved site that has disturbances or does not have adequate space. This is a case of a Community transaction improperly performed: Either the bhikkhus inspecting the site were incompetent, or the disturbances were not immediately apparent. Because the usual penalty for improperly performing a Community transaction is a dukkaṭa (Mv.II.16.4), this may be why the Vibhaṅga allots penalties as it does. As we noted in the Introduction, in cases where the Vibhaṅga is explaining the training rules that deal with Community transactions, it sometimes has to deviate from the wording of the rules to bring them in line with the general pattern for such transactions, a pattern that was apparently formulated after the rules and came to take precedence over them.

Usually, if a Community transaction has been improperly performed, it is invalid and unfit to stand even if the bhikkhus involved think that they are following the proper procedure. In other words, in the case just mentioned, the site would strictly speaking not count as approved, and the hut would involve a saṅghādisesa. However, the Vibhaṅga seems to be making a special exemption here in assigning only a dukkaṭa, perhaps so as not to punish unduly a bhikkhu who went to all the trouble to follow, as best he and his fellow bhikkhus knew how, the proper procedures prior to building his hut.

Effort

The Vibhaṅga allots the derived penalties related to the factor of effort under this rule as follows: If the hut is such that when finished it will entail a saṅghādisesa or two, each act in its construction entails a dukkaṭa, until the next to the last act, which entails a thullaccaya.

If a bhikkhu, intending it for his own use, completes a hut that others have started, he is still bound by the stipulations given in this rule. In other words, the offenses here do not apply only to the original initiator of the hut’s construction.

The Commentary mentions a special case in which two bhikkhus, building a hut for their own use but not to the stipulations under this rule, complete it without having decided which part of the hut will go to which bhikkhu. Because of their indecision, the Commentary states that neither of them incurs the full offense until he has laid claim to his part of the hut.

Getting others to build the hut. The Vibhaṅga states that if, instead of building the hut himself, a bhikkhu tells others, “Build this hut for me,” he must inform them of the four stipulations mentioned in this rule. If he neglects to inform them, and they finish the hut in such a way that it does not meet any or all of the stipulations, he incurs all the relevant offenses for the stipulations that he neglected to mention and that the builders violated. For example: He tells them to build a hut of the right size, but neglects to tell them to have the site approved. They build it to the right size, the site is without disturbances and has adequate space but is not approved, and he incurs a saṅghādisesa. Offenses in cases like this apply whether he gets them to start the hut’s construction or gets them to complete a hut that he has started.

If, while the builders are still building the hut, he hears of what they are doing, he must either go himself or send a messenger to tell them of the stipulations he neglected to mention. If he does neither, he incurs a dukkaṭa, and when the hut is finished he incurs all the relevant offenses for the stipulations that he neglected to mention and that the builders violated.

If, while the hut is still unfinished, he returns to the site and discovers that the stipulations he neglected to mention are being violated, he must either have the hut torn down (to the ground, says the Commentary) and have it rebuilt in line with the stipulations, give it to another bhikkhu or the Community, or face the full penalty—when the hut is finished—for each of the stipulations that he neglected to mention and that the builders violated.

If the bhikkhu originally mentions the proper stipulations but later learns that the builders are ignoring them, he must go himself or send a messenger to reiterate the stipulations. Not to do so incurs a dukkaṭa. If, having been reminded of the stipulations, the builders still ignore them, the bhikkhu incurs no penalty; but they—if they are bhikkhus—incur a dukkaṭa for each of the three criteria regarding the site that they disobey. As for the standard measurement, they are not bound by it as they are building the hut for another’s use.

Begging

The Vibhaṅga to this rule does not go into any great detail on the issue of begging for construction materials. However, the Commentary contains a long discussion of what a bhikkhu may and may not beg for when building any kind of building, even those not covered by this rule. Because the Commentary’s discussion here is not based on the Canon, not all Communities regard these points as binding. Still, many of its suggestions merit serious consideration. Its main points are these:

A bhikkhu may ask for people to give labor in any situation (although this point seems to conflict with the spirit of the origin story to this rule). Thus he may ask stone masons to carry stone posts to his construction site, or carpenters to carry boards there. If, after he has asked them to help with the labor, they volunteer to donate the materials as well, he may accept them without penalty. Otherwise, he has to reimburse them for the materials.

As for tools, vehicles, and other things he will use in the process of construction, he may ask only to borrow them from other people and may not ask for them outright (except when asking from relatives or those who have made an offer). If the tools get damaged, he is responsible for getting them repaired before returning them to the owner. (This opinion, however, seems based on the Commentary’s concept of bhaṇḍadeyya, which we have already rejected under Pr 2.) The only things he needn’t return to the owner are light articles (lahubhaṇḍa), which the Sub-commentary identifies as things like reeds, rushes, grass, and clay—i.e., things having little or no monetary value at all.

This means that unless a bhikkhu is going to build his dwelling out of reeds, etc., or out of thrown-away scraps, he may not ask people in general for any of the materials that will actually go into the dwelling. Keep in mind that these rules were made during a period when wilderness was still plentiful, and solid building materials such as timber and stones were free for the taking. At present, unless a bhikkhu has access to unclaimed wilderness of this sort, to unclaimed garbage, or has enough funds on deposit with his steward (see NP 10) to cover the cost of materials, his only recourse if he wants a solid structure is either to rammed earth or to hinting.

The Commentary notes that while hinting is not allowed with regard to food or cloth, it is allowed with regard to construction materials (although again, this point seems to conflict with the spirit of the origin story). One example it gives is asking, “Do you think this is a good place to build a hut? An ordination hall?” Another example is staking out a construction site in hope that someone will ask, “What are you planning to do here?” If people get the hint and offer the materials, the bhikkhu may accept them. If they don’t, he may not ask directly for any materials except the “light articles” mentioned above.

From this it should be obvious that even in cases not covered by this rule—i.e., the dwelling he is building doesn’t qualify as a “hut,” or he is building something for other people to use—a bhikkhu engaged in construction work should not be burdensome to the laity. This is an important point, as the Buddha illustrated in a story he told to the bhikkhus at Āḷavī. A certain bhikkhu had once come to him with a complaint, and he reports the conversation as follows:

“‘Venerable sir, there is a large stand of forest on the slopes of the Himalayas, and not far from it is a broad, low-lying marsh. A great flock of birds, after feeding all day in the marsh, goes to roost in the forest at nightfall. That is why I have come to see the Blessed One—because I am annoyed by the noise of that flock of birds.’

“‘Bhikkhu, do you want those birds not to come there?’

“‘Yes, venerable sir, I want them not to come there.’

“‘Then in that case, go back there, enter the stand of forest, and in the first watch of the night make this announcement three times: “Listen to me, good birds. I want a feather from everyone roosting in this forest. Each of you give me one feather.” In the second watch…. In the third watch of the night make this announcement three times: “Listen to me, good birds. I want a feather from everyone roosting in this forest. Each of you give me one feather”…. (The bhikkhu did as he was told.) Then the flock of birds, thinking, ‘The bhikkhu asks for a feather, the bhikkhu wants a feather,’ left the forest. And after they were gone, they never again returned. Bhikkhus, begging is unpleasant, hinting is unpleasant even to these common animals—how much more so to human beings?”

Non-offenses

The Vibhaṅga’s non-offense clauses mention, in addition to the usual exemptions, that there is no offense “in a leṇa, in a guhā, in a grass hut, in (a dwelling) for another’s use, or in anything other than a dwelling.” The Commentary explains that no offense here means that these cases are not subject to any of the four stipulations given in this rule. With regard to “another’s use,” it says that this could mean a dwelling that will belong to another individual—such as one’s preceptor or mentor—or to the Community. As for the last case, it explains that if a bhikkhu is building, e.g., a meeting hall, he is not bound by this rule, but if he plans to lay claim to it and use it as his dwelling as well, he is.

Further restrictions and allowances

Further restrictions and allowances concerning the construction of dwellings are discussed under Pc 19 and in BMC2, Chapters 6 and 18.

Summary: Building a plastered hut—or having it built—without a sponsor, destined for one’s own use, without having obtained the Community’s approval, is a saṅghādisesa offense. Building a plastered hut—or having it built—without a sponsor, destined for one’s own use, exceeding the standard measurements, is also a saṅghādisesa offense.

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7

When a bhikkhu is having a large dwelling built—having a sponsor and destined for himself—he is to assemble bhikkhus to designate the site. The site the bhikkhus designate should be without disturbances and with adequate space. If the bhikkhu should have a large dwelling built on a site with disturbances and without adequate space, or if he should not assemble the bhikkhus to designate the site, it entails initial and subsequent meetings of the Community.

The Vibhaṅga defines dwelling here with the same terms it uses for hut in the preceding rule. All explanations for this rule may be inferred from those above, the only difference being that, as the dwelling here has a sponsor, no begging is involved in its construction and so there is no need to limit its size.

None of the texts define sponsor aside from the Vibhaṅga’s statement that the sponsor can be a man or a woman, a householder or one gone forth. The Pali term for “sponsor” here, sāmika, can also mean “owner,” and this has led some to suggest that this rule covers only those cases where the donor maintains ownership over the dwelling even after the bhikkhu has finished it. This, however, would create a serious gap in the rules. Suppose a donor offers to provide all the materials for a bhikkhu to build himself a large hut and to hand ownership of the hut over to the bhikkhu when it is finished as well. This is an extremely common case, and yet it would not be covered by the preceding rule, for that rule deals only with instances where the bhikkhu has to beg for his materials. If sāmika under this rule were confined to the restrictive sense of “owner” given above, the case would not be covered by this rule, either.

There is evidence in the Canon, though, that the word sāmika can have another meaning aside from “owner.” The non-offense clauses to NP 10 use the word sāmika to describe a person who creates a robe-fund for a bhikkhu but does not retain ownership of the robe once it has been given to the bhikkhu, and it seems reasonable to use the word in the same sense under this rule as well. Thus a sponsor here would be anyone—man or woman, ordained or not—who underwrites the cost of building a hut in such a way that the bhikkhu does not have to beg for his materials. Thus if a bhikkhu building a hut for his own use draws entirely on funds deposited with his steward for all materials and labor, the case would come under this rule as well.

Given the way the Commentary defines destined for oneself, if the sponsor maintained ownership of the finished hut, the case would not fall under this rule. If a sponsor is building a dwelling to give to a bhikkhu, and the bhikkhu is not involved in any way in building it or getting it built, this rule does not apply.

Summary: Building a hut with a sponsor—or having it built—destined for one’s own use, without having obtained the Community’s approval, is a saṅghādisesa offense.

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8

Should any bhikkhu—corrupt, aversive, disgruntled—charge a bhikkhu with an unfounded case entailing defeat, (thinking), “Perhaps I may bring about his fall from this celibate life,” then regardless of whether or not he is cross-examined on a later occasion, if the issue is unfounded and the bhikkhu confesses his aversion, it entails initial and subsequent meetings of the Community.

“Now at that time a householder who served fine food gave food to the Community on a regular basis, four bhikkhus every day…. (One day) he happened to go on some business to the monastery. He went to Ven. Dabba Mallaputta and on arrival bowed down to him and sat to one side…. Ven. Dabba Mallaputta roused… him with a Dhamma talk. Then the householder with fine food… said to Dabba Mallaputta, ‘To whom, venerable sir, is tomorrow’s meal in our house assigned?’

“‘…To (the) followers of Mettiya and Bhummaja (§), householder.’ [Mettiya and Bhummaja were among the leaders of the group-of-six bhikkhus—so called because the group had six ringleaders—a faction notorious for its shameless behavior, and instigators of many of the situations that compelled the Buddha to formulate training rules.]

“This upset the householder with fine food. Thinking, ‘How can these evil bhikkhus eat in our house?’ he returned home and ordered his female slave, ‘Hey. Those who are coming for a meal tomorrow: Prepare a seat for them in the gatehouse and serve them unhusked rice porridge with pickle brine.’

“‘As you say, master,’ the female slave answered….

“Then the followers of Mettiya and Bhummaja said to one another, ‘Yesterday we were assigned a meal at the house of the householder with fine food. Tomorrow, attending with his wives and children, he will serve us. Some will offer rice, some will offer curry, some oil, and some condiments.’ Because of their joy, they didn’t sleep as much that night as they had hoped.

“Early the next morning… they went to the home of the householder with fine food. The female slave saw them coming from afar. On seeing them, and having prepared them a seat in the gatehouse, she said to them, ‘Have a seat, honored sirs.’

“The thought occurred to the followers of Mettiya and Bhummaja, ‘No doubt the food isn’t ready yet, which is why we’re being made to sit in the gatehouse.’

“Then the female slave presented them with unhusked rice porridge with pickle brine and said, ‘Eat, honored sirs.’

“‘Sister, we’re the ones here for the regular meal.’

“‘I know you’re the ones here for the regular meal. But yesterday the householder ordered me, “Hey. Those who are coming for a meal tomorrow: Prepare a seat for them in the gatehouse and serve them unhusked rice porridge with pickle brine.” So eat, honored sirs.’

“Then the followers of Mettiya and Bhummaja said to one another, ‘Yesterday the householder with fine food went to the monastery and met with Dabba Mallaputta. No doubt Dabba Mallaputta turned him against us.’ Because of their disappointment, they didn’t eat as much as they had hoped.

“Then… they returned to the monastery and, putting away their robes and bowls, went outside the monastery gatehouse and sat with their outer robes holding up their knees (§)—silent, abashed, their shoulders drooping, their heads down, brooding, at a loss for words.

“Then Mettiyā Bhikkhunī approached them… and said to them, ‘I salute you, masters.’ But when she had said this, they didn’t respond. A second time… A third time she said, ‘I salute you, masters.’ And a third time they didn’t respond.

“‘Have I offended you, masters? Why don’t you respond to me?’

“‘Because you, sister, look on impassively while Dabba Mallaputta treats us like dirt.’

“‘What can I do?’

“‘If you want, you could get the Blessed One to expel Dabba Mallaputta right this very day.’

“‘What can I do? How could I do that?’

“‘Come, sister. Go to the Blessed One and say this: “It is unfitting, venerable sir, and improper. The quarter without dread, without harm, without danger, is (now) the quarter with dread, with harm, with danger. From where there was a calm, there is (now) a storm-wind. The water, as it were, is ablaze. I have been raped by Master Dabba Mallaputta.”’

“‘As you say, masters.’ (And she went to carry out their bidding.)”

This is just the heart of the origin story to this rule, which is one of the longest and most controversial accounts in the Vinaya. After Mettiyā Bhikkhunī made her charge, the Buddha convened a meeting of the Saṅgha to question Ven. Dabba Mallaputta. The latter, who had attained arahantship at the age of seven, responded truthfully that he could not call to mind ever having indulged in sexual intercourse even in a dream, much less when awake. The Buddha then told the Saṅgha to expel Mettiyā Bhikkhunī and to interrogate (§) her instigators, after which he returned to his quarters. When the bhikkhus had expelled her, the followers of Mettiya and Bhummaja told them, “Friends, don’t expel Mettiyā Bhikkhunī. She hasn’t done anything wrong. She was instigated by us, who were upset, dissatisfied, and wanted to see him fall.”

“‘You mean you were charging Ven. Dabba Mallaputta with an unfounded case entailing defeat?’

“‘Yes, friends.’

“So the bhikkhus criticized and complained and spread it about, ‘How can the followers of Mettiya and Bhummaja charge Ven. Dabba Mallaputta with an unfounded case entailing defeat?’”

In the centuries after the Canon was composed, however, many people have criticized and complained more about the Buddha’s treatment of Mettiyā Bhikkhunī. According to the Commentary, her expulsion was one of the controversial points dividing the bhikkhus in the Abhayagiri Vihāra from those in the Mahāvihāra in the old Sri Lankan capital of Anurādhapura. Even modern scholars have objected to the Buddha’s treatment of Mettiyā Bhikkhunī and interpret this passage as a “monkish gloss,” as if the Buddha himself were not a monk, and the entire Canon not the work of monks and nuns. The Commentary maintains that the Buddha acted as he did because he knew if he treated her less harshly, the followers of Mettiya and Bhummaja would never have volunteered the information that they had put her up to making the charge in the first place, and the truth would never have come out. This would have led some people to remain secretly convinced of Ven. Dabba Mallaputta’s guilt and—because he was an arahant—would have been for their long-term detriment and harm.

At any rate, what concerns us here is that at some point after this rule was formulated, the Buddha put the Saṅgha in charge of judging accusations of this sort and gave them a definite pattern to follow to ensure that their judgments would be as fair and accurate as possible. Because the Vibhaṅga and Commentary to this rule are based on this pattern, we will discuss the pattern first before dealing with the special case—unfounded charges—covered by this rule.

Admonition

As the Buddha states in Sg 12, one of the ways bhikkhus may hope for growth in his teachings is through mutual admonition and mutual rehabilitation. If a bhikkhu commits an offense, he is responsible for informing his fellow bhikkhus so that they may help him through whatever procedures the offense may entail. Human nature being what it is, there are bound to be bhikkhus who neglect this responsibility, in which case the responsibility falls to the offender’s fellow bhikkhus who know of the matter to admonish him in private, if possible, or—if he is stubborn—to make a formal charge in a meeting of the Community.

The pattern here is this: Before admonishing the bhikkhu, one must first make sure that one is qualified to admonish him. According to Cv.IX.5.1-2, this means knowing that:

1) One is pure in bodily conduct.

2) One is pure in verbal conduct.

3) One is motivated by good will, not vindictiveness.

4) One is learned in the Dhamma.

5) One knows both Pāṭimokkhas (the one for the bhikkhus and the one for the bhikkhunīs) in detail.

Furthermore, one determines that:

1) I will speak at the right time and not at the wrong time.

2) I will speak about what is factual and not what is unfactual.

3) I will speak gently and not harshly.

4) I will speak what is connected with the goal (attha) and not what is unconnected with the goal (this can also mean: what is connected with the case and not what is unconnected with the case).

5) I will speak from a mind of good will and not from inner aversion.

Cv.IX.5.7 and Pv.XV.5.3 add that one should keep five qualities in mind: compassion, solicitude for the other’s welfare, sympathy, a desire to see him rehabilitated, and esteem for the Vinaya.

If one feels unqualified in terms of these standards yet believes that another bhikkhu has committed an offense for which he has not made amends, one should find another bhikkhu who is qualified to handle the charge and inform him. Not to inform anyone in cases like this is to incur a pācittiya or a derived offense under Pc 64, except in the extenuating circumstances discussed under that rule.

The next step, if one is qualified to make the charge, is to look for a proper time and place to talk with the other party—for example, when he is not likely to get embarrassed or upset—and then to ask his leave, i.e., to ask permission to speak with him: “Let the venerable one give me leave. I want to speak with you—Karotu āyasmā okāsaṁ. Ahan-taṁ vattukāmo.” To accuse him of an offense without asking leave is to incur a dukkaṭa (Mv.II.16.1).

As for the other party, he may give leave, or not, depending on his assessment of the individual asking for leave, for it is possible that someone might ask for leave without any real grounds, simply to be abusive. (This interpretation follows the Burmese edition on the relevant passage, Mv.II.16.3. In other editions, the same passage says that one is allowed to make another bhikkhu give leave after having assessed him. However, in the context of the allowance—some group-of-six bhikkhus ask leave of bhikkhus they know are pure—there seems no need to allow a bhikkhu to reflect on whether the person he plans to accuse might be pure. That is one of the accuser’s duties, as enforced by the present rule along with the following rule, Pc 76, and another passage in Mv.II.16.3. As for the case of asking leave of someone who might prove abusive, that is already covered in Mv.II.16.2, which says that even after another bhikkhu has given leave, one should assess him before leveling a charge against him. Thus, in context, the Burmese reading makes more sense: Having been asked to give leave, one is allowed to assess the person making the request before giving him leave to speak. If we did not follow the Burmese reading here, there would be no allowance in the Vibhaṅga or the Khandhakas not to give leave to an abusive accuser.) A bhikkhu who asks for leave with no grounds—i.e., he has not seen the other party commit the offense, has heard no reliable report to that effect, and has no reason to suspect anything to that effect—incurs a dukkaṭa (Mv.II.16.3).

Pv.XV.4.7 gives further support to the Burmese reading here by suggesting that one should not give leave to a bhikkhu who:

1) is unconscientious,

2) is ignorant,

3) is not in regular standing (e.g., he is undergoing penance for a saṅghādisesa offense or has been placed under a disciplinary transaction),

4) speaks intent on creating a disturbance, or

5) is not intent on rehabilitating the bhikkhu he is accusing.

Pv.XV.5.4 suggests further that one should not give leave to a bhikkhu who:

1) is not pure in bodily conduct,

2) is not pure in verbal conduct,

3) is not pure in his livelihood,

4) is incompetent and inexperienced, or

5) is unable to give a consistent line of reasoning when questioned.

If the bhikkhu is not unqualified in any of these ways, though, one should willingly give him leave to speak. Cv.IX.5.7 says that, when being admonished or accused, one should keep two qualities in mind: truth and staying unprovoked. The Pāṭimokkha also contains a number of rules imposing penalties on behaving improperly when one is being admonished formally or informally: Sg 12 for being difficult to admonish in general, Pc 12 for being evasive or refusing to answer when being formally questioned (see below), Pc 54 for being disrespectful to one’s accuser or to the rule one is being accused of breaking, and Pc 71 for finding excuses for not following a particular training rule.

If both sides act in good faith and without prejudice, accusations of this sort are easy to settle on an informal basis. If an accusation can’t be settled informally, it should be taken to a meeting of the Community so that the group as a whole may pass judgment. The procedures for this sort of formal meeting will be discussed under the aniyata and adhikaraṇa-samatha rules. If the issue is to be brought up at a Community meeting for the uposatha, there are extra procedures to be followed, which are discussed in BMC2, Chapter 15. If the issue is to be brought up at the Invitation at the end of the Rains, the procedures to be followed are discussed in BMC2, Chapter 16.

Abuse of the system

As shown in the origin story to this rule, a bhikkhu making a charge against another bhikkhu might be acting out of a grudge and simply making up the charge. This rule and the following one cover cases where the made-up charge is that the other bhikkhu has committed a pārājika. Pc 76 covers cases where the made-up charge is that he has broken a less serious rule.

The full offense under this rule involves four factors.

1) Object: The other bhikkhu is regarded as ordained.

2) Perception: One perceives him to be innocent of the offense one is charging him with.

3) Intention: One wants to see him expelled from the Saṅgha.

4) Effort: One makes an unfounded charge in his presence that he is guilty of a pārājika offense.

Object

The definition of this factor—the other bhikkhu is regarded as ordained—may sound strange, but it comes from the K/Commentary, which apparently extended the principle expressed in the factor of perception, explained below, that if one perceives the bhikkhu as innocent of the charge one is making, the fact of whether he is actually innocent is irrelevant to the offense under this rule. In the same way, the K/Commentary seems to be reasoning, if one perceives the bhikkhu to be a bhikkhu, the fact of whether he is actually a bhikkhu is irrelevant to this offense. The K/Commentary makes this point for a reason: In normal cases the object of this rule will be an innocent bhikkhu, but there may be cases where a bhikkhu has actually committed a pārājika offense that no one knows about; instead of disrobing, he acts as if he were still a bhikkhu, and everyone else assumes that he still is. Yet even a “bhikkhu” of this sort would fulfill this factor as far as this rule is concerned.

For example, Bhikkhu X steals some of the monastery funds, but no one knows about it, and he continues to act as if he were a bhikkhu. Bhikkhu Y later develops a grudge against him and makes an unfounded charge that he has had sexual intercourse with one of the monastery supporters. Even though X is not really a bhikkhu, the fact that people in general assume him to be one means that he fulfills this factor.

Perception

If one perceives the bhikkhu one is charging with a pārājika offense to be innocent of the offense, that is enough to fulfill this factor regardless of whether the accused is actually innocent or not. To make an accusation based on the assumption or suspicion that the accused is not innocent entails no offense.

Intention

The wording of the training rule suggests that this factor would have to be fulfilled by impulse—aversion—together with motive—desiring the other bhikkhu’s expulsion—but the Vibhaṅga consistently conflates these two sub-factors under motive. Thus all that is needed to fulfill this factor is the desire to see the other bhikkhu expelled. If one’s motive is simply to insult him, the Vibhaṅga says that one’s actions would come under Pc 2. If one’s motive is both to see him expelled and to insult him, one incurs both a saṅghādisesa and a pācittiya. The texts do not explicitly mention this point, but it would appear that if one has a strange sense of humor and is making the false charge as a joke with no intention of being insulting or taken seriously, one’s actions would come under Pc 1.

According to the Vibhaṅga, confessing one’s aversion simply means admitting that the charge was empty or false. Thus the level of malice impelling one’s desire to see the other bhikkhu expelled need not be severe: If one wants to see him expelled just for the fun of it, that would fulfill the factor of intention here.

Effort

The act covered by this rule is that of making an unfounded charge of a pārājika in the accused’s presence. Whether one makes the charge oneself or gets someone else to make it, the penalty is the same. If that “someone else” is a bhikkhu and knows the charge is unfounded, he too incurs the full penalty.

The Vibhaṅga defines an unfounded charge as one having no basis in what has been seen, heard, or suspected. In other words, the accuser has not seen the accused committing the offense in question, nor has he heard anything reliable to that effect, nor is there anything in the accused’s behavior to give rise to any honest suspicion.

Seeing and hearing, according to the Commentary, also include the powers of clairvoyance and clairaudience one may have developed through meditation. Thus if one charges X with having committed a pārājika offense on the basis of what one has seen clairvoyantly, this would not be an unfounded charge, although one should be careful to make clear from the very beginning what kind of seeing the charge is based on.

The Vibhaṅga adds that if there is some basis in fact, but one changes the status of the evidence, the penalty is the same. Changing the status means, e.g., saying that one saw something when in actuality one simply heard about it or suspected it, or that one saw it clearly when in actuality one saw it indistinctly.

An example from the Commentary: Bhikkhu X goes into a grove to relieve himself. Ms. Y goes into the same grove to get something there. One sees them leaving the grove at approximately the same time—which could count as grounds for suspicion—but one then accuses Bhikkhu X, saying that one actually saw him having sex with Ms. Y. This would count as an unfounded charge. Another example: In the dark of the night, one sees a man stealing something from the monastery storehouse. He looks vaguely like Bhikkhu Z, but one can’t be sure. Still, one firms up one’s accusation by saying that one definitely saw Z steal the item. Again, this would count as an unfounded charge.

The Commentary states that for an unfounded charge to count under this rule, it must state explicitly (a) the precise act the accused supposedly committed (e.g., having sexual intercourse, getting a woman to have an abortion) or (b) that the accused is guilty of a pārājika, or (c) that the accused is no longer a true bhikkhu. If one simply says or does something that might imply that the accused is no longer a bhikkhu—e.g., refusing to show him respect in line with his seniority—that does not yet count as a charge.

The Commentary adds that charging a bhikkhu with having committed an equivalent or derived pārājika, as discussed in the conclusion to the preceding chapter, would fulfill this factor as well. For instance, if one makes an unfounded charge accusing Bhikkhu A of having killed his father before his ordination, that would constitute a full offense here. The Vibhaṅga makes no mention of these equivalent pārājikas under this rule, but the Great Standards can be used to justify their inclusion here.

All of the charges given as examples in the Vibhaṅga are expressed directly to the accused—“I saw you commit a pārājika offense,” “I heard you commit a pārājika offense”—and the Commentary concludes from this that the full offense occurs only when one makes the charge in the accused’s presence, in line with the pattern for admonition discussed above. To make an unfounded charge behind the accused’s back, it states, incurs a dukkaṭa.

There is nothing in the Vibhaṅga to indicate that the Commentary is wrong here, aside from the consideration that—because the charge is unfounded—it could entail a pācittiya for deliberate lying. Some people, however, have objected to the Commentary’s position here, saying that a dukkaṭa or even a pācittiya is a very light penalty for backhanded character assassination. Nevertheless, we should remember that the correct procedures for making an accusation require that an earnest charge be made in the presence of the accused. If a bhikkhu spreads gossip about another bhikkhu, accusing him of having committed a pārājika, he should be asked whether he has taken up the matter with the accused. If he hasn’t, he should be told to speak to the accused before he speaks to anyone else. If he says that he doesn’t feel qualified or that he fears the accused will retaliate, he should be told to take the matter up with the bhikkhus who will be responsible for calling a meeting of the Community. If he refuses to do that, he shouldn’t be listened to.

For some reason, the Commentary maintains that a charge made in writing does not count, although a charge made by gesture—e.g., pointing at the accused when one is asked who committed the pārājika—does. Perhaps in those days written charges were regarded as too cowardly to take seriously.

The rule seems to require that the accuser confess that he was acting out of depraved impulses, although the Vibhaṅga states that this means simply that he admits the charge was a lie. The Commentary states further that here the rule is showing the point where the rest of the Community knows that the bhikkhu making the charge is guilty of a saṅghādisesa: He actually committed the offense when he made the charge.

The K/Commentary adds “result” as a further factor to the offense under this rule, saying that the accused must immediately understand the charge—but nothing in the Vibhaṅga supports this added factor.

Whether anyone actually believes the charge is not a factor here.

Non-offenses

If one understands the accused to be guilty of a pārājika and accuses him honestly on the basis of what one has seen, heard, or suspected, then—regardless of whether he is guilty or not—one has not committed an offense. Even in a case such as this, though, one incurs a dukkaṭa if making the charge without asking leave of the accused, and a pācittiya if making the charge so as to insult him.

Summary: Making an unfounded charge to a bhikkhu that he has committed a pārājika offense, in hopes of having him disrobed, is a saṅghādisesa offense.

*    *    *

9

Should any bhikkhu—corrupt, aversive, disgruntled—using as a mere ploy an aspect of an issue that pertains otherwise, charge a bhikkhu with a case entailing defeat, (thinking), “Perhaps I may bring about his fall from this celibate life,” then regardless of whether or not he is cross-examined on a later occasion, if the issue pertains otherwise, an aspect used as a mere ploy, and the bhikkhu confesses his aversion, it entails initial and subsequent meetings of the Community.

“At that time the followers of Mettiya and Bhummaja, descending from Vulture Peak Mountain, saw a billy-goat copulating with a nanny-goat. Seeing them, they said, ‘Look here, friends, let’s name this billy goat Dabba Mallaputta, and this nanny goat Mettiyā Bhikkhunī. Then we’ll phrase it like this: “Before, my friends, we accused Dabba Mallaputta on the basis of what we had heard, but now we have seen him with our very own eyes fornicating with Mettiyā Bhikkhunī!”’”

Some grudges die hard. This rule is almost identical with the preceding one and involves the same factors except for one of the sub-factors under “Effort”: “Unfounded charge” here becomes “a charge based on an issue (adhikaraṇa) that pertains otherwise.” The phrase sounds strange, but the origin story gives a perfect example of what it means.

The precise difference between the two rules is this: With an unfounded charge, one has neither seen, heard, nor suspected that an offense has been committed; or if one has, one changes the status of the evidence—e.g., one states something one has suspected as if one has heard it, or something one has heard as if one has seen it. In a charge based on an issue that pertains otherwise, one has seen an action that would be an offense if committed by a bhikkhu, and one does not change the status of the evidence, but one distorts the facts of the case.

The Vibhaṅga lists ten factors that can be used as a ploy in distorting the facts this way. They are: birth (caste), name, clan (family name), physical characteristics, offenses, bowl, robe, preceptor, mentor, lodging. Given the way in which the Vibhaṅga illustrates these factors in action, they fall into two classes: (1) offenses and (2) the remaining nine factors.

1) An example of using an offense as a ploy: One sees Bhikkhu Y actually committing an offense. Although one perceives it as a lesser offense, one magnifies the charge to a pārājika. For instance, one sees him get into an argument with Bhikkhu Z and in a fit of anger give Z a blow to the head. Z goes unconscious, falls to the floor, and suffers a severe concussion resulting in death. Because Y’s intention was simply to hurt him, not to kill him, he incurs only a pācittiya. If one realizes the nature of Y’s intention and the fact that the penalty is a pācittiya, and yet accuses him of having committed a pārājika, one would incur a saṅghādisesa under this rule. For ease of remembrance, this use of a ploy can be called “same person, different offense.”

2) An example of using any of the other nine factors as a ploy: X, who may or may not be a bhikkhu, has something in common with Bhikkhu Y—they are both tall, short, dark, fair, share the same name, are students of the same preceptor, live in the same dwelling, use similar looking bowls or robes, etc. One sees X committing an action that, if he were a bhikkhu, would amount to a pārājika offense; on the basis of the similarity between the two, one claims to have seen Bhikkhu Y committing a pārājika. For instance, X and Y are both very tall. Late at night one sees X—knowing that it is X—stealing tools from the monastery storeroom. One has a grudge against Y and so accuses him of being the thief, saying, “I saw this big tall guy stealing the tools, and he looked just like you. It must have been you.” For ease of remembrance, this use of a ploy can be called “same offense, different person.”

None of the texts mention the scenario of a double ploy—i.e., “different person, different offense”—but from the way the Vibhaṅga defines an issue that pertains otherwise, a double ploy would fit the definition as well. In other words, if—having seen X engage in lustful contact with a woman—one then accuses Bhikkhu Y, who shares the same family name with X, of engaging in sexual intercourse with the woman, the case would apparently come under this rule.

A case that would not come under this rule is one based on seeing or hearing Y commit an action that bears some resemblance to an offense but is actually not. For instance, one overhears him teaching Vinaya to some new bhikkhus and quoting, by way of illustration, a few of the statements that would count as claims of superior human states. Because this does not constitute an offense, there is no issue (adhikaraṇa) pertaining otherwise that can be used as a ploy. In shorthand terms, this would count as “same person, no offense.” If, realizing the context, one later accuses him of having violated Pr 4, the accusation would count as an unfounded charge and so would come under the preceding rule.

The remaining explanations for this rule are exactly the same as those for the preceding rule, except that in the non-offense clauses the Vibhaṅga states that if one makes a charge—or gets someone else to make a charge—against the accused based on what one actually perceives, there is no offense even if the issue turns out to pertain otherwise. For instance, from the examples already given: One sees X stealing tools in the dark and, because of his resemblance to Y, actually thinks Y is the thief. One sees Y give a fatal blow to Z and actually thinks that Y’s intention was to kill Z. In either of these cases, if one then accuses Y of a pārājika offense, one incurs no penalty regardless of how the case comes out, although—as under the preceding rule—one should be careful to ask Y’s leave before making the charge and to have no intention of insulting him.

Summary: Distorting the evidence while accusing a bhikkhu of having committed a pārājika offense, in hopes of having him disrobed, is a saṅghādisesa offense.

*    *    *

10

Should any bhikkhu agitate for a schism in a united Community, or should he persist in taking up an issue conducive to schism, the bhikkhus are to admonish him thus: “Do not, venerable sir, agitate for a schism in a united Community or persist in taking up an issue conducive to schism. Let the venerable one be reconciled with the Community, for a united Community, on courteous terms, without dispute, with a common recitation, dwells in peace.”

And should that bhikkhu, thus admonished by the bhikkhus, persist as before, the bhikkhus are to rebuke him up to three times for the sake of relinquishing that. If while being rebuked up to three times he relinquishes that, that is good. If he does not relinquish (that), it entails initial and subsequent meetings of the Community.

Schism

A schism is a serious division in the Community—so serious that, if achieved in a dishonest way, it ranks with matricide, patricide, killing an arahant, and maliciously shedding the Tathāgata’s blood as one of the five most heinous crimes a person can commit (AN 5:129).

To qualify as a schism, the division has to meet five criteria:

1) The Community is originally united, which means that it is composed of bhikkhus of common affiliation living in the same territory.

2) It contains at least nine bhikkhus.

3) It becomes involved in a dispute over any of eighteen grounds for a creating a schism. In other words, one of the sides advocates any of the following positions, explaining:

Dhamma as not-Dhamma;

not-Dhamma as Dhamma;

Vinaya as not-Vinaya;

not-Vinaya as Vinaya;

what was not spoken by the Buddha as having been spoken by him;

what was spoken by the Buddha as not;

what was not regularly practiced by him as having been regularly practiced by him;

what was regularly practiced by him as not;

what was not formulated by him as having been formulated by him;

what was formulated by him as not;

an offense as a non-offense;

a non-offense as an offense;

a heavy offense as a light offense;

a light offense as heavy;

an offense leaving a remainder (i.e., not a pārājika) as an offense leaving no remainder (§);

an offense leaving no remainder as an offense leaving a remainder (§);

a serious offense as not serious; or

a not-serious offense as serious.

4) There are at least four bhikkhus on either side.

5) The dispute reaches the point where the two sides conduct separate Pāṭimokkha recitations, Invitation ceremonies, or other Community transactions within the same territory.

The Canon tells of two schisms during the time of the Buddha, one involving the bhikkhus in the city of Kosambī, reported in Mv.X; and the other, Devadatta‘s schism, reported in Cv.VII. The two schisms began from different motives, with both sides in Kosambī thinking that they were following the Dhamma and Vinaya, whereas Devadatta knew that he was not. The two schisms were also accomplished in different ways—unilaterally in the Kosambī case, bilaterally in Devadatta’s—and resolved in different ways as well, with a full reconciliation in the Kosambī case and only a partial one in Devadatta’s. As we will see below, the different patterns followed in these two schisms led to different patterns in the rules dealing with the topic of schism as a whole.

Schism is the result of a dispute, but not all disputes—even when prolonged—will lead to schism. An example is the dispute that led to the Second Council (Cv.XII). Even though it was bitterly fought, there was never a point when either faction thought of splitting off and conducting communal business separately in the same territory. Still, even minor disputes can be potentially schismatic. At the same time, as we will see below, it is possible to act in a divisive way prior to a dispute without yet broaching the questions around which a dispute could develop. This rule and the following one are designed to nip both sorts of behavior in the bud before they can become schismatic. Once a dispute has become a major issue, these rules cannot be used, for at that point the procedures given in Cv.IV.14.16-26—explained in Chapter 11—should be followed. Questions of how to behave once a schism has occurred and how it can be ended are discussed in BMC2, Chapter 21.

The roots of schism

According to Cv.IV.14.4, the act of taking a position in a dispute can be rooted either in unskillful mind states (covetous, corrupt, or confused) or in skillful ones (not covetous, not corrupt, not confused). Given the false nature of the grounds for a schism, the mind state of a bhikkhu agitating for schism must be unskillful. However, it is crucial to determine the way in which his impulses and motivations are unskillful, for this question determines his personal fate and the prospects for whether the schism can be successfully resolved.

Cv.VII.5.3 and Cv.VII.5.5-6 explain that a bhikkhu who accomplishes a schism in the following way is automatically consigned to hell for an eon. The Commentary to Mv.I.67 adds that as soon as the schism is accomplished he is no longer a bhikkhu and is to be expelled from the Saṅgha.

1) The Community, of common affiliation and living in the same territory, is united around a correct understanding of the Dhamma and Vinaya.

2) The bhikkhu agitates for a schism, advocating any of the 18 grounds for creating a schism.

3) He views his explanations or the act of a schism as not-Dhamma—i.e., he knows that what he is doing is contrary to the Dhamma—or he is doubtful about the matter.

4) Nevertheless, he misrepresents his views and actions, claiming that they are Dhamma.

If, however, a bhikkhu advocates any of the 18 grounds for creating a schism with the understanding that he is advocating the Dhamma and that the schism would be in line with the Dhamma, then even if he accomplishes a schism he is still a bhikkhu, he is not automatically consigned to hell, and there is the possibility that he can be reconciled with the Community and the schism resolved.

Strategies for schism

The Cullavagga presents two patterns by which a schism may happen. The first pattern, derived from Devadatta’s schism and given in Cv.VII.5.1, states that schism occurs when a disagreement over the Dhamma, the Vinaya, or the Teacher’s instruction is put to a vote in a Community of at least nine bhikkhus with at least four on either side of the split. It further adds that all the bhikkhus involved must be bhikkhus of regular standing in affiliation with the group as a whole (e.g., they are not already of a separate affiliation, they haven’t been suspended from the Community), and they are living in the same territory (see BMC2, Chapter 13).

If any of these qualifications is lacking—the issue goes to a vote in a Community of less than nine bhikkhus, one side or the other gains less than four adherents, or the bhikkhus involved are not of regular standing, are not of common affiliation, or are not in the same territory—the efforts at schism count as a crack (rāji) in the Community, but not as a full split (bheda).

A second pattern—which describes the Kosambī schism but is given in Cv.VII.5.2 (as well as in AN 10:35 & AN 10:37)—lists two steps by which a group becomes schismatic:

1) The members of the group advocate one or more of the 18 grounds for creating schism.

2) On the basis of any of these 18 points, they draw themselves apart, performing a separate Pāṭimokkha recitation, a separate Invitation, (or) a separate Community transaction.

The Parivāra (XV.10.9), trying to collate these two patterns into one, lists five ways in which a schism can take place: discussion, announcement, vote, transaction, and recitation. The Commentary interprets the five ways as four steps in a single process (with the last two ways counting as alternative forms of a single step):

1) Discussion. A bhikkhu aiming at schism advocates any of the 18 positions listed above.

2) Announcement. He announces that he is splitting off from the Community and asks other bhikkhus to take sides.

3) Vote. The issue goes to a vote in a Community of at least nine bhikkhus, with at least four on either side.

4) Transaction or recitation. The bhikkhus who side with the schismatic split from the others and recite the Pāṭimokkha or perform another Community transaction separately.

According to the Commentary, the actual schism has not taken place until step 4, when the schismatic group conducts communal business separately within the same territory as the group from which it has split. This is in accordance with Cv.VII.5.2 but conflicts with Cv.VII.5.1, so the Commentary explains that if the vote is taken in a split-off meeting of the Community, steps 3 and 4 happen simultaneously, and the schism has been accomplished. Otherwise, if the vote is taken outside of the territory, the schism is not finalized until the split-off faction conducts Community transactions separately within the same territory as the other faction (Pv.VI.2 & XV.10.10).

However, it’s possible that the compilers of the Cullavagga intentionally listed two patterns for a schism because there are two ways in which it can happen: bilaterally and unilaterally. In a bilateral schism, the schismatic group meets with the group from which it is splitting and asks everyone to take sides. This is the pattern presented in Cv.VII.5.1. In a unilateral schism, the schismatic group meets on its own, announces that it has separated from the other bhikkhus in the same territory, and conducts Community transactions separately from them. This is the pattern presented in Cv.VII.5.2.

The Vinaya-mukha, in trying to make the case that not all the canonical Vinaya reflects the Buddha’s intent, focuses on these detailed descriptions of schism as a case in point, arguing that they actually encourage schism by providing precise instructions for how to go about it. This, it says, is not the sort of thing an enlightened teacher would teach. This argument, however, misses the point of the descriptions. They are meant to provide well-meaning bhikkhus with a clear template so that they can recognize an attempt at schism when they see it.

The factors for an offense

The K/Commentary analyzes the factors for an offense under this rule as one—effort—dividing it into several sub-factors. However, it also classifies this rule as sacittaka, which means that either perception or intention must play a role in the offense. Because the Vibhaṅga explicitly rules out perception as a factor, that leaves intention. The Sub-Commentary says that “intention” here refers to the offending bhikkhu’s intention not to relinquish his behavior after being rebuked by the Community. However, the Vibhaṅga’s definition of one of the first sub-factors of effort—agitating for a schism—includes intention as an integral part of the effort. Because the alternative sub-factor—persisting in taking up an issue conducive to schism—does not include intention in its definition, this rule is best explained as covering two separate but related offenses with different factors. (See Sg 2, NP 18, and NP 24 for other instances of this sort.)

In the first offense, the factors are two.

1) Intention: Acting with the thought, “How might these be divided, how might they be separated, how might they become a faction?”

2) Effort: a) one agitates for a schism in a united Community—i.e., one of common affiliation in a single territory—

b) even when rebuked three times in a properly performed Community transaction.

In the second offense, there is only one factor, divided into two sub-factors.

1) Effort: a) One persists in taking up an issue conducive to schism in a united Community—i.e., one of common affiliation in a single territory—

b) even when rebuked three times in a properly performed Community transaction.

Effort

According to the Vibhaṅga, to agitate for a schism is to search for a partisan following or to bind together a group, with the above intention. To persist in taking up an issue conducive to schism is to take a stance on any of the 18 positions mentioned above. The two types of effort may overlap—a bhikkhu attempting to split off a schismatic faction could do so based on any of the 18 positions—but not necessarily. A bhikkhu might try to create a faction in other ways—for example, by arranging special meals exclusively for his friends (see Pc 31). A stubborn bhikkhu might refuse to abandon a position conducive to schism even if he is not yet aiming at schism. In fact, the use of this rule is most effective before the two activities have overlapped. Once a bhikkhu has succeeded in binding together a group around any of the 18 grounds for schism, the Community will have trouble achieving unanimity in rebuking him, for his group will be free to protest the transaction.

Note that, unlike the definition of united Community in Cv.VII.5.3, the Vibhaṅga’s definition of a united Community here does not specify that it has to be united around a correct understanding of the Dhamma and Vinaya. This means, in the case of the first offense, that if a bhikkhu tries to create a partisan following by explaining Vinaya as Vinaya in a Community whose practice has gone astray, the Community could still legitimately rebuke him. If he did not abandon his behavior, he would incur the full offense. This further means that if one wants to establish a return to the genuine Dhamma and Vinaya in such a Community, one should aim at converting the entire Community and not just a clique. If the Community judges one’s efforts to be divisive, one can either search for help from other Communities, as explained in Chapter 11 and exemplified in the story of the Second Council, or simply leave the Community in search of a more conducive location to practice. If other bhikkhus in the Community, approving of one’s views, come to the new location of their own accord, well and good. Nevertheless, this rule indicates that one’s aim in expounding the Dhamma and Vinaya should never be to create a faction. Instead, it should be to convince all who are sincere to join in the pursuit of correct practice. Thus when leaving one’s original Community, one should do so in as amicable a way as possible so as not to alienate those whom one should be aiming to win over to one’s views.

Procedure

The Vibhaṅga states that if the bhikkhus see or hear of a bhikkhu who has begun agitating for a schism or persists in taking up an issue conducive to schism in a united Community, it is their duty to reprimand him three times. Otherwise, if he goes unreprimanded, he is free to continue with his efforts as he likes without incurring a penalty. If they neglect this duty, they each incur a dukkaṭa. The Commentary adds that this dukkaṭa applies to every bhikkhu within a half-yojana (five-mile/eight-kilometer) radius who learns of the instigator’s efforts. Furthermore, it says that one may fulfill one’s duty here only by going to him in person, and not by sending a letter or a messenger. (According to the Sub-commentary, any bhikkhu within the half-yojana radius who is ill or otherwise unable to go reprimand the instigator is not subject to this penalty.) As for any bhikkhu outside the half-yojana radius, even though he may not be subject to the penalty, the Commentary states that he should still regard it as his duty if he is able to go reprimand the instigator as well.

If the attempt takes place during the Rains-residence, the Mahāvagga allows bhikkhus at other locations to cut short their stay at those locations and to come help end the attempt (Mv.III.6-9). It also allows a bhikkhu who has tried to prevent a schism, and yet sees that his efforts are likely to fail, to leave that Community even during the Rains-residence if he does not wish to be present for the turmoil that may follow (Mv.III.11.5).

If, after being reprimanded three times, the instigator abandons his efforts—i.e., stops agitating for a schism or abandons his position with regard to the 18 issues conducive to a schism—he incurs no penalty and nothing further need be done.

If he is still recalcitrant, though, he incurs a dukkaṭa. The next step is to take him into the midst of a formal meeting of the Community (seizing him by the hands and feet if necessary, says the Commentary) and admonish him formally three more times. If he abandons his efforts before the end of the third admonition, well and good. If not, he incurs another dukkaṭa. The next step is to recite a formal rebuke by mandate of the Community, using a formula of one motion and three proclamations (see Appendix VIII). If the instigator remains obstinate, he incurs an additional dukkaṭa at the end of the motion, a thullaccaya at the end of each of the first two proclamations, and the full saṅghādisesa at the end of the third. Once he commits the full offense, the penalties he incurred in the preliminary stages are nullified.

Perception

The Vibhaṅga states that if the rebuke transaction is carried out properly—i.e., the bhikkhu really is looking for a faction or taking up an issue conducive to schism, and the various other formal requirements for a valid transaction are fulfilled—then if he does not abandon his efforts, he incurs the full saṅghādisesa regardless of whether he perceives the transaction to be proper, improper, or doubtful. If the transaction is improperly carried out, then regardless of how he perceives its validity, he incurs a dukkaṭa for not abandoning his efforts (§).

The fact that the bhikkhu is not free from an offense in the latter case is important: There are several other, similar points in the Vinaya—such as the Buddha’s advice to the Dhamma-expert in the controversy at Kosambī (Mv.X.1.8)—where for the sake of the harmony of the Community in cases that threaten to be divisive, the Buddha advises bhikkhus to abandon controversial behavior and to yield to the mandate of the Community even if it seems unjust.

Non-offenses

The non-offense clauses, in addition to the usual exemptions, state that there is no offense if the bhikkhu is not reprimanded or if he gives up his efforts (prior to the end of the third reprimand).

Further steps

If the bhikkhu is so stubborn that he refuses to abandon his schismatic efforts even through the third rebuke, he will probably not acknowledge that the Community has acted properly, in which case he will not admit that he has incurred a saṅghādisesa offense or that he has to make amends for it. This gives the Community clear grounds, if it sees fit, for suspending him then and there (see BMC2, Chapter 20). In fact, this may have been the original intention behind the protocols outlined in this and the remaining three saṅghādisesa rules: to give the Community a clear opportunity to test how stubborn a divisive or recalcitrant bhikkhu is and to end his affiliation with them if he proves this stubborn. For this reason, a Community planning to impose any of these rules on one of its members should be prepared to recite the transaction statement for suspension against him as well.

Once the offender’s affiliation with the Community is ended, he may not accost—go up to talk to—any member of the Community at all. Technically speaking, the fact that he is no longer in affiliation means that he can cause no more than a crack, rather than a full split, in the Saṅgha. This, of course, may not end his schismatic efforts, but the fact that the Community met to deal with his case should be enough to alert well-meaning bhikkhus that he is following a wrong course of action, and this should help unite the Community against his efforts. If they deem it necessary—to keep the laity from being swayed by his arguments—they may authorize one or more of their members to inform the lay community that the schismatic has committed this offense (see Pc 9) and explain why. If, unrepentant, he leaves to go elsewhere, they may send word to any Community he tries to join. Of course, if it turns out that the schismatic was actually in the right in his explanation of the Dhamma and Vinaya, the efforts of the original Community will call unflattering attention to its own behavior. This means that a Community is well advised to reflect on its own practice before bringing this rule to bear.

All of this shows why schism is regarded so seriously: As the Buddha states in the second discourse on future dangers (AN 5:78), it is difficult to find time to practice when the Community is embroiled in controversy this way.

Summary: To persist—after the third proclamation of a formal rebuke in the Community—in trying to form a schismatic group or in taking up a position that can lead to schism is a saṅghādisesa offense.

*    *    *

11

Should bhikkhus—one, two, or three—who are followers and partisans of that bhikkhu, say, “Do not, venerable sirs, admonish that bhikkhu in any way. He is an exponent of the Dhamma. He is an exponent of the Vinaya. He acts with our consent and approval. He knows, he speaks for us, and that is pleasing to us,” the bhikkhus are to admonish them thus: “Do not say that, venerable sirs. That bhikkhu is not an exponent of the Dhamma and he is not an exponent of the Vinaya. Do not, venerable sirs, approve of a schism in the Community. Let the venerable ones’ (minds) be reconciled with the Community, for a united Community, on courteous terms, without dispute, with a common recitation, dwells in peace.”

And should those bhikkhus, thus admonished by the bhikkhus, persist as before, the bhikkhus are to rebuke them up to three times for the sake of relinquishing that. If while being rebuked up to three times they relinquish that, that is good. If they do not relinquish (that), it entails initial and subsequent meetings of the Community.

If the schismatic mentioned in the preceding rule begins to attract adherents, they are to be treated under this rule—and quickly, before the schismatic gains a fourth adherent. The reasons are these:

1) One Community cannot impose a penalty on another Community (four or more bhikkhus) in any one transaction (Mv.IX.2).

2) Penalties of this sort may be imposed only with the unanimous agreement of all the bhikkhus present in the meeting. If there is a fourth adherent present in the meeting, his protest can invalidate the rebuke.

3) As the Sub-commentary points out, once the adherents of a potential schismatic have reached four, they are in a position to go ahead with the schism even if he is observing penance under the preceding rule.

The procedures for dealing with these partisans—reprimanding them in private, admonishing and rebuking them in the midst of the Community—are the same as under the preceding rule. The formula for the rebuke is given in Appendix VIII.

As noted under the preceding rule, the procedures to follow once the schismatics have succeeded in creating a schism are discussed in BMC2, Chapter 21.

Summary: To persist—after the third proclamation of a formal rebuke in the Community—in supporting a potential schismatic is a saṅghādisesa offense.

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12

In case a bhikkhu is by nature difficult to admonish—who, when being legitimately admonished by the bhikkhus with reference to the training rules included in the (Pāṭimokkha) recitation, makes himself unadmonishable, (saying,) “Do not, venerable ones, say anything to me, good or bad; and I won’t say anything to the venerable ones, good or bad. Refrain, venerable ones, from admonishing me”—the bhikkhus are to admonish him thus: “Let the venerable one not make himself unadmonishable. Let the venerable one make himself admonishable. Let the venerable one admonish the bhikkhus in accordance with what is right, and the bhikkhus will admonish the venerable one in accordance with what is right; for it is thus that the Blessed One’s following is nurtured: through mutual admonition, through mutual rehabilitation.”

And should that bhikkhu, thus admonished by the bhikkhus, persist as before, the bhikkhus are to rebuke him up to three times for the sake of relinquishing that. If while being rebuked up to three times he relinquishes that, that is good. If he does not relinquish (that), it entails initial and subsequent meetings of the Community.

If a bhikkhu breaks any of the rules of the Vinaya without undergoing the penalties they entail, the other bhikkhus have the duty of admonishing him, as explained under Sg 8. If he is difficult to admonish, he is subject to additional penalties: under Pc 12 if he is evasive or uncooperative while being admonished, under Pc 54 if he shows disrespect, and under Pc 71 if he tries to excuse himself from training in the rule in question. If he becomes so difficult to admonish that he will accept criticism from no one at all, he is to be treated under this rule.

The Commentary defines difficult to admonish as “impossible to speak to” and adds that a bhikkhu difficult to admonish is one who cannot stand being criticized or who does not mend his ways after his faults are pointed out to him. It quotes from the Anumāna Sutta (MN 15) a list of traits, any one of which makes a bhikkhu difficult to admonish: He has evil desires; exalts himself and degrades others; is easily angered; because of this he harbors ill will, holds a grudge, utters angry words; accused, he throws a tantrum (literally, “explodes”); accused, he is insulting; accused, he returns the accusation; he evades back and forth; he does not respond; he is mean and spiteful; jealous and possessive; scheming and deceitful; stubborn and proud; attached to his own views, obstinate, unable to let them go.

A fair number of these traits are exemplified by Ven. Channa—according to tradition, the Buddha’s horseman on the night of the great Going Forth—in the origin stories to Pc 12, 54, and 71, and especially in the origin story to this rule.

“You think you are to admonish me? It is I who should admonish you! The Buddha is mine, the Dhamma is mine, it was by my young master that the Dhamma was realized. Just as a great wind when blowing would gather up grass, sticks, leaves, and rubbish, or a mountain-born river would gather up water weeds and scum, so you, in going forth, have been gathered up from various names, various clans, various ancestries, various families. You think you are to admonish me? It is I who should admonish you!”

The procedures to follow when a bhikkhu is difficult to admonish—reprimanding him in private, admonishing and rebuking him in a formal meeting of the Community—are the same as under Sg 10, beginning with the fact that a bhikkhu who, hearing that Bhikkhu X is being difficult to admonish, incurs a dukkaṭa if he does not reprimand him. The question of perception and the non-offenses are also the same as under that rule. The formula for the rebuke is given in Appendix VIII.

If the bhikkhu difficult to admonish carries on as before, even after incurring the full penalty under this rule, the Community may perform a banishment transaction (pabbājanīya-kamma) against him for speaking in dispraise of the Community (Cv.I.13—see BMC2, Chapter 20). If he refuses to see that he has committed this saṅghādisesa offense or to undergo the penalty, the Community may exclude him from participating in the Pāṭimokkha and Invitation ceremonies (Mv.IV.16.2; Cv.IX.2—see BMC2, Chapters 15 and 16) or suspend him from the entire Saṅgha (Cv.I.26; Cv.I.31—see BMC2, Chapter 20).

Summary: To persist—after the third proclamation of a formal rebuke in the Community— in being difficult to admonish is a saṅghādisesa offense.

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13

In case a bhikkhu living in dependence on a certain village or town is a corrupter of families, a man of depraved conduct—whose depraved conduct is both seen and heard about, and the families he has corrupted are both seen and heard about—the bhikkhus are to admonish him thus: “You, venerable sir, are a corrupter of families, a man of depraved conduct. Your depraved conduct is both seen and heard about, and the families you have corrupted are both seen and heard about. Leave this monastery, venerable sir. Enough of your staying here.”

And should that bhikkhu, thus admonished by the bhikkhus, say about the bhikkhus, “The bhikkhus are biased through desire, biased through aversion, biased through delusion, biased through fear, in that for this sort of offense they banish some and do not banish others,” the bhikkhus are to admonish him thus: “Do not say that, venerable sir. The bhikkhus are not biased through desire, are not biased through aversion, are not biased through delusion, are not biased through fear. You, venerable sir, are a corrupter of families, a man of depraved conduct. Your depraved conduct is both seen and heard about, and the families you have corrupted are both seen and heard about. Leave this monastery, venerable sir. Enough of your staying here.”

And should that bhikkhu, thus admonished by the bhikkhus, persist as before, the bhikkhus are to rebuke him up to three times for the sake of relinquishing that. If while being rebuked up to three times he relinquishes that, that is good. If he does not relinquish (that), it entails initial and subsequent meetings of the Community.

A corrupter of families is a bhikkhu who—behaving in a demeaning, frivolous, or subservient way—succeeds in ingratiating himself to lay people to the point where they withdraw their support from bhikkhus who are earnest in the practice and give it to those who are more ingratiating instead. This is illustrated in the origin story of this rule, in which the followers of Assaji and Punabbasu (leaders of one faction of the group of six) had thoroughly corrupted the lay people at Kīṭāgiri.

“Now at that time a certain bhikkhu, having finished his Rains-residence among the people of Kāsi and on his way to Sāvatthī to see the Blessed One, arrived at Kīṭāgiri. Dressing (§) early in the morning, taking his bowl and (outer) robe, he entered Kīṭāgiri for alms: gracious in the way he approached and departed, looked forward and behind, drew in and stretched out (his arm); his eyes downcast, his every movement consummate. People seeing him said, ‘Who is this weakest of weaklings, this dullest of dullards, this most snobbish of snobs? Who, if this one approached (§), would even give him alms? Our masters, the followers of Assaji and Punabbasu, are compliant, genial, pleasing in conversation. They are the first to smile, saying, “Come, you are welcome.” They are not snobbish. They are approachable. They are the first to speak. They are the ones to whom alms should be given.’”

The Vibhaṅga lists the ways of corrupting a family as giving gifts of flowers, fruit, etc., practicing medicine, and delivering messages—although the Commentary qualifies this by saying there is no harm in delivering messages related to religious activities, such as inviting bhikkhus to a meal or to deliver a sermon, or in conveying a lay person’s respects to a senior bhikkhu.

Depraved conduct the Vibhaṅga defines merely as growing flowers and making them into garlands, but this, the Commentary says, is a shorthand reference to the long list of bad habits mentioned in the origin story, which includes such things as presenting garlands to women, eating from the same dish with them, sharing a blanket with them; eating at the wrong time, drinking intoxicants; wearing garlands, using perfumes and cosmetics; dancing, singing, playing musical instruments, directing musical performances (§); playing games, performing stunts; learning archery, swordsmanship, and horsemanship; boxing and wrestling. (For the full list, see BMC2, Chapter 10.) Any one of these actions taken in isolation carries only a minor penalty—a dukkaṭa or a pācittiya (see Cv.V.36)—but if indulged in habitually to the point where its bad influence becomes “seen and heard about,” i.e., common knowledge, it can become grounds for the offender’s fellow bhikkhus to banish him from their particular Community until he mends his ways.

The Cullavagga, in a section that begins with the same origin story as the one for this rule (Cv.I.13-16), treats the banishment transaction in full detail, saying that a Community of bhikkhus, if it sees fit, has the authority to perform a banishment transaction against a bhikkhu with any of the following qualities:

1) He is a maker of strife, disputes, quarrels, and issues in the Community.

2) He is inexperienced, incompetent, and indiscriminately full of offenses (§).

3) He lives in unbecoming association with householders.

4) He is defective in his virtue, conduct, or views.

5) He speaks in dispraise of the Buddha, Dhamma, or Saṅgha.

6) He is frivolous in word, deed, or both.

7) He misbehaves in word, deed, or both.

8) He is vindictive in word, deed, or both.

9) He practices wrong modes of livelihood.

This last category includes such practices as:

a) running messages and errands for kings, ministers of state, householders, etc. A modern example would be participating in political campaigns.

b) scheming, talking, hinting, belittling others for the sake of material gain, pursuing gain with gain (giving items of small value in hopes of receiving items of larger value in return, making investments in hopes of profit, offering material incentives to those who make donations). (For a full discussion of these practices, see Visuddhimagga I.61-82.)

c) Practicing worldly arts, e.g., medicine, fortune telling, astrology, exorcism, reciting charms, casting spells, performing ceremonies to counteract the influence of the stars, determining propitious sites, setting auspicious dates (for weddings, etc.), interpreting oracles, auguries, or dreams, or—in the words of the Vibhaṅga to the the bhikkhunīs’ Pc 49 & 50—engaging in any art that is “external and unconnected with the goal.” The Cullavagga (V.33.2) imposes a dukkaṭa on studying and teaching worldly arts or hedonist doctrines (lokāyata). (For extensive lists of worldly arts, see the passage from DN 2 quoted in BMC2, Chapter 10. For the connection between lokāyata and hedonism (e.g., the Kāma Sūtra), see Warder, Outline of Indian Philosophy, pp. 38-39.)

A bhikkhu banished for indulging in any of these activities is duty-bound to undergo the observances listed in Cv.I.15 (see BMC2, Chapter 20) and to mend his ways so that the Community will revoke the banishment transaction.

Two of those duties are that he not criticize the act of banishment or those who performed it. If he does not observe either of those two, he is subject to this rule. The procedure to follow in dealing with him—reprimanding him in private, admonishing and rebuking him in a formal meeting of the Community—is the same as under Sg 10, beginning with the fact that a bhikkhu who, hearing that Bhikkhu X is criticizing the act of banishment, incurs a dukkaṭa if he does not reprimand X. The question of perception and the non-offenses are also the same as under that rule. The formula for the rebuke is given in Appendix VIII. As with the preceding three rules, if the offender does not respond to the rebuke or recognize that he has a saṅghādisesa offense for which he must make amends, the Community would then have grounds to suspend him as well.

Summary: To persist—after the third proclamation of a formal rebuke in the Community—in criticizing a banishment transaction performed against oneself is a saṅghādisesa offense.

*    *    *

A bhikkhu who commits any one of these thirteen saṅghādisesa offenses is duty-bound to inform a fellow bhikkhu and to ask a Community of at least four bhikkhus to impose a six-day period of penance (mānatta) on him. (The Canon says, literally, a six-night period: At the time of the Buddha, the lunar calendar was in use and, just as we using the solar calendar count the passage of days, they counted the passage of nights; a 24-hour period, which is a day for us, would be a night for them, as in the Bhaddekaratta Sutta (MN 131), where the Buddha explicitly says that a person who spends a day and night in earnest practice has had an “auspicious night.”)

Penance

Penance does not begin immediately, but only at the convenience of the Community giving it. During his period of penance, the offender is partially stripped of seniority and must observe 94 restrictions (Cv.II.5-6), discussed in detail in BMC2, Chapter 19. The four most important are:

1) He must not live under the same roof as a regular bhikkhu.

2) He must live in a monastery with at least four regular bhikkhus.

3) If he goes anyplace outside the monastery, he must be accompanied by four full-fledged bhikkhus unless (a) he is going to escape dangers or (b) he is going to another place where there are regular bhikkhus of the same affiliation and he can reach it in one day’s time.

4) Every day he must inform all the bhikkhus in the monastery of the fact that he is observing penance and the precise offense for which the penance was imposed. If visiting bhikkhus come to the monastery, he must inform them as well; if he goes to another monastery, he must inform all the bhikkhus there, too.

If, on any day of his penance, the bhikkhu neglects to observe any of these four restrictions, that day does not count toward the total of six. In addition, he incurs a dukkaṭa each time he fails to observe any of the 94 restrictions.

Once the bhikkhu has completed his penance, he may ask a Community of at least 20 bhikkhus to give him rehabilitation. Once rehabilitated, he returns to his previous state as a regular bhikkhu in good standing.

Probation

If a bhikkhu who commits a saṅghādisesa offense conceals it from his fellow bhikkhus past dawnrise of the day following the offense, he must observe an additional period of probation (parivāsa) for the same number of days as he concealed the offense. Only after he has completed his probation may he then ask for the six-day period of penance.

The Commentary to Cv.III sets the factors of concealment at ten, which may be arranged in five pairs as follows:

1) He has committed a saṅghādisesa offense and perceives it as an offense (i.e., this factor is fulfilled even if he thinks it is a lesser offense).

2) He has not been suspended and perceives that he has not been suspended. (If a bhikkhu has been suspended, he cannot accost other bhikkhus, and thus he cannot tell them until after his suspension has been lifted.)

3) There are no obstacles (e.g., a flood, a forest fire, dangerous animals) and he perceives that there are none.

4) He is able to inform another bhikkhu (i.e., a fellow bhikkhu suitable to be informed lives in a place that may be reached in that day, one is not too weak or ill to go, etc.) and he perceives that he is able. (According to Cv.III.34.2, going insane after committing the offense (!) would count as “not being able to inform another bhikkhu.”) A bhikkhu suitable to be informed means one who is—

a) of common affiliation,

b) in good standing (e.g., not undergoing penance, probation, or suspension himself), and

c) not on uncongenial terms with the offender.

5) He (the offender) desires to conceal the offense and so conceals it.

If any of these factors are lacking, there is no penalty for not informing another bhikkhu that day. For instance, the following cases do not count as concealment:

A bhikkhu does not suspect that he has committed an offense and realizes only much later, after reading or hearing about the rules in more detail, that he has incurred a saṅghādisesa.

A bhikkhu lives alone in a forest and commits a saṅghādisesa in the middle of the night. Afraid of the snakes or other wild animals he might encounter in the dark, he waits until daylight before going to inform a fellow bhikkhu.

A bhikkhu lives alone in a forest, but the only other bhikkhu within one day’s traveling time is a personal enemy who, if he is informed, will use this as an opportunity to smear the offender’s name, so the offender travels another day or two before reaching a congenial bhikkhu whom he informs.

A bhikkhu intends to tell another bhikkhu before dawn but falls asleep and either wakes up too late or else wakes up in time but remembers his offense only after dawnrise has past.

Once all of the first eight factors are complete, though, one must inform another bhikkhu before dawn of the next day or else incur a dukkaṭa and undergo the penalty for concealment.

A bhikkhu who commits a lesser offense that he thinks is a saṅghādisesa and then conceals it, incurs a dukkaṭa (Cv.III.34.1).

The restrictions for a bhikkhu undergoing probation—and the other possible steps in the rehabilitation process—are similar to those for one undergoing penance and are discussed in detail in BMC2, Chapter 19.

Saṅghādisesas are classified as heavy offenses (garukāpatti), both because of the seriousness of the offenses themselves and because the procedures of penance, probation, and rehabilitation are burdensome by design, not only for the offender but also for the Community of bhikkhus in which he lives—a fact intended to act as added deterrent to anyone who feels tempted to transgress.

CHAPTER SIX

Aniyata

This term means “indefinite.” The rules in this section do not assign definite or fixed penalties, but instead give procedures by which the Community may pass judgment when a bhikkhu in uncertain circumstances is accused of having committed an offense. There are two training rules here.

1

Should any bhikkhu sit in private, alone with a woman on a seat secluded enough to lend itself (to sexual intercourse), so that a female lay follower whose word can be trusted, having seen (them), might describe it as constituting any of three cases—entailing defeat, communal meetings, or confession—then the bhikkhu, acknowledging having sat (there), may be dealt with in line with any of the three cases—entailing defeat, communal meetings, or confession—or he may be dealt with in line with whichever case the female lay follower whose word can be trusted described. This case is indefinite.

Woman here means a female human being, “even one born that very day, all the more an older one.” To sit also includes lying down. Whether the bhikkhu sits down when the woman is already seated, or the woman sits down when he is already seated, or both sit down at the same time, makes no difference here.

Private means private to the eye and private to the ear. Two people are sitting in a place private to the eye when no one else is near enough to see if they wink, raise their eyebrows, or nod (§). They are in a place private to the ear when no one else is near enough to hear what they say in a normal voice (§). A secluded seat is one behind a wall, a closed door, a large bush, or anything at all that would afford them enough privacy to engage in sexual intercourse.

For a bhikkhu to sit in such a place with a woman can be in itself a breach of Pc 44 (see the explanations for that rule) and affords the opportunity for breaking Pr 1 and Sg 1, 2, 3, & 4 as well—which is why this case is called indefinite.

If a trustworthy female lay follower happens to see a bhikkhu with a woman in such circumstances, she may inform the Community and charge him on the basis of what she has seen. Female lay follower here means one who has taken refuge in the Buddha, Dhamma, and Saṅgha. Trustworthy means that she is at least a stream-winner. Even if she is not a stream-winner, the Community may choose to investigate the case anyway; but if she is, they have to. The texts do not discuss cases in which a man is making the charge but, given the low legal status of women in the Buddha’s time, it seems reasonable to infer that if a woman’s word was given such weight, the same would hold true for a man’s. In other words, if he is a stream-winner, the Community has to investigate the case. If he isn’t, they are free to handle the case or not, as they see fit.

The wording of the rule suggests that once the matter is investigated and the bhikkhu in question has stated his side of the story, the bhikkhus are free to judge the case either in line with what he admits to having done or in line with the trustworthy female lay follower’s charge. In other words, if his admission and her charge are at variance, they may decide which side seems to be telling the truth and impose a penalty—or no penalty—on the bhikkhu as they see fit.

The Vibhaṅga, however, states that they may deal with him only in line with what he admits to having done. The Commentary offers no explanation for this point aside from saying that in uncertain cases things are not always as they seem, citing as example the story of an arahant who was wrongly charged by another bhikkhu of having broken Pc 44.

Actually, the Vibhaṅga in departing from the wording of the rule is simply following the general guidelines the Khandhakas give for handling accusations. Apparently what happened was that this rule and the following one were formulated early on. Later, when the general guidelines were first worked out, some group-of-six bhikkhus abused the system to impose penalties on innocent bhikkhus they didn’t like (Mv.IX.3.1), so the Buddha formulated a number of checks to prevent the system from working against the innocent. We will cover the guidelines in detail under the adhikaraṇa-samatha rules in Chapter 11, but here we may note a few of their more important features.

If Bhikkhu X wants to charge Bhikkhu Y with an offense, he must first meet privately with Y, as explained under Sg 8. If the issue cannot be settled privately in this way, then it has to go to a formal meeting of the Community. Once the case reaches this stage, one of only three verdicts can settle it: that the accused is innocent, that he was insane at the time he committed the offense (and so absolved of guilt), or that he is not only guilty as charged but—for having dragged out his confession to this point—also deserves a further-punishment transaction (Cv.IV.14.27-29), which is the same as a censure transaction (Cv.IV.11-12).

When the Community meets, both the accused and the accuser must be present, and both must agree to the case’s being heard by that particular group. (If the original accuser is a lay person, one of the bhikkhus is to take up the charge.) The accused is then asked to state his version of the story and is to be dealt with in accordance with what he admits to having done (Mv.IX.6.1-4). Cv.IV.14.29 shows that the other bhikkhus are not to take his first statement at face value. They should press and cross-examine him until they are all satisfied that he is telling the truth, and only then may they pass one of the three verdicts mentioned above.

If necessary, they should be prepared to spend many hours in the meeting to arrive at a unanimous decision, for if they cannot come to a unanimous agreement, the case has to be left as unsettled, which is a very bad question mark to leave hovering over the communal life. The Commentary to Sg 8 suggests that if one side or the other seems unreasonably stubborn, the senior bhikkhus should lead the group in long periods of chanting to wear down the stubborn side.

If, in the course of the interrogation, Y admits to an action that constitutes an offense but he refuses to see it as an offense (Mv.IX.1.3; Cv.XI.1.10), the case is not settled. However, this much of an admission allows the Community, if it sees fit, to suspend him from the Saṅgha at large (see BMC2, Chapter 20) until he sees the error of his ways and is willing to undergo the penalty for the offense.

If, as a result of the formal meeting, the Community reaches a verdict that is later discovered to be wrong—the accused got away with a plea of innocence when actually guilty, or admitted guilt simply to end the interrogation when actually innocent—the Cullavagga allows the Community to reopen the case and reach a new verdict (Cv.IV.8). If a bhikkhu—learning that a fellow bhikkhu actually was guilty and yet got away with a verdict of innocence—then helps conceal the truth, he is guilty of an offense under Pc 64.

Obviously, the main thrust of these guidelines is to prevent an innocent bhikkhu from being unfairly penalized. As for the opposite case—a guilty bhikkhu getting away with no penalty—we should remember that the laws of kamma guarantee that in the long run he is not getting away with anything at all.

These guidelines supersede both aniyata rules except in one important detail: Ordinarily—except on Invitation days (see BMC2, Chapter 16)—if one bhikkhu brings a charge against another either in private or in a formal meeting, he first has to ask leave of the accused, and the accused has the right to deny him leave. However, if the charge is brought by a trustworthy lay follower, then these rules indicate that there is no need to ask or grant leave. One of the bhikkhus must take up the charge, and the accused must respond to it. The fact that the issue has already spread into the lay community means that the Community of bhikkhus must act.

In addition to this point, these rules serve two other important functions:

1) They remind the bhikkhus that the Buddha at one point was willing to let the bhikkhus give more weight to the word of a female lay follower than to that of the accused bhikkhu. This in itself, considering the general position of women in Indian society at the time, is remarkable.

2) As we will see under Pc 44, it is possible under some circumstances—depending on the bhikkhu’s state of mind—to sit alone with a woman in a secluded place without incurring a penalty. Still, a bhikkhu should not blithely take advantage of the exemptions under that rule, for even if his motives are pure, his actions may not appear pure to anyone who comes along and sees him there. These rules serve to remind such a bhikkhu that he could easily be subject to a charge that would lead to a formal meeting of the Community. Even if he were to be declared innocent, the meeting would waste a great deal of time both for himself and for the Community. And in some people’s minds—given the Vibhaṅga’s general rule that he is innocent until proven guilty—there would remain the belief that he was actually guilty and got off with no penalty simply from lack of hard evidence. A bhikkhu would thus be wise to avoid such situations altogether, remembering what Lady Visākhā told Ven. Udāyin in the origin story to this rule:

“It is unfitting, venerable sir, and improper, for the master to sit in private, alone with a woman…. Even though the master may not be aiming at that act, cynical people are hard to convince.”

Summary: When a trustworthy female lay follower accuses a bhikkhu of having committed a pārājika, saṅghādisesa, or pācittiya offense while sitting alone with a woman in a private, secluded place, the Community should investigate the charge and deal with the bhikkhu in accordance with whatever he admits to having done.

*    *    *

2

In case a seat is not sufficiently secluded to lend itself (to sexual intercourse) but sufficiently so to address lewd words to a woman, should any bhikkhu sit in private, alone with a woman on such a seat, so that a female lay follower whose word can be trusted, having seen (them), might describe it as constituting either of two cases—entailing communal meetings or confession—then the bhikkhu, acknowledging having sat (there), may be dealt with in line with either of the two cases—entailing communal meetings or confession—or he may be dealt with in line with whichever case the female lay follower whose word can be trusted described. This case too is indefinite.

This rule differs from the preceding one mainly in the type of seat it describes—private to the eye and private to the ear, but not secluded. Examples would be an open-air meeting hall or a place out in the open in sight of other people but far enough away from them so that they could not see one wink, etc., or hear what one is saying in a normal voice. Such a place, although inconvenient for committing Pr 1, Sg 1 & 2, or Pc 44, would be convenient for committing Sg 3 & 4 or Pc 45. As a result, the term woman under this rule is defined as under those rules: one experienced enough to know what is properly and improperly said, what is lewd and not lewd.

Otherwise, all explanations for this rule are the same as for the preceding rule.

Summary: When a trustworthy female lay follower accuses a bhikkhu of having committed a saṅghādisesa or pācittiya offense while sitting alone with a woman in an unsecluded but private place, the Community should investigate the charge and deal with the bhikkhu in accordance with whatever he admits to having done.

CHAPTER SEVEN

Nissaggiya Pācittiya

The term nissaggiya, used in connection with training rules, means “entailing forfeiture.” Used in connection with articles, it means “to be forfeited.” Pācittiya is a word of uncertain etymology. The Parivāra gives a didactic derivation—that it means letting skillful qualities fall away (patati) with a deluded mind (citta)—but the term is more likely related to the verb pacinati (pp. pacita), which means to discern, distinguish, or know.

Each of the rules in this category involves an item that a bhikkhu has acquired or used wrongly, and that he must forfeit before he may “make the offense known”—confess it—to a fellow bhikkhu, a group of bhikkhus, or to the Community as whole. This confession is what clears him of the offense. In most cases, the forfeiture is symbolic. After his confession, the offender receives the item in return so that, as a donor’s gift, it does not go to waste. Even under the three rules requiring that the offender give up the item for good, the forfeiture protocols allow for the Community to benefit from the item, again as a way of preserving the donor’s faith.

There are thirty rules in this category, divided into three chapters (vagga) of ten rules each.

One: The Robe-cloth Chapter

1

When a bhikkhu has finished his robe and the frame is dismantled (his kaṭhina privileges are ended), he is to keep extra robe-cloth ten days at most. Beyond that, it is to be forfeited and confessed.

The origin story for this rule is retold as part of a longer narrative in the Mahāvagga (VIII.13.4-8). Because the context provided by the longer narrative is what makes it interesting, that is the version translated here.

“(The Buddha addresses the bhikkhus:) ‘As I was traveling on the road from Rājagaha to Vesālī, I saw many bhikkhus coming along loaded down with robe-cloth, having made a mattress of robe-cloth on their heads and a mattress of robe-cloth on their backs/shoulders and a mattress of robe-cloth on their hips. Seeing them, I thought, “All too quickly have these worthless men been spun around into abundance in terms of robe-cloth. What if I were to tie off a boundary, to set a limit on robe-cloth for the bhikkhus?”

“‘Now at that time, during the cold winter middle-eight nights (the four nights on either side of the full moon in February, the coldest time of the year in northern India) when snow was falling, I sat in the open air wearing one robe and was not cold. Toward the end of the first watch I became cold. I put on a second robe and was not cold. Toward the end of the middle watch I became cold. I put on a third robe and was not cold. Toward the end of the final watch, as dawn rose and the night smiled, I became cold. I put on a fourth robe and was not cold. The thought occurred to me, “Those in this doctrine and discipline who are sons of respectable families—sensitive to cold and afraid of the cold—even they are able to get by with three robes. Suppose I were to tie off a boundary, to set a limit on robe-cloth for the bhikkhus and were to allow three robes.” Bhikkhus, I allow you three robes: a double-layer outer robe, a single-thickness upper robe, and a single-thickness lower robe (thus, four layers of cloth).’

“Now at that time, some group-of-six bhikkhus, thinking, ‘The Blessed One allows three robes,’ entered the village wearing one set of three robes, stayed in the monastery wearing another set, and went down to bathe in still another. Modest bhikkhus… criticized and complained and spread it about, ‘How can the group-of-six bhikkhus wear extra robe-cloth?’ They told this matter to the Blessed One. He… addressed the bhikkhus, saying, ‘Bhikkhus, extra robe-cloth is not to be kept’….

“Now at that time extra robe-cloth accrued to Ven. Ānanda, and he wanted to give it to Ven. Sāriputta, but Ven. Sāriputta was at Sāketa. He thought, ‘… Now what line of conduct should I follow?’ He told this matter to the Blessed One, (who said,) ‘But how long is it, Ānanda, before Sāriputta will come here?’

“‘Nine days or ten.’

“Then the Blessed One… addressed the bhikkhus, ‘I allow that extra robe-cloth to be kept at most ten days.’

“Now at that time extra robe-cloth accrued to the bhikkhus. They thought, ‘Now what line of conduct should we follow?’ They told this matter to the Blessed One, (who said,) ‘I allow that extra robe-cloth be placed under shared ownership.’”

The offense under this rule involves two factors.

1) Object: a piece of extra robe-cloth, i.e., a piece of cloth suitable to be made into a robe or other cloth requisite, measuring at least four by eight inches (fingerbreadths), that has not been formally determined for use or placed under shared ownership. This category includes finished requisites as well as simple pieces of cloth, but does not include robe-cloth belonging to the Community.

2) Effort: One keeps it for more than ten days (except during the allowed period) without determining it for use, placing it under shared ownership, abandoning it (giving or throwing it away); and without the cloth’s being lost, destroyed, burnt, snatched away, or taken by someone else on trust within that time.

Object

According to Mv.VIII.3.1, six kinds of cloth are suitable for making into cloth requisites: linen, cotton, silk, wool, jute (§), or hemp (§). The Sub-commentary adds that cloth made of any mixture of hemp with any of the other types of thread would be allowed under “hemp.” Applying the Great Standards, nylon, rayon, and other synthetic fibers would count as suitable as well. Unsuitable materials—such as cloth made of hair, horse-hair, grass, bark, wood-shavings, or antelope hide (and by extension, leather)—do not come under this rule. (For a full list of unsuitable materials, see Mv.VIII.28—BMC2, Chapter 2.) Mv.VIII.29 gives a list of colors—such as black, blue, and crimson—and patterns that are not suitable for robes but that, according to the Commentary, are suitable for things like bed sheets or for linings (inside layers?) in double-layer robes (see BMC2, Chapter 2). Pieces of cloth dyed these colors or printed with these patterns would come under this rule.

Mv.VIII.21.1 states that if a bhikkhu receives a piece of suitable cloth measuring four by eight fingerbreadths or more but does not yet plan to use it, he may place it under shared ownership (vikappana) until he has need for it. Once he decides to make use of the cloth, he must rescind the shared ownership (see Pc 59) before making it into a finished requisite (if it isn’t already). Once it is finished, he may then determine it for use (adhiṭṭhāna) or place it under shared ownership again, depending on the nature of the article:

Each of the three basic robes, handkerchiefs, bed sheets, and the sitting cloth are to be determined, and may not be placed under shared ownership.

A rains-bathing cloth (see NP 24) may be determined for the four months of the rainy season and is to be placed under shared ownership for the remainder of the year.

A skin-eruption cloth (see Pc 90) may be determined when needed and is to be placed under shared ownership when not.

Other items of cloth may be determined as “requisite cloths.”

(The procedures for determining and placing under shared ownership are given in Appendices IV & V.)

Any cloth made of any of the suitable materials and of the requisite size counts as an extra cloth if—

it has not been determined for use or placed under shared ownership,

it has been improperly determined or placed under shared ownership, or

its determination or shared ownership has lapsed.

Many of the cases in which determination and shared ownership lapse also exempt the cloth from this rule: e.g., the owner disrobes or dies, he gives the cloth away, it gets snatched away, destroyed (bitten by things such as termites, says the Commentary), burnt, lost, or someone else takes it on trust. There are a few cases, however, where determination and shared ownership lapse and the cloth does fall under this rule. They are—

Under shared ownership: The first owner takes the cloth on trust, or the second owner formally rescinds the shared ownership.

Under determination: The owner rescinds the determination, or (if the cloth has been determined as one of the three basic robes) the cloth develops a hole. This latter case comes in the Commentary, which gives precise standards for deciding what kind of hole does and does not make the determination of the robe lapse:

1) Size. The hole has to be a full break (through both layers of cloth, if in the outer robe) at least the size of the nail on one’s little finger. If one or more threads remain across the hole, then the hole makes the determination lapse only if either of the two “halves” divided by the thread(s) is the requisite size.

2) Location. On an upper robe or outer robe, the hole has to be at least one span (25 cm.) from the longer side and eight fingerbreadths from the shorter; on a lower robe, at least one span from the longer side and four fingerbreadths from the shorter. Any hole closer to the edge of the robe than these measurements does not make the determination lapse.

Because of these stipulations, the Commentary notes that if one is patching a worn spot—not a hole as defined above—more than the maximum distance away from the edge of one’s robe, the determination lapses if one cuts out the worn spot before applying the patch, but not if one applies the patch before cutting out the worn spot. If the determination lapses, it is an easy matter to re-determine the robe, but one must be mindful to do it within the time span allotted by this rule.

Effort

According to the Vibhaṅga, if one keeps a piece of extra robe-cloth past the eleventh dawnrise (except when the robe-season privileges are in effect), one commits the full offense under this rule. The Commentary explains this by saying that the dawnrise at the morning of the day on which one receives the cloth, or lets its determination/shared ownership lapse, counts as the first dawn. Thus the eleventh dawnrise would actually be the tenth dawnrise after one receives, etc., the cloth.

Because neither the Canon nor the Commentary gives a precise definition of dawn or dawnrise, their exact meaning is a controversial point. The clearest definition of dawnrise—and the one that seems most consistent with the Canon’s use of the term—is in a sub-commentary called the Vinayālaṅkāra, which states that at dawnrise “a red band in the eastern direction and a whiteness in the remaining directions, due to the diffusion of sunlight, can be discerned.” In modern terminology, this corresponds to the onset of civil twilight. This is the definition followed in this book. Further, dawnrise is apparently the moment at which dawn begins, although this is a controversial point. For further discussion, see Appendix I.

Mv.V.13.13 states that if one is informed of a gift of robe-cloth, the counting of the time span does not begin until the cloth has reached one’s hand. The Commentary to that passage insists that this means either when physically coming to one’s possession or when one is informed by the donors that the robe-cloth is with so-and-so or when one is informed by another to the same effect. However, this interpretation seems to directly contradict the passage it is commenting on, which expressly says, “There is no counting of the time span as long as it has not come to his hand”—“his” in this case meaning the bhikkhu’s.

Perception is not a mitigating factor here. Even if one miscounts the days or perceives a robe to be determined when it actually is not, one is not immune from the offense. The robe is to be forfeited and the offense confessed.

If, before it has been forfeited, one uses a robe or piece of robe-cloth that deserves to be forfeited under this rule, the penalty is a dukkaṭa. This is one of only six nissaggiya pācittiya rules where the Vibhaṅga mentions this penalty—the others are NP 2, 3, 21, 28, & 29—but the K/Commentary extends the principle to all nissaggiya pācittiya rules: To use an unforfeited item that deserves to be forfeited incurs a dukkaṭa in every case. (We should add, though, that the use of gold or money acquired in defiance of NP 18 or 19 would carry a nissaggiya pācittiya if used in defiance of NP 19 or 20.)

The Vibhaṅga also states that, in the case of an extra robe that has not been kept more than ten days, if one perceives it to have been kept more than ten days or if one is in doubt about it, the penalty is a dukkaṭa. This can be interpreted in one of two ways: There is a dukkaṭa simply in continuing to keep the robe, or a dukkaṭa in using it. The Commentary opts for the second interpretation.

Robe-season privileges

The fourth lunar month of the rainy season—beginning the day after the first full moon in October and lasting to dawnrise of the day following the next full moon—is termed the robe season, a period traditionally devoted to robe-making. In the early days, when most bhikkhus spent the cold and hot seasons wandering, and stayed put in one place only during the Rains-residence, this would have been the ideal period for them to prepare robes for their wandering, and for lay people who had come to know the bhikkhus during the Rains-residence to show their gratitude and respect for them by presenting them with gifts of cloth for this purpose.

During this robe season, five of the training rules—NP 1 & 3; Pc 32, 33, & 46—are relaxed to make it more convenient for the bhikkhus to make robes. Also, any cloth accruing to a particular monastery during this period may be shared only among the bhikkhus who spent the Rains-residence there, and not with any incoming visitors.

Under certain circumstances (see BMC2, Chapter 17) bhikkhus who have spent the Rains-residence are also entitled to participate in a kaṭhina ceremony in which they receive a gift of cloth from lay people, bestow it on one of their members, and then as a group make it into a robe before dawnrise of the following day. (Kaṭhina means frame, and refers to the frame over which the robe-cloth is stretched while sewing it, much like the frame used in America to make a quilt.) After participating in this ceremony, the bhikkhus may extend their robe season for an additional four lunar months, up to the dawn after the full-moon day that ends the cold season in late February or early-to-mid March (called Phagguna in Pali). During this period they may also take advantage of the additional privilege of not having to observe NP 2. However, a bhikkhu’s kaṭhina privileges may be rescinded—and his robe season ended—earlier than that for either of two reasons:

1) He participates in a meeting in which all the bhikkhus in the monastery, as a Community transaction, voluntarily relinquish their kaṭhina privileges. (This act is discussed under bhikkhunīs’ Pc 30—see BMC2, Chapter 17 and Appendix I.)

2) He comes to the end both of his constraint with regard to the monastery (āvāsa-palibodha) and of his constraint with regard to making a robe (cīvara-palibodha). (See Mv.VII.1.7; Mv.VII.2 & Pv.XIV.6.)

a) A constraint with regard to a monastery ends when either of the following things happens:

—One leaves the monastery without intending to return.

—One has left the monastery, planning to return, but learns that the bhikkhus in the monastery have formally decided to relinquish their kaṭhina privileges.

b) A constraint with regard to making a robe ends when any of the following occurs:

—One finishes making one’s robe(s).

—One decides not to make a robe.

—One’s robe-cloth gets lost, snatched away, or destroyed.

—One expects to obtain robe-cloth, but—after not obtaining it as expected—one abandons one’s expectation.

Only if Point 1 happens, or both Points 2a and 2b happen, do one’s kaṭhina privileges lapse before the dawn after the full moon day marking the end of the cold season.

During the robe season, one may keep an extra piece of robe-cloth for more than ten days without committing an offense under this rule. Once these privileges lapse, though, one must determine the cloth, place it under shared ownership, or abandon it within ten days. If one fails to do so by the eleventh dawnrise after the privileges lapse, the cloth is to be forfeited and the offense confessed.

Forfeiture & confession

To be absolved of the offense under this rule, one must first forfeit the robe-cloth kept more than ten days and then confess the offense. This may be done in the presence of one other bhikkhu, a group of two or three, or a Community of four or more. After confessing the offense, one receives the robe-cloth in return. This is the pattern followed under all the nissaggiya pācittiya rules except for the few in which forfeiture must be done in the presence of a full Community and under which the article may not be returned to the offender. (We will note these rules as we come to them.)

The Pali formulae to use in forfeiture, confession, and return of the article for this and all the following rules are given in Appendix VI. We should note, though, that according to the Commentary one may conduct these procedures in any language at all.

In this and every other rule under which the article may be returned to the offender, it must be returned to him. According to the Vibhaṅga, a bhikkhu who receives the article being forfeited without returning it incurs a dukkaṭa. The Commentary qualifies this by saying that this penalty applies only to the bhikkhu who assumes that, in receiving an article being forfeited in this way, it is his to take as he likes. For the bhikkhu who knows that it is not his to take, the offense is to be treated under Pr 2, with the penalty determined by the value of the article. In passing this judgment, the Commentary is treating the act of accepting the forfeited article as a species of accepting an object placed in safekeeping. However, it has neglected to note that the act of forfeiture is worded in such a way that the offender is actually giving up ownership of the cloth; because the cloth then has no owner, it would not fulfill the factors for an offense under Pr 2. Thus it seems preferable to stick with the Vibhaṅga in saying that, in all cases, a bhikkhu who does not return the article being forfeited incurs a dukkaṭa.

A bhikkhu who has received the robe-cloth in return after forfeiting it and confessing the offense may use it again without penalty, unless he keeps it as a piece of extra robe-cloth beyond ten more dawns. Thus the wise policy is to determine the cloth or place it under shared ownership immediately after receiving it in return.

Non-offenses

In addition to the allowance to keep extra robe-cloth more than ten days during the robe season, the Vibhaṅga says that there is no offense if within ten days the cloth is determined, placed under shared ownership, lost, snatched away, destroyed, burnt, taken by someone else on trust, thrown away, or given away.

In connection with this last point, the Commentary discusses proper and improper ways of giving things away. The article counts as having been properly given if one says, “I give this to you,” or “I give this to so-and-so,” or “Take this, it’s yours,” but not if one says things like, “Make this yours,” or “May this be yours.” Apparently, if one simply hands the article over without saying anything to show that one is transferring ownership, it again does not count. As we noted above, perception is not a mitigating factor under this rule. If one gives extra robe-cloth away in an improper manner, then even though one may assume that the cloth has been given away it still counts as one’s own extra robe-cloth under this rule.

Current practice

As the origin story shows, the purpose of this rule was to prevent bhikkhus from having more than one set of the three robes at any one time. With the passage of time, though, gifts of cloth to the Community became more numerous, and the need for stringency in this matter became less and less felt. Exactly when spare robes became accepted is not recorded, although a passage in the pupil’s duties to his preceptor (Mv.I.25.9) shows that the practice of having a spare lower robe was already current when that part of the Canon was compiled (see Appendix X). Mv.VII.1 also mentions a group of wilderness dwelling bhikkhus who were “wearers of the three robes,” as if this were a special distinguishing characteristic. A number of passages in the Canon—including SN 16:8 and Thag&16:7—mention the practice of using only one set of three robes as special, and the Visuddhimagga (5th century C.E.) classes this practice as one of the thirteen optional dhutaṅga (ascetic) practices.

As we will see below, Pc 92 suggests that in the early days the under, upper, and outer robes were all nearly the same size, so there would have been no difficulty in washing one robe and using the other two while the first one dried. Later, when the compilers of the ancient commentaries greatly enlarged the size of the upper and outer robes after deciding that the Buddha was of superhuman height, getting by with just one set of three robes became less convenient. Thus many teachers at present suggest that even a frugal bhikkhu, when staying in monasteries, should use one spare lower robe or a spare lower and upper robe—so that he will have no trouble keeping his robes clean and presenting an acceptable appearance at all times—and save the three-robe dhutaṅga practice for when he is alone in the wilderness.

At any rate, because only one set of three robes may be determined as such, spare robes—once they became generally accepted—were determined as “requisite cloths.” This point may be inferred from the Commentary’s explanation of this rule, and the Sub-commentary’s explanation of NP 7. The Commentary even contains a discussion of the views of various elders as to whether a bhikkhu who wishes to avoid the special rules surrounding the use of the three robes (such as the following rule) may determine his basic set as requisite cloths as well. The majority opinion—with only one dissenting voice—was Yes, although at present many Communities do not agree with this opinion.

The Sub-commentary suggests an alternative way of dealing with spare robes: placing them under shared ownership and—because none of the three robes may be placed under shared ownership—calling them simply “cloth” (cīvara). This, however, plays havoc with Pc 59 and the general purpose of shared ownership in the Canon as a way of keeping cloth that is not being used. Thus the previous method—determining spare robes as requisite cloth—seems preferable.

In any event, ever since spare robes have been accepted, the effect of this rule has been mainly to deter a bhikkhu from hoarding up robe-cloth in secret and from letting a hole in any of his basic set of three robes go unmended for more than ten days. Nevertheless, the spirit of the rule makes it incumbent on each bhikkhu to keep his cloth requisites to a minimum.

Summary: Keeping a piece of robe-cloth for more than ten days without determining it for use or placing it under shared ownership—except when the robe-season privileges are in effect—is a nissaggiya pācittiya offense.

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2

When a bhikkhu has finished his robe and the frame is dismantled (his kaṭhina privileges are ended): If he dwells apart from (any of) his three robes even for one night—unless authorized by the bhikkhus—it is to be forfeited and confessed.

In the origin story here, a number of bhikkhus went off on tour, leaving their outer robes with their friends at the monastery. Eventually the robes became moldy, and the bhikkhus at the monastery were burdened with having to sun them to get rid of the mold. The Buddha thus formulated this rule so that bhikkhus would be responsible for looking after their own robes.

The offense here consists of two factors: object and effort.

Object:

Any one of the robes that a bhikkhu has determined as his basic set of three—the antaravāsaka (lower robe), uttarāsaṅga (upper robe), and saṅghāṭi (outer robe). This rule thus does not apply to spare robes or other cloth requisites.

Effort:

Greeting dawnrise at a place outside of the zone in which any of one’s robes are located, except when the exemptions mentioned in the rule are in effect.

Dawnrise, as stated under the preceding rule, corresponds to the onset of civil twilight. In Thailand, this point is often measured in a practical way by looking at the palm of one’s hand as it is held out at full arm’s length: Dawnrise is the point in time when the major lines of the hand are visible by natural light. On a bright moonlit night, dawnrise is measured by looking at the foliage of trees: Dawnrise is the point when one can detect the green in the color of the leaves. For further discussion of some of the controversies surrounding dawn and dawnrise, see Appendix I.

Zones

This is the most complex facet of this rule. The zone where a bhikkhu must be at dawnrise depends on the type of location where his robes are placed, whether the property around the location is enclosed, and—if it is enclosed—whether it belongs to one or more than one kula. 

“Enclosed,” according to the Commentary, means surrounded with a wall, a fence, or a moat. The Sub-commentary adds that a river or lake would also qualify as a type of enclosure, under the term moat.

The term kula normally means clan or family, but in the context of this rule it has different meanings for the different types of locations. According to the Commentary, a village is single-kula if ruled by a single ruler, and multi-kula if ruled by a council—as in the case of Vesālī and Kusinārā during the time of the Buddha. (In the time of the Canon and Commentary, rulers were assumed to “own” or have the right to “consume” the territories they ruled.) At present, towns governed under a social contract—such as a town charter—would count as multi-kula even if the highest authority in the government is invested in a single individual.

A building, a vehicle or a piece of land is single-kula if it belongs to one family, and multi-kula if it belongs to more than one (as in an apartment house).

According to the Sub-commentary, a monastery is single-kula if the people who initiated it belong to one kula—of either type, apparently—and multi-kula if they belong to several.

In some of the cases, the Vibhaṅga states that one should greet dawnrise within a particular area “or not more than a hatthapāsa (1.25 meter) away.” Unfortunately, it does not explicitly state what the hatthapāsa is measured from—the robes or the area—so there are different opinions as to what this passage means. The Commentary’s position is that in cases where the Vibhaṅga says that if the robes are kept in a certain area, one should either stay in that area or not more than a hatthapāsa away, the hatthapāsa is measured from the outside boundary of the area. For instance, if the robes are kept in a house in an unenclosed village, one is allowed to greet dawnrise anywhere in the house or in an area one hatthapāsa around the house. (This would allow for a bhikkhu to go outside to relieve himself at dawn without having to carry along his full set of robes.) However, in cases where the Vibhaṅga does not mention that one should stay in a certain area, and instead says simply that one should not be more than a hatthapāsa away—as in an unenclosed field or under a multi-kula tree—the hatthapāsa is measured from the robes themselves.

Some have objected to the Commentary’s position as inconsistent and serving no purpose, and have proposed instead that the hatthapāsa be measured from the robes in every case. This, however, leads to redundancies: If, for instance, the robes are kept in a room and one is allowed (1) to stay in the room or (2) to be no further than a hatthapāsa from the robes, then either (2) negates (1)—in other words, one must stay within a hatthapāsa of the robes and not go elsewhere in the room—or else (1) makes (2) superfluous: One may stay anywhere in the room, without worrying about precisely where in the room the robes are located. In contrast, the Commentary’s position not only avoids these redundancies but also actually serves a purpose. In addition to the convenience mentioned above, there is another convenience in a multi-kula dwelling or a larger multi-kula building: If there is a small bathroom next to the room where the robes are kept, one may use the bathroom at dawn without having to take one’s robes into the bathroom. For these reasons, we will stick to the Commentary’s interpretation here.

1. A village:

a. Enclosed and single-kula: Having kept the robes within the enclosure, greet dawnrise in the enclosure. (The Vibhaṅga actually says, “in the village,” but as the Commentary to Mv.II.12.3 notes, when a village is enclosed, everything in the enclosure counts as “village,” and that is the most sensible interpretation for the Vibhaṅga’s statement here. This is the pattern followed throughout all cases of “enclosed and single-kula.”)

b. Enclosed and multi-kula: Greet dawnrise in the house where the robes are kept, in the public meeting hall, at the town gate, or one hatthapāsa around any of these places (§). If the robes are kept within a hatthapāsa of the path going to the public meeting hall, greet dawnrise in the public meeting hall, at the town gate, or in the area one hatthapāsa around either of the two. If the robes are kept in the public meeting hall, greet dawnrise in the public meeting hall, at the town gate, or in the area one hatthapāsa around either of the two.

c. Unenclosed: Greet dawnrise in the house where the robes are kept or in the area one hatthapāsa around it (§). (See 2 & 3 below for further details.)

2. A dwelling with a yard:

a. Enclosed and single-kula: Having kept the robes within the enclosure, greet dawnrise within the enclosure.

b. Enclosed and multi-kula: Greet dawnrise in the room where the robes are kept, at the entrance to the enclosure, or in the area one hatthapāsa around either of the two (§).

c. Unenclosed: Greet dawnrise in the room where the robes are kept, or in the area one hatthapāsa around it (§).

3. A monastic dwelling (vihāra—according to the Sub-commentary, this includes entire monasteries):

a. Enclosed and single-kula: Having kept the robes within the enclosure, greet dawnrise within the enclosure.

b. Enclosed and multi-kula: Greet dawnrise in the dwelling where the robes are kept, at the entrance to the enclosure, or in the area one hatthapāsa around either of the two (§).

c. Unenclosed: Greet dawnrise in the dwelling where the robes are kept or in the area one hatthapāsa around it (§).

4. A field, orchard, garden (park), or threshing floor:

a. Enclosed and single-kula: Having kept the robes within the enclosure, greet dawnrise within the enclosure.

b. Enclosed and multi-kula (e.g., many fields, etc., within a single enclosure): Having kept the robes within the enclosure, greet dawnrise in the enclosure, at the entrance to the field, etc., where the robe is kept, or in the area one hatthapāsa around either (§).

c. Unenclosed: Greet dawnrise within one hatthapāsa of the robes.

5. Buildings with no yard (such as a fortress or city apartment block):

a. Single-kula: Having kept the robes within the building, greet dawnrise within the building.

b. Multi-kula: Greet dawnrise within the room where the robes are kept, at the entrance (to the building), or in the area one hatthapāsa around either (§).

6. A boat (and by extension, other vehicles):

a. Single-kula: Having kept the robes within the vehicle, greet dawnrise within the vehicle.

b. Multi-kula (as in a commercial airplane or bus): Greet dawnrise in the room where the robes are kept or in the area one hatthapāsa around it (§). (For this reason, a bhikkhu traveling in an airplane overnight should wear his complete set of robes or have it with him in his cabin baggage, rather than in his checked baggage.) The Thai edition of the Canon, unlike the others, adds that one may also greet dawnrise at the entrance to the boat or in the area one hatthapāsa around it.

7. A caravan (according to the Sub-commentary, this includes groups traveling by foot as well as by cart; group hiking trips would thus be included here):

a. Single-kula: Having kept the robes within the caravan, greet dawnrise anywhere up to seven abbhantaras (98 meters) in front of or behind the caravan, and up to one abbhantara (14 meters) to either side.

b. Multi-kula: Having kept the robes within the caravan, greet dawnrise within one hatthapāsa of the caravan.

8. At the foot of a tree:

a. Single-kula: Having kept the robes within the area shaded by the tree at noon, greet dawnrise within that area. According to the Commentary, this doesn’t include spots where sunlight leaks through gaps in the foliage, but many Communities regard this stipulation as excessive.

b. Multi-kula (e.g., a tree on the boundary between two pieces of land): Greet dawnrise within one hatthapāsa of the robes.

9. In the open air (according to the Vibhaṅga, this means a wilderness area where there are no villages; the Commentary adds that this includes dense forests and uninhabited islands):

&bullet;  Greet dawnrise within a seven-abbhantara (98 meter) radius of the robes. (Some have argued that this allowance should apply only when one is staying outside of a dwelling in the wilderness; as for a hut in the wilderness, they say, the zone under (3) should apply. The problem with this interpretation is what it would mean in practice: If a bhikkhu keeping his robes in a wilderness hut wanted to greet dawnrise in the open air, he would have to take his robes out of the hut. Then he would be free to wander 98 meters away from them. This would actually expose the robes to more dangers than if they were left in the hut. Thus it seems preferable to stick with the Vibhaṅga’s definition for this zone: any wilderness area where there are no villages.)

Exemptions

1) As with the preceding rule, this rule is not in force when the kaṭhina privileges are in effect. However—unlike the preceding rule—it is in force during the first month after the Rains-residence unless one has participated in a kaṭhina.

2) In the origin story to this rule, the Buddha gives permission for a Community of bhikkhus to authorize an ill bhikkhu to be separated from his robes at dawnrise throughout the course of his illness without penalty. (The procedure and transaction statement for this authorization are given in Appendix VIII.)

The Commentary discusses how long this authorization lasts, and concludes that once the bhikkhu has recovered he should make every reasonable effort to get back to his robes as soon as possible without jeopardizing his health. The authorization then automatically subsides, with no further transaction being required to rescind it. If his illness returns, the authorization is automatically reinstated.

3) In Mv.II.12.1-3, the Buddha directs the bhikkhus to declare a sīmā—or territory in which Community transactions are enacted—as a ticīvara-avippavāsa, which means that if a bhikkhu’s robes are anywhere within the territory, he may greet dawnrise at any other part of that territory without committing an offense under this rule. In the early days, when such a territory might cover many monasteries (the maximum allowable size is 3x3 yojanas, approximately 48x48 kilometers), this was a definite convenience for bhikkhus who had to leave their monastery to join in Community meetings at another monastery in the same territory. Because it was possible for such territories to include villages and homes as well, the Buddha added the extra stipulation that robes left in the houses of lay people lying in such a territory were not covered by this exemption. For further details, see BMC2, Chapter 13.

At present the custom is to designate much smaller areas as territories—usually only a fraction of the land in one monastery—and although these can also be designated as ticīvara-avippavāsa, this arrangement in such cases is not the great convenience it is in the larger territories.

Forfeiture & confession

If a bhikkhu greets dawnrise outside of the zone where any one of his three determined robes is placed—except when the exemptions are in effect—the robe is to be forfeited and the offense confessed. Perception and intention are not mitigating factors here. If he thinks that he is in the same zone when he actually isn’t, if he thinks the robe is not determined when it actually is, or if he means to be in the same zone when circumstances prevent him, he incurs the penalty all the same. If he then uses the robe before forfeiting it and confessing the offense, he incurs a dukkaṭa.

The Vibhaṅga adds that, with regard to a robe that hasn’t been apart from one, if one perceives it to have been apart or one is in doubt about it, the penalty is a dukkaṭa. The Commentary does not explain these statements, but from the parallel situations under NP 1 it would seem that the dukkaṭa here is for using the robe.

The procedures for forfeiture, confession, and return of the robe are the same as in the preceding rule. For the Pali formula to use in forfeiture, see Appendix VI. Once the robe has been forfeited, its determination lapses, so when the bhikkhu receives it in return he must re-determine it for use or give it away within ten days so as not to commit an offense under the preceding rule.

Non-offenses

In addition to the above-mentioned exemptions, there is no offense if, before dawn, the robe is lost, destroyed, burnt, or snatched away; if someone else takes it on trust; or if the bhikkhu gives it away or rescinds its determination. Because of this last allowance, the Commentary recommends that if a bhikkhu realizes he will not be able to get back to his robe before dawn, he should rescind the robe’s determination before dawnrise so as to avoid an offense, and then re-determine the robe after dawnrise has passed.

A note on Thai practice

The author of the Vinaya-mukha missed the Sub-commentary’s discussion of monastic residences under this rule and so came to the conclusion that none of the texts discuss the question of zones in a monastery. As a result, he formulated his own system, treating each separate monastic dwelling as a lay dwelling with a yard. Furthermore, he neglected to discuss the question of what counts as single-kula and multi-kula in such a dwelling. In the absence of any other standard, Thai bhikkhus have come to view a dwelling of two or more bhikkhus, in which the bhikkhus come from different families, as a multi-kula dwelling. If the bhikkhus live in separate rooms, then the room where the robes are placed, plus a radius of one hatthapāsa around it, is the bhikkhu’s zone. If two or more bhikkhus are spending the night in a single room, each bhikkhu must greet dawnrise within one hatthapāsa of his robes.

Although there is no basis in the Canon or commentaries for this practice, it is so widely accepted in Thailand that the wise policy for anyone spending the night in the same dwelling or the same room with a Thai bhikkhu is to be aware of it and abide by it, to avoid the useless controversies that can arise over minor matters like this.

Summary: Being in a separate zone from any of one’s three robes at dawnrise—except when one’s kaṭhina privileges are in effect or one has received formal authorization from the Community—is a nissaggiya pācittiya offense.

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3

When a bhikkhu has finished his robe and the frame is dismantled (his kathina privileges are ended): Should out-of-season robe-cloth accrue to him, he may accept it if he so desires. Having accepted it, he is to make it up immediately (into a cloth requisite). If it should not be enough (§), he may lay it aside for a month at most when he has an expectation for filling the lack. If he should keep it beyond that, even when he has an expectation (for further cloth), it is to be forfeited and confessed.

There are two factors for an offense here.

1) Object: (a) out-of-season robe-cloth, made of any of the proper six kinds of material, in pieces measuring at least four by eight fingerbreadths;

(b) the cloth is not enough to make the cloth requisite one has in mind, but one expects to receive more.

2) Effort: One keeps the cloth for more than 30 days, except when the kaṭhina privileges are in effect.

Object

The Vibhaṅga defines in-season robe-cloth as any robe-cloth accruing to a bhikkhu—either from the Community, from a group, from relatives, from friends, from cast-off cloth, or from his own resources—during the first month after the Rains-residence if he has not yet participated in a kaṭhina, or during the time when his kaṭhina privileges are in effect if he has. Thus out-of-season cloth is any cloth accruing to him at any other time. However, the Vibhaṅga also notes that cloth accruing to a bhikkhu during the one-month or five-month robe season can count as out-of-season cloth if the donors dedicate it to that purpose. There are two reasons why they might want to do so.

1) Given the way “extra robe-cloth” is defined under NP 1, a gift of in-season robe-cloth can be kept—if it is neither determined nor placed under shared ownership—for ten days after the robe season ends. However, if the cloth is not enough to make into a robe, it cannot be kept—if neither determined nor placed under shared ownership—for the month allowed by this rule. However, as the K/Commentary to NP 24 notes, a gift of out-of-season cloth can be kept for the extra month under this rule. Thus if the donors want to provide the recipient(s) with that extra amount of time—which would be especially useful if they give the cloth toward the end of the robe season—they can dedicate the cloth given in-season as out-of-season cloth.

2) According to Mv.VIII.24-25, in-season cloth given to a Community may be shared among only the bhikkhus who spent the Rains-residence in that particular Community, and not among any visiting bhikkhus. The bhikkhunīs’ NP 2 tells of a case where well-behaved but shabbily dressed bhikkhunīs visited a Community of bhikkhunīs when the robe-season privileges were in effect; lay donors, wishing to help them, gave cloth to the Community with the stipulation that it be treated as out-of-season robe-cloth so that the visiting bhikkhunīs would also have a share.

Out-of-season cloth, if it is enough to make the cloth requisite one has in mind, is treated as extra robe-cloth under NP 1: During the period outside of the robe season it can be kept for at most ten days. If, however, it is not enough, and one expects to get further cloth from any source—again, from the Community, from a group, from relatives, from friends, from cast-off cloth, or from one’s own resources—it may be kept for up to 30 days with no need to be determined or placed under shared ownership.

The further cloth, when received, has a life span of ten days, as under NP 1, and one must finish making one’s requisite within the time period determined by whichever cloth has the shorter life span. Thus, if one obtains the expected cloth during the first 20 days, the requisite must be made within ten days, this being the life span of the second cloth. If one obtains it after the 21st day, the requisite must be made before the original 30 days are up.

If the second cloth turns out to be of different quality from the first, one is under no compulsion to put the two cloths together to make up the requisite if one does not want to, and may continue waiting for further cloth, if one has further expectation of cloth, as long as the life span of the first cloth allows. The Commentary recommends that if the second cloth is of poorer quality than the first, one may determine it as requisite cloth; if the second cloth is of better quality, one may determine the first cloth as requisite cloth and start a new 30-day countdown from the day of receiving the second cloth.

Effort

Days are counted by dawns. If, by the 30th dawnrise after one receives the original cloth, one has not determined it, placed it under shared ownership, or abandoned it, it is to be forfeited and the offense confessed. The Sub-commentary adds that if at any time after the first ten days have elapsed one abandons any expectation for further cloth, one must determine the original cloth, place it under shared ownership, or abandon it before the following dawnrise. Otherwise, one commits an offense under NP 1.

As noted under NP 1, Mv.V.13.13 states that if one is informed of a gift of robe-cloth, the counting of the time span does not begin until the cloth has reached one’s hand.

As in the preceding rules, perception is not a mitigating factor. If one miscounts the dawns or thinks the cloth is properly determined, etc., when in fact it isn’t, there is an offense all the same. The Vibhaṅga states that, with regard to a robe that has not been kept beyond the allowable time, if one perceives it to have been kept beyond that time or if one is in doubt about it, the penalty is a dukkaṭa. As under the preceding rules, this penalty apparently applies to using the robe.

As for out-of-season cloth received shortly before the beginning of the robe season, the countdown would begin when it is received, would be suspended throughout the robe season, and would resume at the robe season’s end.

However, as with many of the above issues, this situation rarely comes up in practice, as it is a simple enough matter to determine the original cloth as requisite cloth or place it under shared ownership until one has enough cloth to make one’s requisite, remove it from those arrangements to make the requisite, and so avoid having to worry about this rule at all.

Forfeiture & confession

The procedures for forfeiture, confession, and return of the cloth are the same as under the preceding rules. For the Pali formula to use in forfeiting the cloth, see Appendix VI. Once the cloth is received in return and is now enough for the requisite one has in mind, it is classed as extra robe-cloth under NP 1. If not, the 30-day countdown starts all over again.

Non-offenses

There is no offense if, before the 30 days are up, the original cloth is lost, destroyed, burnt, or snatched away; if someone else takes it on trust; or if the owner determines it for use, places it under shared ownership, or abandons it. And, as stated above, this rule does not apply when the robe-season privileges are in effect.

Summary: Keeping out-of-season robe-cloth for more than 30 days when it is not enough to make a requisite and one has expectation for more—except when the robe-season privileges are in effect—is a nissaggiya pācittiya offense.

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4

Should any bhikkhu have a used robe washed, dyed, or beaten by a bhikkhunī unrelated to him, it is to be forfeited and confessed.

The origin story here is one of the classics of Vinaya literature, although it is hard to say which is more memorable—the dry, matter-of-fact style with which the narrative relates the improbable events, or the reaction of the bhikkhunīs when they hear what has happened.

“Now at that time Ven. Udāyin’s wife had gone forth among the bhikkhunīs. She often went to his place, and he often went to hers. One day he went to her place for a meal-donation. Dressing (§) early in the morning, taking his bowl and (outer) robe, he went to her and on arrival sat down in front of her, exposing his penis. She sat down in front of him, exposing her vagina. He, impassioned, stared at her vagina. Semen was released from his penis (§). He said to her, ‘Go and fetch some water, sister. I’ll wash my lower robe.’

“‘Give it here, master. I’ll wash it.’

“Then she took some of the semen (§) in her mouth and inserted some of it in her vagina. With that, she conceived a child.

“The bhikkhunīs said, ‘This bhikkhunī has been practicing unchastity. She’s pregnant.’

“‘It’s not that I’ve been practicing unchastity.’ And she told them what had happened. The bhikkhunīs criticized and complained and spread it about, ‘How can this Master Udāyin get a bhikkhunī to wash his used robe?’”

There are three factors for an offense here: object, effort, and result.

Object:

A used robe. Robe, here, according to the Commentary, means any robe that has been dyed and properly marked (see Pc 58). This is its way of saying that the robe must be a finished cloth requisite of the type suitable for wearing, but need not be determined as one of one’s basic three robes. In other words, it could also be as yet undetermined, or a spare robe determined as a requisite cloth.

Used, according to the Vibhaṅga, means worn around the body at least once. According to the Commentary, it can mean used in other ways—e.g., rolled up as a pillow or worn draped over the shoulder or head—as well.

The Vibhaṅga adds that sitting cloths and bed sheets are grounds for a dukkaṭa; other requisites, grounds for no offense.

Effort

One tells an unrelated bhikkhunī to wash, dye, or beat the robe.

A bhikkhunī, here, means one who has received the double ordination, first in the Bhikkhunī Saṅgha and secondly in the Bhikkhu Saṅgha (see BMC2, Chapter 23). A bhikkhunī who has received only her first ordination is grounds for a dukkaṭa. Female trainees and female novices are not grounds for an offense.

Unrelated is explained by the Vibhaṅga as meaning unrelated back through seven grandfathers, either on the father’s or the mother’s side. The Commentary explains further that this means seven generations counted back starting from one’s grandfather. Thus all descendants of one’s great-great-great-great-great-great-great-grandfathers are counted as one’s relatives. In-laws, however, are not. This definition of unrelated applies wherever the Vibhaṅga mentions the word. At the time of the Buddha, perceived ties of kinship extended more widely than they do today, and a bhikkhu at present would be well advised to regard as his relatives only those blood-relations with whom ties of kinship are actually felt.

Perception is not an issue here. If a bhikkhu perceives a bhikkhunī as related when in fact she isn’t, he is subject to the full penalty all the same. If he perceives a related bhikkhunī as unrelated, or if he is in doubt as to whether she is related, he incurs a dukkaṭa in getting her to wash, etc., a robe.

Telling, according to the Commentary, includes gesturing as well. Thus if a bhikkhunī is washing her robes, and a bhikkhu throws his used robe down next to her, that would fulfill the factor here.

Result

The bhikkhunī washes, dyes, or beats the robe as requested.

Offenses

A bhikkhu who tells an unrelated bhikkhunī to wash, etc., his used robe incurs a dukkaṭa in the telling. (For every effort she then makes toward washing it, the Commentary adds, he incurs an extra dukkaṭa, but there is no basis for this opinion in the Vibhaṅga.) If he tells her to wash it, then when the robe is washed it is to be forfeited and the nissaggiya pācittiya offense confessed. If he tells her to dye it, then when the robe is dyed it is to be forfeited and the nissaggiya pācittiya offense confessed. If he tells her to beat it, then when she has beaten the robe at least once with a stick or her hand, it is to be forfeited and the nissaggiya pācittiya offense confessed. The bhikkhu incurs a nissaggiya pācittiya and a dukkaṭa if he gets her to do two of the three actions mentioned in the rule—e.g., washing and dyeing the robe; and a nissaggiya pācittiya and two dukkaṭas if he gets her to do all three.

The procedures for forfeiture, confession, and return of the robe are the same as under the preceding rules. Once the robe is returned, it counts as an extra robe-cloth under NP 1.

Non-offenses

There is no offense if the bhikkhunī is related to the bhikkhu, if an unrelated bhikkhunī washes the robe unasked, if an unrelated bhikkhunī helps a related bhikkhunī wash it, if the robe has not yet been used, if one gets an unrelated bhikkhunī to wash another type of requisite (aside from a robe, a sitting cloth, or a bed sheet), or if one gets an unrelated female trainee or female novice to wash a used robe.

The Commentary discusses the case of a bhikkhu who gives a used robe to a female trainee to wash: She takes it, becomes ordained as a bhikkhunī in the meantime, and then washes it. The verdict: He incurs the full penalty under this rule. For the fun of it, the Commentary then discusses the case of a bhikkhu who gives his used robe to a lay man to wash. The lay man undergoes a spontaneous sex change and becomes a bhikkhunī before washing the robe, and again, the bhikkhu incurs the full penalty. What lesson is intended here is hard to say.

Summary: Getting an unrelated bhikkhunī to wash, dye, or beat a robe that has been used at least once is a nissaggiya pācittiya offense.

*    *    *

5

Should any bhikkhu accept robe-cloth from the hand of a bhikkhunī unrelated to him—except in exchange—it is to be forfeited and confessed.

The reason behind this rule is expressed by a single sentence in the origin story: ‘It’s hard for us women to come by things.’ In the original version of the rule, the Buddha made no allowance for accepting robe-cloth in exchange, but this point was later added at the request of the bhikkhunīs. They had tried to exchange robe-cloth with the bhikkhus, who refused because of the rule as it stood at that time, and this upset the bhikkhunīs. As the Commentary explains, their poverty was what made them complain, ‘If the Masters are not on familiar terms with us even to this extent, how are we supposed to keep going?’

The offense under this rule is composed of two factors: object and effort.

Object:

Any piece of robe-cloth of the six suitable kinds, measuring at least four by eight fingerbreadths. Other requisites are not grounds for an offense.

Effort

The bhikkhu receives such cloth from an unrelated bhikkhunī and does not give her anything in exchange.

Unrelated bhikkhunī here is defined in the same terms as under the preceding rule: a bhikkhunī who has received the double ordination and is not related to the bhikkhu back through their great x 7 grandfathers. A bhikkhunī who has received only her first ordination, from the bhikkhunīs, is grounds for a dukkaṭa. Female trainees and female novices are not grounds for an offense.

Perception here is not a mitigating factor: According to the Vibhaṅga, even if a bhikkhu perceives an unrelated bhikkhunī as related he is still subject to the penalty. If he perceives a related bhikkhunī as unrelated or if he is in doubt about whether she is related, he incurs a dukkaṭa in receiving a robe from her.

The Commentary adds that even if one does not know that the robe comes from a bhikkhunī—as when many donors place robes in a pile for a bhikkhu, and one of the donors, unbeknownst to him, is a bhikkhunī—this factor is fulfilled all the same. If a bhikkhunī gives robe-cloth to someone else to present to a bhikkhu, though, the bhikkhu commits no offense in accepting it.

The Commentary also states that receiving need not be hand-to-hand. If a bhikkhunī simply places robe-cloth near a bhikkhu as her way of giving it to him and he accepts it as given, this factor is fulfilled.

As for the item given in exchange for the cloth, the Vibhaṅga states that it can be worth much more than the cloth or much less. Buddhaghosa quotes the Mahā Paccarī, one of the ancient commentaries, as saying that even if, in return for the cloth, the bhikkhu gives the bhikkhunī a piece of yellow myrobalan—a medicinal fruit, one of the cheapest things imaginable in India—he escapes the penalty under this rule.

Offenses

In making an effort to receive robe-cloth from an unrelated bhikkhunī without offering anything in return, a bhikkhu incurs a dukkaṭa. Once he has obtained the cloth, he must forfeit it and confess the nissaggiya pācittiya offense. The procedures for forfeiture, confession, and return of the cloth are the same as under the preceding rules.

Non-offenses

There is no offense:

if the bhikkhunī is related;

if the bhikkhunī is not related but the bhikkhu gives her something in exchange;

if the bhikkhu takes the cloth on trust;

if he borrows the cloth;

if he accepts a non-cloth requisite; or

if he accepts robe-cloth from a female trainee or female novice.

Exchange

The origin story to this rule is where the Buddha explicitly gives permission for bhikkhus, bhikkhunīs, female trainees, male novices, and female novices to trade items with one another. NP 20 forbids bhikkhus from trading items with lay people and people ordained in other religions.

Summary: Accepting robe-cloth from an unrelated bhikkhunī without giving her anything in exchange is a nissaggiya pācittiya offense.

*    *    *

6

Should any bhikkhu ask for robe-cloth from a man or woman householder unrelated to him, except at the proper occasion, it is to be forfeited and confessed. Here the proper occasion is this: The bhikkhu’s robe has been snatched away or destroyed. This is the proper occasion here.

“Now at that time Ven. Upananda the Sakyan was accomplished in giving Dhamma talks. A certain financier’s son went to him and, on arrival, bowed down to him and sat to one side. As he was sitting there, Ven. Upananda the Sakyan instructed, urged, roused, and encouraged him with a Dhamma talk. Then the financier’s son… said to him, ‘Tell me, venerable sir, what I would be capable of giving you that you need: Robe-cloth? Almsfood? Lodgings? Medicines for the sick?’

“‘If you want to give me something, friend, then give me one of those cloths (you are wearing).’

“‘I’m the son of a good family, venerable sir. How can I go about wearing one cloth? Wait till I go home. After going home, I will send you one of these cloths or a more beautiful one.’

“A second time… A third time, Ven. Upananda said to him, ‘If you want to give me something, friend, then give me one of those cloths.’

“‘I’m the son of a good family, venerable sir. How can I go about wearing one cloth? Wait till I go home. After going home, I will send you one of these cloths or a more beautiful one.’

“‘What’s with this offer without wanting to give, friend, in that having made the offer you don’t give?’

“So the financier’s son, being pressured by Ven. Upananda, left having given him one cloth. People seeing him said to him, ‘Why, master, are you going around wearing only one cloth?’

“He told them what had happened. So the people criticized and complained and spread it about, ‘They’re arrogant, these Sakyan-son monks, and malcontent. It’s no simple matter to make a reasonable offer to them. How can they, after being made a reasonable offer by the financier’s son, take his cloth?’”

The factors for an offense here are three.

1) Object: a piece of any of the six suitable kinds of robe-cloth, measuring at least four by eight fingerbreadths.

2) Effort: One asks, except at the proper time, for such cloth from a lay person who is not related back through one’s great x 7 grandfathers. Perception is not a mitigating factor here. Even if one perceives the lay person to be related when in fact he/she isn’t, that fulfills the factor here.

3) Result: One obtains the cloth.

The proper occasions

Snatched away, according to the Vibhaṅga, refers to a robe snatched by anyone at all, even a king. This would cover cases not only where the robe has been stolen but also where it has been confiscated by a government official. Destroyed means burnt, carried away by water, eaten by such things as rats or termites, or worn out by use—although the Sub-commentary adds here that worn out by use means worn to the point where the robe can no longer offer proper covering for the body.

If all of a bhikkhu’s robes are snatched away or destroyed, the Vibhaṅga says that he is not to “come” naked, which apparently means that he should not approach other people while naked. To do so incurs a dukkaṭa (as opposed to the thullaccaya Mv.VIII.28.1 imposes on a bhikkhu who chooses to go about naked when he has robes to wear). If a bhikkhu with no cloth to cover his body happens on an unoccupied Saṅgha residence, he is permitted to take any cloth he finds there—robes, sheets, mats, pillow cases, or whatever—to wear as a makeshift robe as long as he has the intention of returning it when he obtains a proper robe. Otherwise he should make a covering of grass and leaves.

The Commentary adds several points here:

1) If one picks leaves or cuts grass to make a covering for oneself under these circumstances, one is exempt from the penalty for damaging plant life under Pc 11. In other words, the allowance here takes precedence over the prohibition in that rule, rather than vice versa. (The Vibhaṅga does not clearly state which takes precedence over which.) Other bhikkhus are also exempt from that penalty if they pick grass and leaves to help make a covering for a bhikkhu whose robes have been snatched away or destroyed.

2) If, after getting one’s makeshift robe from an unoccupied Saṅgha residence, one has to go a great distance before getting a proper robe, one may leave the makeshift robe with any convenient monastery as property of the Saṅgha.

3) If, under these circumstances, one asks lay people for cloth and receives cloth of a type or color that normally is not allowed, there is no offense in wearing it until one can obtain suitable cloth.

4) If one’s robes have been taken on trust by another bhikkhu or novice, they count as “snatched away” for the purpose of this and the following rule.

The following rule adds extra stipulations on how much cloth one may ask for in circumstances like this.

Offenses

The act of asking for robe-cloth from an unrelated lay person not at the proper time entails a dukkaṭa. The cloth, once obtained, is to be forfeited and the nissaggiya pācittiya offense confessed. The procedures for forfeiture, confession, and return of the cloth are the same as under the preceding rules. The Pali formula to use in forfeiting the cloth is given in Appendix VI.

If one perceives a related householder as unrelated, or if one is in doubt about whether he/she is related, one incurs a dukkaṭa in asking for and receiving a robe from him/her.

Non-offenses

According to the Vibhaṅga, there is no offense if—

one asks at the right time,

one asks from one’s relations,

one asks from people who have invited one to ask for cloth,

one obtains cloth through one’s own resources, or

one asks for the sake of another. (None of the texts state specifically whether another here includes only other bhikkhus, or bhikkhunīs and novices as well. We will assume that all co-religionists are covered under this exemption.)

The Commentary explains that this last point means two things: One may ask for cloth for the sake of another (co-religionist) (1) from one’s own relations or from people who have invited one to ask for cloth or (2) from the relatives of that (co-religionist) or from people who have invited him/her to ask. This point applies for all rules where one is allowed to ask for the sake of another.

On the surface, it would seem that the allowance to ask for another should mean that one should also be allowed to ask from anyone for the sake of another bhikkhu whose robe has been snatched away or destroyed. However, the origin story to the following rule shows why this is not so: Lay donors can be extremely generous when they learn that a bhikkhu’s robes have been snatched away or destroyed, and it is important to place limits on how much cloth can be requested, and on how many bhikkhus can do the requesting, so as not to take unfair advantage of that generosity.

As for obtaining cloth through one’s own resources, the Sub-commentary notes that one should be careful to do it in such a way as not to commit an offense under NP 20. Again, this applies to all rules that contain this exemption.

Summary: Asking for and receiving robe-cloth from an unrelated lay person, except when one’s robes have been snatched away or destroyed, is a nissaggiya pācittiya offense.

*    *    *

7

If that unrelated man or woman householder presents the bhikkhu with many robes (pieces of robe-cloth), he is to accept at most (enough for) an upper and a lower robe. If he accepts more than that, it is to be forfeited and confessed.

This rule is a continuation of the preceding one, dealing with the protocol in asking for robe-cloth when one’s robes have been snatched away or destroyed. The origin story is as follows:

“At that time some group-of-six bhikkhus, having approached bhikkhus whose robes had been snatched away, said, ‘Friends, the Blessed One has allowed those whose robes are snatched away or destroyed to ask an unrelated man or woman householder for robe-cloth. Ask for robe-cloth, friends.’

“‘Never mind, friends. We have already received (enough) robe-cloth.’

“‘We are asking for your sake, friends’ (§—reading āyasmantānaṁ atthāya with the Thai and Sri Lankan editions of the Canon).

“‘Then go ahead and ask.’

“So the group-of-six bhikkhus, having approached unrelated householders, said, ‘Bhikkhus have come whose robes were snatched away. Give robe-cloth for them.’ And they asked for a lot of robe-cloth. Then a certain man, sitting in a meeting hall, said to another man, ’Master, bhikkhus have come whose robes were snatched away. I gave robe-cloth for them.’

“And he said, ‘I gave, too.’

“And another said, ‘I gave, too.’

“So they criticized and complained and spread it about: ‘How can these Sakyan-son monks, not knowing moderation, ask for a lot of robe-cloth? Will the Sakyan-son monks deal in the cloth business? Or will they set up a shop?’”

Protocol

The Vibhaṅga states that when a bhikkhu’s robes are snatched away or destroyed, the amount of cloth he may ask for and accept from an unrelated householder who has not previously invited him to ask for cloth depends on the number of robes snatched away or destroyed. If three, he may ask for and accept only enough for two. If two, he may ask for and accept only enough for one. If one, he should not ask for any cloth at all.

The K/Commentary mentions that these stipulations apply only when robes from one’s determined set of three are snatched away or destroyed. The way it phrases this restriction suggests that if one’s spare robes are snatched away or destroyed, one has no right to ask for robe-cloth at all. The Sub-commentary, though, interprets this restriction not as a restriction but as an allowance opening a loophole so that if one loses any of one’s spare robes, one may ask for as much cloth as one likes. It then accuses the K/Commentary of contradicting the Canon and Commentary, and of ignoring the purpose of the rule, which is to teach moderation and fewness of wants. Its conclusion: The protocol applies when any of one’s robes are snatched away or destroyed—whether undetermined, determined as the basic set of three, or determined as requisite cloths.

If, however, we recall that originally each bhikkhu had only one set of three robes, and that the allowance in the preceding rule was to relieve the hardship of having little or nothing to wear, we can agree with the K/Commentary’s interpretation: that the allowance in the preceding rule applies only when robes from one’s basic set of three are snatched away or destroyed, and that this is the case we are concerned with here. If one’s spare robes get snatched away or destroyed, one may not make use of the allowance to ask for robe-cloth at all.

The Vibhaṅga states further that if the householder presents one with a great deal of cloth, with the invitation to take as much as one likes, one should take only enough cloth to make the allowable number of robes. The non-offense clauses add that one may take excess cloth if one promises to return the excess when one has finished making one’s robe(s). And if the donor tells one to keep the excess, one may do so without penalty.

The factors of the offense for overstepping the bounds of this protocol are three.

1) Object: any piece of the six kinds of suitable robe-cloth, measuring at least four by eight fingerbreadths.

2) Effort: One asks for more than the allowable amount of robe-cloth from an unrelated householder who has not previously made an invitation to ask. Perception is not a mitigating factor here: Even if one perceives the householder to be related when in fact he/she isn’t—or feels that he/she would be happy to offer the excess cloth even though he/she has given no previous invitation to ask—this factor is fulfilled all the same.

3) Result: One obtains the excess robe-cloth.

The offenses here are as follows: a dukkaṭa for asking in the way that fulfills the factor of effort, and a nissaggiya pācittiya when all three factors are fulfilled. The procedures to follow in forfeiture, confession, and receiving the cloth in return are the same as under the preceding rules. For the Pali formula to use in forfeiting the cloth, see Appendix VI.

If one perceives a related householder as unrelated, or if one is in doubt about whether he/she is related, one incurs a dukkaṭa in asking for and obtaining excess robe-cloth from him/her.

Non-offenses

In addition to the two cases mentioned above—one takes excess cloth with the promise to return the excess when one has finished one’s robe(s), and the donors tell one to keep the excess—there is no offense in taking excess cloth if:

the donors are offering cloth for reasons other than that one’s robes were snatched away or destroyed (e.g., they are impressed with one’s learning, says the Commentary);

one is asking from one’s relatives or people who have previously made one an invitation to ask for cloth (before one’s robes were snatched away or destroyed, says the Sub-commentary);

or one obtains the cloth by means of one’s own resources.

The Commentary calls attention to the fact that the Vibhaṅga’s non-offense clauses make no mention of asking for the sake of another. It then draws the conclusion, based on the fact that the rule was formulated in response to bhikkhus’ requesting excess cloth for the sake of others, that in the circumstances mentioned in this rule, one may not ask for excess cloth for the sake of others. The Sub-commentary takes issue with this, and presents three arguments for its case, with the third argument being the most compelling: If asking for another’s sake is not allowable here, it should also not be allowable in the preceding rule. However, the Sub-commentary misses the point of the origin story, which is that lay donors can be especially generous when they learn that a bhikkhu’s robes have been snatched away or lost. If all other bhikkhus could request cloth for his sake, there is no limit to the amount of cloth they could request, and this would be an unfair exploitation of the donors’ generosity.

Summary: Asking for and receiving excess robe-cloth from unrelated lay people when one’s robes have been snatched away or destroyed is a nissaggiya pācittiya offense.

*    *    *

8

In case a man or woman householder unrelated (to the bhikkhu) prepares a robe fund for the sake of a bhikkhu, thinking, “Having purchased a robe with this robe fund, I will clothe the bhikkhu named so-and-so with a robe”: If the bhikkhu, not previously invited, approaching (the householder) should make a stipulation with regard to the robe, saying, “It would be good indeed, sir, if you clothed me (with a robe), having purchased a robe of such-and-such a sort with this robe fund”—out of a desire for something fine—it is to be forfeited and confessed.

“Now at that time a certain householder said to his wife, ‘I will clothe Master Upananda with a robe.’ A certain bhikkhu on his alms round overheard the man saying this. So he went to Ven. Upananda the Sakyan and on arrival said to him, ‘You have a lot of merit, friend Upananda. In that place over there a certain man said to his wife, ‘I will clothe Master Upananda with a robe.’

“‘He’s my supporter, my friend.’

“So Ven. Upananda the Sakyan went to the man and on arrival said to him, ‘My friend, is it true that you want to clothe me with a robe?’

“‘Now, wasn’t I just thinking, “I will clothe Master Upananda with a robe”?’

“‘Well, if you want to clothe me with a robe, clothe me with a robe like this. What use is it to me to be clothed with a robe I won’t use?’

“So the man criticized and complained and spread it about, ‘They’re arrogant, these Sakyan-son monks, and malcontent. It’s no simple matter to clothe them with a robe. How can this Master Upananda, without having first been invited by me, make a stipulation concerning a robe?’”

The situation covered by this rule is this: An unrelated lay person has put aside resources for purchasing robe-cloth to present to a bhikkhu but without yet asking the bhikkhu what kind of cloth he wants. The factors for the offense here are four.

Object

The Vibhaṅga here does not specify a minimum size for the cloth, nor does it list the types of thread from which the cloth has to be made. Because the primary focus of its discussion is on the price of the cloth, the size and type of cloth are apparently irrelevant. Any piece of cloth of any type, no matter how small, would fulfill this factor.

The texts also do not mention whether funds for other requisites would be grounds for a lesser offense or no offense under this rule, although given the spirit of the rule it would be a wise policy for a bhikkhu not to make stipulations, when uninvited, to a lay person who has prepared funds for purchasing any kind of requisite for his use.

Intention

One wants to get a better piece of cloth than the lay person is planning to buy. The Vibhaṅga defines better as “better quality, higher price.” The Commentary, for some reason, limits better to “higher price,” but there is nothing in the Vibhaṅga to support this.

Effort

One requests the unrelated lay person to improve the cloth. Example statements in the Vibhaṅga are: “Make it long, make it broad, make it tightly-woven, make it soft.” As in the previous rules, perception is not a factor here. Even if one perceives the lay person to be related when he/she actually isn’t, that would fulfill the factor here all the same.

Result

One obtains the long, broad, etc., cloth that the householder bought in line with one’s request. The way the Vibhaṅga defines this factor suggests that whether the lay person actually spends more on the cloth than he/she actually planned is not an issue here.

Offenses

When the donor buys the cloth in line with one’s request, the penalty is a dukkaṭa. When one obtains the cloth it is to be forfeited and the nissaggiya pācittiya offense confessed. The procedures to follow in forfeiture, confession, and receiving the cloth in return are the same as in the preceding rules. For the Pali formula to use in forfeiting the cloth, see Appendix VI.

If one perceives a related householder as unrelated, or if one is in doubt about whether he/she is related, one incurs a dukkaṭa in making a request and receiving cloth from him/her in the manner forbidden by this rule.

Non-offenses

According to the Vibhaṅga, there is no offense if:

the lay person is a relative or has invited one to ask for cloth;

one asks for another’s sake;

one is getting the robe with one’s own resources; or

one gets the lay person, who originally wanted to purchase a more expensive piece of cloth, to purchase a less expensive one.

The Commentary adds that there is also no offense if one’s request to improve the cloth results in a cloth equal in price to the cloth the lay person had in mind—but, as noted above, the Vibhaṅga does not support the Commentary here.

The Vibhaṅga’s Word-commentary to this rule also indicates that there would be no offense if, after one has asked for a better piece of cloth, the lay person ignores the request, buying and presenting the cloth he/she originally had in mind.

Summary: When a lay person who is not a relative is planning to get robe-cloth for one but has yet to ask one what kind of cloth one wants: Receiving the cloth after making a request that would improve it is a nissaggiya pācittiya offense.

*    *    *

9

In case two householders—men or women— unrelated (to the bhikkhu) prepare separate robe funds for the sake of a bhikkhu, thinking, “Having purchased separate robes with these separate robe funds of ours, we will clothe the bhikkhu named so-and-so with robes”: If the bhikkhu, not previously invited, approaching (them) should make a stipulation with regard to the robe, saying, “It would be good indeed, sirs, if you clothed me (with a robe), having purchased a robe of such-and-such a sort with these separate robe funds, the two (funds) together for one (robe)”—out of a desire for something fine—it is to be forfeited and confessed.

Explanations for this training rule are the same as those for the preceding one, the only difference being in the factor of effort: One asks the two donors to put their funds together to purchase one piece of cloth. The question of whether the request would raise the amount of money they would have to spend is not an issue here. A piece of cloth equal in price to the original two pieces would still fulfill the factor of effort here. However, the Vibhaṅga says that if one gets the donors to provide a piece of cloth less expensive than they had originally planned, there is no offense.

The Commentary adds that, under the conditions mentioned here, making requests of three or more people to combine their robe funds into one is also covered by this rule.

Summary: When two or more lay people who are not one’s relatives are planning to get separate pieces of robe-cloth for one but have yet to ask one what kind of cloth one wants: Receiving cloth from them after asking them to pool their funds to get one piece of cloth—out of a desire for something fine—is a nissaggiya pācittiya offense.

*    *    *

10

In case a king, a royal official, a brahman, or a householder sends a robe fund for the sake of a bhikkhu via a messenger, (saying,) “Having purchased a robe with this robe fund, clothe the bhikkhu named so-and-so with a robe”: If the messenger, approaching the bhikkhu, should say, “This is a robe fund being delivered for the sake of the venerable one. May the venerable one accept this robe fund,” then the bhikkhu is to tell the messenger: “We do not accept robe funds, my friend. We accept robes (robe-cloth) as are proper according to season.”

If the messenger should say to the bhikkhu, “Does the venerable one have a steward?” then, bhikkhus, if the bhikkhu desires a robe, he may indicate a steward—either a monastery attendant or a lay follower—(saying,) “That, my friend, is the bhikkhus’ steward.”

If the messenger, having instructed the steward and going to the bhikkhu, should say, “I have instructed the steward the venerable one indicated. May the venerable one go (to him) and he will clothe you with a robe in season,” then the bhikkhu, desiring a robe and approaching the steward, may prompt and remind him two or three times, “I have need of a robe.” Should (the steward) produce the robe after being prompted and reminded two or three times, that is good.

If he should not produce the robe, (the bhikkhu) should stand in silence four times, five times, six times at most for that purpose. Should (the steward) produce the robe after (the bhikkhu) has stood in silence for that purpose four, five, six times at most, that is good.

If he should not produce the robe (at that point), should he then produce the robe after (the bhikkhu) has endeavored further than that, it is to be forfeited and confessed.

If he should not produce (the robe), then the bhikkhu himself should go to the place from which the robe fund was brought, or a messenger should be sent (to say), “The robe fund that you, venerable sirs, sent for the sake of the bhikkhu has given no benefit to the bhikkhu at all. May you be united with what is yours. May what is yours not be lost.” This is the proper course here.

The protocols surrounding gifts of money and their proper use are quite complex—much more complex than even this long training rule would indicate—and require a detailed explanation. What follows is an attempt to make them clear. If it seems long and involved, remember that the purpose of the protocols is to free bhikkhus from the even more bothersome worries and complexities that come with participating in buying, selling, and monetary matters in general.

This rule is one of four nissaggiya pācittiya rules covering a bhikkhu’s proper relationship to money. The others are NP 18, 19, & 20. Although they sometimes seem to be splitting hairs, they focus precisely on the two acts involving money that are most burdensome to a sensitive mind: In the act of accepting money, or having it accepted in one’s name, one is accepting all the cares, responsibilities, and dangers that come with its ownership; in the act of arranging a trade, one is accepting responsibility for the fairness of the trade—that it undervalues neither the generosity of the person who donated the money nor the goods or services of the person receiving the money in exchange.

Thus to protect a bhikkhu from these mental burdens, this rule sets up protocols so that lay donors may have the convenience of dedicating amounts of money and other valuables to provide for a bhikkhu’s needs, and so that the bhikkhu may benefit from such gifts without having to bear the responsibilities of ownership or of having to arrange fair trades.

If a bhikkhu follows the protocols recommended here, the money placed with the steward still belongs to the donor, and the responsibility for making a fair trade lies with the steward. The bhikkhu’s only responsibility is to inform the original donor if, after a reasonable number of promptings, the steward entrusted with the money does not provide him with the requisite the donor had in mind, and then let the donor look after the matter if he/she cares to.

Although the rule itself mentions only funds for robe-cloth intended for individual bhikkhus, we should note from the outset that the Commentary uses the Great Standards to extend it to cover all funds—composed of money, jewels, commodities, land, livestock, or other valuables that bhikkhus are not allowed to accept—not only for an individual bhikkhu’s robe-cloth but also for any type of requisite. And it further extrapolates from this rule to cover funds for Communities and groups of bhikkhus, as well as impersonal funds for such things as buildings and—in the modern world—the printing of books.

The money rules & allowances: an overview

NP 18 forbids a bhikkhu from accepting gifts of money, from getting others to accept them, and from consenting to gifts of money meant for him being placed down next to him. NP 19 & 20 forbid him from engaging in buying, selling, or bartering, regardless of whether it involves money. Mv.VI.34.21, however, contains the following allowance, called the Meṇḍaka Allowance, after the donor who inspired it:

“There are people of conviction and confidence, bhikkhus, who place gold in the hand of stewards, (saying,) ‘With this, give the master whatever is allowable.’ I allow you, bhikkhus, to accept whatever is allowable coming from that. But in no way at all do I say that gold or silver is to be accepted or sought for.”

Even given this allowance, though, it is important that the bhikkhu, in his dealings with the steward, does not say or do anything that would transgress NP 18-20. At the same time, it is important that he not abuse the steward’s services. Otherwise the steward will never want to perform this service for bhikkhus again. This is the main point of the origin story to this rule:

“Then Ven. Upananda the Sakyan approached the lay follower (his steward) and on arrival said, ‘My friend, I have need of a robe.’

“‘Wait for the rest of today, venerable sir. Today there is a town meeting, and the town has made an agreement that whoever comes late is fined 50 (kahāpaṇas).’

“‘Friend, give me the robe this very day!’ (Saying this,) he grabbed hold of him by the belt. So the lay follower, being pressured by Ven. Upananda the Sakyan, purchased a robe for him and came late. The people said to the lay follower, ‘Why, master, have you come late? You’ve lost 50!’ So he told them what had happened. They criticized and complained and spread it about, ‘They’re arrogant, these Sakyan-son monks, and malcontent. It’s no simple matter even to render them a service. How can Upananda the Sakyan, being told by a layman, “Wait for the rest of today, venerable sir,” not wait?’”

Stewards

According to the Commentary, there are three types of steward with whom money might be placed: (1) indicated by the bhikkhu, (2) indicated by the donor or his/her messenger, and (3) indicated by neither.

1) Indicated by the bhikkhu covers two sorts of cases:

a) The donor asks the bhikkhu who his steward is, and the bhikkhu points him/her out, as mentioned in the training rule.

b) The donor, knowing that a particular lay person has volunteered to act as a steward or is on familiar terms with the bhikkhu, gives the money to the lay person and informs the bhikkhu—or has someone else inform him—either before or after the fact.

2) Indicated by the donor covers cases where the donor chooses one of his/her own friends or employees to act as the steward for that particular gift, and informs the bhikkhu—or has someone else inform him—either before or after the fact.

3) Indicated by neither covers two separate cases:

a) The donor asks the bhikkhu who his steward is, and the bhikkhu says that he has none. Another person happens to overhear the conversation and volunteers—in the presence of both—to act as the steward for that particular gift.  

b) The donor gives the gift to the lay person who is normally the bhikkhu’s steward or is on familiar terms with the bhikkhu, but does not inform the bhikkhu or have him informed of the fact.

According to the Commentary, this training rule covers only cases of the first sort—the steward is indicated by the bhikkhu—but not of the other two. This, however, is a controversial point. To understand the controversy, though, we will first have to discuss the protocols for accepting funds and obtaining requisites from stewards as set forth in this rule. Then we will revisit this issue in the section, “range of application,” below.

The protocol in accepting

The Vibhaṅga gives the following guidelines:

If donors offer money, they are to be told that bhikkhus do not accept money.

If they ask who the bhikkhus’ steward is, one may point out any lay person at all, saying, “That’s the steward.” One is not to say, “Give it to him/her,” or “He/she will keep (the money),” for that would be to accept ownership and responsibility for the money, and thus be an infraction of the rule against accepting money. Also, one is not to say, “He/she will buy (the requisite),” or “He/she will get it in exchange,” for even this much would be an infraction of the rule against trading.

The K/Commentary adds that if the donor asks, “To whom should I give this?” or “Who will keep this?” one is not to point anyone out. It doesn’t say what one may do in such a situation, although a wise policy would be to broach the topic of stewards so that the donor will ask a question to which one may give an allowable answer.

The protocol in obtaining requisites from the fund

The rule states that a bhikkhu may give his steward up to three verbal and six silent promptings in order to get a requisite from the fund. The Vibhaṅga works out an arrangement whereby he may exchange two silent promptings for one verbal prompting, which leads the Commentary to lay out the following scheme: A bhikkhu may make up to—

6 verbal & 0 silent promptings

5 verbal & 2 silent promptings

4 verbal & 4 silent promptings

3 verbal & 6 silent promptings

2 verbal & 8 silent promptings

1 verbal & 10 silent promptings, or

 0 verbal & 12 silent promptings.

The Vibhaṅga adds that when giving a verbal prompting, one may say only, “I need a robe (or whatever the requisite may be),” or statements to that effect. One may not say, “Give me a robe,” “Get me a robe,” “Buy me a robe,” or “Get a robe in exchange for me,” for these last two statements in particular would incur a penalty under NP 20.

According to the Commentary, promptings are counted not by the number of visits to the steward but by the number of times the bhikkhu states his need/desire for the requisite. Thus if, in one visit, he states his need for a robe three times, that counts as three verbal promptings.

As for silent promptings—or “standings”—the bhikkhu merely stands in the steward’s presence. If the steward asks, “What have you come for?’ the bhikkhu should say, “You know,” or “You should know.”

The Vibhaṅga also notes that during the period when a bhikkhu has yet to receive the requisite, he should not accept an invitation to sit down at the steward’s place, to accept alms, or to teach Dhamma there. If he does any of these things, that cuts back his number of allowed standings. The Sub-commentary raises the question as to what precisely this means: When a bhikkhu does several of these actions in one visit, does each action take away one standing, or is just that one visit struck from his allowed number of standings? After a long discussion, it sides with the decision in the Three Gaṇṭhipadas: Each time a bhikkhu sits, receives alms, or teaches one sentence of Dhamma (see Pc 7) under these circumstances, even in one visit, he cuts down his allowed number of standings by one.

The Vibhaṅga states that if one obtains the requisite after making the allowable number of verbal and silent promptings—or fewer—there is no offense. If one does not obtain the requisite after the maximum allowable number of promptings, one should inform the original donor and then leave the issue up to him/her. If the donor, being informed, then makes arrangements to get the requisite for the bhikkhu, there is no offense.

The Commentary adds that not to inform the donor here entails a dukkaṭa on the grounds that one is neglecting a duty. This statement, however, should be qualified to apply only in cases where one knows which donor gave which fund to which steward. If a single fund administered by a steward contains donations from many donors, one is unlikely to be in a position to inform all the donors if the steward does not respond to one‘s request. In such cases one should be duty bound to inform only one of the donors.

Range of application

As mentioned above, the Commentary maintains that this rule applies only in the first of the three cases listed there: The steward has been indicated by the bhikkhu. As for the second case—the steward has been indicated by the donor—it maintains that one may make any number of promptings without committing an offense. If the article is not forthcoming, one may get another lay person to handle the issue (although one should be careful to phrase one’s request to this lay person so as not to transgress the rules against accepting money or trading). If the article is not forthcoming, one is not duty-bound to inform the original donor. Although there is nothing in the Canon to contradict any of these points, there is nothing to confirm them, either. Simple etiquette would suggest that one not harass the steward excessively and that one should inform the donor if the article is not forthcoming, so as to let the donor decide what, if anything, should be done. Thus it would make sense, using the Great Standards, to apply this rule even in cases of this sort.

As for the third case, in which the steward is not indicated either by the donor or by a bhikkhu, the Commentary says that, as far as that fund is concerned, the steward should be treated as a person who is not related and has not made an invitation to ask. In other words, one may not make any requests of the steward at all unless he/she happens to invite one to make a request. The Commentary gives no reasons for these positions, and they are hard to infer. In the first of the two instances under this sub-category—the volunteer temporary steward—the Commentary depicts the steward as volunteering in the presence of both the bhikkhu and the donor, and this would seem to place the steward under some obligation to both. Thus the bhikkhu would seem to have the right to make a reasonable number of promptings; and the donor, the right to know if the article is not forthcoming.

As for the second of the two instances—the donor gives the gift to the bhikkhu’s normal steward but does not inform the bhikkhu or have him informed—the steward can either inform the bhikkhu or not. If he/she chooses to inform the bhikkhu, then according to the Commentary the bhikkhu would have the right to make any number of promptings, as the steward now counts as having given an invitation. Thus the steward would not be protected by the protocol under this rule, which doesn’t seem proper. If, however, the steward chooses not to inform the bhikkhu, there are two further possibilities: Either the bhikkhu never learns of the arrangement, in which case the issue is moot; or else he learns through a third party, in which case the bhikkhu would seem to have the right to ask the steward if the third party’s report is true. If the steward lies and says No, then that’s the steward’s kamma. If the steward truthfully reports Yes, then it would seem reasonable to apply the protocol under this rule.

Thus, given these considerations, there would seem to be little reason to limit the protocols under this rule to cases where the steward is indicated by the bhikkhu, and stronger reason, using the Great Standards, to apply the protocols to all three cases: where the steward is indicated by the bhikkhu, by the donor, or by neither.

As we will note under NP 18, a bank can serve as a steward for a bhikkhu. However, because of the protocols surrounding a bhikkhu’s relationship to his steward, he may not sign a check—which is an order to pay money to the order of the payee—even if the check draws on an account set up in his name. Nor may he present the bank with a withdrawal statement to remove money from the account.

The factors of an offense

The factors of an offense here are three.

1) Object: a fund for the purchase of robe-cloth left with a steward. As noted above, the Commentary extends this factor to cover any fund set aside for one’s own requisites.

2) Effort: One makes an excessive number of promptings.

3) Result: One obtains the requested requisite.

There is a dukkaṭa for the excessive promptings. The requisite, when obtained, is to be forfeited and the nissaggiya pācittiya offense confessed. The procedures for forfeiture, confession, and receiving the requisite in return are the same as under the preceding rules. For the Pali formula to use in forfeiture, see Appendix VI.

If one has not given excessive promptings but perceives that one has, or is in doubt about the matter, the penalty for accepting the requisite is a dukkaṭa.

Other funds

The Commentary includes a long discussion of how this rule applies to funds other than those intended for an individual bhikkhu’s requisites, such as funds for Community or group requisites, building funds, etc. (book-printing funds would come under here). Some have suggested that because this rule applies only to funds for one’s own use, the Commentary has erred in discussing other funds in this context, and that they should instead be discussed under Pc 84, the rule dealing with valuables that lay people have left behind in the monastery. However, because the Canon does not discuss such funds at all, they must be treated under the Great Standards, which means that they must be treated in line with the rule(s) that cover situations bearing the greatest similarity to them. The protocols under Pc 84 deal with the issue of how to return lost articles safely to an owner who did not intend them as a gift and still claims ownership of them; the protocols here deal with how to get the money to a steward and how to get the steward to provide what is needed with the money. Because these latter issues are the ones most relevant to the proper management of these other funds, there seems every reason to agree with the Commentary’s discussing them under this rule.

A few of the more relevant cases in the Commentary’s discussion:

Monetary funds for Saṅgha or group requisites

If a donor comes with a gift of money and says that it is being offered to the Saṅgha or to a group for whatever purpose, one should follow the protocol for accepting as under this rule. For instance, if the donor says, “I’m giving this to the Saṅgha for you to make use of the four requisites,” one may not accept it in any of the three ways covered by NP 18. (For details, see the discussion under that rule.) There is also a dukkaṭa, says the Sub-commentary, for every bhikkhu who uses any article bought with the money.

If, however, the donor says, “The money will be with your steward” or “with my people” or “with me: All you need to do is make use of the four requisites,” then there is no offense in accepting and making use of this arrangement. The etiquette to follow in obtaining requisites depends on who the money is left with: If the bhikkhus’ steward, follow the protocol under this rule; if the donor’s workers, one may make any number of promptings; if the donor, follow the guidelines under Pc 47. (In the first two cases here, the Commentary is following its decision, discussed above, that the protocols to be followed with the donor’s workers are different from those to be followed with one’s own steward. In light of our above discussion, however, both cases would come under the protocols stipulated by this rule.)

Non-monetary funds for Saṅgha or group requisites

DN 2 contains a list of other articles that a bhikkhu consummate in virtue does not receive. The Commentary—perhaps in light of the general rule against misbehavior (Cv.V.36)—imposes a dukkaṭa on the act of receiving any of them. These articles include uncooked grain and raw meat; women and girls; male and female slaves; goats and sheep, fowl and pigs, elephants, cattle, steeds, and mares; fields and property. Extrapolating from the Vibhaṅga to Pc 84, which forbids bhikkhus from picking up pearls and precious stones except in certain circumstances—and which does not allow such items to be taken on trust, borrowed, or picked up with the perception that they have been thrown away—the Commentary also assigns a dukkaṭa for receiving these items. These two lists of objects will surface again under NP 18 & 19; for ease of reference, we will call them dukkaṭa objects.

If a donor wants to make a gift of such things to the Saṅgha, the Commentary says, the question of whether they may be accepted depends on how the donation is phrased. If the donor says, “I’m giving this to the Saṅgha,” for whatever the purpose, the gift may not be accepted. As in the previous case, there is a dukkaṭa for whoever receives it and also for whoever uses an article obtained from proceeds coming from the gift.

If the donor says, “This is for the purpose of the four requisites,” or “Accept whatever is allowable coming from this,” without mentioning the Saṅgha or any bhikkhu as custodians or recipients of the unallowable object, the arrangement may be accepted without penalty. For instance, if a donor wants to present a herd of cows, saying, “These are for the purpose of milk products for the Saṅgha,” this is an acceptable arrangement: Cows are not acceptable for bhikkhus to receive, whereas milk products are. But if the donor says, “I am giving these cows to the Saṅgha to provide milk products for the Saṅgha,” then it is not.

If a donor proposes to give pigs, chickens, or other animals used only for their meat to the Saṅgha, the bhikkhus are to say, “We can’t accept gifts like this, but we will be glad to set them free for you.”

If, after setting up an allowable arrangement, the donor asks the bhikkhus to appoint a steward to look after it, they may. If not, they are to do nothing about the arrangement at all.

How the proceeds from such arrangements are to be used depends on what they are: If money, and a bhikkhu tells the steward, “Use this money to buy such-and-such,” no bhikkhu may make use of what is bought with the money. If the proceeds are commodities, such as unhusked rice, and a bhikkhu tells the steward, “Use this rice to trade for such-and-such,” the bhikkhu who makes the order may not use whatever is obtained from the trade, but other bhikkhus may without incurring a penalty. If the proceeds are allowable goods, such as fruit, and a bhikkhu tells the steward, “Use this fruit to trade for such-and-such,” the Commentary says that any bhikkhu may use what is obtained from the trade.

Apparently the Commentary views this arrangement as acceptable because of its interpretation that NP 20 applies only to cases where the bhikkhu tells a steward to conduct a trade with the bhikkhu’s own personal resources. However, as we will note in the discussion of that rule, this interpretation seems mistaken, and the rule applies to any funds for which a bhikkhu assumes responsibility. This means that, in the context of this last arrangement, the bhikkhu who orders the steward would have to forfeit the proceeds of the trade, but all bhikkhus could use them after the forfeiture.

Impersonal funds

If a donor comes with money or any other unallowable gift and says, “I’m giving this to the Saṅgha for the meditation hall (or any other impersonal purpose, such as a book fund or a general building fund),” the gift may not be accepted. But if the donor says, “I am giving this to (or for) the meditation hall,” without mentioning any individual bhikkhu, group of bhikkhus, or the Saṅgha as custodians or recipients of the gift, then this arrangement is not to be refused, and the monastery steward is to be informed of what the donor said.

In the context of NP 18, this means that the bhikkhus are not to take the money directly, or to get anyone else to take it, but may consent to its being placed next to them, as it is not meant as a gift for them.

Many monasteries have donation boxes, and there is a question as to whether the bhikkhus may tell a donor in this case to put the money in the box. The Commentary to NP 18 states that when a donation has been placed down for a bhikkhu—over his protests—and someone aside from the donor offers to put it in a safe place, the bhikkhu may point out a safe place to put the money but may not tell him/her to put it there, as that would imply that he is accepting responsibility for the money. If this stipulation also applies to funds given “to a building,” then the bhikkhus should be able to say to the donor of such funds, “The donation box is over there,” but not, “Put it there.”

After the donor has placed the money, the bhikkhus may then tell the monastery steward what the donor said, but are not to tell him/her to take the money, as this would violate NP 18. They are also to follow the protocol in this rule when telling the steward of their need for building materials, wages for the workers, and other necessities that come up in the course of the building’s construction or maintenance.

The Commentary mentions two other acceptable arrangements:

1) The donor places the money with the workmen and tells the bhikkhus that their only responsibility is to check on whether the work is being done poorly or well.

2) The donor says that the money will be kept with him/her or with his/her employees and that the bhikkhus’ only responsibility is to inform them of whom the money is to be given to.

This second arrangement, however, essentially makes the bhikkhu responsible for arranging a trade: He is telling the donor or his/her employees who deserves to be paid in exchange for goods or labor, which again would be a violation of NP 20. At most, a bhikkhu may tell the donor, etc., how much work the laborers did or what construction materials were delivered to the site, and leave it up to the donor, etc., to figure out who deserves to be paid how much. Also, if a checking account is set up for impersonal purposes such as the construction and upkeep of monastery buildings, a bhikkhu may not sign a check drawing on the account.

The Commentary says that because the steward in arrangements (1) and (2) is indicated by the donor, the bhikkhus may make as many requests as they like—i.e., in the first case, telling the workers what to do; in the second case, telling the steward or donor who is to be paid—but as we noted above, there seems no reason to follow the Commentary in making this allowance.

In addition to building funds, it would seem that any charitable fund for schools, hospitals, etc.—such as some wealthy monasteries have—would come under the category of impersonal funds, as long as the fund is not for requisites for the Saṅgha, either as a group or individually.

Fund management

The Commentary states that if a Community fund has been set up for a particular requisite, it should as a general principle be used to buy only that requisite. If, however, the Community has enough of one kind of lahubhaṇḍa—goods that may be shared among the bhikkhus—but not enough of another, the fund for the first kind may be diverted to the second kind by an apalokana-kamma: a Community transaction in which the motion is phrased in one’s own words and unanimously accepted.

Funds for lodgings and furniture, though, because they are garubhaṇḍa (heavy or expensive goods that may not be shared among the bhikkhus), may not be diverted to lahubhaṇḍa at all. But if Saṅgha furniture is going unused and is in danger of deteriorating before it gets used, the Community may arrange to have it exchanged—using the procedure allowed under NP 20, and making sure not to let it go for less than its full value—and then use the proceeds for lahubhaṇḍa. The Commentary adds that proceeds of this sort should be used “frugally, just enough to keep life going.” In other words, if the Community is not in straitened circumstances, the proceeds should not be used for lahubhaṇḍa at all, and instead should be reserved for garubhaṇḍa as the need arises. If, however, the Community is suffering from such catastrophes as disease or famine, they may allow the proceeds to be used for lahubhaṇḍa as needed, but not to splurge on anything excessive.

Non-offenses

There is no offense if:

the steward gives the item after the bhikkhu has given the allowable number of promptings or less; or

if the donors(s) give the item after they have been informed that the steward has not given the item after having been prompted the allowable number of times.

Note that the Vibhaṅga’s non-offense clauses do not make an exemption for relatives or people who have invited one to ask. This means that even when the donor(s) or the steward or both are related to the bhikkhu or have given him an invitation to ask, he must follow the protocol under this rule.

Summary: When a fund for one’s individual use has been set up with a steward, obtaining an article from the fund as a result of having prompted the steward more than the allowable number of times is a nissaggiya pācittiya offense.

Two: The Silk Chapter

11

Should any bhikkhu have a felt (blanket/rug) made of a mixture containing silk, it is to be forfeited and confessed.

Santhata, translated here as a felt blanket/rug, is a type of cloth described in the texts simply by its method of manufacture. Instead of being woven, it is made by strewing threads over a smooth surface, sprinkling them with a glue-like mixture made from boiled rice, using a roller to roll it smooth, and then repeating the process until the felt is thick and strong enough for one’s purposes. Although felt made like this has a number of uses, its major use in the time of the texts seems to have been as a small personal rug for sitting or lying down, or as a rough blanket for wearing around oneself when sick or cold. Blankets/rugs like this are still made and used in parts of India even today, and as the non-offense clauses to this and the following rules show, it is precisely to this type of blanket/rug that these rules apply.

There are three factors for the full offense here.

1) Object: a felt blanket/rug containing silk threads and intended for one’s own use.

2) Effort: One either makes it oneself, gets someone else to make it, finishes what others have left unfinished, or gets someone else to finish what one has left unfinished.

3) Result: One obtains it after it is finished (or finishes it, if one is making it oneself).

The Vibhaṅga does not mention intention or perception as mitigating factors here. Noting this fact, the Commentary concludes if one is making a felt blanket/rug, and silk threads happen to float in on the breeze and land in the felt, one commits an offense all the same. Perhaps the Commentary’s interpretation here is why bhikkhus no longer use felt rugs, for there is no way of knowing whether there are any stray silk filaments in them that would make them unsuitable for use.

The Vibhaṅga assigns a dukkaṭa for the effort of making a blanket/rug with silk mixed in it, or for having it made. Once it is obtained (or finished, if one is making it oneself), it is to be forfeited and the nissaggiya pācittiya offense confessed. The procedures for forfeiture, confession, and receiving the blanket/rug in return are the same as under the preceding rules on robe-cloth.

According to the Vibhaṅga, there is a dukkaṭa in making a blanket/rug with silk mixed in it for another’s use. If one obtains a blanket/rug with silk mixed in it made by another (§)—not at one’s instigation—then using it entails a dukkaṭa.

Non-offenses

There is no offense in making felt with silk mixed in it to use as a canopy, a floor-covering, a wall screen, a mattress/cushion, or a kneeling mat. None of the texts discuss the issue, but there is apparently also no offense in getting such an item made.

Summary: Making a felt blanket/rug with silk mixed in it for one’s own use—or having it made—is a nissaggiya pācittiya offense.

*    *    *

12

Should any bhikkhu have a felt (blanket/rug) made of pure black wool, it is to be forfeited and confessed.

The origin story to this rule indicates that a pure black felt blanket/rug was considered stylish at that time, and thus inappropriate for a bhikkhu’s use. This is a recurrent theme throughout the Vinaya: that stylish, luxurious, or elegant articles are not in keeping with the bhikkhus’ way of life.

The Vibhaṅga notes that black wool here covers both wool that is naturally black and wool that has been dyed that color.

All other explanations for this training rule are the same as for the preceding rule, simply replacing “a felt blanket/rug made with silk mixed in it” with “a felt blanket made entirely of black wool.”

Summary: Making a felt blanket/rug entirely of black wool for one’s own use—or having it made—is a nissaggiya pācittiya offense.

*    *    *

13

When a bhikkhu is having a new felt (blanket/rug) made, two parts of pure black wool are to be incorporated, a third (part) of white, and a fourth of brown. If a bhikkhu should have a new felt (blanket/rug) made without incorporating two parts of pure black wool, a third of white, and a fourth of brown, it is to be forfeited and confessed.

This is a continuation of the preceding rule. Its purpose is to set the maximum amount of black wool a bhikkhu may include when making his felt blanket/rug or having it made for his own use. The Vibhaṅga gives precise amounts for how much black, white, and brown wool one should use in making the rug, but the Commentary says that these quantities are relative: As long as black wool constitutes no more than half the total amount of wool used, the bhikkhu making the rug commits no offense.

As in the preceding rules, the Vibhaṅga assigns a dukkaṭa for making, for another person’s use, a felt blanket/rug that is more than one-half black wool. If one obtains a felt blanket/rug that is more than one-half black wool made by another—not at one’s instigation—then using it entails a dukkaṭa as well (§).

Non-offenses

There is no offense if the rug is one-quarter or more white wool and one-quarter or more brown wool, or if it is made entirely of white wool or of brown. There is also no offense in felt that is more than one-half black wool if one is making the felt—or having it made—for a canopy, a floor-covering, a wall screen, a mattress/cushion, or a kneeling mat.

Summary: Making a felt blanket/rug that is more than one-half black wool for one’s own use—or having it made—is a nissaggiya pācittiya offense.

*    *    *

14

When a bhikkhu has had a new felt (blanket/rug) made, he is to keep it for (at least) six years. If after less than six years he should have another new felt (blanket/rug) made, regardless of whether or not he has disposed of the first, then—unless he has been authorized by the bhikkhus—it is to be forfeited and confessed.

“Now at that time bhikkhus were (each) having a new felt blanket/rug made every year. They were constantly begging, constantly hinting, ‘Give wool. We need wool.’ People criticized and complained and spread it about, ‘How can these Sakyan-son monks have a new felt blanket/rug made every year?… The felt blanket/rugs we make for ourselves last five or six years, even though our children wet them and soil them, and they get chewed on by rats. But these Sakyan-son monks have a new felt blanket/rug made every year and are constantly begging, constantly hinting, ‘Give wool. We need wool.’”

There are three factors for the full offense here.

1) Object: a new felt blanket/rug for one’s own use.

2) Effort: (a) One either makes it oneself, gets someone else to make it, finishes what others have left unfinished, or gets someone else to finish what one has left unfinished (b) less than six years after one’s last one was made, (c) even though one has not been formally authorized by the bhikkhus to do so.

3) Result: One obtains the rug after it is finished (or finishes it, if one is making it oneself).

The texts are silent on the factor of perception here, which suggests that if a bhikkhu miscounts the passage of years—making a new rug when six years haven’t passed even though he thinks they have—he fulfills the factor of effort all the same.

According to the Vibhaṅga, there is a dukkaṭa in the effort of making the rug or having it made. When all three factors of the offense are fulfilled, the rug is to be forfeited and the nissaggiya pācittiya offense confessed. The procedures for forfeiture, confession, and receiving the blanket/rug in return are the same as under the preceding rules.

Non-offenses

There is no offense if a bhikkhu makes a new felt blanket/rug (or, apparently, if he has one made) after six or more years have passed; if he makes one or has one made for another’s use; if, having obtained one made by (§) someone else—not at his instigation—he uses it; or if he makes felt to use as a canopy, a floor-covering, a wall screen, a mattress/cushion, or a kneeling mat.

Also, as the rule indicates, there is no offense if within less than six years he makes a felt blanket/rug for his own use after being authorized to do so by the bhikkhus. The Vibhaṅga explains this by saying that the Community, if it sees fit, may formally give this authorization—a transaction with a motion and one proclamation (ñatti-dutiya-kamma) —to a bhikkhu who is too ill to do without a new felt blanket/rug before his six years are up. This authorization is best explained by noting that there is no exemption under this rule for a bhikkhu whose felt rug/blanket is snatched away, lost, or destroyed. Had there been such an exemption, bhikkhus might have abused it by intentionally ridding themselves of their existing felt rug/blankets in order to get new ones. In the absence of such exemptions, if a bhikkhu’s rug/blanket is snatched away, lost, or destroyed, the Community—if they are satisfied that he did not intentionally lose it, destroy it, or put it in a place where it might easily get stolen—can give him the authorization to get a new one made.

Summary: Unless one has received authorization to do so from the Community, making a felt blanket/rug for one’s own use—or having it made—less than six years after one’s last one was made is a nissaggiya pācittiya offense.

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15

When a bhikkhu is having a felt sitting rug made, a piece of old felt a sugata span (25 cm.) on each side is to be incorporated for the sake of discoloring it. If, without incorporating a piece of old felt a sugata span on each side, a bhikkhu should have a new felt sitting rug made, it is to be forfeited and confessed.

The full offense here has three factors:

1) Object: a felt sitting rug made without incorporating a piece of old felt a sugata span on each side and intended for one’s own use.

2) Effort: One either makes it oneself, gets someone else to make it, finishes what others have let unfinished, or gets someone else to finish what one has left unfinished.

3) Result: One obtains it after it is finished (or finishes it, if one is
making it oneself).

Object

Object is the only factor requiring explanation here.

A sitting cloth—for protecting his robes from getting soiled by any place where he sits down, and for protecting any place where he sits down from being soiled by him—is one of the requisites a bhikkhu is allowed to have (Mv.VIII.16.1). In fact, if he goes without one for more than four months, he incurs a dukkaṭa (Cv.V.18). Pc 89 gives stipulations for its size and for the requirement that it should have at least one border piece.

There is some question as to whether the felt sitting rug described in this rule counts as a sitting cloth. The Commentary to Pc 89 says Yes, the Sub-commentary No. The Vibhaṅga’s definition for sitting cloth under that rule, however, states simply that it “has a border,” and because the felt sitting rug also “has a border,” it would seem to come under that definition, too. Thus the Commentary’s appears to be the correct position here.

The Commentary to Pc 89 describes the border piece of a felt sitting rug as follows: “Having made a felt rug, then on one end in an area of one sugata span, cutting it at two points, one makes three border pieces.” Whether these three pieces are to be left flapping or are to be sewn back together, it doesn’t say.

According to the Vibhaṅga, when one is making a felt sitting rug, one should take a piece of old felt—at least one span in diameter or one span square—and then either place it down in one part of the new felt as is, or else shred it up and scatter the pieces throughout the new felt. This, it says, will help to strengthen the new felt.

Old felt the Vibhaṅga defines as worn wrapped around oneself at least once: This is one of the few places indicating that felt was commonly used as a blanket. The Commentary rewords the Vibhaṅga’s definition, saying “sat on or lied down upon at least once,” which—at least in the days of the commentators—was the more common usage. The Commentary adds that, in addition to wanting to discolor the new felt sitting rug and make it stronger, one of the Buddha’s purposes in formulating this rule was to teach bhikkhus how to make good use of old, used requisites so as to maintain the good faith of those who donated them.

Offenses

As with the previous rules, there is a dukkaṭa for the bhikkhu who makes a sitting rug—or has one made—that violates this rule, whether it is for his own use or for that of another; and a nissaggiya pācittiya offense when he obtains the rug thus made for his own use (or finishes it, if he is making it himself). The procedures for forfeiture, confession, and receiving the rug in return are the same as under the preceding rules.

Non-offenses

There is no offense if, being unable to find a large enough piece of old felt to provide the one-span piece, one includes a smaller piece of old felt in the sitting rug; if, being unable to find any old felt at all, one does not include any old felt in the rug; if, having obtained a felt sitting rug made by (§) another without old felt—not at one’s instigation—one uses it; or if one is making a canopy, a floor-covering, a wall screen, a mattress/cushion, or a kneeling mat. It seems logical that there would also be no offense for the bhikkhu making a felt blanket that does not have any border pieces and that he is not planning to use for sitting, but for some reason none of the texts mention this point.

Summary: Making a felt sitting rug for one’s own use—or having it made—without incorporating a one-span piece of old felt is a nissaggiya pācittiya offense.

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16

Should wool accrue to a bhikkhu as he is going on a journey, he may accept it if he so desires. Having accepted it, he may carry it by hand—there being no one else to carry it—three yojanas (48 km.=30 miles) at most. If he should carry it farther than that, even if there is no one else to carry it, it is to be forfeited and confessed.

“At that time wool accrued to a bhikkhu as he was on the road in the Kosalan districts, going to Sāvatthī. So, tying the wool into a bundle with his upper robe, he went along his way. People who saw him teased him, ‘How much did you pay for it, venerable sir? How much will the profit be?’”

There are three factors for an offense here: object, effort, and intention.

Object

Wool, under this rule, refers to wool that has not been made into goods (§). The Commentary explains that wool here thus does not include woolen cloth, woolen felt, woolen yarn, or even raw wool tied up with a thread, although this last point is in contradiction to the origin story, where the bhikkhu carried his wool tied up with a robe.

The Commentary goes on to say, though, that wool here does refer to even small quantities of “unmade” wool, such as wool placed in the ear when one has an earache, or wrapped around scissors in their sheath to protect them from rusting, so a bhikkhu should be careful not to travel more than three yojanas with such items.

For wool to “accrue,” the Vibhaṅga states, means that one obtains it either from a Community, from a group, from relatives, from friends, from what has been thrown away, or from one’s own resources.

The wording of the rule seems to indicate that it applies to wool acquired only when one is on a journey. However, the non-offense clauses do not grant an exception for wool acquired under other circumstances, and from this fact the Sub-commentary concludes that this rule applies to wool acquired anywhere.

Effort

Effort includes not only carrying unmade wool more than three yojanas oneself, but also placing it in a bundle or vehicle belonging to someone else without his/her knowing about it, and then letting him/her take it more than three yojanas. Perception is not a mitigating factor here: If one travels more than three yojanas, even if one thinks one hasn’t, that fulfills this factor all the same.

The Vibhaṅga adds that if one has not traveled more than three yojanas with the wool but perceives that one has or is in doubt about the matter, the penalty is a dukkaṭa. Whether this penalty applies to carrying the wool further or to using it, none of the texts say. Arguing from the Commentary’s interpretation of a parallel passage under NP 1, this penalty would apply to using the wool.

Intention

The Vibhaṅga says that there is no offense for the bhikkhu who, after traveling three yojanas, cannot find a proper place to stay and so carries his wool further until finding a proper place. Thus the offense under this rule is only for a bhikkhu who carries wool past the three-yojana mark for motives other than looking for a place to stay.

Non-offenses

In addition to the issue of intention just mentioned, the non-offense clauses say that there is no offense for the bhikkhu who carries wool three yojanas or less; for the bhikkhu traveling more than three yojanas who is carrying wool that he has received back after it was snatched away; for the bhikkhu traveling more than three yojanas who is carrying wool that he has received back after having forfeited it (in line with this rule, the Commentary implies); for the bhikkhu who carries the wool three yojanas and then carries it back; or for the bhikkhu who gets someone else to agree to carry the wool for him.

Summary: Carrying wool that has not been made into cloth or yarn for more than three yojanas is a nissaggiya pācittiya offense.

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17

Should any bhikkhu have wool washed, dyed, or carded by a bhikkhunī unrelated to him, it is to be forfeited and confessed.

The reason behind this rule is expressed succinctly in the following conversation from the origin story:

“Then Mahāpajāpatī Gotamī went to the Blessed One and, on arrival, bowed to him and stood to one side. As she was standing there, the Blessed One said to her, ‘I trust, Gotamī, that the bhikkhunīs remain heedful, ardent, and resolute?’

“‘From where, venerable sir, is there heedfulness among the bhikkhunīs? The masters—the group-of-six bhikkhus—keep having the bhikkhunīs wash, dye, and card wool. The bhikkhunīs, washing, dyeing, and carding wool, neglect… the training in heightened virtue, the training in heightened mind, and the training in heightened discernment.’”

Wool, here, as under the preceding rule, refers to wool that has not been made into cloth or yarn. Thus there is no offense for a bhikkhu who gets a bhikkhunī unrelated to him to wash woolen cloth or yarn that has not yet been used (see NP 4).

Otherwise, all the explanations for this training rule are identical with those for NP 4, except that here “beating” is replaced by “carding.”

Summary: Getting an unrelated bhikkhunī to wash, dye, or card wool that has not been made into cloth or yarn is a nissaggiya pācittiya offense.

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18

Should any bhikkhu accept gold and silver, or have it accepted, or consent to its being deposited (near him), it is to be forfeited and confessed.

As mentioned under NP 10, one of the purposes of this rule is to relieve a bhikkhu of the burden of ownership that comes as the result of accepting gifts of money or having them accepted in one’s name. The discourses contain passages, though, indicating other purposes for this rule as well:

“For anyone for whom gold and silver are allowable, the five strings of sensuality are also allowable. For anyone for whom the five strings of sensuality are allowable, gold and silver are allowable (reading yassa pañca kāmaguṇā kappanti tassa-pi jātarūpa-rajataṁ kappati with the Thai edition). That you can unequivocally recognize as not the quality of a contemplative, not the quality of one of the Sakyan sons.”—SN 42:10

“Bhikkhus, there are these four obscurations of the sun and moon, obscured by which the sun and moon don’t glow, don’t shine, don’t dazzle. Which four? Clouds… Fog…. Smoke and dust… Rāhu, the king of the asuras (believed to be the cause of an eclipse) is an obscuration, obscured by which the sun and moon don’t glow, don’t shine, don’t dazzle…. In the same way, there are four obscurations of contemplatives and brahmans, obscured by which some contemplatives and brahmans don’t glow, don’t shine, don’t dazzle. Which four? There are some contemplatives and brahmans who… do not refrain from drinking alcohol and fermented liquor… who do not refrain from sexual intercourse… who do not refrain from accepting gold and silver… who do not refrain from wrong livelihood…. Because of these obscurations, some brahmans and contemplatives… covered with darkness, slaves to craving, led on, swell the terrible charnel ground, grab at further becoming.”—AN 4:50

Bhikkhus, in abandoning the use of money, make real their abandonment of worldly pursuits and show others by example that the struggle for wealth is not the true way to find happiness.

The factors for an offense under this rule are two: object and effort. However, because “object” is defined in one way for the first two actions stated in the rule, and in another way for the third, it seems best to analyze this rule as covering two separate but related offenses.

In the first offense the factors are:

1) Object: gold or silver.

2) Effort: One accepts or gets someone else to accept it.

In the second offense they are:

1) Object: gold or silver intended for one.

2) Effort: One consents to its being placed down next to one.

Object

The Vibhaṅga defines gold so as to include anything made of gold. Silver it defines to cover coins made of silver, copper, wood, or lac, or whatever is used as a currency. The Commentary adds such examples as bones, pieces of hide, fruit, and seeds of trees used as currency, whether they have been stamped with a figure or not. At present, the term would include coins and paper currency, as well as money orders and cashiers checks not made out to a specific payee, as these meet all three requirements of a currency: (1) They are a generally accepted medium of exchange; (2) they are of standard recognized value; and (3) they are presentable by any bearer. The following items, because they do not fulfill all three of these requirements, would not count as “silver” under this rule: money orders and cashier’s checks made out to a specific payee; personal checks and travelers’ checks; credit cards and debit cards; gift cards, phone cards, frequent flyer miles; food stamps; and promissory notes.

Because the word silver here functionally means “money,” that is how I will translate it for the remainder of the discussion of this rule.

The Vibhaṅga indicates that perception is not a mitigating factor in either offense. Thus if a bhikkhu receives gold or money, even if he perceives it as something else—as when accepting a closed envelope not knowing that it contains money, or consenting to a bolt of cloth’s being placed near him, unaware that money has been placed inside it—he commits the full offense all the same. The same holds true if he is in doubt about what the envelope or bolt of cloth contains. This may seem a harsh penalty for a bhikkhu acting in complete innocence, but we must remember that, having received the money even unknowingly, he is now in possession of it and must dispose of it in a proper way. The protocols under this rule give directions for precisely how to do that.

If a bhikkhu accepts or consents to the placing of something that is not gold or money and yet he perceives it to be gold or money or is in doubt about its status, he incurs a dukkaṭa.

Gold Buddha images and gold items given to Buddha images, relics, or stūpas are not mentioned in the texts in connection with this rule. Over the centuries the common practice has been not to regard them as fulfilling the factor of object here, probably because Buddha images, stūpas, and relics, strictly speaking, cannot be owned by anyone. Similarly with items given to a Buddha image, etc.: Technically, these belong to the image, etc., and not to the monastery in which it may be located. Thus, as long as a bhikkhu realizes that he cannot assume ownership of any of these things, he may handle them without incurring an offense under this rule.

As mentioned under NP 10, the Commentary derives from the Canon a list of items that it says carry a dukkaṭa when accepted by a bhikkhu. These include pearls and precious stones; uncooked grain and raw meat; women and girls, male and female slaves; goats and sheep, fowl and pigs, elephants, cattle, steeds, and mares; fields and property. For convenience’s sake, we will refer to these items from here on as dukkaṭa objects (dukkaṭa-vatthu), or D.O. for short.

Effort

This factor may be fulfilled by any of three actions: accepting gold or money, having it accepted, or consenting to its being deposited. As noted above, the factors of the offense differ among the three: In the first two, the question of whether the bhikkhu consents to the gold or money does not enter into the definition of the act, nor does the donor’s intention as to who the gold or money is for. Only in the third act is the bhikkhu’s consent required to fulfill the action, and only there is it required that the donor intend the gold or money for the bhikkhu himself.

1) Accepting

According to the K/Commentary, this includes receiving gold or money offered as a gift or picking up gold or money left lying around ownerless. (As the non-offense clauses show, this factor does not cover cases where one picks up money left lying around the monastery or a house where one is visiting if one’s purpose is to keep it in safekeeping for the owner. See Pc 84.) According to the Commentary, a bhikkhu who accepts money wrapped up in a bolt of cloth would also commit an offense here, which shows that this act includes receiving or taking the money not only with one’s body, but also with items connected with the body. Thus accepting money in an envelope or having it placed in one’s shoulder bag as it hangs from one’s shoulder would fulfill this factor as well.

The K/Commentary adds the stipulation that in the taking there must be some movement of the gold or money from one place to another. It offers no explanation for this point, but it may refer to cases where the gold or money is forced on a bhikkhu. (Because the presence or absence of the bhikkhu’s consent does not enter into the definition of the act of accepting, this means that when gold or money is forced on him, the act has been accomplished.) A typical example where this stipulation is useful is when a bhikkhu is on alms round and a lay donor, against the bhikkhu’s protestations, places money in his bowl. The stipulation allows the bhikkhu simply to stand there until he gets the donor or someone else to remove the money, and he would be absolved of an offense under this rule.

The commentaries add intention as an extra factor—the full offense is entailed only if the bhikkhu is taking the gold or money for his own sake—but there is no basis for this in the Vibhaṅga. The bhikkhu’s intention in accepting the money does not enter into the Vibhaṅga’s discussions of any of the three actions covered by this rule, the donor’s intent does not enter into the Vibhaṅga’s definition of this action, and the non-offense clauses do not allow for a bhikkhu to accept money for others, so the added factor seems unwarranted. Whether the bhikkhu accepts gold or money for himself or for others is thus not an issue here.

2) Having gold or money accepted

Having gold or money accepted, according to the K/Commentary, includes getting someone else to do any of the actions covered under accepting, as described above. Examples from the commentaries, which draw on the protocols under NP 10, include such things as telling the donor to give the money to a steward, telling the donor that so-and-so will take the money for him; telling the steward to take the money, to put it in a donation box, to “do what he thinks appropriate,” or any similar command.

Anything that falls short of a command, though, would not fulfill this factor, as we have already seen under NP 10. Thus simply telling the donor that X is the bhikkhus’ steward—or that the monastery’s stewards have placed a donation box in such-and-such a place—would not be a factor for an offense here. Also, if the donor—over the bhikkhu’s protestations—leaves money, say, on a table as a gift for a bhikkhu, then if the bhikkhu tells his steward what the donor did and said, without telling the steward to do anything with the money—letting the steward figure things out on his/her own—this too would not entail a penalty. The Commentary’s discussion of stewards under the next point shows that while a bhikkhu who tells a volunteer steward to put such a donation in a donation box would incur a penalty, a bhikkhu who simply points out the donation box would not.

As with the act of accepting, the questions of the bhikkhu’s consent, his intent in accepting, and the donor’s intent in giving do not enter into the definition of this action.

3) Consenting to gold or money’s being deposited

The Vibhaṅga defines this action as follows: “He (the donor), saying, ‘This is for the master,’ deposits it, and the bhikkhu consents (§).” According to the K/Commentary, depositing covers two sorts of situations:

1) The donor places gold or money anywhere in the bhikkhu’s presence, and says, “This is for the master,” or

2) The donor tells him, “I have some gold or money deposited in such-and-such a location. It’s yours.” (One of the implications of this second case is that any monastery with a donation box should make clear that money left in the box is being placed with the steward. Because NP 10 allows a donor to place gold or money intended for a bhikkhu’s needs with a steward, the act of placing money with such a person in a bhikkhu’s presence does not count as “depositing” here.)

Consenting in either of these cases, says the Commentary, means that one does not refuse either in thought, word, or deed. Refusing in thought means thinking, “This is not proper for me.” Refusing in word means telling the donor that such a gift is not allowable. Refusing in deed means making a gesture to the same effect. If one refuses in any of these ways—e.g., one wants to accept the gold or money, but tells the donor that it is not allowable; or one says nothing, but simply reminds oneself that such gifts are not proper to accept—one avoids the penalty here.

The question of whether it is best to express one’s refusal outwardly lies beyond the scope of the Vinaya and often depends on the situation. Ideally, one should inform the donor so that he/she will know enough not to present such gifts in the future, but there are cases where the donor is still new to the idea of rules and will simply be offended if the bhikkhu objects to what he/she means as a well-intentioned gesture. This is thus a matter where a bhikkhu should use his discretion.

The Commentary contains a long discussion of what a bhikkhu should do if, after he refuses such a donation, the donor goes off leaving it there anyway. If someone else comes along and asks the bhikkhu, “What is this?”, the bhikkhu may tell him/her what he and the donor said, but may not ask him/her to do anything about it. If the person volunteers to put the gold or money into safekeeping, the bhikkhu may point out a safe place but may not tell him/her to put it there.

Once the gold or money is in a safe place, one may point it out to other people—one’s steward, for instance—but may not tell anyone to take it. The Commentary gives directions for how to arrange an exchange with gold or money in such a case so as not to violate NP 19 & 20, but I will save that part of the discussion until we come to those rules.

However, the Vibhaṅga’s definition of “depositing” gold or money for a bhikkhu indicates that the question of who the donor intends the money for does make a difference under this action, because the nature of the donor’s action is defined by what he or she says. If the donor means the money for the bhikkhu and the bhikkhu consents to its being placed nearby, that fulfills the factor here. This covers cases where the donor says, “This is for you,” or “This is for you to give to X.”

In cases where the donor says, “This is for the Community,” or “This is for Bhikkhu Y,” and Bhikkhu X consents to its being placed down near him, the Commentary—drawing on the Great Standards—says that X incurs a dukkaṭa. It does not say, though, what should be done with the money, aside from stating that any bhikkhu who uses anything bought with it also incurs a dukkaṭa. Its discussion of the following rule, though, would seem to imply that it should be returned to the original donor.

If money for Bhikkhu Y is placed near Bhikkhu X in this way, and Y in turn consents to the donation, then Y would incur the full penalty here as well. The Commentary’s discussion under NP 10 indicates that if money for the Community is placed near Bhikkhu X, the Community is said to have consented to it only when all members of the Community unanimously consent to it. If one member refuses consent, he saves all the other members from committing an offense—except for X, who still has his dukkaṭa.

The Commentary here also says that a bhikkhu who consents to monetary donations “placed nearby” him for monastery buildings incurs a dukkaṭa as well. This refers to cases where the donor says, “This is for the Community to use in building such-and-such,” and places the money down next to the bhikkhu. As the Commentary itself says under NP 10, if the donor does not mention the name of the bhikkhu or the Community as custodians or recipients of the funds, the donations are not to be refused. Rather, they are to be left there and the steward told of what the donor said.

Forfeiture & confession

A bhikkhu who commits either offense under this rule must forfeit the gold or money in the midst of a formal meeting of the Community before confessing the offense. The formulae and procedures for forfeiture and confession are given in Appendix VI. This is one of the few NP rules where the offender may not forfeit the item in question to an individual bhikkhu or to a group of less than four. Once he has forfeited the gold or money and confessed his offense, the Community may not return it to him, as there is no way a bhikkhu is allowed to possess these things.

If a lay person comes along after the gold or money has been forfeited, the bhikkhus may tell him, “Look at this.” If he asks, “What should be bought with this?”, the bhikkhus are not to tell him to buy anything (as that would violate NP 20), although they may tell him what in general is allowable for bhikkhus, such as the five tonics, as under NP 23, below. If he takes the gold or money and purchases any proper items, all the bhikkhus except the one who originally accepted the gold or money may make use of them. If the lay person does not volunteer to buy anything with the gold or money, the bhikkhus should tell him to get rid of it.

If he does not get rid of it, they are to choose one of the bhikkhus present as the “money-disposer,” by means of the transaction statement—a motion and one proclamation (ñatti-dutiya-kamma)—given in Appendix VI. The money-disposer must be free of the four forms of bias—based on desire, aversion, delusion, or fear—and must know when money is properly disposed of and when it is not. His duty is to throw the money away without taking note of where it falls. If he does take note, he incurs a dukkaṭa. The Commentary recommends that, “Closing his eyes, he should throw it into a river, over a cliff, or into a jungle thicket without paying attention to where it falls, disinterested as if it were a bodily secretion (gūthaka).”

None of the texts mention what a bhikkhu is to do with dukkaṭa objects he has received, but as we shall see under the following rule, the Commentary would seem to suggest that he return them to their donors.

Non-offenses

As mentioned above, there is no offense for the bhikkhu who, finding gold or money lying around the monastery or in a house he is visiting, puts it away in safe keeping for the owner. This point is discussed in detail under Pc 84.

Checks

There is some controversy over the status of checks under this rule. In legal terms, a check is a notice to a bank to provide funds for the payee. Because banks are corporate individuals and not “places,” a check made out to a bhikkhu is thus equivalent to a notice from a donor to a steward to provide funds on the bhikkhu’s behalf. Because the funds in question do not change ownership until the recipient cashes the check, this strengthens the similarity to funds placed with a steward: The funds still belong to the donor until they are used, and the steward is responsible if they become lost in the meantime. Thus the simple act of receiving a check counts not as an act of receiving money but as an acknowledgement of the notice. In passing the notice to someone else, one is simply informing them of the donor’s arrangement. Only if a bhikkhu cashes a check or gives an order to someone else to do so does he commit an offense under this rule.

A bhikkhu who uses a check as a means of barter commits an offense under NP 20. The most he is allowed to do when receiving a check is to hand it over to his steward—being careful not to say anything that would violate the etiquette of kappiya vohāra (“wording things right”) under this rule or NP 10, 19, & 20—and to let the steward make whatever arrangements he/she sees fit.

Summary: Accepting gold or money, having someone else accept it, or consenting to its being placed down as a gift for oneself is a nissaggiya pācittiya offense.

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19

Should any bhikkhu engage in various types of monetary exchange, it (the income) is to be forfeited and confessed.

There are two factors for an offense here: object and effort.

Object

The Vibhaṅga defines money in the same terms it uses to define gold and silver in the preceding rule: any type of gold, whether shaped into an ornament or not; and any coins or other items used as currency.

Effort

The Vibhaṅga’s description of the kind of exchange covered by this rule differs from that given in the Commentary, so they are best discussed separately.

The Vibhaṅga’s interpretation

Monetary exchange refers primarily to the type of business and speculation a gold dealer would engage in—exchanging currency, trading gold ore for gold shaped into ornaments or vice versa, trading gold ore for gold ore, or gold ornaments for gold ornaments—but the Vibhaṅga’s discussion of the factor of perception shows that the factor of effort here includes any exchange in which the bhikkhu ends up with gold or money as a result of the exchange. Thus it would cover cases where a bhikkhu sells any kind of item—allowable or unallowable—for money.

At first glance, this rule would seem redundant with the preceding rule against receiving money and the following rule against engaging in trade, but actually it closes a number of loopholes in those rules. In the preceding rule, a bhikkhu may point out a steward to a person who brings money intended for him; and in the following rule he can, if he words it right, propose a trade or tell a steward to arrange a trade for him. Thus, given just those two rules, it would be possible for a bhikkhu using “proper” procedures to have his steward engage in currency speculation and other money-making activities without committing an offense.

This rule, though, includes no such exceptions for “wording things right (kappiya-vohāra),” and so closes those loopholes as far as this type of trading is concerned. As a result, a bhikkhu may not express a desire to his steward that he/she sell something belonging to him or take funds dedicated for his use and invest them for monetary return. If the bhikkhu is going abroad, he must leave it up to his steward to figure out that any funds donated for his use may have to be exchanged for foreign currency if they are going to serve any purpose.

According to the K/Commentary, the item offered in exchange must be one’s own if the exchange is to fall under this rule, but the Vibhaṅga’s non-offense clauses make no exemptions for a bhikkhu who engages in monetary exchange using items belonging to anyone else. Thus if a bhikkhu were to arrange a monetary exchange using goods belonging to his family, he would have to forfeit any proceeds from the exchange that they might offer to him.

Perception is not a factor here. Thus, when receiving gold or money, even if he perceives it as something else or is in doubt about the matter, he would still be fulfilling the factor of effort. If, when receiving something other than gold or money, if he perceives it as gold or money or is in doubt about it, the penalty would be a dukkaṭa.

The Commentary’s interpretation

According to the Commentary, monetary exchange refers to any trade in which money is involved—whether as the item the bhikkhu brings into the trade, gets out of the trade, or both. Buddhaghosa states that this interpretation is based on a passage that is not in the Vibhaṅga but logically should be. The Sub-commentary supports him, explaining that if monetary exchange covers trades in which money forms one side of the trade, it shouldn’t matter which side of the trade it is on.

This, however, contradicts a number of points in the Vibhaṅga. (1) Its table of the possible actions covered by this rule includes only cases where the outcome of the trade for the bhikkhu is money. As we noted in the Introduction, we have to trust that the Vibhaṅga arrangers knew what was and was not an offense under a certain rule, and that if they had meant the rule to cover more than the alternatives listed in the table they would have included them. (2) In the Vibhaṅga’s discussion of how the forfeiture is to be conducted, it consistently refers to the offender as the “one who purchased money” and to the bhikkhu who throws the forfeited object away as the “money-disposer.” (3) If monetary exchange covers cases where the bhikkhu uses money to buy allowable things, then the discussion of how a bhikkhu could get his steward to use money rightfully placed with the steward to buy such things would have been included under this rule; instead, it is included under the following rule. All of this seems to indicate that the Commentary is on shaky ground when it tries to force its interpretation on the Vibhaṅga here.

Still, the Commentary’s interpretation is widely followed and fairly complex, so it will be good to discuss it in some detail.

As under the preceding rule, the Commentary divides articles into three sorts:

nissaggiya objects (N.O.), i.e., articles such as gold and money, which entail a nissaggiya pācittiya when accepted;

dukkaṭa objects (D.O.), articles such as pearls, precious stones; uncooked grain, raw meat; women and girls, male and female slaves; goats and sheep, fowl and pigs, elephants, cattle, steeds, and mares; fields and property, any of which entail a dukkaṭa when accepted;

allowable objects (A.O.), articles that a bhikkhu may rightfully accept and possess.

It then works out the following scheme to cover all possible trades involving these objects:

Using        to buy        results in

N.O.   →   N.O.       a nissaggiya pācittiya

N.O.   →   D.O.       a nissaggiya pācittiya

N.O.   →   A.O.       a nissaggiya pācittiya

D.O.   →   N.O.       a nissaggiya pācittiya

D.O.   →   D.O.       a dukkaṭa*

D.O.   →   A.O.       a dukkaṭa*

A.O.   →   N.O.       a nissaggiya pācittiya

A.O.   →   D.O.       a dukkaṭa*

A.O.   →   A.O.       a nissaggiya pācittiya under NP 20

The trades marked with asterisks point out one of the anomalies of the Commentary’s interpretation: Why trades involving D.O. should entail only a dukkaṭa, while A.O. → A.O. trades should entail a nissaggiya pācittiya is hard to fathom.

At any rate, to continue with the Commentary’s explanations: N.O. → A.O. trades cover two possible cases, depending on whether the money was obtained properly or improperly under the preceding rule. If improperly, the object bought with the money is unallowable for all bhikkhus. This holds whether the bhikkhu makes the purchase himself or a steward makes it for him. The only way the item can be made allowable is to have an equal sum of money returned to the original donor and the item returned to the person who sold it, and then arrange for a proper exchange as allowed under the following rule. (At first glance, it may seem strange for the Commentary to insist that the price of the A.O. be returned to the original donor of the N.O., as the bhikkhus are in no way in his/her debt; but this is probably the Commentary’s way of ensuring that if the seller returns the purchase price of the A.O. to the bhikkhus’ steward, it is not used to repurchase the A.O.)

If, however, a bhikkhu engages in a N.O. → A.O. trade using money obtained properly under the preceding rule, the item bought is unallowable only for him, but allowable for other bhikkhus once he has forfeited it. If N.O. → A.O. exchanges really were covered by this rule, though, this would contradict the Vibhaṅga, which insists that the item obtained as a result of this rule either has to be given to a lay person or thrown away. Thus it seems better to follow the Vibhaṅga in treating cases of this sort under the following rule.

The Commentary makes no mention of what should be done with items resulting from trades that carry a dukkaṭa here, but its discussion of how to “undo” a trade so as to make the item allowable suggests the following scheme:

For a D.O → D.O. trade: Return the object bought to the person who sold it, return the original object to the donor, and confess the offense.

For a D.O. → A.O. trade: Return the object bought to the person who sold it, return the original object to the donor, and confess the offense. If one wants to, one may then approach the person who sold the allowable object and arrange a proper trade in accordance with the following rule.

For an A.O. → D.O. trade: Return the object bought to the person who sold it and confess the offense.

As an intellectual exercise, the Commentary considers the question of a trade that results in an A.O. that can never be made allowable, and comes up with the following scenario: A bhikkhu takes money improperly obtained under the preceding rule, uses it to get iron mined, smelted, and made into a bowl. Because there is no way to undo these transactions—the iron can never be returned to its state as ore—there is no way any bhikkhu may ever properly make use of the iron no matter what is done with it.

As mentioned above, the Commentary’s explanations here contradict the Vibhaṅga on a number of points, and contain several anomalies as well. It seems preferable to treat a number of cases it mentions here—N.O. → D.O., N.O. → A.O., D.O. → D.O., D.O. → A.O., A.O. → D.O., or in other words, any trade resulting in an allowable or a dukkaṭa object—under the following rule instead.

Forfeiture & confession

When a bhikkhu has obtained gold or money in violation of this rule he is to forfeit it in the midst of a formal meeting of the Community, following the procedures explained under the preceding rule. The Pali formulae for forfeiture and confession are in Appendix VI.

Non-offenses

The Vibhaṅga’s non-offense clauses contain nothing but the blanket exemptions mentioned under Pr 1.

Summary: Obtaining gold or money through trade is a nissaggiya pācittiya offense.

*    *    *

20

Should any bhikkhu engage in various types of trade, it (the article obtained) is to be forfeited and confessed.

“Now at that time Ven. Upananda the Sakyan had become accomplished at making robes. Having made an outer robe of cloak-scraps, having dyed it well and stitched it nicely, he wore it. A certain wanderer, wearing a very expensive cloak, went to him and on arrival said to him, ‘Your outer robe is beautiful, my friend. Give it to me in exchange for this cloak.’

“‘Do you know (what you’re doing), my friend?’

“‘Yes, I know.’

“‘Okay, then.’ And he gave him the robe.

“Then the wanderer went to the wanderers’ park wearing the outer robe. The other wanderers said to him, ‘Your outer robe is beautiful, friend. Where did you get it?’

“‘I got it in exchange for my cloak.’

“‘But how long will this outer robe last you? That cloak of yours was better.’

“So the wanderer, thinking, ‘It’s true what the wanderers said. How long will this outer robe last me? That cloak of mine was better,’ went to Ven. Upananda the Sakyan and on arrival said, ‘Here is your outer robe, my friend. Give me my cloak.’

“‘But didn’t I ask you, “Do you know (what you’re doing)?” I won’t give it to you.’

“So the wanderer criticized and complained and spread it about, ‘Even a householder will give to another householder who regrets (a trade). How can one who has gone forth not give (the same courtesy) to one who has gone forth?’”

As we noted under NP 10, one of the purposes of this rule is to relieve bhikkhus of the responsibilities that come with making trades—the responsibility of having to get a fair price for one’s goods and at the same time offering a fair deal to the person receiving them.

The factors for an offense here are two: object and effort.

Object

The Vibhaṅga defines various types of trade as covering deals involving the four requisites, “even a lump of powder, tooth wood, or unwoven thread”—these being its standard examples of objects with the least possible material value. The Commentary interprets this definition as limiting this rule to deals involving nothing but allowable objects (A.O. → A.O.), but there is nothing in the Vibhaṅga to suggest that this is necessarily so. The emphasis in the Vibhaṅga seems to be that this rule covers even allowable objects of the least possible value, and all the more so more valuable and restricted objects. In fact, as the Vibhaṅga explicitly limits the preceding rule to trades that result in money for the bhikkhu (N.O. → N.O.; D.O. → N.O.; A.O. → N.O.), it seems best to interpret this rule as covering all types of trade not covered in that rule:

N.O. → D.O.; N.O. → A.O.;

D.O. → D.O.; D.O. → A.O.;

A.O. → D.O.; and A.O. → A.O.

The Vibhaṅga, in its description of what constitutes a trade, makes reference to “one’s own” object going to the hand of the other, and the other’s object going to one’s own hand. From this, the K/Commentary deduces that the object given in trade has to be one’s own personal possession. This deduction, however, is mistaken for several reasons: (1) The Vibhaṅga’s protocols under NP 10 do not allow one to tell a steward to use the funds placed in his care to buy or barter for anything, and yet these funds do not belong to the bhikkhu. (2) The Vibhaṅga’s protocols for disposing of money under NP 18 & 19 do not allow a bhikkhu to tell a lay person to buy anything with the money forfeited by the offender under those rules, and again this money does not belong to the bhikkhu. (3) The non-offense clauses to this rule make no exemptions for a bhikkhu who trades using goods belonging to someone else. Thus it would appear that the phrase, “one’s own” goods, in the Vibhaṅga’s description of a trade, is defined simply in opposition to the phrase, “the other person’s” goods prior to the trade. In other words, it would cover anything that starts out on one’s side before the trade, whether those items are one’s own personal possessions or another person’s possessions that have been placed in deposit for one’s use (such as funds placed with a steward) or in one’s keeping (such as monastery funds placed under the supervision of a monastery official).

Effort

Engaging in trade, according to the Vibhaṅga, involves two steps:

1) The bhikkhu proposes an exchange, saying, “Give this for that,” or “Take this for that,” or “Exchange this for that,” or “Purchase this with that.” Because the non-offense clauses make no exemption for exchanges conducted by gesture, any gesture—including a written message or sign language—that clearly makes this proposal would fulfill this step.

2) The goods exchange hands, the bhikkhu’s goods ending up with the other person, and the other person’s goods ending up with the bhikkhu.

The first step entails a dukkaṭa; both steps together, a nissaggiya pācittiya. Perception is not a mitigating factor here: If a bhikkhu manages an exchange in a way that he thinks avoids a penalty under this rule but in fact doesn’t (see below), he commits the full offense all the same. If, on the other hand, he manages an exchange in such a way that would avoid a penalty under this rule but he thinks that it falls under the rule or else is in doubt about the matter, he incurs a dukkaṭa.

Forfeiture & confession

Once a bhikkhu has received an article from a trade, he is to forfeit it either to an individual bhikkhu, to a group of two or three, or to a full Community of four or more. Only then may he confess the offense. The procedures for forfeiture, confession, and the return of the article are the same as under NP 1. The Pali formula for forfeiture is in Appendix VI.

The Vibhaṅga makes no mention of what the bhikkhu may and may not do with the article after receiving it in return, and so it appears that he may keep it as he likes. However, if an individual bhikkhu has used nissaggiya or dukkaṭa objects in a trade, he might—as a wise policy—want to prevent any suspicions that he is trying to “launder” them, and so he may take a page from the Commentary to the preceding rule as his own personal protocol, as follows:

If the exchange was N.O. → D.O., he should return the D.O. to its seller. If the N.O. was properly obtained under NP 18 (e.g., it was placed with a steward), there is nothing further to be done. If not, the bhikkhu should confess the offense for violating that rule. (If the seller offers to refund the purchase price, the bhikkhu should not accept it. If he does, he must forfeit it in the midst of the Community. If he doesn’t accept it, he should simply confess the pācittiya offense for originally accepting the N.O.)

If the exchange was N.O. → A.O., then if the N.O. was obtained in violation of NP 18, no bhikkhu may make use of the A.O. unless it is returned to the seller, the price of the article is turned over to the original donor of the money, and the A.O. is then repurchased in a way that does not violate this rule. (Again, if the seller refunds the purchase price, the bhikkhu should not accept it. If he does, he must forfeit it in the midst of the Community. If he doesn’t accept it, he should simply confess the pācittiya offense for originally accepting the N.O.)

If the N.O. in this case was properly obtained, then the purchased article is allowable for other bhikkhus but not for the offender. (This case covers the instances mentioned under NP 10 where a bhikkhu tells his steward to purchase an article with the fund placed in the steward’s trust for the bhikkhu’s needs. Some might object that if the N.O. was properly obtained it should be treated as A.O., but we must remember that a bhikkhu who orders his steward to use money to buy an object is assuming ownership of the money, which goes against the spirit of NP 10 & 18 and the protocol of having a steward in the first place.)

If the exchange was D.O. → D.O., the bhikkhu should return the purchased article to the seller and the original article (if the seller returns it to him) to the original donor.

If the exchange was D.O. → A.O., the purchased article is not allowable for any bhikkhu unless it is returned to the seller, the D.O. is returned to the original donor, and the A.O. is then repurchased in a way that does not violate this rule.

If the exchange was A.O. → D.O., the bhikkhu should return the purchased article to the seller.

If the exchange was A.O. → A.O., the bhikkhu may make use of the article as he likes.

If the exchange was wages in payment for services rendered, the Commentary notes that there is no way the bhikkhu can rightfully get the payment back, so he should simply confess a pācittiya offense.

All of these protocols derived from the Commentary are optional, however, for—as noted above—the Vibhaṅga places no restrictions on what the bhikkhu may or may not do with the article after having forfeited it and received it in return.

Non-offenses

In the origin story to NP 5, the Buddha allows bhikkhus to trade allowable articles with other bhikkhus, bhikkhunīs, female trainees, and male or female novices. The present rule thus covers trades made only with people who are not one’s co-religionists.

As for trades with people who are not one’s co-religionists, the Vibhaṅga here adds that a bhikkhu commits no offense—

if he asks the price of an object;

if he tells a steward;

if he tells the seller, “I have this. I have need of such-and-such,” and then lets the seller arrange the exchange as he/she sees fit. This last point may seem like mere hair splitting, but we must remember that if a trade is arranged in this way, the bhikkhu is absolved from any responsibility for the fairness of the deal, which seems to be the whole point of the rule.

The Commentary, in discussing these exemptions, raises the following points:

1) A bhikkhu who tries to avoid the technicalities of what is defined as engaging in trading by saying simply, “Give this. Take that,” may do so only with his parents. Otherwise, telling a lay person to take one’s belongings as his/her own is to “bring a gift of faith (saddhā-deyya) to waste”—i.e., to misuse the donations that lay supporters, out of faith, have sacrificed for the bhikkhu’s use (see Mv.VIII.22.1; BMC2, Chapter 10). On the other hand, telling an unrelated lay person to give something is a form of begging, which carries a dukkaṭa unless the lay person is related or has invited one to ask in the first place. (From this we may deduce that bhikkhus should not bargain after having asked the price of goods or services—e.g., a taxi fare—even in situations where bargaining is the norm.)

2) Under the previous rule, the Commentary mentioned that a bhikkhu engaging in an otherwise allowable trade for profit incurs a dukkaṭa. Here it says that if a bhikkhu, proposing a trade by wording it right (kappiya-vohāra), deceives the seller as to the value of his goods, he is to be treated under Pr 2. However, as the Vibhaṅga to Pr 2 indicates, goods received through deceit are to be treated not under that rule but under Pc 1.

3) In the case of “telling a steward,” both the Commentary and K/Commentary deem it allowable to tell the steward, “Having gotten that with this, give it (to me).” This, however, is a clear violation of the protocols set forth by the Vibhaṅga under NP 10, according to which a bhikkhu is not allowed to speak in the imperative, giving the command, “Give,” to a steward, much less a command to barter or buy. Instead, he is allowed to speak only in the declarative: “I have need of such-and-such,” or “I want such-and-such.” Declarative statements of this sort would thus appear to be the only statements allowed under this non-offense clause as well.

4) If a bhikkhu goes with his steward to a store and sees that the steward is getting a bad deal, he may simply tell the steward, “Don’t take it.”

5) The Commentary to NP 10 describes how a bhikkhu may make a purchase when his steward has left funds in safe-keeping on the bhikkhu’s premises but is not present to arrange a trade when, say, a bowl-seller comes along. The bhikkhu may tell the seller, “I want this bowl, and there are funds of equal value here, but there is no steward to make them allowable.” If the seller volunteers to make them allowable, the bhikkhu may show him where they are but may not tell him how much to take. If the seller takes too much, the bhikkhu may cancel the sale by saying, “I don’t want your bowl after all.”

In general it is not a wise policy to have funds left for safe-keeping on one’s premises—a Community allowing this exposes itself to the dangers of robbery and assault—but the Commentary here seems less interested in describing ideal behavior than in simply drawing the line between what is and is not an offense.

Special cases

1) The Bhikkhunīs’ NP rules 4-10 show that if a lay donor gives money to a storeowner to pay for whatever a bhikkhunī will request from the store, the bhikkhunī may avail herself of the arrangement. If the donor stipulates that this arrangement applies only to certain items, or to items worth a certain amount, she may request only what falls under the stipulation: This is the point of the rules. In effect, what this is doing is making the storeowner her steward. Such an arrangement would thus also seem allowable for bhikkhus as long as they word their requests to the storeowner properly, as advised under NP 10.

2) As mentioned under NP 18, checks, credit cards, debit cards, and traveler’s checks do not count as gold or money. However, any trade arranged with them would come under this rule.

In cases where an actual physical item is handed over to the seller in the course of such a trade, the trade is accomplished in the physical exchange, with no need to wait for funds to enter the seller’s account for the offense to be incurred. This is because “object” under this rule can be fulfilled by an item of the least inherent monetary value.

For instance, if a bhikkhu hands a check to a seller—or tells his steward to hand it over—in exchange for goods or services in the manner specified by this rule, he would commit the full offense the moment the check and goods change hands.

Similarly with credit cards: The offense is committed when the bhikkhu hands the signed credit card receipt—or has it handed—to the seller and receives goods or services in return. The receipt is an acknowledgement of the goods or services received from the seller, which in the context of the cardholder’s agreement with the credit card company is his promise to repay the loan he is taking out with the company. This promise is what the bhikkhu is trading with the seller, who will then use it to draw funds from the company’s account.

If, however, no physical item is handed over to the seller, the trade is not accomplished until funds enter the seller’s account. An example would be a debit card: The full offense is committed only when, after pushing the personal identification number (PIN)—which is his order to the bank to pay the seller—the bhikkhu receives goods and services from the seller, and funds are transferred to the seller’s account from his.

Summary: Engaging in trade with anyone except one’s co-religionists is a nissaggiya pācittiya offense.

Three: The Bowl Chapter

21

An extra alms bowl may be kept ten days at most. Beyond that, it is to be forfeited and confessed.

The offense under this rule involves two factors.

1) Object: an alms bowl fit to be determined for use.

2) Effort: One keeps it for more than ten days without determining it for use, placing it under shared ownership, abandoning it (giving or throwing it away); and without its being lost, destroyed, burnt, snatched away, or taken by someone else on trust within that time.

Alms bowls

According to the Commentary, an alms bowl fit to be determined for use must be—

1) made of the proper material;

2) the proper size;

3) fully paid for;

4) properly fired; and

5) not damaged beyond repair.

Material

Cv.V.8.2 allows two kinds of alms bowls: made either of clay or of iron. Cv.V.9.1 forbids eleven: made either of wood, gold, silver, pearl, beryl, crystal, bronze, glass, tin, lead, or copper. Using the Great Standards, the Council of Elders in Thailand has recently decided that stainless steel bowls are allowable—because, after all, they are steel—but aluminum bowls not, because they share some of the dangers of tin. In the time of the Buddha, clay bowls were the more common. At present, iron and steel bowls are.

Size

The Vibhaṅga contains a discussion of three proper sizes for a bowl—the medium size containing twice the volume of the small, and the large twice the volume of the medium—but they are based on measurements that are not known with any precision at present. The author of the Vinaya-mukha reports having experimented with various sizes of bowls based on a passage in the story of Meṇḍaka in the Dhammapada Commentary. His conclusion: A small bowl is just a little larger than a human skull, and a medium bowl approximately 27 1/2 English inches (70 cm.) in circumference, or about 8.75 inches (22.5 cm.) in diameter. He did not try making a large bowl. Any size larger than the large size or smaller than the small is inappropriate; any size between them falls under this rule.

Fully paid for

According to the Commentary, if a bowl-maker makes a gift of a bowl, it counts as fully paid for. If a bowl has been delivered to a bhikkhu but has yet to be fully paid for, it may not be determined and does not come under this rule until paid for in full.

Fired

The Commentary states that a clay bowl must be fired twice before it can be determined, to make sure it is properly hardened; and an iron bowl five times, to prevent it from rusting. Because stainless steel does not rust it need not be fired, but a popular practice is to find some way to make it gray—either by painting it on the outside or firing the whole bowl with leaves that will give it a smoky color—so that it will not stand out.

Not damaged beyond repair

The Vibhaṅga to the following rule says that a bhikkhu may ask for a new bowl if his current bowl has five mends or more, the space for a mend (§) being two inches (fingerbreadths). The Commentary explains this first by saying that a bowl with five mends or more is damaged beyond repair, and thus loses its determination as a bowl. It then expands on the Vibhaṅga’s statements as follows: A clay bowl is damaged beyond repair if it has at least ten inches of cracks in it, the smallest of the cracks being at least two inches long. Cracks less than two inches long are said not to merit mending—this is the meaning of the Vibhaṅga’s phrase, “space for a mend”—and so do not count. As the K/Commentary notes, whether the cracks are actually mended is not an issue here. If a bowl has fewer cracks than that, they should be mended either with tin wire, sap (but for some reason not pure pine sap), or a mixture of sugar cane syrup and powdered stone. Other materials not to be used for repair are beeswax and sealing wax. If the total length of countable cracks equals ten inches or more, the bowl becomes a non-bowl, and the owner is entitled to ask for a new one.

As for iron and steel bowls, a hole in the bowl large enough to let a millet grain pass through is enough to make the determination lapse, but not enough to make the bowl a non-bowl. The bhikkhu should plug the hole—or have a blacksmith plug it—with powdered metal or a tiny metal plug polished smooth with the surface of the bowl and then re-determine the bowl for use.

If the hole is small enough to be plugged in this way, then no matter how many such holes there are in the bowl they do not make it a non-bowl. The bhikkhu should mend it and continue using it. If, however, there is even one hole so large that the metal used to plug it cannot be polished smooth with the surface of the rest of the bowl, the tiny crevices in the patch will collect food. This makes it unfit for use, and the owner is entitled to ask for a new one to replace it.

An extra alms bowl, according to the Vibhaṅga, is any that has not yet been determined for use or placed under shared ownership. Because a bhikkhu may have only one bowl determined for use at any one time, he should place any additional bowls he receives under shared ownership if he plans to keep them on hand. (The procedures for placing bowls under determination and shared ownership, and for rescinding their determination and shared ownership, are given in Appendices IV & V.)

Effort

According to the Commentary, once a bowl belonging to a bhikkhu fulfills all the requirements for a determinable bowl, he is responsible for it even if he has not yet received it into his keeping—in other words, the countdown on the time span begins. For example, if a blacksmith promises to make him a bowl and to send word when it is finished, the bhikkhu is responsible for the bowl as soon as he hears word from the blacksmith’s messenger that the bowl is ready, even if he has yet to receive it. If the blacksmith, prior to making the bowl, promises to send it when it is done, then the bhikkhu is not responsible for it until the blacksmith’s messenger brings it to him. (All of this assumes that the bowl is already fully paid for.)

However, all of this runs contrary to the principle given at Mv.V.13.13, in which the countdown for a robe’s time span (see NP 1) does not begin until the robe reaches one’s hand. It would seem that the same principle should apply here.

The Vibhaṅga states that if within ten days after receiving a new bowl a bhikkhu does not determine it for use, place it under shared ownership, abandon it (give it or throw it away); and if the bowl is not lost, snatched away, damaged beyond repair, or taken on trust, then on the tenth dawnrise after receiving it he incurs the full penalty under this rule. If he then uses the bowl without having forfeited it, the penalty is a dukkaṭa.

Perception is not a mitigating factor here. Even if the bhikkhu thinks that ten days have not passed when they have, or if he thinks that the bowl is damaged beyond repair or placed under shared ownership, etc., when it isn’t, he incurs the penalty all the same.

The Vibhaṅga also states that, in the case of an extra bowl that has not been kept more than ten days, if one perceives it to have been kept more than ten days or if one is in doubt about it, the penalty is a dukkaṭa. As under NP 1, this dukkaṭa is apparently for then using the bowl.

Forfeiture & confession

The procedures for forfeiture, confession, and return of the bowl are the same as under NP 1. For the Pali formulae to use in forfeiting and returning the bowl, see Appendix VI. As with the rules concerning robe-cloth, the bowl must be returned to the offender after he has confessed his offense. Not to return it entails a dukkaṭa. Once the bowl is returned, the ten-day countdown starts all over again.

Non-offenses

There is no offense if within ten days the bhikkhu determines the bowl for use, places it under shared ownership, or abandons it; or if the bowl is lost, destroyed, broken, or snatched away; or if someone else takes the bowl on trust. With regard to “destroyed” and “broken” here, the Commentary’s discussion indicates that these terms mean “damaged beyond repair,” as defined above.

Summary: Keeping an alms bowl for more than ten days without determining it for use or placing it under shared ownership is a nissaggiya pācittiya offense.

*    *    *

22

Should any bhikkhu with an alms bowl having fewer than five mends ask for another new bowl, it is to be forfeited and confessed. The bowl is to be forfeited by the bhikkhu to the company of bhikkhus. That company of bhikkhus’ final bowl should be presented to the bhikkhu, (saying,) “This, bhikkhu, is your bowl. It is to be kept until broken.” This is the proper course here.

“Now at that time a certain potter had invited the bhikkhus, saying, ‘If any of the masters needs a bowl, I will supply him with a bowl.’ So the bhikkhus, knowing no moderation, asked for many bowls. Those with small bowls asked for large ones. Those with large ones asked for small ones. (§) The potter, making many bowls for the bhikkhus, could not make other goods for sale. (As a result,) he could not support himself, and his wife and children suffered.”

Here the full offense involves three factors:

1) Effort: Before one’s alms bowl is beyond repair, one asks for

2) Object: a new almsbowl fit to be determined for use.

3) Result: One obtains the bowl.

According to the Commentary, the phrase, a bowl “having fewer than five mends” refers to one that is not beyond repair, as explained under the preceding rule. Thus this rule allows a bhikkhu whose bowl is beyond repair to ask for a new one.

A bhikkhu whose bowl is not beyond repair incurs a dukkaṭa in asking for a new bowl, and a nissaggiya pācittiya in receiving it.

Forfeiture, confession, & bowl exchange

Once a bhikkhu has obtained a bowl in violation of this rule, he must forfeit it in the midst of the Community and confess the offense. (See Appendix VI for the Pali formulae used in forfeiture and confession.) He then receives the Community’s “final bowl” to use in place of the new one he has forfeited.

The Community’s final bowl is selected in the following way: Each bhikkhu coming to the meeting to witness the offender’s forfeiture and confession must bring the bowl he has determined for his own use. If a bhikkhu has an inferior bowl in his possession—either extra or placed under shared ownership—he is not to determine that bowl and take it to the meeting in hopes of getting a more valuable one in the exchange about to take place. To do so entails a dukkaṭa.

Once the bhikkhus have assembled, the offender forfeits his bowl and confesses the offense. The Community, following the pattern of a motion and one proclamation (ñatti-dutiya-kamma) given in Appendix VI, then chooses one of its members as bowl exchanger. As with all Community officials, the bowl exchanger must be free of the four types of bias: based on desire, based on aversion, based on delusion, based on fear. He must also know when a bowl is properly exchanged and when it’s not. His duty, once authorized, is to take the forfeited bowl and show it to the most senior bhikkhu, who is to choose whichever of the two bowls pleases him more—his own or the new one. If the new bowl is preferable to his own and yet he does not take it out of sympathy for the offender, he incurs a dukkaṭa. The K/Commentary and Sub-commentary add that if he does not prefer the new bowl, there is no offense in not taking it. The Commentary states that if he does prefer the new bowl but, out of a desire to develop the virtue of contentment with what he has, decides not to take it, there is also no offense.

To continue with the Vibhaṅga: Once the most senior bhikkhu has taken his choice, the remaining bowl is then shown to the bhikkhu second in seniority, who repeats the process, and so on down the line to the most junior bhikkhu. The bowl exchanger then takes the bowl remaining from this last bhikkhu’s choice—the least desirable bowl belonging to that company of bhikkhus—and presents it to the offender, telling him to determine it for his use and to care for it as best he can until it is no longer useable.

If the offender treats it improperly—putting it in a place where it might get damaged, using it in the wrong sort of way (on both of these points, see BMC2, Chapter 3)—or tries to get rid of it (§), thinking, “How can this bowl be lost or destroyed or broken,” he incurs a dukkaṭa.

Non-offenses

A bhikkhu whose bowl is not beyond repair incurs no penalty if he asks for a new bowl from relatives or from people who have invited him to ask, or if he gets a new bowl with his own resources. He is also allowed to ask for a bowl for the sake of another, which—following the Commentary to NP 6—would mean that Bhikkhu X may ask for a bowl for Y only if he asks from his own relatives or people who have invited him to ask for a bowl OR if he asks from Y’s relatives or people who have invited Y to ask. Asking for and receiving a bowl for Y from people other than these would entail the full offense.

Summary: Asking for and receiving a new alms bowl when one’s current bowl is not beyond repair is a nissaggiya pācittiya offense.

*    *    *

23

There are these tonics to be taken by sick bhikkhus: ghee, fresh butter, oil, honey, sugar/molasses. Having been received, they are to be used from storage seven days at most. Beyond that, they are to be forfeited and confessed.

The factors for a full offense here are two.

1) Object: any of the five tonics.

2) Effort: One keeps the tonic past the seventh dawnrise after receiving it.

Object

The five tonics mentioned in this rule form one of four classes of edibles grouped according to the time period within which they may be eaten after being received. The other three—food, juice drinks, and medicines—are discussed in detail at the beginning of the Food Chapter in the pācittiya rules. Here is the story of how the tonics came to be a special class:

“Then as the Blessed One was alone in seclusion, this line of reasoning occurred to his mind: ‘At present the bhikkhus, afflicted by the autumn disease, bring up the conjey they have drunk and the meals they have eaten. Because of this they are thin, wretched, unattractive, and pale, their bodies covered with veins. What if I were to allow medicine for them that would be both medicine and agreed to be medicine by the world, and serve as food, yet would not be considered gross (substantial) food.’

“Then this thought occurred to him: ‘There are these five tonics—ghee, fresh butter, oil, honey, sugar/molasses—that are both medicine and agreed to be medicine by the world, and serve as food yet would not be considered gross food. What if I were now to allow the bhikkhus, having accepted them at the right time (from dawnrise to noon), to consume them at the right time’….

“Now at that time bhikkhus, having accepted the five tonics at the right time, consumed them at the right time. Because of this they could not stomach even ordinary coarse foods, much less rich, greasy ones. As a result, afflicted both by the autumn disease and this loss of appetite for meals, they became even more thin and wretched…. So the Blessed One, with regard to this cause, having given a Dhamma talk, addressed the bhikkhus: ‘Bhikkhus, I allow that the five tonics, having been accepted, be consumed at the right time or the wrong time (from noon to dawnrise).’”—Mv.VI.1.2-5

The Vibhaṅga defines the five tonics as follows:

Ghee means strained, boiled butter oil made from the milk of any animal whose flesh is allowable for bhikkhus to eat (see the introduction to the Food Chapter in the pācittiya rules).

Fresh butter must be made from the milk of any animal whose flesh is allowable. None of the Vinaya texts go into detail on how fresh butter is made, but MN 126 describes the process as “having sprinkled curds in a pot, one twirls them with a churn.” Fresh butter of this sort is still made in India today by taking a small churn—looking like an orange with alternate sections removed, attached to a small stick—and twirling it in curds, all the while sprinkling them with water. The fresh butter—mostly milk fat—coagulates on the churn, and when the fresh butter is removed, what is left in the pot is diluted buttermilk. Fresh butter, unlike creamery butter made by churning cream, may be stored unrefrigerated in bottles for several days even in the heat of India without going rancid.

Arguing by the Great Standards, creamery butter would obviously come under fresh butter here. A more controversial topic is cheese.

In Mv.VI.34.21, the Buddha allows bhikkhus to consume five products of the cow: milk, curds, buttermilk, fresh butter, and ghee. Apparently, cheese—curds heated to evaporate their liquid content and then cured with or without mold—was unknown in those days, but there seems every reason, using the Great Standards, to include it under one of the five. The question is which one. Some have argued that it should come under fresh butter, but the argument for classifying it under curds seems stronger, as it is closer to curds in composition and is generally regarded as more of a substantial food. Different Communities, however, have differing opinions on this matter.

Oil, according to the Vibhaṅga, includes sesame oil, mustard seed oil, “honey tree” oil, castor oil, and oil from tallow. The Commentary adds that oil made from any plants not listed in the Vibhaṅga carries a dukkaṭa if kept more than seven days, although it would seem preferable to use the Great Standards and simply apply the full offense under this rule to all plant oils that can be used as food; and to class as medicines (see BMC2, Chapter 5) any aromatic plant oils—such as tea-tree oil or peppermint oil—made from leaves or resins that qualify as medicines that can be kept for life.

Mv.VI.2.1 allows five kinds of tallow: bear, fish, alligator, pig, and donkey tallow. Because bear meat is one of the kinds normally unallowable for bhikkhus, the Sub-commentary interprets this list as meaning that oil from the tallow of any animal whose flesh is allowable—and from any animal whose flesh, if eaten, carries a dukkaṭa—is allowable here. Because human flesh, if eaten, carries a thullaccaya, oil from human fat is not allowed.

Mv.VI.2.1 adds that tallow of any allowable sort may be consumed as oil if received in the right time (before noon, according to the Commentary), rendered in the right time, and filtered in the right time. (The PTS and Thai editions of the Canon use the word saṁsaṭṭha here, which usually means “mixed together”; the Sri Lankan edition reads saṁsatta, or “hung together.” Whichever the reading, the Commentary states that the meaning here is “filtered,” which best fits the context.) According to Mv.VI.2.2, if the tallow has been received, rendered, or filtered after noon, the act of consuming the resulting oil carries a dukkaṭa for each of the three activities that took place after noon. For example, if the tallow was received before noon but rendered and filtered after noon, there are two dukkaṭas for consuming the resulting oil.

Whether the Great Standards can be used to include gelatin under the category of “oil” here is a controversial topic. The argument for including it is that, like oil from tallow, it is rendered from a part of an animal’s body that the Commentary would include under “flesh,” and—on its own—it does not serve as substantial food. Different Communities, however, have differing opinions on this matter.

Honey means the honey of bees, although the Commentary lists two species of bee—cirika, long and with wings, and tumbala, large, black and with hard wings—whose honey it says is very viscous and ranks as a medicine, not as one of the five tonics.

Sugar/molasses the Vibhaṅga defines simply as what is extracted from sugar cane. The Commentary interprets this as meaning not only sugar and molasses, but also fresh sugar cane juice, but this contradicts Mv.VI.35.6, which classes fresh sugar cane juice as a juice drink, not a tonic. The Commentary also says that sugar or molasses made from any fruit classed as a food—such as coconut or date palm—ranks as a food and not as a tonic, but it is hard to guess at its reasoning here, as sugar cane itself is also classed as a food. The Vinaya-mukha seems more correct in using the Great Standards to say that all forms of sugar and molasses, no matter what the source, would be included here. Thus maple syrup and beet-sugar would come under this rule.

The Vinaya-mukha—arguing from the parallel between sugar cane juice, which is a juice drink, and sugar, which is made by boiling sugar cane juice—maintains that boiled juice would fit under sugar here. This opinion, however, is not accepted in all Communities.

According to Mv.VI.16.1, even if the sugar has a little flour mixed in with it simply to make it firmer—as sometimes happens in sugar cubes and blocks of palm sugar—it is still classed as a tonic as long as it is still regarded simply as “sugar.” If the mixture is regarded as something else—candy, for instance—it counts as a food and may not be eaten after noon of the day on which it is received.

Sugar substitutes that have no food value would apparently not be classed as a food or a tonic, and thus would come under the category of life-long medicines.

Proper use

According to Mv.VI.40.3, any tonic received today may be eaten mixed with food or juice drinks received today, but not with food or juice drinks received on a later day. Thus, as the Commentary points out, tonics received in the morning may be eaten with food that morning; if received in the afternoon, they may not be eaten mixed with food at all.

Also, the Commentary to this rule says at one point that one may take the tonic at any time during those seven days regardless of whether one is ill. At another point, though—in line with the Vibhaṅga to Pc 37 & 38, which assigns a dukkaṭa for taking a tonic as food—it says that one may take the tonic after the morning of the day on which it is received only if one has a reason. This statement the Sub-commentary explains as meaning that any reason suffices—e.g., hunger, weakness—as long as one is not taking the tonic for nourishment as food. In other words, one may take enough to assuage one’s hunger, but not to fill oneself up.

Mv.VI.27, however, contains a special stipulation for the use of sugar. If one is ill, one may take it “as is” at any time during the seven days; if not, then after noon of the first day one may take it only if it is mixed with water.

Effort

If a bhikkhu keeps a tonic past the seventh dawnrise after it has been received—either by himself or another bhikkhu—he is to forfeit it and confess the nissaggiya pācittiya offense. Perception is not a mitigating factor here. Even if he thinks that seven days have not yet passed when they actually have—or thinks that the tonic is no longer in his possession when it actually is—he incurs the penalty all the same (§).

Offenses

The procedures for forfeiture, confession, and return of the tonic are the same as under NP 1. The formula to use in forfeiting the tonic is given in Appendix VI. Once the bhikkhu receives the tonic in return, he may not use it to eat or to apply to his body, although he may use it for other external purposes, such as oil for a lamp, etc. Other bhikkhus may not eat the tonic either, but they may apply it to their bodies—for example, as oil to rub down their limbs.

The Vibhaṅga states that, in the case of a tonic that has not been kept more than seven days, if one perceives it to have been kept more than seven days or if one is in doubt about it, the penalty is a dukkaṭa. As under NP 1, this dukkaṭa is apparently for using the tonic.

Non-offenses

According to the Vibhaṅga, there is no offense if within seven days the tonic gets lost, destroyed, burnt, snatched away, or taken on trust; or if the bhikkhu determines it for use, abandons it, or—having given it away to an unordained person, abandoning desire for it—he receives it in return and makes use of it (§).

The Commentary contains an extended discussion of these last three points.

1) Determining the tonic for use means that within the seven days the bhikkhu determines that he will use it not as an internal medicine, but only to apply to the outside of his body or for other external purposes instead. In this case, he may keep the tonic as long as he likes without penalty.

2) Unlike the other rules dealing with robe-cloth or bowls kept x number of days, the non-offense clauses here do not include exemptions for tonics placed under shared ownership, but the Commentary discusses abandons it as if it read “places it under shared ownership.” Its verdict: Any tonic placed under shared ownership may be kept for more than seven days without incurring a penalty as long as the owners do not divide up their shares, but after the seventh day they may not use it for internal purposes. The Sub-commentary adds that any tonic placed under shared ownership may not be used at all until the arrangement is rescinded.

3) The Commentary reports a controversy between two Vinaya experts on the meaning of the last exemption in the list—i.e., “having given it away to an unordained person, abandoning possession of it in his mind, he receives it in return and makes use of it.” Ven. Mahā Sumanatthera states that the phrase, “if within seven days” applies here as well: If within seven days the bhikkhu gives the tonic to an unordained person, having abandoned possession of it in his mind, he may then keep it and consume it for another seven days if the unordained person happens to return it to him.

Ven. Mahā Padumatthera disagrees, saying that the exemption abandons it already covers such a case, and that the exemption here refers to the situation where a bhikkhu has kept a tonic past seven days, has forfeited it and received it in return, and then gives it up to an unordained person. If the unordained person then returns the tonic to him, he may use it to rub on his body.

The K/Commentary agrees with the latter position, but this creates some problems, both textual and practical. To begin with, the phrase, “if within seven days,” modifies every one of the other non-offense clauses under this rule, and there is nothing to indicate that it does not modify this one, too. Second, every one of the other exemptions refers directly to ways of avoiding the full offense and not to ways of dealing with the forfeited article after it is returned, and again there is nothing to indicate that the last exemption breaks this pattern.

On the practical side, if the exemption abandons it covers cases where a bhikkhu may give up the tonic to anyone at all and then receive it in return to use for another seven days, bhikkhus could spend their time trading hoards of tonics among themselves indefinitely, and the rule would become meaningless. But as the origin story shows, it was precisely to prevent them from amassing such hoards that the rule was formulated in the first place.

“Then Ven. Pilindavaccha went to the residence of King Seniya Bimbisāra of Magadha and, on arrival, sat down on a seat made ready. Then King Seniya Bimbisāra… went to Ven. Pilindavaccha and, on arrival, having bowed down to him, sat to one side. As he was sitting there, Ven. Pilindavaccha addressed him: ‘For what reason, great king, has the monastery attendant’s family been imprisoned?’

“‘Venerable sir, in the monastery attendant’s house was a garland of gold: beautiful, attractive, exquisite. There is no garland of gold like it even in our own harem, so from where did that poor man (get it)? It must have been taken by theft.’

“Then Ven. Pilindavaccha willed that the palace of King Seniya Bimbisāra be gold. And it became made entirely of gold. ‘But from where did you get so much of this gold, great king?’

“(Saying,) ‘I understand, venerable sir. This is simply the master’s psychic power’ (§—reading ayyass’ev’eso with the Thai edition of the Canon)’ he had the monastery attendant’s family released.

“The people, saying, ‘A psychic wonder, a superior human feat, they say, was displayed to the king and his retinue by the master Pilindavaccha,’ were pleased and delighted. They presented Ven. Pilindavaccha with the five tonics: ghee, fresh butter, oil, honey, and sugar.

“Now ordinarily Ven. Pilindavaccha was already a receiver of the five tonics (§), so he distributed his gains among his company, who came to live in abundance. They put away their gains, having filled pots and pitchers. They hung up their gains in windows, having filled water strainers and bags. These kept oozing and seeping, and their dwellings were crawling and creeping with rats. People, engaged in a tour of the dwellings and seeing this, criticized and complained and spread it about, ‘These Sakyan-son monks have inner storerooms like the king….’”

Thus it seems more likely that the Vibhaṅga’s non-offense clauses should be interpreted like this: A bhikkhu is no longer held responsible for a tonic if he abandons it or gives it away—no matter to whom he gives it, or what his state of mind—but he may receive it in return and use it another seven days only if within the first seven days he has given it to an unordained person, having abandoned all possession of it in his mind.

Summary: Keeping any of the five tonics—ghee, fresh butter, oil, honey, or sugar/molasses—for more than seven days, unless one determines to use them only externally, is a nissaggiya pācittiya offense.

*    *    *

24

When a month is left to the hot season, a bhikkhu may seek a rains-bathing cloth. When a half-month is left to the hot season, (the cloth) having been made, may be worn. If when more than a month is left to the hot season he should seek a rains-bathing cloth, (or) when more than a half-month is left to the hot season, (the cloth) having been made should be worn, it is to be forfeited and confessed.

Bhikkhus in the time of the Buddha commonly bathed in a river or lake. Passages in the Canon tell of some of the dangers involved: They had to watch over their robes to make sure they weren’t stolen or washed away by the river, and at the same time make sure they didn’t expose themselves. (SN 2:10 tells of a female deva who, seeing a young bhikkhu bathing, became smitten with the sight of him wearing only his lower robe. She appeared to him, suggesting that he leave the monkhood to take his fill of sensual pleasures before his youth had passed, but fortunately he was far enough in the practice to resist her advances.) A further danger during the rainy season was that the rivers would become swollen and their currents strong. During this time, then, bhikkhus would bathe in the rain.

Rains-bathing cloth

Mv.VIII.15.1-7 tells the story of a servant girl who went to a monastery and—seeing bhikkhus out bathing naked in the rain—concluded that there were no bhikkhus there, but only naked ascetics. She returned to tell her mistress, Lady Visākhā, who realized what was actually happening and made this the occasion to ask permission of the Buddha to provide rains-bathing cloths for the bhikkhus, because as she put it, “Nakedness is repulsive.” He granted her request, and at a later point (Mv.VIII.20.2) stated that a rains-bathing cloth could be determined for use during the four months of the rainy season—beginning with the day after the full moon in July, or the second if there are two—and that at the end of the four months it was to be placed under shared ownership. This training rule deals with the protocol for seeking and using such a cloth during the rains and the period immediately preceding them.

The protocol as sketched out in the Vibhaṅga—together with details from the Commentary in parentheses and my own comments in brackets—is as follows: During the first two weeks of the fourth lunar month of the hot season—[the lunar cycle ending with the full moon in July, or the first full moon if there are two]—a bhikkhu may seek a rains-bathing cloth and make it (if he gets enough material). (However, he may not yet use it or determine it for use because it may be determined for use only during the four months of the rainy season—[see Mv.VIII.20.2].)

In seeking the cloth he may directly ask for it from relatives or people who have invited him to ask, or he may approach people who have provided rains-bathing cloths in the past and give them such hints as: “It is the time for material for a rains-bathing cloth,” or “People are giving material for a rains-bathing cloth.” As under NP 10, he may not say, “Give me material for a rains-bathing cloth,” or “Get me…” or “Exchange for me …” or “Buy me material for a rains-bathing cloth.” (If he asks directly from people who are not relatives or who have not invited him to ask, he incurs a dukkaṭa; if he then receives cloth from them, he incurs the full penalty under NP 6. If he gives hints to people who have never provided rains-bathing cloths in the past, he incurs a dukkaṭa [which the Commentary assigns on the general principle of breaking a duty].)

During the last two weeks of the fourth lunar month of the hot season he may now begin using his cloth (although he may not yet determine it for use). [This shows clearly that this rule is providing an exemption to NP 1, under which he otherwise would be forced to determine the cloth within ten days after receiving it.] (If he has not yet received enough material, he may continue seeking for more in the way described above and make himself a cloth when he receives enough.)

(When the first day of the rainy season arrives, he may determine the cloth. If he does not yet have enough material to make his rains-bathing cloth, he may continue seeking it throughout the four months of the rains.) If he bathes naked in the rain when he has a cloth to use, he incurs a dukkaṭa. (However, he may bathe naked in a lake or river without penalty. If he has no cloth to use, he may also bathe naked in the rain.)

(At the end of the four months, he is to wash his cloth, place it under shared ownership, and put it aside if it is still usable. He may begin using it again the last two weeks of the last lunar month before the next rainy season and is to re-determine it for use on the day the rainy season officially begins.)

Toward the end of his discussion of this rule, Buddhaghosa adds his own personal opinion on when a rains-bathing cloth should be determined for use if it is finished during the rains—on the grounds that the ancient commentaries do not discuss the issue—one of the few places where he overtly gives his own opinion anywhere in the Commentary. His verdict: If one receives enough material to finish the cloth within ten days, one should determine it within those ten days. If not, one may keep what material one has, undetermined and throughout the rainy season if need be, until one does obtain enough material and then determine the cloth on the day it is completed.

Offenses

As the K/Commentary points out, this rule covers two separate offenses whose factors are somewhat different: the offense for seeking a rains-bathing cloth at the wrong time and the offense for using it at the wrong time.

Seeking

The factors here are three: object, effort, and result. The bhikkhu is looking for material for a rains-bathing cloth, he makes hints to people during the time he is not allowed to make hints, and he receives the cloth.

Using

The factors here are two: object—he has a rains-bathing cloth—and effort—he has other robes to use, there are no dangers, and yet he wears the cloth during the period when he is not allowed to wear it. (The conditions here are based on the non-offenses clauses, which we will discuss below.)

In neither of these cases is perception a mitigating factor. Even if a bhikkhu thinks that the right time to hint for the cloth or to wear it has come when it actually hasn’t, he is not immune from an offense.

A bhikkhu who has committed either of the two full offenses here is to forfeit the cloth and confess the offense. The procedures for forfeiture, confession, and return of the cloth are the same as under NP 1.

If a bhikkhu seeks or uses a rains-bathing cloth during the permitted times and yet believes that he is doing so outside of the permitted times, or if he is in doubt about the matter, he incurs a dukkaṭa.

Non-offenses

As the rule states, there is no offense for the bhikkhu who hints for a rains-bathing cloth within the last lunar month of the hot season, or for one who wears his rains-bathing cloth during the last two weeks of that month.

The Vibhaṅga then refers to a situation that occasionally happens under the lunar calendar: The four months of the hot season end, but the Rains-residence is delayed another lunar cycle because a thirteenth lunar month has been added at the end of the hot season or the beginning of the rainy season to bring the lunar year back into line with the solar year. In this case, it says that the rains-bathing cloth—having been sought for during the fourth month and worn during the last two weeks of the hot season—is to be washed and then put aside. When the proper season arrives, it may be brought out for use (§).

The Commentary adds that there is no need to determine the cloth in this period until the day the Rains-residence officially starts, but it doesn’t say when the proper season for using it begins. Having made use of the two-week allowance for using the undetermined bathing cloth at the end of the hot season, is one granted another two-week allowance prior to the Rains-residence, or can one begin using it only when the Rains-residence begins? None of the texts say. It would make sense to allow the bhikkhu to begin using the cloth two weeks before the Rains-residence, but this is simply my own opinion.

The Vibhaṅga then adds three more exemptions: There is no offense for a “snatched-away-robe” bhikkhu, a “destroyed-robe” bhikkhu, or when there are dangers. Strangely enough, the Commentary and the K/Commentary—although both were composed by Buddhaghosa—give conflicting interpretations of these exemptions. The Commentary interprets “robe” here as meaning rains-bathing cloth, and says that these exemptions apply to the dukkaṭa offense for bathing naked in the rain. A bhikkhu whose rains-bathing cloth has been snatched away or destroyed may bathe naked in the rain without incurring a penalty, as may a bhikkhu with an expensive bathing cloth who would rather bathe naked because of his fear of cloth thieves.

The K/Commentary, however, makes the Vibhaṅga’s exemptions refer also to the full offense. If a bhikkhu’s other robes have been snatched away or destroyed, he may wear his rains-bathing cloth out of season. The same holds true when, in the words of the K/Commentary, “naked thieves are plundering,” and a bhikkhu decides to wear his rains-bathing cloth out-of-season in order to protect either it or his other robes from being snatched away.

Because the non-offense clauses usually apply primarily to the full offense, it seems appropriate to follow the K/Commentary here.

At present, much of this discussion is purely academic, inasmuch as most bhikkhus—if they use a bathing cloth—tend to determine it for use as a “requisite cloth” so as to avoid any possible offense under this rule.

Summary: Seeking and receiving a rains-bathing cloth before the fourth month of the hot season is a nissaggiya pācittiya offense.

Using a rains-bathing cloth before the last two weeks of the fourth month of the hot season is also a nissaggiya pācittiya offense.

*    *    *

25

Should any bhikkhu—having himself given robe-cloth to (another) bhikkhu and then being angered and displeased—snatch it back or have it snatched back, it is to be forfeited and confessed.

“At that time Ven. Upananda the Sakyan said to his brother’s student, ‘Come, friend, let’s set out on a tour of the countryside.’

“‘I can’t go, venerable sir. My robe is threadbare.’

“‘Come, friend, I’ll give you a robe.’ And he gave him a robe. Then that bhikkhu heard, ‘The Blessed One, they say, is going to set out on a tour of the countryside.’ The thought occurred to him: ‘Now I won’t set out on a tour of the countryside with Ven. Upananda the Sakyan. I’ll set out on a tour of the countryside with the Blessed One.’

“Then Ven. Upananda said to him, ‘Come, friend, let’s set out on that tour of the countryside now.’

“‘I won’t set out on a tour of the countryside with you, venerable sir. I’ll set out on a tour of the countryside with the Blessed One.’

“‘But the robe I gave you, my friend, will set out on a tour of the countryside with me.’ And angered and displeased, he snatched the robe back.”

As the Commentary points out, this rule applies to cases where one perceives the robe-cloth as being rightfully one’s own even after having given it away, as when giving it on an implicit or explicit condition that the recipient does not later fulfill. Thus the act of snatching back here does not entail a pārājika. If, however, one has mentally abandoned ownership of the robe to the recipient and then for some reason snatches it back, the case would come under Pr 2.

The factors for an offense here are three.

Object:

A piece of any of the six allowable kinds of robe-cloth, measuring at least four by eight fingerbreadths.

Effort

One has given the cloth to another bhikkhu on one condition or another and then either snatches it back or has someone else snatch it back. In the latter case, one incurs a dukkaṭa in giving the order to snatch the robe, and the full offense when the robe is snatched. If one’s order is to snatch a single robe but the person ordered snatches and delivers more than one robe, they are all to be forfeited.

Perception (with regard to the recipient/victim) is not a mitigating factor here. If he actually is a bhikkhu, then the offense is a pācittiya regardless of whether one perceives him to be so. If he is not a bhikkhu, the offense is a dukkaṭa, again regardless of whether one perceives him as a bhikkhu or not.

Intention

One is impelled by anger or displeasure. The displeasure here, however, need not be great, as the Vibhaṅga makes an exemption for only one sort of intention under this rule, that of taking the cloth on trust (§).

 Forfeiture & confession. A bhikkhu who has obtained robe-cloth in violation of this rule is to forfeit it and confess the offense. The procedures for forfeiture, confession, and return of the cloth are the same as under NP 1. The formula to use in forfeiting the cloth is given in Appendix VI.

Lesser offenses

There is a dukkaṭa for angrily snatching back from a bhikkhu requisites other than cloth; and for angrily snatching back any kind of requisite—cloth or otherwise—that one has given to someone who is not a bhikkhu. The Sub-commentary adds that to give robe-cloth to a layman planning to be ordained, and then to snatch it back in this way after his ordination, entails the full offense.

Non-offenses

According to the Vibhaṅga, there is no offense if the recipient returns the robe of his own accord or if the donor takes it back on trust (§). The Commentary’s discussion of the first exemption shows that if the recipient returns the robe after receiving a gentle hint from the donor—“I gave you the robe in hopes that you would study with me, but now you are studying with someone else”—the donor incurs no penalty. However, if the donor’s hint shows anger—“I gave this robe to a bhikkhu who would study with me, not to one who would study with somebody else!”—he incurs a dukkaṭa for the hint, but no penalty when the recipient returns the robe.

Summary: Having given another bhikkhu a robe on a condition and then—angry and displeased—snatching it back or having it snatched back is a nissaggiya pācittiya offense.

*    *    *

26

Should any bhikkhu, having requested thread, have robe-cloth woven by weavers, it is to be forfeited and confessed.

This rule covers two actions—asking for thread and getting weavers to weave it into robe-cloth—but the Vibhaṅga is often unclear as to which action its explanations refer to. It barely touches on the first action explicitly, and even its treatment of the second action is extremely terse, leaving many questions unanswered. For these reasons, the compilers of the Commentary felt called upon to clarify the references and fill in the blanks even more than is normally the case. The Vibhaṅga’s discussion does make clear that the factors for an offense here are three—object, effort, and result—so the following discussion will focus on each factor in turn, stating what the Vibhaṅga does and doesn’t say about that factor, giving the Commentary’s further explanations, at the same time evaluating those further explanations as to their cogency.

Object:

Thread or yarn of the six allowable types for robe-cloth that a bhikkhu has himself requested from others. Because the Vibhaṅga’s non-offense clauses give an exemption “to sew a robe,” the Commentary is apparently right in stating that, to fulfill this factor, the thread or yarn has to have been requested for the purpose of making robe-cloth. And because the non-offense clauses also state, “from relatives or people who have invited one to ask,” the Commentary also seems right in stating that thread requested from these two types of people would not fulfill this factor. However, none of the texts explicitly assign a penalty for requesting thread that would not fall under the exemptions. Perhaps it would entail a dukkaṭa under the catch-all rule against misbehavior (Cv.V.36).

Effort

One gets weavers to weave robe-cloth using the thread. Again, because of the exemptions regarding relatives and people who have invited one to ask, the Commentary seems correct in saying that any weavers who fall into either of these categories would not fulfill this factor.

The Vibhaṅga does not give a minimum size for the robe-cloth. The Commentary, following the pattern from other NP rules, states that any cloth measuring four by eight fingerbreadths or larger would fulfill this factor. However, several of the items allowed in the non-offense clauses would be larger than that measurement, so it seems preferable to interpret robe-cloth here as robe—as the Commentary does under Pc 58, where again the Vibhaṅga gives no minimum size for the cloth. In other words, the penalty is for getting the weavers to weave a wearable robe.

The Vibhaṅga states that there is a dukkaṭa in the effort of getting the weavers to weave the robe-cloth, which the Commentary explains by saying that the first dukkaṭa is incurred with the weavers’ first effort toward actually making the cloth, with additional dukkaṭas incurred for each additional effort they make. In other words, the dukkaṭa is for successfully getting the weavers to act on one’s request. It may seem strange not to allot a dukkaṭa for the request itself, but the Vibhaṅga to the following rule clearly states that the bhikkhu, in a similar case, incurs a dukkaṭa only when the weavers act on his request to improve a robe. The Vibhaṅga for this rule simply uses the causative—the form of verb describing the act of getting someone else to do something—which is ambiguous, for it could mean either trying to get the weavers to weave the cloth or successfully getting the weavers to weave the cloth. To clear up the ambiguity, the Commentary seems justified in applying the pattern from the following rule here. However, it seems excessive to impose multiple dukkaṭas on the bhikkhu for what, from his point of view, was a single action. There are many rules—such as Pc 10, Pc 20, and Pc 56—where a single request carries only one offense even if the person requested does the action many times.

None of the texts discuss this point further, but the Commentary’s interpretation of the causative verb here apparently holds for other rules as well in which the Vibhaṅga imposes a penalty on a bhikkhu for improperly getting someone else to make an item for him, such as NP 11-15 and Pc 86-92: no offense for the request itself, but a dukkaṭa if the request successfully persuades the other person to act in line with it. Only when the Vibhaṅga explicitly states that there is an offense in the request—as under Pc 26, the rule concerned with sewing a robe or having one sewn for a bhikkhunī—does the request carry an offense even if the person requested does not follow it.

Result

One obtains the cloth. According to the Commentary, the cloth counts as “obtained” when the weavers have completed weaving four by eight fingerbreadths of cloth. It also states that there is an extra NP offense for each added four-by-eight-fingerbreadths section they complete. Neither of these explanations has a precedent anywhere in the Canon. Mv.V.13.13 states clearly that the countdown on the time span of robe-cloth begins only when it is delivered to one’s hand, and the same principle would surely apply here: The full offense is incurred when the robe-cloth is delivered to one’s hand. As for the second explanation, the Vibhaṅga assigns only one full offense for receiving the cloth, which means that a larger piece of cloth would not carry more offenses than a smaller one.

Perception is not a factor here. The Vibhaṅga states if the cloth was woven as a result of one’s request, then even if one perceives it as not having been woven at one’s request or if one is in doubt about the matter, one incurs the full offense. If, on the other hand, the cloth was not woven at one’s request and yet one perceives it as having been woven at one’s request—or one is in doubt about the matter—the penalty on obtaining it is a dukkaṭa.

Forfeiture & confession

Robe-cloth received in a way that entails the full offense under this rule is to be forfeited and the offense confessed, following the procedure under NP 1.

Derived offenses

To provide a complete treatment of the various combinations of proper and improper behavior related to the two actions covered by this rule, the Commentary gives a table working out the possible combinations of offenses based on two variables: thread properly or improperly received, and weavers proper or improper for the bhikkhu to ask. Thread properly received is any that the bhikkhu has requested from people who are related to him or have invited him to ask. Similarly, weavers proper for him to ask are any who are related to him or have offered him their services.

If both the thread and the weavers are classed as not proper, the penalty is a dukkaṭa in getting them to weave cloth, and a nissaggiya pācittiya when the cloth is obtained.

There is a dukkaṭa in obtaining the cloth if the thread is proper, but the weavers not; OR if the thread is not proper, but the weavers are. (For ease of remembrance: a dukkaṭa if one variable is proper and the other not.)

If both variables are proper, there is no offense.

The Commentary then has a field day working out the permutations if two different weavers—one proper and one improper—work on the cloth, or if proper and improper thread are used in the cloth—proper warp and improper woof, or alternating strands of proper and improper thread—which if nothing else provides an insight into the commentators’ minds.

Non-offenses

The Vibhaṅga says that there is no offense “to sew a robe; in (§) a knee strap (§), in a belt, in a shoulder strap, in a bag for carrying the bowl, or in a water-strainer; from relatives or people who have invited one to ask; for the sake of another; or by means of one’s own resources.”

The Commentary interprets the first exemption as applying to the first action mentioned in the rule, meaning that there is no offense in asking anyone at all for thread or yarn to sew a robe. This seems right, as the grammatical form of the exemption is unusual for a non-offense clause, and does not follow the pattern the Vibhaṅga would have used if the exemption were for getting the weavers to sew a robe.

The Commentary also states that the exemptions for a knee strap and the other small items also apply to the first action. In other words, one may request thread or yarn from anyone to make these items, but may not get weavers to weave them. This explanation seems designed to support the Commentary’s position that a piece of cloth measuring four by eight fingerbreadths would be grounds for a full offense under this rule. Here, however, the grammatical form of the relevant exemptions does not support the Commentary’s assertion, for it follows a pattern typical throughout the Vibhaṅga for non-offenses related to the main action covered by a rule. Thus there would be no offense in providing weavers with thread with which to make small items of this sort. Because these articles can be quickly woven, this may have been a common courtesy that weavers extended to contemplatives in the Buddha’s time.

As for the exemptions for relatives and people who have invited one to ask, we have already noted that the Commentary seems correct in applying them to both actions: asking for thread and getting weavers to weave cloth.

Following the Commentary’s explanation under NP 6 & 22, for the sake of another here would mean that one may ask from one’s own relatives or from those who have invited one to ask OR from relatives of the other person or people who have invited him to ask. Asking for his sake from people other than these would entail the full offense.

If the cloth is obtained by means of one’s own resources—i.e., one arranges to pay for the thread and hire the weavers—the Commentary states that one is responsible for the cloth as soon as it is finished and fully paid for, regardless of whether it is delivered into one’s possession. One must therefore determine it for use within 10 days of that date so as not to commit an offense under NP 1. (Alternatively, the Commentary suggests, one may avoid this difficulty by not giving full payment for the cloth until it is delivered.) If, after one has given full payment for the cloth, the weavers promise to send word when the cloth is done, one’s responsibility starts when one receives word from their messenger; if they have promised to send the cloth when done, one’s responsibility begins when their messenger delivers it. At any rate, as with its explanation of “obtaining cloth” under this rule, the Commentary’s statements here conflict with the principle in Mv.V.13.13, in which the countdown on the time span of the cloth begins only when it is delivered to one’s hand.

Summary: Taking thread that one has asked for improperly and getting weavers to weave cloth from it—when they are unrelated and have not made a previous offer to weave—is a nissaggiya pācittiya offense.

*    *    *

27

In case a man or woman householder unrelated (to the bhikkhu) has robe-cloth woven by weavers for the sake of a bhikkhu, and if the bhikkhu, not previously invited (by the householder), having approached the weavers, should make stipulations with regard to the cloth, saying, “This cloth, friends, is being woven for my sake. Make it long, make it broad, make it tightly woven, well woven, well spread, well scraped, well smoothed, and perhaps I may reward you with a little something”; and should the bhikkhu, having said that, reward them with a little something, even as much as almsfood, it (the cloth) is to be forfeited and confessed.

The origin story here starts like the origin story for NP 8—a donor plans to clothe Ven. Upananda with a robe—but it contains two differences: Ven. Upananda interferes in the process of making the robe while it is still cloth being woven; and he addresses his stipulations, not to the donors, but to the weavers. The Buddha could have used this occasion as a chance to expand that rule, but he didn’t—perhaps because the change in details required new definitions for the factors of effort and object. Under NP 8, “object” is fulfilled only by a finished robe; here, it is fulfilled simply by the cloth made by the weavers, whether sewn into a finished robe or not.

The factors for an offense here are three.

Object:

A piece of any of the six allowable types of robe-cloth, measuring at least four by eight fingerbreadths, which is being made for one’s sake by the arrangement of a donor who is unrelated and has not given an invitation to ask.

Effort

One approaches the weavers and gets them to improve the cloth in any of the seven ways mentioned in the rule. Although the rule seems to indicate that the factor of effort is completed only when the weavers receive the promised reward, the Vibhaṅga says simply that it is completed when, as a result of one’s statement, the weavers improve the cloth as requested. In addition, the non-offense clauses give no exemption for a bhikkhu who does not give the promised reward. Thus, the bhikkhu does not have to give the reward for this factor to be fulfilled. The commentaries follow the Vibhaṅga on this point, and add that the bhikkhu’s statement need not even include a promise of a reward. As the Commentary puts it, the bhikkhu’s words quoted in the rule are meant simply as an example of any way in which one might get them to add more thread to the cloth. The Sub-commentary, however, notes that of the seven ways of improving the cloth, only the first three involve added thread. Its implied conclusion is that any statement that succeeds in getting the weavers to improve the cloth in any of these seven ways would fulfill the factor of effort here, regardless of whether the improvement involves adding more thread.

As for the promised reward, the Vibhaṅga defines almsfood as covering anything of even the slightest material value—food, a lump of powder, tooth wood, unwoven thread, or even a phrase of Dhamma. (For example, the bhikkhu might try to get the weavers to improve the cloth by promising to describe the merit they will gain by doing so.) Note, however, that almsfood is defined as the minimal amount of reward. There is no maximum on what might be promised. Thus, even if the bhikkhu promises to pay in full for any added materials or time that the weavers might devote to the robe, he does not escape fulfilling this factor of the offense. (Some have objected that it should be all right for the bhikkhu to pay in full for the improvements in the robe, but remember that to do so would be an insult to the donors.)

Result

One obtains the cloth.

Offenses

The bhikkhu incurs a dukkaṭa when the weavers improve the cloth in line with his instructions, and the full offense when he obtains it. The procedures for forfeiture, confession, and return of the cloth are the same as under NP 1. The role of perception—regarding whether the donors are one’s relatives or not—is the same as under NP 8.

Non-offenses

There is no offense if—

the donors are relatives,

they have invited one to ask,

one asks for the sake of another,

one gets the weavers to make the cloth less expensive than the donors had ordered, or

it is by means of one’s own resources. (This last point refers only to cases where the bhikkhu was the one who had the weavers hired in the first place.)

Summary: When donors who are not relatives—and have not invited one to ask—have arranged for weavers to weave robe-cloth intended for one: Receiving the cloth after getting the weavers to improve it is a nissaggiya pācittiya offense.

*    *    *

28

Ten days prior to the third-month Kattika full moon, should robe-cloth offered in urgency accrue to a bhikkhu, he is to accept it if he regards it as offered in urgency. Once he has accepted it, he may keep it throughout the robe season. Beyond that, it is to be forfeited and confessed.

The third-month Kattika full moon is the full moon in October, or the first if there are two. This is the final day of the first Rains-residence, and the day before the beginning of the robe season.

 Robe-cloth offered in urgency is any piece of the six allowable kinds of robe-cloth, measuring at least four by eight fingerbreadths, offered under the following conditions: The donor is someone who wants the greater merit that some people believe accrues to a gift of cloth given during the robe season, but who does not want to wait until the robe season to make an offering, either because his/her survival is in doubt—as when a soldier is going into war, a traveler is about to set out on a journey, or a woman has become pregnant—or because he/she has developed new-found faith in the religion. At any time from the fifth through the fifteenth day of the waxing moon at the end of the first Rains-residence (see BMC2, Chapter 11) he/she sends a messenger to the bhikkhus, saying, “May the venerable ones come. I am giving a Rains-residence (cloth).” (The Commentary adds that the donor can also simply bring the cloth to the bhikkhus him- or herself.) Out of compassion for the donor, the bhikkhus should accept the cloth and then, before putting it aside, mark it as robe-cloth offered in urgency. The cloth can then be kept throughout the robe season—the first month after the Rains if the kaṭhina is not spread; and the period during which the kaṭhina privileges are in effect if it is.

The question is, why mark it?

The Commentary argues that, because the cloth counts as Rains-residence cloth, it can appropriately be shared out only among bhikkhus who have kept the Rains-residence up to that point. If any other bhikkhu receives such a piece of cloth, he must give it back, as it belongs to the Community. Thus the mark is for the purpose of recognizing it as such. However, if this were the rationale, there would be no reason to treat the cloth any differently from other gifts of Rains-residence cloth. A more likely rationale for the mark is suggested by a later passage in the Commentary: Other gifts of cloth received during the last ten days of the Rains-residence carry a life span that can, under NP 1 or 3, extend past the end of the robe season. If, for instance, the cloth is offered five days before the end of the Rains, then after the end of the robe season, it can be kept—without determining it or placing it under shared ownership—for an additional five days; if it is not enough to make a robe, it can be kept for up to an additional 25. Robe-cloth offered in urgency, however—as the Vibhaṅga makes clear—carries a life-span that cannot extend past the end of the robe season. Thus, on receiving such a gift of cloth, one should mark it as such before putting it away so as not to forget its status when the end of the robe season approaches.

The factors for an offense

The factors for an offense here are two: object—robe-cloth offered in urgency; and effort—one keeps it past the end of the robe season: the dawnrise after the full moon one month after the end of the first Rains-residence if one does not participate in a kaṭhina, or the end of one’s kaṭhina privileges if one does.

Perception is not a mitigating factor here. Thus the Vibhaṅga states that if, at the end of the robe season, one perceives a piece of robe-cloth offered in urgency as something else—say, as ordinary out-of-season cloth—and keeps it for the amount of time allowed for ordinary out-of-season cloth under NP 3, one commits the full offense all the same. The same penalty holds if the cloth has not been determined or placed under shared ownership and yet one keeps it past the end of the robe season, perceiving that it has.

As for robe-cloth that has not been offered in urgency, if one perceives it as having been offered in urgency or is in doubt about the matter, the penalty is a dukkaṭa. Arguing from the Commentary’s explanation of the similar situation discussed under NP 1, the dukkaṭa here would be for using the cloth without having forfeited it after the robe season is ended.

The procedures for forfeiture, confession, and return of the cloth are the same as under NP 1. See Appendix VI for the Pali formula to use in forfeiting the cloth.

Non-offenses

There is no offense if, before the robe season is over, one determines the cloth, places it under shared ownership, or abandons it (gives it away or throws it away); if it is lost, destroyed, burnt, or snatched away; or if someone else takes it on trust.

Summary: Keeping robe-cloth offered in urgency past the end of the robe season after having accepted it during the last eleven days of the Rains-residence is a nissaggiya pācittiya offense.

*    *    *

29

There are wilderness lodgings that are considered dubious and risky. A bhikkhu living in such lodgings after having observed the Kattika full moon may keep any one of his three robes in a village if he so desires. Should he have any reason to live apart from the robe, he may do so for six nights at most. If he should live apart from it beyond that—unless authorized by the bhikkhus—it is to be forfeited and confessed.

The Vibhaṅga explains the phrase, “after having observed the Kattika full moon,” as meaning that, having completed the first Rains-residence, one is now in the fourth month of the rainy season. As we noted under NP 2, that rule—unlike NP 1 & 3—is not automatically rescinded during this month. However, the origin story to this rule indicates that this period was a dangerous time for bhikkhus living in wilderness areas, as thieves were active—perhaps because they knew that bhikkhus had just received new requisites, or simply because now that roads had become passable it was time to get back to their work. This rule was thus formulated to provide a bhikkhu living in a dangerous wilderness area with a safe place to keep a robe away from his lodging as long as certain conditions are met. The Commentary notes that this rule would be of special use to bhikkhus who have completed their robes, ended their kaṭhina privileges, and so want to settle down in the wilderness to meditate. If it so happens that a bhikkhu’s kaṭhina privileges are still in effect, he has no need for the allowance under this rule because NP 2 is automatically rescinded as part of those privileges, which means that he can keep his robes in a safe place away from his lodging as long as he wants.

The Commentary defines the situation covered by this rule in terms of four factors:

1) A bhikkhu has spent the first Rains-residence (see BMC2, Chapter 11) without break.

2) He is staying in a wilderness lodging, defined in the Vibhaṅga as one at least 500 bow-lengths, or one kilometer, from the nearest village, this distance being measured by the shortest walkable path between the two and not as the crow flies. At the same time, he is not so far from a village that he cannot go for alms there in the morning and then return to eat in his lodging before noon.

3) The lodging is dubious and risky. According to the Vibhaṅga, dubious means that signs of thieves—such as their eating, resting, sitting, or standing places—have been seen within it or its vicinity; risky means that people are known to have been hurt or plundered by thieves there. Unlike other rules occurring later in the Pāṭimokkha that mention the vicinity of a lodging—such as Pc 15 & 84—none of the texts define precisely how far the vicinity extends for the purpose of this rule. This lack of a precise definition also occurs in the other rule dealing with dangerous wilderness lodgings, Pd 4. Given the risks inherent in such places, perhaps it was felt unwise to delimit the area in too precise a manner. Thus, in the context of this rule, the “vicinity” of the lodging can be stretched to include any area where the presence of thieves leads to a common perception that the lodging is dangerous.

4) The time period for the extension is one month beginning the day after the end of the first Rains-residence.

A bhikkhu living in the situation complying with these four factors may keep one robe of his set of three anywhere in the village where he normally goes for alms, and—if he has a reason—may stay apart from it six nights at most. As usual, nights are counted by dawns.

The factors for an offense

The factors for an offense here are two: object—any one robe of a bhikkhu’s basic set of three; and effort—staying away from the robe for seven straight dawns (i.e., six straight dawns after first leaving it). Perception is not a mitigating factor here: Even if one thinks that the seventh dawnrise has not arrived when it actually has, one is not immune from the offense.

As the Sub-commentary points out, the Commentary and K/Commentary differ in their definition of the factor of effort here—in particular, as to what it means to be apart from one’s robe. The difference centers on how the two commentaries interpret one of the non-offense clauses: “Having been apart for six nights, having entered the village territory (gāma-sīmā) again, having stayed there (to greet dawnrise), he departs.” The K/Commentary interprets this as meaning that if, at the seventh dawnrise, one is in one’s wilderness dwelling, one incurs the full offense, but if one enters the village territory for the seventh dawnrise, one can then leave the robes there for another six dawns. This means that the bhikkhu counts as being apart from his robe when it is placed in the village and he is in his wilderness lodging.

The Commentary, however, interprets the non-offense clause as covering a different and very particular situation: The bhikkhu is away from both the village and the lodging, and as the seventh dawnrise approaches he is closer to the village than the lodging. The non-offense clause allows him to enter the village, stay in the public hall or any other spot in the village, check up on his robe, and then return to his dwelling, free from an offense. From this interpretation, the Sub-commentary, following Bhadanta Buddhadatta Thera, concludes that the bhikkhu is not counted as apart from his robe when it is placed in the village and he is staying in his lodging. Thus he can leave the robe in the village for the entire fourth month of the rainy season, but if he leaves that lodging on business and lets his robe remain in the village, he may stay away from the lodging or the village only six dawns at a stretch.

There are minor problems with both interpretations. The Commentary’s explanation of the non-offense clause seems forced, but the K/Commentary’s interpretation ignores the Vibhaṅga’s definition of “any reason”—i.e., “any business”—which under other rules indicates situations where a bhikkhu would be away from his lodging. The reason for this rule, as suggested by the origin story, was similar to that for NP 2: When the bhikkhus were away from their robes, the robes “were lost, destroyed, burned, eaten by rats.” If the bhikkhu is staying in his lodging and going for alms in the village, he may check up on his robe every day to make sure that it is safe and sound. The Commentary’s interpretation seems preferable, but both interpretations would fulfill what seems to be the purpose for the rule, so the question of which interpretation to follow is up to each Community.

None of the texts, by the way, define village territory in the context of this exemption. Apparently it has the same meaning as the village territory mentioned in Mv.II.12.7 which, according to the Commentary to that rule, includes not only the built-up area of the village but also any surrounding areas—such as land under cultivation—from which it collects taxes (see BMC2, Chapter 13).

Forfeiture & confession

A bhikkhu under these conditions who has been away from his robe for seven dawns is to forfeit it and confess the offense. The procedures for forfeiture, confession, and return of the robe are the same as under NP 1. The Pali formula for forfeiting the robe is in Appendix VI.

If seven dawns have not yet passed, and yet one thinks that they have or one is in doubt about the matter, the penalty is a dukkaṭa. As under NP 1, this penalty is apparently for using the robe.

Non-offenses

There is no offense for a bhikkhu who has stayed away from his robe six dawns or fewer than six; or

if, having been apart from his robe six dawns, he enters the village territory again, stays there (to greet dawnrise), and departs;

if, within the six nights, he rescinds the determination of the robe, places it under shared ownership, abandons it; or the robe gets lost, destroyed, burnt, snatched away, or taken by someone else on trust; or

if he has been authorized by the Community to be apart from his robe. (This, according to the Commentary, refers to the authorization discussed under NP 2.)

As mentioned above, a bhikkhu is immune from an offense under this rule as long as his kaṭhina privileges are in effect, no matter how many nights he is away from any of his robes.

Summary: When one is living in a dangerous wilderness lodging during the month after the Rains-residence and has left one of one’s robes in the village where one normally goes for alms: Being away from the lodging and the village for more than six nights at a stretch—except when authorized by the Community—is a nissaggiya pācittiya offense.

*    *    *

30

Should any bhikkhu knowingly divert to himself gains that had been allocated for a Community, they are to be forfeited and confessed.

In AN 3:58, the Buddha states that a person who prevents a donor from giving a gift where intended creates three obstacles: one for the donor’s merit, one for the intended recipient’s gains, and one for himself. There are many ways of creating these obstacles, one of them being to convince the donor to give, not to the recipient originally intended, but to someone else. This is one of two rules— Pc 82 is the other—aimed at preventing a bhikkhu from creating obstacles of this sort.

The origin story here is this:

“Now in Sāvatthī at that time a certain guild had prepared a meal with robe-cloth for the Community, (thinking,) ‘Having fed (the bhikkhus), we will clothe them with robe-cloth.’

“Then some group-of-six bhikkhus went to the guild and on arrival said, ‘Give us these robe-cloths, friends.’

“‘We can’t, venerable sirs. We arrange alms with robe-cloth for the Community (like this) on a yearly basis.’

“‘Many are the Community’s donors, my friends. Many are the Community’s supporters. It’s in dependence on you, looking to you, that we live here. If you won’t give to us, then who is there who will? Give us these robe-cloths, friends.’

“So the guild, pressured by the group-of-six bhikkhus, gave them what robe-cloth they had prepared and then served the meal to the Community. The bhikkhus who knew that a meal with robe-cloth had been prepared for the Community, but not that the cloth had been given to the group-of-six bhikkhus, said to the guild: ‘Present the robe-cloth to the Community, friends.’

“‘There isn’t any, venerable sirs. What robe-cloth we had prepared, the masters—the group-of-six bhikkhus—have diverted to themselves.’

“Those bhikkhus who were modest… criticized and complained and spread it about: ‘How can these group-of-six bhikkhus knowingly divert to themselves gains allocated for the Community?’”

Here there are four factors for an offense.

Object:

Any requisite—“robe-cloth, almsfood, lodgings, medicine, even a lump of powder, tooth wood, or unwoven thread”—that donors have indicated by word or gesture that they intend to give to a Community. As the Commentary notes, donors here include not only lay people in general, but also one’s fellow bhikkhus and relatives—even one’s own mother. The fact that a gift is allocated for a Community overrides all other considerations, even when one is ill.

Perception

One perceives that the donors have allocated the requisite for a Community. (§—The various editions of the Canon differ with regard to the role of perception under this rule. The PTS edition essentially holds that perception is not a factor here, saying that if one diverts to oneself an item that has actually been allocated to a Community, then whether one perceives the item as allocated or not allocated or is doubtful about the matter, one incurs the full offense in every case. This reading is clearly mistaken, as it does not account for the word knowingly in the rule. The Burmese and Sri Lankan editions list the penalties for the same cases as follows: perceiving it as allocated, the full offense; in doubt about the matter, a dukkaṭa; perceiving it as not allocated, a dukkaṭa. The Thai edition lists the penalties as follows: perceiving it as allocated, the full offense; in doubt about the matter, a dukkaṭa; perceiving it as not allocated, no offense. This last reading is most consistent with the word knowingly in the rule and the Vibhaṅga’s general treatment of rules that include this word. In particular, it corresponds to the parallel passage under Pc 82 as given in all four major editions, and is also supported by the K/Commentary to this rule even in its PTS edition. Thus we will adopt it here.)

All the editions of the Canon agree that if the item is not allocated for a particular recipient, there is a dukkaṭa for diverting it to oneself or anyone else if one perceives it as allocated or is doubtful about the matter, and no offense if one perceives it as not allocated.

This is the only NP rule where perception is a factor in the full offense.

Effort

One tries to persuade them that they should give it to oneself instead. (The texts make no allowance for kappiya-vohāra here.) This in itself, following on the second factor, entails a dukkaṭa.

Result

One obtains the article from the donors. This entails the full offense.

Forfeiture & confession

Any gains obtained in violation of this rule are to be forfeited and the offense confessed. The procedures here are the same as under NP 1. The Pali formula for forfeiting the gains is in Appendix VI.

Related offenses

If one knowingly tries to divert gains allocated for a Community to oneself, but the donors go ahead and give the gains to the Community anyway, then the Commentary says that one should not have a share in them. If one does receive a share from the Community, one should return it. If, instead of returning it, one shares it among lay people, the case is to be treated under Pr 2. This, however, seems unnecessarily harsh, for in the case where the donors do give the item to the bhikkhu who tries to divert it to himself, he can receive it back after having forfeited it and then use it as he likes. To impose a heavier penalty on a bhikkhu for not being successful in diverting items to himself seems unfair, and the Vibhaṅga’s judgment here seems preferable: that the penalty in this case would simply be a dukkaṭa for fulfilling the factor of effort.

To divert items allocated for a Community to another individual entails a pācittiya under Pc 82. To divert items allocated for one Community of bhikkhus to another Community or to a shrine (cetiya) entails a dukkaṭa. The same holds true for diverting items allocated for a shrine to a Community, to an individual, or to another shrine; and for diverting items allocated for an individual to a Community, to a shrine, or to another individual. In all of these cases, there is no preliminary offense for the effort. The offense is incurred only when—assuming all the other factors are present—the factor of result is fulfilled.

The Commentary states that the term individual here can mean common animals as well as human beings, and that this last case thus includes even such things as saying, “Don’t give it to that dog. Give it to this one.” This point is well-taken: A bhikkhu has no business interfering with the gains that are to be freely given to another being, no matter what that being’s current status (see AN 3:58).

The Sub-commentary holds that once an item has been presented by a donor, there is nothing wrong in diverting it elsewhere. Thus, it says, taking flowers presented to one shrine and placing them at another—or chasing a dog away from food that has been given to it so that another dog can have a share—would be perfectly all right, but the Thai editors of the Sub-commentary state in a footnote that they disagree.

Non-offenses

The Vibhaṅga discusses the non-offenses under this rule in two different contexts. As we noted above, in its passage on perception it says that if one perceives a planned donation as not yet allocated for a particular recipient, one incurs no offense in diverting it to oneself or to others. In the non-offense clauses, however, aside from the standard exemptions, the Vibhaṅga states simply that if one is asked, “Where do we give (this)?” one may answer, “Give wherever your gift would be used, or would be well-cared for, or would last long, or wherever your mind feels inspired.”

The question is, why the exemption for perception was not included in the non-offense clauses. The apparent answer is that that exemption absolves one from an offense under this rule, but not from offenses under other rules concerning inappropriate requests. In particular, as we have noted above, this rule contains no exemption for diverting an item perceived as allocated even when the donors are relatives or people who have invited one to ask. However, if one perceives the item as not allocated, it would not come under this rule, and so one can request it from people such as these or in other instances where requests for items of that sort are allowed. Aside from these instances, though, one may still not request the item even when perceiving it as not allocated. In other words, perceiving an item as not allocated does not give carte blanche to divert it as one likes.

As for the Vibhaṅga’s non-offense clause, it is similar to a passage in SN 3:24, where King Pasenadi asks the Buddha where a gift should be given, and the Buddha replies, “Wherever the mind feels inspired.” This is an important point of bhikkhu etiquette. Throughout the early texts, the act of generosity is treated as an expression of the donor’s freedom of choice and an illustration of the principle of action. If there were no freedom of choice, actions would be predetermined and there would be no motivation to follow a path of action leading to the end of suffering. When a donor gives a gift, he/she is experiencing a moment of freedom from the claims of greed and possessiveness, and gaining direct experience of the benefits of exercising that freedom. For this reason, the Buddha was careful never to infringe on that freedom by suggesting that there was an obligation to give gifts. When King Pasenadi, in the same sutta, asked the Buddha where a gift, when given, bears great fruit, the Buddha stated that this was a different question entirely, and one that he could answer directly: “What is given to a virtuous person—rather than to an unvirtuous one—bears great fruit.”

Thus, following the Buddha’s example, a bhikkhu may tell where a gift bears great fruit, but even when asked where a gift should be given he may not be more specific than the Buddha’s response in SN 3:24 or the response in the Vibhaṅga’s non-offense clause here. When not asked, he has no business at all telling people where they should give their gifts, regardless of how noble his motives may seem in his eyes.

The Commentary provides an additional example of what it regards as proper etiquette in this case: If donors come to a bhikkhu, expressing a desire to give a gift to a Community, a shrine, or an individual bhikkhu, adding that they want to give it in line with his preference, the bhikkhu may say, “Give where you want.” If they are inspired by this remark and give the gift to him, he incurs no offense. The Commentary adds, though, that if the donors express a general desire to give without saying that they want to give in line with the bhikkhu’s preference, he may say only what is stated in the non-offense clause.

Summary: Persuading a donor to give a gift to oneself, knowing that he or she had planned to give it to a Community, is a nissaggiya pācittiya offense.

*    *    *

A bhikkhu who commits any of these thirty nissaggiya pācittiya offenses must first forfeit the item in question before confessing the offense. If he makes use of the item before forfeiting it, he incurs an extra dukkaṭa—except for money received in violation of NP 18 or 19, which would involve another nissaggiya pācittiya if used in trade. The Commentary to NP 20 states that if the item gets lost, destroyed, or consumed before the bhikkhu forfeits it, he may simply confess a pācittiya. The same would apparently hold true if the item is snatched away or thrown away.

Aside from cases where forfeiture must be made in the midst of a Community of four bhikkhus or more (NP 18, 19, & 22), the offender may forfeit the item to a single bhikkhu, to a group of two or three, or to a Community of four or more. Once he has confessed the offense, he is cleared of the penalty.

In cases where he must forfeit the item in the midst of the Community, he may not receive it in return. In the remaining cases, though, the item must be returned to him. Not to do so entails a dukkaṭa for the bhikkhu(s) to whom it is forfeited. In two cases—NP 22 & 23—there are restrictions as to what a bhikkhu may and may not do with the item received in return after forfeiture, but apart from these rules he is free to use the returned item as he likes.

The act of forfeiture is thus symbolic in most cases, and the effect of the rules is more internal: The offender may not make use of the item until he has confessed his wrong doing, and this in itself should give him time to reflect on his actions. If the item has been obtained or made in an inappropriate way, the act of handing it over to another provides the opportunity to reflect on whether it is worth whatever greed, anger, or delusion it has sparked in one’s mind. If the item has been held in possession either too long (as under NP 1 & 21) or not kept in one’s care at the necessary time (such as NP 2), one can reflect on this evidence of one’s carelessness and on the need for heightened mindfulness.

Offenses of this and the remaining categories in this book are classed as light offenses (lahukāpatti) and are also termed desanā-gāminī, meaning that they can be cleared through confession.

CHAPTER EIGHT

Pācittiya

As explained in the preceding chapter, this term is most probably related to the verb pacinati, “to know,” and means “to be made known” or “to be confessed.” There are 92 rules in this category, divided into eight chapters of ten, and one of twelve.

One: The Lie Chapter

1

A deliberate lie is to be confessed.

“Now at that time Hatthaka the Sakyan had been overthrown in debate. In discussions with adherents of other religions, he conceded points after having denied them, denied them after having conceded, evaded one question with another, told deliberate lies, made an appointment (for a debate) but then didn’t keep it. The adherents of other religions criticized and complained and spread it about….

“The bhikkhus heard them… and having approached Hatthaka the Sakyan, asked him: ‘Is it true, friend Hatthaka, that in discussions with adherents of other religions, you conceded points after having denied them, denied them after having conceded, evaded one question with another, told deliberate lies, made an appointment (for a debate) but then didn’t keep it?’

“‘Those adherents of other religions have to be beaten in some way or another. You can’t just give them the victory!’”

A deliberate lie is a statement or gesture made with the aim of misrepresenting the truth to someone else. The K/Commentary, summarizing the long “wheels” in the Vibhaṅga, states that a violation of this rule requires two factors:

1) Intention: the aim to misrepresent the truth; and

2) Effort: the effort to make another individual know whatever one wants to communicate based on that aim.

Intention

The aim to misrepresent the truth fulfills this factor regardless of what one’s motives are. Thus “white lies”—made with benevolent intentions (e.g., to a person whose state of mind is too weak to take the truth)—would fall under this rule, so a bhikkhu who wants to shield an emotionally weak person from harsh truths has to be very skillful in phrasing his statements. Also, outrageous lies meant as jokes—to amuse rather than to deceive—would fall under this rule as well, a point we will discuss further in the non-offense section.

Effort

According to the Vibhaṅga, to misrepresent the truth means to say that one has seen X when one hasn’t, that one hasn’t seen X when one has, or that one has seen X clearly when one is in doubt about the matter. This pattern holds for the other senses—hearing, smell, taste, touch, and ideation—as well. Thus to repeat what one has heard, seen, etc., even if it actually is misinformation, does not count as a misrepresentation of the truth under this rule, as one is truthfully reporting what one has seen, etc. If, however, one says that one believes in such misinformation—when one actually doesn’t—one’s statement would count as a misrepresentation of the truth and so would fulfill this factor.

According to the Commentary, effort here covers falsehoods conveyed not only by speech but also by writing or gesture. As for falsehoods conveyed by silence: Mv.II.3.3 states that if, while listening to the recitation of the Pāṭimokkha, one remembers that one has an unconfessed offense and yet remains silent about it, that counts as a deliberate lie; Mv.II.3.7 then goes on to impose a dukkaṭa for this kind of lie, which suggests that remaining silent in a situation where silence conveys a false message does not fulfill this factor for the full offense here.

Result is not a factor under this rule. Thus whether anyone understands the lie or is deceived by it is irrelevant to the offense.

In cases where a particular lie would fall under another rule—such as Pr 4, Sg 8 or 9, Pc 13, 24, or 76—the penalties assigned by that rule take precedence over the ones assigned here. For instance, making a false but unspecific claim to a superior human state would entail a thullaccaya under Pr 4; falsely accusing another bhikkhu of a pārājika offense would entail a saṅghādisesa under Sg 8; falsely accusing him of a saṅghādisesa would entail a pācittiya under Pc 76; and falsely accusing him of a lesser offense would entail a dukkaṭa under that rule.

The Vinaya-mukha argues that this rule should take precedence in cases where a particular lie would entail only a dukkaṭa under any of the other rules—as in the last example—but this contradicts the Vibhaṅga.

Non-offenses

A bhikkhu who misrepresents the truth unintentionally commits no offense under this rule. The Vibhaṅga gives two examples: speaking quickly and saying one thing while meaning another. Its word for “quickly”—davāya—can also mean “in fun,” but the Vibhaṅga itself, in a passage unusual for the non-offenses clauses, defines the term, limiting its meaning specifically to “hurriedly.” In doing so, it conforms to a famous passage from MN 61 where the Buddha shows an empty water dipper to Rāhula, his son, telling him that anyone who feels no shame at uttering a deliberate lie is as empty of the virtues of a contemplative as the dipper is empty of water, and then advises Rāhula to train himself: “I will not utter a deliberate lie, even for a laugh.”

The Commentary explains the Vibhaṅga’s two exemptions as follows: Speaking quickly means speaking before one has carefully considered the matter. Saying one thing while meaning another means making a slip of the tongue, either out of stupidity or carelessness. It also seconds the Vibhaṅga in not exempting inaccurate statements made in fun from a penalty under this rule. It illustrates this point with several stories that convey a sense of what passed for humor among the less scrupulous bhikkhus of its time. In the first, a novice asks a bhikkhu, “Have you seen my preceptor?” and the bhikkhu, teasing the novice, responds, “Your preceptor’s probably gone, yoked to a firewood-cart.” In the second story, a novice, hearing the yapping of hyenas, asks a bhikkhu, “What’s making that noise?” and the bhikkhu replies, “That’s the noise of those who are lifting the stuck-in-the-mud wheel of the carriage your mother’s going in.” In addition, the Commentary quotes a few statements that today would be classified as exaggeration or sarcasm, saying that these, too, are forbidden by this rule.

Whatever humor these jokes originally contained has been so dulled by time that the statements now seem obviously unworthy of a bhikkhu. A bhikkhu at present whose sense of humor tends toward misrepresentation and exaggeration would do well to develop a similar perspective on his own jokes. This is not to deny the value or potential wisdom of humor; simply to note that a bhikkhu’s sense of humor should be kept in service to his values, and that the most memorable wit is memorable precisely because it tells the straight truth.

As we noted above, a bhikkhu who speaks from mistaken assumptions—truthfully reporting any mistaken information he may have received or mistaken beliefs he may have thought up—does not come under this rule.

Broken promises

Mv.III.14.1-14 imposes a dukkaṭa on the act of making a promise with pure intentions but later breaking it. Because the texts make no mention of any circumstances beyond one’s control that would exempt one from that penalty, a bhikkhu should be very careful of how he states his plans for the future. A special instance of breaking a promise—accepting an invitation to a meal but then not going—is treated, not under Mv.III.14.1-14, but under Pc 33.

Summary: The intentional effort to misrepresent the truth to another individual is a pācittiya offense.

*    *    *

2

An insult is to be confessed.

An insult is a gesture or statement, written or spoken, made with the malicious intent of hurting another person’s feelings or of bringing him/her into disgrace. The Vibhaṅga analyzes the full offense under this rule in terms of three factors:

1) Effort: One insults a person directly to his face, touching on any one of the ten topics for abuse (akkosa-vatthu) listed below.

2) Object: The person is a bhikkhu.

3) Intention: One’s motive is to humiliate him.

Effort

The Vibhaṅga lists ten ways a verbal insult can be phrased: making remarks about the other person’s

race, class, or nationality (You nigger! You bum! You Frenchman!);

name (You really are a Dick!);

family or lineage (You bastard! You son of a bitch!);

occupation (You pimp! You capitalist pig!);

craft (What would you expect from a guy who crochets?);

disease or handicap (Hey, Clubfoot! Spastic!);

physical characteristics (Hey, Fatty! Beanpole! Shrimp! Hulk!);

defilements (You control freak! Fool! Queer! Breeder!);

offenses (You liar! You thief!); or

using an abusive form of address, such as, “You camel! You goat! You ass! You penis! You vagina!” (§) (All five of these come from the Vibhaṅga.)

(The category of “offense”—which literally means “falling”—contains an interesting sub-category, in that the noble attainment of stream-entry is, literally, “falling into the stream.” Thus an insult along the lines of, “Some stream-winner you are!” would also fit under this category as well.)

These ten topics are called the akkosa-vatthu—topics for abuse—and appear in the following training rule as well.

As the examples in the Vibhaṅga show, the remark that fulfills the factor of effort here must touch on one of these topics for abuse and must be made directly to the listener: “You are X.” It may be phrased either as sarcastic praise or as out-and-out abuse. The Commentary and Sub-commentary say that any insulting remark not listed in the Vibhaṅga would only be grounds for a dukkaṭa, but the Vibhaṅga defines the topics for abuse in such a general way that any term related to them in any way would fulfill this factor here.

Remarks made in an indirect or insinuating manner, though, would not fulfill this factor. Indirect remarks are when the speaker includes himself together with the target of his insult in his statement (“We’re all a bunch of fools”). Insinuating remarks are when he leaves it uncertain as to whom he is referring to (“There are camels among us”). Any remark of either of these sorts, if meant as an insult, entails a dukkaṭa regardless of whether the target is a bhikkhu or not.

All of the insults mentioned in the Vibhaṅga take the form of remarks about the person, whereas insults and verbal abuse at present often take the form of a command—Go to hell! F— off! etc.—and the question is whether these too would be covered by this rule. Viewed from the standpoint of intent, they fit under the general definition of an insult; but if for some reason they would not fit under this rule, they would in most cases be covered by Pc 54.

Insulting remarks made about someone behind his/her back are dealt with under Pc 13.

Object

To insult a bhikkhu incurs a pācittiya; to insult an unordained person—according to the Commentary, this runs the gamut from bhikkhunīs to all other living beings—a dukkaṭa.

Intent

The Vibhaṅga defines this factor as “desiring to jeer at, desiring to scoff at, desiring to make (him) abashed.” If, with no insult intended, a bhikkhu jokes about another person’s race, etc., he incurs a dubbhāsita, regardless of whether the person is lay or ordained, mentioned outright or insinuatingly, and regardless of whether he/she takes it as a joke or an insult. This is the only instance of this class of offense.

The K/Commentary adds result as a fourth factor—the target of one’s insult knows, “He’s insulting me”—but there is no basis for this in either the Vibhaṅga or the Commentary. If one makes an insulting remark under one’s breath, not intending to be heard—or in a foreign language, not intending to be understood—the motive would be to let off steam, which would not qualify as the intention covered by this rule. If one truly wants to humiliate someone, one will make the necessary effort to make that person hear and understand one’s words. But if for some reason that person doesn’t hear or understand (a loud noise blots out one’s words, one uses a slang term that is new to one’s listener), there is nothing in the Vibhaṅga to indicate that one would escape from the full penalty.

For this reason, whether the person addressed actually feels insulted by one’s remarks is irrelevant in determining the severity of the offense. If one makes a remark to a fellow bhikkhu, touching on one of the topics for abuse and meaning it as an insult, one incurs a pācittiya even if he takes it as a joke. If one means the remark as a joke, one incurs a dubbhāsita even if the other person feels insulted.

Non-offenses

According to the Vibhaṅga, a bhikkhu who mentions another person’s race, etc., commits no offense if he is “aiming at Dhamma, aiming at (the person’s) benefit (attha—this can also mean “the goal”), aiming at teaching.” The Commentary illustrates this with a bhikkhu saying to a member of the untouchable caste: “You are an untouchable. Don’t do any evil. Don’t be a person born into misfortune and going on to misfortune.”

Another example would be of a teacher who uses insulting language to get the attention of a stubborn student so that the latter will bring his behavior in line with the Dhamma. This would entail no offense, but one should be very sure of the purity of one’s motives and of the beneficial effect of one’s words before using language of this sort.

Summary: An insult made with malicious intent to another bhikkhu is a pācittiya offense. 

*    *    *

3

Divisive tale-bearing among bhikkhus is to be confessed.

Divisive tale-bearing is described in the Vibhaṅga with a series of examples in the following form: X makes remarks about Y touching on his race, name, or any of the other ten akkosa-vatthu listed in the explanation to the preceding rule. Z, hearing these remarks, goes to tell someone else—either W or Y himself—in hopes of causing a rift between X and his listener or of winning favor with his listener in case there is already a rift between the two. For example:

a) X calls Y a bastard behind his back. Z tells Y, in hopes of ingratiating himself with Y.

b) X makes racist remarks about Y to his face. Z knows that W is a friend of Y and hates racists, and so tells W what X said, in hopes of causing a rift between W and X.

Bhikkhu Z commits the full offense here when three factors are fulfilled: object, effort, and intent.

1) Object: Both Z’s listener and X are bhikkhus; X has made remarks about Y that qualify as a direct insult under the preceding rule—or, if he didn’t make them in Y’s presence, remarks that would have qualified as a direct insult had he done so. (Note that under case (b) above, Y would not have to be a bhikkhu for this factor to be fulfilled.)

2) Effort: Z reports X’s remarks to his listener verbally or by gesture (as in writing a letter),

3) Intent: with the intent of ingratiating himself with his listener, or of causing a rift between his listener and X.

The K/Commentary adds a fourth factor—Z’s listener understands what he is saying—but, as with the preceding rule, there is no basis for this in the Vibhaṅga.

Object

If either X or Z’s listener—or both—are not bhikkhus, then the penalty for Z is a dukkaṭa.

If X’s remarks qualified only as an indirect insult under the preceding rule—e.g., he said with reference to Y that, “There are camels among us”—then Z incurs a dukkaṭa if he reports them with the intent to ingratiate himself or cause a rift, regardless of whether his listener or X are bhikkhus or not.

The Sub-commentary states that there is a dukkaṭa for bearing tales dealing with matters other than remarks about the ten akkosa-vatthu—i.e., telling Y about things said or done by X, to make X appear in a bad light in hopes of winning favor or causing a rift—although some cases of this sort would come under Pc 13.

Effort

This rule is sometimes translated as dealing with slander—false tale-bearing—but as the examples in the Vibhaṅga show, it actually deals with true tale-bearing: X really does say insulting things about Y, and Z gives a true report. The Vinaya-mukha notes that if Z engages in false tale-bearing, then regardless of whether X and Z’s listener are bhikkhus, Z incurs the full penalty under Pc 1.

Intent

To give a true report of such matters with motives other than those of winning favor or causing a rift entails no offense. Examples of this would include:

informing a senior bhikkhu when one bhikkhu has accused another of a serious offense, so that an inquiry can be made for the sake of harmony in the Community; or

telling a senior bhikkhu about a student of his who is making racist remarks, so that the senior bhikkhu can put a stop to it.

Summary: Telling a bhikkhu about insulting remarks made by another bhikkhu—in hopes of winning favor or causing a rift—is a pācittiya offense.

*    *    *

4

Should any bhikkhu have an unordained person recite Dhamma line by line (with him), it is to be confessed.

This is an offense with two factors:

1) Effort: One gets a student to recite Dhamma line-by-line with oneself (which, as we shall see below, means to train the student to be a skilled reciter of a Pali Dhamma text).

2) Object: The student is neither a bhikkhu nor a bhikkhunī.

Only the first factor needs explanation, and is best treated under two headings: Dhamma and reciting line-by-line.

Dhamma

Dhamma the Vibhaṅga defines as “a saying made by the Buddha, his disciples, seers, or heavenly beings, connected with the teaching or connected with the goal.” The Commentary devotes a long discussion to these terms, coming to the conclusion that connected with the Dhamma refers to the Pali Canon—in Pali, not in translation—as agreed on in the first three councils, while connected with the goal (attha) refers to the Mahā Aṭṭhakathā, the most revered ancient commentary (only in its original Pali version, the Sub-commentary says).

The ancient commentaries disagreed as to what other works would fit under this category, but Buddhaghosa’s conclusion seems to be that—in the Milinda Pañhā, for example—Ven. Nāgasena’s quotes of the Buddha’s words would count, but not his own formulations of the teaching, and the same principle holds for other texts quoting the Buddha’s words as well. The ancient commentaries are unanimous, though, in saying that Dhamma does not cover the Mahāyāna sūtras or any compositions (this would include translations) dealing with the Dhamma in languages other than Pali.

This interpretation, identifying Dhamma with particular Pali texts, has caused no controversy in the context of this rule—although it seems unlikely that the compilers of the Vibhaṅga would have had the commentaries in mind when they said, “connected with the goal”—but it has met with disagreement in the context of Pc 7, and so we will discuss it in more detail there.

Reciting line-by-line

To make someone recite line by line means to train him/her by rote to be a skilled reciter of a text.

Bhikkhus in the days of the Buddha committed the teachings in the Canon to memory to preserve them from generation to generation. Although writing was in use at the time—mainly for keeping accounts—no one used it to record teachings either of the Buddha or of any other religious teacher. The Pali Canon was not written down until approximately 500 years after the Buddha’s passing away, after an invasion of Sri Lanka had threatened its survival.

The Vibhaṅga lists four ways in which a person might be trained to be a reciter of a text:

1) The teacher and student recite in unison, i.e., beginning together and ending together.

2) The teacher begins a line, the student joins in, and they end together.

3) The teacher recites the beginning syllable of a line together with the student, who then completes it alone.

4) The teacher recites one line, and the student recites the next line alone.

At present, reciters of the Vedas still use these methods when practicing their texts.

The origin story states that the Buddha forbade these methods of training unordained people because they caused the lay students to feel disrespect for the bhikkhus. The Vinaya-mukha explains this by noting that if a teacher made a slip of the tongue while teaching in this way, his students would look down on him for it. If this were the right explanation, though, the non-offense clauses would have listed “proper” ways of training novices and lay people to recite the Dhamma, but they don’t.

A more likely explanation is that at the time of the Buddha the duty of memorizing and reciting the texts was considered the province of the bhikkhus and bhikkhunīs. Although some lay people memorized discourses (Mv.III.5.9), and bhikkhus of course taught the Dhamma to lay people, there was apparently the feeling that to teach non-ordainees to become skilled reciters of the texts was not good for the relationship between bhikkhus and the unordained. There are three possible reasons for this:

1) People may have felt that the bhikkhus were shirking their responsibilities by trying to pass their duty off onto others.

2) Brahmans at the time were very strict in not allowing anyone outside their caste to memorize the Vedas, and their example may have led lay people to feel disrespect for bhikkhus who were not equally protective of their own tradition.

3) A bhikkhu acting as a tutor for a lay person wishing to memorize the Dhamma might, over time, come to be seen as the lay person’s hireling.

At present, the entire Canon is available in print, and even bhikkhus rarely commit it to memory, although they do frequently memorize parts of it, such as the Pāṭimokkha, the major discourses, and other passages chanted on ceremonial occasions. To train a lay person or novice to become skilled in reciting such teachings by rote would entail the full penalty under this rule.

Offenses are counted as follows: If teaching an unordained person to recite line-by-line, one incurs a pācittiya for each line; if teaching syllable-by-syllable, a pācittiya for each syllable.

Intention is not a mitigating factor here. Thus if a bhikkhu is training a mixed group of bhikkhus and novices, he incurs a pācittiya even if his intention is to train only the bhikkhus in the group.

Perception is also not a mitigating factor. If the person being trained is unordained, the bhikkhu incurs a pācittiya if he perceives him as unordained, a pācittiya if he is in doubt about the matter, and a pācittiya if he perceives him as ordained. If the person is ordained, then the bhikkhu incurs a dukkaṭa if he perceives him as unordained and a dukkaṭa if he is in doubt about the matter. Only if the person is ordained and the bhikkhu perceives him as ordained is he not grounds for an offense. This pattern of six possibilities—three pācittiyas, two dukkaṭas, and one non-offense—is standard in many of the pācittiya rules where perception is not a mitigating factor. We will note other rules in this chapter where this pattern also applies, but explain it in detail only here.

Non-offenses

Because this rule is aimed at methods of teaching, the Vibhaṅga states that there is no offense “for one made to recite in unison.” This, says the Commentary, refers to a young bhikkhu who, in the process of learning a text, is told by his teacher to recite together with a novice who is also the teacher’s student.

Also, according to the Vibhaṅga, there is no offense if a bhikkhu corrects an unordained person who has memorized most of a passage or who is reciting in a confused manner; or if a bhikkhu “rehearses” a passage in unison with unordained people. In the time of the Canon, this meant the practice of reciting a passage one had already memorized. At present, this would include the practice of bhikkhus reciting together with lay people who are reading from a text or reciting from memory—for example, during the evening chanting—and are not learning the text from the bhikkhus. The Commentary extends this allowance to include cases of bhikkhus learning a text from an unordained person, probably on the model of the Itivuttaka, which—according to its Commentary—the bhikkhus first learned from a servant woman who had memorized some of the Buddha’s teachings that the bhikkhus had overlooked.

Summary: To train a novice or lay person to recite passages of Dhamma by rote is a pācittiya offense.

*    *    *

5

Should any bhikkhu lie down together (in the same dwelling) with an unordained person for more than two or three consecutive nights, it is to be confessed.

As the Vinaya-mukha comments, “The Buddha originally laid down the rule forbidding the act of sleeping in the same dwelling with an unordained person so that lay people would not see the unsightly attitudes a bhikkhu might assume while asleep. But then when novices came into being they were classed as unordained people and so had no place to stay. The Buddha therefore relaxed the rule, allowing bhikkhus to sleep in the same dwelling with an unordained person no more than three nights running, thus also opening the way for them to sleep in the same dwelling with ordinary lay men.”

The occasion for the first formulation of the rule was this:

“Now at that time, lay men came to the monastery to hear the Dhamma. After the Dhamma had been taught, each of the elder bhikkhus went to his own dwelling, while the newer bhikkhus went to sleep right there in the assembly hall with the lay men—with muddled mindfulness, unalert, naked, mumbling, and snoring. The lay men criticized and complained and spread it about, ‘How can their reverences go to sleep with muddled mindfulness, unalert, naked, mumbling, and snoring?’”

The occasion for the final formulation was this:

“The bhikkhus said to Ven. Rāhula (who was a novice at the time), ‘There is a training rule laid down by the Blessed One that (a bhikkhu) should not lie down together with an unordained person. Find yourself a place to sleep.’ So Ven. Rāhula, not finding a place to sleep, went to sleep in the restroom. Then the Blessed One, getting up toward the end of the night, went to the restroom and on arriving cleared his throat. Ven. Rāhula cleared his throat.

“‘Who’s there?’

“‘It’s me, venerable sir—Rāhula.’

“‘Why are you lying there?’ (§—reading nipanno’sīti with the Thai edition)

“So Ven. Rāhula told him what had happened.”

There are two factors for the full offense here:

1) Object: an unordained person.

2) Effort: (a) lying down, (b) together in the same dwelling with the unordained person, (c) for four nights running.

Object

The Vibhaṅga defines unordained person as anyone other than a bhikkhu. The Sub-commentary, citing the Three Gaṇṭhipadas, notes that this means males but not females, as there is another training rule, following immediately on this one, dealing specifically with females. According to the Commentary, unordained person includes not only human beings but also any animal large enough to have intercourse with. Again, the Sub-commentary would qualify this as “male animals” for the same reason.

Perception as to whether the other person is ordained is not a mitigating factor here (see Pc 4).

Lying down

To be lying down together with someone else means to be lying down at the same time as the other person is lying down within the area defined as a dwelling (see below). This factor is fulfilled whether the bhikkhu lies down when the other person is already lying there, or vice versa, or both lie down at the same time. Although there are other training rules where lying down is included under the term sitting, sitting is not included under the term lying down here. Whether the bhikkhu or the other person falls asleep is of no account.

If both parties get up and then lie down again, the bhikkhu incurs another pācittiya.

Dwelling

The Vibhaṅga defines the dwelling that can be grounds for a pācittiya here as a place fully roofed and fully walled, or mostly roofed and mostly walled. A place half-roofed and half-walled, it says, is grounds for a dukkaṭa, while a place (a) fully roofed but with no wall (e.g., an open pavilion), (b) fully walled but with no roof (e.g., a corral), or (c) less than half-roofed and less than half-walled, is not grounds for an offense.

Buddhaghosa quotes the Mahā Aṭṭhakathā, the major ancient commentary, as filling in all the other possibilities:

Grounds for a pācittiya:

a place—

fully roofed and mostly walled,

fully roofed and half-walled,

mostly roofed and half-walled,

mostly roofed and fully walled,

half-roofed and fully walled, or

half-roofed and mostly walled.

Grounds for a dukkaṭa:

a place—

fully roofed and less than half-walled,

mostly roofed and less than half-walled,

less than half-roofed and fully walled, or

less than half-roofed and mostly walled.

Grounds for no offense:

a place—

half-roofed and less than half-walled,

less than half-roofed and half-walled, or

less than half-roofed and less than half-walled.

The Commentary notes that tents would fit under the definition of “place” here, and it would seem that vehicles—caravans in the time of the Buddha; automobiles, trains, buses, and airplanes in ours—would fit here as well.

The same dwelling

Unfortunately, the Vibhaṅga does not say how far the boundary of a “single dwelling” would extend. For example, would each separate room in a house count as a separate dwelling? Would the entire house? Would an entire apartment building be a single dwelling? The Commentary tries to remedy this omission by introducing the factor of “having a single common entrance” or “being part of the same enclosure.” (The Pali word it uses, ek’ūpacāra, has both meanings, and the Commentary makes use of both in its discussion.)

What it says is this: Even a seven-story palace or a building with 100 rooms would count as a single dwelling if all the rooms make use of a common entrance. If there are several buildings in a single enclosure, and one can go from one to another without stepping on outside ground, they would count as part of the same dwelling. If there is a building divided into units that are not connected by internal doorways, each unit having a separate entrance, the different units would count as separate dwellings. Locking or closing a door does not close off the doorway. Only if the door opening is bricked up or otherwise permanently sealed off does it no longer count as a doorway.

The Commentary admits that the “single entrance” factor is not mentioned in the Canon in connection with this rule but is borrowed from the idea of “single enclosure” in the Vibhaṅga to NP 2. It argues, though, that this factor is unavoidably bound up in the concept of “walled and roofed” and illustrates its point as follows: There is a two-room dwelling, composed of an antechamber through which one must pass to get to the inner chamber. A bhikkhu is sleeping in the inner chamber, and an unordained person in the antechamber. Now suppose that a stubborn Vinaya student maintains that if the door between the two rooms is closed, the bhikkhu is sleeping in a separate dwelling from the unordained person, while if the door is open, they are in the same dwelling. His teacher then asks him, “Why are they in the same dwelling if the door is open?”

“Because the two rooms share the same roof and walls.”

“And if the door is closed, does that destroy the roof and walls they had in common?”

“No, of course not. But the enclosure in which the bhikkhu is sleeping is marked by the door.”

This, the Commentary says, shows that the notion of enclosure is part and parcel of the concept of dwelling, and that the stubborn student has defeated his own argument. Its reasoning here is probably more convincing in Pali than in English—because as we noted above, Pali uses the same word for enclosure and entrance—but even so the illustration does not carry much force when applied to such places as separate apartments in an apartment building and so leaves the issue unsettled as far as they are concerned.

The Vinaya-mukha notes that the factor introduced by the Commentary has implications that go far beyond the original purpose of this rule—and of the following rule, in which the concept of “single dwelling” is even more important. It suggests borrowing an additional factor from NP 2: the factor of separate residences or zones of ownership (the Pali word kula carries both meanings). Thus in a large building composed of separate residences—such as an apartment building, a hotel, or a hospital with private rooms—it suggests that each separate residence count as a separate dwelling.

Because the Canon gives no clear guidance on this point, the wise policy for an individual bhikkhu is to follow the views of the Community to which he belongs.

Nights

Nights here are counted by dawns. Thus if a bhikkhu is sleeping in the same dwelling with an unordained person but one of them gets up before dawn, that night does not count. If a bhikkhu has been lying down in the same dwelling with an unordained person for two nights running but then skips a night—for example, getting up before dawn at the end of the third night—the consecutive series is broken. (As discussed in Appendix I, before dawn here apparently means before dawnrise, i.e., before the beginning of civil twilight.) If he then lies down in the same dwelling with an unordained person the next night, the counting starts again from one.

However, once he has been lying down in the same dwelling with an unordained person three nights running, then if after sundown on the fourth night he is lying down in the same dwelling in which a lay person is lying down—even if only for a moment—he incurs a pācittiya.

The Commentary interprets the phrase after sundown as meaning any time on the fourth day. In other words, there is no need to wait until the next dawn to count the fourth period of lying down together. As we noted above in the conclusion to the chapter on the saṅghādisesa rules, there was a tendency in the time of the Canon to call a 24-hour period of day and night a “night.” For the purpose of this rule and the following one, this period apparently begins at sundown.

The Commentary also states that the unordained person need not be the same person each of the four nights, and the same principle holds true for the dwelling. In other words, if a bhikkhu lies down in a dwelling with novice X one night and then goes elsewhere and lies down in a dwelling with layman Y the next night and so on for four nights running, he commits an offense all the same.

Perception and intention are not mitigating factors here. Thus a bhikkhu lying down in the same dwelling with a novice whom he thinks to be another bhikkhu commits an offense all the same, as does a bhikkhu who miscounts the nights and lies down in the same room with an unordained person for what he thinks is his third night when it is actually his fourth.

In fact, this is a training rule that one may break without ever realizing it. Suppose a novice comes to lie down in a room where a bhikkhu is sleeping, and then gets up to leave before the bhikkhu awakens. If he does this for four nights running, the bhikkhu incurs a pācittiya even though he may never have been aware of what the novice was doing. Rules like this are the reason why many bhikkhus make a practice of confessing offenses even when they are not consciously aware of having committed them.

Non-offenses

To recapitulate some of the points from the above discussion: To lie down with an unordained person in a dwelling that would qualify as grounds for a pācittiya or a dukkaṭa is no offense as long as one does it no more than three days running. If, after lying down in the same dwelling with an unordained person for two nights running, one gets up before dawn at the end of the third night, one may resume lying down in the same dwelling with an unordained person the next night. Also, there is no offense in lying down any number of consecutive nights with an unordained person in a dwelling that would not qualify as grounds for an offense. And, there is no offense if one of the parties is sitting while the other is lying down, or if both parties are sitting (although see Pc 44 & 45).

The Vinaya-mukha comments that although this rule as it presently stands no longer fulfills its original purpose, bhikkhus should keep the original purpose in mind and avoid sleeping in the same place with an unordained person whenever possible. It would also be a wise policy to avoid sleeping out in a public park, on a public beach, in an unwalled pavilion, etc., in full view of the public, even though no offense would be involved.

It is also worth noting that this rule encourages bhikkhus to get up and meditate before dawn every day so that they can know for sure they haven’t committed the offense here.

Summary: Lying down at the same time, in the same dwelling, with a novice or layman for more than three nights running is a pācittiya offense.

*    *    *

6

Should any bhikkhu lie down together (in the same dwelling) with a woman, it is to be confessed.

There are only two differences between this rule and the preceding one:

1) The factor of “object” here is fulfilled only by a female human being, “even one born that day, all the more an older one,” regardless of whether she is related to the bhikkhu.

2) The four-night clause under “effort” is dropped, which means that the bhikkhu incurs a pācittiya the instant he lies down in the same dwelling with her.

Object

The Vibhaṅga states that female yakkhas, petas, nāgas, devas, and animals—as well as paṇḍakas (people born neuter or castrated men)—are grounds for a dukkaṭa here. The Commentary qualifies this by saying that female animal means one with which it is possible to have intercourse, and the phrase, female yakkhas, petas, nāgas, and devas, includes only those who make themselves visible.

Even if another man is present in the dwelling, it does not negate the offense.

Perception as to whether the other person is a woman is not a mitigating factor here (see Pc 4).

Intention is also not a mitigating factor. Thus a bhikkhu lying down in the same dwelling with a woman commits an offense regardless of whether he realizes that she is there.

The same principles regarding perception and intention also apply to paṇḍakas: A bhikkhu who lies down in the same room with a paṇḍaka whom he thinks to be an ordinary man commits a dukkaṭa; and the same is true for a bhikkhu lying down in a dwelling not knowing that a paṇḍaka is also lying down there.

Effort

A single dwelling is defined as in the preceding rule. Thus a bhikkhu sleeping in the same house as his mother, even if they are in separate rooms and another man is present, commits an offense all the same.

The primary point where this rule differs from the preceding one under the factor of effort is that a bhikkhu incurs a pācittiya the moment he is lying down in a dwelling at the same time a woman is lying there, with no need to count nights or dawns. This is expressed in the Vibhaṅga by saying, “If after sundown a bhikkhu is lying down when a woman is lying down, it is to be confessed.”

The Sub-commentary interprets this as meaning that this rule applies only at night, but the non-offense clauses in the Vibhaṅga give no exemptions for daytime or “before sundown,” which suggests that the Sub-commentary’s interpretation is invalid. What the Vibhaṅga’s statement means is that there is no need to wait until dawnrise to count the period of lying down together. As we noted under the preceding rule, there was a tendency in the time of the Canon to call a 24-hour period of day and night a “night,” and for the purpose of these two rules, this period apparently begins at sundown. The Commentary, switching to our current practice of calling a 24-hour period a day, says, “In the preceding rule, the offense is on the fourth day. Here it is right from the first day.”

Thus, no matter what time of day or night a bhikkhu lies down in the same dwelling with a woman, he immediately incurs a pācittiya.

The purposes of this rule

Another difference between this rule and the preceding one is the obvious point that they have different purposes. As the origin story shows, this rule is to prevent situations that might tempt a bhikkhu to commit a serious offense, such as a Pr 1 or Sg 2.

“Then the woman, having herself prepared a bed inside (her house) for Ven. Anuruddha, having put on her jewelry and scented herself with perfumes, went to him… and said, ‘Master, you are beautiful, good-looking, and appealing. I, too, am beautiful, good-looking, and appealing. It would be good if I were to be your wife.’

“When she said this, Ven. Anuruddha remained silent. So a second time…. A third time she said to him, ‘Master, you are beautiful, good-looking, and appealing. I, too, am beautiful, good-looking, and appealing. It would be good if you would take me together with all my wealth.’

“A third time, Ven. Anuruddha remained silent. So the woman, having slipped off her clothing, paraded up and down in front of him, stood, sat down, and then lay down in front of him. But Ven. Anuruddha, keeping control of his faculties, didn’t as much as glance at her or say even a word.

“Then the thought occurred to her: ‘Isn’t it amazing! Isn’t it astounding! Many men send for me at a price of 100 or even 1,000 (a night), but this monk, even when I myself beg him, doesn’t want to take me together with all my wealth!’ So, putting her clothing back on and bowing her head at his feet, she said to him: ‘Venerable sir, a transgression has overcome me in that I was so foolish, so muddle-headed, so unskillful as to act in such a way. Please accept this confession of my transgression as such, for the sake of (my) restraint in the future.’”

Ven. Anuruddha was very advanced in the practice and so was able to get through the situation with his mindfulness and precepts intact. Many a lesser bhikkhu, though, would have succumbed right from the woman’s first request, and so the Buddha formulated this rule for his protection.

This rule is also meant to prevent situations where suspicious people might think a bhikkhu has committed a serious offense even when he hasn’t. Like Caesar’s wife, a bhikkhu must not only be pure, he must look pure if he is to maintain his reputation. If a bhikkhu and a woman are seen going into a house together in the evening and leaving together the following morning, then even if they slept in separate rooms, suspicious neighbors—and very few neighbors aren’t suspicious of bhikkhus—would be quick to jump to conclusions. This is why no exemption is made for a bhikkhu who commits this offense unknowingly. Other people may know what is happening, and this is the sort of case where their opinion matters a great deal. For the same reason, the wise policy mentioned in the preceding rule applies even more forcefully here: A bhikkhu would be well-advised not to lie down with a woman in such places as parks, beaches, or unwalled pavilions even though in terms of the rules no offense would be involved.

There is some overlap between this rule and Pc 44 & 45, which deal with a bhikkhu sitting or lying down together in private with a woman (or women). Special cases covered by this rule not covered by those would include, for example, a bhikkhu and a woman lying down in separate rooms of the same dwelling; and a bhikkhu and a woman lying down in the same dwelling with another man present. Also, under those rules the questions of the bhikkhu’s state of mind and his awareness of the situation are important factors. Here they are of no consequence: Even a bhikkhu with the purest state of mind—or completely unknowingly—incurs a pācittiya when lying down together with a woman in the same dwelling.

Non-offenses

The Vibhaṅga states that there is no offense in lying down with a woman in a dwelling that under the preceding rule would not be grounds for an offense, i.e.:

fully roofed but with no walls (e.g., an open pavilion),

fully walled but with no roof (e.g., a corral),

less than half-roofed and less than half-walled.

The Commentary adds that these two dwellings would also not be grounds for an offense here:

half-roofed and less than half-walled,

less than half-roofed and half-walled.

Still, as noted above, a bhikkhu would be well-advised to avoid such situations whenever possible, and to have another man present when not.

Summary: Lying down at the same time in the same dwelling with a woman is a pācittiya offense.

*    *    *

7

Should any bhikkhu teach more than five or six sentences of Dhamma to a woman, unless a knowledgeable man is present, it is to be confessed.

“Then Ven. Udāyin, dressing early in the morning and taking his bowl and (outer) robe, went to visit a certain family. At that time the lady of the house was sitting in the main entrance, while the daughter-in-law was sitting in the door to the inner chamber. So Ven. Udāyin went to the lady of the house… and whispered Dhamma into her ear. The daughter-in-law thought, ‘Is this monk my mother-in-law’s lover, or is he being fresh with her?’ Then, having whispered Dhamma into the ear of the lady of the house, Ven. Udāyin went to the daughter-in-law… and whispered Dhamma into her ear. The lady of the house thought, ‘Is this monk my daughter-in-law’s lover, or is he being fresh with her?’ After whispering Dhamma into the daughter-in-law’s ear, Ven. Udāyin left. So the lady of the house said to the daughter-in-law, ‘Hey. What did that monk say to you?’

“‘He taught me Dhamma, ma’am. And what did he say to you?’

“‘He taught me Dhamma, too.’

“So they criticized and complained and spread it about, ‘How can Ven. Udāyin whisper Dhamma into women’s ears? Shouldn’t the Dhamma be taught openly and out loud?’”

The two factors for the full offense here are:

1) Object: a female human being who knows what is and is not lewd, what is well-spoken and ill-spoken, and who has not asked one a question about the Dhamma.

2) Effort: One teaches her more than six sentences of Dhamma without a knowledgeable man present—i.e., a male human being who also knows what is and is not lewd, what is well-spoken and ill-spoken.

Object

The word woman covers women as well: If a bhikkhu is with two or more women but without a knowledgeable man present, he may teach them no more than five or six sentences of Dhamma. Perception as to whether the person being taught is a woman or a man is not a mitigating factor here (see Pc 4).

According to the Vibhaṅga, a female yakkha, a female peta, a paṇḍaka, or an animal (probably a nāga) in the form of a human woman are each grounds for a dukkaṭa here.

Effort

This factor contains two sub-factors requiring explanation: “Dhamma” and “six sentences.”

Dhamma

Dhamma the Vibhaṅga defines in the same terms as under Pc 4: “a saying made by the Buddha, his disciples, seers, or heavenly beings, connected with the teaching, connected with the goal (attha).” 

Precisely what this means is a point of controversy. The Commentary identifies “sayings made by the Buddha, his disciples, seers, or heavenly beings” with different parts of the Pali Canon—in Pali—and then treats “connected with the teaching, connected with the goal” as nouns, the first referring to the Canon, and the second to the ancient commentary named the Mahā Aṭṭhakathā. This last point is highly unlikely, as the Mahā Aṭṭhakathā did not yet exist when the Canon was being composed.

There are two alternatives to the Commentary’s interpretation: One follows the Commentary in treating “connected with the teaching, connected with the goal” as nouns, but interprets them as meaning any statement dealing with the Dhamma, no matter what language it is in, and regardless of whether it is quoted from a text. Thus, according to this interpretation, anything a bhikkhu would say about the Dhamma—quoted from the Canon, from a later text, or of his own invention—would count as Dhamma here.

The second interpretation regards “connected with the teaching, connected with the goal” as adjectives modifying “sayings made by the Buddha, his disciples, seers, or heavenly beings.” This makes more sense in terms of Pali syntax—the terms are in the masculine case, agreeing with the word dhammo, whereas they probably would have been in the neuter case had they been intended as nouns. This limits the meaning of Dhamma in this rule to passages from the Canon, but not necessarily in the Pali language. Translations from the Canon would also come under the rule, as there is a passage in the Cullavagga (V.33.1) where the Buddha allows bhikkhus to learn Dhamma each in his own language, thus showing, contrary to the Commentary, that Dhamma does not have to be in Pali to be Dhamma.

However, both interpretations have their adherents at present, and the question comes down to what one perceives to be the purpose of the rule. Adherents of the first interpretation say that the rule is designed to prevent the sort of suspicions that arise when a bhikkhu is talking at length alone with a woman, but this argument does not fit with the Buddha’s allowance for a bhikkhu to give a talk when a woman asks him for instruction.

It is more likely that the rule is aimed at preventing a bhikkhu from using his knowledge of Dhamma as a come-on, a way of making himself attractive to a woman. As any man who teaches Dhamma soon learns, there are women who find such knowledge irresistible. To view the rule in this light makes either of the two interpretations tenable, so the wise policy is to adhere to the interpretation of the Community to which one belongs.

This rule applies to telephone conversations as well as to conversations in person, but because the Pv.I.5.7 notes that it deals only with the spoken word, it does not cover letters or other written communications.

Six sentences

As for the amount of Dhamma a bhikkhu may say to a woman or women without a knowledgeable man present, the Pali word for “sentence,” (vācā), can also mean “word,” but the Commentary states specifically that one vācā is approximately equal to a line of verse. The Sub-commentary goes on to say that the Commentary’s definition here applies to poetry, while one vācā of prose is equal to the conjugation of a verb, i.e., six words. In either case, six vācās would amount to six sentences.

Offenses are counted as follows: If one is teaching the Dhamma line-by-line, one incurs a pācittiya for each line; if syllable-by-syllable, a pācittiya for each syllable.

Conversations on other topics

Strangely enough, neither the Vibhaṅga nor the Commentary makes mention of conversations with women that do not touch on the Dhamma. The Sub-commentary notes this, and in one of its rare stabs at humor concludes, “It’s perfectly all right to talk as much as you like about Tamils and that sort of thing.”

Conversation that does not deal with the Dhamma, though, is termed “animal talk” (tiracchāna-kathā) in the Canon, and there are several passages (e.g., the Vibhaṅgas to Pc 21 & 85; Mv.V.6.3-4) that criticize group-of-six bhikkhus for engaging in animal talk: worldly talk about “kings, robbers, and ministers of state (politics); armies, alarms, and battles; food and drink; clothing, furniture, garlands, and scents; relatives; vehicles; villages, towns, cities, the countryside; women and heroes; the gossip of the street and the well; tales of the dead; also philosophical discussions of the past and future (this is how the Sub-commentary to Pc 85 explains ‘tales of diversity’), the creation of the world and of the sea, and talk of whether things exist or not.” The Sub-commentary notes, though, that to discuss any of these topics in a way to foster an understanding of the Dhamma—e.g., discussing the impermanence of worldly power—is not considered improper.

Although there is no specific penalty for indulging in such worldly talk, a bhikkhu who indulges in it with lay people, bhikkhus, or novices to the point where he becomes offensive to the Community may be subject to an act of censure, banishment, or suspension on the grounds of “unbecoming association with householders” or “verbal frivolity.” Furthermore, a bhikkhu sitting alone with a woman (or women) engaging in such talk would be subject to the conditions of Pc 44 or 45 and Ay 1 or 2.

It is also worth noting in this regard that, unlike Pc 44 & 45 and Ay 1 & 2, this rule covers situations where either the bhikkhu or the woman, or both, are standing. In other words, if a bhikkhu and a woman are conversing while standing, he may teach her at most six sentences of Dhamma unless any of the non-offense clauses apply.

Non-offenses

There is no offense if, after the bhikkhu teaches the woman six sentences of Dhamma, either he or she changes position—stands up, sits down, etc.—and he continues with six more sentences. This point was most likely included to indicate separate conversations. Once a bhikkhu has taught five or six sentences to a woman, he may teach her again when they meet again and is not condemned to silence for the rest of his life.

Another exemption is that a bhikkhu, after teaching six sentences of Dhamma to one woman, may turn and teach six more sentences to another without incurring a penalty. Thus the Commentary notes that a bhikkhu addressing an assembly of 100 women may teach them a total of 600 sentences of Dhamma if he aims each set of six at a different woman.

A third exemption is that there is no penalty for a bhikkhu who is teaching Dhamma to someone else, and a woman happens to be listening in.

Finally, as noted above, if a woman asks a bhikkhu a question, he may give her a talk even if no other man is present. This exemption is common to all the rules that deal with instructing women (see Pc 21 & 22), but precisely what it means is somewhat uncertain, as none of the texts define how teaching Dhamma (dhammaṁ deseti) differs from giving a talk (katheti), if they differ at all. The Commentary notes simply that in giving a talk one is not limited to six sentences; its example of a ‘talk’ is a recitation of the complete Dīgha Nikāya (!), which shows that, as far as the commentators are concerned, teaching Dhamma and giving a talk are essentially the same. Thus a bhikkhu may answer a woman’s question about Dhamma with a talk including as many sentences of Dhamma as he needs to make his point clear.

This allowance is important in that it honors a woman’s desire to understand the Dhamma. A wise policy, though, would be to show restraint in such situations. The relationship of male teacher to female student has a long, well-known history of getting out of hand. Even if a bhikkhu is in control of himself in such conversations, passers-by—and the woman herself—can easily misconstrue his words and actions. So, wherever possible, he should go out of his way to guard himself against suspicion and misunderstandings in such cases by having a man present when talking alone with a woman, even though the special exemption is made.

Summary: Teaching more than six sentences of Dhamma to a woman, except in response to a question, is a pācittiya offense unless a knowledgeable man is present.

*    *    *

8

Should any bhikkhu report (his own) superior human state to an unordained person, when it is factual, it is to be confessed.

The factors for the full offense here are two:

1) Effort: One reports one’s actual attainment of a superior human state

2) Object: to an unordained person, i.e., any human being who is not a bhikkhu or bhikkhunī.

The commentaries add an extra factor here—result—but this is based on the same misunderstanding that led them to add the same factor to Pr 4. See the explanation under “Understanding,” below.

Effort

Effort is the only factor requiring explanation here.

The meaning of superior human state is discussed at length under Pr 4. In brief, it covers (a) jhāna, (b) the cognitive powers that can arise as its result, and (c) the transcendent attainments.

Factual is not explained in the texts, but probably means factual from the bhikkhu’s own point of view. In other words, regardless of whether he has actually attained a superior human state, if he thinks he has and reports it to an unordained person, he commits an offense all the same. If he actually has attained such a state, e.g., jhāna, but thinks he hasn’t, and yet claims that he has—in other words, he is telling what he thinks to be a lie—he incurs a pārājika.

To report, says the Vibhaṅga, means to speak directly of one’s own attainments, as explained under Pr 4—i.e., to claim that the state is present in oneself or that one is present in the state. To speak indirectly of one’s own attainments—e.g., “The bhikkhu who lives in this dwelling enters jhāna at will”—entails a dukkaṭa. According to the Commentary, gestures fall under this rule as well. Thus, if a bhikkhu who has attained stream-entry nods when asked by a lay person if he has any noble attainments, his nod would fulfill the factor of effort here. As under Pr 4, the use of idioms to express a superior human attainment would fulfill the factor of effort as well.

The origin story to this rule deals with bhikkhus who, as a tactic for getting almsfood in a time of scarcity, had agreed to speak of one another’s superior human states to householders. This would seem to suggest that to speak of another bhikkhu’s actual attainment of superior human states with such motives in mind—e.g., hoping to get a share of the increased gains he might receive—should entail a penalty too, but none of the texts mention this point, so it is not an offense. Still, any bhikkhu who plans to act in such a way, on the grounds that whatever is not an offense is perfectly all right, should remember that the Buddha criticized the bhikkhus in the origin story in very strong terms.

Understanding

The Vibhaṅga contains a series of situations in which understanding is a factor, paralleling a similar series given under Pr 4. In each of the situations, a bhikkhu means to claim one superior human state but ends up claiming another. None of the texts mention this point, but apparently in these cases the state intended has to be actually present within him, whereas the state mentioned by mistake does not. At any rate, if he realizes his slip of the tongue, he incurs a pācittiya; if not, a dukkaṭa.

Unlike Pr 4, the bhikkhu’s understanding when he makes an indirect claim to a superior human state here is not an issue. He incurs a dukkaṭa whether he understands the implications of his statement or not.

Intention is not a factor under this rule. Thus, whether one has a skillful or an unskillful motive for mentioning one’s factual superior human attainments to an unordained person is irrelevant to the offense.

Non-offenses

The Vibhaṅga lists only two non-offense clauses: There is no offense in reporting one’s own superior human attainments to another bhikkhu or to a bhikkhunī, and there is no offense for the original instigators of the rule. The Commentary, noting the absence of the usual exemption for one who is insane, explains it as follows: A person who has attained any of the noble attainments can never become insane; a person who has attained jhāna can become insane only after his/her ability to attain jhāna has been lost. A bhikkhu in the latter category has no right to claim jhāna as a state “present in himself” and therefore does not deserve an exemption under this rule. This last point, however, conflicts with the Vibhaṅga, which includes claims stated in the past tense—for example, “I have attained the first jhāna”—as examples of legitimate claims. A more likely explanation for the lack of the blanket exemptions under this rule is that they are already exempted under Pr 4.

As for the first exemption, allowing a bhikkhu to claim his factual attainments to another bhikkhu or bhikkhunī, a series of stories in the Vinīta-vatthu to Pr 4 raises some points to bear in mind in such situations. A typical example—the stories differ only in minor details—is this:

“Then Ven. Mahā Moggallāna, as he was descending Vulture Peak Mountain, smiled at a certain place. Ven. Lakkhaṇa said to him, ‘Friend Moggallāna, what is the reason, what is the cause for your smile?’

“‘This is not the time, friend Lakkhaṇa, to answer this question. Ask me in the presence of the Blessed One.’

“So Ven. Lakkhaṇa and Ven. Mahā Moggallāna… went to the Blessed One and, on arrival, having bowed down to him, sat to one side. As they were sitting there, Ven. Lakkhaṇa said to Ven. Mahā Moggallāna, ‘Just now, friend Moggallāna… you smiled. What was the reason, what was the cause for your smile?’

“‘Just now, my friend… I saw a man immersed head and all in a pit of excrement, feeding on excrement with both hands. The thought occurred to me, “Isn’t it amazing, isn’t it astounding, that there is a being even like this….”’

“Bhikkhus criticized and complained and spread it about, ‘Ven. Moggallāna is boasting of a superior human state!’

“Then the Blessed One said to the bhikkhus, ‘Actually, bhikkhus, there are disciples of vision and knowledge who will know or see or bear witness like this. Once I myself saw that being but I didn’t disclose it. Had I disclosed it, others would not have believed me… and that would have been to their long-term pain and detriment. That being, bhikkhus, was once a corrupted brahman right in this very same Rājagaha. He, in the time of the Buddha Kassapa, having invited a Community of bhikkhus to a meal, having filled a trough with excrement and announcing the time, said, “Venerable sirs, eat from this and take with you as much as you like.” Having been boiled in hell as a result of that action for many years, many hundreds of years, many thousands of years, many hundreds of thousands of years, he is now—through the remainder of the result of that very same action—experiencing existence as an individual like this. Moggallāna spoke truly, bhikkhus. There is no offense for him.’”

Ven. Moggallāna’s conduct here—waiting until he is in the presence of his teacher before relating his vision—has become a model for conduct among meditators, for as the bhikkhus’ reaction and the Buddha’s comments make clear, there are situations where the act of relating one’s visions, etc., even when allowed, will serve no positive purpose.

Displaying psychic powers

A related rule at Cv.V.8.2 states that to display psychic powers to lay people is a dukkaṭa. In the origin story leading up to that rule, the Buddha levels strong criticism at such an act: “Just as a woman might expose her vagina for a miserable wooden māsaka coin, so too have you displayed a superior human state, a wonder of psychic power, to lay people for the sake of a miserable wooden bowl.”

To display psychic powers to anyone who is not a lay person, though, is no offense. Thus, given the way these two rules are framed, one may not tell a novice of one’s powers but may levitate before his very eyes.

Summary: To tell an unordained person of one’s actual superior human attainments is a pācittiya offense.

*    *    *

9

Should any bhikkhu report (another) bhikkhu’s serious offense to an unordained person—unless authorized by the bhikkhus—it is to be confessed.

“At that time Ven. Upananda the Sakyan had gotten into a quarrel with some group-of-six bhikkhus. Having committed an offense of intentional emission of semen, he asked the Community to grant him probation…. Now at that time a certain guild in Sāvatthī was presenting a meal to the Community. Ven. Upananda, being on probation, sat in the last seat in the meal hall. The group-of-six bhikkhus said to the lay people, ‘Friends, this Ven. Upananda the Sakyan, your esteemed dependent, emitted semen having attacked (himself) with the very same hand with which he is eating your gift of faith…. (This is why), being on probation, he is sitting in the last seat.’”

There are two factors for the full offense here:

1) Object: a serious offense committed by another bhikkhu.

2) Effort: One reports it to an unordained person without having been authorized to do so by the Community.

Object

The Vibhaṅga states that serious offense means any of the four pārājika or thirteen saṅghādisesa offenses, while Buddhaghosa reports the ancient commentaries as saying that it covers only the saṅghādisesas. His discussion of this point is interesting for the light it throws on the history of the texts: He presents two arguments for the commentaries’ position, effectively demolishes them, but then backs down and ends up siding with them. Why he does this is hard to say, although it may be that he himself disagreed with the ancient commentaries on this point but was forced to side with them by the elders of the Mahāvihāra who were responsible for putting the seal of approval on his work.

At any rate, the details of the argument lie outside the scope of this guide. The Vinaya-mukha has already adopted Buddhaghosa’s arguments against the ancient commentaries here, and we will simply follow our usual policy of siding with the Vibhaṅga wherever the other texts depart from it. Serious offense means both the four pārājikas and the thirteen saṅghādisesas.

A bhikkhu’s non-serious offenses are grounds for a dukkaṭa.

Perception as to whether the bhikkhu’s offense is serious is not a mitigating factor. If it actually is serious, then whether one perceives it as serious, not serious, or doubtful, it is grounds for a pācittiya. If it actually is not serious, then regardless of how one perceives it, it is grounds for a dukkaṭa. In other words, the pattern set out under Pc 4 does not hold here.

An unordained person’s misbehavior—serious or not—is also grounds for a dukkaṭa. (§—BD translates the passage on which this last point is based as, “tells one who is not ordained of a transgression” when it should read, “tells of an unordained person’s transgression.”) According to the Commentary, serious misbehavior on the part of an unordained person means breaking any of the five precepts. Anything else would count as not serious.

This dukkaṭa penalty for informing an unordained person about another unordained person’s transgressions of the precepts, though frequently overlooked in discussions of this rule, is important. It seems aimed at keeping bhikkhus from being gossips, so that novices and lay people may seek advice from a bhikkhu concerning the difficulties they have in observing the precepts without fear that he will spread the news to other unordained people as well.

This also helps preserve the good faith of donors: They can give their support to the bhikkhus without fear that the recipients of their support might be gossiping about their lapses in the practice behind their backs. If donors were to learn that a bhikkhu had been gossiping about them, they might become so disgusted as to withdraw their support from the religion as a whole.

Effort

Unordained person here means anyone who is not a bhikkhu or a bhikkhunī.

To report an offense to an unordained person means to tell him/her both the action and the class of the offense. Thus, to say, “Ven. Upananda committed a saṅghādisesa by masturbating,” would fulfill the fact of effort here; while to say simply, “Ven. Upananda committed a saṅghādisesa,” or “Ven. Upananda masturbated,” would not, and would not even be grounds for a lesser offense. None of the texts discuss the question of whether the same principle would apply to the offenses of an unordained person.

This allowance, which looks strange on the surface, was made apparently for such cases as when a lay person, seeing a senior bhikkhu sitting at the end of the line, might ask one of the other bhikkhus why. A bhikkhu would be well-advised, though, to examine his motives before making use of this allowance, for to take advantage of it to discredit a fellow bhikkhu would be to incur a dukkaṭa under Pc 13. Though the penalty is minor, little acts and minor offenses of this sort are often the ones most destructive to the harmony of the Community.

None of the texts state that the person whose offense is being reported has to be mentioned explicitly to fulfill this factor. Thus, apparently, implicit references (“The bhikkhu who lives in that dwelling committed a saṅghādisesa by masturbating”) would fulfill the factor of effort here as well.

The authorization

The Vibhaṅga does not give any indication of when the Community should authorize a bhikkhu to tell unordained people about another bhikkhu’s serious offense. As the Vinaya-mukha sees it, the purpose of the training rule is to prevent bhikkhus from advertising one another’s faults among people outside the Community. However, there are cases, it says, where a bhikkhu may commit a serious offense and refuse to acknowledge it, as when committing a pārājika and yet continuing to assume the status of a bhikkhu, or committing a saṅghādisesa and refusing to go through the procedures for rehabilitation. Thus the Community in such cases is allowed to authorize one of its members to inform lay people, such as the bhikkhu’s supporters, as a way of exerting pressure on him to submit to his penalty.

According to the Commentary, though, the authorization is to be used in cases where the Community feels that the act of informing the laity would help to convince a well-intentioned but weak-willed bhikkhu who repeatedly commits saṅghādisesa offenses—even if he willingly undergoes the period of penance—to mend his ways.

Both interpretations fit with the Canon, although it should be borne in mind that using the authorization in line with the Vinaya-mukha’s rationale—to exert pressure on a bhikkhu who refuses to undergo a penalty—can often backfire, for the laity may simply think that the Community is jealous of the support they are giving to the bhikkhu they assume to be innocent of any wrong-doing.

The Vibhaṅga also does not tell how to issue the authorization. The Commentary recommends using the form of an announcment (apalokana) stated three times and unanimously agreed to by the Community meeting within a single territory (see BMC2, Chapter 12).

The Vibhaṅga does state, though, that when giving the authorization, the Community may limit it to families, to offenses, to both, or to neither. Limited to families means that the bhikkhu receiving the authorization may inform only certain specified families. Limited to offenses means that he may report only certain of the guilty bhikkhu’s offenses. A bhikkhu who oversteps the limits of his authorization incurs a pācittiya.

Non-offenses

We have already covered the cases that the Vibhaṅga includes in the non-offense clauses. To recapitulate: There is no penalty—

1) in telling an unordained person about another bhikkhu’s serious offense if one states the action but not the class of offense, or the class but not the action; or

2) in reporting another bhikkhu’s serious offense—action and class of offense—to an unordained person when one has been properly authorized to do so, as long as one does not overstep the bounds of one’s authorization.

Summary: Telling an unordained person of another bhikkhu’s serious offense—unless one is authorized by the Community to do so—is a pācittiya offense.

*    *    *

10

Should any bhikkhu dig soil or have it dug, it is to be confessed.

This is an offense with four factors: object, effort, perception, and intention.

Object

The Pali word for soil, paṭhavī, also means ground or earth. Thus the Vibhaṅga distinguishes which forms of earth are and are not classed as genuine soil:

Pure loam, pure clay, whatever is mostly loam or clay with a lesser portion of rock, stones, potsherds, gravel, or sand mixed in, is classed as “genuine” (or “natural”) soil (jātā paṭhavī).

Whatever is pure rock, stones, potsherds, gravel, or sand, or any of these with a lesser portion of loam or clay mixed in, is earth classed as “ungenuine” (or “denatured”) soil (ajātā paṭhavī). Also, burnt clay or loam—according to the Commentary, this means soil that has been burnt in the course of firing a bowl, a pot, etc.—is not classed as genuine soil. As for heaps of loam or clay that have been dug up: If they have been rained on for less than four months, they are not classed as genuine soil; but if rained on for four months or more, they are. At present, irrigated soil would count as “rained on” as well. Also, the layer of fine dust that forms on the surface of dry soil as the result of wind erosion is not classed as genuine soil.

The words for “genuine” and “not genuine”—jāta and ajāta—also mean “born” and “not born.” These terms are apparently related to the ancient Indian belief that soil is a form of one-facultied life (see below). The distinction between them seems based on an intuited idea that rock, sand, etc., were not alive, whereas clay and loam were naturally alive, although they would lose life when dug up and regain life when rained on for four months or more.

As the Commentary makes clear in discussing the Vibhaṅga’s non-offense clauses, there is no penalty in digging earth not classed as genuine soil. Thus, for example, digging into a pile of newly dug-up loam or drawing diagrams in the dust on top of dry soil would not be an offense.

Effort

The Vibhaṅga says that the term digging also covers burning, e.g., firing pottery or lighting a fire on top of the soil; and breaking, e.g., making a furrow with a rake or a stick. Thus, using a stick to draw in the soil or driving in a stake or pulling one out in such a way as to disturb the surrounding soil would fulfill the factor of effort here.

The Vibhaṅga adds that if one gives a single command to dig, then no matter how much the person digs, the offense is a single pācittiya.

Perception

If one is in doubt as to whether soil is genuine, the penalty for digging it is a dukkaṭa regardless of whether it is or isn’t. If one perceives it as genuine soil when it actually isn’t, the penalty for digging it is also a dukkaṭa. If one does not perceive it as genuine soil, then whether it is or isn’t, digging it incurs no offense.

Non-offenses

Because perception and intention are mitigating factors here, there is no offense for the bhikkhu who digs soil—

unknowingly—e.g., digging into a pile of soil perceiving it to be sand;

unthinkingly—e.g., absent-mindedly drawing in the dirt while talking with someone else; or

unintentionally—e.g., raking leaves, pulling a wheelbarrow through the mud, or digging in a pile of sand and accidentally digging into the soil underneath.

Also, there is no offense in asking for clay or soil, or in indicating a need for a hole in the ground, without expressly giving the command to dig. Examples in the Vibhaṅga: “Know this. Give this. Bring this. This is wanted. Make this allowable.” Present examples would include such statements as, “Please get me some clay to make a pot.” “We’re going to need a hole right here.” According to the Commentary, an explicit request that a reservoir or pit, etc., be dug also entails no penalty as long as one does not say precisely where to dig it. (“We’re going to have to drain the water from A to B, so dig the trench wherever you think it would do the job best.”) This sort of request or hint is termed kappiya-vohāra—“allowable expression,” or in plain English, “wording it right”—and often finds use in the context of rules where an express command would be an offense, but an indication of a desire or intent would not.

The Commentary quotes the ancient commentaries as saying that if another person or animal has fallen into a pit, there is no penalty for digging the victim out. The same holds true if another person or animal is trapped by a fallen but still-living tree: The bhikkhu may cut the tree to free the victim without incurring a penalty under the following rule.

Although the Commentary cannot find any justification in the Canon for these opinions, it states that they should be accepted because they are the unanimous judgment of the ancient commentaries. As we have noted before, Buddhaghosa does not always accept even the unanimous judgment of the ancient commentaries, but perhaps he felt that these were cases in which it would be better to err on the side of compassion rather than strictness.

However, the Commentary goes on to say that if a bhikkhu falls into a pit himself, he should not dig any earth that would be classed as genuine soil, even for the sake of his life. The same holds true if he is trapped by a fallen but still-living tree: He may not cut the tree even though his life is in danger.

In line with Cv.V.32.1, which allows a bhikkhu to light a counter-fire to ward off an approaching wildfire, the Commentary to Pr 3 states that one may also dig a moat to ward off such a fire without incurring a penalty under this rule.

The reason for this rule, as indicated by the origin story, is that people in general at the time of the Buddha viewed soil as having a form of one-facultied life. The Jains, who were contemporaries of the Buddha, classed life into five categories according to the number of senses or faculties the living thing possessed. In the one-facultied category, where there is only the sense of touch, they included soil and vegetation. One scholar has suggested that the Jains here were simply systematizing an animist belief, predating their theories, that soil and plants had souls. At any rate, this sort of view was so widespread at the time that any potters who were meticulous in their precepts would take their clay only from termite nests and other piles of dug-up earth. The Ghaṭīkāra Sutta (MN 81) describes a potter—a non-returner in the dispensation of the Buddha Kassapa—who, even though he was a lay man, would take the earth for his pots only from collapsed embankments and the piles of dirt around rat holes so as to avoid injuring the soil.

Another consideration, carrying more weight at present, is that the act of digging soil risks killing or injuring whatever animals might be living there.

This rule, together with the following one, also effectively prevents bhikkhus from engaging in agriculture.

Summary: Digging soil or commanding that it be dug is a pācittiya offense.

Two: The Living Plant Chapter

11

The damaging of a living plant is to be confessed.

“A certain Āḷavī bhikkhu was chopping down a tree. The devatā living in the tree said to the bhikkhu, ‘Venerable sir, do not chop down my home to build a home for yourself.’ The bhikkhu, disregarding her, kept right on chopping and injured the arm of the devatā’s child. The devatā thought: ‘What if I were to kill this bhikkhu right here?’ Then another thought occurred to her: ‘But no, that wouldn’t be proper…. What if I were to tell the Blessed One of what has happened?’ So she went to the Blessed One and… told him of what had happened.

“‘Very good, devatā, very good. It’s very good that you didn’t kill the bhikkhu. If you had killed him today, you would have produced much demerit for yourself. Now go, devatā. Over there is a vacant tree. Go into it.’ (The Commentary adds here that the tree, being in Jeta’s Grove, was a definite move up for the devatā. She had a front-row seat for overhearing the Buddha’s teachings well into the night; unlike other lesser devas she wasn’t pushed out to the far reaches of the galaxy when large groups of major devas met with the Buddha; and when the Four Great Kings came to attend to the Buddha, they always made a point of visiting her before leaving. However:)

“People criticized and complained and spread it about, ‘How can these Sakyan-son monks cut down trees and have them cut down? They are mistreating one-facultied life.’”

This is another offense with the four factors of object, effort, perception, and intention.

Object

The Pali term for living plant—bhūtagāma—literally means the home of a being. This the Sub-commentary explains by saying that devatās may take up residence in plants standing in place by means of a longing on which their consciousness fastens (at the end of their previous lives) as in a dream. This rule is justified, it says, in that the etiquette of a contemplative precludes doing harm to the abodes of living beings. As the origin story shows, though, the reason this rule was laid down in the first place was to prevent bhikkhus from offending people who held to the animist belief that regarded plants as one-facultied life having the sense of touch.

The Vibhaṅga defines bhūtagāma as vegetation arising from any of five sources:

1) from bulbs, rhizomes, or tubers (e.g., potatoes, tulips),

2) from cuttings or stakes (e.g., willows, rose bushes),

3) from joints (e.g., sugar cane, bamboo),

4) from runners (e.g., strawberries, couch grass), or

5) from seeds (e.g., corn, beans).

According to the Commentary, a whole plant or part of one that has been removed from its original place is no longer classed as bhūtagāma. If it is capable of growing again when placed in the ground, it is classed as bījagāma, which means “home of a seed.” When a seed is sown, it is regarded as bījagāma until the first shoot turns a fresh green color and the first leaf appears. After that it is regarded as bhūtagāma.

In line with this criterion, the Commentary classifies as bījagāma such lower forms of plant life as mushrooms that still have their spores, fungi, lichens without leaves, and molds, in that they do not pass through a fresh green stage, have no discernable leaves, and yet are capable of regeneration. Mushrooms that have lost their spores, and parts of any plants that have been removed from place and will not grow, or that have been cooked or otherwise damaged to the point where they are incapable of generation, are not grounds for an offense under this rule.

The Commentary asserts further that to damage bījagāma entails a dukkaṭa. The Vibhaṅga does not mention this point, but the Commentary cites as its justification a passage occurring in a number of suttas (such as DN 2) saying that a bhikkhu consummate in virtue refrains from harming both bhūtagāma and bījagāma. In doing so, the Commentary is utilizing the Cullavagga’s blanket rule assigning a dukkaṭa to all bad habits (Cv.V.36). The Mahāvagga and Cullavagga give further but partial justification to the Commentary’s assertion in two passages, dealing with bhikkhus eating fruit, which we will discuss below. The Jain ascetics follow similar observances, which suggests that both the Buddhists and the Jains adopted this point from the ancient Indian ascetics who predated both religions.

Furthermore, according to the Commentary, there are certain kinds of plants that do not count either as bhūtagāma or bījagāma under this rule, and to damage them entails no offense. To justify this point it quotes a passage from Cv.VIII.1.3: “If a wall treated with ochre… (or) a finished floor is moldy (§), one should moisten a rag, wring it out, and wipe it clean.” The Commentary extends the Canon’s instructions here to cover not only mold on walls but also other lower forms of plant life—such as algae on the inside of water jars, fungus on toothbrushes, and mold on food—that would count as filth if they were allowed to continue growing.

Effort

According to the Vibhaṅga, the term damaging includes such actions as cutting, breaking, and cooking, as well as getting other people to perform these actions. The Commentary defines damaging as “dealing with a plant as one likes by cutting it, breaking it, and so on.” Although the word for dealing with—paribhuñjati—literally means “making use of,” the Commentary’s illustrations of what this covers include even such things as shaking a tree limb to get the dry leaves to fall off so that one can sweep them up. Thus, it says, damaging would include picking flowers or leaves, uprooting a plant, engraving one’s initials in a tree trunk, etc. Because no exception is made for doing such things with “benevolent” intentions toward the plant, pruning would be included as well. Given the catch-all nature of the Commentary’s definition, using herbicides to kill plants would also come under damaging.

The Commentary adds that plants growing in water, such as water hyacinths, whose roots do not extend to the earth beneath the water, have the water as their base. To remove them from the water is to damage them, although there is no offense in moving them around in the water. To move them from one body of water to another without incurring a penalty, one may take them together with some of the water in which they originally lived and place them together with that water into the new body of water.

Also, says the Commentary, plants such as mistletoe, orchids, and bird vine that grow on trees have the tree as their base. To remove them from the tree is to damage them and so entails a pācittiya.

Perception

If one damages a living plant (§) perceiving it to be something else—say, a dead plant—there is no offense. If one damages a plant in doubt as to whether it is living or dead, then regardless of what it actually is, the offense is a dukkaṭa.

Intention

Intention is discussed in detail under the non-offenses, below.

Making fruit allowable

Because fruit seeds are bījagāma, the question arises as to how bhikkhus should go about eating fruit. The Commentary to this rule discusses in detail two passages, one each in the Mahāvagga (VI. 21) and the Cullavagga (V.5.2), dealing with precisely this question. The Cullavagga passage reads, “I allow you, bhikkhus, to consume fruit that has been made allowable for monks in any of five ways: if it is damaged by fire, by a knife, by a fingernail, if it is seedless, and the fifth is if the seeds are discharged.” The Mahāvagga passage reads, “Now at that time there was a great quantity of fruit at Sāvatthī, but there was no one to make it allowable…. (The Buddha said,) ‘I allow that fruit that is seedless or whose seeds are discharged be consumed (even if) it has not been made allowable.”

First, to summarize the commentaries’ discussion of seedless fruit and fruit whose seeds have been discharged: According to the Commentary to the Mahāvagga, seedless fruit includes fruit whose seeds are too immature to grow. As for fruit whose seeds have been discharged, the Sub-commentary states that this means, “Fruit, such as mangoes or jackfruit, which it is possible to eat having removed the seeds and separating them entirely (from the flesh).”

The question sometimes arises as to whether bhikkhus may remove the seeds themselves before eating fruit of this sort, or if an unordained person has to remove them first. Given the context of the Mahāvagga passage and the wording of the Sub-commentary’s explanation, it seems clear that the bhikkhus themselves may discharge the seeds before or while eating the fruit. As the Commentary notes, both these kinds of fruit are allowable in and of themselves, and need not go through any other procedure to make them allowable.

Other kinds of fruit, though, such as those with numerous seeds (such as tomatoes and blackberries) or whose seeds would be difficult to remove undamaged (such as grapes) must be damaged by fire, a knife, or a fingernail before a bhikkhu may eat them. The Commentary’s description of how to do this shows that the damaging need only be symbolic: An unordained person draws a hot object or a knife across the skin of the fruit, or pokes it with a fingernail, saying “allowable” (kappiyaṁ) either while doing the damaging or immediately afterward. The Sub-commentary notes that the word for “allowable” may be stated in any language.

If a heap of fruit, such as grapes, is brought to a bhikkhu, he should say, “Make it allowable,” (Kappiyaṁ karohi,) either to the donor or to any other unordained person who knows how. The unordained person need only make one of the grapes allowable in line with the above procedures for the entire heap to be considered allowable, although he/she should not remove the grape from the heap while doing so.

The Sub-commentary claims that the ceremony of making fruit allowable must always be performed in the presence of a bhikkhu, but the Commentary mentions this factor only in connection with this last case—making an entire heap of fruit allowable by “damaging” only one piece—and not in its basic description of how the procedure is done.

In Communities that follow the Sub-commentary, the custom is as follows: When a donor brings grapes, tomatoes, or similar fruit to a bhikkhu, the bhikkhu says, “Kappiyaṁ karohi (Make it allowable).” The donor damages the fruit in any of the three specified ways and says, “Kappiyaṁ bhante (It is allowable, venerable sir),” while doing the damaging, and then presents the fruit to the bhikkhu.

In Communities that do not follow the Sub-commentary, the donor may perform the act of damaging the fruit beforehand. If the damage is obvious, a bhikkhu may accept and consume the fruit without asking. If it’s not, he should ask whether it has been damaged. If the reply is Yes, he may accept and consume it. If No, it should first be damaged in his presence.

Even in this second type of Community, however, the act of making a heap of fruit allowable by damaging only one piece must be done in a bhikkhu’s presence. And we should note again that seedless fruit or fruit whose seeds may be removed entirely from the flesh of the fruit are allowable in and of themselves, and do not have to go through any procedure before a bhikkhu may accept and eat them.

The two passages in the Mahāvagga and Cullavagga that we have been discussing deal specifically only with fruit, but the Commentary extrapolates from them to say that the same conditions apply to other forms of bījagāma, such as sugar cane and bean sprouts as well.

Non-offenses

The Vibhaṅga says that there is no offense for a bhikkhu who cuts a living plant—

unknowingly—e.g., thinking it to be dead,

unthinkingly—e.g., absent-mindedly pulling grass while talking with someone, or

unintentionally—e.g., inadvertently uprooting grass while raking leaves, or grabbing onto a plant for support while climbing a hill and inadvertently uprooting it.

Also, there is no penalty in telling an unordained person to make an item allowable; in asking for leaves, flowers, etc., without specifically saying which leaves or flowers are to be picked; or in indicating indirectly that, e.g., the grass needs cutting (“Look at how long the grass is”) or that a tree needs pruning (“This branch is in the way”) without expressly giving the command to cut. In other words, this is another rule where one may avoid an offense by using kappiya-vohāra: “wording it right.”

Cv.V.32.1 says that if a brush fire is approaching a dwelling, one may light a counter-fire to ward it off. In doing so, one is exempt from any penalty imposed by this rule.

Also, according to the Sub-commentary to NP 6, a bhikkhu whose robes have been snatched away and who cannot find any other cloth to cover himself may pick grass and leaves to cover himself without incurring a penalty here.

Summary: Intentionally cutting, burning, or killing a living plant is a pācittiya offense.

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12

Evasive speech and causing frustration are to be confessed.

This rule deals with a bhikkhu’s behavior in a Community meeting when being formally questioned about a charge made against him. The factors for the full offense here are three.

1) Intention: One’s motive is to hide one’s offenses.

2) Effort: One continues engaging in evasive speech or in causing frustration

3) Object: when being questioned in the Community about a rule or an offense after the Community has brought a formal charge of evasive speech or causing frustration against one.

Effort

Evasive speech is illustrated in the origin story as follows:

“Now at that time Ven. Channa, having misbehaved and being examined about the offense in the midst of the Community, wandered around (§) one thing by way of another: ‘Who has committed the offense? What was committed? With regard to what matter was it committed? How was it committed? What are you saying? Why do you say it?’”

The Vibhaṅga, following the lead of the origin story, gives examples of evasive speech that are all in the form of questions. However, the Commentary argues that the Vibhaṅga’s examples are not intended to be exhaustive, and that evasive speech covers any and all forms of speaking beside the point when being formally questioned. The Sub-commentary agrees and gives an entertaining example of its own: 

“Have you committed this offense?”

“I’ve been to Pāṭaliputta.”

“But we’re not asking about your going to Pāṭaliputta. We’re asking about an offense.”

“From there I went to Rājagaha.”

“Well, Rājagaha or Brahmaṇāgaha, did you commit the offense?”

“I got some pork there.”

As for causing frustration:

“Now at a later time Ven. Channa, being examined about an offense in the midst of the Community, (thinking), ‘By evading one question with another, I will fall into an offense,’ remained silent and frustrated the Community.”

Thus, the texts say, causing frustration means remaining silent when being formally questioned in the midst of the Community.

Intention

This factor is fulfilled only if one’s motive is to conceal one’s own offenses. If one has other motives for remaining silent, asking questions, or speaking not to the point while being questioned, there is no penalty. For example, there is no offense for a bhikkhu who, when being examined,

asks questions or gives answers not to the point because he does not understand what is being said,

is too ill to speak,

feels that in speaking he will create conflict or dissension in the Community, or

feels that the Community will carry out its transactions unfairly or not in accordance with the rule.

Object

If a bhikkhu speaks evasively or remains silent out of a desire to conceal his offenses, he incurs a dukkaṭa. If the Community sees fit, it may then bring a formal charge of evasive speech or causing frustration against him in order to restrain him from persisting in such behavior. (See Appendix VIII for these transaction statements.) If he then continues speaking evasively or remaining silent, he incurs a pācittiya.

Perception is not a factor here. Once a formal charge of evasive speech or causing frustration has been rightfully brought against a bhikkhu, and he continues to speak evasively or remain silent, he incurs a pācittiya regardless of whether he sees the charge as rightful or not. If the charge has been wrongfully brought against him, then regardless of whether he perceives the charge as wrongful, rightful, or doubtful, the offenses or lack of offenses are allotted as if the Community transaction bringing the charge had not happened at all. This covers two situations. In the first, the bhikkhu actually deserves the charge, but the transaction was not carried out strictly in accordance with formal procedure. In this case, if the bhikkhu continues to be evasive or remain silent out of a desire to hide his offenses, he incurs another dukkaṭa. In the second situation, the bhikkhu does not deserve the charge—for instance, he has asked questions or remained silent for one of the allowable reasons, but the Community has abused its powers in bringing the charge against him. In this case, if he continues to ask questions or remain silent for the allowable reasons, he incurs no offense.

As for the case in which the Community rightly brings a formal charge of evasive speech or causing frustration against a bhikkhu, and he incurs a pācittiya for continuing to speak evasively or remain silent: If he continues being uncooperative, he may further be subject to a more severe penalty, a censure transaction (tajjanīya-kamma) for being a maker of trouble and strife for the Community (Cv.I.1-8—BMC2, Chapter 20). If he finally admits to having committed the offense about which he is being questioned—or another previously unconfessed offense—he is subject to what is essentially the same thing: an act of further punishment (tassa-pāpiyasikā-kamma) for not admitting to a true charge right from the start (see the discussion under the Adhikaraṇa-samatha rules, Chapter 11).

Non-offenses

If a bhikkhu answers not to the point or remains silent for any of the allowable reasons, he incurs no penalty even after a transaction of evasive speech or causing frustration has for some reason been enacted against him.

Summary: Persistently replying evasively or keeping silent in order to conceal one’s own offenses when being questioned in a meeting of the Community—after a formal charge of evasive speech or causing frustration has been brought against one—is a pācittiya offense.

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13

Criticizing or complaining (about a Community official) is to be confessed.

Community officials. In the Cullavagga (VI.11.2-4; VI.21.1-3), the Buddha gives allowances for a Community of bhikkhus to designate various of its members as Community officials to handle such business as distributing food, deciding who will stay in which dwelling, keeping the rosters that decide who will receive the invitations to which meals, etc. Ven. Dabba Mallaputta was the first such official and was well-equipped for the job:

“As for those bhikkhus who came at night, he would enter the fire element for them and by that light would assign them dwellings—so much so that bhikkhus arrived at night on purpose, thinking, ‘We will see the marvel of Ven. Dabba Mallaputta’s psychic power.’ Approaching him, they said, ‘Friend Dabba, assign us dwellings.’

“Ven. Dabba Mallaputta said, ‘Where would you like? Where shall I assign them?’

“Then they named a distant place on purpose: ‘Friend Dabba, assign us a dwelling on Vulture’s Peak Mountain. Friend Dabba, assign us a dwelling on Robber’s Cliff….’

“So Ven. Dabba Mallaputta, entering the fire element for them, went before them with his finger glowing, while they followed right behind him with the help of his light.”—Cv.IV.4.4

Even with his special skills, there were bhikkhus who were dissatisfied with the dwellings and meals he assigned to them—as we saw under Sg 8 & 9—and in the origin story to this rule they criticize and complain about him.

The factors for a full offense here are three: object, intention, and effort—although the Vibhaṅga makes intention an integral part of its definition of the factor of effort.

Object

This factor is fulfilled only by (1) a bhikkhu who (2) has been properly authorized as a Community official and (3) does not habitually act out of the four causes for bias: desire, aversion, delusion, or fear. With regard to the first two of these sub-factors, other people—and the Vibhaṅga’s list of “others” here is interesting—are grounds for a dukkaṭa. The list is: an unordained person, an ordained person who acts as a Community official without having been authorized, an ordained person who acts as a Community official having been improperly authorized, and an unordained person who acts as a Community official whether authorized or not. With regard to the third sub-factor, anyone who would otherwise be grounds for a pācittiya or a dukkaṭa is not grounds for an offense if he/she behaves in a biased way.

Perception is not a factor here. Thus, if the official is actually properly authorized, he fulfills this factor whether one perceives his authorization as proper, improper, or doubtful. If he is improperly authorized, he is grounds for a dukkaṭa whether one perceives his authorization as proper, improper, or doubtful. In other words, this is another case where the pattern set out under Pc 4 does not hold.

(The PTS edition of the Canon says that if one perceives an improper authorization as improper, there is no offense, but the Thai, Sri Lankan, and Burmese editions of the Canon, together with the PTS edition of the K/Commentary, all agree with the above reading.)

Intention

One’s motive is to make him lose face, lose status, or feel abashed.

Effort

The Vibhaṅga defines criticizing as criticizing or complaining about a Community official to a fellow bhikkhu with the desire of making the official lose face, lose status, or feel abashed. The line between effort and intention appears blurred here, in that the intention is a part of the definition of “effort,” but the non-offense clauses provide an exemption for critical remarks that are motivated simply by a desire to tell the truth.

The Commentary and Sub-commentary give the clearest description of the distinction between criticizing and complaining: To criticize means to speak critically of a person in the presence of one or more other people so as to make them form a low opinion of him/her. To complain means simply to give vent to one’s criticisms of the person within earshot of someone else.

According to the Vibhaṅga, the penalty for criticizing or complaining about a Community official is a pācittiya if one’s listener is a fellow bhikkhu, and a dukkaṭa if one’s listener is an unordained person (§). The question of who one’s remarks are addressed to is irrelevant if one is criticizing or complaining about an unordained person or a bhikkhu who is not a Community official: The penalty is a dukkaṭa, regardless.

Non-offenses

As mentioned above, if a Community official acts habitually out of any of the four causes for bias—desire, aversion, delusion, or fear—there is no offense in criticizing or complaining about him. For example, if he assigns the best dwellings to certain bhikkhus simply because he likes them, gives the poorest food to certain bhikkhus simply because he dislikes them, habitually sends the wrong bhikkhus to the wrong meals because he is too stupid to handle the rotating rosters properly, or gives the best treatment to certain bhikkhus because he is afraid of them or their supporters, there is no offense in criticizing his behavior in the presence of others.

The reason for this allowance is that one of the qualifying factors for a Community official is that he be unbiased (see BMC2, Chapter 18). Thus any complaint of bias would be tantamount to an accusation that the Community transaction authorizing him as an official was invalid, and the Community would then be duty bound to look into the matter.

However, one should be very sure of the facts of the case before taking advantage of this allowance, for—as noted above—perception is not a mitigating factor under this rule. Disappointment and anger have a way of coloring one’s perceptions, making another person’s perfectly blameless behavior look biased and unjust. If one criticizes or complains about an official, thoroughly convinced that he has been acting out of bias, one is still guilty of an offense if it turns out that in fact the official’s behavior has been fair. The same considerations apply also to complaints or criticisms concerning anyone, ordained or not.

To criticize a Community official to his face, simply for the sake of hurting his feelings, would be an offense under Pc 2, regardless of whether his behavior has in fact been biased or not.

The job of a Community official is often a thankless one. The procedures he must follow in distributing invitations, etc., can be fairly complex and, in large Communities, quite time-consuming. Because there is no way he can guarantee equal treatment to all, there may be times when he seems to be acting out of bias when he is simply following standard procedure. If he cannot receive the benefit of the doubt from his fellow bhikkhus, there is no incentive for him to undertake these duties in the first place. The Buddha likened material gains to excrement (see AN 5:196), and when excrement is shared out there is rarely any point in complaining about who gets the choicest portions.

Summary: If a Community official is innocent of bias: Criticizing him within earshot of another bhikkhu is a pācittiya offense.

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14

Should any bhikkhu set a bed, bench, mattress, or stool belonging to the Community out in the open—or have it set out—and then on departing neither put it away nor have it put away, or should he go without taking leave, it is to be confessed.

During the four months of the rains, furniture belonging to the Community—when not in use—is to be kept in a place where it will not be rained on, such as a fully-roofed storeroom or dwelling. The Vibhaṅga to this rule contains an allowance whereby during the remainder of the year it may also be kept in an open pavilion roofed with slats or branches, or under a tree where birds do not leave droppings. (At present, tents would fit under “pavilions” here.) The Commentary implies, though, that this latter allowance holds only in those regions with a distinct dry season; and, according to the Sub-commentary, even where there is a dry season, if a bhikkhu sees an unseasonable rain storm approaching he should not leave furniture in such semi-open places. And as we can infer from the Vibhaṅga to the next rule, even during the dry season this allowance applies only as long as one continues to reside in the monastery.

This rule deals with a bhikkhu who sets furnishings of the Community out in the open and then leaves without taking leave or getting them put away in the proper place. The factors for the full offense are three.

1) Object: any bed, bench, mattress, or stool belonging to the Community.

2) Effort: One sets such furnishings out in the open and then departs without taking leave, putting the furnishings away, or getting them put away in the proper place.

3) Intention: One has set them out for some purpose other than sunning them (§).

Object

Any bed, bench, mattress, or stool belonging to the Community is grounds for a pācittiya. Perception as to whether the item belongs to the Community is not a mitigating factor here (see Pc 4). Carpets, bedspreads, mats, ground-covering under-pads, foot-wiping cloths, and wooden chairs belonging to the Community are grounds for a dukkaṭa, as are both classes of furnishings—beds, etc., and carpets, etc.—belonging to another individual. One’s own furnishings are not grounds for an offense.

According to the Commentary, if one has made an arrangement with someone else to take his/her belongings on trust, there is no offense in leaving that person’s furnishings out in the open. The Sub-commentary adds that any furnishings a donor presents for the Community to use out in the open—e.g., stone or concrete benches—are likewise not grounds for an offense.

Under this rule, the Commentary contains a long essay on the proper storage of brooms. Because its remarks are based on an improper application of the Great Standards—brooms were known in the time of the Buddha and yet he chose not to include them under this rule—there is no reason to regard them as binding.

Effort

The Vibhaṅga defines departing the furnishings as going further than one leḍḍupāta—approximately 18 meters—from them. It does not define “taking leave,” aside from stating that one may take leave from a bhikkhu, a novice, or a monastery attendant. This much, however, establishes that even though the Pali verb for taking leave, āpucchati, is etymologically related to the verb for asking, pucchati, the act of taking leave does not mean asking permission, for nothing in the Canon suggests that a bhikkhu has to get a novice’s or a lay attendant’s permission for his actions. The Commentary expands on this point, saying that taking leave means informing a bhikkhu, a novice, or a temple attendant whom one assumes will take responsibility for the furnishings. Unlike the following rule, where the intent to return is a mitigating factor, here it is not: Once a bhikkhu has departed from the furnishings, he has completed the factor of effort here even if he intends to return immediately.

Responsibility

A bhikkhu is held responsible for putting away furnishings that he has ordered another person to place in the open, unless the other person is also a bhikkhu, in which case he is the one responsible. The Commentary states that if a senior bhikkhu requests a junior bhikkhu to place out in the open any furnishings that may be grounds for a penalty, then the junior bhikkhu is responsible for them until the senior bhikkhu sits down on them, places an article of his use (such as a robe or a shoulder bag) on them, or gives the junior bhikkhu permission to leave, after which point the senior bhikkhu is responsible.

The Commentary also states that if there is to be an open-air meeting, the host bhikkhus are responsible for any seats set out in the open, until the visiting bhikkhus claim their places, from which point the visitors are responsible. If there is to be a series of Dhamma talks, each speaker is responsible for the sermon seat from the moment he sits in it until the moment the next speaker does.

Non-offenses

As stated above, there is no offense if one departs having set furnishings belonging to the Community or another individual out in the sun with the purpose of drying them, and thinking, “I will put them away when I come back (§).” Also, there is no offense:

if one departs after someone else takes possession of or responsibility for furnishings one has left out in the open;

if there are constraints on the furnishings—the Commentary mentions a senior bhikkhu making one get up from them and taking possession of them, tigers or lions lying down on them, or ghosts or ogres taking possession of them; or

if there are dangers—which according to the Commentary means dangers to one’s life or to one’s remaining in the celibate life—that leave one no time to put the furnishings away.

The Vinaya-mukha, extracting a general principle from this rule, says, “This training rule was formulated to prevent negligence and to teach one to care for things. It should be taken as a general model.”

Summary: When one has set a bed, bench, mattress, or stool belonging to the Community out in the open: Leaving its immediate vicinity without putting it away, arranging to have it put away, or taking leave is a pācittiya offense.

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15

Should any bhikkhu set out bedding in a dwelling belonging to the Community—or have it set out—and then on departing neither put it away nor have it put away, or should he go without taking leave, it is to be confessed.

Here again the three factors for a full offense are object, effort, and intention.

Object

Bedding here includes mattresses, pillows, rugs, sheets, mats, sitting cloths, blankets, bedspreads, animal skins, throw rugs, etc., but not the beds or benches on which they may be placed. Unlike the preceding rule, the question of whom the bedding belongs to is not an issue in determining the offense under this rule.

The place where it is left, though, is an issue. Bedding left in a dwelling belonging to the Community is grounds for a pācittiya. Bedding (§) left in a dwelling belonging to another individual is grounds for a dukkaṭa, as is bedding left in the area around a dwelling, in an assembly hall, an open pavilion, or at the foot of a tree—these last three places belonging to the Community or to another individual.

A bed or a bench taken from its original place and left in any of the above places is grounds for a dukkaṭa. Given that this rule covers a different kind of ”departing” from the preceding rule, this penalty applies even during the periods when one is allowed to keep such things under trees, etc., through the allowance given in the Vibhaṅga to that rule.

Bedding left in a dwelling, etc., belonging to oneself is not grounds for an offense.

According to the Vibhaṅga, this rule applies specifically to bedding that one has oneself set out or arranged to be set out. Thus it would not apply to cases where a bhikkhu comes to a dwelling and finds bedding already set out there, even when set out as a courtesy for him. The Commentary qualifies this point by saying that if a visiting bhikkhu is staying temporarily in a Community dwelling to which another bhikkhu has laid claim (see BMC2, Chapter 18), the bedding is the responsibility of the bhikkhu with the claim on the dwelling, and not of the visitor. Once the visitor does lay claim to the dwelling, however, responsibility for the bedding becomes his. In line with this qualification, if a monastery has a dwelling set aside for receiving visiting elders, it would be a wise policy for one of the resident bhikkhus to lay claim to it so that visiting elders would not have to be responsible for any bedding set out for them.

Perception as to whether the dwelling belongs to the Community or to another individual is not a mitigating factor here (see Pc 4).

Effort

The Commentary’s discussion of putting the item away shows that it essentially means putting it back in the safe place where it was kept before being spread out. Thus, if the bedding was hanging in a bundle from a clothesline before being spread out, it should be wrapped in a bundle and hung from the line as before. If it was taken from another room, it should be returned to the room from which it was taken.

Having the item put away and taking leave are defined as under the preceding rule, with one exception: A bhikkhu who orders someone else to spread the item is responsible for it even if the other person is also ordained.

To depart is defined as going outside the grounds of the monastery: beyond the wall of the monastery if it is walled, beyond its vicinity if it is not. (In all rules mentioning this point, the Commentary defines a monastery’s vicinity as a distance of two leḍḍupātas—approximately 36 meters—from the buildings.) However, the absence of any reference to this rule in the protocols to be done before one’s alms round (Cv.VIII.5—see BMC2, Chapter 9) indicates that temporary excursions outside the monastery are not counted as “departing.” This conclusion is seconded by one of the non-offense clauses here, discussed below, which says that when a bhikkhu goes with the expectation of returning but then sends word back to the monastery that he is taking leave, he avoids any penalty under this rule. This implies that a bhikkhu who leaves his bedding spread out in a dwelling belonging to the Community, leaves the monastery temporarily with the intent of returning, and returns as planned, incurs no penalty as well.

The question arises, though, as to how long a temporary period of absence is allowable. The Vibhaṅga itself sets no time limit. The Commentary illustrates the non-offense clause we have just mentioned with the case of a bhikkhu who leaves, thinking, “I will return today,” but makes no specific statement that longer periods are not allowed.

Because the texts give no specific guidelines here, this is a matter that each Community should decide for itself, taking the following considerations into account:

1) The origin story suggests that the purpose of the rule is to prevent the bedding’s being left so long in an unoccupied dwelling that it attracts ants, termites, or other pests.

2) Another consideration, raised by the Vinaya-mukha, is that if a bhikkhu goes for a long excursion, leaving his bedding and other belongings scattered about in a dwelling, this might inconvenience the resident bhikkhus in that they could not easily allot the dwelling to another bhikkhu in the interim.

Intention

is a factor here, in that—as mentioned above—if one plans to return within the allowable space of time, there is no offense. This point is conveyed by a passage in the non-offense clauses that reads, “having gone with the desire (to return), staying there one takes leave; he is constrained by something or another.” The Commentary, reasonably, reads this passage as two exemptions governed by the first phrase. In other words, (1) if one leaves the monastery with the intent to return and then, after reaching the opposite bank of a river or going the interval of one village away, one changes one’s mind and decides not to return, one can avoid an offense by sending word back to the monastery with the message that one is taking leave. Or, (2) if one leaves the monastery with the intent to return but encounters physical constraints—such as flooded rivers, kings, or robbers—that prevent one’s return, that in and of itself exempts one from an offense, and there is no need to send word.  

Non-offenses

In addition to these two exemptions, the Vibhaṅga says that there is no offense in departing having left bedding spread out in a dwelling if someone else has taken responsibility for the bedding or if one has taken leave of a bhikkhu, a novice, or a monastery attendant. According to the protocols to be done before leaving a monastery to live elsewhere (Cv.VIII.3.2), if there is no one from whom to take leave, “then having set the bed on four stones, having stacked bed on bed, bench on bench, having placed the lodgings (including the bedding) in a heap on top, having put away the wooden goods and clay goods, having closed the windows and doors, he may set out.”

And as under the preceding rule, there is no offense if there is a constraint on the bedding or there are dangers—i.e., constraints or dangers that would prevent one from putting them away before leaving.

Summary: When one has spread bedding out in a dwelling belonging to the Community: Departing from the monastery without putting it away, arranging to have it put away, or taking leave is a pācittiya offense.

*    *    *

16

Should any bhikkhu knowingly lie down in a dwelling belonging to the Community so as to intrude on a bhikkhu who arrived there first, (thinking), “Whoever finds it confining will go away”—doing it for just that reason and no other—it is to be confessed.

There are four factors for an offense here.

1) Object: a bhikkhu who should not be forced to move.

2) Perception: One perceives him as such.

3) Effort: One intrudes on his space in a dwelling belonging to the Community

4) Intention: with the sole purpose of forcing him out.

Object & perception

Knowingly is defined in the Vibhaṅga as knowing that the dwelling’s current occupant is a senior bhikkhu, a sick one, or one to whom the Community (or its official) has assigned the dwelling. The Commentary interprets this definition as a list of examples and generalizes from it to include any case where one knows, “This bhikkhu shouldn’t be forced to move.”

Effort

To intrude means to lie down or sit down in the area immediately adjacent to the bhikkhu’s sleeping or sitting place—which the Commentary defines as anywhere within 75 cm. of the sleeping or sitting place—or on a 75 cm. wide path from either of those places to the dwelling’s entrance. There is a dukkaṭa for placing one’s bedding or seat in such an area, and a pācittiya for each time one sits or lies down there. To place one’s bedding or seat in any other part of the dwelling entails a dukkaṭa; and to sit or lie down there, another dukkaṭa—assuming in all of these cases that the dwelling belongs to the Community.

Perception with regard to the dwelling is not an issue here (see Pc 4). If the dwelling actually belongs to the Community, this part of the factor is fulfilled regardless of whether one perceives it as belonging to the Community or not.

There is a dukkaṭa for intruding on the space of a bhikkhu—intending to force him out—in the area immediately adjacent to such a dwelling, in a place belonging to the Community that is not the dwelling of a particular person (e.g., an open pavilion or a meal hall), the shade of a tree, in the open air, or in a dwelling belonging to another individual. To do so in a dwelling belonging to oneself entails no offense. According to the Commentary, this last allowance also applies to a dwelling belonging to anyone who has offered to let one take his/her belongings on trust.

Intention

If there is a compelling reason—one is ill or suffering from the cold or heat, or there are dangers outside—one may intrude on the space of another bhikkhu without penalty. The reason for these allowances would appear obvious—one is not aiming at forcing the other bhikkhu out—but the matter is not as simple as that. The Sub-commentary reports the Three Gaṇṭhipadas as saying that because of this allowance, one may make an excuse of one’s illness, etc., as a pretext for intruding on the other bhikkhu’s space so as to force him out of the dwelling. The Sub-commentary tries to argue with this ruling, but the Gaṇṭhipadas have the support of the Vibhaṅga here: Only if one’s sole motive is to force the other bhikkhu out is one subject to an offense under this rule. If one has mixed motives, one may take advantage of one’s illness, etc., to move in on the other bhikkhu.

However, once the illness, etc., has passed, one would commit an offense each time one continued to sit or lie down intruding on his space.

All of this may seem very strange on the surface, but it is likely that the original occupant would not feel unduly pressured if an ill bhikkhu or one escaping dangers were to move into his dwelling, while he would start feeling pressured by the continued presence of the bhikkhu after the illness or dangers had passed, which is why the penalties are allotted as they are.

Summary: Intruding on another bhikkhu’s sleeping or sitting place in a dwelling belonging to the Community, with the sole purpose of making him uncomfortable and forcing him to leave, is a pācittiya offense.

*    *    *

17

Should any bhikkhu, angered and displeased, evict a bhikkhu from a dwelling belonging to the Community—or have him evicted—it is to be confessed.

“At that time some group-of-seventeen bhikkhus (see Pc 65) were fixing up a large dwelling on the fringes of the monastery, thinking, ‘We will spend the Rains here.’ Some group-of-six bhikkhus… seeing them, said, ‘These group-of-seventeen bhikkhus are fixing up a dwelling place. Let’s drive them out.’ But others of them said, ‘Wait, friends, while they fix it up. When it’s fixed up, then we’ll drive them out.’

“Then the group-of-six bhikkhus said to the group-of-seventeen bhikkhus, ‘Get out, friends. The dwelling is ours.’

“‘Shouldn’t this have been mentioned beforehand so that we could have fixed up another one?’

“‘Isn’t this a dwelling belonging to the Community?’

“‘Yes….’

“‘Then get out. The dwelling is ours.’

“‘The dwelling is large, friends. You can stay here, and we’ll stay here, too.’

“‘Get out. The dwelling is ours.’ And, angered and displeased, seizing them by the throat, they threw them out. The group-of-seventeen bhikkhus, having been thrown out, began to cry.”

The three factors for the full offense here are:

1) Object: a bhikkhu.

2) Effort: One evicts him from a dwelling belonging to the Community.

3) Intention: One’s prime impulse is anger.

Object

A bhikkhu is grounds for a pācittiya here, while the following are grounds for a dukkaṭa: a bhikkhu’s belongings, an unordained person, and an unordained person’s belongings.

Effort

According to the Commentary, this rule covers both physical eviction—picking up the bhikkhu and throwing him out—as well as verbal eviction—ordering him to leave. The penalty in both cases is the same. (The Mahāsāṁghikas and Sarvāstivādins write this point into their version of the rule.) The Vibhaṅga counts offenses here as follows: a pācittiya for evicting the bhikkhu from the room to the porch, and another pācittiya for evicting him off the porch. If, with a single effort, one evicts him through many doors, one incurs a single pācittiya.

There is a dukkaṭa in telling someone else to evict the bhikkhu—no allowances for kappiya-vohāra are given here—and, assuming that all the other factors are fulfilled, a pācittiya once the bhikkhu has been evicted, regardless of how many efforts it takes. (The Thai edition of the Canon assigns a pācittiya for the order/request for someone else to do the eviction, but even the Thai edition of the Commentary assigns only a dukkaṭa here, as do all the other major editions of the Canon, so the Thai reading here is probably mistaken.)

To evict a bhikkhu from a dwelling belonging to the Community entails a pācittiya. As under the preceding rule, perception with regard to the ownership of the dwelling is not an issue here. To evict anyone—bhikkhu or not—from an area immediately adjacent to a dwelling belonging to the Community, from a place belonging to the Community that is not the dwelling of a particular person, from the shade of a tree, from a spot in the open air, or from a dwelling belonging to another individual entails a dukkaṭa. There is also a dukkaṭa for throwing a person’s belongings out from any of these places. (In all the cases mentioned in this paragraph, the assumption is that one is motivated by anger.)

To evict anyone or anyone’s belongings from one’s own dwelling—or from one that belongs to an individual who has offered to let one take his/her belongings on trust—is not grounds for an offense.

Perception as to whether the dwelling belongs to the Community is not a mitigating factor here (see Pc 4).

Intention

There is no offense in evicting anyone when one’s primary impulse is not anger. Examples given in the non-offense clauses include evicting anyone—or the requisites of anyone—who is insane, unconscientious in his/her behavior, or a maker of quarrels, strife, and dissension in the Community. The Commentary adds here that one also has the right to throw the person out of the monastery as a whole if he/she is a maker of quarrels, strife, and dissension, but not if he/she is simply unconscientious.

The Vibhaṅga adds that one may without penalty evict one’s student or his belongings from his dwelling if he is not properly observing his duties.

In all of these cases, the Sub-commentary notes, if anger happens to arise in one’s mind in the course of evicting the person, there is no offense as long as it is not the primary impulse.

The texts do not mention the case where one’s primary motive is greed, and the origin story suggests why: The group-of-six bhikkhus’ anger was simply a function of frustrated greed, and the two emotions would easily go together in any infraction of this rule.

Summary: Causing a bhikkhu to be evicted from a dwelling belonging to the Community—when one’s primary impulse is anger—is a pācittiya offense.

*    *    *

18

Should any bhikkhu sit or lie down on a bed or bench with detachable legs on an (unplanked) loft in a dwelling belonging to the Community, it is to be confessed.

Object

A loft is a partial second story in a dwelling; an unplanked loft is one whose joists have not been covered with floorboards. A bed or bench with detachable legs on an unplanked loft is grounds for a pācittiya under this rule if it is in a dwelling belonging to a Community, a dukkaṭa if in a dwelling belonging to another individual, and no offense if in a dwelling belonging to oneself or to anyone who has offered to let one take his/her belongings on trust. Perception of the ownership of the dwelling, as in the preceding rules, is not an issue here.

The purpose of this rule, as indicated by the origin story, is to guard against injury to a bhikkhu living under the loft: He might get hit on the head if any of the detachable legs fall down through the joists of the loft. Thus there is no offense if the loft is not high enough off the ground for a man of medium height to stand under it without hitting his head; if the floor of the loft is completely planked; if there is no one under the loft; if the area under the loft cannot be used as a dwelling (e.g., it is used solely for storage space, says the Commentary); if the bed or bench with detachable legs is on the ground; or if the legs of the bed or bench are securely fixed to their frame.

Effort

There is a question as to whether sitting and lying down would include standing as well, inasmuch as the non-offense clauses allow one “to stand there and hang things up or take them down.” The Commentary interprets “there” as a bed or bench with detachable legs, but standing on such a thing would seem to be even more dangerous than sitting or lying down on it. More probably, “there” refers to the unplanked loft.

Some people have noted that although the bhikkhu in the origin story sat down hurriedly, the word hurriedly does not appear in the rule, and they speculate that it may have been dropped by mistake. If one is not allowed at all to sit or lie down on a bed or bench with detachable legs on an unplanked loft, they say, there would be no reason to have one there. Actually, beds with detachable legs do not sound like wise things to have on an unplanked loft, and perhaps the Buddha’s purpose in formulating this rule was to discourage their being placed there in the first place.

Summary: Sitting or lying down on a bed or bench with detachable legs on an unplanked loft in a dwelling belonging to the Community is a pācittiya offense.

*    *    *

19

When a bhikkhu is having a large dwelling built, he may supervise two or three layers of facing to plaster the area around the window frame and reinforce the area around the door frame the width of the door opening, while standing where there are no crops to speak of. Should he supervise more than that, even if standing where there are no crops to speak of, it is to be confessed.

“Now at that time a chief minister who was Ven. Channa’s supporter was having a dwelling built for Ven. Channa. Ven. Channa had the finished dwelling covered with roofing material again and again, plastered again and again, so that the dwelling, overloaded, caved in. Then Ven. Channa, collecting grass and sticks, despoiled the barley field of a certain brahman. The brahman criticized and complained and spread it about, ‘How can their reverences despoil our barley field?’… Bhikkhus… criticized and complained and spread it about, ‘How can Ven. Channa have a finished dwelling covered with roofing material again and again, plastered again and again, so that the dwelling gets overloaded and caves in?’”

This rule is an extension of Sg 7, giving further directions for how to go about building a dwelling for one’s own use when sponsored by another person. Because the rule deals with techniques used in building wattle and daub dwellings 2,500 years ago, the rule and its explanations in the Canon and commentaries contain terms whose meaning is uncertain at present. The syntax of the rule suggests one interpretation, the Commentary another, while the Vibhaṅga is non-committal on the points where the two interpretations differ. Because both interpretations make sense, we will present them both.

What the rule seems to say

The area 1.25 meters around the door frame is to be covered with up to three layers of plaster or roofing material to reinforce it so that when the door is blown open or shut it will not damage the wall or be loosened from its hinges. Five kinds of roofing material are mentioned in the Vibhaṅga: tiles, stones, lime (cement), grass, and leaves.

Similarly, around the windows, an area the width of the window shutters is to be reinforced with up to three layers of plaster to protect it from being damaged when the shutters are blown open or shut. Three kinds of plaster were used in the Buddha’s time—white, black, and ochre—and bhikkhus were allowed to apply them in a number of geometrical patterns, but not to use them to make obscene pictures of men and women on the walls (!) (Cv.VI.3.1-2). Although the bhikkhus were allowed to cover the entire walls and floor with this plaster, this rule gives directions only for the minimum area that should be covered to keep the walls strong.

What the Commentary says

Because the rule refers to roofing material, the Commentary assumes that it must refer to the roof of the dwelling, even though this assumption does violence to the syntax of the rule. Its interpretation: One may reinforce the door and window frames with as much plaster or roofing material as one likes, but may cover the roof with only three layers of roofing material. A relevant point from the Canon is the passage at Cv.VIII.3.3 stating that if at a later date the roof begins to leak, the resident bhikkhu—if he can—should re-roof it himself or arrange for someone else to do it for him. If he can do neither, though, there is no offense.

The reasons for this rule

The origin story suggests that the Buddha imposed the three-layer limit in order to prevent the dwelling from collapsing under the weight of too much roofing material, but the non-offense clauses show clearly that the rule is aimed at preventing bhikkhus from abusing the generosity of the person sponsoring the building work. In either case, the Commentary’s interpretation has its logic, in that an overloaded roof would be more burdensome to the dwelling and to the sponsor than an overloaded window or door frame would be.

A supplementary regulation arising from the origin story is that one should not perform any building operations, including supervising, where crops are growing.

The offenses here are as follows: a pācittiya for each piece of roofing beyond the allowable three layers, and a dukkaṭa for doing or directing the work while standing where crops are growing. These offenses apply regardless of whether one is doing the work oneself or having it done. They also apply whether one is building a new dwelling or having an old one repaired.

Perception as to whether one has exceeded the allowable number of layers is not a factor here (see Pc 4).

Non-offenses

According to the Vibhaṅga, these regulations do not apply to “an abode in a cave, a grass hut, (a dwelling) for the use of another, (a dwelling built) by means of one’s own resources, or anything other than a dwelling.” The Sub-commentary argues from the wording of the rule—its reference to “a large dwelling”—that the regulations also do not apply to small dwellings built to the standard measurement specified under Sg 6: i.e., no larger than 3 by 1.75 meters.

Summary: When a bhikkhu is building or repairing a large dwelling for his own use, using resources donated by another, he may not reinforce the window or door frames with more than three layers of roofing material or plaster. To exceed this is a pācittiya offense.

*    *    *

20

Should any bhikkhu knowingly pour water containing living beings—or have it poured—on grass or on clay, it is to be confessed.

This is an offense with four factors.

Object:

Water containing living creatures. The K/Commentary’s contribution to the next factor shows that this includes things like mosquito larvae, but not beings so small they cannot be seen.

Perception

Knowingly, according to the Vibhaṅga, means that one either knows on one’s own or has been told that the living creatures are there. The K/Commentary adds two points: (1) knowing on one’s own means that one has either seen them or heard (that they are there); and (2) knowing also includes knowing that they will die from the factor of effort, defined below.

If one is in doubt as to whether water contains living beings (e.g., the water is murky or in a dark place; it contains seeds that bear a resemblance to insects), then to use it in a way that would cause their death if they were there is to commit a dukkaṭa. If one thinks that the water contains living beings when it actually doesn’t, the penalty for using it in such a way is also a dukkaṭa.

Effort

Because of a peculiarity of Pali grammar, the Commentary states that, in addition to the above reading, this rule can also be interpreted as reading, “Should any bhikkhu knowingly pour grass or clay—or have it poured—in water containing living beings, it is to be confessed.” It also states that grass and clay in the context of this second reading would include any material that would cause death to living beings in the water. There are two objections to the Commentary’s second reading: One is that it defies the natural word order of a prose sentence in canonical Pali; the other is that the Pali word for “pour”—siñcati—is used only for water and not for solids like grass and clay. Still, even if this second reading is not quite grammatical, the Great Standards could be invoked for including it under this rule to prevent the pouring of lethal pollutants into water. Thus actions covered by this rule would include, under the first reading, such things as emptying old water from a flower vase onto the ground or pouring water into a basin filled with cement-mix; and, under the second reading, pouring a toxic chemical into the water.

Unlike some of the other rules that deal with giving orders, simply giving the order to pour is enough to fulfill this factor. Thus, for example, a bhikkhu who tells someone else to dump an aquarium of fish on the floor incurs a pācittiya for giving the order and another pācittiya when the other person does as told. If a bhikkhu gives one request for water to be poured but the other person pours water many times, the bhikkhu incurs only two pācittiyas: one for the request, and one for the fact that his request was obeyed.

As with all the rules covering threats to an animal’s life, there is no allowance for kappiya-vohāra (“wording it right”) under this rule.

Intention

This factor is fulfilled simply by the immediate aim of pouring the water or having it poured (or of pouring “grass and clay” into the water or having it poured). For example, if after perceiving that the water contains insects, one chooses to ignore their existence and pours the water on a burning log—not to kill the insects, but to put out the fire—one commits an offense all the same.

In fact, the K/Commentary claims that for one’s actions to fall under this rule, one must not be motivated by a murderous intention. This claim was apparently inspired by a desire to prevent any overlap between this rule and Pc 61, for there is nothing in the Vibhaṅga to allow for motivation to count as a sub-factor here. The K/Commentary’s claim would also have an anomalous result in practice: If Bhikkhu A, with murderous intent, pours water on the ground but the animals in the water don’t die, he would incur only a dukkaṭa under Pc 61; if Bhikkhu B, with no murderous intent, pours water on the ground and the animals don’t die, he would incur the stronger penalty of a pācittiya under this rule. Thus there seems no reason to follow the K/Commentary on this point. In other words, regardless of motivation, if one intends to pour water, or have it poured, and then acts on that intention, one’s actions would fall under this rule.

Result is not a factor here. Whether the living beings actually die is of no consequence in determining the offense.

Non-offenses

There is no offense in using water containing living beings in any of the ways covered by this rule—

unknowingly—e.g., not knowing that it contains living beings; pouring a toxic chemical into the water thinking it to be harmless;

unthinkingly—e.g., heating a kettle of water on the stove, seeing that it has tadpoles in it and in a knee-jerk reaction dumping the water out on the ground so that they won’t be boiled to death; or

unintentionally—e.g., accidentally knocking over a goldfish bowl.

However, a bhikkhu should always check water before using it. Water strainers are discussed in BMC2, Chapter 3.

Watering plants

The topic of watering plants comes up in the Commentary’s discussion of the bad habits of the bhikkhus at Kīṭāgiri mentioned under Sg 13. There it says that even if the water has no discernable life, to use it or have someone else use it to water plants with the purpose of corrupting families with gifts from the plant entails a dukkaṭa. In cases of this sort, one is not allowed to use kappiya-vohāra or any other way of indicating one’s desire that the plant be watered.

If one wants to use the fruits or flowers of the plant in other ways—to eat the fruit oneself, to make a gift of fruit to the Community, to use the flowers as an offering to a Buddha image, etc.—one may not water it oneself, but there is no offense in getting someone else to water it if one uses kappiya- vohāra. (“Look at how dry this plant is !” “If it doesn’t get any water, it’s going to die.”)

If one wants the plant to grow for other reasons—for the sake of its shade or as part of a decorative garden or forest—there is no offense in watering it oneself as long as one uses water with no discernable life in it. Two of the ancient commentaries add that if one simply desires shade, a garden, or a forest, one may plant the plant oneself as long as one places it in earth that would not count as “genuine soil” (jātā paṭhavī) under Pc 10.

Summary: Pouring water that one knows to contain living beings—or having it poured—on grass or clay is a pācittiya offense. Pouring into such water anything that would kill the beings—or having it poured—is also a pācittiya offense.

Three: The Exhortation Chapter

21

Should any bhikkhu, unauthorized, exhort the bhikkhunīs, it is to be confessed.

“Now at that time, elder bhikkhus exhorting the bhikkhunīs became recipients of robes, almsfood, lodgings, and medicines for the sick. (According to the Commentary, if a bhikkhu gave a good exhortation to the bhikkhunīs, they would tell their supporters, who in turn would provide the exhorter with requisites.) The thought occurred to some group-of-six bhikkhus: ‘At present, elder bhikkhus exhorting the bhikkhunīs have become recipients of robes, almsfood, lodgings, and medicines for the sick. Let’s exhort the bhikkhunīs, too.’ So, having approached the bhikkhunīs, they said, ‘Come, sisters, go to us too, and we’ll exhort you as well.’

“So the bhikkhunīs went to the group-of-six bhikkhus and, on arrival, having bowed down, sat to one side. Then the group-of-six bhikkhus, after giving just a trifling Dhamma talk and spending the day with animal talk, dismissed the bhikkhunīs: ‘You may go, sisters.’

“Then the bhikkhunīs went to the Blessed One and, on arrival, having bowed to him, stood to one side. As they were standing there, the Blessed One said to them: ‘I hope the exhortation was effective, bhikkhunīs.’

“‘Venerable sir, from where would the exhortation be effective? The group-of-six bhikkhus, giving just a trifling Dhamma talk, dismissed us after spending the day with animal talk.’”

When Mahāpajāpatī Gotamī, the Buddha’s aunt and stepmother, asked him to establish an order of bhikkhunīs, he did so on the condition that she and all future bhikkhunīs accept eight rules of respect (garu-dhamma). (This term is sometimes translated as “heavy rules” or “important rules,” but the Commentary explains it as meaning vows that the bhikkhunīs are to accept with respect.) In short:

1) Even a bhikkhunī who has been ordained over a century must pay homage to a bhikkhu ordained that very day.

2) A bhikkhunī must not spend the Rains in a residence where there is no bhikkhu (within half a yojana, says the Commentary).

3) Every half month a bhikkhunī should expect two things from the Community of bhikkhus: permission to ask the date of the Pāṭimokkha recitation and permission to approach for an exhortation.

4) At the end of the Rains-residence, every bhikkhunī should invite accusations both from the Community of bhikkhunīs and from the Community of bhikkhus.

5) A bhikkhunī who has broken any of the rules of respect must undergo penance (mānatta) for half a month under both Communities.

6) A woman may become ordained as a bhikkhunī only after, as a female trainee (sikkhamānā), she has observed the first six of the ten precepts without lapse for two full years. (Apparently she did this as a ten-precept female novice, although this point is controversial.)

7) A bhikkhunī is not to insult or revile a bhikkhu in any way. According to the Commentary, this means that she is not to insult him with any of the ten akkosa-vatthu (see Pc 2) or any other matter, nor is she to threaten him with harm.)

8) A bhikkhunī may not instruct a bhikkhu, although a bhikkhu may instruct a bhikkhunī. (According to the Commentary, this means that a bhikkhunī may not give commands to a bhikkhu on how to behave. However, it notes, she may teach him in a more indirect manner, saying, for instance, “In the past, the great bhikkhus behaved like this.”)

This rule deals with the biweekly exhortation mentioned in the third vow. The pattern for the exhortation was that once a bhikkhu had been chosen by the bhikkhus to exhort the bhikkhunīs, he was to sweep the place for the exhortation within the monastery where he was dwelling, set out water for drinking and washing, arrange seats for the bhikkhunīs, find a male companion, and then sit waiting for the bhikkhunīs to arrive. When they had come, he was to ask if all the bhikkhunīs were present and if the eight rules of respect were being kept up (§). (According to the Commentary, this last question means, “Are they kept memorized so that they are fresh in the memory?”) If they weren’t, he was to recite the eight rules. If they were, he was to present an exhortation.

Because the eight rules form the heart of the exhortation, the two factors for the full offense under this rule are defined as follows:

1) Object: a bhikkhunī or group of bhikkhunīs.

2) Effort: A bhikkhu exhorts her/them concerning the eight rules of respect when he has neither been properly authorized to do so by the Community nor asked by the bhikkhunī(s) to give instruction.

Object

A bhikkhunī had to undergo a double ordination, first in the Bhikkhunī Saṅgha and then in the Bhikkhu Saṅgha, before she was considered fully ordained. Thus only a bhikkhunī with the full double ordination is grounds for a pācittiya here. A bhikkhunī who has received only her first ordination, from the Bhikkhunī Saṅgha, is grounds for a dukkaṭa, while female trainees and female novices are not grounds for an offense.

Effort

A bhikkhu, not properly authorized, who exhorts the bhikkhunīs on any topic other than the eight rules incurs a dukkaṭa.

The authorization

When this rule was still newly formulated, some group-of-six bhikkhus simply authorized one another to continue exhorting the bhikkhunīs. This forced the Buddha to establish stringent standards for the type of bhikkhu who could properly be authorized. They were, in short:

He is scrupulously virtuous.

He is very learned and thoroughly understands the teachings of the celibate life.

He has mastered both the bhikkhus’ Pāṭimokkha and the bhikkhunīs’ Pāṭimokkha.

He has a pleasing voice and delivery.

He is well-liked by most of the bhikkhunīs. (As the Commentary notes, this means that he is liked by the bhikkhunīs who are learned, virtuous, and wise.)

He is capable of exhorting the bhikkhunīs. (This, according to the Commentary, means that he is able to cite sutta passages and other reasons that will instill within the bhikkhunīs a sense of the dangers in the cycle of rebirth.)

He never, before his ordination, violated an important rule against one wearing the ochre robe. (This, according to the Commentary, means that he never engaged in bodily contact with a bhikkhunī or in sexual intercourse with a female trainee or female novice).

He has been a bhikkhu for at least 20 years.

With regard to the first of these qualifications, Cv.II.1.2 notes that a bhikkhu undergoing penance or probation for a saṅghādisesa offense should not accept an authorization to exhort the bhikkhunīs; even if authorized, he should not exhort them. The same restriction applies to bhikkhus undergoing the duties imposed by a transaction of censure, further punishment, demotion, banishment, suspension, or reconciliation. (See BMC2, Chapter 20. For more details on the authorization procedures, see BMC2, Chapter 23.)

As the Commentary notes, the group-of-six bhikkhus never possessed the above eight qualities even in their dreams.

One’s perception as to whether one was properly authorized is not a factor here (see Pc 4).

Non-offenses

Although this rule grew from a time when bhikkhus were eager to exhort the bhikkhunīs, times changed. The Cullavagga (Cv.X.9.5) deals with a period when the bhikkhus tried to avoid exhorting the bhikkhunīs, and Cv.X.9.4 tells what should be done when there is no bhikkhu qualified to exhort them. (The bhikkhus were to tell them, “Strive for completion (in the practice) in an amicable way.”)

Even in these cases, though, the bhikkhunīs were not left adrift. They could approach any bhikkhu they admired and ask him for instruction. Thus the Vibhaṅga’s non-offense clauses here say, “There is no offense when, having given the exposition, having given the interrogation, and then, after being requested by the bhikkhunīs to recite, he recites.” According to the Commentary, “exposition” here means a recitation of the eight rules in Pali, whereas “interrogation” means the ancient commentary on the eight rules. This last is hardly likely. What seems more likely is that “exposition” means establishing that the bhikkhunīs have all come; “interrogation,” questioning them as to whether they have memorized the eight rules. At any rate, the Commentary goes on to say that, when a bhikkhu has been invited like this, he is free to speak about the eight rules or any other Dhamma topic without offense. Again, this seems unlikely, for the Vibhaṅga is very precise in the terminology it uses for the various stages leading up to the exhortation, and recites (osāreti) is not the verb it uses for speaking about a topic. Instead, it usually means repeating a passage from memory.

However, there is a non-offense clause in the Vibhaṅga that allows for an unauthorized bhikkhu to exhort a bhikkhunī (or bhikkhunīs) on the eight rules or any other topic in the following situation: if, being asked a question by a bhikkhunī, one answers her question. There is also no offense if a bhikkhunī happens to overhear any instruction one is giving for the sake of another person.

Subsidiary rules

The Vibhaṅga to this rule includes a discussion of three subsidiary rules related to the exhortation of the bhikkhunīs:

1) A bhikkhu, even if authorized, incurs a dukkaṭa if he exhorts an incomplete group of bhikkhunīs, regardless of whether he perceives them as complete or not. The Sub-commentary notes, however, that according to the Vibhaṅga to the bhikkhunīs’ Pc 58 an ill bhikkhunī is not obliged to go to an exhortation. Thus if all the bhikkhunīs except the ill ones have come, the group counts as complete. If the group is complete and yet the bhikkhu perceives it as incomplete or is in doubt, then if he still goes ahead with the exhortation he incurs a dukkaṭa.

2) If an authorized bhikkhu, after asking the bhikkhunīs if they have all come, speaks of another Dhamma (instead of asking them if the eight rules have been memorized), he incurs a dukkaṭa.

3) If, without having first introduced the exhortation, he speaks of another Dhamma, he incurs a dukkaṭa. According to the Commentary, “introducing” an exhortation means simply announcing, “This, sisters, is the exhortation.” (See the origin story to the following rule for an example of this practice.) In other words, the dukkaṭa here is for simply launching into a talk without observing the proper formalities.

Summary: Exhorting a bhikkhunī about the eight rules of respect—except when one has been authorized to do so by the Community or asked a question by a bhikkhunī—is a pācittiya offense.

*    *    *

22

Should any bhikkhu, even if authorized, exhort the bhikkhunīs after sunset, it is to be confessed.

“Now at that time it was Ven. Cūḷapanthaka’s turn to exhort the bhikkhunīs. The bhikkhunīs said, ‘Today the exhortation won’t be effective, for Master Cūḷapanthaka will simply say the same old stanza over and over again.’

“Then the bhikkhunīs went to Ven. Cūḷapanthaka and, on arrival, having bowed down to him, sat to one side. As they were sitting there, Ven. Cūḷapanthaka said to them, ‘Are you all present, sisters?’

“‘Yes, venerable sir, we are all present.’

“‘Are the eight rules of respect being kept up?’

“‘Yes, venerable sir, they are being kept up.’

“Having introduced (the exhortation, saying,) ‘This, sisters, is the exhortation,’ he said this stanza over and over again:

Of heightened awareness and heedful,

the sage trained in sagacity’s ways:

He has no sorrows, one who is Such,

calmed and ever mindful.

“The bhikkhunīs said (to one another), ‘Didn’t we say so? Today the exhortation won’t be effective, for now Master Cūḷapanthaka will simply say the same old stanza over and over again.’

“Ven. Cūḷapanthaka heard the bhikkhunīs’ conversation. Rising up into the air, he walked back and forth in space, in the sky, stood, sat, lay down, emitted smoke, emitted flames, and disappeared, saying the same old stanza and many other sayings of the Buddha. The bhikkhunīs said, ‘Isn’t it amazing? Isn’t it astounding? Never before has there been an exhortation as effective as Master Cūḷapanthaka’s!’

“Then Ven. Cūḷapanthaka, having exhorted the bhikkhunīs until nightfall, dismissed them: ‘You may go, sisters.’ So the bhikkhunīs—the gates of the city being closed—spent the night outside the city walls and entered the city only after daybreak. People criticized and complained and spread it about, ‘These bhikkhunīs are unchaste. Having spent the night with the bhikkhus in the monastery, only now are they entering the city.’”

The factors for the full offense here are two: object and effort.

Object

As with the preceding rule, a bhikkhunī or group of bhikkhunīs who have received the double ordination are grounds for a pācittiya here. A bhikkhunī who has received only her first ordination, from the Bhikkhunī Saṅgha, is grounds for a dukkaṭa, while female trainees and female novices are not grounds for an offense.

Effort

One exhorts the bhikkhunī(s) about the eight rules or any other Dhamma after the sun has set. Perception as to whether the sun has actually set is not a mitigating factor here (see Pc 4).

Non-offenses

Although the origin story suggests that it is unwise in any case to teach bhikkhunīs after sunset—because of the suspicions that such an action may provoke—the non-offense clauses give more respect to the bhikkhunīs’ desire for instruction than to the fear of gossiping lay people. As under the preceding rule, a bhikkhu may recite for the bhikkhunīs after sunset if, after he has given them the exposition and interrogation, they request that he recite. He also incurs no offense if he teaches any topic of Dhamma after sunset in response to a bhikkhunī’s question, or if a bhikkhunī after sunset happens to overhear any instruction he is giving for the sake of another person. And, as mentioned above, female trainees and female novices are not grounds for an offense under this rule.

Summary: Exhorting bhikkhunīs on any topic at all after sunset—except when they request it—is a pācittiya offense.

*    *    *

23

Should any bhikkhu, having gone to the bhikkhunīs’ quarters, exhort the bhikkhunīs—except at the proper occasion—it is to be confessed. Here the proper occasion is this: A bhikkhunī is ill. This is the proper occasion here.

Here again there are two factors for the full offense:

Object:

A bhikkhunī who is not ill. Ill means that she is unable to go to an exhortation or to an “affiliation” (saṁvāsa), which the New K/Sub-commentary defines as a Community meeting such as the uposatha.

As with the preceding rule, a bhikkhunī or group of bhikkhunīs who have received the double ordination are grounds for a pācittiya here. A bhikkhunī who has received only her first ordination, from the Bhikkhunī Saṅgha, is grounds for a dukkaṭa, while female trainees and female novices are not grounds for an offense.

Effort

One goes to her residence—any place where a bhikkhunī has spent at least one night—and exhorts her concerning the eight rules of respect. Exhorting her about any other topic is grounds for a dukkaṭa. Perception with regard to her status as ordained is not a mitigating factor here (see Pc 4).

Non-offenses

As the rule states, there is no offense for the bhikkhu who goes to the bhikkhunīs’ quarters to exhort an ill bhikkhunī. Otherwise, the non-offense clauses are identical with those for the preceding rule. Here again, a bhikkhunī’s desire for instruction is considered more important than the suspicions of the laity.

Summary: Going to the bhikkhunīs’ quarters and exhorting a bhikkhunī about the eight rules of respect—except when she is ill or has requested the instruction—is a pācittiya offense.

*    *    *

24

Should any bhikkhu say that the bhikkhus exhort the bhikkhunīs for the sake of worldly gain, it is to be confessed.

Here the factors for the full offense are three.

Object:

A bhikkhu who has been properly authorized to teach the bhikkhunīs and who is not teaching for the sake of worldly gain: either material (robes, almsfood, lodgings, or medicine) or immaterial (honor, respect, reverence, homage, or veneration).

A bhikkhu who has not been properly authorized is grounds for a dukkaṭa, as is a non-ordained person, properly authorized or not. (The PTS edition of the Canon contains a wheel in which a person not properly authorized and perceived as not properly authorized is not grounds for an offense, but this contradicts the passages earlier in the Vibhaṅga which make the above points. The same wheel in the Thai, Burmese, and Sri Lankan editions is thus more correct in saying that a person not properly authorized and perceived as such is grounds for a dukkaṭa.)

Perception as to the validity of the bhikkhu’s authorization is not a mitigating factor here. If it was valid, he is grounds for a pācittiya whether one perceives it as valid, invalid, or doubtful. If it was invalid, he is grounds for a dukkaṭa whether one perceives it as valid, invalid, or doubtful. This is another case where the pattern set out under Pc 4 does not hold.

Intention

One’s motive is make him lose face, lose status, or to feel abashed (the same intention as under Pc 13).

Effort

One accuses him of teaching for the sake of worldly gain, as defined above.

Non-offenses

If the bhikkhu does actually teach for the sake of worldly gain, there is no offense in stating the facts of the case. However, as we noted in the similar case under Pc 13, this exemption does not apply in cases where one’s perception that he teaches for the sake of worldly gain is mistaken, so one must be careful that one’s perception is accurate.

Summary: Saying that a properly authorized bhikkhu exhorts the bhikkhunīs for the sake of worldly gain—when in fact that is not the case—is a pācittiya offense.

*    *    *

25

Should any bhikkhu give robe-cloth to a bhikkhunī unrelated to him, except in exchange, it is to be confessed.

This rule is the counterpart to NP 5. The full offense is composed of two factors: object and effort.

Object:

Any piece of robe-cloth of the six suitable kinds, measuring at least four by eight fingerbreadths. Other requisites are not grounds for an offense.

Effort

The bhikkhu gives the cloth to an unrelated bhikkhunī and does not receive anything from her in exchange.

Unrelated bhikkhunī here is defined in the same terms as under NP 4: a bhikkhunī who has received the double ordination and is not related to the bhikkhu back through their great x 7 grandfathers. An unrelated bhikkhunī who has received only her first ordination, from the bhikkhunīs, is grounds for a dukkaṭa. Female trainees and female novices are not grounds for an offense.

Perception as to whether the bhikkhunī is actually one’s relative is not a mitigating factor here (see Pc 4).

The Commentary states that the giving need not be hand-to-hand. If a bhikkhu simply places the cloth near a bhikkhunī as his way of giving it to her, and she accepts it as given, this factor is fulfilled.

As for the item given in exchange for the cloth, the Vibhaṅga states that it can be worth much more than the cloth or much less. Buddhaghosa quotes the Mahā Paccarī, one of the ancient commentaries, as saying that even if, in return for the cloth, the bhikkhunī gives the bhikkhu a piece of yellow myrobalan—a medicinal fruit, one of the cheapest things imaginable in India—he escapes the penalty under this rule.

Non-offenses

There is no offense if:

the bhikkhunī is a relation;

she is not related, but she gives one something in exchange;

she takes the cloth on trust;

she borrows the cloth;

one gives her a non-cloth requisite; or

one gives robe-cloth to a female trainee or female novice.

Summary: Giving robe-cloth to an unrelated bhikkhunī without receiving anything in exchange is a pācittiya offense.

*    *    *

26

Should any bhikkhu sew robe-cloth or have it sewn for a bhikkhunī unrelated to him, it is to be confessed.

“Now at that time Ven. Udāyin had become accomplished in making robes. A certain bhikkhunī went to him and on arrival said, ‘It would be good, venerable sir, if you sewed me a robe.’ So Ven. Udāyin, having sewed a robe for the bhikkhunī, having dyed it well and stitched it nicely, having embroidered an obscene design in the middle (a man and woman in mid-intercourse, done in full color, says the Commentary), and having folded it up, placed it to one side. Then the bhikkhunī went to him and on arrival said, ‘Where is the robe, venerable sir?’

“‘Here you are, sister. Take this robe as it is folded and place it aside. When the Community of bhikkhunīs comes for exhortation, put it on and come behind them.’

“So the bhikkhunī took the robe as it was folded and placed it aside. When the Community of bhikkhunīs came for exhortation, she put it on and came behind them. People criticized and complained and spread it about, ‘How brazen these bhikkhunīs are, how mischievous and shameless, in that they embroider an obscene design on a robe!’

“The bhikkhunīs said, ‘Whose work is this?’

“‘Master Udāyin’s,’ the bhikkhunī answered.

“‘A thing like this wouldn’t be attractive even from those who are brazen, mischievous, and shameless, much less from Master Udāyin (§).’”

The full offense here has three factors.

1) Effort: One sews—or gets someone else to sew—

2) Object: a robe

3) Intention: for the sake of a bhikkhunī unrelated to oneself.

Effort

The Vibhaṅga says that there is a pācittiya for every stitch one makes in the robe-cloth. If one gets someone else to sew it, there is a pācittiya in giving the command or making the request, and another pācittiya when the other person does as commanded/requested, no matter how many robe-cloths he/she sews.

Object

The Vibhaṅga defines robe here as meaning any of the six kinds of robe-cloth, even a piece measuring at least four by eight fingerbreadths. This would seem to suggest that cloth being sewn into any object would come under this rule, but the non-offense clauses give an exemption for sewing “any requisite aside from a robe,” so only cloth being sewn into a robe would fulfill the factor of effort here.

Intention

This factor is fulfilled only if the robe-cloth being sewn is intended for an unrelated bhikkhunī, as under the preceding rule: a bhikkhunī who has received the double ordination and is not related to the bhikkhu back through their great x 7 grandfathers. An unrelated bhikkhunī who has received only her first ordination, from the bhikkhunīs, is grounds for a dukkaṭa. Related bhikkhunīs are not grounds for an offense, nor are female trainees or female novices.

Perception as to whether the bhikkhunī is actually one’s relative is not a mitigating factor here (see Pc 4).

The Commentary states that if Bhikkhu X is sewing robe-cloth for a bhikkhunī related to him, and Bhikkhu Y—who is not related to her—helps him sew it, Bhikkhu Y incurs a pācittiya for every stitch he sews in the cloth. The Sub-commentary adds, though, that if Bhikkhu Y does not know that the cloth is for the bhikkhunī, he is exempt from the offense.

Non-offenses

There is no offense in sewing a cloth requisite other than a robe for an unrelated bhikkhunī, in sewing anything for a bhikkhunī who is a relation, or in sewing anything for a female trainee or female novice, related or not.

Summary: Sewing a robe—or having it sewn—for an unrelated bhikkhunī is a pācittiya offense.

*    *    *

27

Should any bhikkhu, by arrangement, travel together with a bhikkhunī even for the interval between one village and the next, except at the proper occasion, it is to be confessed. Here the proper occasion is this: The road is to be traveled by caravan (§) and is considered dubious and risky. This is the proper occasion here.

Here the full offense has two factors.

1) Object: a bhikkhunī.

2) Effort: (a) Having made an arrangement together with her to travel together, (b) one actually travels together with her as arranged (c) from one village to another (d) except on the allowable occasions.

Object

A bhikkhunī who has received the double ordination is grounds for a pācittiya here. Any other woman would come under Pc 67.

Making an arrangement

According to the Vibhaṅga, both the bhikkhu and the bhikkhunī must give their verbal assent to the arrangement for this part of the factor to be fulfilled. If the bhikkhu proposes the arrangement but the bhikkhunī does not give her verbal assent, then even if they later travel together as he proposed, he incurs a dukkaṭa. If she proposes the arrangement but he does not give his verbal assent, then even if they later travel together as she proposed, he incurs no penalty. The K/Commentary notes that the offense under this rule can be committed either by body or by speech, which means that a gesture conveying verbal assent—such as a written message or text—would fulfill this factor as well. Silence, however, would not.

The Vibhaṅga and Commentary give examples of various ways in which verbal assent might be expressed, with the Commentary adding a few examples of statements that would not constitute verbal assent. The primary point of distinction is that a statement or set of statements that mentions both sides of the arrangement in connection with the journey—“We’ll go”; “Let’s go”; “You’ll go with me”—would count as verbal assent, whereas a statement or set of statements mentioning only one’s own plans with regard to the journey—“I’ll go”—would not. Thus, for example, if a bhikkhu states that he is going to a certain place to pay homage to a cetiya, and a bhikkhunī says, “Let’s go together,” then if the bhikkhu says nothing more on the topic, he has not expressed verbal assent.

The Commentary further stipulates that the defining feature of the arrangement is that it specifies the time at which the bhikkhu and bhikkhunī will leave together. However, the Vibhaṅga to this rule and to the other rules dealing with traveling by arrangement (Pc 28, 66, & 67) contains many examples of arrangements in which the time is not explicitly mentioned, so the Commentary’s stipulation here cannot stand. Any expressed agreement to go together would fulfill this factor, regardless of whether the time frame is explicitly stated.

For some reason, the Commentary also adds that there is no offense in making an arrangement while both the bhikkhu and bhikkhunī are standing in bhikkhunīs’ quarters, on the way between one monastery and another, in an assembly hall, or in the residence of people ordained in another religion. There is nothing in the Vibhaṅga, however, to support this exemption. (The Commentary does add, however, that even though it would impose no preliminary offense for the arrangement in this case, the bhikkhu would still incur the pācittiya for going as arranged.)

Perception as to whether the factors for making an arrangement are actually fulfilled is not a mitigating factor here (see Pc 4).

The texts do not address the case in which another person makes the arrangements for a bhikkhu and bhikkhunī to travel together, say, as part of a larger group. However, the wording of the Vibhaṅga’s definition of arrangement—in which the bhikkhu and bhikkhunī are addressing each other—and the non-offense clause allowing the two to travel together if they have not made an arrangement, suggest that as long as the bhikkhu and bhikkhunī do not address each other—directly or through an intermediary—about making the trip, there would be no offense in joining the group.

Going as arranged

The two parties must travel together as specified in the arrangement for this sub-factor to be fulfilled. If the arrangement is minimal or spur-of-the-moment, with no time frame explicitly specified—“Let’s go.” “Yes, let’s go”—then simply leaving together at any time would fulfill this sub-factor.  If a time frame is explicitly specified, then this sub-factor is fulfilled only if they leave within the time frame. If they happen to start out earlier or later than arranged, the bhikkhu incurs no penalty. The examples in the Commentary suggest that “earlier“ or “later” here involve fairly substantial amounts of time, i.e., going one day later than arranged, or going before the meal when the arrangement was to go after the meal. This is supported by the Vibhaṅga, in which the examples that specify a time frame express it in large units, such as “today” or “tomorrow.” The Commentary also adds that if a specific place to meet or route to travel is part of the arrangement, any change in those factors would be irrelevant to the offense. For example, if they agree to go by train but end up going by car, the factor of “going as arranged” would still be fulfilled.

From one village to another

There is some controversy as to whether this phrase—gāmantara—means “from one village to another” or “from one house to another.” According to Buddhaghosa, the ancient commentaries opted for “village,” while he opts for “house.” The ancient commentaries have the support of the Canon here, in that the term in question also occurs in the bhikkhunīs’ Sg 3 & Pc 37, where it definitely means the area outside a village and not the interval from one house to another within a village.

There is a pācittiya for every village-to-village interval one passes. In a wilderness area with no villages—i.e., says the Sub-commentary, where villages are further than a half-yojana (eight kilometers or five miles) apart—there is a pācittiya for every half-yojana one travels together as arranged.

The allowable occasions

A road to be traveled by caravan (§) is one too dubious or risky to travel alone. (BD translates this as a “road to be traveled with a weapon,” but because bhikkhus and bhikkhunīs are not allowed even to touch weapons, it’s a doubtful translation at best.)

Dubious means that the eating, sleeping, sitting, or standing places of thieves have been seen along the road; risky, that people are known to have been beaten, plundered, or robbed by thieves there.

The Vibhaṅga adds that if the road was believed to be dubious or risky but is later found to be safe, the exemption no longer holds, and the bhikkhus are to dismiss the bhikkhunīs from their company.

Non-offenses

There is no offense:

if the bhikkhu and bhikkhunī happen to travel together without having made an arrangement;

if the bhikkhunī proposes an arrangement, while the bhikkhu does not give his verbal assent;

if they leave not as specified in the arrangement (§), (e.g., on another day);

if they travel on a dubious and risky road; or

if there are other dangers.

The Commentary illustrates this last contingency with a stock phrase whose meaning admits two interpretations. It starts, “Savage tribes are attacking the countryside,” and then comes the ambiguous part, either, “People mount their wheels (their carriages, says the Sub-commentary),” or, alternatively, “The tribes seize power (another meaning for ‘wheel’).”

Summary: Traveling by arrangement with a bhikkhunī from one village to another—except when the road is risky or there are other dangers—is a pācittiya offense.

*    *    *

28

Should any bhikkhu, by arrangement, get in the same boat with a bhikkhunī going upstream or downstream—except to cross over to the other bank—it is to be confessed.

“Now at that time, some group-of-six bhikkhus, having made an arrangement with some bhikkhunīs, got in the same boat with them. People criticized and complained and spread it about: ‘Just as we sport with our wives in a boat, so too these Sakyan-son monks, having made an arrangement with bhikkhunīs, sport with them in a boat….’”

(The Buddha then formulated the first version of this rule, without the exception for crossing over to the other bank.)

“Then at that time a number of bhikkhus and bhikkhunīs were traveling on the road from Sāketa to Sāvatthī. Along the way, they had to cross over a river. The bhikkhunīs said to the bhikkhus, ‘We’ll cross over with the masters.’

“‘Sisters, it isn’t proper for bhikkhus, having made an arrangement, to get in the same boat with bhikkhunīs. Either you cross over first or we will.’

“‘The masters are the foremost men. Let the masters cross over first.’

“Then as the bhikkhunīs were crossing over afterward, thieves robbed them and raped them.”

The factors for the full offense here are similar to those for the preceding rule.

1) Object: a bhikkhunī.

2) Effort: (a) Having made an arrangement together with her to get in a boat together, (b) one actually travels together with her as arranged, going upstream or downstream along a river (c) from one village to another.

Object

A bhikkhunī who has received the double ordination is grounds for a pācittiya here. Unlike its treatment of many other rules in this section, the Vibhaṅga here does not state that a bhikkhunī who has received only her first ordination is grounds for a dukkaṭa, nor that a female trainee or a female novice would be grounds for no offense. This may have been an oversight. The Vibhaṅga here closely follows the Vibhaṅga to the preceding rule, which omits mentioning these three classes of women because they are covered by a parallel rule, Pc 67. This rule, however, has no such parallel rule to cover these three classes, and so the omission here leaves them neither allowed nor forbidden by any rule.

Effort

The conditions for making an arrangement here, as well as those concerning the issue of perception about the arrangement, are identical with those under the preceding rule.

The issues around the next sub-factor—going as arranged—are also the same as under the previous rule, with the one difference that “going” is here replaced with “getting in the boat.”

Once they get in the boat as arranged, the bhikkhu incurs a pācittiya for every village-to-village interval they pass along the riverbank while going upstream or downstream. In a wilderness area with no villages—i.e., says the Sub-commentary, where the villages are further than a half-yojana (8 km.) apart—he incurs a pācittiya for every half-yojana they travel together.

The commentaries add “intention” as an additional factor here—the bhikkhu’s purpose in traveling with the bhikkhunī(s) is for amusement—but there is no basis for this in the Vibhaṅga.

Non-offenses

As the rule says, there is no offense in making an arrangement and crossing over a river with a bhikkhunī. The Commentary adds that this applies not only to rivers but also to oceans: If one travels from one seaport to another by arrangement with a bhikkhunī, no penalty is entailed.

The K/Commentary goes even further and says that this rule applies only to rivers, and that a bhikkhu seeking some amusement with a bhikkhunī may make a date with her and travel around the ocean as much as he likes with no offense. The Sub-commentary disagrees with both the Commentary and K/Commentary here, saying that a bhikkhu traveling by arrangement with a bhikkhunī in a boat on the ocean incurs a dukkaṭa for every half-yojana they travel. The Sub-commentary’s position here is more in keeping with the Great Standards and so carries more weight.

Finally, there is no offense if:

the bhikkhu and bhikkhunī happen to travel together in the same boat without having made an arrangement;

the bhikkhunī proposes an arrangement, while the bhikkhu does not give his verbal assent;

they get in the boat not as specified in the arrangement (§), (e.g., on another day); or

there are dangers.

Summary: Traveling by arrangement with a bhikkhunī upriver or downriver in the same boat—except when crossing a river—is a pācittiya offense.

*    *    *

29

Should any bhikkhu knowingly eat almsfood donated through the prompting of a bhikkhunī, except for food that householders had already intended for him prior (to her prompting), it is to be confessed.

“Now at that time Bhikkhunī Thullanandā regularly took her meals with a certain family. Then one day the head of the household invited some senior bhikkhus to a meal. Bhikkhunī Thullanandā, dressing early in the morning, taking her bowl and (outer) robe, went to the family’s place and on arrival said to the head of the household, ‘Why has so much of this staple and non-staple food been prepared?’

“‘I’ve invited some senior bhikkhus for a meal.’

“‘But who, to you, are senior bhikkhus?’

“‘Master Sāriputta, Master Mahā Moggallāna, Master Mahā Kaccāna, Master Mahā Koṭṭhita, Master Mahā Kappina, Master Mahā Cunda, Master Anuruddha, Master Revata, Master Upāli, Master Ānanda, Master Rāhula.’

“‘But why have you invited these scoundrels when great heroes are available? (§)’

“‘And who, to you, are great heroes?’

“‘Master Devadatta, Master Kokālika, Master Kaṭamoraka Tissaka, Master Khaṇḍadeviyāputta, Master Samuddadatta….’ At that point, Bhikkhunī Thullanandā was interrupted in mid-sentence when the senior bhikkhus entered. ‘It’s true! You’ve invited great heroes!’

“‘Just now you made them out to be scoundrels, and now great heroes.’ So he threw her out of the house and put an end to her regular meals.”

The factors for the full offense here are three.

1) Object: any of the five staple foods (see the preface to the Food Chapter, below) offered by a lay person at the instigation of a bhikkhunī.

2) Perception: One knows that it was offered at her instigation.

3) Effort: One eats the food.

Object

Any of the five staple foods is grounds for a pācittiya. Any edible aside from them is not grounds for an offense.

Bhikkhunī here refers to one who has received the double ordination. The Vibhaṅga notes that one who has received only her first ordination—from the Bhikkhunī Saṅgha—is grounds for a dukkaṭa, while female trainees and female novices are not grounds for an offense.

Instigating means that the bhikkhunī speaking to a lay person who is not already planning to give food to Bhikkhu X, praises X or suggests that food should be presented to him. If the lay person was already planning to give food to X, this factor is not fulfilled. The Vibhaṅga defines already planning to give food in the following terms: Either X and the lay person are related, the lay person has previously invited X to ask for food, or the lay person has already prepared the food in question for X of his/her own accord prior to the bhikkhunī’s instigation.

Perception

If one is in doubt as to whether the food was offered at a bhikkhunī’s instigation, the penalty for eating it is a dukkaṭa regardless of whether it was. If one thinks that it was offered at her instigation when it actually wasn’t, the penalty for eating it is again a dukkaṭa. If one does not perceive it as offered at her instigation, then whether it was or wasn’t, there is no offense.

Effort

There is a dukkaṭa for accepting food with the purpose of eating it, and a pācittiya for every mouthful one eats.

Non-offenses

There is no offense if:

one does not know,

the food offered is not one of the five staples,

the lay person was instigated by a female trainee or female novice, or

the lay person was already planning to present one with the food before the bhikkhunī’s instigation.

As we noted above, one’s relatives and people who have invited one to ask for food also fit under this allowance.

Summary: Eating any of the five staple foods that a lay person has offered as the result of a bhikkhunī’s prompting—unless the lay person was already planning to offer the food before her prompting—is a pācittiya offense.

*    *    *

30

Should any bhikkhu sit in private, alone with a bhikkhunī, it is to be confessed.

Except for one rare case—a bhikkhunī who does not know what is lewd and not lewd—this rule is completely subsumed under Pc 45. For explanations, see the discussion under that rule.

Summary: When aiming at privacy, sitting or lying down alone with a bhikkhunī in an unsecluded but private place is a pācittiya offense.

Four: The Food Chapter

Many of the rules in this chapter classify food into two groups: bhojana/bhojaniya (consumables) and khādaniya (chewables). Scholars usually translate the two as “softer food” and “harder food,” although the hardness or softness of a particular food has little to do with the category it belongs to. A translation closer to the essence of each category would be “staple food” and “non-staple food.” The distinction between the two is important, for it is often the deciding factor between what is and is not an offense. Note, however, that the term staple here covers only what was considered staple in the time of the Buddha. Bread, pasta, and potatoes, which are staples in the West, were not always staples in India at that time and so do not always fit into this category.

Staple foods

Staple foods are consistently defined as five sorts of foods, although the precise definitions of the first two are a matter of controversy.

1) Cooked grains: The Commentary to Pc 35 defines this as seven types of cooked grain, but there is disagreement on the identity of some of the seven. They are sāḷi (BD translates this as rice; the Thais, wheat); vīhi (BD again has rice, and the Thais agree); yava (BD has barley; the Thais, glutinous rice); godhūma (BD has wheat; the Thais, tares); kaṅgu (both BD and the Thais identify this as millet or sorghum); varaka (BD doesn’t identify this beyond saying that it is a bean; the Thais are probably right in identifying it as Job’s tears); and kudrūsaka (the Commentary defines this term as covering all forms of grain coming from grass—rye would be an example in the West). Whatever the precise definitions of these terms, though, we could argue from the Great Standards that any grain cooked as a staple—including corn (maize) and oats—would fit into this category.

2) Kummāsa: The Commentary describes this as a staple confection made out of yava but doesn’t give any further details aside from saying that if the kummāsa is made out of any of the other grains or mung beans, it doesn’t count as a staple food. References to kummāsa in the Canon show that it was a very common staple that could form a rudimentary meal in and of itself and would spoil if left overnight.

3) Sattu: any of the seven types of grain dried or roasted and pounded into meal.

4) Fish: the flesh of any animal living in the water.

5) Meat: the flesh of any animal living on land, except for that which is unallowable. Because the Commentary, in discussing unallowable meat, uses the word meat to cover all parts of an animal’s body, the same convention would apply to allowable meat (and to fish) as well. Thus it covers the liver, kidneys, eggs, etc., of any animal whose flesh is allowable.

The Mahāvagga (Mv.VI.23.9-15) forbids ten kinds of flesh: that of human beings, elephants, horses, dogs, snakes, lions, tigers, leopards, bears, and hyenas. To eat human flesh entails a thullaccaya; to eat any of the other unallowable types, a dukkaṭa. Human beings, horses, and elephants were regarded as too noble to be used as food. The other types of meat were forbidden either on grounds that they were repulsive (“People criticized and complained and spread it about, ‘How can these Sakyan-son monks eat dog meat? Dogs are loathsome, disgusting’”) or dangerous (bhikkhus, smelling of lion’s flesh, went into the jungle; the lions there, instead of criticizing or complaining, attacked them).

The Commentary adds three comments here: (a) These prohibitions cover not only the meat of these animals but also their blood, bones, skin, and hide (the layer of tissue just under the skin—see AN 4:113). (b) The prohibition against dog flesh does not include wild dogs, such as wolves and foxes, (but many teachers—including the Thai translator of the Commentary—question this point). The flesh of a half-dog half-wolf mixture, however, would be forbidden. (c) The prohibition against snake flesh covers the flesh of all long, footless beings. Thus eels would not be allowed. (Many Communities question this last point as well.)

Mv.VI.23.9 also states that if a bhikkhu is uncertain as to the identity of any meat presented to him, he incurs a dukkaṭa if he doesn’t ask the donor what it is before eating it. The Commentary interprets this as meaning that if, on reflection, one recognizes what kind of meat it is, one needn’t ask the donor about the identity of the meat. If one doesn’t recognize it, one must ask. If one mistakenly identifies an unallowable sort of meat as allowable and then goes ahead and consumes it under that mistaken assumption, there is no offense.

Raw flesh and blood are allowed at Mv.VI.10.2 only when one is possessed by non-human beings. Thus, in more ordinary circumstances, one may not eat raw fish or meat even if of an allowable kind. This would include such things as steak tartare, sashimi, oysters on the half-shell, raw eggs, and caviar. Furthermore, even cooked fish or meat of an allowable kind is unallowable if the bhikkhu sees, hears, or suspects that the animal was killed specifically for the purpose of feeding bhikkhus (Mv.VI.31.14).

Non-staple foods

Non-staple foods are defined according to context:

a) in Pc 35-38: every edible aside from staple foods, juice drinks, the five tonics, and medicines (see below);

b) in Pc 40: every edible aside from staple foods, water, and toothwood;

c) in Pc 41 (also the bhikkhunīs’ Pc 44 & 54): every edible aside from staple foods, the five tonics, juice drinks, medicine, and conjey.

The Commentary to Pc 37 lists the following items as non-staple foods: flour and confections made of flour (cakes, bread and pasta made without eggs would be classed here); also, roots, tubers (this would include potatoes), lotus roots, sprouts, stems, bark, leaves, flowers, fruits, nuts, seed-meal, seeds, and resins that are made into food. Any of these items made into medicines, though, would not be classed as a non-staple food.

The Commentary also acknowledges that some societies use roots, tubers, confections made out of flour, etc., as staple foods, but it nowhere suggests that the definition of staple food be altered to fit the society in which one is living. However—because eggs come under meat—any bread, pastries, noodles, and pasta made with eggs are staple foods. Thus in the West we are left with a somewhat zigzag line separating what are and are not staple foods for the purposes of the rules: Meal pounded from grain is a staple; flour ground from grain is not. Bread made with oat meal, corn meal, wheat germ, etc., would thus be a staple; bread made without any grain meal or eggs would not. The same holds true for pastries, noodles, and pasta.

This means that it would be possible for a donor to provide bhikkhus with a full, strictly vegetarian meal that would include absolutely no staple foods. A wise policy in such a case, though, would be to treat the meal as if it did contain staple foods with reference to the rules (Pc 33 & 35) that aim at saving face for the donor.

Conjey, the watery rice porridge or gruel commonly drunk before alms round in the time of the Buddha, is classed differently according to context. If it is so thick that it cannot be drunk and must be eaten with a spoon, it is regarded as a staple food at Mv.VI.25.7 and under Pc 33. “Drinking conjey” is classed as a non-staple food under Pc 35-38 & 40, whereas it is considered neither a staple nor a non-staple food under Pc 41. The Commentary notes, though, that if drinking conjey has bits of meat or fish “larger than lettuce seeds” floating in it, it is a staple food.

Mv.VI.34.21 contains an allowance for the five products of the cow: milk, curds, buttermilk, butter, and ghee. The Commentary mentions that each of these five may be taken separately—i.e., the allowance does not mean that all five must be taken together. Milk and curds are classed as “finer staple foods” under Pc 39, but in other contexts they fit under the definition of non-staple food. All other dairy products—except for fresh butter and ghee when used as tonics (see NP 23)—are non-staple foods.

One of the ten disputed points that led to the convening of the Second Council was the issue of whether thin sour milk—milk that has passed the state of being milk but not yet arrived at the state of being buttermilk—would count inside or outside the general category of staple/non-staple food under Pc 35. The decision of the Council was that it was inside the category, and thus a bhikkhu who has turned down an offer of further food would commit the offense under that rule if he later in the morning consumed thin sour milk that was not left over.

In addition to staple and non-staple foods, the Vibhaṅga to the rules in this chapter mentions three other classes of edibles: juice drinks, the five tonics, and medicines.

Juice drinks

Juice drinks include the freshly squeezed juice of sugar cane, water lily root, all fruits except grain, all leaves except cooked greens, and all flowers except licorice (Mv.VI.35.6). The way the allowance for juice drinks is phrased—fruits, leaves, and flowers are mentioned as a class, whereas canes and roots are not—suggests that the Great Standards should not be used to extend the allowance for sugar cane juice and water lily root juice to include the juice from other canes or roots.

According to the Commentary, the juice must be strained and may be warmed by sunlight but not heated over a fire. What category boiled juice would fit under, the Commentary does not say. As we noted under NP 23, the Vinaya-mukha—arguing from the parallel between sugar cane juice, which is a juice drink, and sugar, which is made by boiling sugar cane juice—maintains that boiled juice would fit under sugar in the five tonics. This opinion, however, is not accepted in all Communities. In those that do accept it, pasteurized juice, juice concentrates, and juice made from concentrate would come under sugar.

In discussing the Great Standards, the Commentary says that grain is a “great fruit,” and thus the juice of any one of nine large fruits—palmyra fruit, coconut, jackfruit, breadfruit, bottle gourd, white gourd, muskmelon, watermelon, and squash—would fall under the same class as the juice of grain: i.e., as a non-staple food and not a juice drink. From this judgment, many Communities infer that the juice of any large fruit, such as pineapple or grapefruit, would also be classed as a non-staple food. However, not all Communities follow the Commentary on this point, as the allowance for juice-drinks states specifically that the juice of all fruits is allowed except for that of grain.

According to the Commentary, allowable leaf-juice drinks include juice squeezed from leaves that are considered food—such as lettuce, spinach, or beet greens—as well as from leaves that are classed as medicines. Health drinks such as wheat grass juice would thus be allowable. Leaf-juice may be mixed with cold water and/or warmed in the sunlight. The prohibition against consuming the juice from cooked vegetables in the afternoon covers all cooked leaves that are considered food, as well as any medicinal leaves cooked in liquids that are classed as food, such as milk. Medicinal leaves cooked in pure water retain their classification as lifetime medicines.

The Commentary’s discussion of flower juice drinks allowable and unallowable for the afternoon shows that licorice flower juice was used to make alcohol, which is why the Canon doesn’t include it as allowable in this class. The Commentary extends this prohibition to cover any kind of flower juice prepared in such a way that it will become alcoholic. The Commentary goes on to say, though, that licorice flower juice and other flower juices not prepared so that they will become toddy are allowable in the morning.

The Commentary notes further that if a bhikkhu himself makes any of the juice drinks, he may consume it only before noon. If the juice is made by a non-bhikkhu and formally offered before noon, one may “also” drink it with food before noon—the “also” here implying that the original allowance, that one may drink it without food after noon and before dawnrise, still holds. If the juice is made by a non-bhikkhu and formally offered after noon, one may drink it without food until the following dawnrise. The allowance for mango juice drink covers juice made either from ripe or from unripe mangoes. To make unripe mango juice, it recommends that the mango be cut or broken into small pieces, placed in water, heated in sunlight, and then strained, adding honey, sugar, and/or camphor as desired. Juice made from Bassia pierrei must be diluted with water, as the undiluted juice of this fruit is too thick.

The five tonics

The five tonics are discussed in detail under NP 23.

Medicines

According to the Mahāvagga (VI.3.1-8), any items in the six following categories that, by themselves, are not used as staple or non-staple food are medicines: roots, astringent decoctions, leaves, fruits, resins, and salts. For example, under fruits: Oranges and apples are not medicines, but pepper, nutmeg, and cardamom are. Most modern medicines would fit under the category of salts. Using the Great Standards, we can say that any edible that is used as a medicine but does not fit under the categories of staple or non-staple food, juice drinks, or the five tonics, would fit here. (For a full discussion of medicines, see BMC2, Chapter 5.)

Keeping and consuming

Each of the four basic classes of edibles—food, juice drinks, the five tonics, and medicines—has its “life span,” the period during which it may be kept and consumed. Food may be kept and consumed until noon of the day it is received; juice drinks, until dawnrise of the following day; the five tonics, until dawnrise of the seventh day after they are received; and medicines, for the remainder of one’s life.

Mixed foods

Edibles made from mixed ingredients that have different life spans—e.g., salted beef, honeyed cough syrup, sugared orange juice—have the same life span as the ingredient with the shortest life span. Thus salted beef is treated as beef, honeyed cough syrup as honey, and sugared orange juice as orange juice (Mv.VI.40.3). According to the Commentary, mixing here means thorough intermingling. Thus, it says, if fruit juice has a whole, unhusked coconut floating in it, the coconut may be removed, and the juice is all right to drink until the following dawnrise. If butter is placed on top of rice porridge, the part of the butter that hasn’t melted into the rice may be kept and eaten for seven days. If items with different life spans are all presented at the same time, they maintain their separate life spans as long as they don’t interpenetrate one another. Not all Communities, however, follow the Commentary on this point.

Mv.VI.40.3, the passage underlying these rulings, can be translated as follows (replacing the formal terms for categories of food with the primary examples of each category):

“Juice-mixed-with-food, when received that day, is allowable during the right time and not allowable at the wrong time. A tonic-mixed-with-food, when received that day, is allowable during the right time and not allowable at the wrong time. Medicine-mixed-with-food, when received that day, is allowable during the right time and not allowable at the wrong time. A tonic-mixed-with-juice, when received that day, is allowable through the watches of the night and not allowable when the watches of the night have past. Medicine-mixed-with-juice, when received that day, is allowable through the watches of the night and not allowable when the watches of the night have past. Medicine-mixed-with-a-tonic, when received, is allowable for seven days and not allowable when seven days have past.”

Translated in this way, the passage covers foods that are already mixed when presented to a bhikkhu. One of the general issues that led to the convening of the Second Council, however, concerned how to treat cases where foods received separately are then mixed by a bhikkhu. The specific issue presented to the Council was that of bhikkhus who kept a horn filled with salt so that they could add salt to bland foods. The Council’s verdict was that in doing so, the bhikkhus incurred a pācittiya under Pc 38. The Vibhaṅga to that rule, however, gives a dukkaṭa for using, as food, life-long medicine that has been stored overnight, and salt is a life-long medicine. Thus the elders at the Council seem to have reasoned that if the salt has been mixed in with food, the mixture as a whole counts as food accepted when the first ingredient (the salt) was accepted: thus the pācittiya, rather than the dukkaṭa, under Pc 38. This principle is nowhere expressly stated in the texts, but is in some places taught as an oral tradition.

The Commentary, in treating the issue of foods mixed by a bhikkhu, translates Mv.VI.40.3 as follows:

“Juice received that day, when mixed with food, is allowable during the right time and not allowable at the wrong time. A tonic received that day, when mixed with food, is allowable during the right time and not allowable at the wrong time. Medicine received that day, when mixed with food, is allowable during the right time and not allowable at the wrong time. A tonic received that day, when mixed with juice, is allowable through the watches of the night and not allowable when the watches of the night have past. Medicine received that day, when mixed with juice, is allowable through the watches of the night and not allowable when the watches of the night have past. Medicine received, when mixed with a tonic, is allowable for seven days and not allowable when seven days have past.”

The question the Commentary then raises is, “Why is the word ’that day’ (tadahu) omitted from the last case?” Its answer is that there is no limit on when the medicine has to be received for it to be properly mixed with a tonic received today. In other words, it could have been received any number of days before the tonic was received. If it is mixed with the tonic on the first day of the tonic’s life span, the mixture as a whole has a seven-day life span. If mixed with the tonic on the second day of the tonic’s life, the mixture has a six-day life span, and so forth. The Commentary’s translation of this passage may strain standard Pali syntax, but it is grammatically correct and is the only way of deriving from Mv.VI.40.3 a general principle to cover the issue of foods received separately that are then mixed by a bhikkhu. Thus the principle has been generally accepted that tonics and medicines, such as sugar and salt, received today may be eaten mixed with food or juice drinks received today, but not with food or juice drinks received on a later day. Medicine, such as salt, tea, or cocoa, received at any time may be eaten mixed with any of the five tonics on any day of the tonic’s life span.

*    *    *

31

A bhikkhu who is not ill may eat one meal at a public alms center. Should he eat more than that, it is to be confessed.

“Now at that time a certain guild had prepared food at a public alms center not far from Sāvatthī. Some group-of-six bhikkhus, dressing early in the morning, taking their bowls and (outer) robes, entered Sāvatthī for alms but, after not getting any almsfood, went to the public alms center. The people there said, ‘At long last your reverences have come,’ and respectfully waited on them. Then on the second day… the third day, the group-of-six bhikkhus… entered Sāvatthī for alms but, after not getting any almsfood went to the public alms center and ate. The thought occurred to them, ‘What’s the use of our going back to the monastery? (§) Tomorrow we’ll have to come right back here.’

“So staying on and on right there, they ate the food of the public alms center. The members of other religions fled the place. People criticized and complained and spread it about: ‘How can these Sakyan-son monks stay on and on, eating the food of the public alms center? The food at the public alms center isn’t prepared just for them; it’s prepared for absolutely everybody.’”

A public alms center is a place—in a building, under the shade of a tree, or in the open air—where all comers are offered as much food as they want, free of charge. Soup kitchens and shelters for the homeless, if run in this way, would fit under this rule. A meal is defined as one that includes any of the five staple foods. Not ill in this rule is defined as being able to leave the alms center.

The origin story seems to indicate that this rule is directed against staying on and eating day after day in the alms center. The Commentary, though, maintains that it forbids eating in the center two days running, without making any mention of whether the bhikkhu stays on at the center or not. To eat one day in a center belonging to one family (or group) and the next day in a center belonging to another group, it says, entails no penalty. However, if—after one’s first meal there—a center has to close down for a period of time for lack of food and then later reopens, one should not eat there the first day of its reopening.

According to the Vibhaṅga, a bhikkhu incurs a dukkaṭa for accepting, with the intention of eating it, any food that falls under the conditions specified by this rule, and a pācittiya for every mouthful he eats.

Perception as to whether one is actually ill is not a mitigating factor here (see Pc 4.)

Non-offenses

According to the Vibhaṅga, there is no offense in taking a meal on the second day—

if one is invited by the proprietors;

if one is ill;

if the food is specifically intended for bhikkhus (§); or

if the center determines the amount of food the recipients may take, rather than allowing them to take as much as they want (§). The reason for this allowance is that if the owners of the center were unhappy with having a bhikkhu eat there, they could give him very little or nothing at all.

The Vibhaṅga also states that, “everything aside from the five staple foods is a non-offense.” None of the texts discuss this point, but this apparently refers both to the first and to the subsequent meal. In other words, if a bhikkhu consumed no staple foods at his first meal, then there would be no penalty in accepting and eating any of the five staple foods in the subsequent meal. But if he did consume any staple foods at his first meal, then at the subsequent meal he would have to refrain from eating staple foods if he wanted to avoid an offense.

Also, there is no offense in taking a second meal when “coming or going,” which in the context of the origin story seems to mean that one may take a second meal if one simply leaves the center and then comes back. The Commentary, though, interprets this phrase as meaning “coming or going on a journey,” and even here it says a meal should not be taken from the center two days running unless there are dangers, such as floods or robbers, that prevent one from continuing on one’s way.

Summary: Eating food obtained from the same public alms center two days running—without leaving in the interim—unless one is too ill to leave the center, is a pācittiya offense.

*    *    *

32

A group meal, except at the proper occasions, is to be confessed. Here the proper occasions are these: a time of illness, a time of giving cloth, a time of making robes, a time of going on a journey, a time of embarking on a boat, a great occasion, a time when the meal is supplied by monks. These are the proper occasions here.

This is a rule dating from Devadatta’s efforts to create a schism in the Saṅgha.

“Now at that time Devadatta, his gain and offerings diminished, ate his meals with his following having asked and asked for them among households. (Here the Commentary elaborates: ‘Thinking, “Don’t let my group fall apart,” he provided for his following by eating his meals among households together with his following, having asked for them thus: “You give food to one bhikkhu. You give food to two.”’) People criticized and complained and spread it about: ‘How can these Sakyan-son monks eat their meals having asked and asked for them among households? Who isn’t fond of well-prepared things? Who doesn’t like sweet things?’”

Group meals

The Vibhaṅga defines a group meal as one consisting of any of the five types of staple foods to which four or more bhikkhus are invited. Pv.VI.2 adds that this rule covers any group meal that the donor offers at his/her own initiative, as well as any that results from a bhikkhu’s requesting it.

In the early days of the Buddha’s career, donors who wished to invite bhikkhus to their homes for a meal would invite an entire Community. Later, as Communities grew in size and there were times of scarcity in which donors were unable to invite entire Communities (Cv.VI.21.1), the Buddha allowed:

1) designated meals, at which a certain number of bhikkhus were to be served. The donors would ask the Community official in charge of meal distribution—the meal designator (bhattuddesaka)—to designate so-and-so many bhikkhus “from the Community” to receive their meals. Bhikkhus would be sent on a rotating basis to these meals as they occurred.

2) invitational meals, to which specific bhikkhus were invited;

3) lottery meals, for which the bhikkhus receiving the meals were to be chosen by lot; and

4) periodic meals, i.e., meals offered at regular intervals, such as every day or every uposatha day, to which bhikkhus were to be sent on a rotating basis, as with designated meals. The meal designator was to supervise the drawing of lots and keep track of the various rotating schedules. (The explanations of these various types of meal come partly from the Commentary. For a fuller explanation, see Appendix III.)

The non-offense clauses to this rule state that in addition to the exceptions mentioned in the rule, which we will discuss below, this rule does not apply to lottery meals or periodic meals. The Commentary concludes from this—and on the surface it seems reasonable enough—that the rule thus applies to meals to which the entire Community is invited and to invitational meals. (Buddhaghosa reports that there was disagreement among Vinaya authorities as to whether it applies to designated meals—more on this point below.)

The Commentary’s conclusion, though, creates a problem when lay people want to invite Communities of more than three bhikkhus to their homes for a meal. Perhaps this problem is what induced the Commentary to interpret the Vibhaṅga’s definition of a group meal as meaning one in which the invitations specifically mention the word meal or food, or the type of meal or food to be served. (“Come to my house for breakfast tomorrow.” “I know you don’t often get a chance to eat Indian food, so I’m inviting you all over for chappatties and curry.”) This interpretation has led to the custom of phrasing invitations to eat “in the morning” or to eat “before noon,” so that groups of four or more bhikkhus may be invited without breaking this rule.

The Buddha’s purposes for establishing this rule, though, are listed at Cv.VII.3.13 as follows: “For the restraint of evil-minded individuals, for the comfort of well-behaved bhikkhus, so that those with evil desires will not split the Community by (forming) a faction, and out of compassion for families.”

The Commentary’s definition of group meal accomplishes none of these purposes: The custom of phrasing invitations to avoid the word meal or food does nothing to restrain evil-minded individuals, etc., and it actually creates trouble for lay people who do not know the custom, a point well-illustrated by the Commentary itself in an entertaining section on how to deal with a person whose invitation contains the word meal. After getting the run-around from the meal designator—who apparently was not allowed to tell him in any straightforward way how to phrase his invitation and so gave him a long series of hints—the poor man returns to his friends and makes a cryptic statement that the A/Sub-commentary translates as: “There are a lot of words that have to be spoken in this business of making an invitation. What’s the use of them all?”

Two other arguments against the Commentary’s interpretation are:

1) The Vibhaṅga’s definition of invited in this rule is repeated word-for-word under Pc 33 & 46. If the factor of mentioning “food” or “meal,” etc., is necessary for there to be an offense under this rule, it would have to be necessary under those rules as well, a proposal that makes no sense in their context and that no one has ever suggested.

2) In the origin stories of two of the reformulations of the rule, bhikkhus refuse invitations on the grounds that they would break the rule against a group meal, and yet the invitations make no mention of “food” or “meal.”

An alternative interpretation

To find an alternative to the Commentary’s explanation, we have to go back to the origin stories leading to the reformulations of the rule, where we find an interesting point: The invitations rejected by scrupulous bhikkhus on the grounds that they would break the rule all deal with “invitational” meals. In one of them, a naked ascetic invites a group of bhikkhus to an invitational meal and is rejected on the grounds that it would constitute a group meal. He then goes to the Buddha and—after complaining that he should not be subjected to such treatment—rephrases the invitation, this time inviting the entire Community. This suggests that he felt an invitation of this sort would not constitute a group meal.

His reasoning has its grounds in the Vinaya itself: Throughout the Vibhaṅga and Khandhakas, the word group is used to refer to any set of bhikkhus not forming a complete Community and yet acting as an independent unit. This may be why the category of Community meal was not mentioned in the non-offense clauses: The arrangers of the Vibhaṅga may have felt that no mention was necessary, in that the term group meal automatically excluded Community meals.

Similar considerations suggest that designated meals may also be exempted from this rule even though they are not mentioned in the non-offense clauses. Invitations to such meals were customarily worded as requests for so-and-so many bhikkhus “from the Community,” and thus—as a type of Community meal—they would by definition not be invitations to a “group” meal.

Because invitations to lottery meals and periodic meals did not customarily make reference to the Community, the Vibhaṅga arrangers did have to make mention of those types of meals in order to exempt them.

We are left with a rule that applies exclusively to invitations to specific groups—not Communities—of four or more bhikkhus regardless of whether the invitation mentions the word “food” or “meal.”

The rule in this form has the virtue of fulfilling the express purposes mentioned for it in Cv.VII.3.13: It would prevent evil-minded bhikkhus and lay people from trying to exert influence over specific groups in the Community by arranging meals especially for them; and in the same way, it would prevent people with evil desires from creating a split in the Community. (Because the smallest faction that can create a split in the Community is four bhikkhus, the maximum number allowed at a group meal is three.)

The rule in this form would also contribute to the comfort of well-behaved bhikkhus in that invitations to meals would not be preempted by factions; and it would protect lay families from being prey to the maneuverings of bhikkhus who would pressure them repeatedly into providing meals as part of their strategy to create and maintain such factions. (Anyone who has lived in a traditional Buddhist country knows only too well the influence of sweet-talking bhikkhus over unsuspecting or low-minded lay people. This sort of thing neither started nor ended with Devadatta.)

Because Community meals and designated meals would not form an opening for such machinations, there would be no reason to limit them to groups of three if lay people want to invite groups larger than that. One objection to exempting Community meals from this rule is that a meal for the entire Community would be more burdensome than a meal for a smaller group, but that is what designated meals are for. A donor willing and able to provide a meal for an entire Community is welcome but not required to do so. A donor willing but not able may simply ask to provide a meal for x-number of bhikkhus from the Community, leaving it up to the meal designator to designate which bhikkhus will go for the meal, with no danger of creating a faction.

Thus the point at issue is not whether the invitation makes mention of food or meals, but whether it specifies the individual bhikkhus to be invited. If it specifies more than three individual bhikkhus—either naming them outright or saying such things as “Ven. X and four of his friends,” or “The five of you,” etc.—the meal would count as a group meal.

Perception as to whether food actually constitutes a group meal is not a mitigating factor (see Pc 4).

Effort

The Vibhaṅga states that, aside from the allowable times, there is a dukkaṭa for accepting—with the thought of eating it—food that would qualify as a group meal, and a pācittiya for every mouthful eaten. Whether the bhikkhus accepting the food actually eat together is not an issue. If they receive their food at the same invitation to a group meal but then split up and eat it separately, they still incur the full penalty.

Non-offenses

The Vibhaṅga defines the proper occasions mentioned in the rule—during which bhikkhus may eat a group meal without committing an offense—as follows:

A time of giving cloth is the “robe season.”

A time of making robes is any time the bhikkhus are making robes.

A time of journeying is any time the bhikkhus are about to go, are going, or have just returned from a journey of at least half a yojana (about five miles, or eight kilometers).

A time of embarking on a boat is any time the bhikkhus are about to embark, are embarking, or are disembarking from a boat. No minimum distance for the boat journey is specified.

A time of illness is, in its minimal terms, a time when the bhikkhus’ feet are split (and they cannot go for alms).

A great occasion is one in which there are so many bhikkhus in proportion to the donors giving alms that three bhikkhus going for alms can obtain enough food to support themselves, but not enough to support a fourth.

A meal supplied by monks is one provided by a person who has taken on the state of religious wanderer. This the Commentary explains as meaning not only those ordained in other religions, but also one’s own co-religionists (bhikkhus, bhikkhunīs, and novices) as well; the Vibhaṅga’s definition of “one who has taken on the state of religious wanderer” under Pc 41 suggests that the Commentary is correct. This exemption, as its origin story makes clear, was formulated to promote good relations between bhikkhus and members of other religions, but it also means that a bhikkhu, from his own resources, can provide food for a group of his friends without incurring an offense. Although this exemption could thus open the door for wealthy bhikkhus to attract factions, as long as they are not getting their funds from lay donors, they would be placing no burden on the laity, which seems to be the most important of the purposes for this rule.

Aside from the proper occasions, there is no offense—

if groups of three or less eat a meal to which they have been specifically invited;

if the meal to which a group of four or more is invited does not include any of the five staple foods; or

if bhikkhus, having walked separately for alms, eat assembled as a group.

No mention is made of whether bhikkhus can go for alms in groups of four or more, as is the custom at present in the rural areas of many Buddhist countries. From the various stories of bhikkhus and bhikkhunīs on alms round that appear in the Canon, it seems that the custom was for them to go individually. Pc 42 mentions bhikkhus going for alms as a pair, but the Vibhaṅga notes that they might receive less food that way than when going individually. Apparently, going as a group would not have made much sense in their cultural context.

As mentioned above, the Vibhaṅga also states that there is no offense for groups of any number eating periodic meals or lottery meals; and as we have already stated, our interpretation would explicitly extend this exemption to cover Community and designated meals as well.

Summary: Eating a meal to which four or more individual bhikkhus have been specifically invited—except on special occasions—is a pācittiya offense.

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33

An out-of-turn meal, except at the proper occasions, is to be confessed. Here the proper occasions are these: a time of illness, a time of giving cloth, a time of making robes. These are the proper occasions here.

“Now at that time a meal-series of exquisite meals had been arranged in Vesālī. The thought occurred to a certain poor laborer: ‘The way these people respectfully present meals suggests that it’s not a minor thing at all. What if I were to present a meal?’ So he went to his supervisor (§) and said, ‘Young master, I want to present a meal for the Community of bhikkhus with the Buddha at its head. Please give me my wage.’ Now that supervisor also had faith and confidence in the Buddha, so he gave the laborer more than his wage.

“Then the laborer went to the Blessed One, bowed down to him, sat down to one side, and said, ‘Venerable sir, may the Blessed One together with the Community of bhikkhus acquiesce to a meal with me tomorrow.’

“‘You should know, friend, that the Community of bhikkhus is large.’

“‘Let it be large, venerable sir. I have prepared plenty of jujube fruits. The masters (§) will fill themselves even with the jujube hash.’

“So the Blessed One acquiesced by becoming silent…. The bhikkhus heard, ‘…The masters will fill themselves even with the jujube hash,’ so right before the time of the meal they went for alms and ate. People heard, ‘They say that the poor laborer has invited the Community of bhikkhus with the Buddha at its head,’ so they took a great deal of staple and non-staple foods to the laborer…. (When the time came for the meal) the Blessed One went to the poor laborer’s house… and sat on a seat made ready, together with the Community of bhikkhus. Then the poor laborer served the bhikkhus in the meal-hall. The bhikkhus said, ‘Give just a little, friend. Give just a little.’

“‘Don’t take so little, venerable sirs, thinking that I’m just a poor laborer. I’ve prepared plenty of staple and non-staple food. Take as much as you want.’

“‘That’s not the reason why we’re taking so little, friend. It’s simply that we went for alms and ate just before the time for the meal: That’s why we’re taking so little.‘

“So the poor laborer criticized and complained and spread it about: ‘How can their reverences eat elsewhere when they were invited by me? Am I not capable of giving them as much as they want?’”

Object

The term out-of-turn meal covers two sorts of situations: A bhikkhu has been invited to a meal consisting of any of the five staple foods but then either (1) goes elsewhere and eats another meal consisting of any of the five staple foods at the same time as the meal to which he was originally invited; or (2) eats a staple food prior to going to the meal, as in the origin story.

Perception as to whether food actually constitutes an out-of-turn meal is not a mitigating factor (see Pc 4).

Effort

The Vibhaṅga states that there is a dukkaṭa for accepting—with the thought of eating it—food that will constitute an out-of-turn meal, and a pācittiya for every mouthful eaten.

Proper times

The special occasions when one may accept and eat an out-of-turn meal are defined as follows:

 A time of illness is when one is unable to eat enough at one sitting and so has to eat two or more times in a morning.

The times of giving cloth and making robes are defined as in the preceding rule. The reason for exempting them is that in the days of the Buddha, cloth and thread were hard to come by, and donors who wanted to offer them usually did so in conjunction with a meal. If these exemptions were not made, a bhikkhu making a robe, having already been invited to one meal, could not go to another meal beforehand to receive the cloth or thread offered there.

There is reason to believe that these three exemptions apply to out-of-turn meals of the type mentioned in the origin story: i.e., a bhikkhu is allowed in these cases to go to another meal before attending the meal to which he was originally invited.

Sharing invitations

As for the sort of out-of-turn meal where a bhikkhu invited to one meal goes to another meal instead, the Buddha in a story ancillary to this rule gives permission to share invitations: If a bhikkhu has received an invitation, he may give it to another bhikkhu or novice by saying, “I give my expectation of a meal to so-and-so.” He is then allowed to eat elsewhere.

The Commentary regards the act of sharing as a mere formality: One may even make the statement outside of the other bhikkhu’s presence without his knowing anything about it. This, though, is very unlikely to satisfy the original donor. The wise policy in this case would be to make the statement in the presence of the other bhikkhu—“I give my expectation of a meal to you”—making reasonably sure that he is willing and able to go.

The Vinaya-mukha adds, though, that if the donors of the meal have specifically invited one to a meal—i.e., one is going to an invitational meal rather than a designated meal (see Pc 32)—it would be bad manners to share the invitation without making an agreement with the donors first.

Non-offenses

In addition to mentioning the “proper times” during which one may eat an out-of-turn meal, the non-offense clauses state that there is no penalty for a bhikkhu who, on receiving an invitation, states, “I will go for alms.” This statement the Commentary explains as a refusal, and interprets the allowance as meaning that if a bhikkhu refuses an invitation, he is still allowed to eat another meal at the time for which the invitation was made. If the Vibhaṅga arrangers did mean this statement to be a refusal, though, it is probably for the sake of those bhikkhus who hold to the dhutaṅga vow of going for alms and not accepting invitations. If a bhikkhu who does not hold to such a vow refuses an invitation for a time for which he has no prior commitment, it is considered very bad manners. And if he were later to accept an invitation for a meal served at the same time as the meal he earlier refused, it would be extremely bad manners.

An alternative explanation for the statement, “I will go for alms,” is that there is no offense if the bhikkhu lets the donor know beforehand that he will go for alms before the meal: He can have his alms meal first and then go to receive the meal offered by the donor. This would make room for the custom common in village monasteries throughout Theravādin countries, where invitations are usually for the late-morning meal, and bhikkhus are expected to have an early-morning alms meal before that. (If this interpretation does not hold, most village bhikkhus would then probably claim a perpetual “time of illness” as their exemption from this rule.)

Meals that do not include any of the five staple foods are also exempted from this rule. Thus if one is invited to a meal and takes a snack of milk, drinking conjey, fruit, etc., beforehand, this would not constitute an offense—although to be in keeping with the spirit of the rule, one should not take so much as to spoil one’s appetite for the meal.

There is no offense if, when invited to more than one meal on the same day, one goes to them in the order in which one received the invitations (but see Pc 35); if one puts the food from the various invitations together in one’s bowl and eats them at the same time; or, if invited by an entire village, one goes to eat anywhere in the village.

The Commentary, in discussing this point, mentions a situation that often occurs where there are very few bhikkhus in proportion to the number of donors: A bhikkhu has been invited to a meal but, before he leaves the monastery to go to the meal, another group of donors arrives with food to place in his bowl; or after he arrives at the home of the original donor, another group of donors arrives with still more food. According to the Commentary he may accept the food of these various donors as long as he is careful—when he finally eats—to take his first mouthful from the food offered by the original donor.

The non-offense clauses also state that periodic meals and lottery meals do not count as out-of-turn meals under this rule, but the Vibhaṅga offers no explanation as to why. The Commentary to Cullavagga VI.21 shows that the custom was for many families to prepare such meals on the same day. This exemption would thus seem to provide for the situation where there are fewer bhikkhus than there are families preparing these meals. One bhikkhu would be allowed to accept more than one meal so that no family’s meal would go without a recipient.

Mv.VI.25.7 implies that if the donor of the meal provides a pre-meal snack of thick conjey—or by extension any other staple food—there would be no offense in eating it. And the Commentary notes that if the donor gives explicit permission to eat another meal before the one he/she is providing, there would be no offense in doing so.

Summary: Eating a meal before going to another meal to which one was invited, or accepting an invitation to one meal and eating elsewhere instead, is a pācittiya offense except when one is ill or during the time of giving cloth or making robes.

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34

In case a bhikkhu arriving at a family residence is presented with cakes or cooked grain-meal, he may accept two or three bowlfuls if he so desires. If he should accept more than that, it is to be confessed. Having accepted the two-or-three bowlfuls and having taken them from there, he is to share them among the bhikkhus. This is the proper course here.

The purpose of this rule is to prevent bhikkhus from abusing a donor’s generosity and good faith.

The origin story deals with two separate cases. In the first, a woman named Kāṇā is about to return to her husband’s house after visiting her parents. Her mother, thinking, “How can one go empty-handed?” bakes some cakes. A bhikkhu comes, and the mother—being a faithful lay follower—presents him with the cakes and then bakes some more to replace them. The bhikkhu, meanwhile, has informed another bhikkhu that cakes are baking at Kāṇā’s house, so the second bhikkhu goes and receives the second batch of cakes. This process keeps up until Kāṇā’s husband tires of waiting for her and takes another woman for his wife. The Commentary notes, reasonably enough, that Kāṇā developed a long-term grudge against Buddhism as a result of this incident.

In the second case, a man is preparing provisions for a journey by caravan. A similar series of events takes place, and he eventually ends up tagging along behind the caravan and getting robbed. People criticize and complain as usual, and spread it about, “How can these Sakyan-son monks accept food without knowing moderation?”

There are two factors for the full offense here.

1) Effort: Receiving more than three bowlfuls

2) Object: of cakes or cooked grain-meal (sattu).

Effort

Receiving, here, is defined in the context of an invitation to take as much as one likes. Perception as to whether one has taken more than three bowlfuls is not a mitigating factor here (see Pc 4).

Object

In the context of this rule, the Vibhaṅga defines cakes to cover anything prepared as a present, and cooked grain-meal (sattu) to cover anything prepared as provisions for a journey. Thus we will use the terms presents and provisions for the remainder of this explanation. The word journey here refers to journeys that the donors are planning to take themselves. This rule thus does not cover gifts of food that donors have prepared to give to a bhikkhu for a journey he is planning to take.

The Vinaya-mukha, using the Great Standards, infers from the Vibhaṅga’s definitions for presents and provisions that any food prepared in large quantities for sale or for a party, banquet, or reception, etc., should be covered by this rule as well.

Protocol

If a bhikkhu has accepted two or three bowlfuls of such items, then on his return from there he should tell every bhikkhu he sees, “I accepted two or three bowlfuls over there. Don’t you accept anything there.” He incurs a dukkaṭa if, seeing a bhikkhu, he does not tell him, while there is a dukkaṭa for the other bhikkhu if, having been told, he accepts anything at the place in question. According to the Commentary, if the first bhikkhu accepts two bowlfuls, he should tell the second bhikkhu to accept no more than one, and all other bhikkhus he meets that they should not accept anything. If he accepts only one bowlful, he should follow a similar process so that, all-in-all, the bhikkhus accept a total of no more than three.

The Commentary states further that a bhikkhu receiving two or three bowlfuls may keep one bowlful and do as he likes with it, but must share the remainder among an entire Community, i.e., not just among his friends. A bhikkhu receiving only one bowlful may do with it as he likes .

Non-offenses

The Vibhaṅga states that there is no offense in taking more than three bowlfuls of items not intended as presents or provisions, of items left over from preparing presents or provisions, or of provisions remaining when plans for a journey have been abandoned. As explained above, the Vinaya-mukha would include items prepared for sale or for parties, etc., under the word provisions here.

The Vibhaṅga also says that there is no penalty in accepting more than three bowlfuls from relatives or from those who have offered an invitation. Here the Commentary states that if such people give more than three bowlfuls outright, one may accept them without penalty, but if they tell one to take as much as one likes from items prepared as presents or provisions, the proper course is to take only two or three bowlfuls.

The Vibhaṅga further says that there is no offense in having more than three bowlfuls of presents or provisions purchased with one’s own resources, and that there is no offense in taking extra for the sake of another. Neither the Commentary nor Sub-commentary discusses this last point, but the only way it can make sense in the context of this rule is if it refers to cases where the bhikkhu takes extra for the sake of another not on his own initiative, but because the donor asks him to.

Summary: Accepting more than three bowlfuls of food that the donors prepared for their own use as presents or as provisions for a journey is a pācittiya offense.

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35

Should any bhikkhu, having eaten and turned down an offer (of further food), chew or consume staple or non-staple food that is not leftover, it is to be confessed.

“Now at that time a certain brahman, having invited bhikkhus, fed them. The bhikkhus, having eaten and turned down an offer of further food, went to their relatives’ families. Some ate there; some left having received alms.

“Then the brahman said to his neighbors, ‘Masters, the bhikkhus have been satisfied by me. Come and I will satisfy you as well.’

“They said, ‘Master, how will you satisfy us? Even those you invited came to our homes. Some ate there; some left having received alms.’

“So the brahman criticized and complained and spread it about, ‘How can their reverences, having eaten in my home, eat elsewhere? Am I not capable of giving as much as they want?’”

When a donor invited bhikkhus for a meal, the custom in the time of the Buddha was for him/her to offer food to the bhikkhus repeatedly while they ate, and to stop only when the supplies of food were exhausted or the bhikkhus refused any further offers. (This custom is still widespread in Sri Lanka and Burma.) Thus it was often a matter of pride among donors that their supplies were not easily exhausted and that they could continue offering food until the bhikkhus were completely satisfied and could eat no more. Now, where there is pride there is bound to be wounded pride: A donor could easily feel insulted if bhikkhus refused further offers of food, finished their meal, and then went to eat someplace else.

As the origin story shows, this rule is designed to protect generous donors from being insulted by the bhikkhus in this way. It is also designed to protect bhikkhus from being forced to go hungry by stingy or impoverished donors. If the donor stops offering food before the bhikkhus have refused further offers—or if what he/she offers is not substantial food at all (see the discussion under Pc 8 for an historic case of this sort)—the bhikkhus, after finishing their meal, are free to accept food elsewhere that morning if they are still hungry.

There are two factors for an offense here.

1) Object: staple or non-staple food that is not leftover.

2) Effort: One eats the food after having eaten and turned down an offer of further food.

Before explaining these factors, we must first explain the situation of having eaten and turned down an offer of further food.

Having eaten

Having eaten (bhuttāvin), according to the Vibhaṅga, means having eaten any of the five staple foods, “even as much as a blade of grass.” On the surface, this could mean one of two things: having taken one’s first bite of a meal or having finished a meal—even the smallest possible one. The Commentary adopts the first interpretation, but in doing so creates two problems:

1) If having eaten means having taken one’s first bite of a meal, then the word serves no purpose in the rule, because the first factor of “having turned down an offer of further food” is “the bhikkhu is eating,” and as the Commentary itself notes, if one is eating then one has already taken one’s first bite of the meal. It concludes that the word having eaten, both in the rule and in the Vibhaṅga, is completely superfluous.

2) A more practical problem coming from the Commentary’s interpretation is that if one turns down an offer of extra food when one already has more than enough food in one’s bowl but has yet to finish one’s meal, one cannot continue eating. The Commentary tries to get around this predicament by introducing an additional factor: As long as one does not move from the spot on which one is sitting, one may continue eating. This, though, creates further problems: Suppose a bhikkhu has turned down an offer of further food but has yet to finish his meal. If there is then some compelling reason for him to move from the spot on which he is sitting—for example, the donor spills a pot of hot soup, or ants come crawling into his robes—then he cannot finish his meal even if the donor begs him to continue eating.

The Sub-commentary gets around the first problem by interpreting having eaten as “having finished a meal,” which fits better with the origin story and with the linguistic usage of the Canon itself. (The word bhuttāvin also appears in MN 91, Cv.VIII.4.6, and Cv.VIII.11.5, where it clearly and consistently means “having finished a meal.” The Canon uses a separate term, asana, for one who is in the process of eating a meal without yet having finished it.) The author of the Sub-commentary doesn’t realize, though, that in adopting this interpretation he is also eliminating the need for the Commentary’s extra factor concerning moving from one’s spot. If the factor is unnecessary and has no basis in the Canon, there seems no reason to adopt it. Thus the Commentary’s factor, and not the wording of the rule, is what is superfluous. So we can say that having eaten means having finished one’s meal, and that the question of having moved from one’s spot doesn’t enter into the rule.

As the Commentary itself notes when discussing the term asana, the point where one finishes eating is determined in one of two ways:

a) There is no food left in one’s bowl, hand, or mouth; or

b) one decides that one has had enough for that particular meal.

Thus, as long as the bhikkhu has not yet finished the donor’s meal, he is free to turn down, accept, and eat food as he likes. In other words, if he turns down an offer of further food, he may continue eating what is left in his bowl. If he initially turns down an offer of further food but then gives in and accepts it after being pressured by the donor, he may eat what he accepts without penalty. Or if he feels, for example, that he has enough vegetables but would like more rice, he may turn down an offer of vegetables yet accept and eat an offer of rice that follows it.

But once he no longer has any food in his bowl, hand, or mouth, or has decided that he has had enough for that particular meal, he fulfills the factor of “having eaten” under this rule. If he turned down an offer of further food before finishing the meal, he may not for the remainder of the day eat any staple or non-staple foods that are not leftovers.

Turning down an offer of further food

The Vibhaṅga defines this as an act with five factors:

1) The bhikkhu is eating.

2) There is further staple food.

3) The donor is standing within hatthapāsa (1.25 meters) of the bhikkhu.

4) He/she offers the food.

5) The bhikkhu turns it down.

The Commentary adds that if the bhikkhu has finished eating before the further food is offered, factor (1) is not fulfilled, so if he turns down the food he does not fall under the terms of this rule. Similarly, if the food in factor (2) is not a staple food—e.g., if it is fruit, chocolates, or cheese—or if it is staple food of a sort unallowable for a bhikkhu to eat—e.g., it has been offered as a result of a bhikkhu’s claiming a superior human state or corrupting a family (see Sg 13), or it is made of human flesh or snake meat, etc.—the factor is not fulfilled. Because none of the texts specify that the donor under factor (3) must be unordained, a bhikkhu offering food to a fellow bhikkhu would apparently fulfill this factor as well. Thus this rule would apply not only to meals offered by lay donors, but also to food handed out by bhikkhus and novices in a monastery.

Factor (5) is fulfilled by any refusal made by word or gesture.

Cv.VI.10.1 states that when a senior bhikkhu makes a junior bhikkhu get up from his seat before the latter has finished his meal, the senior bhikkhu counts as having turned down an offer of further food (§). In other words, when the senior bhikkhu then finishes his own meal, he comes under the purview of this rule as well.

Staple & non-staple food

Staple food, here, follows the standard definition. Non-staple food, in the context of this rule, covers all edibles except for the five staple foods, juice drinks, the five tonics, medicines, and water.

Leftover food is of two sorts: (1) leftover from a sick bhikkhu’s meal and (2) formally “made” leftover by a bhikkhu who is not sick. In the latter case, the formal act has seven factors:

1) The food is allowable.

2) It has been formally received by any bhikkhu except Bhikkhu Y.

3) Bhikkhu X lifts it up in the presence of Bhikkhu Y.

4) Bhikkhu Y is within hatthapāsa of X.

5) Bhikkhu Y has finished his meal.

6) Bhikkhu Y has not yet gotten up from the seat where he has finished his meal and turned down an offer of further food; and

7) he says, “All that is enough (in Pali: Alam’etaṁ sabbaṁ).” 

The Commentary notes under step (3) that X may either offer the food to Y or simply lift it up, even slightly. It goes on to say that any bhikkhu except Bhikkhu Y may eat the food formally made leftover in this way.

Both of these allowances for leftover food are designed to prevent food’s going to waste. The first needs no explanation; the second would be useful for preventing waste in cases such as these: (a) X has turned down an offer of further food but cannot finish the food in his bowl; after getting Y to make it leftover, X can take the food back to the monastery and finish it there later. (b) All the bhikkhus except X have finished eating after turning down an offer of further food. Friends of the donors arrive late with large quantities of food they want to present to the bhikkhus; after X receives the food from them and gets Y to make it leftover, all the bhikkhus except Y may partake of it.

Effort

If a bhikkhu who, having eaten and turned down an offer of further food, is presented with staple or non-staple food that is not leftover—e.g., a snack of milk or ice cream—he incurs a dukkaṭa if he accepts it with the thought of eating it, and a pācittiya for every mouthful he eats.

According to the Vibhaṅga, perception as to whether the food is actually leftover is not a mitigating factor here (see Pc 4).

Non-offenses

There is no offense—

if a bhikkhu accepts the food and takes it for the sake of another,

if he accepts and eats leftover food, or

if, having a reason, he later in the day accepts and consumes juice drinks, any of the five tonics, or medicine. According to the Commentary, having a reason means, in the case of juice drinks, being thirsty; and in the case of the tonics and medicine, suffering from an illness that they are meant to assuage. (As we have noted under NP 23, these illnesses include hunger and fatigue as well as medical disorders.) In other words, a bhikkhu under the circumstances covered by this rule may not take these items as food. The Vibhaṅga penalizes him with a dukkaṭa if he accepts them with the idea of taking them as food, and a further dukkaṭa for every mouthful he eats.

According to the Mahāvagga (VI.18.4, VI.19.2, VI.20.4), this rule was relaxed during times of famine so that a bhikkhu who had eaten and turned down an offer of further food could later in the day consume food that was not leftover:

if it was accepted before he went to his meal,

if it is brought back from a place where a meal has been offered, or

if it has been taken from a wilderness area or a pond. The texts offer no explanation for this last stipulation. Perhaps, during famines, these were places where people would commonly forage for food.

These famine allowances were later rescinded (Mv.VI.32.2) without any provision for invoking them again if a similar crisis—such as the collapse of modern civilization—were to arise. Thus, they were part of the Buddha’s repertoire but not of the Community’s after his parinibbāna.

Summary: Eating staple or non-staple food that is not leftover, after having earlier in the day finished a meal during which one turned down an offer to eat further staple food, is a pācittiya offense.

*    *    *

36

Should any bhikkhu, knowingly and wishing to find fault, present staple or non-staple food he has brought to a bhikkhu who has eaten and turned down an offer (of further food), saying, “Here, bhikkhu, chew or consume this”—when it has been eaten, it is to be confessed.

“Now at that time two bhikkhus were traveling through the Kosalan districts on their way to Sāvatthī. One of them indulged in bad habits; the second one said, ‘Don’t do that sort of thing, my friend. It isn’t proper.’ The first one developed a grudge. Eventually, they arrived at Sāvatthī.

“Now at that time one of the guilds in Sāvatthī presented a Community meal. The second bhikkhu finished his meal, having turned down an offer of further food. The bhikkhu with the grudge, having gone to his relatives and bringing back almsfood, went to the second bhikkhu and on arrival said to him, ‘Here, friend, have some of this.’

“‘No thanks, my friend. I’m full.’

“‘Really, this is delicious almsfood. Have some.’

“So the second bhikkhu, being pressured by the first, ate the almsfood. Then the bhikkhu with the grudge said to him, ‘You think I’m the one to be reprimanded when you eat food that isn’t leftover, after finishing your meal and turning down an offer of further food?’

“‘Shouldn’t you have told me?’

“‘Shouldn’t you have asked?’”

This rule covers cases in which one bhikkhu, knowingly and wishing to find fault, offers food to another bhikkhu in order to trick him into committing an offense under the preceding rule. The full offense here requires a full set of five factors.

1) Object: staple or non-staple food that one perceives not to be leftover.

2) Effort: One gives the food to a bhikkhu who has eaten and turned down an offer of further food, as under the preceding rule.

3) Perception: One knows that he has eaten and turned down an offer of further food.

4) Intention: One wishes to find fault with him.

5) Result: He finishes a meal that includes that food.

Only four of these factors—object, perception, intention, and result—require further explanation.

Object

Staple food and non-staple food here are defined as under the preceding rule. Whether the food is actually leftover is not a factor in determining the offense here. The important point lies in the perception: As long as one assumes the food to be not leftover, one is subject to a penalty if the other bhikkhu accepts it. If one assumes the food to be leftover, one’s actions would not fit under this rule.

Perception

If one is in doubt as to whether a bhikkhu has eaten and turned down an offer of further food, he is grounds for a dukkaṭa regardless of whether he has. If one thinks that he has eaten and turned down an offer of further food when he actually hasn’t, he is grounds for a dukkaṭa. If one thinks that he has not eaten and turned down an offer of further food, then regardless of whether he has or hasn’t, he is not grounds for an offense.

Intention

Wishing to find fault, according to the Vibhaṅga, means planning either to charge, interrogate, counter-charge, or counter-interrogate the bhikkhu (these are steps in a formal accusation), or simply to make him abashed after one has succeeded in tricking him into breaking the preceding rule.

Effort & result

Bhikkhu X, in giving food to Bhikkhu Y “knowingly and wishing to find fault,” incurs a dukkaṭa when he brings the food to Y, another dukkaṭa when Y accepts the food with the thought of eating it, a further dukkaṭa for every mouthful Y eats of the food, and a pācittiya when Y has stopped eating from it. If X then tries to make Y feel abashed, he is to be treated under Pc 2 as well. As for Y, the Commentary states that he should be treated under the preceding rule. Because perception is not a factor there, this means that Y is not exempt from an offense even though X has deliberately misled him as to the status of the food he is eating. (Some have misread one of the “wheels” of offenses listed in the Vibhaṅga to this rule as applying to Y, but because they conflict with the offenses the Vibhaṅga to the preceding rule allots to Y for eating under a misperception, that reading cannot stand. Thus the Commentary seems right in stating that all the offenses mentioned in the Vibhaṅga to this rule apply to X.) This means further that both bhikkhus in the origin story were right: The bhikkhu with a grudge should have told the second bhikkhu, while the second bhikkhu should have asked.

Non-offenses

There is no offense—

if one gives leftover food for the other bhikkhu to eat;

if one gives him food for the sake of another; or

if one gives him juice drinks, any of the five tonics, or medicines when he has a reason to take them.

In the case of the second exemption—one gives him food for the sake of another—none of the texts mention the point, but it would seem to hold only in cases where the other bhikkhu is ill or has not eaten and turned down an offer of further food.

None of the texts make any mention of a bhikkhu trying to trick another bhikkhu into committing an offense under any rule other than Pc 35; and apparently, a bhikkhu who tricks a fellow bhikkhu into committing an offense under Pc 35 with no desire to blame or shame him, but simply for the perverse satisfaction of seeing him commit the offense, would incur no penalty under this or any other rule. There is no escaping the fact, though, that such actions carry their own inherent penalty in terms of one’s spiritual maturity. This is one of those cases where a wise policy is to look past the particulars of the rule to the general principle underlying it: that one should not deliberately trick another person into breaking a rule or vow that he or she has pledged to uphold.

Summary: Deliberately tricking another bhikkhu into breaking the preceding rule, in hopes of finding fault with him, is a pācittiya offense.

*    *    *

37

Should any bhikkhu chew or consume staple or non-staple food at the wrong time, it is to be confessed.

Object

Staple food here follows the standard definition given in the preface to this chapter. Non-staple food refers to all edibles except for the five staple foods, juice drinks, the five tonics, medicines, and water.

The wrong time

The Vibhaṅga defines the wrong time as from noon until dawnrise of the following day. (See Appendix I for a discussion of how dawnrise is defined.) Noon is reckoned as the moment the sun reaches its zenith, rather than by the clock—in other words, by local rather than standard or daylight-savings time. Thus, for example, a bhikkhu who is offered food while traveling in an airplane should check the position of the sun in order to determine whether he may accept and eat it. Some have argued that one may eat after noon if one has begun one’s meal before noon, but the Commentary says explicitly that this is not the case.

Perception as to whether one is eating at the wrong time or the right time is not a mitigating factor here (see Pc 4).

Effort

The verbs chew and consume in the Pali of this rule are the verbs normally paired, respectively, with non-staple and staple foods. They both mean “to eat,” but the question arises as to whether eating means going down the throat or entering the mouth. This becomes an issue, for instance, when a bhikkhu has a piece of food stuck in his teeth from his morning meal and swallows it after noon.

The Commentary generally defines eating as going down the throat, but a passage from the Cullavagga (V.25) suggests otherwise. In it, the Buddha allows a ruminator who brings up food to his mouth at the “wrong time” to swallow it, and ends with the statement: “But food that has been brought out from the mouth should not be taken back in. Whoever should take it in is to be dealt with according to the rule (i.e., this rule and the following one).” This suggests, then, that eating is technically defined as “taking into the mouth.”

Offenses

The Vibhaṅga says that a bhikkhu incurs a dukkaṭa when, intending to eat it, he accepts staple or non-staple food. The question is, is the dukkaṭa only for accepting the food in the wrong time, or is it also for accepting food in the right time, intending to eat it in the wrong time? The Vibhaṅga doesn’t answer the question, but the Commentary does, saying that the dukkaṭa is for accepting the food in the wrong time. The Vibhaṅga goes on to say that if the bhikkhu eats staple or non-staple food at the wrong time he incurs a pācittiya for every mouthful he eats. As for juice drinks, the five tonics, and medicine, there is a dukkaṭa for accepting them at the wrong time to be used as food, and another dukkaṭa for eating them at the wrong time as food.

No exception is granted to an ill bhikkhu, because there are a number of edibles an ill bhikkhu may consume at the wrong time without involving an offense: juice drinks, the five tonics, and medicines. Also, there is an allowance in Mv.VI.14.7 for a bhikkhu who has taken a purgative to take strained meat broth, strained rice broth, or strained green gram (mung bean) broth at any time of the day. Using the Great Standards, we may say that a bhikkhu who has a similar illness or worse may take these broths at any time; and some have argued that other bean broths—such as strained broth made from boiled soybeans—would fit under the category of green gram broth as well. However, unlike the case with the five tonics, mere hunger or fatigue would not seem to count as sufficient reasons for taking any of these substances in the wrong time.

A substance termed loṇasovīraka (or loṇasocīraka) is allowed (Mv.VI.16.3) to be taken in the wrong time as a medicine for ill bhikkhus and, when mixed with water, as a beverage for bhikkhus who are not ill. No one makes it anymore, but the recipe for it in the Commentary to Pr 3 bears some resemblance to the recipe for miso (fermented soybean paste). Some have argued, using the Great Standards, that the special allowance for this substance should extend to miso as well, but this is a controversial point. As far as I have been able to ascertain, miso is not used to cure diseases in adults even in China, which would be the place to look for its use as a medicine. However, even if the allowance does apply to miso, taking miso broth as food in the wrong time would entail a dukkaṭa.

Non-offenses

There is no offense if, having a reason, one consumes juice drinks, any of the five tonics, or medicine after noon or before dawnrise.

Summary: Eating staple or non-staple food in the period from noon till the next dawnrise is a pācittiya offense.

*    *    *

38

Should any bhikkhu chew or consume stored-up staple or non-staple food, it is to be confessed.

This is one of the few rules where the original instigator was an arahant: Ven. Beḷaṭṭhasīsa, Ven. Ānanda’s preceptor and formerly the head of the 1,000 ascetics who attained Awakening on hearing the Fire Sermon (SN 35:28). The origin story here reports that he made a practice of keeping leftover rice from his alms round, drying it, and then moistening it to eat on a later day. As a result, he only rarely had to go out for alms. Even though he was doing this out of frugality rather than greed, the Buddha still rebuked him. The story doesn’t give the precise reasons for the rebuke. Perhaps it was because the Buddha saw that such behavior would open the way for bhikkhus to avoid going on alms round, thus depriving themselves of the excellent opportunity that alms-going provides for reflecting on their dependency on others and on the human condition in general; and depriving the laity of the benefits that come from daily contact with the bhikkhus and the opportunity to practice generosity of the most basic sort every day. Although frugality may be a virtue, there are times when other considerations supercede it.

Another possible reason for this rule is expressed in AN 5:80: “In the course of the future there will be bhikkhus who will live entangled with monastery attendants and novices. As they are entangled with monastery attendants and novices, they can be expected to live intent on many kinds of stored-up consumables and on making blatant signs (identifying their) land and crops.” The Buddha showed great foresight in seeing this as a danger. Over the centuries, whenever bhikkhus have lived in Communities where vast stores of food were kept—such as the great Buddhist universities in India—they have tended to grow lax in their practice, and a gulf of misunderstanding and suspicion has come to separate them from the laity.

Object

Staple food here, as usual, follows the standard definition given in the preface to this chapter. Non-staple food here includes all edibles except for the five staples, juice drinks, the five tonics, medicine, and water.

Stored-up means formally accepted by a bhikkhu (see Pc 40, below) on one day and eaten on the next or a later day. The boundary between one day and the next is dawnrise.

Perception as to whether food has been stored up is not a mitigating factor here (see Pc 4).

The story of the Second Council (Cv.XII.2.8) shows that this rule also forbids storing such medicines as salt (or pepper, vinegar, etc.) to add to any bland food one might receive on a later day. (See the discussion preceding Pc 31 for more details on this subject.)

The Commentary contains an allowance of its own, saying that, “If a bhikkhu without desire (for the food) abandons it to a novice, and the novice, having stored it (overnight) gives it (again), that is all allowable. If, however, he has received it himself and has not abandoned it, it is not proper on the second day.” This allowance raises two main questions, the first being how to interpret it. Some, focusing on the second sentence to the exclusion of the first, have noticed that it makes no mention of the presence or absence of any desire for the food, and so have interpreted it as meaning that the issue of desire is totally irrelevant: If one has not given the food to a non-bhikkhu, it is not allowable; if one has given it away, it is. This interpretation, however, ignores the point that if the presence or absence of desire for the food were irrelevant, the first sentence would not have mentioned it. Both the Old and New K/Sub-commentaries note this point, and say the abandoning in the second sentence means “abandoning without desire.” In other words, the Commentary’s allowance is meant to apply only in cases where one has abandoned both the food and any desire to receive it back.

This, however, begs the second question, which is what justification the Commentary has for making the allowance. There is no basis for it in the Vibhaṅga’s definition of “stored-up,” nor is there anything else in the Vibhaṅga to this rule from which the Great Standards could be used to support the allowance. The Commentary is apparently importing one of the non-offense clauses from NP 23 to this rule, but that is a misapplication of the Great Standards. The Vibhaṅga for one rule cannot be used to rewrite the Vibhaṅga for another; otherwise there would be no end to the rewriting of the rules. Had the compilers meant for the principle under NP 23 to be applied here, they could have done so themselves. For these reasons, there seem to be no grounds for accepting the allowance as valid. Thus, if one abandons food received today then, regardless of whether one has abandoned desire for it, if one accepts it again on a later day and eats it, one commits the full offense under this rule all the same. For further analysis of this point, see the article, Stored-up Food: A Discussion of Pācittaya 38.

Effort

The Vibhaṅga says that there is a dukkaṭa “if one accepts/takes it, thinking, ‘I will eat it.’” The question has arisen as to whether “it” here means food that has already been stored up or food that one is planning to store up. The Commentary, noting that the intention “I will store it up” is not mentioned, adopts the first interpretation: “It” here means food already stored up. The Vibhaṅga adds that there is a pācittiya for every mouthful one eats.

Perception is not a factor here. Thus, a bhikkhu who eats stored-up food commits an offense regardless of whether he perceives it as stored-up. This means—

1) If Bhikkhu X receives the food on one day and lets someone else put it away, and Bhikkhu Y eats it on a later day, Y commits an offense all the same, regardless of whether he knows that the food was stored-up.

2) One should be careful that there are no traces of any edible received yesterday on a utensil from which one will eat food today. The protocols a student should follow with regard to his preceptor (upajjhāya-vatta) (Mv.I.25.9) show that the custom in the Buddha’s time was to rinse out one’s bowl before going for alms. The Commentary suggests a method for making sure that one’s bowl is clean: Run a finger along the inside of the bowl while it is dry. If there is enough food residue or dust in the bowl for the finger to make a mark in it, clean the bowl again before use.

3) In a monastery where there are lay and novice attendants, it is important that they be fully informed of the need to make sure that leftovers from the bhikkhus‘ meals not be served to the bhikkhus again on a later day. If donors come with a large pot of food, intending for it to be eaten over a period of several days, the amount of food that the bhikkhus would eat in one day can be placed in a separate vessel and offered to them, while the remainder can be stored in a proper place for later use.

Derived offenses

If a bhikkhu accepts or takes, for the sake of food, a juice drink, a tonic, or medicine that has been stored overnight, there is a dukkaṭa in the taking, and another dukkaṭa for every mouthful he eats. The Commentary, though, asserts that when a bhikkhu takes, not for food but simply to assuage his thirst, a juice drink stored overnight, he incurs a pācittiya with every swallow.

It seems strange that drinking the juice simply as juice would entail a stronger penalty than taking it as food. As there is no basis anywhere in the Canon for the Commentary’s assertion, there seems no reason to adopt it. Mv.VI.40.3 states clearly that juice drinks, taken for any reason, are allowable at any time on the day they are accepted, but not after dawnrise of the following day. No specific penalty is given for taking them on the following day, but inferring from the Vibhaṅga to this rule we can use the Great Standards to say that the penalty would be a dukkaṭa.

Non-offenses

There is no offense in the mere act of storing food. A bhikkhu going on a journey with an unordained person may thus carry the latter’s food—while the latter carries the bhikkhu’s food—without committing an offense.

There is also no offense in telling an unordained person to store food that has not been formally received. For example, if donors simply leave food at a bhikkhu’s residence without formally presenting it, the bhikkhu may tell a novice or lay person to take it and put it away for a later day. If the food is then presented to the bhikkhu on a later day, he may eat it that day without penalty.

However, Mv.VI.33.2 states that food may be stored indoors in a monastery only in a building designated for the purpose (this would include the dwelling of anyone who is not a bhikkhu—see BMC2, Chapter 7). To eat food stored indoors anywhere else in the monastery, even if it has not been formally accepted on a previous day, would incur a dukkaṭa under Mv.VI.32.2. A bhikkhu may, however, store medicines or the five tonics anywhere in the monastery without penalty.

If a bhikkhu accepts, sets aside, and then eats any of the four kinds of edibles all within their permitted time periods—e.g., he receives bread in the morning, sets it aside, and then eats it before that noon; or receives honey today, sets it aside, and takes it as a tonic tomorrow—there is no offense.

This rule makes no exceptions for a bhikkhu who is ill. The Buddha once suspended it during famine but then later reinstated it in such a way that there is no provision for suspending it ever again (Mv.VI.17-20.

Summary: Eating food that a bhikkhu—oneself or another—formally received on a previous day is a pācittiya offense.

*    *    *

39

There are these finer staple foods: ghee, fresh butter, oil, honey, sugar/molasses, fish, meat, milk, and curds. Should any bhikkhu who is not ill, having requested finer staple foods such as these for his own sake, then consume them, it is to be confessed.

There are three factors for an offense here: object, effort, and result.

Object

The Vibhaṅga defines finer staple foods as any of the nine foods mentioned in the rule, either on their own or mixed with other foods. Thus milk and milk-mixed-with-cereal would both be finer staple foods. The ancient commentators, though, must have objected to including some of these items under the category of staple food (bhojana), so we have the Commentary defining “finer staple foods” as any of the substances mentioned in the rule mixed with any one of the seven types of grain. Thus, it would say, milk with cereal would be a finer staple food, but milk on its own would not.

As we have seen, though, the Vibhaṅga defines its terms to fit the situation covered by each particular rule and is not always consistent from one rule to another. Thus, as the Vibhaṅga is not at fault for being inconsistent here, there is no reason to follow the Commentary in deviating from it. The rule means what it says: It covers each of the foods mentioned in it, whether pure or mixed with other ingredients.

The first five of these finer staple foods are discussed in detail under NP 23. Fish and meat are discussed in the preface to this chapter. Milk and curds here refers to milk and curds from animals whose flesh is allowable. The Sub-commentary, in discussing this point, maintains that tiger’s milk, bear’s milk, etc., are not unallowable, simply that they would not come under this rule. This is an interesting idea, but was included probably just to wake up sleepy students in the back of the room.

According to the Commentary, any food other than these nine finer staple foods is grounds for a dukkaṭa under Sk 37.

None of the texts mention the issue, but this rule apparently refers only to finer staple foods that have been offered in response to one’s request—either from the person to whom the request was directed or from another person who has learned of the request. If one has made a request for any of these foods but then receives the food from someone who knows nothing of the request, that food would apparently not fulfill this factor of the offense.

Another issue not discussed in any of the texts is what to do if the people who received the request or knew of it continue to offer food of the sort requested. Is one forbidden for life from ever accepting that sort of food from them again? One suggestion for resolving this issue would be to borrow a page from the Commentary’s treatment of a revoked banishment-transaction (see Sg 13). This would mean that if—after the original offering of food—those who know of the request continue offering that sort of food, one must tell them that one may not accept the food because of the penalty it would entail. If, without further prompting, they say that they are offering the food not because of the request but because of their own independent desire to offer it, one may accept it and consume it.

Effort & result

A bhikkhu who is not ill, requesting any of the finer staple foods for his own use, incurs a dukkaṭa for every request he makes, a dukkaṭa for accepting the food with the intention of eating it, and a pācittiya for every mouthful he eats.

Not ill means that one is able to fare comfortably without these foods. None of the texts go into detail on this point, but ill probably means something more than simply being hungry, for there is a separate allowance under Sk 37 for a bhikkhu who is hungry to ask for rice and bean curry, which was the basic diet of the day, and the Commentary extends the allowance to cover all foods not covered by this rule. Here ill probably refers to any form of fatigue, weakness, or malnutrition that comes specifically from lacking any of the foods mentioned in the rule.

Perception as to whether one is actually ill is not a mitigating factor here (see Pc 4).

The Commentary adds that if a bhikkhu asks for one kind of finer staple food but receives another kind instead, he incurs the dukkaṭa for asking, but no penalty for accepting and eating what he gets. It also notes that when a bhikkhu asks a lay person for any of the finer staple foods, and the lay person makes a donation of money to the bhikkhu’s steward to buy that food, then once the food is bought it comes under this rule all the same.

Non-offenses

There is no offense:

in asking for food—any kind of food—when one is ill, and then eating it, even if one has recovered in the meantime (§);

in eating food that has been requested for the sake of an ill bhikkhu and is leftover after his meal;

in asking from relatives;

in asking from those who have offered an invitation to ask;

in asking for the sake of another person; or

in asking that food be bought with one’s own resources.

Also, according to the Meṇḍaka Allowance (Mv.VI.34.21), a bhikkhu going on a journey through a wilderness area where almsfood is difficult to obtain may search for provisions of husked rice, kidney beans, green gram (mung beans), salt, sugar, oil, and ghee for the journey. The Commentary says, though, that he should first wait for spontaneous offerings of these provisions from people who learn of his plans for the journey. If these aren’t forthcoming, he should ask from his relatives or from those who have given him an invitation to ask. Or he may see what he gets on his alms round. (This last alternative apparently applies to the salt, sugar, oil, and ghee; people ordinarily would not be giving uncooked rice, beans, or green gram for alms.) Only when these avenues fail should he ask from people who are unrelated to him and have not given an invitation to ask. Furthermore, he should ask for no more than the journey will require.

None of the texts mention any permission for the bhikkhu, after he has searched for the provisions, to store them longer than usual or to cook them in any way. Apparently, they expect him to arrange for an unordained person—or people—to accept the provisions and be responsible for their storage and preparation while on the road.

Summary: Eating finer staple foods, after having asked for them for one’s own sake—except when ill—is a pācittiya offense.

*    *    *

40

Should any bhikkhu take into his mouth an edible that has not been given—except for water and tooth-cleaning sticks (§)—it is to be confessed.

“Now at that time a certain bhikkhu, living entirely off of what was thrown away (§), was staying in a cemetery. Not wanting to receive gifts from people, he himself took the offerings for dead ancestors—left in cemeteries, under trees, and on thresholds—and ate them. People criticized and complained and spread it about, ‘How can this bhikkhu himself take our offerings for our dead ancestors and eat them? He’s robust, this bhikkhu. He’s strong. Perhaps he feeds on human flesh.’”

There are two factors for the full offense here: object and effort.

Object

An edible is whatever is fit to eat, and includes all four classes of food and medicine: staple and non-staple foods, juice drinks, the five tonics, and medicine. As the rule notes, however, there are two exceptions:

1) Water, according to the Commentary, includes ice, hailstones, and snow as well. Whether such things as boiled water, bottled water, and man-made ice should also come under this exception is a controversial point. Because the texts offer no specific guidance here, this is an area where the wise policy is to follow the dictates of one’s Community.

2) Tooth-cleaning sticks, as used in the time of the Buddha, were semi-edible. They were sticks of soft wood, like balsam, cut four to eight fingerbreadths long, chewed until they were reduced to fiber and spat out. People in India still use tooth-cleaning sticks of this sort even today.

Here again there is a controversy as to whether toothpaste comes under this exception as well. On the one hand it fits in with the pattern for tooth-cleaning sticks—it is semi-edible and not intended to be swallowed—but on the other hand it contains substances, such as mineral salts, that the Canon classes as medicines (Mv.VI.8) and that are meant to have medicinal value for the teeth and gums. This second consideration would seem to override the first, as it is a question of following what is explicitly laid out in the Canon, rather than of applying the Great Standards. Thus the wise policy would seem to be to regard toothpaste as a medicine that has to be formally given before it can be used, and not as coming under this exception.

The act of giving food and other edibles, as described in the Vibhaṅga, has three factors:

1) The donor (an unordained person) is standing within reach—one hatthapāsa, or 1.25 meters—of the bhikkhu.

2) He/she gives the item with the body (e.g., the hand), with something in contact with the body (e.g., a spoon), or by means of letting go. According to the Commentary, letting go means releasing from the body or something in contact with the body—e.g., dropping from the hand or a spoon—and refers to such cases as when a donor drops or tosses something into a bhikkhu’s bowl or hands without directly or indirectly making contact.

3) The bhikkhu receives the item with the body or with something in contact with the body (e.g., his bowl, a piece of cloth).

There is a tradition in Thailand that a bhikkhu should never receive an offering from a woman hand-to-hand. Either she must offer it with something in contact with her body (e.g., a tray) or the bhikkhu must accept it with something in contact with his: an alms bowl, a tray, a piece of cloth, etc. Apparently this tradition arose as a means of protecting a sexually aroused bhikkhu from committing an offense under Sg 2, or from the embarrassment that might arise if, say, yesterday he was not aroused and so could take something straight from her hand, while today he is and so can’t. Many Thai eight-precept nuns, even though they don’t have any precepts corresponding to Sg 2, follow a reciprocal tradition of not receiving anything hand-to-hand from a man. Neither of these traditions is mentioned in the Canon or the commentaries, nor are they observed by bhikkhus or ten-precept nuns in Burma or Sri Lanka.

A special allowance in the Cullavagga (V.26) states that if food accidentally falls while being offered, a bhikkhu may pick it up himself and eat it without committing an offense.

Effort

The Vibhaṅga states that a bhikkhu incurs a dukkaṭa if, with the intention of eating it, he takes food that hasn’t been properly given; and a pācittiya for every mouthful he eats. Perception as to whether the food has actually been formally given is not a mitigating factor here (see Pc 4).

The Commentary asserts, however, that perception would be a mitigating factor in the act of taking food. In other words, the bhikkhu would not incur the dukkaṭa for taking the food if he perceived it as properly given even when in fact it wasn’t. This assertion has no basis in the Vibhaṅga to this rule, and cannot be based on the Great Standards because the Canon contains no example of a derived offense requiring the factor of perception under a rule where the full offense does not. Thus there seems no reason to follow the Commentary on this point.

Once, during a famine, the Buddha allowed bhikkhus to pick up fallen fruit, take it to an unordained person, place it on the ground, and have it formally “given” without committing an offense. This allowance, however, was later rescinded in a way that left no possibility for its being invoked again (Mv.VI.17.8-9; Mv.VI.32). Thus a bhikkhu who—with the intention of eating it—picks up an edible he knows has not been given may not later make it allowable by formally “receiving” it from an unordained person. Whether other bhikkhus may receive it and make use of it, though, is a controversial point discussed in the Commentary in a treatise separate from its explanation of the Vibhaṅga (see below).

Non-offenses

Mv.VI.14.6 allows a bhikkhu bitten by a snake to make an antidote of urine, excrement (burned in fire), ashes, and soil. If there is no unordained person present who can or will make these things allowable, the bhikkhu may take and prepare them himself, and then eat them without incurring a penalty under this rule. The Commentary adds that if he cuts a tree under these circumstances to burn it, or digs the earth to get soil, he is exempt from the rules dealing with those actions as well.

Controversial points from the Commentary

As mentioned above, the Commentary’s discussion of this rule includes a treatise separate from its explanation of the Vibhaṅga, dealing with controversial points for which the Canon gives unclear answers or no answers at all. Because the treatise is a compilation of the opinions of various teachers and does not pretend to explain the meaning or intent of the Buddha’s words—and because the Buddha warned bhikkhus against making up their own rules (NP 15.1.2)—the opinions expressed in the treatise are not necessarily normative. Many Communities do not accept them, or are selective in choosing what they do and do not accept. Here we will give a summary of some of the Commentary’s opinions that have influenced practices found in some, if not all, Communities of bhikkhus at present.

1. Taking into the mouth

is defined as going down the throat. As we have already noted under Pc 37, though, this definition has no justification in canonical usage. The Sub-commentary attempts to justify the Commentary’s stand here by defining “mouth” (mukhadvāra—literally, the door of the face) as the larynx, i.e., the back door rather than the front door to the mouth, but again this is not supported by the Canon. Sk 41—“I will not open the door of the face when the mouthful has yet to be brought to it”—shows decisively that this term refers to the lips and not to the larynx. MN 140 explicitly lists the mukhadvāra and the passage “whereby what is eaten, drunk, consumed, and tasted gets swallowed” as two separate parts of the internal space element in the body. Taking into the mouth thus means taking in through the lips.

2. Food

Pond water so muddy that it leaves a scum on the hand or on the mouth is considered to be food, and so must be given before it can be drunk. The same holds true with water into which so many leaves or flowers have fallen that their taste is discernible in the water. For some reason, though, water that has been scented with flowers need not be given, and the same is true with water taken from a stream or river no matter how muddy. (There is a belief still current in India and other parts of Asia that flowing water is inherently clean.) Although leaves and flowers technically do count as edibles—they are classed as non-staple foods or medicines, depending on one’s purpose in eating them—the idea of counting mud and scum as edibles seems to be taking the concept of edible a little too far.

If toothwood is chewed for the sake of its juice, it must first be given. Even if one is chewing it for the sake of cleaning the teeth but accidentally swallows the juice, one has committed an offense all the same. These two opinions have no basis in the Canon, inasmuch as intention is not a factor in determining the offense under this rule.

A long section of this treatise discusses what to do if things that are not given get into food that has been given. It concludes that they must be removed from the food or the food must be given again. If the items “not given” are edibles, this seems reasonable enough, but the Commentary extends the concept to include such things as dust, dirty rain water, rust from a knife, beads of sweat dropping from one’s brow, etc. Again, this seems to be taking the concept too far, for the Vibhaṅga states clearly that the rule covers only those things generally considered as fit to eat.

3. Giving

The Commentary redefines the act of giving, expanding its factors to five:

(a) The item is such that a man of average stature can lift it.

(b) The donor is within reach—1.25 m.—of the bhikkhu.

(c) He/she makes a gesture of offering the food.

(d) The donor is a deva, a human being, or a common animal.

(e) The bhikkhu receives the item with the body or with something in contact with the body.

Factor (a) was included apparently to discourage the practice, still found in many places, of getting two or more men to present a table of food to a bhikkhu by lifting the entire table at once. The inclusion of this factor, though, has given rise to the assumption that the donor must lift the food a certain distance before handing it to the bhikkhu, but the Commentary itself shows that this assumption is mistaken, for it states that if a small novice too weak to lift a pot of rice simply slides it along the table or floor onto a bhikkhu’s hand, it is properly given.

Factor (b): If any part of the donor’s body (except for his/her extended arm) is within 1.25 meters of any part of the bhikkhu’s body (except for his extended arm), this factor is fulfilled. If the donor is standing beyond reach, the bhikkhu should tell him/her to come within reach before donating the food. If for some reason the donor does not comply with the bhikkhu’s request, the bhikkhu may still accept the food but should then take it to another unordained person—without setting it down and picking it up again in the meantime (see below)—and have it properly “given” before eating it.

Although the donor must be within reach, the food itself need not be. Thus if the donor places many vessels on a mat while the bhikkhu touches the mat with the intention of receiving them, all of the food is considered to be properly received as long as the donor is within reach of the bhikkhu. The same holds true if the donor places many vessels touching one another while the bhikkhu touches one of the vessels with the intention of receiving them all. (The factor of the bhikkhu’s intention is discussed further under factor (e) below.)

Factor (c) means that the donor cannot simply tell the bhikkhu to take the food being given. Rather, he/she should make a physical gesture of offering the food. In some Communities, this factor is interpreted as meaning that the donor must assume a humble or respectful manner while making the offering, and has led some to believe, for instance, that a bhikkhu going barefoot on his alms round should not accept food from a donor wearing shoes. This view is not supported by the Commentary. Although some of the gestures it cites as examples, such as tilting the head, might be interpreted as showing respect, some of them are not respectful in terms of Asian etiquette at all. For instance, a person riding on the bhikkhu’s shoulders picks a piece of fruit from a tree, drops it into the bhikkhu’s hands, and it is considered properly given.

The question arises as to how much of a gesture is necessary for this factor to be fulfilled. In the West, if a donor brings a tray of food and stands in front of a bhikkhu, waiting for him to take some of the food, the fact that he/she stands there waiting would be considered enough of a gesture to show that the food is being given. If the bhikkhu were to demand more of a gesture than that, the donor would probably be offended. Because the opinions expressed in this section of the Commentary are not necessarily normative, this is an area where one can make allowances for cultural norms. The essence of this factor would seem to be that a bhikkhu should not snatch food that a person happens to be carrying past him without showing any indication that he/she wants him to take the food.

Factor (d) is not discussed by the Commentary, although it is probably inspired by such stories as that of elephants offering lotus stalks to Ven. Moggallāna, and of Sakka, the king of the devas, presenting a gift of food to Mahā Kassapa after the latter had withdrawn from seven days of concentration (Ud.III.7). There is at least one bhikkhu in Thailand today who has trained a pet monkey to “give” him things.

Factor (e): The effort involved in receiving the item may be minimal indeed. In fact, the Commentary’s discussion of the Vibhaṅga quotes the Mahā Paccarī, one of the ancient Sinhalese commentaries, as saying that attention is the measure determining whether or not food has been received. Thus if a donor offers food by placing it on a table, the bhikkhu may simply touch the table with his finger, thinking, “I am receiving the food,” and it is properly given. The same holds true if he is sitting on the table or lying on a bed and regards the act of sitting or lying there as one of receiving whatever is placed there. However, immovable objects—such as a floor, the ground, or anything fixed to the floor or ground—may not be used as “items connected to the body” to receive food in this way.

Food placed in a bhikkhu’s hand when he is asleep or his attention is elsewhere—e.g., in deep meditation—does not count as properly given. He must be awake and paying enough attention to know that the food is being given for this factor to be fulfilled. Food placed in a bhikkhu’s mouth is considered properly given if he is awake. If he is asleep or unconscious and food is put into his stomach via a feeding tube, he has not broken this rule for he is not the agent putting it there, and as the Sub-commentary notes under Sg 1, the Vinaya does not apply to a bhikkhu when he is not in a normal, waking state of awareness.

4. Taking food that has not been given

To take food knowing that it has been improperly given or not given at all (here we are not talking about cases of stealing) is no offense if the bhikkhu has no intention of ever eating it. If, after he has set it down, the food is later “given” to him, he may accept and eat it with no penalty. Here the examples given in the Commentary include such things as picking up fallen fruit or the remains of a lion’s kill with the thought of taking them for a novice to eat, or picking up oil or ghee with the thought of taking it to one’s parents. A common example at present would be picking up food left lying around when one is cleaning up the monastery. The Sub-commentary states that this allowance does not hold if one is thinking of taking the food for other bhikkhus to eat.

To take food with the purpose of eating it, thinking that it has been properly given when in fact it hasn’t, is also no offense. If one then learns or realizes that it has not been properly given, one should return it—if possible, to its original place—without setting it down and picking it up again in the meantime. Once the food is back in its original place, one may “receive” and eat it with no penalty. If one sets it down and picks it up again before returning it to its original place, though, then technically one incurs a dukkaṭa for taking food that one realizes is not properly given, and so one may not later formally receive the food, as mentioned above. If for some reason there is no possibility of returning the food to its original place, one need only return it to some other spot in the building from which it was taken and then “receive” and eat it without committing an offense.

As we noted above, the Commentary’s discussion of this point has no basis in the Vibhaṅga to this rule or in the Great Standards, so there seems no reason to follow it.

According to the Commentary’s treatise, taking the food also includes deliberately touching it or the vessel containing it with the intention of eating it. (Touching it accidentally carries no penalty.) If a bhikkhu deliberately touches it in this way, he may not then properly receive it, although other bhikkhus may. Even after they have received it, the first bhikkhu may not eat any of it.

If the first bhikkhu, instead of merely touching the food or its vessel, actually moves it from its place, then neither he nor any of the other bhikkhus may receive it. Thus if a donor brings a pot of stew to the monastery, and one of the bhikkhus, curious to see what is going to be offered that day, tilts the pot to peek inside, none of the bhikkhus may eat the food, and the donor must either give it to the novices and any attendants at the monastery, if there are any, throw it to the dogs, or take it home.

Many Communities do not accept the Commentary’s opinions on this point, and with good reason: The last-mentioned penalty—even though the offense is a dukkaṭa—is stronger than that imposed by any of the nissaggiya pācittiya rules, and penalizes perfectly innocent people: the other bhikkhus and the donor of the food as well. An alternate opinion, which many Communities follow, is that if a bhikkhu takes—with the thought of eating it—food that he knows has not been properly offered, he may not then formally receive it from an unordained person, but other bhikkhus may. Once it has been properly received, any bhikkhu—including the first—may eat from it.

This is an area in which none of the texts gives an authoritative answer, and a wise policy is to adhere to the views of the Community in which one is living, as long as they fit into the framework provided by the Canon.

5. When food becomes “ungiven.”

The Commentary to Pr 1, in its discussion of what to do when a bhikkhu’s sex changes spontaneously (!), lists seven actions through which an edible given to a bhikkhu becomes “ungiven”—i.e., no bhikkhu may pick it up and eat it until it is formally given again. The seven are—

(a) undergoing a spontaneous sex change,

(b) dying,

(c) disrobing and becoming a lay person,

(d) becoming a low person (according to the Sub-commentary, this means committing a pārājika),

(e) giving the item to an unordained person (because a spontaneous sex change would turn a bhikkhu into a bhikkhunī, unordained person here apparently includes not only lay people and novices, but bhikkhunīs as well),

(f) abandoning the item, having lost interest in it,

(g) the theft of the item. (The Sub-commentary, in discussing this last point, refers solely to cases of out-and-out thievery, and not to the mere act of touching or moving.)

The agent in actions (a) through (f) is apparently the bhikkhu who, at that time, has possession of the item. In other words, it does not have to be the original recipient. If Bhikkhu X, after receiving an item, gives it to Bhikkhu Y, then even if X then dies, the item still counts as given.

Of these seven actions, the Commentary’s treatise appended to this rule discusses only two—(e) and (f)—in a series of examples, as follows:

A bhikkhu with rice in his hand offers it to a novice: The rice remains “given” until the novice takes it.

A bhikkhu places food in a vessel and, no longer interested in it, tells a novice to take it: The food is “ungiven” as soon as he says this. This point, however, does not apply to food the bhikkhu leaves in his own bowl or in any Community vessel from which the bhikkhus are served or in which their food is prepared. If he leaves food in such a vessel, he is not regarded as having abandoned interest in it.

A bhikkhu sets his bowl on a stand and tells a novice to take some rice from it. Assuming that the novice’s hand is clean—i.e., not “contaminated” with any food from his own bowl that might fall into the bhikkhu’s bowl—the rice remaining in the bhikkhu’s bowl after the novice has taken his portion is still “given.” Technically speaking, the treatise says, the rice taken by the novice still belongs to the bhikkhu until the novice puts it in his own bowl. Thus if the novice begins to take a second handful and, being told by the bhikkhu, “That’s enough,” puts the second handful back in the bhikkhu’s bowl; or if any grains of rice from the first handful happen to fall back into the bhikkhu’s bowl while the novice is lifting it out, all the rice in the bhikkhu’s bowl is still “given.”

A bhikkhu holding a stick of sugar cane tells a novice to cut off a piece from the other end: The remaining section is still “given.”

A bhikkhu places pieces of hardened molasses on a tray and tells other bhikkhus and novices to help themselves from the tray: If the bhikkhus and novices simply pick up their portions and take them, the remaining hardened molasses is still “given.” If, though, a novice picks up one piece, puts it down, picks up another piece, puts it down, and so on, the hardened molasses remaining on the tray becomes “ungiven.”

The Sub-commentary explains this by saying that the novice picking up the molasses is thinking, “This is mine. I’ll take it,” then changes his mind, puts it down and then lays claim to another piece, and so on. Thus, only the pieces that the novice claims and then abandons in this way become “ungiven.” The other pieces on the tray still count as “given.”

This last example, when taken out of context, has led to the widespread view that food given to a bhikkhu becomes “ungiven” if an unordained person touches or moves it. Viewed in context, though, the example does not imply this at all. The bhikkhu has offered the hardened molasses to the novice, and the novice in picking it up simply completes the factors for case (e): “The bhikkhu gives the item to an unordained person.” The example of the novice taking rice from a bhikkhu’s bowl shows that even when a bhikkhu offers food to an unordained person, the mere fact that the person touches or moves the food does not necessarily make the food “ungiven.”

Thus in cases where the bhikkhu is not giving away the food and has not abandoned interest in it—and the unordained person is not stealing it—there is no reason to hold that “given” food becomes “ungiven” simply when an unordained person touches or moves it. This is another area, though, where different Communities hold different views, and where the wise policy is to conform to the observances of the Community in which one is living.

These points from the Commentary’s treatise may seem like a lot of hair-splitting, but remember that the gift of food ranks with sexual temptation as one of the largest issues in a bhikkhu’s—or anyone’s—life. If questions of this sort hadn’t arisen in practice, no one would have bothered to compile the treatise in the first place. Given the cursory manner in which the Vibhaṅga treats this rule, and given the large gray areas surrounding the act of giving—modern anthropology started with this subject and will probably never finish with it—it’s good to have those areas spelled out in detail so as to minimize any disharmony that might arise in a Community when its members find themselves in gray situations.

Still, as we have noted several times, the guidelines in the Commentary’s treatise are not binding, and the wise policy is to follow the standards of the Community in which one is living, as long as they fall within the framework of the Canon.

Summary: Eating food that has not been formally given is a pācittiya offense.

Five: The Naked Ascetic Chapter

41

Should any bhikkhu give staple or non-staple food with his own hand to a naked ascetic, a male wanderer, or a female wanderer, it is to be confessed.

There are two origin stories here, the first being the more entertaining of the two:

“Now at that time (a lot of) non-staple food accrued to the Community. Ven. Ānanda told this matter to the Blessed One, who said, “In that case, Ānanda, give the cakes to those who eat scraps.’”

“‘As you say, venerable sir,’ Ven. Ānanda responded to the Blessed One. Then, having had those who eat scraps sit down in a line and giving a cake to each, he gave two cakes to a certain female wanderer, thinking they were one. The female wanderers around her said, “That monk is your lover.’

“‘No, he’s not. He just gave me two cakes thinking they were one.’

“A second time…. A third time, Ven. Ānanda, giving a cake to each, gave two cakes to that female wanderer, thinking they were one. The female wanderers around her said, “That monk is your lover.’

“‘No, he’s not. He just gave me two cakes thinking they were one.’

“So—‘Lover!’ ‘Not a lover! (§)’—they kept squabbling.”

The second story, though, gives a better idea of the reason for the rule:

“Then a certain naked ascetic went to a distribution of food. A certain bhikkhu, having mashed some rice with a great deal of ghee, gave a large helping to the naked ascetic. So the naked ascetic, having received his alms, left. Another naked ascetic asked him, ‘Where, friend, did you get your alms?’

“‘At a distribution of food by that shaveling householder, the Gotama monk.’”

This training rule is corollary to the preceding one. Other religions at the Buddha’s time observed the formalities of receiving food from their lay followers just as the bhikkhus did, and thus a bhikkhu who gave food in such a way to a mendicant ordained in another religion would be placing himself in the position of a lay follower of that religion, as the second origin story shows. An interesting point about this rule is that the Buddha formulated it at the request of Buddhist lay followers. Having overheard the naked ascetics’ conversation, they said to him, “Venerable sir, these adherents of other religions enjoy criticizing the Buddha… Dhamma… and Saṅgha. It would be good if the masters did not give to adherents of other religions with their own hands.”

Object

The Vibhaṅga defines the terms naked ascetic and male or female wanderer in such a way that they cover all people who have “gone forth” except for bhikkhus, bhikkhunīs, female trainees, and male or female novices. Because “going forth” was how ordination was understood at that time, we can use the Great Standards at present to include anyone ordained in other religions—e.g., Catholic priests, Protestant ministers, Jewish rabbis, Muslim mullahs, etc.—under the factor of object here as well. Different Communities differ as to whether they would include people ordained in other Buddhist religions—such as Zen priests or Tibetan lamas—under this category as well.

Perception as to whether a person would qualify as a naked ascetic or a male or female wanderer is not a mitigating factor here (see Pc 4).

Effort

Staple and non-staple food here covers all edibles: juice drinks, tonics, and medicines as well as food, but not water or tooth-cleaning sticks. Staple and non-staple foods are grounds for a pācittiya; water and tooth-cleaning sticks, grounds for a dukkaṭa.

To give is defined as giving with the body, with something in contact with the body, or by means of letting go, as in the preceding rule.

Non-offenses

To get someone else to give edible things, to give edible things by depositing them near (as in NP 18), or to give ointments for external use entails no offense. The Commentary qualifies the first exemption by saying that the “someone else” must not be fully ordained. The New K/Sub-commentary points out that the last exemption was probably meant to apply to oils, which otherwise would come under “non-staple food” here.

Summary: Handing food or medicine to a person ordained in another religion is a pācittiya offense.

*    *    *

42

Should any bhikkhu say to a bhikkhu, “Come, my friend, let’s enter the village or town for alms,” and then—whether or not he has had (food) given to him—dismiss him, saying, “Go away, my friend. I don’t like sitting or talking with you. I prefer sitting or talking alone”—doing it for just that reason and no other—it is to be confessed.

The factors for the full offense here are four.

1) Object: another bhikkhu.

2) Intention: One wants to indulge in misconduct and does not want him to see it.

3) Effort: One dismisses him.

4) Result: He leaves one’s range of hearing and sight.

Although the rule mentions one specific situation—bhikkhus going for alms in a town or village—the non-offense clauses give no exemption for a bhikkhu who, wanting to indulge in misconduct, dismisses another bhikkhu while outside of a village or engaged in an activity other than going for alms. The commentaries notice this point and, reasonably, do not list the specific situation as a necessary factor for the offense. For this reason, the factors for this offense apply in any location and at any time of the day.

Object

The Vibhaṅga states that a bhikkhu is grounds for a pācittiya here; an unordained person (which for the purpose of this rule would include bhikkhunīs), grounds for a dukkaṭa. Perception as to whether a person is actually a bhikkhu is not a mitigating factor here. In other words, a bhikkhu is grounds for a pācittiya if one perceives him as a bhikkhu, if one perceives him as an unordained person, or if one is in doubt about the matter. An unordained person is grounds for a dukkaṭa if one perceives him as a bhikkhu, if one perceives him as an unordained person, or if one is in doubt about the matter. This pattern—three pācittiyas and three dukkaṭas—is repeated in all the rules where a bhikkhu is grounds for a pācittiya, an unordained person is grounds for a dukkaṭa, and perception is not a mitigating factor.

Intention

The Vibhaṅga defines misconduct as laughing, playing, or sitting in private with a woman, or any other misbehavior of any sort. To dismiss the other person, ordained or not, for motives other than a desire to hide one’s own misconduct entails no offense. Examples of such motives given in the non-offense clauses are listed below.

Effort & result

To dismiss the other person means either to say outright for him/her to go away, or else to make remarks that will make him/her want to leave. The Commentary gives an example here—“Look at how this guy stands, sits, and looks around. He stands like a stump, sits like a dog, and looks about like a monkey”—but this would more likely come under Pc 2.

The offenses here are as follows:

a dukkaṭa for speaking the words of dismissal;

a dukkaṭa when the other bhikkhu is leaving the range of hearing and sight; and

a pācittiya when he has left.

The Commentary defines range of hearing and range of sight as twelve cubits, or six meters. If, however, there is a wall or a door within that distance, it says, that delimits the range.

Non-offenses

According to the Vibhaṅga, there is no offense in:

dismissing one’s companion with the thought that two bhikkhus going together won’t obtain enough food;

dismissing him after seeing costly goods ahead, so that he won’t develop a feeling of greed;

dismissing him after seeing a beautiful woman ahead, so that he won’t lose his resolve for the celibate life;

sending him back with food for one who is sick, who was left behind, or who is guarding the monastery; or

dismissing him for any other proper reason as long as one is not planning to indulge in misconduct.

Summary: Sending another bhikkhu away so that he won’t witness any misconduct one is planning to indulge in is a pācittiya offense.

*    *    *

43

Should any bhikkhu sit intruding on a family “with its meal,” it is to be confessed.

The origin story here, briefly, is this: Ven. Upananda visits a woman in her private quarters. Her husband approaches him respectfully, has his wife give him alms, and then asks him to leave. The wife senses that her husband wants to have sexual intercourse with her and so—as a game, apparently—keeps detaining Ven. Upananda until the husband gets exasperated and goes to complain to the bhikkhus: “Venerable sirs, this master Upananda is sitting in the bedroom with my wife. I have dismissed him, but he isn’t willing to go. We are very busy and have much work to do.”

Object:

A family “with its meal.” This term—sabhojanaṁ—appears to be a pun in the original Pali, meaning either “with its meal”—sa + bhojanaṁ—or “with two people”—sa + ubho + janaṁ. The Vibhaṅga explains it as a euphemism meaning “a man and woman together, both not having gone out (of their bedroom), not both without lust.” As its further explanations show, this means a man and woman together in their private quarters, with at least one of them desiring sexual intercourse with the other. Although the Commentary tries to justify the Vibhaṅga’s explanation etymologically (bhoga, the root form of meal, has other forms meaning enjoyment, indulgence, and use), there is no need to turn to etymology. Since ancient times in all cultures, eating has been commonly used as a metaphor for sex. (Similarly, the husband’s comment that he “has much work to do” could also be taken as a double entendre.)

Effort

To sit intruding means to sit—without another bhikkhu present—in the private area of the house, this being defined in terms of how large the house is. In one large enough to have a separate bedroom, the private area is any spot more than one hatthapāsa (1.25 meters) in from the doorway (of the bedroom, says the Commentary). In a smaller house, the private area is the back half of the house. None of the texts discuss such things as one-room apartments or hotel rooms, but these would probably be treated as “separate bedrooms.”

The Vibhaṅga states that perception with regard to the private area is not a mitigating factor here (see Pc 4) and apparently the same holds true for perception with regard to whether the couple is “with its meal.” As for intention, the Parivāra and commentaries maintain that it is a factor, but the Vibhaṅga does not mention it at all. Thus, to be perfectly safe from an offense in cases like this, a bhikkhu should not sit intruding on a couple unless they both make him 100% certain that he is welcome: a wise policy in any case, regardless of whether one is a bhikkhu.

Cases of sitting with a woman alone in her bedroom—or any other private place—are covered by the following rule.

Non-offenses

There is no offense—

if both the man and woman have left the bedroom/private area;

if neither of them is sexually aroused;

if the building is not a “sleeping building”;

if the bhikkhu is not in the private area; or

if he has a second bhikkhu as his companion.

Summary: To sit down intruding on a man and a woman in their private quarters—when one or both are sexually aroused, and when another bhikkhu is not present—is a pācittiya offense.

*    *    *

44

Should any bhikkhu sit in private on a secluded seat with a woman, it is to be confessed.

There are three factors for the offense here.

1) Object: a female human being, “even one born that very day, all the more an older one.”

2) Effort: One sits with her in a private, secluded seat without another man present.

3) Intention: One is aiming at privacy.

Object

Woman here includes women as well. In other words, even if one is sitting with many women in the secluded area, one is not exempt from this factor.

A female human being is grounds for a pācittiya; a paṇḍaka, a female peta, a female yakkha, and an animal in the form of a woman, grounds for a dukkaṭa.

Perception as to whether a person is actually a woman is not a mitigating factor (see Pc 4).

Effort

Sitting also includes lying down. Whether the bhikkhu sits near the woman when she is already seated, or the woman sits near him when he is already seated, or both sit down at the same time, makes no difference.

Private means private to the eye and private to the ear. Two people sitting in a place private to the eye means that no one else can see if they wink, raise their eyebrows, or nod (§). If they are in a place private to the ear, no one else can hear what they say in a normal voice.

A secluded seat is one behind a wall, a closed door, a large bush, or anything at all that would afford them enough privacy to commit the sexual act.

According to the Commentary, private to the eye is the essential factor here. Even if a knowledgeable man is within hearing but not within sight—i.e., he is sitting just outside the door to the private place—that does not exempt one from the offense here.

The Vibhaṅga states that the presence of a man within sight absolves one from this factor only if he is knowledgeable enough to know what is and is not lewd. The Commentary adds that he must also be awake and neither blind nor deaf. Even a distracted or drowsy man, though, if he meets these criteria, would absolve one from this factor.

Intention

The non-offense clauses give an exemption for a bhikkhu “not aiming at privacy,” but the Vibhaṅga nowhere explains what this means. In light of its definition of private, “aiming at privacy” could mean simply not wanting anyone near enough to hear what he is saying or to see him wink, raise his eyebrow, or nod.

The Commentary offers an alternative explanation, defining aiming at privacy as being impelled by any defilement related to sex, but this explanation opens as many questions as it tries to resolve. Does it refer solely to the desire for intercourse or to other more subtle sexually-related desires such as those listed in AN 7:47? That is the discourse describing a brahman or contemplative who observes the celibate life by not engaging in sexual intercourse but whose celibacy is “broken, cracked, spotted, and blemished” by the joy he finds in any of the following activities:

1) He consents to being anointed, rubbed down, bathed, and massaged by a woman.

2) He jokes, plays, and amuses himself with a woman.

3) He stares into a woman’s eyes.

4) He listens to the voices of women outside a wall as they laugh, speak, sing, or cry.

5) He recollects how he used to laugh, converse, and play with a woman.

6) He sees a householder or householder’s son enjoying himself endowed with the five sensual pleasures.

7) He practices the celibate life intent on being born in one or another of the deva hosts, (thinking) “By this virtue or practice or abstinence or celibate life I will be a deva of one sort or another.”

The joy a person finds in any of these things is termed a sexual fetter (methuna-saṁyoga) that prevents him from gaining release from birth, aging, and death, and from the entire round of suffering. If the Commentary is indeed referring to this sort of thing when it mentions “defilements related to sexual intercourse” (methuna-nissita-kilesa), then in light of its interpretation, the factor of intention under this rule would be fulfilled by such things as wanting to joke with the woman, to stare into her eyes, or to enjoy hearing her voice as she talks or laughs.

The Vinaya-mukha provides a third interpretation, defining “not aiming at privacy” with the following illustration: A bhikkhu is sitting in a secluded place with a man and woman present, but the man gets up and leaves before the bhikkhu can stop him. In other words, the bhikkhu is not intending to sit alone in private with the woman at all, but circumstances beyond his control force him to.

Although the first interpretation, because it adheres most closely to the wording in the Vibhaṅga, is probably the correct one here, the Vinaya-mukha’s is probably the safest, and many Communities adhere to it with good reason. Both the Canon and the Commentary give frequent warnings about the dangers that can arise when a bhikkhu sits alone with a woman even when his original intention is innocent. His own defilements may eventually tempt him to do, say, or think things that are detrimental to his resolve in the celibate life; and even when his motives are pure, he is inviting the suspicions of others. Ay 1 requires that if a trustworthy outside witness is suspicious of a bhikkhu’s sitting alone with a woman—and unless he is sitting with his mother or other elderly relative, it’s rare that outsiders won’t be suspicious—the Community must meet to investigate the issue. Even though they may find him innocent of any wrong doing, the fact that they have had to investigate his behavior is usually enough to keep suspicions alive among the laity and to create resentment among his fellow bhikkhus over the waste of their time due to his indiscretion. At the same time, a bhikkhu sitting alone with a woman is leaving himself at the mercy of the woman, who will later be free to make any claims she likes about what went on while they were alone together. As Lady Visākhā said in the origin story to Ay 1, “It is unfitting and improper, venerable sir, for the master to sit in private, alone with a woman…. Even though the master may not be aiming at that act, cynical people are hard to convince.”

Thus the wise policy would be to be no less strict than one’s Community in interpreting this factor.

Non-offenses

In addition to the bhikkhu not aiming at privacy, there is no offense for the bhikkhu who sits alone with a woman when his attention is elsewhere—e.g., he is absorbed in his work or his meditation when a woman comes in and sits down in the room where he is sitting. Also, there is no offense if either the bhikkhu or the woman or both are standing, or if both are sitting when a knowledgeable man is present.

Summary: When aiming at privacy, sitting or lying down with a woman or women in a private, secluded place with no other man present is a pācittiya offense.

*    *    *

45

Should any bhikkhu sit in private, alone with a woman, it is to be confessed.

The full offense here has three factors that differ slightly from those for the preceding rule.

Object

Here woman is defined as a female human being who knows what is properly and improperly said, what is lewd and not lewd. Paṇḍakas, female petas, female yakkhas, and animals in the form of a woman are again grounds for a dukkaṭa. As under the preceding rule, perception as to whether a person is actually a woman is not a mitigating factor here (see Pc 4).

Effort

One sits with her alone—without another person present—in a place private to the ear and to the eye, but not secluded. Examples of such places would be spots out in the open (e.g., a bench in an open, deserted park), seats in a glassed-in porch or room, or in an open-air pavilion. The Commentary would include walled-in open areas—such as a park with a fence around it—here as well, but outside areas screened by a wall or a bush would fall under the preceding rule. Ay 1 & 2 suggest that the distinguishing factor here would be how hidden it is. If it would be convenient for committing sexual intercourse, it would fall under the preceding rule; if not, it would fall here.

Sitting is defined as under the preceding rule.

This rule’s expression for alone—one man with one woman—implies that the other person whose presence exempts one from this factor can be either a man or a woman. The Commentary states explicitly that this is so, and adds that this person must also know what is properly and improperly said, what is lewd and not lewd; must be awake; must not be deaf or blind; and must be sitting “within sight,” i.e., a radius of six meters. As in the preceding rule, whether or not the man or woman is distracted or drowsy is of no consequence.

Intention

One must be aiming at privacy for this factor to be fulfilled. See the discussion under the preceding rule.

Non-offenses

Strangely enough, the Vibhaṅga’s non-offense clauses here are identical with those for the preceding rule—i.e., they make no mention of the fact that the presence of another woman would exempt one from an offense. The Commentary seems justified in inferring this fact from the rule, though, for otherwise there would be no reason to have these two separate rules on the same subject.

Summary: When aiming at privacy, sitting or lying down alone with a woman in an unsecluded but private place is a pācittiya offense.

*    *    *

46

Should any bhikkhu, being invited for a meal and without taking leave of an available bhikkhu, go calling on families before or after the meal, except at the proper occasions, it is to be confessed. Here the proper occasions are these: a time of giving cloth, a time of making robes. These are the proper occasions here.

The origin story here suggests that the purpose of this rule is to prevent bhikkhus from wandering off before an appointed meal time so that they will not show up late or be difficult to track down; and to prevent them, after the meal, from using the invitation as an excuse to go off wandering without taking leave (see Pc 85). However, the definition of the factor of object—which limits this rule to visiting lay people’s houses—and the non-offense clauses—which allow one to visit monasteries and nunneries without taking leave—suggest a more over-riding purpose: to prevent bhikkhus from taking the invitation as an excuse to visit lay people and spend their time in inappropriate activities.

There are two factors for the full offense here.

1) Object: a family residence.

2) Effort: One enters such a residence—without having taken leave of an available bhikkhu—on a morning when one has been invited to a meal, except during the time exemptions mentioned in the rule.

Object

A family residence is grounds for a pācittiya here; its yard, grounds for a dukkaṭa.

Effort

Entering the residence is defined as having both feet inside the threshold. Having only one foot over the threshold incurs a dukkaṭa, in addition to the dukkaṭa for entering the yard.

Meal means one consisting of any of the five staple foods. The Vibhaṅga indicates that the amount eaten is irrelevant.

As for the question of how to determine whether another bhikkhu is or is not available, the Commentary draws the distinction like this: After the desire to go calling on families arises in one’s mind and one takes a normal path to leave the monastery, if one comes across a bhikkhu who is close enough to address in a normal tone of voice (within six meters, says the Sub-commentary), that means that a bhikkhu is available and one should inform him of where one is going. If one does not come across a bhikkhu that close, no bhikkhu is available, and there is no need to go out of one’s way to find one.

This, though, is in direct contradiction to the Vibhaṅga’s definition of available—“It is possible to go, having taken leave”—that is, if there is another bhikkhu in the monastery, and there are no obstacles to taking one’s leave from him (e.g., he is asleep, he is sick, he is receiving important visitors), one is obliged to go out of one’s way to inform him.

According to the K/Commentary, taking leave in the context of this rule means the simple act of informing the other bhikkhu that, “I am going to the house of so-and-so,” or any similar statement. In other words, one is not asking permission to go (see the discussion of taking leave under Pc 14). However, if the other bhikkhu sees that one is doing something improper in going, he is perfectly free to say so. If one treats his comments with disrespect, one incurs at least a dukkaṭa under Pc 54. (See the discussion under that rule for details.)

For a new bhikkhu still living in dependence (nissaya) on his mentor, though, taking leave is a matter of asking permission at all times, whether one has been invited to a meal or not. The Mahāvagga (I.25.24; II.21.1) states that one of the duties of such a bhikkhu is that he must receive permission from his mentor before entering a village, going to a cemetery, or leaving the district. Not to ask permission before going, or to go after being denied permission, is to incur a dukkaṭa. As for the mentor, if he gives permission to go when it is not appropriate to do so, he is the one who incurs the dukkaṭa.

Perception as to whether one has actually been invited to a meal is not a mitigating factor here (see Pc 4).

Non-offenses

As the rule states, there is no offense in not taking leave at the time of giving cloth—the robe season—or at a time of making robes, i.e., any time when one is making a robe. These exceptions enable a bhikkhu to visit his lay supporters easily to obtain any gifts of thread, cloth, or scissors, etc., he may need at such times.

There is also no offense in going to or through a family residence when one has taken leave of another bhikkhu, or in going when one has not taken leave under any of the following circumstances:

—There is no bhikkhu available (in addition to the examples mentioned above, this would include cases where one is living alone, all the other bhikkhus have left, or all the bhikkhus in the monastery are going together).

—One is going to the house where one was invited for the meal.

—The path to the house in which the meal is to be given leads through another house or its yard.

—One is on one’s way to another monastery (§), to bhikkhunīs’ quarters, to the residence of people ordained in another religion (located in a village, says the Commentary), or one is returning from any of these places.

—There are dangers. This, according to the Commentary, refers to dangers to one’s life or to one’s resolve in remaining celibate.

The non-offense clauses do not mention this point, but the perception section of the Vibhaṅga makes clear that this rule does not apply when one is not invited to a meal.

The general principle

This rule, in conjunction with Pc 85, is designed to keep bhikkhus from visiting lay people and spending their time in inappropriate ways. Pc 85 deals with entire villages and towns, and covers the act of leaving the monastery during the period from noon until the following dawnrise. This rule deals with family residences and covers the act of leaving the monastery during the period from dawnrise until noon on days when one has been invited to a meal. The period from dawnrise to noon on days when one is not invited to a meal, and would be expected to go on alms round, is thus not covered by either rule. Note, however, that in the origin story to this rule the Buddha reprimands Ven. Upananda for visiting families during the latter part of a morning after going for alms. This shows that he did not approve of such behavior even though he had practical reasons for not laying down a rule against it: On mornings when one is going for alms—and in his time, alms-going could often be an all-morning affair—there is no convenient way to draw a hard and fast line between appropriate alms-going and inappropriate visiting. Thus we have the rules as they stand. At present, though, in monasteries where alms-going takes up much less of the morning or where the bhikkhus do not go outside the monastery for alms at all, a wise policy is to adhere to the general principle by informing a fellow bhikkhu whenever possible when one is leaving the monastery for errands or visits involving lay people, even during periods not covered by the rules.

Summary: Visiting lay families—without having informed an available bhikkhu—before or after a meal to which one has been invited is a pācittiya offense except during the robe season or any time one is making a robe.

*    *    *

47

A bhikkhu who is not ill may accept (make use of) a four-month invitation to ask for requisites. If he should accept (make use of) it beyond that—unless the invitation is renewed or is permanent—it is to be confessed.

Invitations

An invitation to ask for requisites is an offer made by a lay person to supply a bhikkhu with requisites whenever he (the bhikkhu) asks for them. Such invitations may be made either to individual bhikkhus, to groups, or to entire Communities. The responsibilities incumbent on the two sides in such an arrangement are well illustrated in a passage from the origin story to this rule.

“Now at that time some group-of-six bhikkhus wore their lower robes improperly, their upper robes improperly, and were not at all consummate in their deportment. Mahānāma the Sakyan criticized them: ‘Venerable sirs, why do you wear your lower robes improperly, your upper robes improperly, and why are you not at all consummate in your deportment? Shouldn’t a person who has gone forth wear his lower robe properly, his upper robe properly, and be consummate in his deportment?’

“The group-of-six bhikkhus nursed a grudge against him. They thought, ‘Now, how can we make Mahānāma the Sakyan feel abashed?’ Then the thought occurred to them, ‘He has made an invitation to provide the Community with medicines. Let’s ask him for ghee.’

“So they went to Mahānāma the Sakyan and on arrival said to him, ‘We need a tubful of ghee, my friend.’

“‘Please wait for the rest of today, venerable sirs. People have just gone to the cattle pen to get ghee. You may come and fetch it in the morning.’

A second time… A third time, they said to him, ‘We need a tubful of ghee, my friend.’

“‘Please wait for the rest of today, venerable sirs. People have just gone to the cattle pen to get ghee. You may come and fetch it in the morning.’

“‘What’s with this invitation without wanting to give, friend, in that having made the invitation you don’t give?’

“So Mahānāma the Sakyan criticized and complained and spread it about, ‘How can their reverences, being told, “Please wait for the rest of today, venerable sirs,” not wait?’”

As the story shows, the person making the invitation was expected to provide the goods he offered, while bhikkhus were expected to be reasonable in their requests.

The Vibhaṅga‘s discussion here assumes that this rule applies to invitations offering medicines, but it does not say explicitly whether it covers invitations made to individuals or to those made to entire Communities. The Commentary, however, argues reasonably from a statement in the Vibhaṅga’s non-offense clauses (see below) that it covers only invitations made to Communities.

The rule and origin stories show that invitations of this sort originally had three standard forms: a four-month invitation (each of the major seasons in India lasts four months, which may have been the reason for this type of invitation), a renewed four-month invitation, and a permanent invitation. Eventually, though, the Vibhaṅga worked out the following fourfold schema to cover invitations of a wide variety of sorts: those that specify (1) requisites (medicines), (2) a time period, (3) both, or (4) neither.

1) An invitation specifying requisites may specify merely the type of item offered—“Let me know if you ever need any honey or sugar”—or also the amount—“Let me know if you ever need a bottle of honey… a pound of sugar.” In cases like these, a bhikkhu may ask for the type or amount of the item offered. If he asks for other items or for more of the proper item than the amount offered, if that too is specified, he incurs a pācittiya. However, because the donor mentions no time limit, the Vibhaṅga says that the bhikkhu may ask at any time.

2) An invitation specifying the time period may be phrased, for example, “Let me know if you need any medicine during this Rains-residence.” In cases like this, a bhikkhu may ask for any type or amount of medicine during that time period. But as the origin stories to this and the other rules dealing with asking make clear (see Sg 6 and NP 6 & 7), he should be moderate and reasonable when making requests, and not abuse the lay supporter’s generosity. If, not being ill, he asks after the period has expired, he incurs a pācittiya.

3) An invitation specifying requisites and the time period might be phrased, “Let me know if you need any honey during the Rains-residence.” In cases like this, a bhikkhu incurs a pācittiya if he asks for items other than those offered—or for more of the proper item than the amount offered, if that too is specified—regardless of whether he asks during the specified time period. He also incurs a pācittiya if, not being ill, he asks for the items offered after the time period has expired.

4) An invitation specifying neither requisites nor the time period may be phrased, for example, “Let me know if you ever need any medicine.” In cases like this, the bhikkhu may ask for any medicine at any time. As in case (2), though, he should try to be reasonable in his requests.

The factors of the offense

The factors of the offense here are two.

1) Object: medicine that a donor has invited a Community to request.

2) Effort: One requests it outside of the terms of the invitation when one is not ill.

Object

The Vibhaṅga does not define medicine here, but its examples all deal with the five tonics, and that is how the Commentary defines medicine under this rule. The Great Standards could be used to extend medicine to cover lifetime medicines as well.

Effort

The Vibhaṅga also neglects to give an explicit definition for not ill, but in one of its wheels it states that if a bhikkhu asks for a medicine when he has no need for a medicine (§—reading na-bhesajjena karaṇiye with the Thai and Sri Lankan editions of the Canon), he incurs a pācittiya in the asking. The Commentary explains having no need for medicine as being well enough to get by on “mixed” food, which is apparently its term for food acquired at random (see BMC2, Chapter 18).

The Vibhaṅga’s wheel goes on to state that if a bhikkhu requests one medicine when he actually has need of another (e.g., he has a disease that calls for a disgusting ghee concoction (see Mv.VIII.1.23-26) but requests honey instead), he incurs a pācittiya in the requesting as well. These penalties apply regardless of whether he receives what he requests.

Perception as to whether one is making a request outside the terms of the invitation is not a mitigating factor here (Pc 4).

Non-offenses

Three of the non-offense clauses require no explanation: There is no offense in asking from relatives, for the sake of another, or for medicine to be bought with one’s own resources.

One of the two non-offense clauses requiring explanation is that there is no offense in asking “from those by whom one was invited with medicine.” This the Commentary explains by saying that if one has received a personal invitation, one may ask in line with its terms, but that otherwise the limits set by this rule apply only to invitations made to an entire Community and not to those made on a personal basis to individual bhikkhus. Although the Vibhaṅga makes no specific mention of this point, the Commentary’s explanation seems the best way to make sense of this non-offense clause and the relationship between this rule and Pc 39. Under that rule, a bhikkhu who is not ill and has not been invited incurs a dukkaṭa in asking for any one of the five tonics, and there seems no reason to impose a heavier penalty for requesting one of the five tonics after a personal invitation to do so has expired. If, though, the invitation referred to in this rule is one made to an entire Community, the heavier penalty makes sense as an added protection to the donor against having his/her invitation abused by the less conscientious members of the Community. This added protection would also be a means of encouraging further invitations of this sort in the future.

The second non-offense clause requiring explanation is the one for an ill bhikkhu. Reading the rule, one might imagine that the exemption for an ill bhikkhu would read simply, “There is no offense if one is ill,” but instead it reads, “There is no offense if one says, ‘The time period for which we were invited has passed, but we have need of medicine.’” This is an important point of etiquette. Normally, an ill bhikkhu may ask anyone for medicine at any time, but in dealing with a person who has made an invitation for medicine to the Community, he has to show special consideration. In mentioning the fact that the time period for the invitation has expired, he gives recognition of the fact that the donor is no longer under any obligation to provide the medicine, thus giving the donor a convenient “out” in case he/she can no longer provide it. This simple gesture is the least consideration that can be shown to someone who has had the generosity to invite the Community to ask for medicines. And again, simple gestures of this sort help to protect donors and encourage similar invitations again in the future.

Although this last non-offense clause applies explicitly only to an invitation specifying the time period, the Great Standards could be used to apply it to an invitation specifying requisites as well. In other words, an ill bhikkhu could say, “You invited the Community with honey, but I have need of ghee.”

An alternative interpretation

The Vinaya-mukha tries to extend this rule to cover invitations of every sort, individual and communal, dealing with any sort of requisite. It also reads the training rule to mean that if a time limit is not specified on an invitation, a four-month time limit is to be assumed. All of this has no support in the Vibhaṅga and so is not binding, but the last point is something that individual bhikkhus may adopt as a personal policy to teach themselves moderation in their requests. A donor’s faith and financial position can change quickly, and it is reasonable not to depend on an invitation for longer periods of time unless the donor makes it clear that he/she is still willing to continue providing the item offered on a long-term basis.

Summary: When a supporter has made an offer to supply medicines to the Community: Asking him/her for medicine outside the terms of the offer when one is not ill is a pācittiya offense.

*    *    *

48

Should any bhikkhu go to see an army on active duty, unless there is a suitable reason, it is to be confessed.

This is an offense with three factors: object, effort, and intention.

Object

An army in the time of the Buddha was a very different affair from what an army is now. We will start with a discussion of how the Vibhaṅga explains this factor in terms of armies at that time, and then follow with a discussion of how it may be applied to armies at present.

Armies in the Buddha’s time consisted mainly of what we would call reserve units. These were organized into four divisions: elephant units, cavalry units, chariot units, and infantry units. The soldiers for the most part were citizens who would live at home until called up on active duty to engage in actual warfare or to practice maneuvers, activities that normally took place outside the city. Battles, both actual and practice, were fought according to rules—total warfare did not come to India until many centuries after the Buddha’s time—and it was possible for non-military citizens to watch, with occasional danger to life and limb, much as people at present watch football games. (Going to a battlefield is listed in the Brahmajāla Sutta (DN 1) as a form of entertainment.)

With this information in mind, it is easy to understand the Vibhaṅga’s treatment of this rule: An army on active duty—composed of a full panoply of elephant, cavalry, chariot, and infantry units who have left the city—is grounds for a pācittiya. This applies whether the army is camped or on the move. Any segment of an army on duty—even one armed archer, says the Commentary—is grounds for a dukkaṭa. An army not on duty—the Commentary illustrates this with a king’s pleasure trip—is not grounds for an offense.

To apply these definitions to armed forces at present: The Vibhaṅga’s definition for army comes close to the modern definition of a field army with a full array of artillery, armored, airborne, and infantry divisions. Navies, marines, and air forces did not exist at that time, but the Great Standards would allow us to extend the definition of army to cover similar large units of these branches of the military as well. Because armies on active duty no longer limit their activities to areas outside of cities—they are sometimes based in cities, run practice drills there, and can be called in to quell riots or fight enemy forces there—the definition of “on active duty” must be changed to fit the way armies use it at present. Thus soldiers at work on base or off would count as being on duty. An army camped—on base or off—for active duty would also count as being on active duty. There is some controversy at present as to whether the on-base areas for staff housing would count as an army camped, but because the Vibhaṅga defines active duty as being away from home, it would seem that the homes within a base would not come under this rule.

With these points in mind, we may say that a full field army—or the equivalent in naval, marine, or air forces—on active duty would be grounds for a pācittiya here. Any smaller unit of the military on active duty—a regiment, a division, or even one armed soldier—would be grounds for a dukkaṭa. Armies not on active duty, as when they organize charity events, would not be grounds for an offense.

Perception as to whether a group qualifies as an army on duty is not a mitigating factor here (see Pc 4).

Effort

This factor is fulfilled simply by staying still and watching an army on duty except when one has a suitable reason. The Vibhaṅga gives a dukkaṭa for every step one makes in going to watch an army on duty, and a pācittiya for staying still and watching. It also gives an extra pācittiya for every time one returns to watch after going away.

Intention

The origin story’s example of a suitable reason is that a bhikkhu’s uncle in the army had fallen ill and wished to see him. The non-offense clauses also allow one to take shelter with the army to escape dangers. (This the Commentary defines as dangers to one’s life or celibacy.) Other suitable reasons would include accepting an invitation from the soldiers to receive alms or to give a Dhamma talk.

Non-offenses

There is no offense—

if, having gone on business, one sees the army;

if, standing within a monastery, one watches an army fighting or holding practice maneuvers nearby;

if an army comes to where one happens to be;

if one meets an army coming from the opposite direction; or

if there are dangers.

Summary: Watching a field army—or similar large military force—on active duty, unless there is a suitable reason, is a pācittiya offense.

*    *    *

49

There being some reason or another for a bhikkhu to go to an army, he may stay two or three (consecutive) nights with the army. If he should stay beyond that, it is to be confessed.

Object

Unusually, the Vibhaṅgas to this rule and the next do not define army, a crucial term in both rules. But because these rules are continuations of the preceding one, we may be justified in reading their Vibhaṅgas as continuations of the preceding one as well. If so, army means the same thing in all three rules, and the permutations for object are identical in all three as well. Thus this rule does not apply to the housing where military officers live with their families, whether on base or off.

Effort

As under Pc 5—the rule that deals with sleeping in the same dwelling with an unordained person—nights here are counted by dawns. If a bhikkhu leaves the army before dawn at the end of any night, that night is not counted. If he returns to spend another night/dawn with the army, the series starts over again from one. If, however, he has spent three consecutive nights with the army and is still with the army at any time beginning with sunset of the fourth night, he incurs a pācittiya. Unlike Pc 5, he does not need to be lying down for this factor to count. The Commentary illustrates this point by saying that even if he is using his psychic power to sit levitating above the army at sunset on the fourth day, he still fulfills this factor.

Perception as to whether more than three consecutive nights have actually passed is not a mitigating factor here (see Pc 4).

Non-offenses

There is no offense in staying longer than three nights if they are not consecutive, or in staying longer than three consecutive nights:

if one is ill or caring for someone else who is ill;

if the army is surrounded by opposing forces (so that the road out is blocked, says the Commentary);

if one is being constrained (either by the army or its opponents, says the Commentary); or

if there are other dangers (which the Commentary in many other non-offense clauses defines as dangers to one’s life or one’s celibacy).

Summary: Staying more than three consecutive nights with an army on active duty, unless one has a suitable reason to be there, is a pācittiya offense.

*    *    *

50

If a bhikkhu staying two or three nights with an army should go to a battlefield, a roll call, the troops in battle formation, or to see a review of the (battle) units, it is to be confessed.

“Then a certain group-of-six bhikkhu, having gone to the battlefield, was pierced by an arrow. People made fun of him: ‘We hope (the battle) was well fought, venerable sir. How many points did you get? (§)’”

A battlefield, according to the Vibhaṅga and Commentary here, is a place where actual fighting may be seen; according to the Commentary to the Brahmajāla Suttanta, it is a place where war games are held. Both interpretations seem valid, especially considering the organized and decorous nature of warfare in those days.

The Commentary also says that a review of battle units can mean anything down to a review of a single unit.

Roll call and troops in battle formation are self-explanatory.

DN 1 mentions all four of these activities as forms of entertainment. From this, using the Great Standards, we may say that any show the armed forces put on for the public—parades, air shows, etc.—would also fall under this factor.

Notice that these activities fulfill this factor even if they do not include the full array of forces that one would find in a field army or similar large military unit. In other words, a bhikkhu staying with the army would incur the full penalty here for watching these activities even if they involve only a small segment of a single division. If he is not staying with the army, though, then under Pc 48 he would incur a pācittiya for watching these activities if they contain the full complement of artillery, armored, airborne, and infantry forces; and a dukkaṭa if they contain only a segment.

Effort

As with Pc 48, there is a dukkaṭa for every step one takes toward watching these activities, and a pācittiya for staying still and watching them.

Non-offenses

The Vibhaṅga’s non-offense clauses here are identical with those for Pc 48. In other words, there is no offense:

if, having gone on business, one happens to see any of these activities;

if, staying within a monastery, one watches these activities;

if an army comes to where one happens to be;

if one meets an army coming from the opposite direction; or

if there are dangers.

Summary: Going to a battlefield, a roll call, an array of troops in battle formation, or to see a review of the battle units while one is staying with an army is a pācittiya offense.

Six: The Alcoholic Drink Chapter

51

The drinking of alcohol or fermented liquor is to be confessed.

“Then Ven. Sāgata went to the hermitage of the coiled-hair ascetic of Ambatittha, and on arrival—having entered the fire building and arranged a grass mat—sat down cross-legged with his body erect and mindfulness to the fore. The nāga (living in the fire building) saw that Ven. Sāgata had entered and, on seeing him, was upset, disgruntled, and emitted smoke. Ven. Sāgata emitted smoke. The nāga, unable to bear his rage, blazed up. Ven. Sāgata, entering the fire element, blazed up. Then Ven. Sāgata, having consumed the nāga’s fire with his own fire, left for Bhaddavatikā.

“Then the Blessed One, having stayed at Bhaddavatikā as long as he liked, left on a walking tour to Kosambī. The lay followers of Kosambī heard, ‘They say that Ven. Sāgata did battle with the Ambatittha nāga!’

“Then the Blessed One, having toured by stages, came to Kosambī. The Kosambī lay followers, after welcoming the Blessed One, went to Ven. Sāgata and, on arrival, having bowed down to him, sat to one side. As they were sitting there they said to him, ‘What, venerable sir, is something the masters like that is hard for you to get? What can we prepare for you?‘

“When this was said, some group-of-six bhikkhus said to the Kosambī lay followers, ‘Friends, there is a strong liquor called pigeon’s liquor (the color of pigeons’ feet, according to the Commentary) that the bhikkhus like and is hard for them to get. Prepare that.’

“Then the Kosambī lay followers, having prepared pigeon’s liquor in house after house, and seeing that Ven. Sāgata had gone out for alms, said to him, ‘Master Sāgata, drink some pigeon’s liquor! Master Sāgata, drink some pigeon’s liquor’ Then Ven. Sāgata, having drunk pigeon’s liquor in house after house, passed out at the city gate as he was leaving the city.

“Then the Blessed One, leaving the city with a number of bhikkhus, saw that Ven. Sāgata had passed out at the city gate. On seeing him, he addressed the bhikkhus, saying, ‘Bhikkhus, pick up Sāgata.’

“Responding, ‘As you say, venerable sir,’ the bhikkhus took Ven. Sāgata to the monastery and laid him down with his head toward the Blessed One. Then Ven. Sāgata turned around and went to sleep with his feet toward the Blessed One. So the Blessed One addressed the bhikkhus, saying, ‘In the past, wasn’t Sāgata respectful to the Tathāgata and deferential?’

“‘Yes, venerable sir.’

“‘But is he respectful to the Tathāgata and deferential now?’

“‘No, venerable sir.’

“‘And didn’t Sāgata do battle with the Ambatittha nāga?’

“‘Yes, venerable sir.’

“‘But could he do battle with even a salamander now?’

“‘No, venerable sir.’”

(§—Reading deḍḍubhena-pi with the Thai and Sri Lankan versions of the Canon.)

Object

Alcohol means any alcoholic beverage made from grain, yeast, or any combination of ingredients. Examples now would include whiskey, beer, vodka, and gin. Fermented liquor means any alcoholic beverage made from flowers, fruits, honey, sugar, or any combination of ingredients. Examples now would include wine, mead, and rum. Together, the two terms are meant to cover all kinds of alcoholic beverages.

There is some controversy as to what other substances would be included in this factor in line with the Great Standards. Because the Canon repeatedly criticizes alcohol on the grounds that it destroys one’s sense of shame, weakens one’s discernment, and can put one into a stupor—as happened to Ven. Sāgata—it seems reasonable to extend this rule to other intoxicants, narcotics, and hallucinogens as well. Thus things like marijuana, hashish, heroin, cocaine, and LSD would fulfill this factor. Coffee, tea, tobacco, and betel do not have this effect, though, so there is no reason to include them here.

Perception as to whether a liquid counts as alcohol or liquor is not a mitigating factor here (see Pc 4). Thus a bhikkhu drinking champagne that he thinks to be carbonated apple juice would fall under this factor, regardless of his ignorance.

Effort

The Vibhaṅga defines drinking as taking even as little as the tip of a blade of grass. Thus taking a small glass of wine, even though it might not be enough to make one drunk, would be more than enough to fulfill this factor.

The Vibhaṅga does not, however, indicate how offenses are to be counted here. According to the Commentary, the number of offenses involved in taking an alcoholic drink is determined by the number of separate sips. As for intoxicants taken by means other than sipping, each separate effort would count as an offense.

Non-offenses

The Vibhaṅga states that there is no offense in taking items that are non-alcoholic, but whose color, taste, or smell is like alcohol. Thus, for example, carbonated apple juice that resembles champagne would not be grounds for an offense.

There is also no offense in taking alcohol “cooked in broth, meat, or oil.” The Commentary interprets the first two items as referring to sauces, stews, and meat dishes to which alcoholic beverages, such as wine, are added for flavoring before they are cooked. Because the alcohol would evaporate during the cooking, it would have no intoxicating effect. Foods containing unevaporated alcohol—such as rum babas—would not be included under this allowance.

As for alcohol cooked in oil, this refers to a medicine used in the Buddha’s time for afflictions of the “wind element.” The Mahāvagga (VI.14.1) allows this medicine for internal use only as long as the taste, color, and smell of the alcohol are not perceptible. From this point, the Vinaya-mukha argues that morphine and other narcotics used as pain killers are allowable as well.

In addition, the non-offense clauses contain a phrase that can be read in two different ways. The first way would be, “With regard to molasses and emblic myrobalan, (there is no offense) if he drinks unfermented ariṭṭha.” This is the way the Commentary interprets the phrase, which it explains as follows: Ariṭṭha is the name of an aged medicine, made from emblic myrobalan, etc., whose color taste, and smell are like alcohol, but which is not alcoholic. This item, however, would seem to come under the first non-offense clause. Another way to read the phrase would be to take ariṭṭha as an adjective, which would yield, “With regard to molasses and emblic myrobalan, (there is no offense) if he drinks what has not fermented and not turned bad.” Perhaps the mixture of emblic myrobalan and molasses was used to make a type of toddy, in which case the allowance would grant permission for the mixture to be drunk before it had fermented. This allowance could then be extended to liquids like apple cider consumed before it has turned alcoholic.

Summary: Taking an intoxicant is a pācittiya offense regardless of whether one is aware that it is an intoxicant.

*    *    *

52

Tickling with the fingers is to be confessed.

“Now at that time some group-of-six bhikkhus were making one of the group of seventeen laugh by tickling him with their fingers. Convulsed with laughter and unable to catch his breath, he died.”

There are three factors for the full offense here.

1) Object: another bhikkhu.

2) Effort: One touches any part of his body with any part of one’s own body

3) Intention: for fun.

Object

A bhikkhu is grounds for a pācittiya here; any unordained person, grounds for a dukkaṭa. The Vibhaṅga does not say whether unordained here includes bhikkhunīs. The Commentary states explicitly that it does, adding that a bhikkhu looking for a little fun can tickle a bhikkhunī without incurring a penalty stronger than a dukkaṭa. There are occasional attempts at humor in the Commentary, and we can probably write this off as one of them.

Perception as to whether the person being tickled is ordained is irrelevant to the offense (see Pc 42).

Effort

This factor is fulfilled only by body-to-body contact, as defined at length under Sg 2. The following actions, if done with the intent of making the other person laugh, would be grounds for a dukkaṭa here regardless of whether the person was ordained or not:

using an item connected with the body—such as a stick—to poke at the person;

touching an item connected with the other person’s body;

tossing or dropping things on the other person.

Intention

If one has legitimate motives for touching the other person aside from a desire for fun, there is no penalty in doing so. Thus a bhikkhu massaging another bhikkhu’s tired back commits no offense if he inadvertently happens to touch a spot where the other bhikkhu is ticklish. However, touching another bhikkhu in anger would come under Pc 74.

Summary: Tickling another bhikkhu is a pācittiya offense.

*    *    *

53

The act of playing in the water is to be confessed.

Here again, the factors for the full offense are three.

1) Effort: One jumps up or down, splashes, or swims

2) Object: in water deep enough to immerse one’s ankle

3) Intention: for fun.

Effort

The Vibhaṅga is silent on how to count offenses under this rule. According to the Commentary, each individual effort counts as a separate offense. Thus if one is swimming for fun, one incurs a pācittiya for each hand or foot stroke.

Perception as to whether one’s actions count as “playing in the water” is not a mitigating factor here (see Pc 4).

Object

Jumping up or down in water less than ankle deep entails a dukkaṭa, as does splashing water with the hands, feet, a stick, or a piece of tile; or playing with water or other liquids—such as rice gruel, milk, buttermilk, colored dyes, urine, or mud—in a vessel.

The Vibhaṅga states that there is also a dukkaṭa for playing in a boat. This the Commentary illustrates with examples: such things as paddling a boat with an oar, propelling it with a pole, or pushing it up on shore. At present, sailing a sailboat or steering a motorboat would come under this factor.

Intention

The Vibhaṅga defines this factor as “for a laugh” (hassādhippāyo), which the Commentary translates as “for fun” or “for sport” (kiḷādhippāyo). 

The question of swimming for fitness or exercise is not discussed in any of the texts and seems to have been virtually unheard of in Asia until recent times. Swimming in most Asian countries has long been regarded as a childish form of play, and the one mention in the Canon of athletic bhikkhus keeping their bodies in strong shape is disparaging. In the origin story to Sg 8, Ven. Dabba Mallaputta assigned separate dwellings to different groups of bhikkhus—those who studied the suttas, those who studied the Vinaya, those who meditated, etc.—and, finally, “for those bhikkhus who lived indulging in animal talk and keeping their bodies in strong shape, he assigned dwellings in the same place, ‘So that even these venerable ones will stay as they like.’” Thus it does not seem likely that the Buddha would have recognized physical fitness as an appropriate reason for bhikkhus to go swimming.

On the other hand, if a bhikkhu has a medical motive for swimming—e.g., he has injured his shoulder, and his doctor has recommended that he swim to help speed its healing—this would probably count as an instance of “having business to do in the water” and thus would come under the relevant non-offense clause.

Non-offenses. The Vibhaṅga states that there is no offense in jumping in or out of the water, swimming, or using a boat—

if one goes into the water not for fun but because one has business to do—examples would include bathing or helping a person who cannot swim;

if one is crossing to the other shore of a body of water; or

if there are dangers—e.g., one is escaping a fire or a wild beast.

Summary: Jumping and swimming in the water for fun is a pācittiya offense.

*    *    *

54

Disrespect is to be confessed.

This rule refers to cases where one has been admonished for one’s behavior. The factors for the full offense are two.

1) Effort: Having been admonished by a fellow bhikkhu who cites a rule formulated in the Vinaya, one shows disrespect

2) Object: for the bhikkhu or for the rule.

We will discuss these factors in reverse order.

Object

Only if the bhikkhu cites a rule formulated in the Vinaya is this factor grounds for a pācittiya. If he criticizes one’s actions, citing standards of behavior for the sake of being “self-effacing, scrupulous, or inspiring; for lessening (defilement) or arousing energy” that are not formulated in the Vinaya, this factor becomes grounds for a dukkaṭa. The Commentary limits “not formulated” to teachings in the suttas and Abhidhamma, but there is nothing in the Vibhaṅga to suggest that this is so. Its normal way of referring specifically to the suttas and mātikās (the basis for the Abhidhamma) is to say, “another Dhamma,” and so its choice of words here seems intended to include any principle, whether expressed in the other parts of the Canon or not, that aims at the goal of being self-effacing, etc. Thus any teaching devoted to such goals would be grounds for a dukkaṭa.

If the person admonishing one is not a bhikkhu, then regardless of whether he/she cites a rule in the Vinaya or standards for being self-effacing, etc., outside of the Vinaya, then the penalty for showing disrespect to that person is a dukkaṭa.

Perception as to whether the person doing the admonishing is ordained is irrelevant to the offense (see Pc 42).

The validity of the admonition is not an issue here. Even if the other person is really an ignorant fool, has misinterpreted the rule, or has peculiar ideas on being self-effacing, etc., one should be careful not to show disrespect in word or deed.

If one is being criticized against standards that have nothing to do with being self-effacing, etc., it would not be grounds for an offense. However, a wise policy would be to avoid showing disrespect for another person, regardless of the situation.

Effort

There are two possible targets for one’s disrespect—the person and the rule—and two ways of showing it: by word or by gesture.

Disrespect for the person includes—

saying things that show disrespect in either a crude or subtle way, e.g., “Who are you to tell me?” “It’s presumptuous of you to pass judgment when you aren’t in my position,” “Your critical attitude shows that you have some messy emotional problems that you would be well-advised to look into,” “Get lost!” or “Go to hell!”

or making a rude gesture or even a slight facial expression to show one’s contempt.

Disrespect for the rule includes—

saying, “That’s a stupid rule,” “That rule doesn’t apply to me”;

stubbornly repeating the action for which one was admonished (this point is covered in Mv.IV.17.7-9);

or making a rude gesture, saying, “This is what I think of that rule.”

None of the texts explicitly confine this factor to disrespect expressed in the person’s presence. Thus it would seem that if, as a result of the person’s comments, one expresses disrespect behind his or her back, it would fulfill this factor as well.

Further action

If one persists in acting disrespectfully when being admonished, one may also be subject to Sg 12 or to suspension from the Community (see BMC2, Chapter 20).

Non-offenses

There is no offense if, being admonished, one states simply that one was taught differently by one’s teachers. (The precise words in the Vibhaṅga are, “Such is our teachers’ tradition and catechism.” (§)) The Commentary contains a discussion of which sort of teachers’ tradition is worthy of including in this exemption, but this seems to miss the point. If one can rightfully cite one’s teacher’s instruction as the reason for one’s behavior, then regardless of whether the teacher is right or wrong, such a citation would not count as disrespect.

As Dhp 76 says, one should regard a person who points out one’s faults as a guide who points out hidden treasure. If one shows disrespect to such a guide, it is unlikely that he/she will feel inclined to point out any hidden treasure ever again.

A good example of how to receive admonishment was set by Ven. Ānanda during the First Council (Cv.XI.1.10). Although he was admonished for committing acts that the Buddha had not declared to be offenses, and although he did not see that he had committed any error, still he willingly confessed his actions as offenses so as to show good faith in his fellow bhikkhus.

A related rule

Pc 71 covers the case of a bhikkhu who, trying to avoid an offense under this rule, uses a ploy to get out of altering his behavior in response to an admonition. For details, see the explanation under that rule.

Summary: Speaking or acting disrespectfully after having been admonished by another bhikkhu for a breach of the training rules is a pācittiya offense.

*    *    *

55

Should any bhikkhu try to frighten another bhikkhu, it is to be confessed.

There are three factors for the full offense here.

Intention

One wants to frighten the other person.

Effort

One arranges a frightening sight, sound, smell, taste, or tactile sensation—this would include such things as hanging a sheet in a dark room so that it looks like a ghost, making a ghostly wail outside the person’s window, etc.—or one describes dangers from ghosts, robbers, or wild animals.

Object

The other person is a bhikkhu. Anyone who is not a bhikkhu is grounds for a dukkaṭa.

Perception as to whether the person one is trying to frighten is ordained is irrelevant to the offense (see Pc 42).

“Result” is not a factor here. If the three factors are fulfilled, one commits the offense regardless of whether the other person is actually frightened.

Non-offenses

To inform another person of dangers from ghosts, robbers, etc., without intending to frighten him/her constitutes no offense. The same exemption holds for arranging a sight, sound, smell, taste, or tactile sensation without the intention of causing fright.

Summary: Attempting to frighten another bhikkhu is a pācittiya offense.

*    *    *

56

Should any bhikkhu who is not ill, seeking to warm himself, kindle a fire or have one kindled—unless there is a suitable reason—it is to be confessed.

“Now at that time, in the winter months, bhikkhus warmed themselves, having kindled a fire by a large hollow log. And in that hollow a cobra was scorched by the fire. Coming out, it sprang at the bhikkhus. The bhikkhus ran off every which way.”

Here again the factors for the full offense are three.

1) Object: One is not ill.

2) Effort: One lights a fire or gets someone else to light one

3) Intention: for the purpose of warming oneself.

Object

Not ill, in the context of this rule, means that one can fare comfortably without warming oneself. The Vibhaṅga makes the point that perception as to whether one is actually ill is not a mitigating factor here (see Pc 4). What this means is that when it is chilly outside, one should be very sure that extra warmth is necessary for one’s health before lighting a fire to warm oneself.

Effort

Lighting a fire at present would include turning on the flame in a heating system in one’s dwelling for the sake of the warmth. Solar or electric heating systems, which do not use flames, would not be included here.

Getting a fire lit, according to the Vibhaṅga, means ordering another person to light a fire. Thus there is apparently room for kappiya-vohāra under this rule, as long as one’s suggestion for lighting a fire not be an express command.

If, when not ill, one orders someone else to light a fire (or fires) for the purpose of warming oneself, there is a pācittiya in making the order, and another pācittiya when the other person lights the fire(s), regardless of how many fires are lit as a result of the one order. To return a burning piece of fuel to a fire is grounds for a dukkaṭa; adding new fuel to a fire—according to the Commentary—is grounds for a pācittiya.

Intention

There is no offense if one lights a fire or has one lit for purposes other than warming oneself. Thus one may light a lamp or light a fire to boil water, burn dead leaves, or fire an alms bowl without penalty. Cv.V.32.1 says that if a forest fire is approaching one’s dwelling, one may light a counter-fire to ward off its approach. In other circumstances, though, Pc 10 would impose a penalty for lighting a fire on top of “live” soil; and Pc 11 would impose a further penalty for damaging plant life.

Non-offenses

In addition, there is no offense in warming oneself at raked-out coals or at a fire lit by someone else (not at one’s request). And there is no offense in lighting a fire when there are dangers. This, the Commentary says, refers to cases when one is bitten by a snake (and wants to make the snake-bite medicine mentioned under Pc 40), when one is surrounded by robbers, or disturbed by non-human beings or beasts of prey.

Cv.V.14.1 allows bhikkhus to use a “fire hall (§),” similar to a sauna at present, for the purpose of inducing perspiration for health reasons. According to the Vibhaṅga, there is no offense in lighting a fire in a place such as this.

The purpose of this rule is suggested by AN 5:219, which lists the five disadvantages of sitting around a fire: It is bad for one’s eyes, bad for one’s skin, bad for one’s strength, and (most importantly, in this context) groups tend to form (that can turn into factions), and they spend their time in animal talk.

Summary: Lighting a fire to warm oneself—or having it lit—when one does not need the warmth for one’s health is a pācittiya offense.

*    *    *

57

Should any bhikkhu bathe at intervals of less than half a month, except at the proper occasions, it is to be confessed. Here the proper occasions are these: the last month and a half of the hot season, the first month of the rains, these two and a half months being a time of heat, a time of fever; (also) a time of illness; a time of work; a time of going on a journey; a time of wind or rain. These are the proper occasions here.

“Now at that time bhikkhus were bathing in the hot spring (at Rājagaha). Then King Seniya Bimbisāra of Magadha, having gone to the hot spring (with the thought), ‘I will bathe my head,’ waited to one side, (thinking,) ‘I will wait as long as the masters are bathing.’ The bhikkhus bathed until nightfall.

“Then King Seniya Bimbisāra of Magadha, after having bathed his head at the wrong time (night)—the gates of the city being closed—spent the night outside the city walls…. (The Buddha learned of the incident and rebuked the bhikkhus:) ‘How can you worthless men, even though you saw the king, bathe not knowing moderation?’”

The original formulation of this rule—with no allowance for “proper occasions”—seems to have been intended as a temporary disciplinary measure for the bhikkhus who had inconvenienced the king. (There was a similar temporary rule, against eating mangoes (Cv.V.5.1), that the Buddha formulated when King Bimbisāra had invited the bhikkhus to help themselves to his mangoes, and some group-of-six bhikkhus went and took all the mangoes in his park, even the unripe ones. The rule was later rescinded (Cv.V.5.2) when the Buddha allowed bhikkhus to eat any and all fruit as long as it was allowable in any of the five ways mentioned under Pc 11.)

As for this rule: Once the proper occasions were added, they relaxed it considerably. For instance:

a time of illness is any time when one does not feel comfortable without bathing;

a time of work can involve as little work as sweeping out the yard of one’s dwelling (§);

a time of going on a journey is whenever one is about to go, is going, or has gone on a trip of at least half a yojana (approximately 5 miles/8 kilometers);

a time of wind and rain is whenever a dusty wind blows and at least two or three drops of rain fall on one’s body.

In addition, Mv.V.13 tells the story of Ven. Mahā Kaccāna’s leaving the middle Ganges Valley and settling in Avantī, to the south. After some time, one of his students—Ven. Soṇa Kuṭikaṇṇa—asked permission to visit the Buddha. Ven. Mahā Kaccāna gave his permission, together with a request to convey to the Buddha: that certain rules inappropriate for areas outside of the Ganges Valley—this rule among them—be rescinded for bhikkhus living in outlying districts. The Buddha complied with the request and defined the outlying districts in such a way that there is nowhere in the world outside of the middle Ganges Valley where this rule applies.

Offenses

For those who live in the middle Ganges Valley, the offenses for bathing more frequently than once a fortnight outside of the proper occasions are these: a dukkaṭa for every time one scrubs oneself with chunam (bathing powder) or clay (soap), and a pācittiya when one has finished bathing.

Perception as to whether a fortnight has actually passed is not a mitigating factor here (see Pc 4).

Non-offenses

In addition to the allowances to bathe more frequently than once a fortnight during the proper occasions or in areas outside the middle Ganges Valley, there is no offense in bathing more frequently if one is crossing a river or if there are dangers. This last allowance the Commentary explains with an example: One is being chased by bees and so jumps into the water to escape them.

Summary: Bathing more frequently than once a fortnight when residing in the middle Ganges Valley, except on certain occasions, is a pācittiya offense.

*    *    *

58

When a bhikkhu receives a new robe, any one of three means of discoloring it is to be applied: green, brown, or black. If a bhikkhu should make use of a new robe without applying any of the three means of discoloring it, it is to be confessed.

“Now at that time many bhikkhus and wanderers were traveling from Sāketa to Sāvatthī. On the way, thieves came out and robbed them. Royal officials, coming out of Sāvatthī and capturing the thieves with the goods, sent a messenger to the bhikkhus, saying, ‘Come, your reverences. Let each identify his own robes and take them.’ The bhikkhus couldn’t identify their robes. People criticized and complained and spread it about, ‘How can their reverences not identify their own robes?’”

Protocol

As this rule indicates, a bhikkhu should wear robes only that have been marked with an identifying mark. The Vibhaṅga does not go into any great detail on procedures for marking a robe, aside from saying that the mark may be as small as the tip of a blade of grass, and can be made with any of the colors mentioned in the rule. (The color green in Pali also covers the color blue, so a mark made with blue ink would be acceptable.)

The Commentary goes into more detail: After the robe has been dyed, one should make a round mark no smaller than the size of a bedbug’s back and no larger than the iris of a peacock’s eye in all four corners of the robe, three corners, two, or one, as one sees fit. Only round marks are allowable. Such things as lines or angular marks (squares, triangles, or stars) are not. Because these prohibitions have no basis in the Canon or the Great Standards, they are not binding.

As the Vibhaṅga notes, once the robe has been marked there is no need to mark it again, even if the mark wears off, the marked part of the robe gets worn through age, one sews a marked cloth together with an unmarked one, or one patches, darns, or adds a hem to a marked robe. If Bhikkhu X marks a robe and then gives it to Bhikkhu Y, Y may wear it without having to mark it again.

In Thailand at present, the custom is to make three small dots in one corner of the robe, saying, “Imaṁ bindu-kappaṁ karomi,” (I make this properly marked) while making each dot. This procedure does not appear in the Canon or commentaries, but does not conflict with any of them.

The factors for the offense here are two: object—a new robe; and effort—one makes use of it without first marking it.

Object

According to the Vibhaṅga, a new robe here is one made out of any of the six kinds of robe-cloth and not yet marked. Thus an unmarked cloth kept for a long time is still regarded as new. The Commentary, noting that the Vibhaṅga does not qualify robe as including even the smallest cloth that can be placed under shared ownership, concludes that robe in the context of this rule refers specifically to completed robes that can be worn over the shoulders or around the waist—i.e., lower robes, upper robes, outer robes, rains-bathing cloths, skin-eruption covering cloths—and not to ordinary pieces of cloth or other cloth items such as sitting cloths, handkerchiefs, or shoulder bags. Any cloth requisite that is not a robe in this sense is not grounds for an offense. Shoulder cloths (aṁsa) were not worn in the time of the Commentary but would seem to fall under this factor, as would any other item a bhikkhu might wear around his body.

Perception as to whether the robe has actually been marked is not a mitigating factor here (see Pc 4).

Effort

The Vibhaṅga defines this factor with the verb “use” (paribhuñjati), while the K/Commentary is more specific in saying that this factor is fulfilled when one wears the robe over the shoulders or around the waist. Because the mark is to be added only after the robe is dyed, this factor does not cover such things as trying on a new robe while it is being sewn but has yet to be dyed.

Non-offenses

As noted above, there is no offense—

in using a robe that has been properly marked;

in using a robe whose mark has worn off (as in washing); or

in using a robe whose marked corner has been torn off or otherwise destroyed.

There is also no need to re-mark a marked robe if one sews it together with an unmarked piece of cloth, or if one patches it, darns it, or adds a new hem to it.

The K/Commentary, arguing from the allowance for makeshift robes under NP 6, states that if one’s robes have been snatched away, destroyed, etc., one may wear an unmarked piece of cloth without committing an offense.

Summary: Wearing an unmarked robe is a pācittiya offense.

*    *    *

59

Should any bhikkhu, having himself placed robe-cloth under shared ownership (vikappana) with a bhikkhu, a bhikkhunī, a female trainee, a male novice, or a female novice, then make use of the cloth without the shared ownership’s being rescinded, it is to be confessed.

Shared ownership

As mentioned in the explanations to NP 1, vikappana is an arrangement whereby a bhikkhu places a robe or robe-cloth under shared ownership so that he may store it for any length of time without its being counted as an extra cloth. One may share ownership with any of one’s co-religionists as mentioned in the rule.

Passages in the Mahāvagga (VIII.20.2; VIII.21.1) show that shared ownership is intended for cloth that is being stored and not for cloth in use. Cloth that has not been made into a finished robe, rains-bathing cloths being kept during the eight months of the year outside of the rainy season, and skin-eruption covering cloths being kept when they are not needed, may all be placed under shared ownership. The three basic robes, miscellaneous requisites, handkerchiefs, and the sitting cloth may not. As this rule states, when a bhikkhu wants to use a piece of cloth placed under shared ownership, the shared ownership must first be rescinded.

Protocol

The Vibhaṅga to this rule explains how cloth may be placed under shared ownership, but unfortunately the explanation is rather terse, so we will have to discuss two alternative interpretations.

What the Vibhaṅga says

One may place a piece of cloth under shared ownership only if it is one of the six kinds of robe-cloth discussed under NP 1 and it measures at least four by eight fingerbreadths. There are two ways of placing it under shared ownership: in the presence of (the second owner presumably, although this is a controversial point) or in the absence of (again, this would seem to mean the second owner).

In the first method, one says, “I place this robe-cloth under shared ownership with you (plural)” or “with so-and-so.” (The Pali formulae for this and the following procedures are in Appendix V.) This is as far as the Vibhaṅga explains the method, but it seems to refer to two ways of doing the procedure in the presence of the second owner: One uses “you (plural)” if the other owner is a bhikkhu with more seniority than oneself; and the second owner’s name if he/she is a junior bhikkhu, a bhikkhunī, female trainee, or male or female novice. (Passages throughout the Canon show that it was considered disrespectful to refer to a senior person by his name in his presence. Buddhists, for instance, would never address the Buddha as Gotama, although members of other religions often did. At Mv.I.74.1, Ven. Ānanda says that he is not worthy enough to refer to Ven. Mahā Kassapa by name, as the latter is his teacher.)

The Vibhaṅga does not say how shared ownership is to be rescinded in a case like this, although the K/Commentary gives a formula for the second owner to say: “Use what is mine, give it away, or do as you like with it.”

In the second method, one gives the cloth to a witness and says, “I give this robe-cloth to you to place under shared ownership.” The witness then says, “Who are your friends and acquaintances?” One then names two of one’s friends (with whom one has made an arrangement for using one another’s belongings on trust), and the witness says, “I give it to them. Use what is theirs, give it away, or do as you like with it.”

This second method, apparently, is for use in situations where one has an extra cloth whose time span is almost up and one is far away from any co-religionist with whom one has made an arrangement to use one another’s belongings on trust.

What is happening in the procedure is that one is giving the cloth away to the witness; the witness then places it with one as a gift to one’s friends. Because one already has permission to use their things on trust, one may freely make use of the cloth if one wants to, or simply keep it for any number of days if not. (See Mv.V.13.13.) Cases of placing gifts in trust in this way are discussed in detail at Mv.VIII.31.2-3. According to those passages, the witness has no business in giving one permission to use the cloth after having given it to the two other people; perhaps the statement is included here to show that all sides involved—the witness and the two new owners of the cloth—are agreeable to one’s making use of the cloth. If the two new owners have not previously given one permission to use their belongings on trust, one may not make use of the cloth until they give express permission to do so, although one may keep it for any number of days without incurring a penalty under NP 1.

What the K/Commentary says

The Commentary has nothing to say about these procedures, while the K/Commentary goes into great detail, reworking the Vibhaṅga’s descriptions to come up with three methods.

In the first method, “in the presence of,” one says in the presence of the second owner, “I place this robe-cloth under shared ownership with you.” The shared ownership is rescinded when the second owner/witness gives one permission to use the cloth, give it away, or do as one likes with it.

In the second method—which the K/Commentary also calls “in the presence of”—one says in the presence of a witness who is not the second owner, “I place this robe-cloth under shared ownership with so-and-so.” The shared ownership is rescinded when the witness gives one permission to use the cloth, give it away, or do as one likes with it.

In the third method, “in the absence of,” one gives the cloth to a witness, saying, “I give this robe-cloth to you to place under shared ownership.” The witness says, “Who is a friend or acquaintance of yours?” One names a friend, and the witness says, “I give it to him/her. Use what is his/hers, give it away, or do as you like with it.” The shared ownership is rescinded when the witness says this.

There are several problems with the K/Commentary’s interpretations. First, it is hard to see any practical difference between its methods 2 and 3, why one should be called “in the presence of” and the other “in the absence of,” and in method 2 why the witness should have the right to give one permission to use an article that strictly speaking belongs to someone else.

Second, the K/Commentary’s method for “in the absence of” deviates from the Vibhaṅga’s description of the method. In the Vibhaṅga’s description, the witness places the cloth under shared ownership with two of one’s friends, whereas in the K/Commentary’s, he/she places it under shared ownership with one friend. Why this should be the case, none of the texts explains.

For these reasons, it would seem that the previous explanation—that there are two methods, as described in the Vibhaṅga—is preferable to the K/Commentary’s.

The factors for the offense

The factors for the offense here are two: object—any one of the six kinds of robe-cloth, measuring at least four by eight fingerbreadths, that one has placed under shared ownership; and effort—one uses the cloth without the shared ownership’s being rescinded.

Perception as to whether the shared ownership has actually been rescinded is not a mitigating factor here (see Pc 4).

The K/Commentary notes that this rule applies not only to robe-cloth, but also to bowls as well. None of the other texts mention this point, but—given that bowls placed under shared ownership are mentioned under NP 21, and that there is nothing in the Vibhaṅga to indicate that this arrangement is different for bowls than it is for cloth—the Great Standards could be cited to support the K/Commentary here.

Non-offenses

There is no offense in using an item placed under shared ownership if the shared ownership has been rescinded or if one makes use of the item on trust. The factors for legitimately taking an item on trust are as follows (Mv.VIII.19.1):

1) The other person is a friend.

2) He/she is an intimate.

3) He/she has spoken of the matter. (According to the Commentary, this means that he/she has said, “You may take any of my property you want.”)

4) He/she is still alive.

5) One knows that he/she will be pleased at one’s taking it.

These factors are discussed in detail under Pr 2.

The K/Commentary’s analysis of the factors involved in committing an offense under this rule suggests that when an item placed under shared ownership is taken on trust, the shared ownership is automatically rescinded, and the item reverts to the status of extra cloth or an extra bowl, as the case may be.

Summary: Making use of cloth or a bowl stored under shared ownership—unless the shared ownership has been rescinded or one is taking the item on trust—is a pācittiya offense.

*    *    *

60

Should any bhikkhu hide (another) bhikkhu’s bowl, robe, sitting cloth, needle box, or belt—or have it hidden—even as a joke, it is to be confessed.

This is another rule that comes from some members of the group of six teasing the children in the group of seventeen. The factors for the full offense are three.

Object:

Any of the requisites mentioned in the rule, belonging to a bhikkhu. Robe here means any piece of robe material measuring at least four by eight fingerbreadths, except for sitting cloths, which are mentioned separately. Needle box covers not only cases containing needles (see Pc 86) but also empty ones. Any requisite not mentioned in the rule but belonging to a bhikkhu is grounds for a dukkaṭa, as is any requisite belonging to a person who is not a bhikkhu.

Perception as to the status of the person whose requisite one is hiding is not a mitigating factor here (see Pc 42).

Effort

One hides the article or has it hidden. In the latter case—assuming that the other factors are fulfilled—there is a pācittiya in making the request/command/suggestion, and another pācittiya when the other person does one’s bidding, regardless of how many items that person hides as the result of the one request/command/suggestion.

Intention

One is doing it as a game. The Sub-commentary makes clear that the “game” here can either be friendly or malicious. If one hides the other bhikkhu’s requisites out of the perverse pleasure of annoying him or simply for a friendly laugh, one commits the full offense all the same.

Non-offenses

There is no offense if—

not as a game, one puts away properly items that have been put away improperly (§), e.g., a bowl left hanging on a peg (see Cv.V.9.5); or

one puts away an item, thinking, “I will give it back (to him) after having given him a Dhamma talk.” Dhamma talk here, the Commentary says, refers to such admonitions as, “A contemplative should not leave his requisites scattered around.” Hiding things with this purpose in mind is sometimes an effective way for a teacher to train his students to stop being careless with their belongings, but it should be used with discretion, for it can easily backfire.

Summary: Hiding another bhikkhu’s bowl, robe, sitting cloth, needle box, or belt—or having it hidden—either as a joke or with the purpose of annoying him, is a pācittiya offense.

Seven: The Animal Chapter

61

Should any bhikkhu intentionally deprive an animal of life, it is to be confessed.

There are five factors for the full offense here.

1) Object: a living animal.

2) Perception: One perceives it to be a living animal.

3) Intention: One knowingly, consciously, deliberately, and purposefully wants to cause its death.

4) Effort: whatever one does with the purpose of causing it to die.

5) Result: It dies as a result of one’s action.

Object

Animal here covers all common animals. As the Commentary notes, whether the animal is large or small makes no difference in terms of the penalty, although the size of the animal is one of the factors determining the moral gravity of the act.

Apparently, this factor does not include beings too small to be seen with the naked eye, inasmuch as the classes of medicine allowed in Mv.VI include a number of anti-bacterial and anti-viral substances—some mineral salts and the decoctions made from the leaves of some trees, for example, can be antibiotic. The Commentary’s example of the smallest extreme to which this rule extends is a bed bug egg. The four “Things Not To Be Done” taught to every new bhikkhu immediately after his full Acceptance (Mv.I.78.4) say that one should not deprive an animal of life “even if it is only a black or white ant.”

On the other end of the spectrum, Pr 3 imposes a pārājika for deliberately killing a human being, and a thullaccaya for deliberately killing a peta, yakkha, or nāga.

Perception

If one is in doubt as to whether something is a living animal, it is grounds for a dukkaṭa regardless of whether it actually is. If one perceives an inanimate object to be a living animal, it is grounds for a dukkaṭa. If one perceives an object to be inanimate, then regardless of whether it actually is, it is not grounds for an offense. Thus, for example, if—with murderous intent—one steps on a spot of dirt thinking it to be a bed bug egg, the penalty is a dukkaṭa. If one steps on bed bug eggs thinking them to be spots of dirt, there is no penalty.

Intention

Intention, in the Vibhaṅga, is described as “having willed, having made the decision knowingly and consciously”—the same phrase used to define intention under Pr 3. The Commentary to this rule refers back to the Commentary to that rule, where having willed means having willed, having planned, with a murderous intention. Having made the decision means “having summoned up a reckless mind-state, ‘crushing’ through the power of an attack.” Knowingly means knowing that, “This is a living being.” Consciously means being aware that one’s action is depriving the animal of life.

All of this indicates that this factor is fulfilled only when one acts on a clear and consciously made decision to deprive the animal of life. Thus, for example, if one is sweeping a walk, trying carefully not to kill any insects, and yet some ants happen to die, one does not commit an offense even if one knew that there was the possibility that some might die, because one’s purpose in acting was not to cause their death.

Motive, here, is irrelevant to the offense. Even the desire to kill an animal to “put it out of its misery” fulfills the factor of intention all the same.

Effort

The Vibhaṅga is silent on what ways of taking life would fall under this rule. The Commentary says that explanations for this rule may be inferred from its discussion to Pr 3. Thus the four ways of taking life listed in the Vibhaṅga to that rule would apply here as well:

using one’s own person (e.g., hitting with the hand, kicking, using a knife or a club);

throwing (hurling a stone, shooting an arrow or a gun);

using a stationary device (setting a trap, placing poison in food);

commanding.

Mv.V.10.10 discusses a case of this last instance, in which a depraved bhikkhu tells a layman that he has use for a certain calf’s hide, and the layman kills the calf for him. Because the bhikkhu did not give a specific command that the calf be killed, and yet the Buddha said that his action did come under this rule, we can conclude that there is no room for kappiya-vohāra in this context. Whatever one says in hopes of inciting someone else to kill an animal would fulfill this factor. This rule thus differs from Pr 3, under which commanding covers only clear imperatives.

Two other ways of taking life, listed in the Commentary to Pr 3, would apparently also apply here:

using magical formulae;

using psychic powers.

Result

Only if the animal dies does one incur the pācittiya here. The Vibhaṅga here mentions no penalty for the case where one tries to kill an animal but the animal does not die. However, under Pr 3—in its discussion of a pitfall arranged with the intent of causing the death of any living being falling into it—it assigns the following penalties: if an animal falls into the pitfall, a dukkaṭa; if it experiences pain as a result, another dukkaṭa; if it dies, a pācittiya. Thus it seems reasonable to extrapolate from this specific example to make these penalties general: For a bhikkhu making an intentional effort to kill an animal, there is a dukkaṭa for the first effort that touches the animal’s body; another dukkaṭa if the animal experiences pain because of one’s effort; and the full offense if, as a result, it dies.

Non-offenses

There is no offense in killing an animal—

unintentionally—e.g., accidentally dropping a load that crushes a cat to death;

unthinkingly—e.g., absent-mindedly rubbing one’s arm while it is being bitten by mosquitoes;

unknowingly—e.g., walking into a dark room and, without realizing it, stepping on an insect; or

when one’s action is motivated by a purpose other than that of causing death—e.g., giving medicine to a sick dog whose system, it turns out, cannot withstand the dosage.

Still, the Commentary states that if one notices even bed bug eggs while cleaning a bed, one should be careful not to damage them. Thus, “out of compassion, one’s duties are to be done carefully.” Or, in the words of the Sub-commentary: “One’s duties in looking after one’s dwelling are to be done with mindfulness well-established so that such creatures do not die.”

Summary: Deliberately killing an animal—or having it killed—is a pācittiya offense.

*    *    *

62

Should any bhikkhu knowingly make use of water containing living beings, it is to be confessed.

This rule is similar to Pc 20, differing only in the factor of effort and in the fact that intention is not a factor for an offense. So here the factors for the full offense are three: object, perception, and effort.

Object:

Water containing living creatures. This includes things like mosquito larvae, but not beings too small to be seen.

Perception

One knows that they are there—either from having sensed their presence on one’s own or from having been told of their presence—and that they will die from the factor of effort, defined below.

If one is in doubt as to whether water contains living beings, or if one perceives living beings in the water when there actually aren’t, then to use it in a way that would cause their death if they were there is to incur a dukkaṭa.

Effort

The Vibhaṅga does not go into detail on this factor, while the Commentary defines it with examples: drinking the water, using it to wash one’s bowl, using it to cool hot porridge, dipping it out of a tank or pond to bathe with it, making waves in a pool so that the water will splash over its banks. The Sub-commentary suggests that this rule covers only cases in which one is using water for one’s own personal consumption, but this does not fit with the fact that, under this rule, the Commentary explains how one should go about cleaning out a dirty pool. (Place eight to ten potfuls of water containing no living beings in another place that will hold the water, and then dip the water from the pool into it.) The Commentary to Pr 3 states that using water to put out a fire—even an approaching wildfire that threatens one’s dwelling—would also come under this rule.

From all of this, it would appear that this rule covers all cases of using water containing living beings that are not covered by Pc 20.

Unlike that rule, though, the Vibhaṅga does not include the act of getting other people to make use of water containing living beings under the factor of effort here, although the Commentary and K/Commentary do. On the surface, the commentaries’ position seems reasonable. However, the compilers of the Vibhaṅga may have been taking into account the fact that, unlike telling a person to pour water on the ground, telling a person simply to use water containing living beings is not an order that, if carried out, would automatically doom those beings to death. For example, if one told another bhikkhu to drink water containing living beings, he would be the one responsible for deciding whether to strain the water first (see below). If he did, no damage would be done. If he didn’t, the offense under this rule would be his. Thus the Vibhaṅga seems correct in not including the act of getting other people to use such water under this rule. In fact, this distinction between this rule and Pc 20 may be one of the reasons why this topic is covered by two separate rules.

The K/Commentary claims that intention is also a factor here, and—as under Pc 20—it states that the intention has to be non-murderous—the implication being that if it were murderous, the case would come under Pc 61. However, unlike the non-offense clauses to Pc 20, the Vibhaṅga’s non-offense clauses here make no exception for a bhikkhu who uses water containing living beings either unthinkingly or unintentionally. The only exemptions deal with what one knows or does not know about the water. This means that if one knows the water contains living beings that would die from using it, then even if one spills the water accidentally, one’s action would incur a penalty all the same.

Result is not a factor here. Whether the living beings actually die is of no consequence in determining the offense.

Non-offenses

There is no offense in using water—

if one does not know that it contains living beings;

if one knows that it does not contain living beings; or

if one knows that the living beings it contains will not die from the use one has in mind.

Water strainers

Cv.V.13.1 gives permission for one to use a water strainer to remove dirt and living beings from water before using it, and such strainers eventually became one of a bhikkhu’s eight basic requisites. According to Cv.V.13.2, one must take a water strainer along when going on a journey. If one has no strainer, one may determine the corner of one’s outer robe as a strainer and use it to filter water.

Summary: Using water, or getting others to use it, knowing that it contains living beings that will die from that use, is a pācittiya offense.

*    *    *

63

Should any bhikkhu knowingly agitate for the reviving of an issue that has been rightfully dealt with, it is to be confessed.

Issues

An issue (adhikaraṇa) is a matter that, once arisen, must be dealt with formally in a prescribed manner. The Vibhaṅga lists four sorts:

1) dispute-issues (vivādādhikaraṇa) concerning Dhamma and Vinaya (see Sg 10), which the Community must deal with by declaring which side is right and which wrong;

2) accusation-issues (anuvādādhikaraṇa) concerning offenses (see Sg 8 & 9; Ay 1 & 2), which the Community must deal with by judging them true or false;

3) offense-issues (āpattādhikaraṇa), in other words, the commission of offenses, which are to be dealt with by the offender’s undergoing the prescribed penalties (confession, penance, or expulsion from the Community); and

4) duty-issues (kiccādhikaraṇa)—Community transactions, such as giving ordination and holding the Pāṭimokkha recitation—which the Community must deal with by performing them properly.

An issue rightfully dealt with is one that has been handled properly in accordance with the procedures given in the Vinaya. Some of these procedures are discussed under Pc 79 & 80, the Adhikaraṇa-samatha rules, and in BMC2, Chapters 12-22. If an issue has been dealt with improperly, it may be reopened for reconsideration, but once it has been dealt with properly it is considered closed for good.

The factors for an offense under this rule are three.

1) Object: an issue that has been dealt with properly.

2) Perception: One knows that it was dealt with properly, either because one was directly involved or one has been told of the matter.

3) Effort: One says—in the presence of another bhikkhu—that it was dealt with improperly. The Vibhaṅga gives the following examples of statements that would fulfill this factor: “The issue was not carried out.” “It was poorly carried out.” “It should be carried out again.” “It was not settled.” “It was poorly settled.” “It should be settled again.”

Pv.IX.3 contains a short discussion of this rule, making the point that one is subject to this rule regardless of whether one was involved in dealing with the issue the first time around.

Perception

If the transaction dealing with the issue was invalid but one perceives it as valid, it is grounds for a dukkaṭa. If one is in doubt about the validity of the transaction, then it is grounds for a dukkaṭa regardless of whether it was actually valid or not. What this last point means in practice is that if one is in doubt about the transaction, one may declare one’s doubt, but to state baldly that the issue needs to be reopened is to incur a dukkaṭa.

Further action

The Commentary to Cv.IX.3 states that in committing this offense one is subject to having one’s Pāṭimokkha canceled (see BMC2, Chapter 15). This would provide an opportunity for the Community to look into one’s attitude to see if one is still insistent on having the issue revived. If one continues to make a concerted effort to reopen an issue, knowing that it was properly dealt with, one is considered a maker of strife, and as such is subject to an act of censure, banishment, or suspension, depending on the gravity of the case (see BMC2, Chapter 20).

Non-offenses

There is no offense in agitating to have an issue re-opened if one perceives it to have been improperly dealt with: e.g., dealt with not in accordance with the rules and procedures of the Vinaya, dealt with by an incomplete group, or—in the case of an accusation or similar acts—performed against someone who did not deserve it. This allowance holds regardless of whether, in actuality, the issue was properly dealt with. For example: A Community has performed a censure transaction against Bhikkhu X. One honestly believes that X did not deserve the act, and says so to a fellow bhikkhu. In this case, one commits no offense even if it turns out that X did in fact deserve censure.

Summary: Agitating to re-open an issue, knowing that it was properly dealt with, is a pācittiya offense.

*    *    *

64

Should any bhikkhu knowingly conceal (another) bhikkhu’s serious offense, it is to be confessed.

Here there are four factors for the full offense.

1) Object: a serious offense committed by another bhikkhu.

2) Perception: One perceives the offense as serious—either from knowing on one’s own, from having been told by the bhikkhu, or from having been told by others.

3) Intention: One wants to hide the offense from other bhikkhus, one’s motive being either (a) fear that they will charge him with the offense or interrogate him about it (steps in the formal inquiry into the offense) or (b) fear that they will jeer, scoff, or make him feel abashed (steps in his enemies’ informal reaction to the news). In other words, this factor is fulfilled if one wants to prevent a Community transaction from being carried out against the offender or simply to protect him from the jeering remarks of other bhikkhus who may dislike him.

4) Effort: One sees a bhikkhu suitable to be informed of the matter but abandons one’s duty to report the offense.

Object & perception

Serious offense, according to the Vibhaṅga, means a pārājika or a saṅghādisesa. As under Pc 9, the Commentary states that, despite what the Vibhaṅga actually says here, its compilers meant to include only saṅghādisesa offenses under this definition. But, as was also the case under Pc 9, this explanation clearly contradicts the Vibhaṅga, so it cannot stand.  

Another bhikkhu’s non-serious offenses are grounds for a dukkaṭa here, as are the misdeeds—serious or not—of an unordained person. None of the texts explicitly define the term unordained person here, but because bhikkhus have no responsibility to tell other bhikkhus of the misdeeds of lay people, the sense of the rule would seem to require that it cover only bhikkhunīs, female trainees, male novices, and female novices. (Again, none of the texts state explicitly whether a bhikkhunī counts as ordained or unordained in the context of this rule, but because the Vibhaṅga defines serious offenses as the four pārājikas and the thirteen saṅghādisesas, and because the bhikkhunīs have different numbers of these two classes of rules, it would appear that a bhikkhunī would count as an unordained person here.) According to the Commentary, a breach of any of the first five precepts would count as serious for an unordained person (presumably meaning a novice or female trainee), whereas any other misdeed would count as not serious.

As for a bhikkhu’s offenses, the Vibhaṅga states that only a serious offense that one perceives to be serious is grounds for a pācittiya. All other possible combinations of object and perception—a serious offense about which one is in doubt, a serious offense that one perceives to be non-serious, a non-serious offense that one perceives to be serious, a non-serious offense about which one is in doubt, and a non-serious offense that one perceives to be non-serious—are grounds for a dukkaṭa.

Effort & intention

The K/Commentary defines the factor of effort here as if it were a simple act of mind—one decides that, “I won’t tell any bhikkhu about this”—but this goes against the principle that the commentaries themselves derive from the Vinīta-vatthu to Pr 2 and apply to all the rules: that the mere arising of a mind state is never sufficient for an offense. It would seem better to argue from the Vibhaṅga’s non-offense clauses to this rule and say that this factor is fulfilled if one comes to this decision when seeing a bhikkhu who is suitable to tell and yet decides not to tell him.

None of the texts define suitable bhikkhu here, but—following the Commentary to Cv.III—it would probably mean one who is of common affiliation and in good standing, i.e., neither suspended or undergoing penance or probation. Because of the way in which the factor of intention is worded here, a suitable bhikkhu in this case—unlike the case in which a bhikkhu needs to report his own saṅghādisesa offense—would not have to be on congenial terms with either the bhikkhu who committed the offense that needs to be reported or the bhikkhu responsible for reporting it. If the only bhikkhu available to be told is uncongenial, one must be scrupulously honest with oneself about any disinclination to inform him of the offense. If one’s only fear is that he will jeer at the offender or initiate a Community transaction to look into the offense, one is duty bound to tell him. If one feels that telling him will lead to strife in the Community or retaliation from the original offender—as the non-offense clauses note—one may wait and tell a more suitable bhikkhu.

Because the non-offense clauses also state that there is no offense in not reporting the offense if one’s motive is not to hide it, one need not inform the first suitable bhikkhu one meets if one is planning to inform a more appropriate bhikkhu, such as a senior member of the Community, a Vinaya expert, or the offender’s mentor or preceptor.

Apparently, once one has told a suitable bhikkhu, one is absolved of the responsibility of having to tell anyone else. However, none of the texts discuss the question of what one’s duty is if, after informing another bhikkhu, one realizes that he wants to conceal the offense. A responsible course of action, if none of the dangers listed in the non-offense clauses apply, would be to find and inform a more responsible bhikkhu, but this is a matter of one’s conscience and not of the rules.

The Commentary says that if, out of a desire to hide the original offense, one neglects to inform a suitable bhikkhu but then later changes one’s mind and tells either him or yet another bhikkhu, one has committed the offense all the same.

It also says that if one tells Bhikkhu X, asking him to help hide Bhikkhu Y’s offense, this also fulfills the factors of effort and intention here. If X then abandons his responsibility to tell, he too commits the corresponding offense under this rule. Regardless of how many co-conspirators would end up trying to keep the original offense secret enough to prevent a formal inquiry into it, all of them would be guilty of the offense here.

Non-offenses

There is no offense in not telling another bhikkhu—

if one thinks that telling will lead to strife or a split in the Community;

if, seeing that the bhikkhu who has committed the offense is violent by nature, one feels that he might create “dangers to life” or “dangers to the celibate life”;

if one sees no suitable bhikkhu to tell;

if one has no desire to hide the offense; or

if one feels that the wrong-doer’s own behavior will betray him and thus there is no need to tell.

Summary: Not informing another bhikkhu of a serious offense that one knows a third bhikkhu has committed—out of a desire to protect the third bhikkhu either from having to undergo the penalty or from the jeering remarks of other bhikkhus—is a pācittiya offense.

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65

Should any bhikkhu knowingly give full Acceptance (ordination) to an individual less than twenty years old, the individual is not accepted and the bhikkhus are blameworthy; and as for him (the preceptor), it is to be confessed.

The origin story here tells how the group of seventeen came to be ordained.

“Now at that time in Rājagaha, a group of seventeen boys were friends, with the boy Upāli as their leader. Then the thought occurred to Upāli’s parents, ‘By what means could Upāli, after our death, live pleasantly and not suffer?… If he studies writing, his fingers will hurt…. If he studies calculation, his breast will hurt…. If he studies money changing, his eyes will hurt. Now, these Sakyan-son monks are of pleasant virtue and conduct. Having eaten good meals, they lie down in beds sheltered from the wind. If Upāli went forth among the Sakyan-son monks, he would live pleasantly after our death and not suffer.’

“The boy Upāli heard his parents’ conversation. So he went to the boys… and said, ‘Come, masters, let’s go forth among the Sakyan-son monks.’

“‘If you go forth, master, so will we.’

“So each of the boys, having gone to his parents, said, ‘Permit us to go forth from home into homelessness.’ Then the parents of the boys gave their permission, (thinking,) ‘All these boys are unanimous in their desire. Their motives are noble.’

“(The boys) having gone to the bhikkhus, asked for the Going-forth. The bhikkhus gave them the Going-forth and full Acceptance. Then, waking up in the last watch of the night, the boys (now bhikkhus) cried out, ‘Give us porridge! Give us a meal! Give us food!’

“The bhikkhus said, ‘Wait, friends, until the night turns light. If there is porridge, you will drink it. If there is a meal, you will eat it. If there is food, you will eat it. But if there is no porridge or meal or food, then you will eat having gone for alms.’

“But even then, those (new) bhikkhus cried out as before, ‘Give us porridge! Give us a meal! Give us food!’ And they wet the bedding and soiled it.”

The Buddha, in rebuking the bhikkhus who had given full Acceptance to the seventeen boys, painted a picture of the bhikkhus’ life very different from that imagined by Upāli’s parents:

“Bhikkhus, how can these worthless men knowingly give full Acceptance to an individual less than 20 years old? An individual less than 20 years old is not resistant to cold, heat, hunger, thirst, the touch of gadflies and mosquitoes, wind and sun and creeping things; or to abusive, hurtful language. He is not the sort who can endure bodily feelings that, when they arise, are painful, sharp, stabbing, fierce, distasteful, disagreeable, deadly.’”

The factors for the full offense here are three.

1) Object: a man less than 20 years old.

2) Perception: One knows that he is less than 20 years old—either from knowing on one’s own, from having been told by the man, or from having been told by others.

3) Effort: One acts as the preceptor in his full Acceptance as a bhikkhu.

Object

As Mv.I.75 makes clear, a person’s age for the purpose of this rule is counted from the time he becomes a fetus in his mother’s womb. Because this is difficult—if not impossible—to date with any accuracy, the usual practice in calculating a person’s age is to add six months to the number of years since his birth, to allow for the possibility of his having been born prematurely. As the Commentary notes, a baby born after seven months in the womb may survive, but one born after only six months in the womb won’t.

Perception

If one is in doubt as to whether an individual is less than 20, but goes ahead and ordains him anyway, one incurs a dukkaṭa regardless of his actual age. If one perceives him as less than 20 when he is actually 20 or older, he is grounds for a dukkaṭa. If one perceives him as 20 or older, then regardless of his actual age he is not grounds for an offense.

Effort

There is a dukkaṭa for every step in arranging the Acceptance of an individual one knows to be less than 20 years old, beginning with the act of searching out a group to join in the transaction, looking for robes and a bowl for him to use, etc., all the way to the second proclamation in the Acceptance transaction. Once the third and final proclamation has been made, the preceptor incurs a pācittiya, and all other bhikkhus in the group who know that the individual is less than 20 years old, a dukkaṭa.

In any case, if the individual is really less than 20 years old when he is accepted, then—regardless of whether he or anyone else knows of the fact—he does not count as a bhikkhu and is only a novice. The Commentary notes here that if he continues in this state for long enough to become a preceptor or teacher in another person’s Acceptance, that person counts as rightly accepted only as long as there are enough true bhikkhus in the group accepting him, not counting the improperly accepted “bhikkhu” in question. (See BMC2, Chapter 14 for more details on this issue.)

The Commentary adds that if one is less that 20 when being accepted, without knowing the fact, it does not act as an obstacle to one’s qualifying for heaven or the transcendent states; but if one ever finds out the truth that one was improperly accepted, one should immediately arrange for a proper Acceptance.

Summary: Acting as the preceptor in the full Acceptance of a person one knows to be less than 20 years old is a pācittiya offense.

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66

Should any bhikkhu knowingly and by arrangement travel together with a caravan of thieves, even for the interval between one village and the next, it is to be confessed.

Here the full offense has three factors.

1) Object: a caravan of thieves.

2) Perception: One knows that it is a caravan of thieves—either from knowing on one’s own, from having been told by one of the thieves, or from having been told by others.

3) Effort: (a) Having made an arrangement together with the caravan to travel together, (b) one actually travels together with them as arranged (c) from one village to another.

Object

A caravan of thieves, according to the Vibhaṅga, is any group that has committed a theft, is on its way to commit a theft, is planning to evade a tax, or is planning to “rob the king,” which the Commentary translates as planning to cheat the government in one way or another. At present this would include any person or group of people smuggling or trading in contraband goods.

None of the texts mention the minimum number of thieves needed to form a “group,” but because the Vibhaṅga consistently uses plural forms to describe the thieves, it would appear that at least two thieves are needed to fulfill this factor.

Perception

If one is in doubt as to whether a group would count as a caravan of thieves, there is a dukkaṭa for traveling with them regardless of whether they actually are a caravan of thieves or not. If one perceives them to be a caravan of thieves when they actually aren’t, they are grounds for a dukkaṭa. If one does not perceive them to be a caravan of thieves, then regardless of whether they are or aren’t, they are not grounds for an offense.

Making an arrangement

According to the Vibhaṅga, both the bhikkhu and the thieves must give their verbal assent to the arrangement for this part of the factor to be fulfilled. If the bhikkhu proposes the arrangement but the thieves do not give their verbal assent, then even if they later travel together as he proposed, he incurs a dukkaṭa. If they propose the arrangement but he does not give his verbal assent, then even if they later travel together as proposed, he incurs no penalty. As under Pc 27, verbal assent expressed by writing would fulfill this factor as well.

As mentioned under Pc 27, a statement or set of statements mentioning both sides of the arrangement in connection with the journey—“We’ll go”; “Let’s go”; “You and I will go together”—would count as verbal assent here, whereas a statement or set of statements mentioning only one’s own plans with regard to the journey—“I’ll go”—would not. Thus if a bhikkhu states, “I’m going to cross the border tomorrow,” and a group of thieves says, “Let’s go together,” then if he says nothing more on the topic, he has not expressed verbal assent.

According to the Commentary, the defining feature of the arrangement is that it specifies the time at which they will leave together. But as we noted under Pc 27, many examples of arrangements in the Vibhaṅga do not explicitly mention a time frame for leaving, so the Commentary’s stipulation here cannot stand. Any expressed agreement to go together would fulfill this factor, regardless of whether the time frame is explicitly stated.

The texts do not address the case in which another person initiates the arrangements for a bhikkhu to travel together with a caravan of thieves, say, as part of a larger group. However, as under Pc 27, the examples of arrangements given in the Vibhaṅga suggest that as long as the bhikkhu and the thieves do not address each other—directly or through an intermediary—about traveling together, there would be no offense in joining the group.

Going as arranged

The two parties must travel together as specified in the arrangement for this sub-factor to be fulfilled. If the arrangement is minimal or spur-of-the-moment, with no time frame explicitly specified, then simply leaving together at any time would fulfill this sub-factor. If a time frame is explicitly specified, then this sub-factor is fulfilled only if they leave within the time frame. If they happen to start out earlier or later than arranged, the bhikkhu incurs no penalty. As under Pc 27, the Commentary suggests that “earlier“ or “later” here involve fairly substantial amounts of time, i.e., going one day later than arranged, or going before the meal when the arrangement was to go after the meal. However, if they leave from a different spot than the one they had arranged or go by a different route, that does not absolve the bhikkhu from the offense.

From one village to another

There is a pācittiya for every village-to-village interval one passes. In an area where there are no villages—i.e., says the Sub-commentary, where villages are farther than half a yojana (8 km. or 5 miles) apart—there is a pācittiya for every half-yojana one travels together with the thieves as arranged.

None of the texts mention cases of traveling long distances within a large city, but it would seem that in such cases—arguing from the Great Standards—one would incur the full penalty in traveling from one administrative district to the next.

Non-offenses

There is no offense—

if the bhikkhu and thieves happen to travel together without having made an arrangement;

if the thieves propose an arrangement, but the bhikkhu does not give his verbal assent;

if the bhikkhu leaves not as specified in the arrangement (§); or

if there are dangers (and the bhikkhu must join the caravan for his safety).

A peculiarity of the third non-offense clause here, is that—unlike its parallels in Pc 27 & 28—all the major Asian editions of the Canon express it in the singular (he leaves) rather than the plural (they leave). Only the PTS edition puts it in the plural. In the following rule, all the major editions, including the PTS, put the parallel clause in the singular. None of the commentaries call attention to these disparities, and apparently they make no difference in practice.

Summary: Traveling by arrangement with a group of thieves from one village to another—knowing that they are thieves—is a pācittiya offense.

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67

Should any bhikkhu, by arrangement, travel together with a woman, even for the interval between one village and the next, it is to be confessed.

“Now at that time a certain bhikkhu, going through the Kosalan districts on his way to Sāvatthī, passed by the gate of a certain village. A woman, leaving the village after quarreling with her husband, saw the bhikkhu and said, ‘Where are you going, venerable sir?’

“‘I’m going to Sāvatthī, sister.’

“‘Then I’m going with you.’

“‘As you wish, sister.’

“Then the woman’s husband, leaving the village, asked people, ‘Have you seen such-and-such a woman?’

“‘She’s going along with a monk.’

“So the man, having caught up with them, seized the bhikkhu, gave him a good thrashing, and set him free. The bhikkhu went and sat fuming under a certain tree. The woman said to the man, ‘That bhikkhu didn’t abscond with me. I was the one who went with him. He’s innocent. Go and ask his forgiveness.’

“So the man asked the bhikkhu for his forgiveness.”

Object

A female human being, experienced enough to know what is properly and improperly said, what is lewd and not lewd, is grounds for a pācittiya here. Paṇḍakas, female yakkhas and petas, and animals in the form of a female human being are all grounds for a dukkaṭa. Woman here also includes women. In other words, the inclusion of one or more extra women in the travel arrangement is not a mitigating factor; and, in fact, there is an offense for every woman included in the travel arrangement. The inclusion of men in the travel arrangement, however, is a controversial issue at present, and is discussed below.

Perception as to whether the person is actually a woman is not a mitigating factor here (see Pc 4).

Similarly, if one travels by arrangement with a paṇḍaka, not knowing that that’s what he is, one still incurs a dukkaṭa.

Effort

Effort here is defined in a parallel way to its definition under the preceding rule: (a) Having made an arrangement together with the woman to travel together, (b) one actually travels together with her as arranged (c) from one village to another. See the preceding rule for explanations and for the allotment of offenses.

Non-offenses

There is no offense—

if the bhikkhu and woman happen to travel together without having made an arrangement;

if the woman proposes an arrangement, while the bhikkhu does not give his verbal assent;

if either party leaves (or, apparently, both leave together) not as specified in the arrangement (§); or

if there are dangers.

Current practice

In the time of the Buddha, long-distance travel was mostly by foot, and the question of prior arrangement was what made the difference between whether one was traveling together with someone else or simply happened to be walking along the road at the same time. At present, when one is taking public transport—buses, subways, trains, and airplanes—this is still the factor determining whether one is traveling together with someone else or simply happens to be on the bus, etc., at the same time. This rule thus forbids a bhikkhu from traveling together with a woman, by prior arrangement, on the same public transport.

Private transport, though—such as automobiles, trucks and vans—is an area that different Communities treat in differing ways. Some treat it under Pc 44 rather than here, saying that a bhikkhu may sit in an automobile with a woman as long as a knowledgeable man is present. This holds regardless of whether the automobile is sitting still or traveling any number of miles, and regardless of whether the woman or the man is driving.

Other Communities treat private transport under this rule, but say that the prior arrangement is implicitly with the driver of the transport. If the driver is a woman, there is a pācittiya in riding with her from one village to the next. If the driver is a man, there is no offense, regardless of whether a woman is riding along.

The Commentary would not agree with this second interpretation, for it states explicitly when discussing Mv.V.10.3 that a bhikkhu may ride in a cart driven by a woman or a man. At any rate, though, this is another area where the wise policy is to follow the practice of the Community in which one belongs, as long as one is careful to adhere to the Vibhaṅga by not entering verbally into any arrangement with a woman to go traveling together.

Summary: Traveling by arrangement with a woman from one village to another is a pācittiya offense.

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68

Should any bhikkhu say the following: “As I understand the Dhamma taught by the Blessed One, those acts the Blessed One says are obstructive, when engaged in are not genuine obstructions,” the bhikkhus are to admonish him thus: “Do not say that, venerable sir. Do not slander the Blessed One, for it is not good to slander the Blessed One. The Blessed One would not say anything like that. In many ways, friend, the Blessed One has described obstructive acts, and when engaged in they are genuine obstructions. [The Sri Lankan and Burmese recensions read: In many ways, friend, the Blessed One has described obstructive acts as obstructive, and when engaged in they are genuine obstructions.] ”

And should that bhikkhu, thus admonished by the bhikkhus, persist as before, the bhikkhus are to rebuke him up to three times for the sake of relinquishing that. If while being rebuked up to three times he relinquishes that, that is good. If he does not relinquish (that), it is to be confessed.

Obstructions

The Vibhaṅga does not define obstruction in the context of this rule, although the origin story makes clear that it refers at the very least to the sexual act. The Commentary defines obstruction as anything that acts as an obstacle to the attainment of heaven or emancipation. It lists five major categories:

1) Actions, i.e., the five ānantariya/ānantarika-kamma: patricide, matricide, the murder of an arahant, the wounding of a Buddha, the creation of a schism in a Saṅgha;

2) Defilements, i.e., firmly held wrong views (the Sub-commentary lists determinism, fatalism, annihilationism, etc.);

3) Fruits of past actions, e.g., birth as a common animal (see the story of the nāga at Mv.I.63—BMC2, Chapter 14);

4) Verbal abuse, i.e., reviling a Noble One—although this is an obstruction only so long as one has not asked forgiveness; and finally, for a bhikkhu,

5) Intentional transgressions of the Buddha’s ordinances, although these are obstacles only as long as one has not undergone the penalty called for in the relevant rule.

The Commentary does not say from where it derives this list. The first three categories—without explanations—are found in AN 6:86. AN 6:87 provides the examples for the first category. The statement in the Nidāna to the Pāṭimokkha that an intentional lie is an obstruction may have provided the Commentary with an example of the fifth category. (AN 3:88 states that arahants may intentionally commit offenses, but that they willingly undergo rehabilitation for them.) As for the fourth category, the primary reference in the Canon is to the case of the bhikkhu Kokālika, who spreads lies about Sāriputta and Moggallāna, comes down with a horrible disease, and then dies, reappearing in hell because he continued to harbor animosity toward them (SN 6:10). Thus reviling here would seem to mean spreading lies impelled by animosity.

The Commentary notes that this training rule deals with a bhikkhu who holds to the view that the fifth category is not an obstacle, the most common example being the bhikkhu who believes that there is nothing wrong in a bhikkhu’s having sexual intercourse in defiance of Pr 1.

There are many ways one might rationalize such an idea, and the Commentary gives an entertaining description of one of them:

“There is the case where a bhikkhu… having gone into seclusion, reasons as follows: ‘There are people living the household life, enjoying the five pleasures of the senses, who are stream-winners, once-returners, and non-returners. As for bhikkhus, they see pleasurable forms cognizable via the eye, hear… smell… taste… feel (pleasurable) tactile sensations cognizable via the body. They use soft carpets and clothing. All this is proper. Then why shouldn’t the sight, sound, smell, taste, and feel of a woman be proper? They too are proper!’ Thus… comparing a mustard seed with Mount Sineru, he gives rise to the evil view, ‘Why did the Blessed One—binding the ocean, as it were, with great effort—formulate the first pārājika training rule? There is nothing wrong with that act.’”

Simply holding such a view is not enough to bring a bhikkhu under the purview of this rule, but if he asserts it to others, the Vibhaṅga states that other bhikkhus have the duty of reprimanding him up to three times in the manner described in the rule. If, having learned of his assertion, they do not reprimand him, they each incur a dukkaṭa, for if he goes unreprimanded, he may continue with his assertions as he likes without incurring a penalty.

If, after being reprimanded, he relinquishes his view, he incurs no penalty. But if he doesn’t, he incurs a dukkaṭa. He should then be taken into the midst of the Community to be admonished and rebuked as described under Sg 10, the only difference here being that the penalty is a dukkaṭa in each of the preliminary stages, and a pācittiya after the third formal rebuke. (The formula for the rebuke is given in Appendix VIII.) Unlike the Vibhaṅga to the parallel saṅghādisesa rules, the Vibhaṅga here does not say that the penalties incurred in the preliminary stages are annulled when the full penalty is incurred.

Perception is not a mitigating factor here. If the rebuke transaction is properly carried out, then one’s offense is a pācittiya regardless of whether one regards it as such. If the transaction is improperly carried out, then again—regardless of how one perceives its validity—one incurs a dukkaṭa (§), probably for one’s unwillingness to relinquish one’s view after being reprimanded. In other words, a pattern similar to the one set out under Sg 10, rather than the one under Pc 4, holds here.

Further action

If a bhikkhu penalized under this rule persists in asserting his evil view, he is subject to an act of suspension, under which he is not allowed to commune or affiliate with bhikkhus in any Community until he sees the error of his ways and relinquishes his view (see BMC2, Chapter 20). As is the case under Sg 10-13, a Community preparing to impose this rule on a stubborn bhikkhu should also be prepared to impose a suspension transaction on him immediately in case he refuses to respond to the formal rebuke.

Non-offenses

There is no offense for the bhikkhu if he has not been reprimanded or if, after being reprimanded, he relinquishes his view.

Summary: Refusing—after the third proclamation of a formal rebuke in a meeting of the Community—to relinquish the evil view that there is nothing wrong in intentionally transgressing the Buddha’s ordinances is a pācittiya offense.

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69

Should any bhikkhu knowingly commune, affiliate, or lie down in the same dwelling with a bhikkhu professing such a view who has not acted in compliance with the rule, who has not abandoned that view, it is to be confessed.

This rule reinforces the suggestion made under the preceding rule, that a bhikkhu who refuses to respond to the rebuke imposed by that rule should immediately be suspended. There are three factors for the full offense here.

1) Object: a bhikkhu who has been suspended by a Community transaction and has not yet been restored.

2) Perception: One knows that he has been suspended and has not yet been restored—either from knowing on one’s own, from having been told by the bhikkhu, or from having been told by others.

3) Effort: One communes with him, affiliates with him, or lies down in the same dwelling with him.

Object

According to Cv.I.25-35, a bhikkhu may be suspended for any one of three reasons:

He refuses to relinquish an evil view, as in the preceding rule;

he refuses to see an offense (i.e., he admits to having performed an action forbidden by the rules, but refuses to concede that it is an offense); or

he refuses to make amends for an offense (again, he admits to having performed an action forbidden by the rules, but refuses to undergo the attendant penalty).

Once a bhikkhu has been suspended, it is his duty to change his ways and reject the view or position that led to his suspension, so that he may be restored to normal status.

According to the Vibhaṅga, the factor of object here is fulfilled by a bhikkhu who has been suspended for the first of these three reasons and has yet to be restored. However, because the rules governing the way in which a suspended bhikkhu is to be treated by other bhikkhus are the same for all three cases (see Cv.I.27, Cv.I.31, Cv.I.33), the Commentary argues that a bhikkhu suspended for either of the other two reasons would fulfil this factor as well. The Vibhaṅga’s non-offense clauses add, though, that if the bhikkhu was suspended for holding an evil view and has come to relinquish that view, he does not fulfill this factor even if the Community has yet to restore him to normal status. This allowance would apparently apply to bhikkhus suspended for other reasons as well.

Perception

There is no offense in communing, etc., with a suspended bhikkhu if one perceives him as unsuspended; a dukkaṭa for communing, etc., with an unsuspended bhikkhu if one perceives him as suspended; and a dukkaṭa for communing, etc., with a bhikkhu if one is in doubt as to whether he has been suspended. This last penalty holds regardless of whether he has actually been suspended.

None of the texts mention the matter, but a similar principle would also seem to apply to one’s perception of the transaction whereby the bhikkhu was suspended. Thus, there would be no offense in communing, etc., with him if one perceived a valid transaction as invalid; a dukkaṭa for communing, etc., with him if one perceived an invalid transaction as valid; and a dukkaṭa for communing, etc., with him if one was in doubt as to the transaction’s validity, regardless of whether it was actually valid or not.

Effort

Effort here covers any one of three sorts of action:

1) One communes with the bhikkhu. Communion takes one of two forms: sharing material objects, i.e., giving material objects to the bhikkhu or receiving them from him; or sharing Dhamma, i.e., reciting Dhamma for him or getting him to recite Dhamma. The penalties for sharing Dhamma are, if one recites line-by-line or gets the other to recite line-by-line, a pācittiya for each line; if syllable-by-syllable, a pācittiya for each syllable.

2) One affiliates with the bhikkhu, i.e., one participates in a transaction of the Community along with him. An example would be sitting in the same assembly with him to listen to the Pāṭimokkha.

3) One lies down in the same dwelling with him. “Same dwelling” here, unlike Pc 5 & 6, means one with the same roof. Thus, as the K/Commentary notes, if one is lying under the same roof with the bhikkhu, one falls under this factor even if one is lying in a room that is not connected by any entrance with the one he is lying in. And, we might add, one falls under this factor regardless of whether the dwelling is walled or not. Whether one lies down first, the suspended bhikkhu lies down first, or both lie down at the same time, is not an issue here. As under Pc 5, if both parties get up and then lie down again, one incurs another pācittiya.

These three actions touch on only a few of the observances a suspended bhikkhu must follow, but they are the only ones that entail a pācittiya for a regular bhikkhu who has dealings with him while he is suspended. For further details, see Cv.I.25-35 and BMC2, Chapter 20.

Non-offenses

There is no offense in communing, affiliating, or lying down in the same dwelling with another bhikkhu if one knows that—

he has not been suspended;

he was suspended but has been restored; or

he has abandoned the evil view that led to his suspension.

The Vibhaṅga states explicitly that the first of these three exemptions holds regardless of whether one’s perception is correct, and the same principle would seem to apply to the remaining two as well.

Summary: Communing, affiliating, or lying down under the same roof with a bhikkhu who has been suspended and not been restored—knowing that such is the case—is a pācittiya offense.

*    *    *

70

And if a novice should say the following: “As I understand the Dhamma taught by the Blessed One, those acts the Blessed One says are obstructive, when engaged in are not genuine obstructions,” the bhikkhus are to admonish him thus: “Do not say that, friend novice. Do not slander the Blessed One, for it is not good to slander the Blessed One. The Blessed One would not say anything like that. In many ways, friend, the Blessed One has described obstructive acts, and when engaged in they are genuine obstructions. [The Sri Lankan and Burmese recensions read: In many ways, friend, the Blessed One has described obstructive acts as obstructive, and when engaged in they are genuine obstructions.]”

And should that novice, thus admonished by the bhikkhus, persist as before, the bhikkhus are to admonish him thus: “From this day forth, friend novice, you are not to claim the Blessed One as your teacher, nor are you even to have the opportunity the other novices get—that of sharing dwellings two or three nights with the bhikkhus. Away with you! Get lost!”

Should any bhikkhu knowingly befriend, receive services from, commune with, or lie down in the same dwelling with a novice thus expelled, it is to be confessed.

The factors for the full offense here are three.

1) Object: a novice who has been expelled and has not relinquished his evil view.

2) Perception: One perceives that he has been expelled and has not relinquished his evil view—either from knowing on one’s own, from having been told by him (§), or from having been told by others.

3) Effort: One befriends him, receives services from him, communes with him, or lies down in the same dwelling with him.

Object

According to the Commentary, there are three types of expulsion: expulsion from affiliation (this applies only to bhikkhus and bhikkhunīs, and refers to the act of suspension discussed under the preceding rule); expulsion from one’s status; and expulsion as a punishment. Novices are subject to the latter two.

1) Mv.I.60 lists ten grounds for expelling a novice from his status as a novice: He breaks any of his first five precepts; he speaks in dispraise of the Buddha, Dhamma, or Saṅgha; he holds to wrong views (such things as eternalism, fatalism, or annihilationism, says the Commentary); or he rapes a bhikkhunī.

The Commentary to Mv.I.60 states that a novice who breaks any of his first five precepts has cut himself off from the Triple Refuge, from his teacher, and from his right to a dwelling in a monastery. He is still a novice, though, and if he sees the error of his ways and is determined to restrain himself in the future, he may take the Triple Refuge from his teacher again and so be restored to his former status. (The Commentary adds that a novice who knowingly drinks alcohol in defiance of the fifth precept may be restored to his status as a novice but may never ordain as a bhikkhu in this lifetime. Not all Communities share this view, as it is not supported by the Canon.) If, however, a novice breaks any of these precepts habitually and is not determined to restrain himself in the future, he is to be expelled from his status as a novice.

As for the novice who holds to wrong views or who speaks in dispraise of the Buddha, Dhamma, or Saṅgha, the bhikkhus are to instruct him to show him the error of his ways. If he abandons his views, he is to undergo punishment for an appropriate period (see Mv.I.57-58) and then be allowed to confess his error, so as to return to his former status. If he does not change his ways, he is to be expelled from his status as a novice.

And as for the novice who rapes a bhikkhunī: The Commentary notes that this comes under the breaking of the third precept, but is listed separately because a novice who has sexual intercourse with anyone but a bhikkhunī may be reinstated if he sees the error of his ways, whereas one who has raped a bhikkhunī may not—and furthermore, he can never be ordained as a novice or a bhikkhu in this lifetime. (See BMC2, Chapter 14.)

Except in the last case, a novice who has been expelled from his status as a novice may be reordained as a novice if he sees his errors and can convince the bhikkhus that he will mend his ways in the future.

2) The second form of expulsion—expulsion as punishment—is the one mentioned in this rule: A novice comes to think that there is nothing wrong with any novice’s having sexual intercourse or breaking any of his other precepts. If he asserts this view, the bhikkhus are to instruct him to show him that it is evil, but if they cannot sway him, they are to expel him in the form described in the rule: He has no right to claim the Buddha as his teacher and loses his right to live in the same dwellings with the bhikkhus, although he retains his status as a novice. This form of expulsion lasts as long as he has yet to relinquish his view. If and when he does relinquish it, he is to be reinstated. The Commentary doesn’t say how, but we can reason from the pattern mentioned above that he should take the Triple Refuge from his teacher again.

The Commentary states that the factor of object under this rule is fulfilled only by a novice who has undergone the second form of expulsion and has yet to relinquish his evil view.

Perception

There is no offense in befriending, etc., an expelled novice if one does not know that he has been expelled; a dukkaṭa for befriending, etc., a novice who has not been expelled but whom one perceives as expelled; and a dukkaṭa for befriending, etc., a novice if one is in doubt about the matter. This last penalty holds regardless of whether he has actually been expelled or not.

Effort

Effort here is fulfilled by any one of four sorts of action:

1) Befriending a novice means making friendly overtures to him with the thought of supplying him with material requisites or instruction in the Dhamma, as a mentor would.

2) Receiving services from him means to accept the services a mentor normally receives from his student—the Vibhaṅga mentions accepting powder, clay (soap) for washing, tooth-wood, or water for rinsing the mouth or washing the face (§).

3 & 4) Communing and lying down in the same dwelling are defined as under the preceding rule.

Non-offenses

There is no offense in befriending, etc., a novice if one knows that he has not been expelled, or if one knows that he has relinquished the view that led to his expulsion in the first place. As under the preceding rule, the Vibhaṅga states explicitly that the first exemption holds regardless of whether one’s perception is correct, and the same principle would seem to apply to the second one as well.

Summary: Befriending, receiving services from, communing, or lying down under the same roof with an expelled novice—knowing that he has been expelled—is a pācittiya offense.

Eight: The In-accordance-with-the-Rule Chapter

71

Should any bhikkhu, admonished by the bhikkhus in accordance with a rule, say, “Friends, I will not train myself under this training rule until I have put questions about it to another bhikkhu, competent and learned in the discipline,” it is to be confessed. Bhikkhus, a bhikkhu in training should understand, should ask, should ponder. This is the proper course here.

This rule deals with cases where a bhikkhu tries to excuse himself from following any of the training rules without showing out-and-out disrespect for the rule or the person admonishing him. (If he showed out-and-out disrespect, the case would come under Pc 54.) The factors for the full offense here are three.

1) Object: One has been admonished by a fellow bhikkhu who cites a rule formulated in the Vinaya.

2) Intention: One does not want to train oneself in line with the rule.

3) Effort: As a ploy to excuse oneself, one says something to the effect that one will not train in line with the rule.

Only two of these factors—object and effort—require explanation.

Object

The explanation for this factor is exactly the same as under Pc 54. Perception as to whether the person giving the admonishment is ordained is irrelevant to the offense (see Pc 42).

Effort

Looking at the Vibhaṅga’s discussion of this factor, it would appear to cover only cases where one used the precise words mentioned in the training rule, but the K/Commentary—drawing probably on the Great Standards—expands it to cover any case where one says something as a ploy to excuse oneself from following the rule without showing disrespect. Examples might include: “I’ll worry about that rule when I come to it.” “I don’t have time for that right now.” “I’ve been wondering: Do you really think that that rule applies in this day and age? It gets in the way of our spreading the Dhamma.” In other words, this factor closes any loopholes left by Pc 54.

Non-offenses

According to the Vibhaṅga, the only way to avoid an offense in situations like this is to say that one will learn about the rule and train in line with it. As the non-offense clauses to Pc 54 make clear, though, if one has been admonished with any interpretation of a rule that differs from one’s teachers’, one may avoid an offense simply by stating that one’s teachers taught differently.

Summary: When being admonished by another bhikkhu with regard to a training rule formulated in the Vinaya, saying something as a ploy to excuse oneself from training under the rule is a pācittiya offense.

*    *    *

72

Should any bhikkhu, when the Pāṭimokkha is being recited, say, “Why are these lesser and minor training rules recited when they lead only to anxiety, bother, and confusion?” the criticism of the training rules is to be confessed.

“Now at that time the Blessed One, phrasing it in many ways, gave a talk on discipline to the bhikkhus. He spoke in praise of discipline, in praise of the mastery of discipline, and in praise of Ven. Upāli, referring to him again and again. The bhikkhus (said), ‘… Come, friends, let’s study discipline with Ven. Upāli.’ They and many other bhikkhus—elders, newly ordained, and those in between—studied discipline with Ven. Upāli.

“Then the thought occurred to some group-of-six bhikkhus: ‘Now, friends, many bhikkhus… are studying discipline with Ven. Upāli. If they become well versed in the discipline, they will push us and pull us around in whatever way they like, however they like, and as long as they like. Come, friends, let’s criticize the discipline.’ Then the group-of-six bhikkhus, going to the bhikkhus, said, ‘Why are these lesser and minor training rules repeated when they lead only to anxiety, bother, and confusion?’”

The full offense here has three factors.

1) Effort: One criticizes the discipline in the presence

2) Object: of another bhikkhu

3) Intention: with the intent of disparaging it.

Effort

The Vibhaṅga explains criticizing the discipline with a list of examples. In addition to the statement in the rule, the list includes such statements as, “Those who master this suffer anxiety, bother, and confusion. Those who don’t master this suffer no anxiety, bother, or confusion. It would be better (§) if this were not repeated. It would be better (§) if this were not learned. It would be better (§) if this were not mastered. It would be better (§) if this were not borne in mind. May the discipline disappear or may these bhikkhus not be well-versed in this.” This last sentence sounds less like a criticism and more like a possible motivation for one’s criticism—a typical ambiguity in the style of the Pali Canon—but none of the commentaries discuss this point.

The training rule would seem to indicate that these actions are grounds for an offense only while the Pāṭimokkha is being recited or rehearsed, but the non-offense clauses in the Vibhaṅga give no allowance to criticize the discipline at other times, and the K/Commentary follows the Vibhaṅga in not making the recitation of the Pāṭimokkha a necessary factor for the offense here. In other words, the factor of effort here is fulfilled if one criticizes the discipline at any time.

Object

There is a pācittiya for criticizing the discipline in the presence of a bhikkhu; and a dukkaṭa for criticizing any other Dhamma in his presence, or criticizing either the discipline or any other Dhamma in the presence of an unordained person. Perception as to whether one’s listener is ordained is irrelevant to the offense (see Pc 42).

Intention

This factor is fulfilled when one’s intention is to disparage the discipline. Given the way “effort” is defined above, this factor might seem superfluous, but the non-offense clauses give an example of an effort that may sound like criticism but is not actually meant to be taken as disparagement. The Commentary defines the factor of intention here as the desire to give rise to skepticism (vimati) about the discipline in the listener’s mind.

Further action

A bhikkhu who makes a concerted effort to speak in dispraise of the Dhamma or discipline may be subject to an act of censure or banishment, depending on the seriousness of the case (Cv.I.4.1; Cv.I.14.2). (See BMC2, Chapter 20.)

Non-offenses

There is no offense if, without intending to criticize the discipline, one suggests to another person that he/she master the suttas, the gāthās (verses), or the Abhidhamma first, before mastering the discipline.

Summary: Criticizing the discipline in the presence of another bhikkhu, in hopes of making him skeptical about the discipline or its study, is a pācittiya offense.

*    *    *

73

Should any bhikkhu, when the Pāṭimokkha is being recited every half-month, say, “Just now have I learned that this case, too, is handed down in the Pāṭimokkha, is included in the Pāṭimokkha, and comes up for recitation every half-month”; and if the bhikkhus should know of that bhikkhu, “This bhikkhu has already sat through two or three recitations of the Pāṭimokkha, if not more,” the bhikkhu is not exempted for being ignorant. Whatever the offense he has committed, he is to be dealt with in accordance with the rule; and in addition, his deceit is to be exposed: “It is no gain for you, friend, it is ill-done, that when the Pāṭimokkha is being recited, you do not pay attention, properly taking it to heart.” As for the deception (§), it is to be confessed.

To summarize the Vibhaṅga: If a bhikkhu—when the recitation of the Pāṭimokkha comes to a rule he has violated—tries to excuse himself through the sort of pretence cited in the rule, he immediately incurs a dukkaṭa if he has already listened to the Pāṭimokkha in full three times or more. The other bhikkhus may then expose his deception by means of a Community transaction (see Appendix VIII). If he then continues with the pretence, he incurs a pācittiya. If they do not enact a transaction against him, though, he incurs a dukkaṭa for each effort he makes in keeping up the pretence. There is no offense, though, if he is not feigning ignorance or if he has not yet heard the Pāṭimokkha in full at least three times.

Obviously, these explanations were formulated when Pali was the bhikkhus’ native language, and the recitation of the Pāṭimokkha in Pali offered the opportunity to learn the rules, along with the opportunity to feign ignorance without telling an out-and-out lie. In other words, one could say immediately after the recitation of a particular rule, “Just now have I heard that this rule is in the Pāṭimokkha,” and strictly speaking it would be true: One has just heard it, even if for the umpteenth time, but one hopes that the other bhikkhus will be deceived into inferring that one has just heard it for the first time.

However, the discussion of this rule in the Vibhaṅga and commentaries makes no exceptions for bhikkhus whose native language is not Pali. Nevertheless, as the Pāṭimokkha is available in a number of translations, the grace period in which one is expected to be ignorant—three recitations covers at least a month to a month and a half—is not too short a time for a new bhikkhu to read and remember the rules in translation.

It is also worth noting that the non-offense clauses do not make an exception for a bhikkhu who tries a similar ploy to feign ignorance of the rules outside of the time when the Pāṭimokkha is being formally recited, and the K/Commentary—as under the preceding rule—follows the Vibhaṅga in not making the recitation of the Pāṭimokkha a necessary factor for the offense here. In other words, this rule covers the use of a half-truth to feign ignorance of the rules at any time.

The factors for the full offense here are three.

1) Object: a rule in the Pāṭimokkha.

2) Intention: One wants to deceive the bhikkhus into believing that one is ignorant of the rule one has broken.

3) Effort: One has heard the Pāṭimokkha in full for at least three times, yet one persists in saying half-truths to feign ignorance after the bhikkhus have enacted a Community transaction exposing one’s deceit. (Out-and-out lies would come under Pc 1.)

Perception as to the transaction’s validity is not a mitigating factor here. If the transaction exposing one’s deceit has been properly carried out, then regardless of whether one perceives it as valid, one incurs a pācittiya for trying to deceive the bhikkhus any further. If it has been improperly carried out, one incurs a dukkaṭa for trying to deceive them further, regardless of how one perceives the transaction.

Non-offenses

There is no offense if one has heard the Pāṭimokkha in full fewer than three times or if one is not intending to deceive anyone.

Summary: Using half-truths to deceive others into believing that one is ignorant of the rules in the Pāṭimokkha—after one has already heard the Pāṭimokkha in full three times, and a Community transaction exposing one’s deceit has been brought against one—is a pācittiya offense.

*    *    *

74

Should any bhikkhu, angered and displeased, give a blow to (another) bhikkhu, it is to be confessed.

The factors for the full offense here are three.

1) Object: another bhikkhu.

2) Effort: One gives him a blow

3) Intention: out of anger.

Object

A bhikkhu is grounds for the full offense here; anyone unordained, grounds for a dukkaṭa. According to the Commentary, anyone unordained includes animals as well as human beings.

As under Pc 42, the Vibhaṅga indicates that perception as to whether the person receiving the blow is ordained is irrelevant to the offense here.

Effort

This factor is fulfilled whether one gives a blow—

with one’s own body (hitting with a fist, jabbing with an elbow, kicking with a foot);

with something attached to the body (e.g., a stick, a knife); or

with something that can be “thrown” (this includes such things as throwing a rock, shooting an arrow, or firing a gun). According to the Vibhaṅga, this last category includes throwing “even a lotus leaf,” which shows that the blow need not be painful in order to fulfill this factor.

Such actions as twisting the other person’s arm behind his back or wringing his neck are not mentioned under this rule, but the act of grabbing his arm prior to twisting it or grabbing his neck prior to wringing it would fulfil the factor of effort here.

Intention

If one gives a blow for reasons other than anger, the action does not fall under this rule. Thus, for instance, if one thumps a fellow bhikkhu on the back to help dislodge something caught in his throat, there is no offense. And as the Commentary notes, if—impelled by lust—one gives a blow to a woman, one incurs the full penalty under Sg 2.

For some reason, the Commentary says that if one cuts off the nose or ear of a fellow bhikkhu in order to disfigure him, one incurs only a dukkaṭa. As the Vinaya-mukha points out, though, there is no basis in the Vibhaṅga or in reason for this statement. It is hard to imagine anyone doing this unless impelled by anger, and the act of cutting another person would come under the factor of giving a blow with something connected with the body.

“Result” is not a factor here. Whether the other person is hurt—or how badly he/she is hurt—does not affect the offense. If one intends simply to hurt the other person, but he/she happens to die from one’s blow, the case is treated under this rule, rather than under Pr 3. In other words, the penalty is a pācittiya if the victim is a bhikkhu, and a dukkaṭa if not.

Non-offenses

According to the Vibhaṅga, there is no offense for a bhikkhu who, trapped in a difficult situation, gives a blow “desiring freedom.” The Commentary’s discussion of this point shows that it includes what we at present would call self-defense; and the K/Commentary’s analysis of the factors of the offense here shows that even if anger or displeasure arises in one’s mind in cases like this, there is no penalty.

Summary: Giving a blow to another bhikkhu when impelled by anger—except in self-defense—is a pācittiya offense.

*    *    *

75

Should any bhikkhu, angered and displeased, raise the palm of his hand against (another) bhikkhu, it is to be confessed.

This rule is similar to the preceding one, differing only in the factor of effort: Raising the palm of one’s hand means raising any part of one’s body (the hand, the foot, etc.) or anything attached to the body (a stick, a rock, a gun, a bow and arrow) in a threatening manner.

The Commentary notes that if one intends only to raise one’s hand but then accidentally gives a blow, one incurs a dukkaṭa. The Sub-commentary, following the lead of the Old K/Sub-commentary, explains this in the only way that would make sense: One incurs the dukkaṭa for the blow, but a pācittiya for raising the hand in the first place.

The Sub-commentary also notes that if an animal, for example, is making a mess and a bhikkhu raises his hand against it, this would be included under desiring freedom—i.e., from the mess—and so would not be an offense. This explanation, however, would open a large loophole for a bhikkhu who wanted to justify raising his hand against another bhikkhu in any situation that he found displeasing. It would seem preferable to limit the allowance for one desiring freedom to cases where one is in physical danger.

Summary: Making a threatening gesture against another bhikkhu when motivated by anger—except in self-defense—is a pācittiya offense.

*    *    *

76

Should any bhikkhu charge a bhikkhu with an unfounded saṅghādisesa (offense), it is to be confessed.

Here again the factors for the full offense are three.

1) Object: another bhikkhu.

2) Perception: One has not seen, heard, or suspected him of committing the offense one is charging him with.

3) Effort: One accuses him in his presence—or gets someone else to accuse him in his presence—of having committed a saṅghādisesa offense.

If one makes an unfounded charge accusing another bhikkhu of a defect in conduct or a defect in view, the penalty is a dukkaṭa. According to Mv.IV.16.12, a defect in conduct means any offense of a thullaccaya or less; a defect in view means wrong view or a view holding to an extreme. The Commentary to Pv.VI.10 identifies wrong view as mundane wrong view as defined in MN 117, and as classed as a defect in view in AN 3:117. The same Commentary identifies a view holding to an extreme as any one of the ten standpoints on which the Buddha refused to take a stand. See, e.g., DN 9 and MN 63. Although a defect in view is not automatically an offense, charging a bhikkhu with such a defect could lead the Community to interrogate him to see if the view warrants treatment under Sg 10, Pc 69, or the procedures leading up to censure.

The Vibhaṅga states that there is also a dukkaṭa for making an unfounded charge accusing an unordained person—such as a bhikkhunī or a novice—of a defect in conduct or a defect in view.

As under Pc 42, perception as to whether the person being charged is ordained is irrelevant to the offense.

The topic of unfounded charges is a complex one and has already been covered in detail under Sg 8. Additional points may be inferred from the discussion of that rule, the differences being that intention is not a factor here, and the change in effort—one is accusing the other bhikkhu of a saṅghādisesa or lesser offense—changes the seriousness of the penalty.

Non-offenses

As under Sg 8, there is no offense if one makes the accusation—or gets someone else to make it—when one thinks it to be true, even if the other bhikkhu is actually not guilty of the offense.

Summary: Making an unfounded charge to another bhikkhu—or getting someone else to make the charge to him—that he is guilty of a saṅghādisesa offense is a pācittiya offense.

*    *    *

77

Should any bhikkhu intentionally provoke anxiety in (another) bhikkhu, (thinking,) “This way, even for just a moment, he will have no peace”—doing it for just that reason and no other—it is to be confessed.

The Vinaya-mukha’s explanation for this rule is worth quoting at length:

“There are people who normally tend to be anxious about one thing or another…. If someone speaks to this sort of bhikkhu about contingencies that run counter to the Buddha’s ordinances and are impossible to know—e.g., ‘When you were ordained, how can you know that all the qualifications (for a valid Community transaction) were fulfilled? If they were lacking, doesn’t that mean you aren’t really ordained?’—even this is enough to set him worrying, giving him all sorts of anguish. A bhikkhu who is unrestrained and who—looking for fun with no concern for how his friends will suffer—takes such matters to tell them is penalized with a pācittiya in this rule.”

The full offense here has four factors.

1) Object: another bhikkhu.

2) Effort: One mentions that he might have broken a rule.

3) Result: One provokes anxiety in him.

4) Intention: One’s motive is simply to cause him anxiety even if just for a moment.

Object

A bhikkhu here is grounds for a pācittiya; an unordained person—this apparently includes bhikkhunīs—grounds for a dukkaṭa. As under Pc 42, perception as to whether one’s listener is ordained is irrelevant to the offense.

Effort & result

The Vibhaṅga illustrates these two factors together, saying, “One provokes anxiety (saying), ‘Perhaps you were ordained when less than twenty; perhaps you have eaten at the wrong time; perhaps you have drunk alcohol; perhaps you have sat down in private with a woman.’ Most of these possible offenses are ones that can be committed unknowingly, but the last one is not. However, it is close enough to an offense that the mention of the possibility of having done it unknowingly would cause an ignorant bhikkhu anxiety. Similarly, in the origin story, some group-of-six bhikkhus made insinuating remarks to the group of seventeen that because they were ordained when they were less than 20 years old, they were not really ordained. Yet, because the group of seventeen were the instigators for that rule, they were not subject to it. All of this shows that the factor of effort can be fulfilled by any statement one might make to another bhikkhu insinuating that he may have broken a rule, even if the action mentioned is not actually an offense.

The Commentary underlines the need for the factor of result here by translating “provokes” as “generates.” In other words, anxiety has to arise in one’s listener as a result of one’s remarks, even if for a moment, for there to be an offense. This interpretation is seconded by the fact that the Vibhaṅga to Pc 55, which is in some ways parallel to this rule, contains explicit statements to the effect that result is not a factor under that rule, whereas the Vibhaṅga to this rule contains no such statements.

Intention

Intention here is defined in the same terms used under Pr 3, Sg 1, and Pc 61: “having willed, having made the decision knowingly and consciously.” In those rules, this phrase indicates that one’s intention has to be clear and unequivocal. Here, however, the wording of the training rule suggests that, to fulfill the factor of intention, one’s intention to cause anxiety has to be the sole motive for one’s statements. The non-offense clauses illustrate this point with the case where, not wanting to provoke anxiety, one says, “Perhaps you were ordained when less than twenty; perhaps you have eaten at the wrong time; perhaps you have drunk alcohol; perhaps you have sat down in private with a woman. Please look into it. Don’t suffer anxiety later.” It’s easy to anticipate that a bhikkhu hearing these remarks might suffer a moment of anxiety, but because one’s overriding purpose is to prevent greater anxiety at a later time—say, after he has become a preceptor and ordained many other bhikkhus, he discovers that his ordination was invalid—one incurs no offense in making these remarks in a timely and compassionate fashion.

Summary: Intentionally provoking anxiety in another bhikkhu that he may have broken a rule, when one has no other purpose in mind, is a pācittiya offense.

*    *    *

78

Should any bhikkhu stand eavesdropping on bhikkhus when they are arguing, quarreling, and disputing, thinking, “I will overhear what they say”—doing it for just that reason and no other—it is to be confessed.

“Now at that time some group-of-six bhikkhus were quarreling with the well-behaved bhikkhus. The well-behaved bhikkhus (meeting among themselves) said, ‘These group-of-six bhikkhus are shameless. There’s no way you can quarrel with them.’

“(Later,) the group-of-six bhikkhus said to them, ‘Why do you disgrace us by calling us shameless?’

“‘But how did you overhear?’

“‘We stood eavesdropping on you.’”

The factors for the full offense here are three.

1) Object: other bhikkhus who are involved in an argument over an issue.

2) Effort: One stands eavesdropping on them,

3) Intention: with the purpose of using what they say against them, either as part of a formal accusation (charging, interrogating, counter-charging, or counter-interrogating them) or simply to make them feel abashed.

Object

According to the Vibhaṅga, the words, arguing, quarreling, and disputing refer to arguments over issues (see Pc 63). The Commentary says that this refers to one kind of issue—disputes—but accusations would appear to fit here as well.

This factor is fulfilled regardless of whether the two parties in the dispute/accusation are confronting each other or—as in the origin story—one party is talking in private. It is also fulfilled regardless of whether one is already involved in the dispute oneself.

Bhikkhus involved in an argument are grounds for a pācittiya; unordained people involved in an argument, grounds for a dukkaṭa. The Vibhaṅga, in its references to bhikkhus as objects under this rule, switches back and forth between the singular and the plural. Thus even a single bhikkhu, involved in an argument with an unordained person, would be grounds for the full offense.

The role of perception here is the same as under Pc 42.

People who are not involved in an argument are not grounds for an offense. Thus there is no penalty in eavesdropping on a Dhamma talk or on a bhikkhu sitting in private with a woman, to see what they will say to each other.

Effort

The Vibhaṅga goes into a fair amount of detail on this factor, allotting the offenses as follows (assuming the other factors to be fulfilled as well):

One goes with the purpose of eavesdropping on the other party (§): a dukkaṭa. One stays in one place eavesdropping on them: a pācittiya.

One is walking behind the other party and speeds up one’s steps to overhear them: a dukkaṭa. One stays in one place eavesdropping on them: a pācittiya.

One is walking ahead of the other party and slows down to overhear them: a dukkaṭa. One stays in one place eavesdropping on them: a pācittiya.

One comes to a place where a bhikkhu involved in discussion is sitting, standing, or lying down: One should cough, clear one’s throat, or otherwise let one’s presence be known. (The K/Commentary suggests saying, “I’m here.”) Not to do so entails a pācittiya.

At present, surreptitiously reading another person’s mail would seem to fulfill this factor as well.

Intention

According to the Vibhaṅga, there is no offense if one goes (to listen) with the motive, “having heard their (words), I will abstain, I will refrain, I will grow calm, I will free myself” (“by declaring my innocence,” says the Commentary) (§).

Summary: Eavesdropping on bhikkhus involved in an argument over an issue—with the intention of using what they say against them—is a pācittiya offense.

*    *    *

79

Should any bhikkhu, having given consent (by proxy) to a transaction carried out in accordance with the rule, later complain (about the transaction), it is to be confessed.

“Now at that time some group-of-six bhikkhus were indulging in bad habits but protested when a transaction was being carried out against any one of their group. Then on one occasion the Community was meeting on some business or other, and the group-of-six bhikkhus, making robes, sent their consent with one of their members. Then the Community, (saying,) ‘Look, friends, this member of the group-of-six has come alone. Let’s carry out a transaction against him,’ did just that.

“He then went to the group-of-six bhikkhus. They asked him, ‘What, friend, did the Community do?’”

“‘They carried out a transaction against me.’

“‘That wasn’t what we gave our consent for, that they would carry out a transaction against you. If we had known that they would carry out a transaction against you, we wouldn’t have given our consent!’”

Transactions

A transaction is a procedure by which a Community issues a statement to settle an issue (see BMC2, Chapter 12). Cv.IV gives the pattern for such procedures, stating the minimum number of bhikkhus that have to be present for the transaction, the qualifications (positive or negative) of the individual or situation warranting the act, and the formal pattern for the statement—an announcement, a motion, a motion with one proclamation, or a motion with three proclamations—that constitutes the transaction. Thus the Vibhaṅga to this rule defines transaction as any of the four types of statements that form the heart of the transaction. A transaction carried out in accordance with these patterns is said to be carried out in accordance with the rule.

However, for a transaction to be valid and irreversible, it must be carried out not only in accordance with the rule but also by a complete assembly (Mv.IX.2.4). This point is to prevent small factions from carrying out transactions as they like. When this point was first raised, the question arose, How many bhikkhus are needed for an assembly to be complete? All the bhikkhus in the world? All the bhikkhus in a particular monastery? The Buddha’s answer was, All the bhikkhus in a monastery, and he gave permission for the bhikkhus to mark out territories (sīmā) so as to determine who did and did not have to join in the transaction for the assembly to be complete (Mv.II.5.2,6.1,12.7). Later, he gave permission that an ill bhikkhu living within the territory did not have to attend the meeting, but could give his consent by proxy, through word or gesture, and the assembly would still be regarded as complete (Mv.II.23.1-2).

Thus a complete assembly is defined as follows: All the bhikkhus of common affiliation within the territory are either present at the meeting (sitting within hatthapāsa, or 1.25 meters of one another) or have given their consent by proxy, and no one—in the course of the transaction—makes a valid protest against its being carried out (Mv.IX.3.5-6). (An invalid protest would be one made by someone who is not a bhikkhu, by a bhikkhu who is insane, possessed by a spirit, outside the territory, or suspended from the Community, or by the bhikkhu against whom the act is being carried out (Mv.IX.4.7-8).)

Before we go on to discuss this rule, there are a few added points concerning the origin story we should touch on:

1) A protest does not need to be justified in order to count as valid. In other words, a bhikkhu can make protest simply because he doesn’t agree with the transaction, and his protest stands regardless of whether he can find any basis for it in the Dhamma and Vinaya.

2) One Community may not carry out a transaction against another Community (Mv.IX.2.3). What this means is that they may carry it out against no more than three bhikkhus at a time. This is why the group-of-six bhikkhus were able to protect one another from being subject to a transaction, for there were usually more than three of them at any one meeting of the Community. Even though the ones against whom the transaction was being carried out had no right to protest, their friends did, and they took advantage of their right.

3) In the passage where the Buddha gives permission for bhikkhus to give their consent by proxy (Mv.II.23.1-2), he states that this permission applies to ill bhikkhus. Yet in the origin stories to this rule and the following one, the group-of-six bhikkhus are not ill, they give their consent by proxy, and the transaction carried out with their consent is considered valid. None of the texts make note of this point, but it seems to indicate that ill in this context covers not only physical illness but also any other serious inconvenience that prevents one from joining in the meeting.

The factors for the offense under this rule are three.

1) Object: a valid transaction to which one has given one’s consent.

2) Perception: One perceives it as valid.

3) Effort: One complains about it.

Object & perception

The various permutations of these factors are as follows:

a valid transaction that one perceives to be valid: grounds for a pācittiya;

an invalid transaction that one perceives to be valid: grounds for a dukkaṭa;

a transaction that one is doubtful about, regardless of its actual validity: grounds for a dukkaṭa;

a transaction that one perceives to be invalid, regardless of its actual validity: grounds for no offense.

Effort

Any expression of displeasure with the transaction would fulfill this factor. If, however, one states that the transaction was not carried out in accordance with the rule, then regardless of whether one had given one’s consent, the case would fall under Pc 63 rather than here.

Non-offenses

There is no offense in complaining about the transaction if one perceives it as having been carried out not in accordance with the rule, by an incomplete assembly, or against someone who did not warrant such an act. This exemption holds even if the transaction was actually valid.

Summary: Complaining about a Community transaction to which one gave one’s consent—if one perceives the transaction as having been carried out in accordance with the rule—is a pācittiya offense.

*    *    *

80

Should any bhikkhu, when deliberation is being carried on in the Community, get up from his seat and leave without having given consent, it is to be confessed.

The origin story here is a sequel to the one for the preceding rule.

“Now at that time the Community was meeting on some business or other, and the group-of-six bhikkhus, making robes, sent their consent with one of their members. Then the Community, thinking, ’We’ll carry out the transaction (against the one member of the group-of-six) that was our real purpose in meeting,’ set forth a motion. The bhikkhu—thinking, ‘It’s just in this way that these people carry out transactions against us one at a time. Well, who are you going to carry out this transaction against?’—without giving his consent, got up from his seat and left.”

As explained under the preceding rule, a bhikkhu has no right to protest when the Community is carrying out a transaction against him. However, the Community may not carry out a transaction against a bhikkhu who is not in its midst (see As 1), and any transaction is invalid if carried out when there is a bhikkhu within the territory who is not in the meeting and who has not given his consent. The bhikkhu in the origin story took advantage of these two principles to escape from the transaction’s being carried out against himself, and the Buddha then formulated this rule to impose a penalty on any bhikkhu who tried the same maneuver in the future.

There are four factors for the full offense.

1) Object: a Community transaction that has been started but has yet to be finished, and is being carried out in a valid manner.

2) Perception: One perceives it as being carried out in a valid manner.

3) Intention: One wants to invalidate the transaction or to keep the group from carrying it out.

4) Effort: Without having first given one’s consent, one goes beyond hatthapāsa (1.25 m.) from the bhikkhus sitting in the meeting.

Object & perception

The various permutations of these two factors are as follows:

a valid transaction that one perceives to be valid: grounds for a pācittiya;

an invalid transaction that one perceives to be valid: grounds for a dukkaṭa;

a transaction that one is doubtful about, regardless of its actual validity: grounds for a dukkaṭa;

a transaction that one perceives as invalid, regardless of its actual validity: grounds for no offense.

According to the Vibhaṅga, the time period covered by the factor of object begins at the point where the matter has been brought up in the Community—or a motion has been set forth—and ends when the Community’s decision has been announced.

The Commentary, in discussing this point, says that, in the case of an accusation, the point when the matter has been brought up is when both sides have stated their initial positions, and a bhikkhu has been authorized to cross-examine them. This, however, would open a loophole for an accused bhikkhu to avoid a penalty simply by leaving the meeting after being accused but before stating his case. Thus it would seem preferable to follow the Vibhaṅga here, holding that the time period even in an accusation would begin when the issue is first raised in a valid Community meeting.

Effort

The Vibhaṅga divides the effort here into three parts and allots the penalties as follows:

One gets up to go: a dukkaṭa.

One reaches the distance of one hatthapāsa from the meeting: another dukkaṭa.

One passes beyond the distance of one hatthapāsa: a pācittiya.

The K/Commentary adds that one must also remain within the territory (sīmā) for this factor to be fulfilled, but the Vibhaṅga makes no mention of this, and there seems no reason to adopt it. If we did adopt it, it would mean that if a transaction were being carried out against a bhikkhu, and he left both the meeting and the territory to avoid it, he would be committing no offense. Thus it seems better to stick with the Vibhaṅga and say that this factor is fulfilled when one goes beyond one hatthapāsa away from the meeting, regardless of whether one then continues to stay within the territory.

Intention

There is no offense if, without giving one’s consent, one leaves the meeting for purposes other than to invalidate the transaction. Examples in the Vibhaṅga include:

One is ill.

One has to do something (e.g., prepare or give medicine) for one who is ill.

One is overcome with the need to urinate or defecate.

One leaves, without desiring to invalidate the transaction, with the thought, “I’ll come right back.”

In all of these cases, though, if possible, it is best to give one’s consent before going.

Further action

A bhikkhu who has committed this offense would, under Cv.IX.3, be subject to having his Pāṭimokkha canceled (see BMC2, Chapter 15). This would provide the Community with the opportunity to look into his attitude and to take further disciplinary actions if it sees fit.

Non-offenses

In addition to the above cases, there is also no offense if one leaves a meeting without giving one’s consent with the purpose of invalidating the transaction if one perceives that:

the transaction will lead to strife, quarreling, a dispute, a crack, or a split in the Community; or

the transaction is being carried out not in accordance with the rule, by an incomplete assembly, or against/for a person who doesn’t warrant it.

Summary: Getting up and leaving a meeting of the Community in the midst of a valid transaction that one knows to be valid—without having first given one’s consent to the transaction and with the intention of invalidating it—is a pācittiya offense.

*    *    *

81

Should any bhikkhu, (acting as part of) a united Community, give robe-cloth (to an individual bhikkhu) and later complain, “The bhikkhus allocate the Community’s gains according to friendship,” it is to be confessed.

Apportioning the Community’s gains

Cv.VI.15.2 states that no one—not even the Community itself—can take any of the following items belonging to the Community and turn them over to individual ownership: monasteries or monastery land; dwellings or land on which dwellings are built; furnishings, such as couches, chairs, or mattresses; metal vessels or tools; building materials or articles made of pottery or wood. The collective term for these goods is garubhaṇḍa: heavy or expensive articles. (For a detailed discussion of these articles, see BMC2, Chapter 7.) The penalty for handing any of the Community’s garubhaṇḍa over to individual ownership is a thullaccaya. In the origin story to Pr 4, the Buddha states that a bhikkhu who gives the Community’s garubhaṇḍa to a lay person is one of the five great thieves in the world.

Light or inexpensive articles (lahubhaṇḍa) belonging to the Community, though, may be turned over to individual ownership—of a bhikkhu or novice—but only when the proper procedures are followed. The usual pattern is to appoint a Community official, through a Community transaction, to be responsible for ensuring that such items be distributed fairly to the members of the Community eligible to receive them. Such officials include distributors of robe-cloth, of food, of fruit, and of non-staple foods; and dispensers of small accessories, such as scissors, sandals, water strainers, etc. (see BMC2, Chapter 18).

In the origin story to Pc 41, the Community receives a large amount of non-staple food, so much that the Buddha instructs Ānanda to share the excess among those who live off leftovers. Some Communities have taken this as a precedent for taking excess perishable items belonging to the Community and distributing them among the poor.

In addition, this training rule shows that a Community acting as a whole may take lahubhaṇḍa articles belonging to it and turn them over to individual bhikkhus or novices. (According to the K/Commentary to Pc 79, this can be done with a simple announcement (apalokana), although the kaṭhina ceremony, which would fall under this general category, follows the pattern of a motion with one announcement.) A typical example, apart from the kaṭhina, would be if the Community receives a particularly fine piece of cloth and, instead of cutting it up to share the pieces out among its members, decides to present the entire piece to one of its members who has been especially helpful to the group. This is one way in which the Community may reward a Community official for his services.

Any member of the Community who disagrees with such a decision may prevent it from happening by protesting during the announcement. The purpose of this rule is to prevent members of the Community from complaining after they have taken part in such a decision that the Community was acting out of favoritism.

The factors for the full offense are two.

1) Object: One has acted as part of a united Community that has given robe-cloth to a bhikkhu who has been chosen, through a prior Community transaction, to be a Community official.

2) Effort: One complains afterward that the Community acted out of favoritism.

Object

Acting as part of a united Community means that one is in affiliation with the Community that handed over the cloth, and that one was in the same territory with them: i.e., one was either in the meeting or had given one’s consent to it.

Robe-cloth means a piece of any of the six kinds of allowable cloth, measuring at least four by eight fingerbreadths.

The various permutations of articles and recipients are as follows:

Complaining when the Community has given robe-cloth to a Community official: a pācittiya.

Complaining when the Community has given any other light article to a Community official: a dukkaṭa.

Complaining when the Community has given any light article—cloth or otherwise—to a bhikkhu who is not a Community official: a dukkaṭa.

Complaining when the Community has given any light article—cloth or otherwise—to a novice, whether authorized as a Community official or not: a dukkaṭa.

Perception with regard to the transaction is not a mitigating factor here. If the recipient was made a Community official through a valid Community transaction, then regardless of how one perceives that transaction, he is grounds for a pācittiya. If the act was invalid then, again, regardless of how one perceives it, he is grounds for a dukkaṭa. (The Vibhaṅga is somewhat confusing on this point, not saying explicitly whether the factor of “perception with regard to the transaction” refers to the transaction by which the official was appointed or to the one by which the cloth was handed over to him. The interpretation given here follows the Commentary, which for this issue refers the reader to its explanation of Pc 13, and the K/Commentary, which defines the validity of the object’s authorization as a factor in the offense here. This interpretation has given rise to some controversy, largely because there are two variant readings of the last sentence of the perception section in the Vibhaṅga. The PTS and Burmese editions of the Canon give the sentence as, “In perceiving an invalid transaction as an invalid transaction: no offense.” The Thai and Sri Lankan editions of the Canon, and the PTS edition of the K/Commentary, give the sentence as, “In perceiving an invalid transaction as an invalid transaction: a dukkaṭa offense.” If the first reading were correct, the perception would apply to the transaction by which the cloth is handed to the official. However, with the Commentary stating that the perception section here is identical with that under Pc 13, and with all Asian editions of the Canon giving the second reading there, it would seem that the PTS and Burmese editions are mistaken here, and that the correct interpretation of the perception passages here is the one given above.)

Effort

This factor is fulfilled by any expression of personal displeasure with the Community in regard to its distribution of requisites. If, however, one accuses the Community of having carried out the transaction improperly—not in accordance with the rule, or with an incomplete assembly—the case would come not here, but under Pc 63.

Non-offenses

The Vibhaṅga says that if the recipient of the article acts out of habitual favoritism, anger, delusion, or fear, there is no offense in complaining, “What’s the use of giving it to him? Even having received it, he’ll ruin it; he won’t take proper care of it.” This is an extension of the non-offense clause under Pc 13, in which one is allowed to complain about a community official who acts out of any of the four bases for bias. Thus this exemption applies here both before and after the Community gives the article to the individual in question. As an application of the exemption under Pc 13, one can complain before the Community transaction that the recipient is unqualified to receive the article. This would put a halt to the transaction. As an application of the exemption under Pc 63, one can complain after the transaction that the recipient was a poor choice because his habitual favoritism, anger, delusion, or fear means that he was unqualified to be given the article. This would mean that the Community transaction was invalid to begin with, and so one is entitled to complain.

Summary: After participating in a Community transaction giving robe-cloth to a Community official: Complaining that the Community acted out of favoritism is a pācittiya offense.

*    *    *

82

Should any bhikkhu knowingly divert to an individual gains that had been allocated for a Community, it is to be confessed.

This rule has already been explained under NP 30.

Summary: Persuading a donor to give to another individual a gift that he or she had planned to give to a Community—when one knows that it was intended for the Community—is a pācittiya offense.

Nine: The Valuable Chapter

83

Should any bhikkhu, unannounced beforehand, cross the threshold of a consecrated noble king’s (sleeping chamber) from which the king has not left, from which the valuable (the queen) has not withdrawn, it is to be confessed.

“As he was sitting to one side, King Pasenadi of Kosala said to the Blessed One, ‘It would be good, venerable sir, if the Blessed One would appoint a bhikkhu to teach Dhamma in our harem’…. So the Blessed One addressed Ven. Ānanda, ‘In that case, Ānanda, go teach Dhamma in the king’s harem.’

“Responding, ‘As you say, venerable sir,’ Ven. Ānanda entered the king’s harem time and again to teach Dhamma. Then (one day) Ven. Ānanda, dressing early in the morning, taking his bowl and (outer) robe, went to King Pasenadi’s palace. At that time King Pasenadi was lying on a couch with Queen Mallikā. Queen Mallikā saw Ven. Ānanda coming from afar and, on seeing him, got up hurriedly. Her cloth of burnished gold slipped off. Ven. Ānanda turned around and went back to the monastery.”

The factors for the full offense here are two: object and effort.

Object

A king—a consecrated (“crowned” in Western terms) member of the noble warrior class, pure in his lineage through the past seven generations—is in his sleeping chamber with his queen. Sleeping chamber means any place where his bed is prepared, even if it is outside, surrounded only by a curtain or screen wall (as was the custom on royal excursions in those days, a custom often depicted in murals on the walls of Thai temples).

Effort

If, unannounced, one steps over the threshold of the sleeping chamber with one foot, the penalty is a dukkaṭa; when both feet are over the threshold, a pācittiya. Perception as to whether one has been announced is not a mitigating factor here (see Pc 4).

Non-offenses

There is no offense if—

one has been announced,

the king is not a member of the noble warrior class or has not been consecrated,

either the king or the queen has left the sleeping chamber, or

the room is not a sleeping chamber.

Obviously, there is little chance that a bhikkhu will break this rule at present. However, in the course of formulating the rule, the Buddha mentioned ten dangers for a bhikkhu who enters the king’s inner palace even at the king’s request, and some of these dangers still apply to any situation in which a bhikkhu is on familiar terms with a person of influence, royal or not:

1) “‘There is the case where the king is on a couch together with the queen. A bhikkhu enters there. Either the queen, seeing the bhikkhu, smiles; or the bhikkhu, seeing the queen, smiles. The thought occurs to the king, “Surely they’ve done it, or are going to do it”….

2) “‘And furthermore, the king is busy, with much to do. Having gone to a certain woman, he forgets about it. On account of that, she conceives a child. The thought occurs to him, “No one enters here but the one gone forth. Could this be the work of the one gone forth?”….

3) “‘And furthermore, some valuable in the king’s inner palace disappears. The thought occurs to the king, “No one enters here but the one gone forth. Could this be the work of the one gone forth?”….

4) “‘And furthermore, secret consultations in the confines of the inner palace get spread abroad. The thought occurs to the king, “No one enters here but the one gone forth. Could this be the work of the one gone forth?”….

5) “‘And furthermore, in the king’s inner palace the son is estranged from the father, or the father from the son. The thought occurs to them, “No one enters here but the one gone forth. Could this be the work of the one gone forth?”….

6 & 7) “‘And furthermore, the king establishes one from a low position in a high position… (or) one from a high position in a low position. The thought occurs to those displeased by this, “The king is on familiar terms with one gone forth. Could this be the work of the one gone forth?”….

8) “‘And furthermore, the king sends the army out at the wrong time. The thought occurs to those displeased by this, “The king is on familiar terms with one gone forth. Could this be the work of the one gone forth?”….

9) “‘And furthermore, the king sends the army out at the right time, but has it turn around mid-way. The thought occurs to those displeased by this, “The king is on familiar terms with one gone forth. Could this be the work of the one gone forth?”….

10) “‘And furthermore, bhikkhus, the king’s inner palace is crowded with elephants… horses… chariots. There are enticing sights, sounds, smells, tastes, tactile sensations unsuitable for one gone forth. This, bhikkhus, is the tenth danger for one who enters the king’s inner palace.’”

Summary: Entering a king’s sleeping chamber unannounced, when both the king and queen are in the chamber, is a pācittiya offense.

*    *    *

84

Should any bhikkhu pick up or have (someone) pick up a valuable or what is considered a valuable, except in a monastery or in a dwelling, it is to be confessed. But when a bhikkhu has picked up or had (someone) pick up a valuable or what is considered a valuable (left) in a monastery or in a dwelling, he is to keep it, (thinking,) “Whoever it belongs to will (come and) fetch it.” This is the proper course here.

The general purpose of this rule is to prevent a bhikkhu from picking up misplaced valuables belonging to other people, for as the origin story shows, there are dangers inherent in such an act even when done with the best intentions.

“Now at that time a certain bhikkhu was bathing in the Aciravatī River. And a certain brahman, having placed a bag of 500 gold pieces on the river bank, bathed in the river and left, forgetting it. The bhikkhu, (saying to himself,) ‘Don’t let this bag of the brahman’s be lost,’ picked it up. Then the brahman, remembering, rushed back and said to the bhikkhu, ‘My good man, have you seen my bag?’

“‘Here you are, brahman,’ he said, and gave it to him.

“Then the thought occurred to the brahman, ‘Now by what means can I get away without giving a reward to this bhikkhu?’ So (saying,) ‘I didn’t have 500, my good man, I had 1,000!’ he detained him for a while and then let him go.”

However, a bhikkhu who comes across a fallen valuable in a monastery or in a dwelling he is visiting—if he does not pick it up—may later be held responsible if it gets lost: thus the two situations mentioned as exemptions in the rule. In situations such as these, a bhikkhu is allowed even to pick up money and other items he is not normally allowed to take. In fact, the Vinaya-mukha states that if he does not pick up the valuable and put it in safe-keeping, he incurs a dukkaṭa. None of the other texts mention this point, although it is probably justified on the grounds that the bhikkhu is neglecting his duty in not following the “proper course” here.

The Vibhaṅga advises that if a bhikkhu has picked up a fallen valuable in this way and put it in safe keeping, he should take note of its features. (The Commentary adds that if it is a bag of money, he should open the bag and count how much it contains. The same would hold for such things as wallets at present.) He should then have an announcement made, “Let him come whose goods are lost.” If a person comes to claim the item, the bhikkhu should ask him/her to describe it. If the person describes it correctly, the bhikkhu should hand it over. If not, he should tell the person to “keep looking.” If the bhikkhu is going to leave the monastery to live elsewhere, he should entrust the item to another bhikkhu or—if no suitable bhikkhu is available—to a suitable lay person (§).

The Commentary adds that if, after a suitable length of time, no one comes to claim the item, the bhikkhu should have it exchanged for something of lasting use to the monastery. If, after that, the owner does come to claim the item, the bhikkhu should tell him/her of the use to which it was put. If the owner is satisfied, there is no problem. If not, the bhikkhu should arrange to have the owner compensated. However, as we noted in the discussion of compensation under Pr 2, the Canon imposes only one potential penalty on a bhikkhu in a situation such as this: The Community, if it sees fit, can force him to apologize to the owner (Cv.I.20; see BMC2, Chapter 20).

The factors for the offense here are four.

1) Object: a valuable or anything considered a valuable that one finds left behind, except in a monastery or a dwelling that one is visiting.

2) Perception: One does not perceive it as discarded.

3) Intention: One wants to keep it in safe keeping for the owner.

4) Effort: One picks it up or has someone else pick it up.

Object

The Vibhaṅga defines a valuable as jewels, gold, or silver. At present, money would be included here. What is considered a valuable means anything that people use or consume. Items meeting these definitions at present would include wallets, watches, keys, eyeglasses, cameras, etc.

According to the K/Commentary, the object has to belong to someone else to fulfill the factor of effort here. The Vibhaṅga does not state this point explicitly, but it does make the point implicitly with the activities it discusses under this rule: putting an item in safe keeping, quizzing those who come to claim it, taking an item on trust, borrowing it. These are all activities that pertain to the belongings of others, and not to one’s own belongings. The K/Commentary adds that if the owner has given one permission to take the article, it does not fulfill the factor of object here. This comment has to be qualified, of course, by noting that if the item is a valuable, then taking it would involve an offense under another rule.

The Vibhaṅga defines in a monastery as follows: If the monastery is enclosed, then within the enclosure. If not, then in the immediate vicinity (according to the Commentary, a radius of two leḍḍupātas—approximately 36 meters—around the monastery buildings). As for in a dwelling: If the area around the dwelling is enclosed, then within the enclosure. If not, then in the immediate vicinity (according to the Commentary, the distance one can throw a basket or a pestle (!) from the dwelling).

For some reason, the Commentary says that if the item has fallen in an area of the monastery where many people come and go—e.g., the doorway to the Bodhi tree or public shrine—one should not pick it up. Its reasoning here is hard to guess. It notes that the Kurundī—one of the ancient commentaries—interprets the range of a bhikkhu’s responsibility in the opposite direction. In other words, the Kurundī holds that if a bhikkhu walking alone along a road outside a monastery comes across a valuable or anything considered valuable in such circumstances that he might later be suspected of being responsible for its disappearance, he should stop and wait by the roadside until the owner appears. If no owner appears, he should make it “allowable” and take it with him. The Sub-commentary adds that making it allowable means deciding that it has been thrown away, and applies only to items classed as “considered a valuable.” All of this, however, lies outside the allowances in the Vibhaṅga, and at most can be adopted, where appropriate, as a wise policy.

The Commentary also notes that if someone asks to put his/her belongings in safe keeping with a bhikkhu, the bhikkhu should not accept—so as to avoid being responsible for them—but if he/she leaves the things with the bhikkhu and goes off in spite of his objections or before giving him a chance to object, he should take the belongings and put them away in safe keeping.

Perception & intention

According to the Commentary, if one picks up money for one’s own use, for the Community, or for anyone aside from the owner, the case would come under NP 18, rather than here. The same holds true with dukkaṭa objects, such as jewels and semi-precious stones. This judgment, though, would seem to hold only in the case where one perceives the money, etc., as thrown away or left behind for the use of the person or Community for whom one is taking it. If one does not perceive it as thrown away or abandoned, and one is not borrowing it or taking it on trust, the case would come under Pr 2, regardless of what the item is.

The Commentary also makes the peculiar point that if one sees an item belonging to one’s mother or other close relative left behind on the roadside, one would incur the full penalty under this rule for picking it up to put in safe keeping for the owner, but no offense if one took the item, on trust, for one’s own. Of course, after taking it on trust like this, one could then without penalty give it back to the owner as one liked.

Effort

When getting someone else to pick up the item, the offense is incurred not in the asking but only when the other person does as asked.

Non-offenses

There is no offense if, within a monastery or a dwelling, one picks up a valuable or what is considered a valuable—or if one has it picked up—with the thought, “Whoever this belongs to will come for it.” (§)

Also, according to the Vibhaṅga, there is no offense in taking an item “considered to be a valuable” no matter where it is found if one takes it on trust, borrows it, or perceives it as having been thrown away (§).

Summary: Picking up a valuable, or having it picked up, with the intention of putting it in safe keeping for the owner—except when one finds it in a monastery or in a dwelling one is visiting—is a pācittiya offense.

*    *    *

85

Should any bhikkhu, without taking leave of an available bhikkhu, enter a village at the wrong time—unless there is a suitable emergency—it is to be confessed.

As the origin story here indicates, the purpose of this rule is to prevent bhikkhus from passing their time among householders engaged in animal talk (see the discussion under Pc 7).

The factors for the full offense here are two.

1) Object: a village (this would include larger inhabited areas, such as towns and cities, as well).

2) Effort: One enters the village at the wrong time—without having taken leave of an available bhikkhu—except when there is an emergency.

Object

The Vibhaṅga says that if the village as a whole is enclosed, everywhere inside the enclosure is considered to be in the village. If not, the area in the village includes all the buildings and their immediate vicinity. According to the Sub-commentary, this means everywhere within a two-leḍḍupāta radius of the buildings.

Thus if one is staying in a monastery located within a village or town, the area covered by this factor would apparently begin at the vicinity of the nearest buildings outside the monastery.

Effort

The Vibhaṅga defines the wrong time as from after noon until the following dawnrise. This rule thus dovetails with Pc 46, which deals with the period from dawnrise until noon on days when one has been invited to a meal.

Perception as to whether the time is right or wrong is not a mitigating factor here (see Pc 4).

As under Pc 46, another bhikkhu is said to be available for taking one’s leave if, in the Vibhaṅga’s words, “It is possible to go, having taken leave of him.” That is, if there is another bhikkhu in the monastery, and there are no obstacles to taking one’s leave from him (e.g., he is asleep, he is sick, he is receiving important visitors), one is obliged to go out of one’s way to inform him.

According to the K/Commentary, taking leave in the context of this rule means the simple act of informing the other bhikkhu that, “I am going into the village,” or any similar statement. In other words, one is not asking permission to go, although if the other bhikkhu sees that one is doing something improper in going, he is perfectly free to say so. If one treats his comments with disrespect, one incurs at least a dukkaṭa under Pc 54. (See the discussion under that rule for details.)

The Commentary states that if there is no bhikkhu in the monastery to take leave from, there is no need to inform any bhikkhu one may meet after leaving the monastery. If many bhikkhus are going together, they need only take leave from one another before entering the village.

For a new bhikkhu still living in dependence (nissaya) on his mentor, though, the protocols in Cullavagga VIII indicate that taking leave is a matter of asking permission from his mentor at all times, “wrong” or not. (See the discussion of this point under Pc 46.)

As for the suitable emergencies under this rule—which would seem to exempt even new bhikkhus from having to take leave from their mentors—the Vibhaṅga gives the example of a bhikkhu rushing to get fire to make medicine for another bhikkhu bitten by a snake. Examples more likely at present would include rushing to get a doctor for a sick bhikkhu or to get help when a fire has broken out in the monastery.

Further action

Although there is no penalty for engaging in animal talk, a bhikkhu who enters a village frequently and engages in it, even if he takes leave of other bhikkhus, can be subject to an act of censure for “unbecoming association with householders” (see BMC2, Chapter 20).

Non-offenses

There is no offense in entering a village when one has taken leave of another bhikkhu, or in going when one has not taken leave if:

There is an emergency.

There is no bhikkhu available (e.g., one is living alone or all the other bhikkhus have left).

One is on one’s way to another monastery (§), to bhikkhunīs’ quarters, to the residence of people ordained in another religion (located in a village, says the Commentary), or one is returning from any of these places.

One is going along a road that happens to pass through a village. (According to the Commentary, a bhikkhu who wants to leave the road and enter the village proper should take leave of another bhikkhu if one is available.)

There are dangers. (Examples in the Commentary include seeing lions or tigers approaching, or clouds building up and threatening a storm.)

Summary: Entering a village, town, or city during the period after noon until the following dawnrise, without having taken leave of an available bhikkhu—unless there is an emergency—is a pācittiya offense.

*    *    *

86

Should any bhikkhu have a needle box made of bone, ivory, or horn, it is to be broken and confessed.

The origin story here echoes the one for NP 22.

“Now at that time a certain ivory-worker had invited the bhikkhus, saying, ‘If any of the masters needs a needle box, I will supply him with a needle box.’ So the bhikkhus asked for many needle boxes. Those with small needle boxes asked for large ones; those with large ones asked for small ones. (§) The ivory-worker, making many needle boxes for the bhikkhus, was not able to make other goods for sale. He could not support himself, and his wife and children suffered.”

Here there are three factors for the full offense.

1) Object: a needle box made of bone, ivory, or horn.

2) Effort: One obtains it after making it or having it made

3) Intention: for one’s own use.

Two of these factors involve permutations: effort and intention.

Effort

The permutations under this factor are as follows: the act of making the needle box or having it made—a dukkaṭa; obtaining the finished box—a pācittiya. This last penalty applies regardless of whether the box was made entirely by oneself, entirely by others either partly or entirely at one’s instigation, or whether one finished what others began or got others to finish what one began oneself. In any event, one must break the box before confessing the offense.

If one obtains a bone, ivory, or horn needle box made by another—not at one’s instigation—then using it entails a dukkaṭa (§).

Intention

There is a dukkaṭa in making a bone, ivory, or horn needle box—or having it made—for another’s use.

Non-offenses

The non-offense clauses, instead of listing materials from which a needle box might be made, list allowable items made of bone, ivory, or horn: a fastener (§) (for a robe), a fire-starter (according to the Commentary, this means a bow used with the upper stick of a fire-starter), a belt fastener, an ointment box, a stick for applying ointment, an adze handle, and a water wiper (§) (see BMC2, Chapter 1). This list was apparently intended simply to be illustrative, because the Khandhakas contain allowances for many other items to be made from bone, ivory, or horn as well—although it’s worth noting that the non-offense clauses here are the only passages in the Canon stating that the fire-starter, adze handle, and water wiper can be made of these materials.

Pc 60 mentions a needle box as one of a bhikkhu’s requisites, so apparently one would be allowable if not made of bone, ivory, or horn. Cv.V.11.2 contains an allowance for a “needle tube” (or “needle cylinder”—sūci-nāḷika) for keeping needles, but does not explain how it differs from a needle box. Apparently both the box and the tube may be made of reed, bamboo, wood, lac (resin), fruit (e.g., coconut shell), copper (metal), or conch-shell, as the Khandhakas often list these materials as allowable for other items as well.

The general principle

The Vinaya-mukha derives a general principle from this rule: The Buddha, in formulating this rule, was putting a halt to the sort of fad that can occur among bhikkhus when certain requisites become fashionable to the point of inconveniencing donors, and senior bhikkhus at present should try to put a halt to any similar fads.

Summary: Obtaining a needle box made of bone, ivory, or horn after making it—or having it made—for one’s own use is a pācittiya offense requiring that one break the box before confessing the offense.

*    *    *

87

When a bhikkhu is having a new bed or bench made, it is to have legs (at most) eight fingerbreadths long—using sugata fingerbreadths—not counting the lower edge of the frame. In excess of that it is to be cut down and confessed.

The purpose of this rule is to prevent bhikkhus from making and using furnishings that are high and imposing.

The factors for the offense here are three.

1) Object: a bed or bench whose legs, measuring from the lower side of the frame to the floor, are longer than eight sugata fingerbreadths (16.7 cm.)

2) Effort: One obtains it after making it or having it made

3) Intention: for one’s own use.

Object

The Canon contains many rules dealing with furnishings, especially in the Khandhakas, and because furnishings in the time of the Buddha were somewhat different from what they are now, it is often a matter of guesswork as to what, precisely, the rules are referring to. The bed (mañca) here almost certainly refers to what we mean by a bed. The bench (pīṭha), according to the K/Commentary, is shorter than a bed, but not so short that it is square. This last stipulation comes from Cv.VI.2.4, which allows bhikkhus to use an āsandika—apparently a square stool, large enough to sit on but not to lie on—even if the legs are long. Another piece of furniture with long legs allowed in the same passage is the sattaṅga, a chair or sofa with a back and arms. The Vinaya-mukha includes a pañcaṅga—a chair or sofa with a back but no arms—under this allowance as well. The Canon and commentaries make no mention of this point, but it seems valid: Armless chairs and sofas are less imposing than those with arms.

The sugata measures are a matter of controversy, discussed in Appendix II. For the purposes of this book, we are taking the sugata span to be 25 cm. Because there are twelve sugata fingerbreadths in a sugata span, eight sugata fingerbreadths would be equal to 16.7 cm.

Effort

The permutations under this factor are as follows: the act of making the bed/bench or having it made—a dukkaṭa; obtaining the finished article—a pācittiya. This last penalty applies regardless of whether the bed/bench was made entirely by oneself, entirely by others either partly or entirely at one’s instigation, or whether one finished what others began or got others to finish what one began oneself. In any event, one must cut the bed/bench down to the proper size before confessing the offense.

If one obtains a tall bed/bench made by another—not at one’s instigation—then using it entails a dukkaṭa (§). Cv.VI.8 allows that if furnishings of the sort unallowable for bhikkhus to own themselves are in a lay person’s house (and belong to the lay person, says the Sub-commentary) bhikkhus may sit on them but not lie down on them. There are three exceptions to this allowance, the one piece objected to on account of its height being a dais (āsandī)—a square platform, large enough to lie on, and very high. Bhikkhus are not allowed even to sit on such a thing, even in a lay person’s house.

Intention

There is a dukkaṭa in making a bed or bench with extra long legs—or having it made—for the sake of another person.

Non-offenses

There is no offense in making a bed or bench—or having one made—if the legs are eight sugata fingerbreadths or less; or in receiving a bed or bench with overly long legs made by another if one cuts the legs down to regulation size before using it. The Commentary notes that if one buries the legs in the ground so that no more than eight fingerbreadths separate the ground from the lower frame, that is also allowable.

Summary: Obtaining a bed or bench with legs longer than eight sugata fingerbreadths after making it—or having it made—for one’s own use is a pācittiya offense requiring that one cut the legs down before confessing the offense.

*    *    *

88

Should any bhikkhu have a bed or bench upholstered with cotton down, it (the upholstery) is to be torn off and confessed.

Upholstery & cushions

Cotton down was apparently the most luxurious material known in the Buddha’s time for stuffing furniture, cushions, and mattresses, inasmuch as bhikkhus are forbidden by this rule from making beds and benches upholstered with cotton-down. Cv.VI.8 forbids them from sitting on cushions or other articles of furnishing upholstered or stuffed with cotton down (this would include meditation cushions), even in the homes of lay people. The only article of furnishing stuffed with cotton down allowed to bhikkhus is a pillow (§), although the pillow should be made no larger than the size of the head (Cv.VI.2.6).

The Commentary’s explanations of this point show that the pillow used in those days was an oblong cushion, looking like a rectangle when viewed from above and a triangle when viewed from either the right or left side (like the old style of pillow still in use in Thailand). Such pillows, the Commentary says, should be no more than two cubits (1 meter) long, and one span plus four fingerbreadths (32 cm.) from corner to corner on the sides (although this seems considerably larger than a pillow “the size of the head”). A bhikkhu who is not ill may use such a pillow for his head and feet; an ill bhikkhu may line up a series of pillows, cover them with a cloth, and lie down on them with no offense. According to Cv.VI.14, if bhikkhus are presented with cushions stuffed with cotton down, they may use them only after tearing them up and making them into pillows.

Human hair was another forbidden form of stuffing. Mattresses and cushions stuffed with other materials, though, are allowed even for use in the monastery. Cv.VI.2.7 mentions five kinds of allowable stuffing: wool, cloth, bark, grass, and leaves. (According to the Commentary, wool here includes all kinds of animal fur and bird feathers. Goose down would thus be allowable. Synthetic fibers and synthetic down would apparently come under “cloth.” The Commentary also mentions that, according to the Kurundī, mattresses and cushions stuffed with these materials are allowable whether covered with leather or cloth.)

The purpose of all this is to keep bhikkhus from using furnishings that are extravagant and ostentatious. As the Vinaya-mukha mentions, though, standards of what counts as extravagant and ostentatious vary from age to age and culture to culture. Some of the things allowed in the Canon and commentaries now seem exotic and luxurious; and other things forbidden by them, common and ordinary. Thus the wise policy, in a monastery, would be to use only those furnishings allowed by the rules and regarded as unostentatious at present; and, when visiting a lay person’s home, to avoid sitting on furnishings that seem unusually grand.

The factors for the offense here are three.

1) Object: a bed or bench stuffed with cotton down.

2) Effort: One obtains it after making it or having it made

3) Intention: for one’s own use.

Object

Cotton down, according to the Vibhaṅga, includes any down from trees, vines, and grass. The Commentary to Cv.VI.2.6 interprets this as meaning down from any plant, inasmuch as “trees, vines, and grass” is the Canon’s usual way of covering all plant life. Kapok, flax fibers, jute, and cotton would thus all come under this category.

Because cotton-down cushions are forbidden in all situations, bed and bench here would seem to include all forms of furniture, including the stools, chairs, and sofas exempted from the preceding rule.

Effort

The permutations under this factor are as follows: the act of making the bed/bench or having it made—a dukkaṭa; obtaining the finished article—a pācittiya. This last penalty applies regardless of whether the bed/bench was made entirely by oneself, entirely by others either partly or entirely at one’s instigation, or whether one finished what others began or got others to finish what one began oneself. In any event, one must tear off the upholstery before confessing the offense.

If one obtains an upholstered bed/bench made by another—not at one’s instigation—then using it entails a dukkaṭa (§).

Intention

There is a dukkaṭa in making a bed or bench upholstered with cotton down—or having it made—for the sake of another person.

Non-offenses

There is no offense in using cotton down to stuff a pillow, a knee strap (§), a belt, a shoulder strap, or a bag for carrying the alms bowl; or to form the filter in a water strainer. If one obtains a bed or bench stuffed with cotton down made for another person’s use, there is no offense in using it if one removes the upholstery first.

Summary: Obtaining a bed or bench stuffed with cotton down after making it—or having it made—for one’s own use is a pācittiya offense requiring that one remove the stuffing before confessing the offense.

*    *    *

89

When a bhikkhu is having a sitting cloth made, it is to be made to the standard measurement. Here the standard is this: two spans—using the sugata span—in length, one and a half spans in width, the border a span. In excess of that, it is to be cut down and confessed.

The origin story here follows on the passage in Mv.VIII.16.1, where the Buddha allows bhikkhus to use a sitting cloth in order to protect their robes from getting soiled by their furnishings, and their furnishings from getting soiled by their robes and bodies.

“Now at that time the Blessed One had allowed a sitting cloth for the bhikkhus. Some group-of-six bhikkhus… used sitting cloths, without any limit in size, that hung down in front and behind even on beds and benches.” (As a result, the Buddha set the limit at 2 by 1.5 spans.) Now, Ven. Udāyin was very large. Setting out his sitting cloth in front of the Blessed One, he stretched it out on all sides before sitting down. The Blessed One said to him, ‘Why is it, Udāyin, that when setting out your sitting cloth you stretch it out on all sides like a worker in old leather? (§)’

“Because the sitting cloth the Blessed One has allowed for the bhikkhus is way too small.’” (Thus the Buddha added the allowance for the border.)

There are three factors for the full offense here.

1) Object: a sitting cloth larger than the standard measure.

2) Effort: One obtains it after making it or having it made

3) Intention: for one’s own use.

Object

A sitting cloth, by definition, has to have a border, regardless of whether it is made of felted or woven material. However—as none of the texts give any clear indication as to how many sides should have a border or how the borders should be patterned—there is no definitive measurement as to how large the overall cloth should be. A wise policy, then, is to take the origin story as a guide: Make the cloth large enough so that one can sit cross-legged on it without soiling one’s robes or furnishings, but not so large that it extends out on any side.

Effort

The permutations under this factor are as follows: the act of making the sitting cloth or having it made—a dukkaṭa; obtaining the finished article—a pācittiya. This last penalty applies regardless of whether the cloth was made entirely by oneself, entirely by others either partly or entirely at one’s instigation, or whether one finished what others began or got others to finish what one began oneself. In any event, one must cut the cloth down to the proper size before confessing the offense.

If one obtains an oversized sitting cloth made by another—not at one’s instigation—then using it entails a dukkaṭa (§).

Intention

There is a dukkaṭa in making an overly large sitting cloth—or having it made—for the sake of another person.

Non-offenses

There is no offense if one receives an overly large sitting cloth made by another person (§)—not at one’s instigation—and cuts it down to size before using it oneself. The non-offense clauses also state that there is no offense in a canopy, a floor-covering, a wall screen, a mattress/cushion, or a kneeling mat. This apparently means that if one receives an overly large sitting cloth, one may use it as a canopy, etc., instead.

Summary: Obtaining an overly large sitting cloth after making it—or having it made—for one’s own use is a pācittiya offense requiring that one cut the cloth down to size before confessing the offense.

*    *    *

90

When a bhikkhu is having a skin-eruption covering cloth made, it is to be made to the standard measurement. Here the standard is this: four spans—using the sugata span—in length, two spans in width. In excess of that, it is to be cut down and confessed.

Object

Mv.VIII.17 allows bhikkhus to use a skin-eruption covering cloth to protect their robes when they are suffering from boils, running sores, rashes, or “thick scab” diseases (large boils? psoriasis?). The Vibhaṅga to this rule states that the cloth is to cover the area from the navel down to the knees, thus suggesting that the cloth is intended to be worn as an inner robe beneath the lower robe. As we already mentioned under NP 1, one should determine these cloths for use when one is suffering from such a disease and place them under shared ownership when not.

As mentioned under Pc 87, above, the sugata measures are discussed in Appendix II. Here we take the sugata span to equal 25 cm., which would put the standard measurement for the skin-eruption covering cloth at 1 meter by 50 cm.

Effort, intention, & non-offenses

The permutations of these factors are the same as under the preceding rule.

Summary: Obtaining an overly large skin-eruption covering cloth after making it—or having it made—for one’s own use is a pācittiya offense requiring that one cut the cloth down to size before confessing the offense.

*    *    *

91

When a bhikkhu is having a rains-bathing cloth made, it is to be made to the standard measurement. Here the standard is this: six spans—using the sugata span—in length, two and a half spans in width. In excess of that, it is to be cut down and confessed.

Object

The rains-bathing cloth has already been discussed in detail under NP 24. Taking the sugata span as 25 cm., the standard measurement for the rains-bathing cloth would be 1.5 m. by 62.5 cm.

Effort, intention, & non-offenses

The permutations of these factors are the same as under Pc 89.

Summary: Obtaining an overly large rains-bathing cloth after making it—or having it made—for one’s own use is a pācittiya offense requiring that one cut the cloth down to size before confessing the offense.

*    *    *

92

Should any bhikkhu have a robe made the measurement of the sugata robe or larger, it is to be cut down and confessed. Here, the measurement of the Sugata’s sugata robe is this: nine spans—using the sugata span—in length, six spans in width. This is the measurement of the Sugata’s sugata robe.

Object

The term sugata—meaning well-gone or accomplished—is an epithet for the Buddha.

Robe is not defined in the Vibhaṅga here but apparently means any of the three basic robes: the lower robe, the upper robe, and the outer robe. This raises an interesting point: Perhaps in the Buddha’s time all three of the basic robes were approximately the same size. This would have made it much more convenient than it is at present to hold to the practice of using only one set of three robes. When washing one robe, one could wear the other two without looking out of line.

At any rate, taking the sugata span to be 25 cm. would put the size of the Buddha’s robes at 2.25 m. by 1.50 m.—much larger than the lower robes used at present, but much smaller than present-day upper and outer robes.

As we will see under Appendix II, various theories have been offered over the centuries as to the length of the sugata span. Beginning at least with the time of the Mahā Aṭṭhakathā, one of the ancient commentaries, the Buddha was assumed to be of three-times normal height, and so his handspan, cubit, etc., were assumed to be three-times normal length. Only recently, within the last century or so, have Vinaya experts taken evidence from the Canon to show that the Buddha, though tall, was not abnormally so, and thus the estimate of the sugata span, etc., has shrunk accordingly. Still, the traditional estimates of the Buddha’s height continue to influence the size of the robes that bhikkhus wear today throughout the Theravādin countries. There was a movement in Thailand during the mid-19th century to return to the original size and style as shown in the earliest Indian Buddha images, but the idea never caught on.

Effort, intention, & non-offenses

The permutations of these factors are the same as under Pc 89.

Summary: Obtaining an overly large robe after making it—or having it made—for one’s own use is a pācittiya offense requiring that one cut the robe down to size before confessing the offense.

CHAPTER NINE

Pāṭidesanīya

This term means “to be acknowledged.” As a name for training rules, it means “entailing acknowledgement.” The four training rules here are unique in that they mention, as part of the rule, the words to be used in acknowledging the violation; the second rule is especially unique in that it depicts the violators as acknowledging their offense as a group.

1

Should any bhikkhu chew or consume staple or non-staple food, having received it with his own hand from the hand of an unrelated bhikkhunī in an inhabited area, he is to acknowledge it: “Friends, I have committed a blameworthy, unsuitable act that ought to be acknowledged. I acknowledge it.”

A long series of events led up to the formulation of this rule.

“At that time a certain woman whose husband was away from home was made pregnant by her lover. She, having caused an abortion, said to a bhikkhunī who was dependent on her family for alms, ‘Come, lady, take this fetus away in your bowl.’ So the bhikkhunī, having placed the fetus in her bowl and covering it up with her outer robe, went away. Now at that time a certain alms-going bhikkhu had made this vow: ‘I won’t eat from the first almsfood I receive without having given some of it to a bhikkhu or bhikkhunī.’ Seeing the bhikkhunī, he said to her, ‘Come, sister, accept alms.’

“‘No thank you, master.’—“A second time… A third time… —“‘No thank you, master.’

“‘Look, sister, I have made this vow: “I won’t eat from the first almsfood I receive without having given some of it to a bhikkhu or bhikkhunī.” So come on, accept alms.’

“Then the bhikkhunī, being pressured by the bhikkhu, took out her bowl and showed it to him. ‘You see, master: a fetus in the bowl. But don’t tell anyone’….

“(Of course the bhikkhu couldn’t help but tell his fellow bhikkhus, and word reached the Buddha, who formulated a double rule:) ‘A bhikkhunī should not take a fetus in a bowl…. I allow a bhikkhunī, when seeing a bhikkhu, to take out her bowl and show it to him.’

“Now at that time some group-of-six bhikkhunīs, on seeing a bhikkhu, would turn their bowls upside down and show him the bottom side…. ‘I allow a bhikkhunī, when seeing a bhikkhu, to show him her bowl rightside up. And she is to offer him whatever food there is in the bowl.’”—Cv.X.13

Here is where the origin story for this rule begins:

“Now at that time a certain bhikkhunī, on the way back from going for alms in Sāvatthī, seeing a certain bhikkhu, said to him, ‘Come, master, accept alms.’

“‘Very well, sister.’ And he took everything. As the time (for alms-going) was almost up, she was unable to go for alms and so was deprived of her meal.

“On the second day… the third day… he took everything…. she was deprived of her meal.

“On the fourth day, she went staggering along the road. A financier, coming the opposite direction in a chariot, said to her, ‘Get out of the way, lady.’

“Stepping down (from the road), she fell down right there.

“The financier asked her forgiveness, ‘Forgive me, lady, for making you fall.’

“‘It wasn’t that you made me fall, householder. It’s just that I myself am weak.’

“‘But why are you weak?’

“And she told him what had happened. The financier, having taken her to his house and having fed her (§), criticized and complained and spread it about, ‘How can their reverences take food from the hand of a bhikkhunī? It’s difficult for women to come by things.’”

There are two factors for the full offense here.

1) Object: staple or non-staple food that a bhikkhu has accepted from the hand of a bhikkhunī—unrelated to him—while she is in a village area.

2) Effort: He eats the food.

Object

There are two elements to this factor: the food sub-factor and the bhikkhunī sub-factor. Under the food sub-factor: Staple food follows the standard definition given in the Food Chapter under the pācittiya rules. Non-staple food includes all edibles except juice drinks, tonics, and medicines. Staple and non-staple food are grounds for a pāṭidesanīya; juice drinks, tonics, and medicines taken as food, grounds for a dukkaṭa.

As for the bhikkhunī sub-factor: Bhikkhunī refers to one who has received the double ordination. A bhikkhunī who has received only her first ordination—in the Bhikkhunī Saṅgha—is grounds for a dukkaṭa. Unrelated means sharing no common ancestor back through seven generations. Perception as to whether the bhikkhunī is related is not a mitigating factor here. The permutations around the issue of perception here are similar to those under Pc 4, with the only difference that the three pācittiyas under that pattern are changed to three pāṭidesanīyas here. In other words, if she is unrelated, she is grounds for a pāṭidesanīya whether one perceives her as unrelated, related, or doubtful. If she is related, she is grounds for a dukkaṭa if one perceives her as unrelated or doubtful. If she is related and one perceives her as related, she is not grounds for an offense. This pattern with regard to perception is followed in all four pāṭidesanīya rules.

A village area is defined as a house or roadway in a village, town, or city.

Effort

There is a dukkaṭa in accepting staple or non-staple food with the purpose of eating it, and in accepting juice drinks, tonics, or medicine with the purpose of taking them as food; while there is a pāṭidesanīya for every mouthful of the staple or non-staple food one eats, and a dukkaṭa for every mouthful one takes of the juice drinks, tonics, or medicine for the sake of food.

Non-offenses

There is no offense if a bhikkhu accepts and eats food from a related bhikkhunī or from a female trainee or female novice, related or not. There is also no offense in the following situations even if the bhikkhunī is unrelated:

She gets someone else to give him the food.

She gives it by placing it near him (as in NP 18 and Pc 41).

She gives it to him in a monastery, nuns’ quarters, a dwelling of members of other sects, or on the way back from such places.

She gives it to him after she has left the village.

She gives him juice drinks, tonics, or medicine, and he uses them as such, rather than as food.

The Commentary contains a fairly extensive explanation of the second exemption here. To begin with, the bhikkhunī cannot give the food simply by placing it down. She also has to state that she is giving the food, and the bhikkhu has to state his acceptance. In its discussion of Cv.X.15.1-2, the Commentary argues that food formally accepted by a bhikkhunī does not count as formally accepted for a bhikkhu, and vice versa. Thus, in the case of this exemption, even though the food has been given, the bhikkhu cannot take it until it has been formally offered. The Commentary states that the bhikkhunī can then formally offer it herself, but this would turn the exemption into a mere formality. What is more likely is that the food should be formally offered by someone else.

In all of these exemptions, the wise policy would be not to take so much of the bhikkhunī’s food that she is deprived of a full meal.

Summary: Eating staple or non-staple food after having accepted it from the hand of an unrelated bhikkhunī in a village area is a pāṭidesanīya offense.

*    *    *

2

In case bhikkhus, being invited, are eating in family residences, and if a bhikkhunī is standing there as though giving directions, (saying,) “Give curry here, give rice here,” then the bhikkhus are to dismiss her: “Go away, sister, while the bhikkhus are eating.” If not one of the bhikkhus should speak to dismiss her, “Go away, sister, while the bhikkhus are eating,” the bhikkhus are to acknowledge it: “Friends, we have committed a blameworthy, unsuitable act that ought to be acknowledged. We acknowledge it.”

This rule refers to situations where lay donors invite bhikkhus to a meal, and a bhikkhunī stands giving orders, based on favoritism, as to which bhikkhus should get which food. The duty of the bhikkhus in such cases is to tell her to go away before they accept any of the food. If even just one of them does, they all are exempt from the offense here. If none of them does, and the following factors are fulfilled, they all incur the penalty and must acknowledge their offense as a group.

If, instead of giving her orders in the bhikkhus’ presence, the bhikkhunī goes to the donors’ place and gives her orders prior to their arrival, then if the bhikkhus know of her actions, the case would come under Pc 29.

Object

As with the preceding rule, there are two objects here: the food and the bhikkhunī. Any one of the five staple foods received in the above situation would fulfill the food sub-factor. A bhikkhunī who has received double ordination would fulfill the bhikkhunī sub-factor. A bhikkhunī ordained only in the Bhikkhunī Saṅgha would be grounds for a dukkaṭa. If she has not been ordained, she is not grounds for an offense.

Perception as to whether she has been ordained is not a mitigating factor here (see Pd 1).

Effort

There is a dukkaṭa in accepting the staple food received under such circumstances, and a pāṭidesanīya for every mouthful one eats.

Non-offenses

There is no offense if—

the bhikkhunī gets others to give her food to the bhikkhus but does not give it herself;

she herself gives the food of other people to the bhikkhus;

she gets the donors to give food they have forgotten to give;

she gets them to give to a bhikkhu they have passed over;

she gets them to give the food equally to all;

she gets them to give anything but the five staple foods; or

she is a female trainee or novice.

The Commentary explains the first exemption here by noting that if the bhikkhunī were to give her own food to the bhikkhus, they would incur an offense under the preceding rule.

Summary: Eating staple food accepted at a meal to which one has been invited and where a bhikkhunī has given directions, based on favoritism, as to which bhikkhu should get which food, and none of the bhikkhus have dismissed her, is a pāṭidesanīya offense.

*    *    *

3

There are families designated as in training. Should any bhikkhu, not being ill, uninvited beforehand, chew or consume staple or non-staple food, having received it himself at the homes of families designated as in training, he is to acknowledge it: “Friends, I have committed a blameworthy, unsuitable act that ought to be acknowledged. I acknowledge it.”

The term in training (sekha) is usually used to refer to anyone who has attained at least the first noble path but has yet to become an arahant. Here, though, the Vibhaṅga uses it to refer to any family whose faith is increasing but whose wealth is decreasing—i.e., a family whose faith is so strong that they become generous to the point of suffering financially. In cases such as these, the Community may, as a formal transaction, declare them as families in training so as to protect them with this rule from bhikkhus who might abuse their generosity.

The factors for the offense here are two.

1) Object: staple or non-staple food accepted at the residence of a family designated as in training when one is not ill and has not been invited by them beforehand.

2) Effort: One eats the food.

Object

Staple food follows the standard definition given in the Food Chapter under the pācittiya rules. Non-staple food includes all edibles except juice drinks, tonics, and medicines. Staple and non-staple food are grounds for a pāṭidesanīya; juice drinks, tonics, and medicines taken as food, grounds for a dukkaṭa.

Ill is defined as being unable to go for alms.

Invited means that one has been invited on that day or a previous day by a member of the family—or a messenger—standing outside of the residence or its yard/compound. If they invite one while they are inside the residence or its yard/compound, one is not exempt from the offense in accepting and eating their food.

Perception as to whether the family has been designated as “in training” is not a mitigating factor here (see Pd 1).

Effort

There is a dukkaṭa in accepting staple or non-staple food with the purpose of eating it, or in accepting juice drinks, tonics, or medicine with the purpose of taking them as food; a pāṭidesanīya for every mouthful of the staple or non-staple food one eats; and a dukkaṭa for every mouthful one takes of the juice drinks, tonics, or medicine for the sake of food.

Non-offenses

There is no offense in eating food that one has accepted from the house of a family in training if—

one is ill;

one was invited;

almsfood supplied by people other than the members of the family in training is set out in the residence or its yard (§);

the family has made an arrangement to provide meals by drawing lots, on a daily basis, or on a regular or rotating basis—such as on a particular day of the waxing or waning moon, the uposatha days, or day after the uposatha days (see Appendix III)—and one accepts food as part of that arrangement;

one eats the leftovers of one who received the food at their residence when he was invited or ill (which suggests that if Bhikkhu X receives food from such a family in a way that would violate this rule and gives it to Bhikkhu Y, Y would incur offenses in receiving it with the thought of eating it and in consuming it);

one accepts juice drinks, tonics, or medicine and uses them as such; or

the members of the family give the food outside of their residence or yard/compound. The Commentary quotes the Mahā Paccarī, one of the ancient commentaries, as saying that this last exemption holds regardless of whether they take the food out of the residence before or after seeing one approach.

Summary: Eating staple or non-staple food after accepting it—when one is neither ill nor invited—at the residence of a family formally designated as “in training” is a pāṭidesanīya offense.

*    *    *

4

There are wilderness lodgings that are considered dubious and risky. Should any bhikkhu, not being ill, living in such lodgings, chew or consume (a gift of) staple or non-staple food that was unannounced beforehand, having received it with his own hand in the lodging, he is to acknowledge it: “Friends, I have committed a blameworthy, unsuitable act that ought to be acknowledged. I acknowledge it.”

“Now at that time the Sakyan slaves were rebelling. The Sakyan ladies wanted to present a meal (for the bhikkhus) in wilderness lodgings. The Sakyan slaves heard, ‘The Sakyan ladies, they say, want to present a meal in the wilderness lodgings,’ so they infested the way. The Sakyan ladies, carrying exquisite staple and non-staple foods, went to the wilderness lodgings. The Sakyan slaves, coming out, robbed them and raped them. The Sakyans, having come out and captured the thieves with the goods, criticized and complained and spread it about, ‘How can their reverences not inform us that there are thieves living in the monastery?’”

Here again there are two factors for the full offense.

1) Object: an unannounced gift of staple or non-staple food that one has received, when not ill, in a dubious and risky wilderness lodging.

2) Effort: One eats the food.

Object

The Vibhaṅga defines a wilderness lodging as one at least 500 bow-lengths, or one kilometer, from the nearest village, measuring by the shortest walkable path between the two, and not as the crow flies. Such a lodging is considered dubious if signs of thieves—such as their eating, resting, sitting, or standing places—have been seen within it or its vicinity; it is considered risky if people are known to have been hurt or plundered by thieves there. As under the other rule dealing with dubious and risky wilderness lodgings—NP 29—none of the texts here give a precise definition of how far the vicinity of the lodging extends for the purpose of this situation. As noted in the explanation to NP 29, given the risks inherent in such lodgings it was perhaps felt unwise to delimit the area too precisely. Thus, in the context of this rule, the “vicinity” of the lodging can be stretched to include any area where the presence of thieves leads to a common perception that the lodging is dangerous.

Staple food follows the standard definition given in the Food Chapter under the pācittiya rules. Non-staple food includes all edibles except juice drinks, tonics, and medicines.

Staple and non-staple food are grounds for a pāṭidesanīya; juice drinks, tonics, and medicines taken as food, grounds for a dukkaṭa.

The Vibhaṅga gives specific instructions for how the gift of food should be announced. The donor(s) or a messenger must come into the lodging compound if it is walled, or into its vicinity if it is not, and tell one of the inhabitants that a gift of food will be brought. The inhabitant must then tell the informant that the area is dubious and risky. If the informant says, “Never mind, the donor(s) will come anyway,” then someone in the lodging must tell the thieves, “Go away. People are coming to serve food.” This is unlikely to make the thieves go away but, as the Commentary explains, it absolves the bhikkhus from any responsibility if the thieves attack the donors.

According to the Vibhaṅga, even if the informant specifies that only certain types of food will be brought, anything that comes along with those foods counts as announced (§). Here the Commentary adds that if other people learn of the intended donation and bring food to add to it, their food counts as announced as well. The Vibhaṅga also states that if the informant says a group of people is coming to bring food, the announcement covers anything brought by any member of the group.

The Vibhaṅga makes clear that the announcement is valid only if the informant makes it in the lodging or its vicinity/compound. Thus, for example, if the donors announce their intended donation to the bhikkhu while he is in the village for alms, the donation is still considered unannounced. And, for the same reason, such things as telephone calls, letters, and faxes would also not count.

The Commentary adds that if the donors send a bhikkhu or novice to the lodging to announce the donation, it does not count as announced. In other words, the messenger must be a lay person.

Perception as to whether the food has been properly announced is not a mitigating factor here (see Pd 1).

A bhikkhu counts as ill if he is unable to go for alms.

Effort

Under these circumstances, there is a dukkaṭa in accepting unannounced staple or non-staple food with the purpose of eating it, or in accepting unannounced juice drinks, tonics or medicine with the purpose of taking them as food; a pāṭidesanīya for every mouthful of the unannounced staple or non-staple food one eats; and a dukkaṭa for every mouthful one takes of the unannounced juice drinks, tonics, or medicine for the sake of food. These penalties apply not only to the bhikkhu who accepts these items directly from the donor(s), but also to all other bhikkhus who take these items and eat them.

Non-offenses

There is no offense in eating food accepted in the lodging if one is ill or if the gift was announced. There is also no offense—

in using fruit, roots, bark, leaves, or flowers growing in the lodging (or, apparently, in its vicinity or compound);

in eating left-over announced food or food given to one who is ill;

in accepting food outside the lodging and eating it inside; or

in accepting and consuming juice drinks, tonics, and medicines as such and not as food.

The Commentary, in discussing these allowances, makes the following points: 1) If lay people take any of the fruits, roots, etc., growing in the lodging and cook them at home, they must announce the gift before bringing them back to the lodging. 2) If the donors, after announcing the gift, bring large amounts of food, some of it may be set aside—without presenting it to the bhikkhus—to be presented on a later day.

All of this causes no hardships in communities where everyone knows that they have to announce a gift of food before bringing it to the dangerous lodging, but there are bound to be cases where donors do not know that the lodging is dangerous or that they should announce their gifts before bringing them, and they are likely to show up at the lodging with unannounced gifts of food. In such cases, the Commentary recommends: 1) Either have the donor take the food outside the area of the lodging, come back in to announce it, and then go out to bring the food back in to present it; or 2) have the donor take the food outside and have a bhikkhu follow him/her out to accept it there.

In order to minimize the need for doing this, though, it would be a wise policy for a bhikkhu who finds himself living in such a lodging to announce to all his supporters beforehand—and ask them to spread the word—that if they want to bring him gifts of food, they have to come and announce the gifts in advance.

Summary: Eating an unannounced gift of staple or non-staple food after accepting it in a dangerous wilderness lodging when one is not ill is a pāṭidesanīya offense.

CHAPTER TEN

Sekhiya

This term means “to be trained in.” There are 75 training rules in this category, divided by subject into four groups: etiquette in dressing and behaving when in inhabited areas; etiquette in accepting and eating almsfood; etiquette when teaching the Dhamma; and etiquette in urinating, defecating, and spitting.

The rules themselves do not impose a direct penalty. Instead, they simply say, “(This is) a training to be observed.” The Vibhaṅga, though, says that to violate any of these rules out of disrespect incurs a dukkaṭa. The non-offense clauses state in each case that to violate them unintentionally, unthinkingly, or unknowingly, or to disobey them when there are dangers or (in most cases) when one is ill, incurs no penalty. (The exemption for dangers is not in the Burmese edition of the Canon.)

The Commentary adds that unknowingly in this case does not mean not knowing the rule. For a new bhikkhu not to make the effort to know the rules, it says, would qualify as disrespect. So unknowingly here means not knowing that a situation contrary to the rules has developed. For instance, if one does not know that one’s robes have gotten out of kilter, that would not count as a breach of the relevant rule.

One: The 26 Dealing with Proper Behavior

The Canon contains several stories in which a bhikkhu’s behavior causes another person to become interested in the Dhamma. The most famous example is the story of Ven. Sāriputta’s first encounter with Ven. Assaji.

“Now at that time the wanderer Sañjaya was staying in Rājagaha with a large company of wanderers—250 in all. And at that time Sāriputta and Moggallāna were practicing the celibate life under Sañjaya. They had made this agreement: Whoever attains the Deathless first will inform the other.

“Then Ven. Assaji, dressing early in the morning, taking his bowl and (outer) robe, entered Rājagaha for alms: gracious in the way he approached and departed, looked forward and behind, drew in and stretched out (his arm); his eyes downcast, his every movement consummate. Sāriputta the wanderer saw Ven. Assaji going for alms in Rājagaha: gracious… his eyes downcast, his every movement consummate. On seeing him, the thought occurred to him: ‘Surely, of those bhikkhus in this world who are arahants or have entered the path to arahantship, this is one. What if I were to go to him and question him: “Friend, on whose account have you gone forth? Or who is your teacher? Or in whose Dhamma do you delight?”’

“But then the thought occurred to Sāriputta the wanderer: ‘This is the wrong time to question him. Having entered among houses, he is going for alms. What if I were to follow behind this bhikkhu, (to know) the path found out by those who seek it?’”—Mv.I.23.1-3

Even though the following rules deal with minor matters, a bhikkhu should remind himself that the minor details of his behavior can often make the difference between sparking and killing another person’s interest in the Dhamma.

1 [2]

I will wear the lower robe [upper robe] wrapped around (me): a training to be observed.

To wear the lower robe wrapped around means to wear the upper edge circling the waist, covering the navel, and the lower edge covering the kneecaps. This is called covering the “three circles.” The Commentary states that when one is standing, the lower edge should be not more than eight fingerbreadths below the knees, although if one’s calves are disfigured, it is all right to cover them more than that.

To wear the upper robe wrapped around means, according to the Vibhaṅga, keeping both ends of the top edge in line with each other, and the same with both ends of the bottom edge. The bottom edge of the upper robe, though, does not have to be level with the bottom edge of the lower robe. Given the size of the upper robe in the Buddha’s time, it would not have extended down that far.

Intentionally to wear either robe hanging down in front or in back is a breach of these rules. The Commentary states that the purpose of these rules is to prevent bhikkhus from wearing their robes in any of the various ways that lay people in those days wore theirs—e.g., pleated “with 100 pleats,” tied up, or tucked up between the legs. It also comments that because these rules are not qualified, as the following ones are, with the phrase, “in inhabited areas,” they should be followed in the monastery and wilderness areas as well. However, the wilderness protocols (Cv.VIII.6.2-3) clearly show that bhikkhus were not expected to wear the upper robe wrapped around them in the wilderness; and the sauna protocols (Cv.VIII.8.2) seem to indicate that bhikkhus on their way to and from the sauna were not required to wear their lower robes covering the three circles as long as they covered their private parts front and back.

As a practical matter, if one is working on a high ladder or in a tree—whether in a village, a monastery, or the wilderness—a wise policy is to tuck one’s lower robe up between the legs for decency’s sake.

3 [4]

I will go [sit] well-covered in inhabited areas: a training to be observed.

The Vibhaṅga does not define inhabited areas in this or any of the following rules. The term thus probably has the same meaning as under Pd 1: in the homes of lay people, or along the streets and alleys of villages, cities, or towns. This does not include, however, monasteries located in inhabited areas, for the incoming bhikkhu’s protocols (Cv.VIII.1.2) show that when the Canon was composed, bhikkhus were not required to wear their upper robes in the monastery. At present, though, many monasteries located in inhabited areas require that bhikkhus living with them observe many of these rules when outside of their personal quarters but still within monastery grounds.

Well-covered, according to the Commentary, means not exposing one’s chest or knees. One should have the upper edge of the upper robe around the neck, and the lower edge covering the wrists. The lower edge of the lower robe, as stated above, should cover the knees. When seated, only one’s head, hands, and legs from the calves on down should show.

Sk 4 here has an added non-offense clause: There is no offense if one sits not “well-covered” within one’s residence (§). According to the Vinaya-mukha, this means within one’s room when staying overnight in a lay person’s home; when outside of one’s room, though, one should follow the rule.

5 [6]

I will go [sit] well-restrained in inhabited areas: a training to be observed.

Well-restrained, according to the Vibhaṅga, means not playing with the hands or feet. This would include such things as dancing, cracking one’s knuckles, or wiggling one’s fingers or toes.

7 [8]

I will go [sit] with eyes lowered in inhabited areas: a training to be observed.

The Vibhaṅga says that a bhikkhu should keep his gaze lowered to the ground the distance of a plow’s length ahead of him—this equals two meters, according to the Commentary. The purpose of this rule, it adds, is to prevent one from gazing aimlessly at the sights here and there as one walks along. There is nothing wrong, though, in looking up when one has reason to do so. An example given in the Commentary is stopping to look up and see if there are dangers from approaching horses or elephants. A more modern example would be checking the traffic before crossing a road.

9 [10]

I will not go [sit] with robes hitched up in inhabited areas: a training to be observed.

According to the Vibhaṅga, to hitch up one’s robes means to lift them so as to expose either side or both sides of the body. Sk 10 here, like Sk 4, does not apply when one is sitting in one’s residence in an inhabited area (§).

11 [12]

I will not go [sit] laughing loudly in inhabited areas: a training to be observed.

According to the Vibhaṅga, if there is any reason for amusement, one should simply smile. It also states that there is no offense in laughing loudly when ill or there are dangers. The editors of the Thai edition of the Pali Canon question these exemptions on the grounds that they see no reason why anyone would laugh loudly in either of these situations, but this objection shows a lack of imagination.

13 [14]

I will go [sit] (speaking) with a lowered voice in inhabited areas: a training to be observed.

The Commentary defines a lowered voice as follows: Three bhikkhus are sitting in a row at intervals of three meters. The first bhikkhu speaks. The second can hear him and clearly catch what he is saying. The third can hear his voice but not what he is saying. If the third can clearly catch what he is saying, it maintains, the first bhikkhu is speaking too loudly. As the Vinaya-mukha notes, though, when one is speaking to a crowd of people, there is nothing wrong in raising one’s voice provided that one does not shout. And as the non-offense clauses show, there is nothing wrong in shouting if there are dangers—e.g., someone is about to fall off a cliff or be hit by a car. It would also seem that there is no offense in shouting if one’s listener is partially deaf.

15 [16]

I will not go [sit] swinging my body in inhabited areas: a training to be observed.

This means that one should keep one’s body straight. Sk 16, like Sk 4, does not apply when one is sitting in one’s residence in an inhabited area (§).

17 [18]

I will not go [sit] swinging my arms in inhabited areas: a training to be observed.

According to the Commentary, this means that one should keep one’s arms still, although as the Vinaya-mukha points out, there is nothing wrong in swinging one’s arms slightly to keep one’s balance as one walks. The non-offense clauses indicate that Sk 18, like Sk 4, does not apply when one is sitting in one’s residence in an inhabited area.

19 [20]

I will not go [sit] swinging my head in inhabited areas: a training to be observed.

This refers to swinging the head from side to side or letting it droop forward or back. Of course, there is no offense if one is dozing off, and like Sk 4, Sk 20 does not apply when one is sitting in one’s residence in an inhabited area.

21 [22]

I will not go [sit] with arms akimbo in inhabited areas: a training to be observed.

Akimbo means with the hand on the hip. This rule, the Vibhaṅga says, forbids having one arm or both arms akimbo. Sk 22 does not apply when one is sitting in one’s residence in an inhabited area.

23 [24]

I will not go [sit] with my head covered in inhabited areas: a training to be observed.

Covered here means covered with a robe, a scarf, or other similar piece of cloth. Sk 24 does not apply when one is sitting in one’s residence in an inhabited area. The allowance for “one who is ill” under both rules means that one may cover one’s head when the weather is unbearably cold or the sun unbearably hot.

25

I will not go tiptoeing or walking just on the heels in inhabited areas: a training to be observed.

This translation of the rule follows the Commentary.

26

I will not sit clasping the knees (§) in inhabited areas: a training to be observed.

This, the Vibhaṅga says, refers to sitting with one or both arms or hands hugging one or both knees; or with a strap or a strip of cloth around one or both knees and the torso (§). The bas-reliefs at Borobudur show royalty using this latter position as a way of keeping the body erect when tired or weak.

This rule does not apply when one is sitting in one’s residence in an inhabited area (§).

*    *    *

In addition to the rules listed here, there are others in the Khandhakas concerning behavior in inhabited areas. These include:

A bhikkhu entering an inhabited area must wear all three of his basic set of robes unless—

he is ill;

there is sign of rain;

his kaṭhina privileges are in effect;

he is going to cross a river; or

he has a secure dwelling (or other hiding place, the Commentary says, such as a hollow in a tree or a rock) in which to place the robe he leaves behind (Mv.VIII.23.2-3).

He should also wear his waistband. The bhikkhu who instigated this rule had the unforgettable experience of having his lower robe slip off in front of a group of people who thoroughly enjoyed the spectacle (Cv.V.29.1).

A bhikkhu entering an inhabited area, though, should not spread out his outer robe to sit on (Cv.VIII.4.3) and, unless he is ill, should not wear footwear—shoes, sandals, boots, etc.—(Mv.V.12) or use an umbrella or sunshade (Cv.V.23.3). The Commentary to the umbrella rule includes physical or mental discomfort under ill in this case, and says that one may also use the umbrella to protect one’s robes from the rain.

Two: The 30 Dealing with Food

27

I will receive almsfood appreciatively: a training to be observed.

This rule was formulated in response to an incident in which some group-of-six bhikkhus accepted almsfood unappreciatively, as if—to quote the Vibhaṅga—“they wanted to throw it away.” The Commentary explains appreciatively as “with mindfulness established.” One should also remind oneself of the trouble and expense the donors incurred in providing the food.

28

I will receive almsfood with attention focused on the bowl: a training to be observed.

The purpose of this rule is to prevent one from looking at the donor’s face (see Cv.VIII.5.2) or gazing aimlessly in other directions while he/she is placing food in the bowl. However, one of the “duties to be observed on alms round,” (Cv.VIII.5) is that one should not stand too long or turn away too soon. This means that one should glance at what the donor has prepared to give, so that one will not stand waiting for more when the donor has finished giving, or turn away when he/she has more to give.

29

I will receive almsfood with bean curry in proper proportion: a training to be observed.

This rule refers specifically to eating habits at the time of the Buddha. Bean curry means dishes made with gram, pulses, vetch, etc., thick enough that they can be placed in the bowl by the hand. In proper proportion, according to the Commentary, means no more than one-quarter of the total food. The Vinaya-mukha tries to interpret this rule as covering curries and soups of all kinds, but the Vibhaṅga and commentaries state unequivocally that it covers only bean curries. Other gravies, soups, stews, and sauces are exempt.

This rule probably refers to situations in which bhikkhus are offered food from a serving dish from which they help themselves—as was the custom when they were invited to homes in the Buddha’s time, and is still the custom in Sri Lanka and Burma—for the Vibhaṅga states that there is no offense in receiving more than the proper proportion if one is invited to accept more than that. There is also no offense in taking more than the proper proportion if one is ill, one is accepting it from relatives, one is accepting it for the sake of another, or one has obtained the food through one’s own resources. (This interpretation follows the Commentary. The K/Commentary, for some reason, maintains that these latter non-offense situations—accepting from one’s relatives, from people who have offered an invitation, for the sake of another, or from food obtained through one’s own resources—apply only to dishes that are not bean curries, but this interpretation does not fit with the Vibhaṅga.)

30

I will receive almsfood level with the edge (of the bowl): a training to be observed.

Iron bowls in the past had a hoop approximately 1 cm. wide around the inside of the mouth. According to the Commentary, edge here means the bottom edge of this hoop. A bhikkhu is prohibited from accepting so much food that it would pile up above this level, although of course there is nothing against accepting less.

The Commentary contains a long discussion of what does and does not come under almsfood in this rule, and concludes that the term covers only staple and non-staple foods. Thus if one receives a sweet, the “tail” of whose leaf-wrapper extends above the edge of the bowl (such sweets are still common in Asia today), it would not count as an infraction of this rule. The same holds true if one receives foods that do not fill the bowl but extend above the edge—such as a length of sugar cane—or if the donor places on top of one’s bowl another vessel containing food, such as a box of sweets or a bag of fruit.

The Vinaya-mukha, in discussing this rule, makes the following point: “In terms of present-day customs, receiving a lot of food in a way that demonstrates greed is unacceptable. There is nothing wrong, however, in receiving a lot in a way that demonstrates compassion. For instance, when a newly-ordained bhikkhu goes to receive alms at his family home, if he accepts only one bowlful, not everyone will have a chance to put food in his bowl. If they take his bowl and pour out the contents (into a basin), and he then continues accepting food until everyone has had a chance, this is no breach of manners, and no one would criticize him as greedy.” Because this is an instance of breaking the rule not out of disrespect, it would incur no offense; the same observation can be applied to similar situations as well.

31

I will eat almsfood appreciatively: a training to be observed.

According to the Vinaya-mukha, this rule forbids doing other things—such as reading—while eating one’s food. The Recollection at the Moment of Using One’s Requisites requires that one reflect that one is eating “not playfully, nor for intoxication, nor for putting on bulk, nor for beautification; but simply for the survival and continuance of this body, for ending its afflictions, for the support of the celibate life, (thinking) ‘I will destroy old feelings [of hunger] without creating new feelings [from overeating]: Thus will I maintain myself, be blameless, and live in comfort.’” One should also remind oneself of the effort and expense the donors went to in providing the meal.

32

I will eat almsfood with attention focused on the bowl: a training to be observed.

The purpose of this rule is to prevent one from gazing aimlessly about while eating. The Vinaya-mukha notes, though, “To look elsewhere in ways related to one’s eating—e.g., looking with the thought of providing a nearby bhikkhu with whatever he is lacking—is not prohibited.” (See Sk 38, below.)

33

I will eat almsfood methodically (§): a training to be observed.

The aim of this rule is that a bhikkhu work steadily across his food from one side to another while eating and not pick at it here and there. Special treats, though, may be passed over—either as a form of self-denial or to save them for the end of the meal. Also, there is no offense in picking here and there when taking food from one’s bowl to give to another person (§).

34

I will eat almsfood with bean curry in proper proportion: a training to be observed.

This rule does not apply to foods that are not thick bean curries, or to situations where one is ill or where one has received bean curry from relatives, from people who offered an invitation to take more, or from one’s own resources.

35

I will not eat almsfood taking mouthfuls from a heap: a training to be observed.

This refers to the food on one’s plate or in one’s bowl. The Commentary explains from a heap as from the top or from the middle. As noted under Sk 33, one should work across one’s food systematically; this rule indicates that one should start from the side when taking mouthfuls and not from the middle of the heap. The non-offense clauses state that if a little food remains scattered in one’s bowl, there is no offense in gathering it together in a small heap and eating from that (§). The Vinaya-mukha maintains that it is a custom among bhikkhus before eating to level off the food in their bowls so that its surface is even, but I have found no reference to this point in any of the other texts. However, the Vinaya-mukha does make the helpful point that if one is served other foods—such as sweets—stacked on a platter, it would be impolite to level them off (or to take from the edge in a way that would collapse the heap), so in such cases one may take from the top of the heap.

36

I will not hide bean curry and foods with rice out of a desire to get more: a training to be observed.

Some donors, if they see that a bhikkhu has nothing but rice in his bowl, will go out of their way to provide him with extra food. This rule is to prevent bhikkhus from taking advantage of their kind intentions.

According to the Vibhaṅga, there is no offense if donors cover the food in one’s bowl with rice, or if one covers it with rice oneself for some reason other than a desire for more.

The Commentary takes special note of the fact that the Vibhaṅga gives no exception here for a bhikkhu who is ill.

37

Not being ill, I will not eat rice or bean curry that I have requested for my own sake: a training to be observed.

The Commentary to Pc 39 says that rice or bean curry here covers all foods not covered in that rule.

There is no offense in requesting these foods from relatives, from people who have offered an invitation to request, or if one is ill (weak from hunger would be included here). There is also no offense in obtaining these foods by means of one’s own resources. The Sub-commentary raises the question of how the blanket Sekhiya exemptions for the bhikkhu acting “unintentionally” or “without mindfulness” apply to this rule, and comes up with the following example: A bhikkhu takes the food into his mouth and then, on feeling regret, spits it out in displeasure. A better example might be that of a bhikkhu who asks for these foods from a lay person and then eats them, having forgotten that the lay person’s invitation to ask for such foods has expired.

The Meṇḍaka Allowance (Mv.VI.34.21) permits a bhikkhu to search for provisions of husked rice, kidney beans, green gram (mung beans), salt, sugar, oil, and ghee when going on a journey through a wilderness area where almsfood will be hard to find. For details, see the discussion under Pc 39.

38

I will not look at another’s bowl intent on finding fault: a training to be observed.

The K/Commentary defines finding fault as taking note of the fact that the other bhikkhu or novice has something. What this probably means is that he has some especially nice food that he is not sharing. The Vinaya-mukha provides an alternative suggestion, that this rule refers to finding fault with another’s sloppy manner of eating. Sloppiness, though, is something about which bhikkhus may admonish one another, so the K/Commentary’s interpretation seems more to the point.

The Vibhaṅga states that there is no offense in looking at another’s bowl if one is not meaning to find fault or if one wants to provide him with whatever he may be lacking.

Here again, the Commentary notes that there is no exception for a bhikkhu who is ill.

39

I will not take an extra-large mouthful: a training to be observed.

According to the Commentary, a mouthful the size of a peacock egg is too large, while one the size of a chicken egg is too small (!). One midway between these two sizes is just right. This seems hard to fathom unless chicken eggs in those days were much smaller than they are now.

According to the Vibhaṅga, this rule does not cover fruits, solid foods such as roots, or special confections (sandwiches at present would fit here). Apparently, if these items are a little large, it is all right to stick them whole into the mouth, although if they are very large it would be better to take bites out of them (see Sk 45).

40

I will make a rounded mouthful: a training to be observed.

People at that time ate food with their hands, and formed mouthfuls of the food with their fingers before taking them to the mouth.

This rule, like the preceding one, does not cover fruits, solid foods such as roots, or special confections such as sandwiches. In other words, one does not have to mash these things up and form them into rounded mouthfuls before eating.

41

I will not open the mouth when the mouthful has yet to be brought to it: a training to be observed.

42

I will not insert the whole hand into the mouth while eating: a training to be observed.

The Commentary and K/Commentary are in agreement that this is the proper translation for this rule. The Sub-commentary insists that it should be “any part of the hand” rather than “the whole hand,” but according to the Commentary the act of sticking a finger in one’s mouth while eating comes under Sk 52. Although there are people with small hands and large mouths who have actually succeeded in inserting their whole hands into their mouths, the rarity of this ability has given rise to alternative interpretations for this rule. For instance, although the verb in the rule clearly means “insert,” some have suggested that this rule forbids taking a handful of food in the palm of the hand and pushing the palm right up against the mouth. Others have suggested that it forbids inserting all five of one hand’s fingers into the mouth. However, even though these suggestions promote good manners, they do not fit the precise act mentioned in the rule, and so at most can be taken on an individual basis as wise policies to follow.

43

I will not speak with the mouth full of food: a training to be observed.

According to the Commentary, if the amount of food in one’s mouth is not enough to affect the clarity of one’s pronunciation, it is all right to speak.

44

I will not eat from lifted balls of food: a training to be observed.

What this means is that one should not lift food from the bowl in one hand and then use the other hand to take parts of that handful to put in the mouth. According to the Vibhaṅga, this rule does not cover fruits or solid foods. Thus, for example, it is all right to pick up a bunch of grapes in one hand and then take the grapes one by one with the other hand to put them in the mouth.

This rule is often translated as, “I will not eat tossing up balls of food,” but it seems unlikely that there would be an allowance for tossing fruit, etc., into the air and catching it in the mouth. Because the Pali term ukkhepa can mean “lifting,” the above translation is probably more correct.

45

I will not eat nibbling at mouthfuls of food: a training to be observed.

After forming a mouthful of food (see Sk 39 & 40), one should place it all into the mouth at one time, rather than biting it off bit by bit.

Again, this rule does not cover fruits, solid foods, or special confections (§—these last two items are missing in the PTS edition of the Canon). In other words, there is nothing wrong in taking bites from any of these foods that are too large to fit into the mouth, although the etiquette in many Asian countries at present frowns on taking bites even out of things such as these.

46

I will not eat stuffing out the cheeks: a training to be observed.

This is another rule that does not cover fruits, solid foods, or special confections. Apparently this allowance covers cases where the fruits, etc., would make up a mouthful a little on the large side, as defined under Sk 39.

47

I will not eat shaking (food off) the hand: a training to be observed.

According to the Vibhaṅga, there is no offense in shaking the hand while throwing away scraps.

48

I will not eat scattering lumps of rice about: a training to be observed.

The Vibhaṅga states that there is no offense in throwing away lumps of rice while throwing away scraps.

49

I will not eat sticking out the tongue: a training to be observed.

50

I will not eat smacking the lips: a training to be observed.

51

I will not eat making a slurping noise: a training to be observed.

In the origin story to this rule, a certain brahman prepared a milk drink for the bhikkhus, who drank it making a hissing or slurping sound. One of the bhikkhus, a former actor, made a joke about the fact: “It’s as if this entire Saṅgha were cooled.” (This of course, is a pun on the higher meaning of the term, cooled.) Word got to the Buddha, who in addition to formulating this rule, also imposed a dukkaṭa on the act of making a joke about the Buddha, Dhamma, or Saṅgha.

52

I will not eat licking the hands: a training to be observed.

According to the Commentary, this rule also covers the act of sticking a finger into the mouth. There are times, though—it says—when one is eating a semi-liquid food with one’s hand, in which case it is all right to stick the tips of the fingers into the mouth so as to get as much of the food as possible into the mouth without spilling it.

53

I will not eat licking the bowl: a training to be observed.

The Commentary shows that the verb lick here also means scrape, when it says that scraping the bowl even with one finger is a breach of this rule. The Commentary is surely correct here, for otherwise there is no making sense of the Vibhaṅga’s allowance that if there are a few scattered crumbs left in the bowl, one may gather them into one last mouthful, “lick” them up, and eat them.

If the crumbs are not enough to form a mouthful, though, the Vinaya-mukha recommends leaving them as they are. One would then throw them out with the bowl-washing water (see Sk 56). This practice of leaving a little food uneaten is a point of etiquette common throughout Asia. If one is a guest and has been offered food or drink, one should not eat it to the last crumb or drink it to the last drop, for that would imply that one was not offered enough and is hungry or thirsty for more. Wasting a few bits of food is less serious than hurting the feelings of one’s host. (For more on this point, see Pc 35.) Even when one is eating in a situation where the donor is not around to watch, it is generally a good practice to leave a few crumbs—to be thrown away a good distance from one’s dwelling—as a gift to insects or other small, hungry beings.

54

I will not eat licking the lips: a training to be observed.

55

I will not accept a water vessel with a hand soiled by food: a training to be observed.

The Vibhaṅga says that if one’s hand is soiled, one may take the water vessel with the thought that, “I will wash it or get it washed (§),” although this allowance might be qualified with the consideration that one should try to get it washed before anyone else wants to use it.

According to the Commentary, this rule was formulated to prevent unclean habits, and so it changes the verb in the Pali—“accept” or “receive”—to “take” or “take hold of.” In other words, it applies this rule not only to situations where one is accepting the water vessel from someone else, but also to those in which one simply picks it up on one’s own. It adds that water vessel here applies to anything from which one would drink water, whether it belongs to oneself or to others. If one’s hand is partially soiled, it says, one may pick up a water vessel with the unsoiled part.

56

I will not, in an inhabited area, throw away bowl-rinsing water that has grains of rice in it: a training to be observed.

The custom in those times, when bhikkhus were invited to eat at a lay person’s home, was for the donor to offer water to the bhikkhus to rinse out their bowls before the meal and again after it. In both cases, each bhikkhu was to hold his bowl in both hands, receive the water into the bowl, swish it around without scraping it (against the ground or floor), and pour it into a receptacle if there was one—or on the ground if not—taking care not to splash any nearby people or his own robes (Cv.VIII.4.4-6).

This rule applies to the after-meal rinsing. The Vibhaṅga says that there is no offense in throwing away bowl-rinsing water if the rice grains are removed or if they are squashed so as to dissolve in the water. Different editions of the Canon have variant readings for the remaining non-offense clauses. According to the PTS edition, there is no offense “in having received or in having carried out,” but it is hard to tell what having received would mean here. According to the reading given in the Thai and Sri Lankan editions of the Canon, as well as the Commentary, there is no offense “in a receptacle (paṭiggahe) or in having carried out.” The reading “receptacle” here is supported by the Meal-hall Protocols in Cv.VIII.4.6 (BMC2, Chapter 9), and so is probably correct. Thus, as the Commentary explains, there is no offense in pouring the water with rice grains into a receptacle, nor is there an offense in carrying the bowl containing water with rice grains outside the inhabited area to throw it away there.

*    *    *

In addition to the above rules, the duties observed on alms round and in eating at a lay person’s home include the following points of etiquette:

While on alms round. One should go unhurriedly, and stand neither too close to nor too far from the donor (Cv.VIII.5.2).

While eating in a home. One should select a seat that does not encroach on the senior bhikkhus’ spaces but that also does not preempt the seats of the junior ones (Cv.VIII.4.3).

If there are any special foods, the most senior bhikkhu should tell the donor to make sure that everyone gets equal portions. He should also not begin eating until everyone is served rice (Cv.VIII.4.4), nor should he accept water for rinsing his bowl until everyone has finished eating (Cv.VIII.4.6).

For more details, see BMC2, Chapter 9.

*    *    *

The Vinaya-mukha notes that some of the rules and allowances in this section outline table manners that would be regarded as either excessively fussy or messy by polite modern standards. Thus wherever ancient and modern codes of etiquette are at variance, the wise policy would be to adhere to whichever code is more stringent on that particular point.

Three: The 16 Dealing with Teaching Dhamma

SN 6:2 records that the Buddha himself had the highest respect for the Dhamma he had discovered; that, as others might live under the guidance of a teacher, honoring and revering him, the Buddha lived under, honored, and revered the Dhamma. He enjoined his followers to show the same respect for the Dhamma not only when listening to it but also when teaching it, by refusing to teach it to a person who shows disrespect.

The following set of rules deals with situations in which a listener, in terms of the etiquette at that time, would be regarded as showing disrespect for a teacher or his teaching. As the Vinaya-mukha notes, a few of these cases—such as those concerning footwear—are not considered disrespectful under certain circumstances at present, although here the exceptions given for listeners who are ill might be stretched to cover any situation where the listener would feel inconvenienced or awkward if asked to comply with the etiquette of the Buddha’s time. On the other hand, there are many ways of showing disrespect at present that are not covered by these rules, and an argument could be made, reasoning from the Great Standards, that a bhikkhu should not teach Dhamma to a person who showed disrespect in any way.

Dhamma here is defined as any statement spoken by the Buddha, his disciples, seers, or devatās, connected with the teaching or with its goal. See Pc 7 for a more detailed discussion of this point.

57

I will not teach Dhamma to a person with an umbrella in his hand who is not ill: a training to be observed.

An umbrella or sunshade, at that time, was considered a sign of rank. According to the Commentary, this rule applies regardless of whether the umbrella is open or closed, as long as one’s listener has his/her hand on it. If, however, the umbrella is on the listener’s lap, resting against his/her shoulder, or if someone else is holding it over the listener’s head, there is no offense in teaching him/her any Dhamma. This last point may have been offered as a concession to royalty at the time.

58

I will not teach Dhamma to a person with a staff in his hand who is not ill: a training to be observed.

According to the Vibhaṅga, a staff is a pole two meters long. For some reason, any pole shorter or longer than that would not come under this rule—perhaps because a two-meter pole was used as a weapon, whereas other poles, such as walking sticks, were not.

59

I will not teach Dhamma to a person with a knife in his hand who is not ill: a training to be observed.

The term knife here includes anything with a blade. According to the Commentary, if the knife is not in the listener’s hand—e.g., it is in a sheath attached to a belt—there is no penalty in teaching him/her any Dhamma.

60

I will not teach Dhamma to a person with a weapon in his hand who is not ill: a training to be observed.

The Vibhaṅga defines weapon as a bow, and the Commentary includes arrows here as well. The Vinaya-mukha adds guns; and in fact any weapon that does not have a blade would seem to fall under this rule.

Again, if the weapon is not in the listener’s hand—e.g., it is in a holster attached to the belt—there is no penalty in teaching him/her any Dhamma.

61 [62]

I will not teach Dhamma to a person wearing non-leather [leather] footwear who is not ill: a training to be observed.

The Pali terms for non-leather and leather footwear—upāhanā and pādukā—cover all forms of shoes, sandals, and boots (see Mv.V.1.30-8.3).

Wearing means any one of three things: placing one’s feet on top of the footwear without inserting the toes; inserting the toes without fastening the footwear; or fastening the footwear with the toes inside.

63

I will not teach Dhamma to a person in a vehicle who is not ill: a training to be observed.

The Commentary makes the point that if the vehicle is large enough to seat two or more, the bhikkhu may sit together with his listener and teach Dhamma without penalty. The same holds true if the bhikkhu and his listener are in separate vehicles, as long as the bhikkhu’s vehicle is the same height or higher than his listener’s and is not following along behind it.

64

I will not teach Dhamma to a person lying down who is not ill: a training to be observed.

The Commentary goes into great detail on this rule, listing the various permutations of the bhikkhu’s position and his listener’s, saying which ones are allowable and which ones not:

A bhikkhu lying down may teach any listener who is standing or sitting down. He may also teach a listener lying down on a piece of furniture, a mat, or the ground, as long as the bhikkhu’s position is on an equal level or higher than his listener’s.

A bhikkhu sitting down may teach a listener who is standing or sitting down (see also Sk 68 & 69), but not one who is lying down, unless the listener is ill.

A bhikkhu standing may teach a listener who is also standing, but not one who is sitting or lying down, again unless the listener is ill (see Sk 70).

65

I will not teach Dhamma to a person who sits clasping his knees and who is not ill: a training to be observed.

The position of clasping the knees is discussed in detail under Sk 26.

66

I will not teach Dhamma to a person wearing headgear who is not ill: a training to be observed.

This rule applies only to headgear—such as turbans or hats—that hide all of the hair. If the hat/turban does not hide all of the hair, or if the listener adjusts it so as to expose some hair, it would not come under this rule.

67

I will not teach Dhamma to a person whose head is covered (with a robe or scarf) and who is not ill: a training to be observed.

There is no offense in teaching if the listener adjusts the robe or scarf to uncover his/her head.

68

Sitting on the ground, I will not teach Dhamma to a person sitting on a seat who is not ill: a training to be observed.

According to the Commentary, a seat here includes even a piece of cloth or a pile of grass.

69

Sitting on a low seat, I will not teach Dhamma to a person sitting on a high seat who is not ill: a training to be observed.

The Commentary states that this rule also covers cases where the bhikkhu and his listener are both sitting on the ground but the listener is sitting on a higher piece of ground than the bhikkhu.

70

Standing, I will not teach Dhamma to a person sitting who is not ill: a training to be observed.

71

Walking behind, I will not teach Dhamma to a person walking ahead who is not ill: a training to be observed.

There is no offense, the Commentary says, if the bhikkhu and his listener are walking side by side; or if two bhikkhus are walking along, one in front of the other, and they practice reciting a passage of Dhamma together.

72

Walking beside a path, I will not teach Dhamma to a person walking on the path who is not ill: a training to be observed.

Four: The 3 Miscellaneous Rules

73

Not being ill, I will not defecate or urinate while standing: a training to be observed.

Arguing from the Commentary’s allowance under the following rule, it would seem that a bhikkhu who needs to urinate, finds himself in a public restroom, and can no longer hold himself in while waiting for a toilet, would qualify as “ill” here and so would be able to use a urinal without penalty.

74

Not being ill, I will not defecate, urinate, or spit on living crops: a training to be observed.

The Vinaya-mukha says that crops here includes all plants that are tended—such as in gardens, farms, or lawns—but not plants growing wild. The Commentary includes roots of living trees that appear above ground, in addition to green plants running along on top of the ground. It also notes that the Mahā Paccarī, one of the ancient commentaries on which it is based, includes blowing the nose under the term spitting in this rule and the next.

According to the Vibhaṅga, there is no offense if—after defecating, urinating, or spitting on a place where there are no plants—the feces, urine, or saliva then spreads to a place where there are plants (§). The Commentary adds that if a bhikkhu looking for a place without crops to do his business can’t find one and is unable to hold himself in any longer, he would qualify as “ill” under this rule.

75

Not being ill, I will not defecate, urinate, or spit in water: a training to be observed.

According to the Commentary, water here includes water fit for drinking or bathing, but not water unfit for such use—e.g., salt water, stagnant water, water already befouled with spit, urine, or feces—or water in a toilet. If there is a flood with no dry ground available, there is no offense in relieving oneself in the water.

As under the preceding rule, the Vibhaṅga says that there is no offense if—after defecating, urinating, or spitting on the ground—the feces, urine, or saliva then spreads into the water (§).

*    *    *

Cv.VIII.10 contains a series of rules on the etiquette in using a restroom. Among them:

—The restroom should be used in order of arrival, rather than in order of seniority. (“Now at that time, bhikkhus used the restroom in order of seniority. Newly-ordained bhikkhus, having arrived first and having to wait, keeled over in a faint from holding themselves in.”)

—One’s robes should be hung up on a line or rod before entering. This, according to the Vinaya-mukha, refers to one’s upper and outer robe (inasmuch as one is not to lift up one’s lower robe until astride the toilet—see below).

—One should not go bursting into the restroom. Before entering, one should cough or clear one’s throat; if a bhikkhu is inside, he should cough or clear his throat in response.

—One should not have one’s lower robe open or pulled up while entering, and instead should wait to pull up one’s robe only when astride the toilet.

—One should not make grunting or groaning noises while relieving oneself.

—If the toilet or restroom is dirty, one should clean it for the next person.

—One should not go bursting out of the restroom when finished—again, taking care not to have one’s lower robe pulled up or open.

Cv.VIII.9 adds that after one has defecated—inside a restroom or not—one should always rinse oneself if water is available.

For more details, see BMC2, Chapter 9.

CHAPTER ELEVEN

Adhikaraṇa-samatha

This term means “the settling of issues.” The seven rules in this section are actually principles and procedures for settling the four sorts of issues mentioned under Pc 63: dispute-issues (vivādādhikaraṇa), accusation-issues (anuvādādhikaraṇa), offense-issues (āpattādhikaraṇa), and duty-issues (kiccādhikaraṇa. The Canon’s explanations of these procedures are given not in the Vibhaṅga but in Cullavagga IV, which starts with a sketch of the procedures, followed by a detailed discussion of how to apply them to each of the four types of issues. We will follow the same mode of presentation here.

For the settling, the resolution of issues that arise:

1

A face-to-face verdict should be given.

This means that the transaction settling the issue must be carried out face-to-face with the Community, face-to-face with the individuals, and face-to-face with the Dhamma and Vinaya.

Face-to-face with the Community means that the group of bhikkhus that has gathered is competent to carry out the transaction in question. In other words, it contains the minimum number of bhikkhus required, all the qualified bhikkhus in the valid territory (sīmā) in which the meeting is held either are present or have sent their consent, and none of the qualified bhikkhus in the meeting makes protest against having the matter settled by the group—although as we noticed under Pc 80, if a transaction is being carried out against a bhikkhu, his protest does not invalidate the act; any protest made by any other member of the group, though, would invalidate it, even if he only informs the bhikkhu sitting next to him (Mv.IX.4.8).

Face-to-face with the individuals means that all the individuals involved in the matter are present. For instance, in a dispute-issue, both sides of the dispute must be in the meeting; when the Community is carrying out a transaction against one of its members, the accused must be there; in an ordination, the bhikkhu-to-be must be present. There are a few cases where this factor is not followed—such as the ordination of a bhikkhunī by messenger and the act of turning the bowl upside down (refusing to accept donations from a lay person who has mistreated the Community)—but these are rare.

Face-to-face with the Dhamma and Vinaya means that all the proper procedures laid down in the Vinaya are followed (see BMC2, Part II), and that bhikkhus who advocate what is not truly Dhamma or Vinaya are not holding sway over the group.

2

A verdict of mindfulness may be given.

This is the verdict of innocence given in response to an accusation, based on the fact that the accused remembers fully that he did not commit the offense in question.

This verdict is valid only if—

1) The bhikkhu is pure and without offense.

2) He is accused of an offense.

3) He asks for the verdict.

4) The Community gives him the verdict.

5) It is in accordance with the Dhamma, the assembly of bhikkhus being united and competent to give it (Cv.IV.4.11).

According to the Commentary, factor (1) here—the bhikkhu is pure and without offense—applies only to arahants, but the Canon makes no mention of this point. There are other places in the Khandhakas where the phrase “pure and without offense” is used to refer to any bhikkhu who has not committed the offense of which he is accused (e.g., Mv.IX.1.7; Mv.IX.4.9), with nothing to indicate that he would have to be an arahant as well. If the Commentary’s interpretation were correct here, there would be no way that a bhikkhu in his right mind who is not an arahant could be declared innocent of an offense at all, for the only three verdicts that may settle an accusation-issue are this one, the verdict of past insanity (for a bhikkhu who was insane when he committed the offense in question), and the transaction for further punishment (literally, “making it worse for him,”) for a bhikkhu who committed the offense in question when he was in his right mind. The fourth rule below—acting in accordance with what is admitted—which is sometimes assumed to cover cases of innocence, actually applies only to cases where the bhikkhu admits to having committed an offense, and not to cases where he is innocent and asserts his innocence.

Thus we will follow the general usage in the Khandhakas and say that the factor “pure and without offense” is fulfilled by any bhikkhu—arahant or not—who has not committed the offense in question.

3

A verdict of past insanity may be given.

This is another verdict of innocence given in an accusation, based on the fact that the accused was out of his mind when he committed the offense in question and so is absolved of any responsibility for it.

This verdict is valid only if given to a bhikkhu who:

1) does not remember what he did while insane;

2) remembers, but only as if in a dream; or

3) is still insane enough to believe that his behavior is proper. (“I act that way and so do you. It’s allowable for me and allowable for you!”) (Cv.IV.6.2).

4

Acting in accordance with what is admitted.

This refers to two types of situations. The first is the ordinary confession of offenses, where no formal interrogation is involved. The confession is valid only if in accord with the facts, e.g., a bhikkhu actually commits a pācittiya offense and then confesses it as such, and not as a heavier or lighter offense. If he were to confess it as a dukkaṭa or a saṅghādisesa, that would be invalid.

The second situation is when, following on an accusation, the Community has met to interrogate the bhikkhu in question and he has admitted to doing the action in question (although he may still not see the action as an offense or, if he does, may still refuse to undergo the penalty for it). If he admits that it was an offense, he may be dealt with in line with the severity of the offense. For instance, if he committed a saṅghādisesa offense, they would have to at least tell him to prepare for his penance and probation, and later actually carry them out. This would count as “acting in accordance with what is admitted.” However, the accusation is still not settled. The Community must then impose an extra disciplinary action on him—at the very least, the “further-punishment” transaction described under As 6, below—for having put the Community to the trouble of having to hold the interrogation to begin with. Only then is the issue settled. This is why Cv.IV.14.27 does not list “acting in accordance with what is admitted” as a procedure for settling accusation-issues, because even though the bhikkhus must deal with the accused in line with what was admitted, the accusation-issue is not settled until the extra punishment has been applied.

5

Acting in accordance with the majority.

This refers to cases in which bhikkhus are unable to settle a dispute unanimously, even after all the proper procedures are followed, and—in the words of the Canon—are “wounding one another with weapons of the tongue.” In cases such as these, decisions can be made by majority vote.

Such a vote is valid only if—

1) The issue is important.

2) The face-to-face procedures have all been followed but have not succeeded in settling the issue. (The discussion in the Cullavagga indicates that at least two Communities have tried settling the issue; the Commentary recommends trying the normal procedures in at least two or three.)

3) Both sides have been made to reflect on their position.

4) The distributor of voting tickets knows that the majority sides with the Dhamma.

5) He hopes (§) that the majority sides with the Dhamma (in other words, he himself is on the side of the Dhamma).

6) The distributor of voting tickets knows that the procedure will not lead to a split in the Saṅgha.

7) He hopes (§) that the procedure will not lead to a split in the Saṅgha (again, this means that he himself does not want there to be a split).

8) The tickets are taken in accordance with the Dhamma (according to the Commentary, this means that there is no cheating—e.g., one bhikkhu taking two tickets—and the Dhamma side wins).

9) The assembly is complete.

10) The bhikkhus take the tickets in accordance with their views (and not, for example, under fear of intimidation or coercion). (Cv.IV.10)

6

Acting for his further punishment.

This refers to cases where a bhikkhu admits to having committed the offense in question only after being formally interrogated about it. After getting him to disclose the offense, the Community is to carry out a “further-punishment” transaction against him for being so uncooperative as to require the formal interrogation in the first place.

The Cullavagga (IV.11.2-12.3) contains two separate discussions of the conditions that are necessary for the act to be valid. The discussions overlap, but can be summarized as follows:

1) The accused is impure (i.e., he actually did commit the offense, and it is an offense that requires confession).

2) He is unconscientious (i.e., he didn’t voluntarily confess the offense on his own in the first place).

3) He stands accused of the offense. (The Commentary translates this word—sānuvāda, “with an accusation”—as meaning “argumentative”—sa-upavāda—but in Mv.IV.16.16 it clearly means that an apparently well-founded charge has been brought against the accused by a competent bhikkhu.)

4) A formal meeting has been called in which he is present and has been interrogated: charged with the offense and made to remember—i.e., to think back to the events in question.

5) He discloses the offense—i.e., admits to having committed it.

6) The Community carries out the transaction

7) in accordance with the Dhamma and Vinaya, and with a united assembly.

What makes this transaction special is that—unlike other disciplinary transactions, which the Community can impose or not at its discretion—this act must be imposed on a bhikkhu who has committed an offense that requires confession but does not admit to the action until having been formally interrogated (Cv.IV.14.27). In addition, though, Cv.IV.12.3 states that, if the Community wants to, it may also impose the act on a bhikkhu who:

1) is a maker of strife, quarrels, and dissension in the Community;

2) is inexperienced, incompetent, indiscriminately (§) full of offenses; or

3) lives in unbecoming association with lay people.

However, if the Community wants to, it may also impose a censure transaction on the bhikkhu who meets either of these sets of qualifications (Cv.I.2; Cv.I.4). Given that the prohibitions imposed by both the censure and the further-punishment transactions are identical, it is hard to understand why there are two separate transactions that, for all intents and purposes, are essentially the same.

Once a further-punishment transaction has been carried out against a bhikkhu, he must observe the following prohibitions:

1) He may not act as preceptor or teacher for another bhikkhu, nor is he to have a novice attend to him.

2) He may not accept authorization to exhort bhikkhunīs; even if authorized, he is not to exhort them.

3) He should not commit the offense for which he is being punished, a similar offense, or a worse one.

4) He should not find fault with the transaction or with those who carried it out.

5) He should not accuse others of offenses or participate actively in any of the procedures involved in or leading up to a formal accusation—i.e., canceling another bhikkhu’s right to join in the Pāṭimokkha recitation, canceling his invitation at the end of the Rains, setting up an accusation, asking his leave to accuse him, charging him, interrogating him (literally, “making him remember”).

6) He should not join bhikkhus in quarreling with other bhikkhus (following the Thai edition of the Canon, which reads, “na bhikkhū bhikkhūhi sampayojetabbanti”). (Cv.IV.12.4).

If he abides by all these prohibitions, and the Community is satisfied that he has seen the error of his ways, they are to rescind the transaction and restore him to his former status as a full-fledged bhikkhu.

7

Covering over as with grass.

This refers to situations in which both sides of a dispute realize that, in the course of their dispute, they have done much that is unworthy of a contemplative. If they were to deal with one another for their offenses, the result would be greater divisiveness, even to the point of schism. Thus if both sides agree, all the bhikkhus gather in one place. (According to the Commentary, this means that all bhikkhus in the territory must attend. No one should send his consent, and even sick bhikkhus must go.) A motion is made to the entire group that this procedure will be followed. One member of each side then makes a formal motion to the members of his faction that he will make a confession for them. When both sides are ready, the representative of each side addresses the entire group and makes the blanket confession, using the form of a motion and one proclamation (ñatti-dutiya-kamma).

This clears all offenses except for—

1) any grave fault (pārājika or saṅghādisesa offense, says the Commentary) committed by anyone in the group;

2) any offenses dealing with the laity;

3) any offenses of any member of either side who does not approve of the procedure; and

4) any offenses of any bhikkhu who does not attend the meeting. (This is the reason for the Commentary’s statement that even sick bhikkhus must attend.) (Cv.IV.13.4)

Point (3) here is interesting. If any member of either side were to dissent, that would invalidate the whole procedure. This point is thus probably added as a reminder to any bhikkhu who might be vindictive enough to want to deal with his enemies case-by-case, that his offenses will have to be dealt with case-by-case as well. This might be enough to discourage him from dissenting.

The Commentary explains the name of this procedure by comparing the offenses cleared in this way to excrement that has been so thoroughly covered with grass that it can no longer send an oppressive smell.

*    *    *

According to Cv.IV.14—sections 16, 27, 30, and 34—the principle of “face-to-face” applies to all four types of issues: dispute-issues, accusation-issues, offense-issues, and duty-issues. In addition, dispute-issues must be settled “in accordance with the majority”; accusation-issues, either by a verdict of mindfulness, a verdict of past insanity, or an act of further punishment; and offense-issues, by acting in accordance with what is admitted or by covering them over as with grass.

What follows is a more detailed discussion of how these principles and procedures apply in each of the four cases:

Disputes

Disputes are heated disagreements over what the Buddha did and did not teach, or—in the words of the Cullavagga—“when bhikkhus dispute, saying:

‘It is Dhamma,’ or ‘It is not Dhamma;’

‘It is Vinaya,’ or ‘It is not Vinaya;’

‘It was spoken by the Tathāgata,’ or ‘It was not spoken by the Tathāgata;’

‘It was regularly practiced by the Tathāgata,’ or ‘It was not regularly practiced by the Tathāgata;’

‘It was formulated by the Tathāgata,’ or ‘It was not formulated by the Tathāgata;’

‘It is an offense,’ or ‘It is not an offense;’

‘It is a light offense,’ or ‘It is a heavy offense;’

‘It is an offense leaving a remainder (§),’ or ‘It is an offense leaving no remainder (§);’

‘It is a serious offense,’ or ‘It is not a serious offense.’

“Any strife, quarreling, contention, dispute, differing opinions, opposing opinions, antagonistic words, abusiveness based on this is called a dispute-issue.”—Cv.IV.14.2

Thus not all disagreements on these matters are classed as issues. Friendly disagreements or differences of interpretation aren’t; heated and abusive disagreements are.

The Cullavagga quotes the Buddha as recommending that a bhikkhu who wants to bring up such questions for discussion should first consider five points:

1) whether it is the right time for such a discussion;

2) whether it concerns something true;

3) whether it is connected with the goal;

4) whether he will be able to get on his side bhikkhus who value the Dhamma and Vinaya; and

5) whether the question will give rise to strife, quarreling, disputes, cracks and splits in the Community.

If the answer to the first four questions is Yes, and to the fifth question No (i.e., the discussion is not likely to lead to strife), he may then go ahead and start the discussion. Otherwise, he should let the matter rest for the time being (Cv.IX.4).

The Cullavagga also quotes the Buddha as saying that two sorts of mental states—skillful and unskillful—can turn disputes into issues. The unskillful states are covetous, corrupt, or confused states of mind; the skillful ones, states of mind that are not covetous, not corrupt, and not confused. The Buddha adds, however, that six character traits can lead to issues arising from disputes that will act toward the detriment of many people. They are when a bhikkhu:

is easily angered and bears ill will,

is mean and spiteful,

is jealous and possessive,

is scheming and deceitful,

has evil desires and wrong views,

is attached to his own views, obstinate, unable to let them go.

Such a bhikkhu, he says, lives without deference or respect for the Buddha, the Dhamma, the Saṅgha, and does not complete the training. If one should see any of these traits within oneself or others, one should strive for their abandoning. If no such traits are present, one should make sure that they don’t arise in the future (Cv.IV.14.3).

Although the source of a dispute-issue may be in skillful or unskillful mind states, Cv.IV.14.8 states that the actual conduct of the issue may be skillful, unskillful, or neutral—apparently, depending on the mind states of the bhikkhus as they get involved.

As noted under Sg 10, when a dispute is still small but threatens to become schismatic, a Community may use the procedures described under Sg 10 & 11. Once it has become a major issue, however, the procedures to follow are these:

Face-to-face—Step 1:

a) The Community meets, with at least four bhikkhus—the minimum to form a quorum—present. All of the bhikkhus in the territory are either present or have sent their consent, and none of the bhikkhus present protests having the matter settled by the group.

b) Both sides of the dispute are present.

c) The meeting is carried out in a way that does not transgress any of the rules laid down by the Buddha, and the unanimous decision of the Community is in line with what the Buddha actually laid down. This point is important: It means that no Community—even if it follows the proper form for the meeting—can legitimately replace the Buddha’s teachings with its own preferences on any point.

If the Community can settle the matter in this way, it is properly settled and should not be reopened.

Step 2: If the Community cannot settle the matter, they should go to a monastery where there are more bhikkhus and ask them to help settle the matter. If the group can settle the matter among themselves on the way to the other monastery, then it is properly settled, and they may return home to their own monastery.

Step 3: If the matter is still unsettled by the time they reach the second monastery, they should ask the resident bhikkhus there to help settle the matter. The resident bhikkhus should then meet and consider among themselves whether they are competent to do so. If they feel they aren’t, they shouldn’t take it on. If they feel they are, they should then ask the incoming bhikkhus how the dispute arose. (The Commentary here adds that the residents should first stall for two or three days—saying that they have to wash their robes or fire their bowls first—as a way of subduing the pride of the incoming bhikkhus.)

Once the resident bhikkhus have asked the history of the dispute, the incoming bhikkhus are to say that if the resident bhikkhus can settle the dispute, they (the incoming bhikkhus) will hand it over to them; if they can’t settle it, the incoming bhikkhus will still be in charge of the matter.

If the resident bhikkhus can then settle the dispute, it is properly settled.

Step 4: If they can’t settle it in this way—and, in the words of the Canon, “endless disputes arise, and there is no discerning the meaning of a single statement”—the disputants should, with a motion and one proclamation, hand the matter over to a panel of experts (§). (The Commentary recommends a panel of ten.) Cv.IV.14.19 states that each member of the panel must meet ten qualifications, which are in brief:

1) He is virtuous, abiding scrupulously by the rules of the Vinaya, seeing danger in the slightest faults.

2) He is learned in all teachings dealing with the complete celibate life, understanding them thoroughly.

3) He has memorized both the Bhikkhu and the Bhikkhunī Pāṭimokkhas in detail, understanding them thoroughly.

4) He is shrewd in his knowledge of the Vinaya and is not easily led off-track.

5) He is competent at placating and reconciling both sides of a dispute.

6) He is skilled at settling an issue.

7) He knows what constitutes an issue.

8) He knows the origination of an issue (i.e., through skillful or unskillful states of mind).

9) He knows the cessation of an issue.

10) He knows the way leading to the cessation of an issue. (Notice that these last four qualifications are similar in form to knowledge of the four noble truths.)

The Commentary notes that while the panel is discussing the issue, none of the other bhikkhus is to speak. If the panel can settle the issue, it is properly settled and should not be reopened.

Step 5: If the panel has trouble settling the issue, and there are members of the panel who “hide the Dhamma under the shadow of the letter”—i.e., use the letter of the rules to go against the spirit—they may be removed from the panel through a formal motion. If the panel can then settle the issue, it is properly settled.

If not—and by this time, the Commentary says, at least two or three monasteries have become involved—the face-to-face procedures have been exhausted, and the dispute must go on to a settlement “in accordance with the majority.”

In accordance with the majority: A decision by majority vote is valid only when it meets the ten qualifying factors listed above, under As 5. When these factors are all present, the group should first ask one of its members to act as a distributor of voting tickets. He should be free of the four kinds of bias (from desire, aversion, delusion, and fear), and know what does and does not constitute the proper taking of a voting ticket. Before accepting the role, he should reflect on whether the situation meets the ten qualifying factors, and accept only when it does. Once he accepts the role, he is to be authorized by means of a formal motion and one proclamation.

He is then to have voting tickets made—a different color for each side—and conduct the ballot in one of three ways: secretly, by whispering in the ear, or openly.

In secret balloting, he is to tell each bhikkhu, “This color is for this side, and that color for that. Take one, but don’t show it to anyone.” According to the Commentary, this method is to be used when there are many unconscientious bhikkhus in the assembly.

In “whispering in the ear” balloting, he is to whisper to each bhikkhu, “This color is for this side, and that color for that. Take one, but don’t tell anyone.” This method, the Commentary says, is for assemblies in which there are many foolish or trouble-making bhikkhus.

In open balloting, the bhikkhus are to take the voting tickets openly. This method is for assemblies where the distributor is certain that the conscientious bhikkhus are in the majority.

Once the vote is taken, the distributor is to assess the result before announcing it. If he sees that the anti-Dhamma side has won, he is to annul the balloting and take the vote all over again. According to the Commentary, he may take the vote up to three times. If the anti-Dhamma side is still in the majority, he should announce that the time is not right for a vote, adjourn the meeting, and try to find more bhikkhus on the side of the Dhamma to join the next meeting.

These procedures make two interesting assumptions: One side of the dispute is clearly in the right, and the distributor must belong to the right side. If he belongs to the wrong side, the balloting is invalid and the issue may later be reopened without penalty. If neither side is clearly in the right, the compilers of the Cullavagga would probably consider the issue unimportant and not worthy of a vote in the first place. If this is true, then even if a vote is taken, it would not be a valid use of the procedure, and the results would not be binding.

In all of these steps for settling dispute-issues, the important point to remember is that in no way is a group of bhikkhus to rewrite the Dhamma or Vinaya in line with their views. Even if they attempt it, following the procedures to the letter, the fact that their decision goes against the Buddha’s teachings invalidates their efforts, and the issue may be reopened at any time without penalty.

*    *    *

Accusations

When a bhikkhu has committed an offense, it is his responsibility to undergo the attendant penalty voluntarily so as to make amends for it. If his fellow bhikkhus see, hear, or suspect that he has committed an offense without undergoing the penalty, it is their duty to question and admonish him in private, in accordance with the procedures discussed under Sg 8. The issue may be settled informally in one of three ways: (1) The accused admits to the act, sees it as an offense, and undergoes the penalty. (2) He is truly innocent, professes his innocence, and can convince his admonishers that their suspicions were ungrounded. (3) He committed the action in question but was insane at the time, and can convince his accusers that this was the case.

If both sides act in good faith and without prejudice, issues of this sort are relatively easy to settle informally in this way. If the issue can’t be settled informally, it should be taken to a meeting of the Community for a formal interrogation and verdict.

When the Community meets, both the accuser (X) and the accused (Y) must be present. (If the original accuser is a lay person, one of the bhikkhus is to take up the accusation.) If they meet during the regular time for the Pāṭimokkha (see BMC2, Chapter 15), the accusation must first be preceded by a formal period of questions and answers about Vinaya matters touching on the accusation (Mv.II.15.6-11). This is to educate the group as a whole so that they will be ready to judge the case, inasmuch as the ultimate verdict has to be unanimous. This also gives Y the chance to speak up and confess the offense, if he is guilty of it, so as to eliminate the need for any further interrogation. However, Mv.II.15.8 and Mv.II.15.11 indicate that the bhikkhus who are to ask and answer Vinaya questions should first assess the assembly to see if it is safe and advisable to bring up the issue, for there may be bhikkhus present who might react violently if the matters under discussion touch too closely on their own misbehavior or that of their friends.

If, after the conclusion of the Vinaya questions and answers, Y has not confessed an offense, X—while the motion for the Pāṭimokkha is being recited—may interrupt it with the announcement that Y has an offense and that the Pāṭimokkha should not be recited in his presence (see BMC2, Chapter 15, for the formal statement). Then, after assessing Y’s state of mind—to ensure that he won’t act in a threatening way if accused—X asks formal leave to speak to Y about the offense, saying, “May the venerable one give leave. I want to speak with you—Karotu āyasmā okāsaṁ. Ahan-taṁ vattukāmo.” Y, after assessing his accuser and the assembly, may choose to give leave or not. (See the discussion of this point under Sg 8 and Ay1.) If he chooses not to, the Pāṭimokkha will not be recited that day. The issue is left hanging for the time being and can be brought up at a later date.

If X brings up the issue during the Invitation (see BMC2, Chapter 16), a similar process is followed, although this time there is no preliminary session of questions and answers. X can simply ask Y’s leave to speak about the accusation; if Y doesn’t give leave, X may cancel his invitation, and the Community has to look into the matter. If they know that X is incompetent or ignorant, they will override his cancelation and continue with the Invitation. Otherwise, they will question him about his planned accusation. Because Y in this case does not have the right to refuse to give leave, he is potentially open to an abusive or ill-willed accusation. Thus the Community has the responsibility of interrogating X thoroughly concerning his general knowledge about accusations and the particulars of his accusation against Y (see Mv.IV.16.10-16; BMC2, Chapter 16). If they find his answers ignorant and inconsistent, they can override the cancelation. If, however, they find his answers knowledgeable and consistent, they should turn to interrogate Y, as described below.

It is also possible to bring up an accusation in a Community meeting on a day other than that of the Pāṭimokkha or the Invitation, but the Canon does not prescribe any special preliminaries for this case. Given the need to have a well-informed assembly, it would be wise to follow the pattern for the Pāṭimokkha meeting and to begin the proceedings with a period of questions and answers about Vinaya rules touching on the proposed accusation.

If, in situations where Y has the right to refuse to give leave, he does give leave to X, the next step is for X formally to level his charge against Y, after which Y is interrogated—literally, “made to remember”—whether he can recall having committed the offense in question. Although he can be dealt with only in accordance with what he admits to having done (Mv.IX.6.1-4), Cv.IV.14.29 shows that the other bhikkhus are not to take his first statement at face value.

“There is the case where a bhikkhu, in the midst of the Community, charges (another) bhikkhu with a heavy offense: ‘Does the venerable one recall having committed a heavy offense of this sort, a pārājika or bordering on a pārājika?’ He (the other) says, ‘No….’ He (the first) presses the one who denies this, ‘Please, venerable sir, very carefully ascertain whether you recall having committed a heavy offense of this sort, a pārājika or bordering on a pārājika.’ The second one says, ‘I don’t recall having committed a heavy offense of this sort… but I do remember having committed a trifling offense of this sort.’ The first one presses the one who denies this, ‘Please, venerable sir, very carefully ascertain whether you recall having committed a heavy offense of this sort, a pārājika or bordering on a pārājika.’ The second one says, ‘Look. Unasked, I have admitted to having committed a trifling offense. How would I, when asked, not admit to having committed a heavy offense…?’ The first one says, ‘You look, friend. (Before,) when you were unasked, you didn’t admit to having committed (your) trifling offense. So how would you, when unasked, admit to having committed a heavy offense?”

The accuser should press and cross-examine the accused in this way until the Community is satisfied that the accused is telling the truth, and only then may they pass one of three verdicts:

1) If he is innocent of the offense and can convince the group of his innocence, he is to request a verdict of mindfulness—expressing the request three times—and the Community is to give it to him by means of a formal motion with three proclamations. (See Appendix VIII.)

2) If he committed the offense while insane or possessed, he should request a verdict of past insanity—again, expressing the request three times—and the Community is to give it to him by means of a formal motion with three proclamations. (See Appendix VIII.)

3) If he committed the offense while in his right mind but admits to it only after the interrogation has begun, the other bhikkhus—after getting him to disclose the offense—are to impose a further-punishment transaction on him by means of a formal motion with three proclamations. (See BMC2, Appendix IV.)

With one set of exceptions, these verdicts must be unanimous. In other words, one of the conditions for a valid verdict is that the entire Community agree to it. This is why, if the accusation is made on a Pāṭimokkha day, it has to be preceded by a session of questions and answers on the Vinaya so that all the assembled bhikkhus will be conversant enough with the relevant rules to make an informed decision.

The set of exceptions applies to accusations made on an Invitation day. If on that day the accused ultimately admits to having committed a minor offense, but the members of the Community are divided as to what kind of offense it is—and their opinions range from a saṅghādisesa on down—then the knowledgeable members of the Community may take the accused to one side, away from the group; arrange for his confession of what they know to be the offense; and then return to the group, announcing that the Invitation may resume. The reason for this exception is apparently to save time and to make up for the fact that there is no preceding session of questions and answers on the Vinaya. For more details, see BMC2, Chapter 16.

As we noted above, another condition for a valid verdict is that it be in line with the truth. If it so happens that a guilty bhikkhu is given a verdict of mindfulness, a bhikkhu who committed the offense in question while he was in his right mind is given a verdict of past insanity, or an innocent bhikkhu receives a further-punishment transaction, the verdict is invalid even if unanimous. When new evidence surfaces, the case may be reopened and a new verdict given.

There are, however, two situations in which none of these three verdicts applies, and the accusation-issue—at least for the time being—remains unsettled:

1) If a bhikkhu, in the course of an interrogation, admits to an action that is an offense but either refuses to see it as an offense or refuses to make amends for it, he is subject to an act of suspension. Although this too may later be rescinded on the basis of good behavior—when he admits that his action was an offense and makes amends for it—it is a much stronger penalty than a further-punishment transaction.

2) If a bhikkhu denies having committed the act in question, and the bhikkhus are not convinced of his innocence, there are various ways of pressuring him to tell the truth: As noted above, the Cullavagga suggests intensive interrogation; the Commentary, long bouts of group chanting. If neither works, and the Community still has doubts about his innocence, the issue is to be abandoned for the time being as unsettled. The accused is neither to be punished nor declared innocent. As long as the issue remains unsettled, though, there will be no peace of mind either for the accused or for the Community as a whole.

*    *    *

Offenses

All offense-issues are settled by means of the principle of face-to-face. Most are also settled by means of the procedure of in accordance with what is admitted. Rare cases may be settled by covering over as with grass.

In accordance with what is admitted: When a bhikkhu has committed an offense requiring confession and then confesses it truthfully in the presence of another bhikkhu, a group of bhikkhus, or a complete Community, that is called settling in accordance with what is admitted. It also counts as having been settled face-to-face with the Dhamma and Vinaya and the individuals—i.e., the bhikkhu making the confession and the bhikkhu(s) witnessing it.

If a bhikkhu has committed a saṅghādisesa offense, it is settled only after he has confessed it and undergone penance—and, if necessary, probation—both of which require further confessions. Only then, when a Community of at least 20 bhikkhus has met to lift the penalty from him, is the offense settled. Here, face-to-face would include not only the Dhamma, Vinaya, and individuals, but also the Community, when it imposes the penance and/or probation, and again when it lifts the penalty.

If a bhikkhu has committed a pārājika offense, it is settled only when he admits that he is no longer a bhikkhu and returns to lay life. Here, face-to-face would have the same factors as under confessable offenses, above.

Covering over as with grass: This procedure has already been discussed in detail above. Face-to-face, here, means face-to-face with the Dhamma, the Vinaya, the individuals, and the Community. Face-to-face with the individuals means that those who make the blanket confession and those who witness it are present. Face-to-face with the Community means that enough bhikkhus for a quorum (four) have arrived, and the assembly is united: all the qualified bhikkhus in the territory have joined the meeting, and none of the bhikkhus, having met, makes protest.

*    *    *

Duty-issues

Duty-issues are settled face-to-face—

1) if they are properly carried out in line with the procedures set out in the Dhamma and Vinaya,

2) if the relevant individuals are present (e.g., the ordinand in an ordination, the bhikkhu-to-be-banished in a banishment transaction, etc.), and

3) if the Community that has met to carry them out forms a quorum and a complete assembly, with none of those present—except the bhikkhu against whom a transaction is to be carried out, if such is the case—makes protest.

CHAPTER TWELVE

Appendices

I. Controversial points: Dawn and dawnrise

In a number of rules where the boundary between two days is the line between an offense and a non-offense, the Vibhaṅga in some cases defines that boundary as dawn (aruṇa) and in others as dawnrise (aruṇuggamana). Dawnrise is the boundary for NP 1, 3, 21, 24, & 29; and for Pc 37 & 85. In the case of the NP rules, an item kept until dawnrise after the allowed number of days has to be forfeited. In the case of the Pc rules, dawnrise marks the end of the “wrong time” and the beginning of the “right time” for the activities discussed in those rules. The boundary for Pc 5 & 49, however, is dawn. If, under the situations covered by these rules, one gets up or leaves before dawn (purāruṇā), the night ending in that dawn doesn’t count toward the offense. The Vibhaṅga to NP 2 refers to both dawn and dawnrise in analyzing the offense under that rule: As with the other NP rules, a robe kept until dawnrise is to be forfeited. If, however, the robe is abandoned, etc., anto aruṇe—which can either mean “before dawn” (just as anto pātarāse means “before the morning meal”) or “during dawn” (just as anto māse under NP 3 means “within the month”)—there is no offense.

The Vibhaṅga treats these various terms casually, offering no definition of when dawn and dawnrise take place, or of how the two are related. The Commentary and Sub-commentary also treat them casually, passing over the terms as “obvious.”

In later centuries, however, there was an effort to make these terms more precise. The Khuddakasikkhā—a Vinaya manual written by Ven. Dhammasiri, a Sinhalese monk, in the 11th or 12th century—states that the sky lightens in four stages before sunrise (measuring in Sinhalese hours, of which there are 60 in one period of day and night): a slight reddening 4 Sinhalese hours (= 1 hour and 36 minutes) before sunrise; a slight whitening 3 Sinhalese hours (= 1 hour and 12 minutes) before sunrise; a second reddening 2 Sinhalese hours (= 48 minutes) before sunrise; and a second whitening 1 Sinhalese hour (= 24 minutes) before sunrise.

Some Communities in Burma, Sri Lanka, and Thailand follow this analysis, differing among themselves only as to which of the four stages constitutes dawnrise. Some count the first reddening, when aside from the faint light on the horizon, the sky is still dark. However, as mentioned in the discussion under NP 1, a sub-commentary entitled the Vinayālaṅkāra counts the last whitening, and there is good Canonical reason to follow its definition.

Pc 37 & 38, taken together, require that a bhikkhu not accept alms before dawn. If he did go for alms before dawn, he would not be able to eat any of the food he accepted at that time, as Pc 37 forbids him from eating before dawnrise, and Pc 38 forbids him from eating food received on a previous day. A passage in MN 66 states specifically that once the rules were established, one of their benefits was that they prevented bhikkhus from going for alms in the dark. This suggests that in the time of the Canon, the first faint light on the horizon did not count as dawnrise. The passage runs as follows:

“[Ven. Udāyin—apparently the good Udāyin, not the lax Udāyin of the first five saṅghādisesas—is addressing the Buddha:] ‘It used to be, venerable sir, that we ate in the evening, in the morning, and in the wrong time [the afternoon]. Then there was the time when the Blessed One addressed the bhikkhus, saying, “Bhikkhus, please discontinue that daytime meal at the wrong time.” For just a day I was upset, for just a day I was sad, [thinking,] “The exquisite staple and non-staple foods that faithful householders give us during the day at the wrong time: The Blessed One has us abandon them! The Sugata has us relinquish them!” But, considering our love & respect & shame & compunction around the Blessed One, we abandoned that daytime meal at the wrong time and ate (only) in the evening and in the morning.

“‘Then there was the time when the Blessed One addressed the bhikkhus, saying, “Bhikkhus, please discontinue that evening meal at the wrong time.” For just a day I was upset, for just a day I was sad, [thinking,] “The more exquisitely prepared of our two meals: Even that the Blessed One has us abandon! Even that the Sugata has us relinquish!” It has happened, venerable sir, that a man—obtaining some soup during the day—has told his wife, “Put this aside and we’ll all eat it together in the evening.” [Almost] all food preparation is done at night, venerable sir, and almost none during the day. But, considering our love & respect & shame & compunction around the Blessed One, we abandoned that evening meal.

“‘It has happened that bhikkhus going for alms in the pitch black of night have walked into a waste-water hole, fallen into a cesspit, stumbled over a thorny hedge, stumbled over a sleeping cow. They have encountered young hooligans on the way to or from a crime. They have been propositioned by women. Once I went for alms in the pitch black of night. A woman washing a pot saw me by a lightning flash and, on seeing me, screamed out: “I’m done for! A demon is after me!”

“‘When this was said, I said to her, “I’m no demon, sister. I’m a bhikkhu waiting for alms.”

“‘“Well then you’re a bhikkhu whose mommy’s dead and daddy’s dead. It would be better for you, bhikkhu, that your belly be slit open with a sharp butcher’s knife than this prowling around for alms for your belly’s sake in the pitch black of night!”

“‘On recollecting this, venerable sir, the thought occurred to me: “So many painful things has the Blessed One taken away from us! So many pleasant things has he brought us! So many unskillful qualities has the Blessed One taken away from us! So many skillful qualities has he brought us!”’”

This shows clearly that once the rules were in effect, bhikkhus were saved from the dangers of going for alms in the dark. It further suggests that dawnrise can be no earlier than the point recognized by the Vinayālaṅkāra.

As noted under NP 1, the Vinayālaṅkāra’s definition of dawnrise corresponds in modern terminology to the onset of civil twilight. Although the Khuddakasikkhā states that this period of whitening occurs 24 minutes prior to sunrise, this figure would apply only to locations that, like Sri Lanka, lie near the equator. At other latitudes, the length of time from the onset of civil twilight to sunrise would vary widely according to season, with the variations most extreme at higher latitudes.

This leaves the question of how dawnrise is related to dawn. As mentioned above, anto aruṇe under NP 2 can mean either “during dawn” or “before dawn.” The Vinayālaṅkāra defines this term as “before dawn-rising” (aruṇodayato puretaram’eva); another sub-commentary, the Namakkāra, in turn defines aruṇodayato as equivalent to aruṇuggamana, or dawnrise.

Some scholars, opting to translate anto aruṇe as “within dawn” or “during dawn,” have cited these passages to assert that dawn is a period of time preceding and ending with dawnrise.

This assertion, however, is dubious on several grounds. One obvious objection is that if the Vinayālaṅkāra had meant to define dawn as a distinct period of time, it would have mentioned not only the point at which dawn ends—at dawnrise—but also the point at which it begins. But it doesn’t. In fact, unless we assume that dawnrise is actually the beginning of dawn and not its end, none of the texts define a beginning for dawn. This leads to a severe practical problem, in that it would leave Pc 5 and Pc 49 with no clear line to define how to avoid an offense under those rules, where the beginning of dawn is the end of the non-offense period. If the compilers of the Vibhaṅga to those rules had meant to draw the line dividing an offense from a non-offense following a standard different from that in all the other rules in the Pāṭimokkha where the line between the end of night and the beginning of day is also relevant, they would have offered clear definitions to distinguish one standard from the other. But they don’t. This indicates that the assumption of a separate “dawn” preceding “dawnrise” must be mistaken.

A reading more consistent with the Canon’s casual treatment of the issue of dawn would be to translate anto aruṇe as “before dawn,” and to interpret dawnrise (aruṇuggamana) as the beginning of dawn, and not as its end. In other words, in all the rules where the line dividing the end of night from the beginning of day is the line between an offense and a non-offense, that line is marked by the onset of civil twilight, regardless of whether the Vibhaṅga refers to the period immediately preceding it as anto aruṇe or purāruṇā.

This reading is also consistent with all the other uses of dawn and dawnrise in the Commentary and Sub-commentary.

*    *    *

II. Controversial points: Sugata measures

The Commentary to Sg 6 states that the Buddha’s cubit—the distance from his bent elbow to the tips of his fingers—was three times that of a normal man. This puts all the sugata measures—based on the Buddha’s cubit, handspan, and breadth of his fingers—at three times normal length and makes the Buddha freakishly tall.

How the Commentary arrived at this figure is hard to say, for the Vinaya-mukha cites several passages from the Canon showing that the Buddha, though tall, was not abnormally so. The most telling passage is the one from DN 2, in which King Ajātasattu visits the Buddha while the latter is sitting in an assembly of bhikkhus, and the king is unable to identify which member of the assembly the Buddha is. This, of course, is meant to indicate the king’s spiritual blindness, but if the Buddha had been remarkably tall it would have been part of his general reputation, and the king would not have had to ask.

The Vinaya-mukha then goes on to suggest a variety of ways of calculating the Buddha’s measurements, the most useful being to assume the Buddha’s cubit to be 50 cm. This, at least roughly, fits a number of passages from the Canon, as follows:

According to DN 30, the spread of the Buddha’s arms, outstretched, was equal to his height. Because a person’s cubit is one-fourth the spread of his outstretched arms, this would put the Buddha’s height at 2 meters, or approximately 6 feet 7 inches. The origin story to Pc 92 states that his half-brother, Nanda, was four fingerbreadths shorter than he, and that when bhikkhus saw him coming from afar, they would mistake him for the Buddha, partly on the basis of his tall height. One fingerbreadth is said to be 1/24 cubit, or a little more than 2 cm. by this reckoning, which would put Nanda at 1.92 meters, or approximately 6 feet 4 inches tall.

These figures would seem to fit the information in the Canon fairly well, in that they allow for both Nanda and the Buddha to be tall but not outlandishly so.

Another pair of passages supporting these measurements is the ruling under Pc 87 that the legs of a bhikkhu’s bed not be more than eight sugata fingerbreadths tall, taken together with the recommendation at Cv.VIII.1.5 that one should grope under the bed with one’s hand to make sure that nothing is there before placing one’s bowl there. Our measurements would put the maximum height for the bed legs at 18 cm. If they were much taller than that, there would be no need to grope, for one could easily see under the bed with a glance. If they were much shorter than that, even a small bowl wouldn’t fit.

Although there is no way of determining the sugata measures with 100% accuracy, the above considerations suggest that the following estimates are reasonable:

The sugata cubit = 50 cm.

The sugata span = 25 cm.

The sugata fingerbreadth = 2.08 cm.

Applied to the various rules, this would give us a hut 3 x 1.75 meters—small, but adequate; a rains-bathing cloth 1.5 x .625 meters—enough to cover one from the waist to the knees; and an skin-eruption covering cloth 1 x .5 meters—enough to cover one from the waist to just above the knees. All of these figures seem appropriate and so have been accepted for the purposes of this book.

*    *    *

III. Controversial points: Meals

Cv.VI.21.1 allows bhikkhus to accept seven kinds of specially arranged meals in addition to the meals they receive on alms round. The context for this allowance is as follows:

“Now at that time Rājagaha was short of food. People were not able to provide a meal for the Community, but they wanted to provide a designated meal, an invitational meal, a lottery meal, a meal on a day of the waxing or waning of the moon, on uposatha days, and on the day after each uposatha day. They told this matter to the Blessed One. He said, ‘I allow, bhikkhus, a Community meal, a designated meal, an invitational meal, a lottery meal, a meal on a day of the waxing or waning of the moon, on an uposatha day, and on the day after an uposatha day.’”

Unfortunately, the Canon provides no detailed explanation of these terms. The Commentary explains Community meals as meals for the entire Community, and the other terms as follows:

“(Having said,) ‘Give one, two… ten bhikkhus designated from the Community,’ they wanted to provide a meal for the bhikkhus they got through that designation. Later, having decided on bhikkhus in the same way (i.e., one, two… ten bhikkhus), and having invited them, they wanted to provide a meal for them. Later, they wanted to provide a meal having decided on a lottery. Later, having fixed a date—the waxing or waning moons, the uposatha day, or the day after—they wanted to provide a meal for one, two… ten bhikkhus. This is the extent of the meals that fall under the terms ‘designated meals, invitational meals (the Sub-commentary adds an ‘etc.’ here.)’”

These definitions seem fairly clear: a designated meal is one in which the donors do not specify which bhikkhus are to receive it, but simply ask for x number of bhikkhus from the Community, leaving it up to the meal designator—the Community official responsible for managing these various meals (see BMC2, Chapter 18)—to designate who the recipients will be. An invitational meal is one in which the donors decide on the recipients themselves. A lottery meal is one in which the recipients are chosen by drawing lots, while the remaining meals—periodic meals—are given regularly to a rotating roster of x number of bhikkhus every time the specified date comes around.

However, the Commentary’s discussion of how the meal designator should manage these meals blurs the lines between the first three categories. It gives no detailed discussion of Community meals, but divides designated meals into the following two types:

1a) Meals for which the number of bhikkhus to be designated is equal to the total number of bhikkhus in the Community.

1b) Meals for which the number of bhikkhus to be designated is less than the total number of bhikkhus in the Community.

Invitational meals come in four types:

2a) Meals to which the entire Community is invited.

2b) Meals to which specific individuals or types of bhikkhus (e.g., no one but senior bhikkhus) are invited.

2c) Meals to which one bhikkhu is invited and asked to bring x number of his friends.

2d) Meals for which the donor simply asks for x number of bhikkhus, without specifying in any way who they should be.

This typology raises two questions. First, why aren’t types 1a and 2a grouped under Community meals? Is it because the donor uses the words designated and invited when announcing his/her plans for the meal? If so, how does one arrange for a Community meal that would not fall into these two types, in line with the fact that a Community meal is said to be a separate category?

The second question is how type 2d differs from a designated meal. Is it, again, because the donor does not use the word designated in announcing the meal? If so, the difference is only formal, for the Commentary itself states that the meal designator is to treat such a meal as he would a designated meal, which shows that in essence it is the same thing.

As we reasoned in the discussion of Pc 32, that rule applies only to invitational meals. If we follow the Commentary’s original definitions of the various categories of special meal—eliminating types 1a, 2a and 2d as redundant—it is easy enough to determine in essence which types of meals fall into this category and which don’t. If we follow the detailed typologies, though, the distinctions become more a matter of formality and technicalities. For example, if the donor asks the meal designator to “designate nine bhikkhus from the Community,” the meal would not violate Pc 32, but if he simply asked for nine bhikkhus—even if he did not specify who they were to be—the meal would be a group meal, and any bhikkhus who ate it would be committing an offense. Or again, if he asked that the entire Community be “designated” to come to his meal, they would not incur a penalty in going, but if he simply invited the entire Community to a meal, they would.

Because the Commentary is a compendium of the opinions of many generations of teachers, the definitions of the categories of meals may have been agreed on by one generation of teachers, and the typologies by another. This would explain the discrepancies between the two. Or the entire discussion—definitions and typologies—may have been the product of one generation, who did mean the distinctions among the categories to depend on formalities and technicalities.

At any rate, as with many other areas where the Canon gives no definite guidance, this is an area where the wise policy for each bhikkhu is to follow the standards of the Community to which he belongs.

*    *    *

IV. Pali formulae: Determination

The articles a bhikkhu must determine for his use have already been mentioned under NP 1, 21, & 24.

Determination, according to the Commentary, may be done in either of two ways: by body or by word. To determine by body means to grasp or touch the object in question with any part of the body and to determine in the mind that the object is for one’s own particular use, in line with the formula given below. To determine by word means to speak the formula out loud. In this case, if the object is within the reach of the hand, use the same formula as for determination with the body. If it is beyond the reach of the hand, alter the formula, changing imaṁ, “this,” to etaṁ, “that.’ Articles to be worn—i.e., robes, the rains-bathing cloth—must first be dyed the proper color and properly marked in accordance with Pc 58.

The Canon and commentaries make no mention of any formula to repeat while marking, but the tradition in Thailand is to repeat:

Imaṁ bindu-kappaṁ karomi,

which means, “I make this properly marked.”

The words for determination, taking the bowl as an example, are:

Imaṁ pattaṁ adhiṭṭhāmi,

which means, “I determine this bowl” or “I determine this as a bowl.”

To determine other requisites, replace the word pattaṁ, bowl, with the appropriate name, as follows:

for the outer robe: saṅghāṭiṁ

for the upper robe: uttarāsaṅgaṁ

for the lower robe: antaravāsakaṁ

for the sitting cloth: nisīdanaṁ

for the skin-eruption cloth: kaṇḍu-paṭicchādiṁ

for the rains-bathing cloth: vassikasāṭikaṁ

for the sleeping cloth: paccattharaṇaṁ

 for the handkerchief: mukha-puñchana-colaṁ

for other cloth requisites: parikkhāra-colaṁ

To determine many cloths of the same sort at the same time, use the plural forms: Change imaṁ to imāni; etaṁ to etāni; and the –aṁ ending for the name of the article to -āni. For example, to determine many miscellaneous cloth requisites within reach of the hand, the formula is:

Imāni parikkhāra-colāni adhiṭṭhāmi.

A bhikkhu may determine only one of each of the following five items for use at any one time: the bowl, the basic set of three robes, and the sitting cloth. If he wishes to replace an old item with a new one, he must first withdraw the determination of the old item before determining the new one. The formula for withdrawal, again taking the bowl as an example, is:

Imaṁ pattaṁ paccuddharāmi,

which means, “I relinquish this bowl.” To withdraw the determination of other items, replace the word pattaṁ with the appropriate name, as above.

If an item has been snatched away, burnt, destroyed, lost, given away, or taken away on trust, its determination automatically lapses, and there is no need to withdraw the determination before determining a new item to replace it. The Commentary explains destroyed as meaning that the bowl or any of the three robes develops a hole of a certain size: for a clay bowl, a hole large enough for a millet grain to pass through; for an iron bowl, a hole large enough to let liquid pass through; for the robes, a complete break at least the size of the fingernail of the small finger, located at least one handspan in from the long edge of the robe, and four fingerbreadths from the short edge of the lower robe, or eight fingerbreadths from the short edge of the upper and outer robes.

Once the robe or bowl develops a hole of this sort, it reverts to the status of an extra robe or bowl. If the owner still wishes to use it, the hole must be mended and the article redetermined before ten days elapse. Otherwise, he is subject to the penalties imposed by NP 1 or 21.

*    *    *

V. Pali formulae: Shared ownership

The topic of shared ownership, together with the various controversies connected with it, are discussed in detail under Pc 59. Here we will simply give the formulae.

There are two formulae for sharing ownership in the presence of the second owner. The first—taking as an example a piece of robe-cloth within reach of the hand—is this:

Imaṁ cīvaraṁ tuyhaṁ vikappemi,

meaning, “I share ownership of this robe-cloth with you (plural).”

To place a bowl under shared ownership, change cīvaraṁ to pattaṁ. For more than one piece of cloth, change imaṁ cīvaraṁ to imāni cīvarāni. For more than one bowl, change imaṁ pattaṁ to ime patte. For articles beyond the reach of the hand, change imaṁ to etaṁ; imāni to etāni; and ime to ete.

The second formula—less formal than the first—is:

Imaṁ civaraṁ Itthannāmassa vikappemi,

which means, “I share ownership of this robe-cloth with so-and-so.” Suppose, for example, that the person’s name is Nando. If he is one’s senior, change Itthannāmassa to Āyasmato Nandassa; if he is one’s junior, change it to Nandassa Bhikkhuno; if he is a novice, change it to Nandassa Sāmaṇerassa. If he is very much one’s senior, use the first formula, above. (Mv.I.74.1 shows that the tradition in the Buddha’s time was not to use a very senior or respected person’s name when referring to him.)

To share a bowl in this way, change cīvaraṁ to pattaṁ. Other changes, as called for, may be inferred from the previous formulae.

To place a piece of robe-cloth under shared ownership with two people who are absent, say to a witness:

Imaṁ cīvaraṁ vikappan’atthāya tuyhaṁ dammi,

which means, “I give this robe-cloth to you to share.” The witness should ask the original owner the names of two bhikkhus or novices who are his friends or acquaintances. In Pali, this is:

Ko te mitto vā sandiṭṭho vā.

After the original owner tells the names, the witness says:

Ahaṁ tesaṁ dammi,

which means, “I give it to them.”

To rescind the shared ownership, the Vibhaṅga says that the witness in the last case should say,

Tesaṁ santakaṁ paribhuñja vā vissajjehi vā yathā-paccayaṁ vā karohi,

which means, “Use what is theirs, give it away, or do as you like with it.”

As for cases in which the article is placed under shared ownership in the presence of the second owner, the Vibhaṅga gives no formula for rescinding the arrangement. The K/Commentary suggests that the second owner should say,

Mayhaṁ santakaṁ paribhuñja vā vissajjehi vā yathā-paccayaṁ vā karohi,

which means, “Use what is mine, give it away, or do as you like with it.”

The Pubbasikkhā-vaṇṇanā, though, suggests the following formula (for robe-cloth within reach, rescinded by a bhikkhu who is senior to the original owner):

Imaṁ cīvaraṁ mayhaṁ santakaṁ paribhuñja vā vissajjehi vā yathā-paccayaṁ vā karohi,

which means, “Use this robe-cloth of mine, give it away, etc.” If the bhikkhu rescinding the shared ownership is junior to the original owner, the verb endings are more formal:

Imaṁ cīvaraṁ mayhaṁ santakaṁ paribhuñjatha vā vissajjetha vā yathā-paccayaṁ vā karotha.

For a bowl, change cīvaraṁ to pattaṁ. If more than one piece of cloth is involved, the formula begins, Imāni cīvarāni mayhaṁ santakāni…. If more than one bowl, Ime patte mayhaṁ santake…. Changes for articles outside the reach of the hand may be inferred from those for the earlier formulae.

*    *    *

VI. Pali formulae: Forfeiture

As noted in the conclusion to the chapter on nissaggiya pācittiya rules, articles received in defiance of NP 18, 19, & 22 must be forfeited to a Community. The words of forfeiture in these cases are:

NP 18

For receiving gold and silver (money):

Ahaṁ bhante rūpiyaṁ paṭiggahesiṁ. Idaṁ me nissaggiyaṁ. Imāhaṁ saṅghassa nissajjāmi.

This means, “Venerable sirs, I have received money. This of mine is to be forfeited. I forfeit it to the Community.”

NP 19

For engaging in monetary exchange:

Ahaṁ bhante nānappakārakaṁ rūpiya-saṁvohāraṁ samāpajjiṁ. Idaṁ me nissaggiyaṁ. Imāhaṁ saṅghassa nissajjāmi.

This means, “Venerable sirs, I have engaged in various types of monetary exchange. This of mine is to be forfeited. I forfeit it to the Community.”

NP 22

For asking for a new bowl when one’s original bowl is still usable:

Ayaṁ me bhante patto ūna-pañca-bandhanena pattena cetāpito nissaggiyo. Imāhaṁ saṅghassa nissajjāmi.

This means, “This bowl of mine, venerable sirs, asked for when the (previous) bowl had less than five mends, is to be forfeited. I forfeit it to the Community.”

In each case, after the item has been forfeited, the offender must confess his offense, with an experienced and competent bhikkhu to receive his confession, using the following formula:

Confessant: Ahaṁ bhante nissaggiyaṁ pācittiyaṁ āpattiṁ āpanno. Taṁ paṭidesemi.

Recipient: Passasi āvuso?

C: Āma bhante, passāmi.

R: Āyatiṁ āvuso saṁvareyyāsi.

C: Sādhu suṭṭhu bhante saṁvarissāmi. (Three times.)

An alternative version of the last exchange, found in MN 104, is:

A: Āyatiṁ saṁvaraṁ āpajjeyyāsi.

C: Saṁvaraṁ āpajjissāmi.

This is the formula to use when the bhikkhu making the confession is junior to the bhikkhu receiving it. For translations and instructions on how to change the formula to use when the bhikkhu making the confession is senior to the bhikkhu receiving it, see Appendix VII.

If, after money has been forfeited under NP 18 or 19 and the offense has been confessed, the Community needs to authorize a money-disposer, they must first choose a member of the group who is free of the four kinds of bias—based on desire, based on aversion, based on delusion, based on fear—and who knows what counts as disposed and not disposed. Then they must ask him to perform this duty. When he has agreed, one of the bhikkhus recites the transaction statement, as follows:

Suṇātu me bhante saṅgho. Yadi saṅghassa pattakallaṁ, saṅgho Itthannāmaṁ bhikkhuṁ rūpiya-chaḍḍakaṁ sammanneyya. Esā ñatti.

Suṇātu me bhante saṅgho. Saṅgho Itthannāmaṁ bhikkhuṁ rūpiya-chaḍḍakaṁ sammannati. Yass’āyasmato khamati, Itthannāmassa bhikkhuno rūpiya-chaḍḍakassa sammati, so tuṇhassa. Yassa nakkhamati, so bhāseyya.

Sammato saṅghena Itthannāmo bhikkhu rūpiya-chaḍḍako. Khamati saṅghassa, tasmā tuṇhī. Evam-etaṁ dhārayāmi.

This means, Venerable sirs, may the Community listen to me. If the Community is ready, it should authorize Bhikkhu (name) as the money-disposer. This is the motion.

Venerable sirs, may the Community listen to me. The Community authorizes Bhikkhu (name) as the money-disposer. He to whom the authorization of Bhikkhu (name) as the money-disposer is agreeable should remain silent. He to whom it is not agreeable should speak.

Bhikkhu (name) has been authorized by the Community as the money-disposer. This is agreeable to the Community, therefore it is silent. Thus do I hold it.

If the bhikkhu being authorized is senior to the bhikkhu reciting the authorization, Itthannāmo bhikkhu should be replaced as follows (supposing that his name is Dhammadharo):

Itthannāmo bhikkhu  →  āyasmā Dhammadharo

Itthannāmaṁ bhikkhuṁ  →  āyasmantaṁ Dhammadharaṁ

Itthannāmassa bhikkhuno  →  āyasmato Dhammadharassa

For the patterns to use when the bhikkhu’s name has a different stem-form (-i, -u, etc.), see the introduction to Appendix II in BMC2.

To authorize a bowl-exchanger under NP 22, the same procedure is followed, except that—in addition to being free from the four forms of bias—the bhikkhu to be chosen must know what is (properly) exchanged and what is not. The same form for the transaction statement is used, replacing rūpiya-chaḍḍakaṁ/ rūpiya-chaḍḍakassa/ rūpiya-chaḍḍako with patta-gāhāpakaṁ/ patta-gāhāpakassa/ patta-gāhāpako.

Articles used or received in violation of the remaining NP rules may be forfeited to the Community, to a group, or to an individual. Here, only the formulae for forfeiting to an individual will be given. Formulae for rules rarely broken—e.g., involving bhikkhunīs or felt rugs—are not listed.

NP 1

For an extra robe (or robe-cloth) kept beyond ten days:

Idaṁ me bhante cīvaraṁ dasāhātikkantaṁ nissaggiyaṁ. Imāhaṁ āyasmato nissajjāmi.

This means, “This robe (robe-cloth) of mine, venerable sir, kept beyond ten days, is to be forfeited. I forfeit it to you.” If the speaker is senior to the listener, change bhante to āvuso. If many pieces of cloth are to be forfeited at once, the forms should be changed to plural:

Imāni me bhante cīvarāni dasāhātikkantāni nissaggiyāni. Imānāhaṁ āyasmato nissajjāmi.

For robes beyond the reach of the hand, change idaṁ to etaṁ; imāhaṁ to etāhaṁ; imāni to etāni; and imānāhaṁ to etānāhaṁ. For example, for one robe, one would say:

Etaṁ me bhante cīvaraṁ dasāhātikkantaṁ nissaggiyaṁ. Etāhaṁ āyasmato nissajjāmi.

For more than one robe beyond the reach of the hand, one would say:

Etāni me bhante cīvarāni dasāhātikkantāni nissaggiyāni. Etānāhaṁ āyasmato nissajjāmi.

Once the offense has been confessed, the robe (robe-cloth) is to be returned to the original owner, using this formula:

Imaṁ cīvaraṁ āyasmato dammi,

which means, “I give this robe (robe-cloth) to you.”

For more than one piece:

Imāni cīvarāni āyasmato dammi.

Changes in the formula for robe-cloth beyond the reach of the hand may be inferred from the preceding example. These two formulae for returning robe-cloth are used in every case involving robes or robe-cloth and will not be repeated below.

NP 2

For a robe from which one dwelled apart a night or more:

Idaṁ me bhante cīvaraṁ ratti-vippavutthaṁ aññatra bhikkhu-sammatiyā nissaggiyaṁ. Imāhaṁ āyasmato nissajjāmi,

which means, “This robe of mine, venerable sir, from which I dwelled apart for a night without authorization of the bhikkhus, is to be forfeited. I forfeit it to you.” Change cīvaraṁ to dvi-cīvaraṁ for two robes, and to ti-cīvaraṁ for three. Other changes, as necessary, may be inferred from the formulae for NP 1, above. The formulae for returning the robe(s) are also given there.

NP 3

For out-of-season robe-cloth kept more than a month:

Idaṁ me bhante akāla-cīvaraṁ māsātikkantaṁ nissaggiyaṁ. Imāhaṁ āyasmato nissajjāmi,

which means, “This out-of-season robe-cloth of mine, venerable sir, kept beyond a month, is to be forfeited. I forfeit it to you.” For more than one piece of cloth:

Imāni me bhante akāla-cīvarāni māsātikkantāni nissaggiyāni. Imānāhaṁ āyasmato nissajjāmi.

Other changes, as necessary, may be inferred from the formulae for NP 1.

NP 6

For a robe (robe-cloth) requested from an unrelated householder:

Idaṁ me bhante cīvaraṁ aññātakaṁ gahapatikaṁ aññatra samayā viññāpitaṁ nissaggiyaṁ. Imāhaṁ āyasmato nissajjāmi,

which means, “This robe (robe-cloth) of mine, venerable sir, requested from an unrelated householder at other than the proper occasion, is to be forfeited. I forfeit it to you.”

For more than one robe:

Imāni me bhante cīvarāni aññātakaṁ gahapatikaṁ aññatra samayā viññāpitāni nissaggiyāni. Imānāhaṁ āyasmato nissajjāmi.

NP 7

For a robe (robe-cloth) requested from an unrelated householder during an allowable occasion, but beyond the allowable limit:

Idaṁ me bhante cīvaraṁ aññātakaṁ gahapatikaṁ tad’uttariṁ viññāpitaṁ nissaggiyaṁ. Imāhaṁ āyasmato nissajjāmi,

which means, “This robe (robe-cloth) of mine, venerable sir, requested beyond that (allowable) from an unrelated householder, is to be forfeited. I forfeit it to you.”

For more than one robe:

Imāni me bhante cīvarāni aññātakaṁ gahapatikaṁ tad’uttariṁ viññāpitāni nissaggiyāni. Imānāhaṁ āyasmato nissajjāmi.

NP 8

For cloth received after making a stipulation to an unrelated householder:

Idaṁ me bhante cīvaraṁ pubbe appavārito aññātakaṁ gahapatikaṁ upasaṅkamitvā cīvare vikappaṁ āpannaṁ nissaggiyaṁ. Imāhaṁ āyasmato nissajjāmi,

which means, “This cloth, venerable sir—mine after, without having been invited beforehand, I approached an unrelated householder and made stipulations about cloth—is to be forfeited. I forfeit it to you.”

NP 9

For cloth received after making stipulations to two or more unrelated householders, use the same formula as for the preceding rule, changing aññātakaṁ gahapatikaṁ to aññātake gahapatike.

NP 10

For a robe (robe-cloth) received after reminding one’s steward too many times:

Idaṁ me bhante cīvaraṁ atireka-tikkhattuṁ codanāya atireka-chakkhattuṁ ṭhānena abhinipphāditaṁ nissaggiyaṁ. Imāhaṁ āyasmato nissajjāmi,

which means, “This robe (robe-cloth) of mine, venerable sir, produced after more than three reminders, after more than six standings, is to be forfeited. I forfeit it to you.”

NP 18 & 19

The formulae for these rules are given at the beginning of this appendix.

NP 20

For an article received in trade:

Ahaṁ bhante nānappakārakaṁ kaya-vikkayaṁ samāpajjiṁ. Idaṁ me nissaggiyaṁ. Imāhaṁ āyasmato nissajjāmi,

which means, “Venerable sir, I have engaged in various types of trade. This of mine is to be forfeited. I forfeit it to you.”

To return the article:

Imaṁ āyasmato dammi,

which means, “I give this to you.”

NP 21

For an extra bowl kept beyond ten days:

Ayaṁ me bhante patto dasāhātikkanto nissaggiyo. Imāhaṁ āyasmato nissajjāmi,

which means, “This bowl of mine, venerable sir, kept beyond ten days, is to be forfeited. I forfeit it to you.”

To return the bowl:

Imaṁ pattaṁ āyasmato dammi.

NP 22

The formula for this rule is given at the beginning of this appendix.

NP 23

For any of the five tonics kept beyond seven days:

Idaṁ me bhante bhesajjaṁ sattāhātikkantaṁ nissaggiyaṁ. Imāhaṁ āyasmato nissajjāmi,

which means, “This medicine of mine, venerable sir, kept beyond seven days, is to be forfeited. I forfeit it to you.”

To return the medicine:

Imaṁ bhesajjaṁ āyasmato dammi.

NP 25

For a robe (robe-cloth) snatched back in anger:

Idaṁ me bhante cīvaraṁ bhikkhussa sāmaṁ datvā acchinnaṁ nissaggiyaṁ. Imāhaṁ āyasmato nissajjāmi,

which means, “This robe (robe-cloth) of mine, venerable sir, snatched back after I myself gave it to a bhikkhu, is to be forfeited. I forfeit it to you.”

NP 28

For a robe (robe-cloth) offered in urgency kept beyond the robe season:

Idaṁ me bhante acceka-cīvaraṁ cīvara-kāla-samayaṁ atikkāmitaṁ nissaggiyaṁ. Imāhaṁ āyasmato nissajjāmi,

which means, “This robe-cloth-offered-in-urgency of mine, venerable sir, kept beyond the robe season, is to be forfeited. I forfeit it to you.”

NP 29

For a robe separated from one for more than six nights:  

Idaṁ me bhante cīvaraṁ atireka-chā-rattaṁ vippavutthaṁ aññatra bhikkhu-sammatiyā nissaggiyaṁ. Imāhaṁ āyasmato nissajjāmi,

which means, “This robe of mine, venerable sir, separated (from me) for more than six nights without authorization of the bhikkhus, is to be forfeited. I forfeit it to you.” Change cīvaraṁ to dvi-cīvaraṁ for two robes, and to ti-cīvaraṁ for three.

NP 30

For gains intended for the Community that one has diverted to oneself:

Idaṁ me bhante jānaṁ saṅghikaṁ lābhaṁ pariṇataṁ attano pariṇāmitaṁ nissaggiyaṁ. Imāhaṁ āyasmato nissajjāmi,

which means, “This of mine, venerable sir, which—knowing it was intended for the Community—I diverted for myself, is to be forfeited. I forfeit it to you.”

To return the article:

Imaṁ āyasmato dammi.

*    *    *

VII. Pali formulae: Confession

Six types of offense may be absolved through confession: thullaccaya, nissaggiya pācittiya, pācittiya, pāṭidesanīya, dukkaṭa, and dubbhāsita.

The formula for confessing a pāṭidesanīya is given in the training rules themselves:

Gārayhaṁ āvuso dhammaṁ āpajjiṁ asappāyaṁ pāṭidesanīyaṁ. Taṁ paṭidesemi,

which means, “Friend, I have committed a blameworthy, unsuitable act that ought to be acknowledged. I acknowledge it.”

The five remaining types of offenses are confessed as follows: One arranges one’s upper robe over the left shoulder, approaches another bhikkhu, kneels down and, with hands raised palm-to-palm over the heart, repeats the formula of confession. The bhikkhu to whom the offense is to be confessed must be part of the same affiliation—i.e., he does not belong to another affiliation and has not been suspended from one’s own affiliation—and he must not be guilty, without having made confession, of the same offense that one is confessing.

If all the bhikkhus in a particular residence are guilty of the same offense, one of them must go to another residence to confess the offense and then return to let the remaining bhikkhus confess their offenses face-to-face with him, or one after another face-to-face with those who have already confessed. If this cannot be arranged, then on the day of the Pāṭimokkha recitation one of the bhikkhus should announce the fact of their common offense in the midst of the gathering. Only then may they go ahead with the recitation.

As bhikkhus are supposed to be pure of unconfessed offenses before listening to the Pāṭimokkha, a bhikkhu who listens to the Pāṭimokkha knowing that he has an unconfessed offense must tell one of his neighboring bhikkhus of the offense when the recitation comes to the relevant rule. At the same time, he must promise that he will confess it when the recitation is over. Otherwise, if he tells no one, he incurs a dukkaṭa (Mv.II.3.7).

The Cullavagga (IV.14.30) gives a formula for confessing an offense face-to-face with another bhikkhu:

Ahaṁ āvuso itthannāmaṁ āpattiṁ āpanno. Taṁ paṭidesemi,

which means, “Friend, I have fallen into an offense of such-and-such a name. I confess it.”

The bhikkhu receiving the confession says,

Passasi?

which means, “Do you see (the offense)?”

The bhikkhu confessing the offense says,

Āma, passāmi,

which means, “Yes, I see it.”

The bhikkhu receiving the confession then says,

Āyatiṁ saṁvareyyāsi,

which means, “You should restrain yourself in the future.”

MN 104 gives some variations on this formula. To begin with, it notes that if the bhikkhu confessing the offense is junior to the one receiving his confession, he should first arrange his upper robe over one shoulder, bow down to the senior bhikkhu, sit in a kneeling position with his hands palm-to-palm over his heart, and state his confession. At the conclusion of the formula, the senior bhikkhu should advise restraint by saying,

Āyatiṁ saṁvaraṁ āpajjeyyāsi.

which means, “You should achieve restraint in the future.”

The bhikkhu confessing the offense then replies,

Saṁvaraṁ āpajjissāmi.

which means, “I will achieve restraint.”

The formula most generally used at present in Thailand is expanded from these patterns. Following MN 104, the confessant vows to exercise restraint at the end of the formula, but the vow is worded to follow the pattern set in Cv IV.14.30. Also, in his original confession, he includes the words “many” and “of various sorts” to qualify the word, “offenses.” This latter change is meant to streamline the confession. Rather than confessing each offense of a particular class separately, one gathers them into a single statement. As one is allowed to confess more offenses than one has actually committed, and as it is possible in some cases to commit offenses unknowingly, the current formula has been adopted to cover such unwitting offenses. In this context, the phrase, “I see,” in the confession means, “I see that I may have committed an offense unknowingly.” Thus it is not a lie.

Because the formula is repeated by every bhikkhu before the recitation of the Pāṭimokkha, the procedure has become little more than a formality. The Vinaya-mukha thus recommends that a bhikkhu conscious of having committed a particular offense should mention it to the other bhikkhu in their own language before making use of the Pali formula.

If the bhikkhu making confession is junior to the one receiving the confession, the exchange is as follows (taking dukkaṭa offenses as an example):

Confessant: Ahaṁ bhante sambahulā nānā-vatthukāyo dukkaṭāyo āpattiyo āpanno. Tā paṭidesemi.

Recipient: Passasi āvuso?

C: Āma bhante, passāmi.

R: Āyatiṁ āvuso saṁvareyyāsi.

C: Sādhu suṭṭhu bhante saṁvarissāmi. (Three times.)

This last sentence means, “Very well, venerable sir, I will be restrained,” and is taken from the Commentary.

If the bhikkhu making confession is senior to the other bhikkhu, the exchange is as follows:

C: Ahaṁ āvuso sambahulā nānā-vatthukāyo dukkaṭāyo āpattiyo āpanno. Tā paṭidesemi.

A: Passatha bhante?

C: Āma āvuso, passāmi.

A: Āyatiṁ bhante saṁvareyyātha.

C: Sādhu suṭṭhu āvuso saṁvarissāmi. (Three times.)

For other categories of offenses, change dukkaṭāyo to

thullaccayāyo,

nissaggiyāyo pācittiyāyo,

pācittiyāyo, or

dubbhāsitāyo,

as the case may be. In confessing dubbhāsita offenses, drop the word nānā-vatthukāyo, as there is only one rule in this class.

*    *    *

VIII. Pali formulae: Transaction Statements

Rebukes

Sg 10: Agitating for a schism

Suṇātu me bhante saṅgho. Ayaṁ Itthannāmo bhikkhu samaggassa saṅghassa bhedāya parakkamati. So taṁ vatthuṁ nappaṭinissajjati. Yadi saṅghassa pattakallaṁ, saṅgho Itthannāmaṁ bhikkhuṁ samanubhāseyya tassa vatthussa paṭinissaggāya. Esā ñatti.

Suṇātu me bhante saṅgho. Ayaṁ Itthannāmo bhikkhu samaggassa saṅghassa bhedāya parakkamati. So taṁ vatthuṁ nappaṭinissajjati. Saṅgho Itthannāmaṁ bhikkhuṁ samanubhāsati tassa vatthussa paṭinissaggāya. Yass’āyasmato khamati, Itthannāmassa bhikkhuno samanubhāsanā tassa vatthussa paṭinissaggāya, so tuṇh’assa. Yassa nakkhamati, so bhāseyya.

Dutiyam-pi etam-atthaṁ vadāmi. Suṇātu me bhante saṅgho. Ayaṁ Itthannāmo bhikkhu samaggassa saṅghassa bhedāya parakkamati. So taṁ vatthuṁ nappaṭinissajjati. Saṅgho Itthannāmaṁ bhikkhuṁ samanubhāsati tassa vatthussa paṭinissaggāya. Yass’āyasmato khamati, Itthannāmassa bhikkhuno samanubhāsanā tassa vatthussa paṭinissaggāya, so tuṇh’assa. Yassa nakkhamati, so bhāseyya.

Tatiyam-pi etam-atthaṁ vadāmi… so bhāseyya.

Samanubhaṭṭho saṅghena Itthannāmo bhikkhu tassa vatthussa paṭinissaggāya. Khamati saṅghassa, tasmā tuṇhī. Evam-etaṁ dhārayāmi.

This means, Venerable sirs, may the Community listen to me. This Bhikkhu (name) is agitating for a schism in a united Community. He does not relinquish that point. If the Community is ready, it should rebuke Bhikkhu (name) for the sake of relinquishing that point. This is the motion.

Venerable sirs, may the Community listen to me. This Bhikkhu (name) is agitating for a schism in a united Community. He does not relinquish that point. The Community rebukes Bhikkhu (name) for the sake of relinquishing that point. He to whom the rebuke of Bhikkhu (name) for the sake of relinquishing that point is agreeable should remain silent. He to whom it is not agreeable should speak.

A second time…. A third time I speak about this matter. Venerable sirs, may the Community listen to me…. He to whom it is not agreeable should speak.

Bhikkhu (name) has been rebuked by the Community for the sake of relinquishing that point. This is agreeable to the Community, therefore it is silent. Thus do I hold it.

Sg 11: Following an agitator for a schism

Suṇātu me bhante saṅgho. Itthannāmo ca Itthannāmo ca bhikkhū Itthannāmassa bhikkhuno saṅghabhedāya parakkamantassa anuvattakā vaggavādakā. Te taṁ vatthuṁ nappaṭinissajjanti. Yadi saṅghassa pattakallaṁ, saṅgho Itthannāmañ-ca Itthannāmañ-ca bhikkhū samanubhāseyya tassa vatthussa paṭinissaggāya. Esā ñatti.

Suṇātu me bhante saṅgho. Itthannāmo ca Itthannāmo ca bhikkhū Itthannāmassa bhikkhuno saṅghabhedāya parakkamantassa anuvattakā vaggavādakā. Te taṁ vatthuṁ nappaṭinissajjanti. Saṅgho Itthannāmañ-ca Itthannāmañ-ca bhikkhū samanubhāsati tassa vatthussa paṭinissaggāya. Yass’āyasmato khamati, Itthannāmassa ca Itthannāmassa ca bhikkhūnaṁ samanubhāsanā tassa vatthussa paṭinissaggāya, so tuṇh’assa. Yassa nakkhamati, so bhāseyya.

Dutiyam-pi etam-atthaṁ vadāmi. Suṇātu me bhante saṅgho. Itthannāmo ca Itthannāmo ca bhikkhū Itthannāmassa bhikkhuno saṅghabhedāya parakkamantassa anuvattakā vaggavādakā. Te taṁ vatthuṁ nappaṭinissajjanti. Saṅgho Itthannāmañ-ca Itthannāmañ-ca bhikkhū samanubhāsati tassa vatthussa paṭinissaggāya. Yass’āyasmato khamati, Itthannāmassa ca Itthannāmassa ca bhikkhūnaṁ samanubhāsanā tassa vatthussa paṭinissaggāya, so tuṇh’assa. Yassa nakkhamati, so bhāseyya.

Tatiyam-pi etam-atthaṁ vadāmi… so bhāseyya.

Samanubhaṭṭhā saṅghena Itthannāmo ca Itthannāmo ca bhikkhū tassa vatthussa paṭinissaggāya. Khamati saṅghassa, tasmā tuṇhī. Evam-etaṁ dhārayāmi.

This means, Venerable sirs, may the Community listen to me. Bhikkhu (name) and Bhikkhu (name) are followers and partisans of Bhikkhu (name), who is agitating for a schism in the Community. They do not relinquish that point. If the Community is ready, it should rebuke Bhikkhu (name) and Bhikkhu (name) for the sake of relinquishing that point. This is the motion.

Venerable sirs, may the Community listen to me. Bhikkhu (name) and Bhikkhu (name) are followers and partisans of Bhikkhu (name), who is agitating for a schism in the Community. They do not relinquish that point. The Community rebukes Bhikkhu (name) and Bhikkhu (name) for the sake of relinquishing that point. He to whom the rebuke of Bhikkhu (name) and Bhikkhu (name) for the sake of relinquishing that point is agreeable should remain silent. He to whom it is not agreeable should speak.

A second time…. A third time I speak about this matter. Venerable sirs, may the Community listen to me…. He to whom it is not agreeable should speak.

Bhikkhu (name) and Bhikkhu (name) have been rebuked by the Community for the sake of relinquishing that point. This is agreeable to the Community, therefore it is silent. Thus do I hold it.

Sg 12: Making oneself unadmonishable

Suṇātu me bhante saṅgho. Ayaṁ Itthannāmo bhikkhu bhikkhūhi sahadhammikaṁ vuccamāno attānaṁ avacanīyaṁ karoti. So taṁ vatthuṁ nappaṭinissajjati. Yadi saṅghassa pattakallaṁ, saṅgho Itthannāmaṁ bhikkhuṁ samanubhāseyya tassa vatthussa paṭinissaggāya. Esā ñatti.

Suṇātu me bhante saṅgho. Ayaṁ Itthannāmo bhikkhu bhikkhūhi sahadhammikaṁ vuccamāno attānaṁ avacanīyaṁ karoti. So taṁ vatthuṁ nappaṭinissajjati. Saṅgho Itthannāmaṁ bhikkhuṁ samanubhāsati tassa vatthussa paṭinissaggāya. Yass’āyasmato khamati, Itthannāmassa bhikkhuno samanubhāsanā tassa vatthussa paṭinissaggāya, so tuṇh’assa. Yassa nakkhamati, so bhāseyya.

Dutiyam-pi etam-atthaṁ vadāmi. Suṇātu me bhante saṅgho. Ayaṁ Itthannāmo bhikkhu bhikkhūhi sahadhammikaṁ vuccamāno attānaṁ avacanīyaṁ karoti. So taṁ vatthuṁ nappaṭinissajjati. Saṅgho Itthannāmaṁ bhikkhuṁ samanubhāsati tassa vatthussa paṭinissaggāya. Yass’āyasmato khamati, Itthannāmassa bhikkhuno samanubhāsanā tassa vatthussa paṭinissaggāya, so tuṇh’assa. Yassa nakkhamati, so bhāseyya.

Tatiyam-pi etam-atthaṁ vadāmi… so bhāseyya.

Samanubhaṭṭho saṅghena Itthannāmo bhikkhu tassa vatthussa paṭinissaggāya. Khamati saṅghassa, tasmā tuṇhī. Evam-etaṁ dhārayāmi.

This means, Venerable sirs, may the Community listen to me. This Bhikkhu (name), when legitimately admonished by the bhikkhus, makes himself unadmonishable. He does not relinquish that point. If the Community is ready, it should rebuke Bhikkhu (name) for the sake of relinquishing that point. This is the motion.

Venerable sirs, may the Community listen to me. This Bhikkhu (name), when legitimately admonished by the bhikkhus, makes himself unadmonishable. He does not relinquish that point. The Community rebukes Bhikkhu (name) for the sake of relinquishing that point. He to whom the rebuke of Bhikkhu (name) for the sake of relinquishing that point is agreeable should remain silent. He to whom it is not agreeable should speak.

A second time…. A third time I speak about this matter. Venerable sirs, may the Community listen to me…. He to whom it is not agreeable should speak.

Bhikkhu (name) has been rebuked by the Community for the sake of relinquishing that point. This is agreeable to the Community, therefore it is silent. Thus do I hold it.

Sg 13: Criticizing a banishment transaction

Suṇātu me bhante saṅgho. Ayaṁ Itthannāmo bhikkhu, saṅghena pabbājanīya-kammakato, bhikkhū chandagāmitā, dosagāmitā, mohagāmitā, bhayagāmitā pāpeti. So taṁ vatthuṁ nappaṭinissajjati. Yadi saṅghassa pattakallaṁ, saṅgho Itthannāmaṁ bhikkhuṁ samanubhāseyya tassa vatthussa paṭinissaggāya. Esā ñatti.

Suṇātu me bhante saṅgho. Ayaṁ Itthannāmo bhikkhu, saṅghena pabbājanīya-kammakato, bhikkhū chandagāmitā, dosagāmitā, mohagāmitā, bhayagāmitā pāpeti. So taṁ vatthuṁ nappaṭinissajjati. Saṅgho Itthannāmaṁ bhikkhuṁ samanubhāsati tassa vatthussa paṭinissaggāya. Yass’āyasmato khamati, Itthannāmassa bhikkhuno samanubhāsanā tassa vatthussa paṭinissaggāya, so tuṇh’assa. Yassa nakkhamati, so bhāseyya.

Dutiyam-pi etam-atthaṁ vadāmi. Suṇātu me bhante saṅgho. Ayaṁ Itthannāmo bhikkhu, saṅghena pabbājanīya-kammakato, bhikkhū chandagāmitā, dosagāmitā, mohagāmitā, bhayagāmitā pāpeti. So taṁ vatthuṁ nappaṭinissajjati. Saṅgho Itthannāmaṁ bhikkhuṁ samanubhāsati tassa vatthussa paṭinissaggāya. Yass’āyasmato khamati, Itthannāmassa bhikkhuno samanubhāsanā tassa vatthussa paṭinissaggāya, so tuṇh’assa. Yassa nakkhamati, so bhāseyya.

Tatiyam-pi etam-atthaṁ vadāmi… so bhāseyya.

Samanubhaṭṭho saṅghena Itthannāmo bhikkhu tassa vatthussa paṭinissaggāya. Khamati saṅghassa, tasmā tuṇhī. Evam-etaṁ dhārayāmi.

This means, Venerable sirs, may the Community listen to me. This Bhikkhu (name), on whom the Community has imposed a banishment transaction, defames the bhikkhus with a bias through desire, a bias through aversion, a bias through delusion, a bias through fear. He does not relinquish that point. If the Community is ready, it should rebuke Bhikkhu (name) for the sake of relinquishing that point. This is the motion.

Venerable sirs, may the Community listen to me. This Bhikkhu (name), on whom the Community has imposed a banishment transaction, defames the bhikkhus with a bias through desire, a bias through aversion, a bias through delusion, a bias through fear. He does not relinquish that point. The Community rebukes Bhikkhu (name) for the sake of relinquishing that point. He to whom the rebuke of Bhikkhu (name) for the sake of relinquishing that point is agreeable should remain silent. He to whom it is not agreeable should speak.

A second time…. A third time I speak about this matter. Venerable sirs, may the Community listen to me…. He to whom it is not agreeable should speak.

Bhikkhu (name) has been rebuked by the Community for the sake of relinquishing that point. This is agreeable to the Community, therefore it is silent. Thus do I hold it.

Pc 68: Holding an evil view

Suṇātu me bhante saṅgho. Itthannāmassa bhikkhuno evarūpaṁ pāpakaṁ diṭṭhigataṁ uppannaṁ, “Tathāhaṁ bhagavatā dhammaṁ desitaṁ ājānāmi, yathā ye’me antarāyikā dhammā vuttā bhagavatā, te paṭisevato nālaṁ antarāyāyā” ti. So taṁ diṭṭhiṁ nappaṭinissajjati. Yadi saṅghassa pattakallaṁ, saṅgho Itthannāmaṁ bhikkhuṁ samanubhāseyya tassā diṭṭhiyā paṭinissaggāya. Esā ñatti.

Suṇātu me bhante saṅgho. Itthannāmassa bhikkhuno evarūpaṁ pāpakaṁ diṭṭhigataṁ uppannaṁ, “Tathāhaṁ bhagavatā dhammaṁ desitaṁ ājānāmi, yathā ye’me antarāyikā dhammā vuttā bhagavatā, te paṭisevato nālaṁ antarāyāyā” ti. So taṁ diṭṭhiṁ nappaṭinissajjati. Saṅgho Itthannāmaṁ bhikkhuṁ samanubhāsati tassā diṭṭhiyā paṭinissaggāya. Yass’āyasmato khamati, Itthannāmassa bhikkhuno samanubhāsanā tassā diṭṭhiyā paṭinissaggāya, so tuṇh’assa. Yassa nakkhamati, so bhāseyya.

Dutiyam-pi etam-atthaṁ vadāmi. Itthannāmassa bhikkhuno evarūpaṁ pāpakaṁ diṭṭhigataṁ uppannaṁ, “Tathāhaṁ bhagavatā dhammaṁ desitaṁ ājānāmi, yathā ye’me antarāyikā dhammā vuttā bhagavatā, te paṭisevato nālaṁ antarāyāyā” ti. So taṁ diṭṭhiṁ nappaṭinissajjati. Saṅgho Itthannāmaṁ bhikkhuṁ samanubhāsati tassā diṭṭhiyā paṭinissaggāya. Yass’āyasmato khamati, Itthannāmassa bhikkhuno samanubhāsanā tassā diṭṭhiyā paṭinissaggāya, so tuṇh’assa. Yassa nakkhamati, so bhāseyya.

Tatiyam-pi etam-atthaṁ vadāmi… so bhāseyya.

Samanubhaṭṭho saṅghena Itthannāmo bhikkhu tassā diṭṭhiyā paṭinissaggāya. Khamati saṅghassa, tasmā tuṇhī. Evam-etaṁ dhārayāmi.

This means, Venerable sirs, may the Community listen to me. An evil viewpoint of this sort has arisen in Bhikkhu (name): “As I understand the Dhamma taught by the Blessed One, those acts the Blessed One says are obstructive, when engaged in are not genuine obstructions.” He does not relinquish that view. If the Community is ready, it should rebuke Bhikkhu (name) for the sake of relinquishing that view. This is the motion.

Venerable sirs, may the Community listen to me. An evil viewpoint of this sort has arisen in Bhikkhu (name): “As I understand the Dhamma taught by the Blessed One, those acts the Blessed One says are obstructive, when engaged in are not genuine obstructions.” He does not relinquish that view. The Community rebukes Bhikkhu (name) for the sake of relinquishing that view. He to whom the rebuke of Bhikkhu (name) for the sake of relinquishing that view is agreeable should remain silent. He to whom it is not agreeable should speak.

A second time…. A third time I speak about this matter. Venerable sirs, may the Community listen to me…. He to whom it is not agreeable should speak.

Bhikkhu (name) has been rebuked by the Community for the sake of relinquishing that view. This is agreeable to the Community, therefore it is silent. Thus do I hold it.

Verdicts

A. A verdict of mindfulness

To request this verdict, a bhikkhu should arrange his robe over one shoulder, approach the Community, bow down to the feet of the senior bhikkhus and, while kneeling with his hands palm-to-palm over his heart, say:

Maṁ bhante bhikkhū amūlikāya sīla-vipattiyā anuddhaṁsenti. So’haṁ bhante sati-vepullappatto saṅghaṁ sati-vinayaṁ yācāmi.

Maṁ bhante bhikkhū amūlikāya sīla-vipattiyā anuddhaṁsenti. So’haṁ sati-vepullappatto dutiyam-pi bhante saṅghaṁ sati-vinayaṁ yācāmi.

Maṁ bhante bhikkhū amūlikāya sīla-vipattiyā anuddhaṁsenti. So’haṁ sati-vepullappatto tatiyam-pi bhante saṅghaṁ sati-vinayaṁ yācāmi.

This means, Venerable sirs, bhikkhus have charged me groundlessly with a defect in virtue. I, having reached fullness of mindfulness, ask the Community for a verdict of mindfulness.

Venerable sirs, bhikkhus have charged me groundlessly with a defect in virtue. I, having reached fullness of mindfulness, ask the Community a second time… a third time for a verdict of mindfulness.

To give this verdict, an experienced and competent bhikkhu should inform the Community:

Suṇātu me bhante saṅgho. Bhikkhū Itthannāmaṁ bhikkhuṁ amūlikāya sīla-vipattiyā anuddaṁsenti. So sati-vepullappatto saṅghaṁ sati-vinayaṁ yācati. Yadi saṅghassa pattakallaṁ, saṅgho Itthannāmassa bhikkhuno sati-vepullappattassa sati-vinayaṁ dadeyya. Esā ñatti.

Suṇātu me bhante saṅgho. Bhikkhū Itthannāmaṁ bhikkhuṁ amūlikāya sīla-vipattiyā anuddaṁsenti. So sati-vepullappatto saṅghaṁ sati-vinayaṁ yācati. Saṅgho Itthannāmassa bhikkhuno sati-vepullappattassa sati-vinayaṁ deti. Yass’āyasmato khamati, Itthannāmassa bhikkhuno sati-vepullappattassa sati-vinayassa dānaṁ, so tuṇh’assa. Yassa nakkhamati, so bhāseyya.

Dutiyam-pi etam-atthaṁ vadāmi. Suṇātu me bhante saṅgho…. Yassa nakkhamati, so bhāseyya.

Tatiyam-pi etam-atthaṁ vadāmi. Suṇātu me bhante saṅgho…. Yassa nakkhamati, so bhāseyya.

Dinno saṅghena Itthannāmassa bhikkhuno sati-vepullappattassa sati-vinayo. Khamati saṅghassa, tasmā tuṇhī. Evam-etaṁ dhārayāmi. (Cv.IV.4.10; Cv.IV.14.27)

This means, Venerable sirs, may the Community listen to me. Bhikkhus have charged Bhikkhu (name) groundlessly with a defect in virtue. He, having reached fullness of mindfulness, asks the Community for a verdict of mindfulness. If the Community is ready, it should grant Bhikkhu (name), who has reached fullness of mindfulness, a verdict of mindfulness. This is the motion.

Venerable sirs, may the Community listen to me. Bhikkhus have charged Bhikkhu (name) groundlessly with a defect in virtue. He, having reached fullness of mindfulness, asks the Community for a verdict of mindfulness. The Community grants Bhikkhu (name), who has reached fullness of mindfulness, a verdict of mindfulness. He to whom the granting of a verdict of mindfulness to Bhikkhu (name), who has reached fullness of mindfulness, is agreeable should remain silent. He to whom it is not agreeable should speak.

A second time…. A third time I speak about this matter. Venerable sirs, may the Community listen to me…. He to whom it is not agreeable should speak.

Bhikkhu (name), who has reached fullness of mindfulness, has been granted a verdict of mindfulness by the Community. This is agreeable to the Community, therefore it is silent. Thus do I hold it.

B. A verdict of past insanity

To request this verdict, a bhikkhu should arrange his robe over one shoulder, approach the Community, bow down to the feet of the senior bhikkhus and, while kneeling with his hands palm-to-palm over his heart, say:

Ahaṁ bhante ummattako ahosiṁ citta-vipariyāsakato. Tena me ummattakena citta-vipariyāsakatena bahuṁ assāmaṇakaṁ ajjhāciṇṇaṁ bhāsita-parikkantaṁ. Maṁ bhikkhū ummattakena citta-vipariyāsakatena ajjhāciṇṇena āpattiyā codenti, “Sarat’āyasmā evarūpiṁ āpattiṁ āpajjitāti.” Ty’āhaṁ evaṁ vadāmi, “Ahaṁ kho āvuso ummattako ahosiṁ citta-vipariyāsakato. Tena me ummattakena citta-vipariyāsakatena bahuṁ assāmaṇakaṁ ajjhāciṇṇaṁ bhāsita-parikkantaṁ. Nāhan’taṁ sarāmi. Mūḷhena me etaṁ katanti.” Evam-pi maṁ vuccamānā codent’eva, “Sarat’āyasmā evarūpiṁ āpattiṁ āpajjitāti.” So’haṁ bhante amūḷho saṅghaṁ amūḷha-vinayaṁ yācāmi.

Ahaṁ bhante ummattako ahosiṁ…. So’haṁ amūḷho dutiyam-pi bhante saṅghaṁ amūḷha-vinayaṁ yācāmi.

Ahaṁ bhante ummattako ahosiṁ…. So’haṁ bhante amūḷho tatiyam-pi bhante saṅghaṁ amūḷha-vinayaṁ yācāmi.

This means, Venerable sirs, I have been mad, out of my mind. While I was mad, out of my mind, I committed much and prevaricated about much in a way that was unworthy of a contemplative. Bhikkhus charge me with an offense committed while I was mad, out of my mind: “Let the venerable one recall (§) having fallen into an offense of this sort.” I say to them, “Friends, I have been mad, out of my mind. While I was mad, out of my mind, I committed much and prevaricated about much in a way that was unworthy of a contemplative. I don’t recall that. It was done by me through insanity.” But even though I have told them this, they charge me as before: “Let the venerable one recall having fallen into an offense of this sort.” I, no longer insane, ask the Community for a verdict of past insanity.

Venerable sirs I have been mad, out of my mind… I, no longer insane, ask the Community a second time… a third time for a verdict of past insanity.

To give this verdict, an experienced and competent bhikkhu should inform the Community:

Suṇātu me bhante saṅgho. Ayaṁ Itthannāmo bhikkhu ummattako ahosi citta-vipariyāsakato. Tena ummattakena citta-vipariyāsakatena bahuṁ assāmaṇakaṁ ajjhāciṇṇaṁ bhāsita-parikkantaṁ. Taṁ bhikkhū ummattakena citta-vipariyāsakatena ajjhāciṇṇena āpattiyā codenti, “Sarat’āyasmā evarūpiṁ āpattiṁ āpajjitāti.” So evaṁ vadeti, “Ahaṁ kho āvuso ummattako ahosiṁ citta-vipariyāsakato. Tena me ummattakena citta-vipariyāsakatena bahuṁ assāmaṇakaṁ ajjhāciṇṇaṁ bhāsita-parikkantaṁ. Nāhan’taṁ sarāmi, mūḷhena me etaṁ katanti.” Evam-pi naṁ vuccamānā codent’eva, “Sarat’āyasmā evarūpiṁ āpattiṁ āpajjitāti.” So amūḷho saṅghaṁ amūḷha-vinayaṁ yācati. Yadi saṅghassa pattakallaṁ, saṅgho Itthannāmassa bhikkhuno amūḷha-vinayaṁ dadeyya. Esā ñatti.

Suṇātu me bhante saṅgho. Ayaṁ Itthannāmo bhikkhu ummattako ahosi citta-vipariyāsakato, tena ummattakena citta-vipariyāsakatena bahuṁ assāmaṇakaṁ ajjhāciṇṇaṁ bhāsita-parikkantaṁ. Taṁ bhikkhū ummattakena citta-vipariyāsakatena ajjhāciṇṇena āpattiyā codenti, “Sarat’āyasmā evarūpiṁ āpattiṁ āpajjitāti.” So evaṁ vadeti, “Ahaṁ kho āvuso ummattako ahosiṁ citta-vipariyāsakato. Tena me ummattakena citta-vipariyāsakatena bahuṁ assāmaṇakaṁ ajjhāciṇṇaṁ bhāsita-parikkantaṁ. Nāhan’taṁ sarāmi. Mūḷhena me etaṁ katanti.” Evam-pi naṁ vuccamānā codent’eva, “Sarat’āyasmā evarūpiṁ āpattiṁ āpajjitāti.” So amūḷho saṅghaṁ amūḷha-vinayaṁ yācati. Saṅgho Itthannāmassa bhikkhuno amūḷhassa amūḷha-vinayaṁ deti. Yass’āyasmato khamati, Itthannāmassa bhikkhuno amūḷhassa amūḷha-vinayassa dānaṁ, so tuṇh’assa. Yassa nakkhamati, so bhāseyya.

Dutiyam-pi etam-atthaṁ vadāmi. Suṇātu me bhante saṅgho…. Yassa nakkhamati, so bhāseyya.

Tatiyam-pi etam-atthaṁ vadāmi. Suṇātu me bhante saṅgho…. Yassa nakkhamati, so bhāseyya.

Dinno saṅghena Itthannāmassa bhikkhuno amūḷhassa amūḷha-vinayo. Khamati saṅghassa, tasmā tuṇhī. Evam-etaṁ dhārayāmi. (Cv. IV.5.2; Cv.IV.14.28)

This means, Venerable sirs, may the Community listen to me. This Bhikkhu (name) has been mad, out of his mind. While he was mad, out of his mind, he committed much and prevaricated about much in a way that was unworthy of a contemplative. Bhikkhus charge him with an offense committed while he was mad, out of his mind: “Let the venerable one recall having fallen into an offense of this sort.” He says to them, “Friends, I have been mad, out of my mind. While I was mad, out of my mind, I committed much and prevaricated about much in a way that was unworthy of a contemplative. I don’t recall that. It was done by me through insanity.” But even though he has told them this, they charge him as before: “Let the venerable one recall having fallen into an offense of this sort.” He, no longer insane, asks the Community for a verdict of past insanity. If the Community is ready, it should grant Bhikkhu (name), who is no longer insane, a verdict of past insanity. This is the motion.

Venerable sirs, may the Community listen to me. This Bhikkhu (name) has been mad, out of his mind. While he was mad, out of his mind, he committed much and prevaricated about much in a way that was unworthy of a contemplative…. He, no longer insane, asks the Community for a verdict of past insanity. The Community grants Bhikkhu (name), who is no longer insane, a verdict of past insanity. He to whom the granting of a verdict of past insanity to Bhikkhu (name), who is no longer insane, is agreeable should remain silent. He to whom it is not agreeable should speak.

A second time…. A third time I speak about this matter. Venerable sirs, may the Community listen to me…. He to whom it is not agreeable should speak.

Bhikkhu (name), who is no longer insane, has been granted a verdict of past insanity by the Community. This is agreeable to the Community, therefore it is silent. Thus do I hold it.

Others

NP 2: Authorization to be apart from one’s triple robe

To request this authorization, a bhikkhu should arrange his robe over one shoulder, approach the Community, bow down to the feet of the senior bhikkhus and, while kneeling with his hands palm-to-palm over his heart, say:

Ahaṁ bhante gilāno. Na sakkomi ticīvaramādāya pakkamituṁ. So’ham bhante saṅghaṁ ticīvarena avippavāsa-sammatiṁ yācāmi. (three times)

This means, Venerable sirs, I am ill. I am not able to leave taking my triple robe along. I ask the Community for an authorization (declaring me as) not dwelling apart from the triple robe.

To give this authorization, an experienced and competent bhikkhu should inform the Community:

Suṇātu me bhante saṅgho. Ayaṁ Itthannāmo bhikkhu gilāno. Na sakkoti ticīvaramādāya pakkamituṁ. So saṅghaṁ ticīvarena avippavāsa-sammatiṁ yācati. Yadi saṅghassa pattakallaṁ, saṅgho Itthannāmassa bhikkhuno ticīvarena avippavāsa-sammatiṁ dadeyya. Esā ñatti.

Suṇātu me bhante saṅgho. Ayaṁ Itthannāmo bhikkhu gilāno. Na sakkoti ticīvaramādāya pakkamituṁ. So saṅghaṁ ticīvarena avippavāsa-sammatiṁ yācati. Saṅgho Itthannāmassa bhikkhuno ticīvarena avippavāsa-sammatiṁ deti. Yass’āyasmato khamati, Itthannāmassa bhikkhuno ticīvarena avippavāsa-sammatiyā dānaṁ, so tuṇh’assa. Yassa nakkhamati, so bhāseyya.

Dinnā saṅghena Itthannāmassa bhikkhuno ticīvarena avippavāsa-sammati. Khamati saṅghassa, tasmā tuṇhī. Evam-etaṁ dhārayāmi.

This means, Venerable sirs, may the Community listen to me. This Bhikkhu (name), is ill. He is not able to leave taking his triple robe along. He asks the Community for an authorization (declaring him as) not dwelling apart from the triple robe. If the Community is ready, it should grant Bhikkhu (name) an authorization (declaring him as) not dwelling apart from the triple robe. This is the motion.

Venerable sirs, may the Community listen to me. This Bhikkhu (name) is ill. He is not able to leave taking his triple robe along. He asks the Community for an authorization (declaring him as) not dwelling apart from the triple robe. The Community is granting Bhikkhu (name) an authorization (declaring him as) not dwelling apart from the triple robe. He to whom the granting of an authorization (declaring him as) not dwelling apart from the triple robe to Bhikkhu (name) is agreeable should remain silent. He to whom it is not agreeable should speak.

Bhikkhu (name) has been granted by the Community an authorization (declaring him as) not dwelling apart from the triple robe. This is agreeable to the Community, therefore it is silent. Thus do I hold it.

Pc 12: Evasion

Suṇātu me bhante saṅgho. Ayaṁ Itthannāmo bhikkhu saṅghamajjhe āpattiyā anuyuñjiyamāno aññenaññaṁ paṭicarati. Yadi saṅghassa pattakallaṁ, saṅgho Itthannāmassa bhikkhuno aññavādakaṁ ropeyya. Esā ñatti.

Suṇātu me bhante saṅgho. Ayaṁ Itthannāmo bhikkhu saṅghamajjhe āpattiyā anuyuñjiyamāno aññenaññaṁ paṭicarati. Saṅgho Itthannāmassa bhikkhuno aññavādakaṁ ropeti. Yass’āyasmato khamati, Itthannāmassa bhikkhuno aññavādakassa ropanā, so tuṇh’assa. Yassa nakkhamati, so bhāseyya.

Ropitaṁ saṅghena Itthannāmassa bhikkhuno aññavādakaṁ. Khamati saṅghassa, tasmā tuṇhī. Evam-etaṁ dhārayāmi.

This means, Venerable sirs, may the Community listen to me. This Bhikkhu (name), when questioned in the midst of the Community about an offense, evades one question with another. If the Community is ready, it should make public Bhikkhu (name)’s evasive speech. This is the motion.

Venerable sirs, may the Community listen to me. This Bhikkhu (name), when questioned in the midst of the Community about an offense, evades one question with another. The Community makes public Bhikkhu (name)’s evasive speech. He to whom the making public of Bhikkhu (name)’s evasive speech is agreeable should remain silent. He to whom it is not agreeable should speak.

Bhikkhu (name)’s evasive speech has been made public by the Community. This is agreeable to the Community, therefore it is silent. Thus do I hold it.

Pc 12: Frustrating the Community

Suṇātu me bhante saṅgho. Ayaṁ Itthannāmo bhikkhu saṅghamajjhe āpattiyā anuyuñjiyamāno tuṇhībhūto saṅghaṁ viheseti. Yadi saṅghassa pattakallaṁ, saṅgho Itthannāmassa bhikkhuno vihesakaṁ ropeyya. Esā ñatti.

Suṇātu me bhante saṅgho. Ayaṁ Itthannāmo bhikkhu saṅghamajjhe āpattiyā anuyuñjiyamāno tuṇhībhūto saṅghaṁ viheseti. Saṅgho Itthannāmassa bhikkhuno vihesakaṁ ropeti. Yass’āyasmato khamati, Itthannāmassa bhikkhuno vihesakassa ropanā, so tuṇh’assa. Yassa nakkhamati, so bhāseyya.

Ropitaṁ saṅghena Itthannāmassa bhikkhuno vihesakaṁ. Khamati saṅghassa, tasmā tuṇhī. Evam-etaṁ dhārayāmi.

This means, Venerable sirs, may the Community listen to me. This Bhikkhu (name), when questioned in the midst of the Community about an offense, frustrates the Community by remaining silent. If the Community is ready, it should make public Bhikkhu (name)’s act of causing frustration. This is the motion.

Venerable sirs, may the Community listen to me. This Bhikkhu (name), when questioned in the midst of the Community about an offense, frustrates the Community by remaining silent. The Community makes public Bhikkhu (name)’s act of causing frustration. He to whom the making public of Bhikkhu (name)’s act of causing frustration is agreeable should remain silent. He to whom it is not agreeable should speak.

Bhikkhu (name)’s act of causing frustration has been made public by the Community. This is agreeable to the Community, therefore it is silent. Thus do I hold it.

Pc 73: Deceit

Suṇātu me bhante saṅgho. Ayaṁ Itthannāmo bhikkhu pāṭimokkhe uddissamāne na sādhukaṁ aṭṭhikatvā manasikaroti. Yadi saṅghassa pattakallaṁ, saṅgho Itthannāmassa bhikkhuno mohaṁ āropeyya. Esā ñatti.

Suṇātu me bhante saṅgho. Ayaṁ Itthannāmo bhikkhu pāṭimokkhe uddissamāne na sādhukaṁ aṭṭhikatvā manasikaroti. Saṅgho Itthannāmassa bhikkhuno mohaṁ āropeti. Yass’āyasmato khamati, Itthannāmassa bhikkhuno mohassa āropanā, so tuṇh’assa. Yassa nakkhamati, so bhāseyya.

Āropito saṅghena Itthannāmassa bhikkhuno moho. Khamati saṅghassa, tasmā tuṇhī. Evam-etaṁ dhārayāmi.

This means, Venerable sirs, may the Community listen to me. This Bhikkhu (name), when the Pāṭimokkha is being recited, does not pay attention, properly taking it to heart. If the Community is ready, it should expose Bhikkhu (name)’s deceit. This is the motion.

Venerable sirs, may the Community listen to me. This Bhikkhu (name), when the Pāṭimokkha is being recited, does not pay attention, properly taking it to heart. The Community exposes Bhikkhu (name)’s deceit. He to whom the exposing of Bhikkhu (name)’s deceit is agreeable should remain silent. He to whom it is not agreeable should speak.

Bhikkhu (name)’s deceit has been exposed by the Community. This is agreeable to the Community, therefore it is silent. Thus do I hold it.

*    *    *

IX. Thullaccaya offenses

Rules entailing thullaccaya offenses are found in the Sutta Vibhaṅga as derivatives from pārājika and saṅghādisesa rules; in the Khandhakas, as stand-alone rules. The fact that they are scattered throughout the Canon with no special arrangement or section of their own makes it difficult to determine whether one has committed an offense of this class. To lessen this difficulty, they are gathered here. For thullaccayas in the Sutta Vibhaṅga, I have provided summaries in my own words. For those in the Khandhakas, I have given the rules in their original form, arranging them in the order in which they are found in BMC2.

Thullaccayas in the Sutta Vibhaṅga

Under Pr 1:

A bhikkhu engages in mouth-to-mouth penetration with another human being or animal: a thullaccaya offense.

A bhikkhu attempts intercourse with the decomposed mouth, anus, or genitals of a corpse: a thullaccaya offense.

Under Pr 2:

A bhikkhu steals an article worth more than one māsaka but less than five: a thullaccaya offense.

A bhikkhu gets an accomplice to agree to steal an article worth at least five māsakas: a thullaccaya offense.

A bhikkhu performs any of the following steps in stealing an article worth at least five māsakas, defined by what constitutes moving the article:

Moving the object from its place: Making the object budge without fully moving it from its place: a thullaccaya offense.

“Cutting off” a fistful: Making the object budge without fully cutting off a fistful: a thullaccaya offense.

Sticking a vessel into a pool of liquid or pile of objects and causing some of the pool or pile to enter the vessel: Making the pool or pile budge without fully getting five māsakas worth separated from the pool or pile and inside the vessel: a thullaccaya offense.

Removing entirely from the mouth of a container: Lifting the object: a thullaccaya offense. Bringing it up to the level of the mouth of the container: another thullaccaya offense.

Drinking liquid from a container: Drinking between one and five māsakas’ worth of liquid: a thullaccaya offense.

Moving the object from one part of one’s body to another or dropping it: Moving it but not to the point of putting it on another part of the body or dropping it: a thullaccaya offense.

Causing a boat to move a hair-breadth upstream, downstream, or across a body of water: Making the boat rock without causing it to move a hair-breadth upstream, downstream, or across a body of water: a thullaccaya offense.

Breaking an embankment so that water flows out: Letting between one and five māsakas’ worth of water flow out: a thullaccaya offense.

Causing an animal to move all its feet: Getting it to move any of its feet prior to its moving its last foot: a thullaccaya offense for each step.

Cutting down: The next-to -last chop needed to cut the plant through: a thullaccaya offense.

Causing the owner to give up efforts to regain possession of objects handed to one for safe keeping: Inducing doubt in the owner’s mind as to whether he/she will get the object back: a thullaccaya offense. If the case goes to court and the bhikkhu loses: another thullaccaya offense.

Causing the owner to give up efforts to regain possession of land: Inducing doubt in the owner’s mind as to whether he/she will lose the land: a thullaccaya offense. Again, if the case goes to court and the bhikkhu loses: another thullaccaya offense.

Shifting a boundary marker: Any steps between removing the boundary marker from its original place and putting it in a new place: a thullaccaya offense for each step.

Taking a dutiable item through a customs area without paying duty: Making the object move without fully moving it from the customs area: a thullaccaya offense.

Under Pr 3:

A bhikkhu kills a “non-human being”—a yakkha, nāga, or peta: a thullaccaya offense.

A bhikkhu causes a human being to experience pain or injury as a result of his efforts to kill him/her: a thullaccaya offense.

A bhikkhu gets an accomplice to agree to kill a human being: a thullaccaya offense.

A bhikkhu tests a poison on a human being: a thullaccaya offense regardless of whether the human being dies.

Under Pr 4:

A bhikkhu means to lay false claim to one superior human state but actually lays false claim to another, while not being alert to what he is saying: a thullaccaya offense.

A bhikkhu lays false claim to a superior human state, explicitly mentioning the state but without explicitly mentioning himself, fully aware that he is making such a claim: a thullaccaya offense.

Under Sg 1:

A bhikkhu makes an intentional effort to emit semen, but without reaching an emission: a thullaccaya offense.

Under Sg 2:

Impelled by lust, a bhikkhu makes bodily contact with a paṇḍaka, a female yakkha, or a dead woman, perceiving his object correctly: a thullaccaya offense.

Impelled by lust, a bhikkhu makes bodily contact with a woman while under the impression that she is something else—a paṇḍaka, a man, or an animal: a thullaccaya offense.

Impelled by lust, a bhikkhu uses his body to make lustful contact with an article connected to a woman’s body: a thullaccaya offense.

Impelled by lust, a bhikkhu uses an item connected with his body to make lustful contact with a woman’s body: a thullaccaya offense.

A woman whom a bhikkhu perceives to be a woman makes an effort at a bhikkhu’s body using something connected to her body. The bhikkhu desires contact, makes an effort, and detects contact: a thullaccaya offense.

A woman whom a bhikkhu perceives to be a woman makes an effort at something connected to the bhikkhu’s body using her body. The bhikkhu desires contact, makes an effort, and detects contact: a thullaccaya offense.

Under Sg 3:

Impelled by lust, a bhikkhu speaks to a woman he perceives to be a woman and refers to parts of her body—aside from her private parts—below her collarbone and above her knees: a thullaccaya offense.

Impelled by lust, a bhikkhu speaks to a paṇḍaka he perceives to be a paṇḍaka and refers lustfully to his (the paṇḍaka’s) private parts or performing sexual intercourse: a thullaccaya offense.

Impelled by lust, a bhikkhu speaking to a woman whom he perceives to be a paṇḍaka, a man, or an animal, refers to her genitals, anus, or performing sexual intercourse: a thullaccaya offense.

Impelled by lust, a bhikkhu speaking to a woman makes direct reference to her genitals or anus, but the woman doesn’t immediately understand that he is referring to those things: a thullaccaya offense.

Under Sg 4:

Impelled by lust, a bhikkhu speaks to a paṇḍaka he perceives to be a paṇḍaka in praise of the paṇḍaka’s ministering to his (the bhikkhu’s) sensual needs, referring to sexual intercourse as a meritorious gift: a thullaccaya offense.

Impelled by lust, a bhikkhu makes such remarks to a woman he perceives to be a paṇḍaka, a man, or an animal: a thullaccaya offense.

Under Sg 5:

A bhikkhu performs any two of the three steps in a go-between’s role—accepting, inquiring, reporting—or gets someone else to perform any two of the three: a thullaccaya offense.

A bhikkhu performs all three steps in a go-between’s role for a paṇḍaka (reading paṇḍake as the locative singular, which is called for in the grammatical context of the sentence): a thullaccaya offense.

Under Sg 6:

A bhikkhu performs the next-to-last act in building a hut for his own use—its materials acquired through begging—that is oversized or located on an unauthorized site: a thullaccaya offense.

Under Sg 7:

A bhikkhu performs the next-to-last act in building a hut for his own use—financed by a sponsor—that is located on an unauthorized site: a thullaccaya offense.

Under Sg 10:

A bhikkhu persists in his intention to form a schismatic group or to take up a position that can lead to schism, up through the end of the second proclamation of a formal rebuke in a meeting of the Community: a thullaccaya offense.

Under Sg 11:

A bhikkhu persists in his intention to support a potential schismatic, up through the end of the second proclamation of a formal rebuke in a meeting of the Community: a thullaccaya offense.

Under Sg 12:

A bhikkhu persists in being difficult to admonish, up through the end of the second proclamation of a formal rebuke in a meeting of the Community: a thullaccaya offense.

Under Sg 13:

A bhikkhu persists in criticizing an act of banishment performed against him, up through the end of the second proclamation of a formal rebuke in a meeting of the Community: a thullaccaya offense.

Thullaccayas in the Khandhakas

“Nakedness, a sectarian observance, should not be followed. Whoever should follow it: a thullaccaya offense.”—Mv.VIII.28.1

“A kusa-grass garment… a bark-fiber garment… a garment of bark pieces… a human hair blanket… a horse tail-hair blanket… owls’ wings… black antelope hide, (each of which is) a sectarian uniform, should not be worn. Whoever should wear one: a thullaccaya offense.”—Mv.VIII.28.2

“One should not consume human flesh. Whoever should do so: a thullaccaya offense.”—Mv.VI.23.9

“One should not, with lustful thoughts, touch the sexual organs (of cattle). Whoever should touch (one): a thullaccaya offense.”—Mv.V.9.3

“One’s own penis/genitals should not be cut off. Whoever should cut them off: a thullaccaya offense.”—Cv.V.7

“Surgery should not be done in the crotch. Whoever should do it (have it done): a thullaccaya offense.”—Mv.VI.22.3

“Surgery and hemorrhoid removal (§) should not be done within the area two inches around the crotch. Whoever should do it (have it done): a thullaccaya offense.”—Mv.VI.22.4

“These five things not-to-be-given-out should not be given out by a Community, a group, or an individual. Even when they have been given out, they are not (to be considered as) given out. Whoever should give them out: a thullaccaya offense. Which five?

1) A monastery, the land of a monastery (a site for a monastery). This is the first thing not to be given out….

2) A dwelling, the land of a dwelling (a site for a dwelling). This is the second thing not to be given out….

3) A bed, bench, mattress, pillow. This is the third thing not to be given out….

4) A metal pot, a metal vessel, a metal jar/bottle, a metal frying pan/wok, a knife/machete, an axe, an adze, a hoe, a drill/chisel. This is the fourth thing not to be given out….

5) Vines, bamboo, coarse grass, reeds, tiṇa-grass, clay (all of which can be used as building materials), wooden goods, clay goods. This is the fifth thing not to be given out….

“These are the five things not-to-be-given-out that should not be given out by a Community, a group, or an individual. Even when they have been given out, they are not (to be considered as) given out. Whoever should give them out: a thullaccaya offense.”—Cv.VI.15.2

“These five things not-to-be-divided-up (not-to-be-distributed) (as above).”—Cv.VI.16.2

“There is the case where on the uposatha day in a certain residence, many resident bhikkhus gather, four or more. They know, ‘There are other resident bhikkhus who have not come yet.’ (Thinking,) ‘They are expelled. They are destroyed. Who has need of them? (§)’ they recite the Pāṭimokkha… : a thullaccaya offense—Mv.II.32

“(Incoming bhikkhus on the uposatha day,) being doubtful, search for resident bhikkhus. Searching for them, they see them. Seeing them, (thinking,) ‘They are expelled. They are destroyed. Who has need of them? (§)’ they perform the uposatha separately, aiming at schism: a thullaccaya offense.”—Mv.II.34.5-6

(With reference to the newly-ordained bhikkhus who had ignorantly followed Devadatta in a schism): “In that case, you should have the followers of the schismatic confess a thullaccaya offense.”—Cv.VII.4.4

*    *    *

X. A pupil’s duties as attendant to his mentor

As mentioned in Chapter 2, one is required to act as one’s mentor’s personal attendant if he does not already have one. There I sketched out these duties in general terms. What follows is a translation from Mv.I.25.8-24, which lays them out in very specific terms. Some Communities have their members follow these duties to the letter; others have adapted them to fit in with what they see as changes in culture and technology (e.g., bathing practices now differ from what they were then). Even in the latter cases, though, it is useful to have the original standards down in writing as practical guides to mindful action in daily life and sensitivity to one’s mentor’s needs, for the role of attendant is an excellent opportunity for learning the Dhamma and Vinaya in action on a day-to-day basis. A bhikkhu who approaches this role with the proper attitude will benefit greatly from it, much as Ven. Ānanda benefited from the care and attention he brought to bear in attending to the Buddha.

In the following passages, statements in brackets are from the Commentary; statements in braces from the Sub-commentary; statements in parentheses are my own.

“Having gotten up early, having taken off his sandals, having arranged his upper robe over one shoulder, the pupil should provide tooth wood (see Pc 40) and water for washing the face/rinsing the mouth. [C: On the first three days when one is performing these services, one should provide the preceptor with three lengths of tooth wood—long, medium, and short—and notice which one he takes. If he takes the same length on all three days, provide him only with that length from then on. If he is not particular about the length, provide him with whatever length is available. A similar principle holds for the water: On the first three days, provide him with both warm and cold water. If he consistently takes either the warm or the cold, provide him only with that kind of water from then on. If not, provide him with whatever water is available.] (The Commentary suggests that in “providing” these things, one need only set them out, rather than hand them to the preceptor. Once they have been set out, one should proceed to sweep out the restroom and its surrounding area while the preceptor is using the tooth wood and water. Then, while the preceptor is using the restroom, one should proceed to the next step.)

“Arrange a seat. If there is conjey, then having washed a shallow bowl, offer the conjey to the preceptor. When he has drunk the conjey, then having given him water, having received the bowl, having lowered it (so as not to let the washing water wet one’s robes), wash it carefully without scraping it [C: knocking it against the floor] and then put it away. When the preceptor has gotten up, take up the seat. If the place is dirty, sweep it.

“If the preceptor wishes to enter the village for alms, give him his lower robe, receiving the spare lower robe (he is wearing) from him in return. (This is one of the few passages showing that the practice of having spare robes was already current when the Canon was being compiled.) Give him his waistband; give him his upper and outer robe, arranged so that the upper robe forms a lining for the outer one (§). Having rinsed out the bowl, give it to him while it is still wet (i.e., pour out as much of the rinsing water as possible, but don’t wipe it dry).

“If the preceptor desires an attendant, one should put on one’s lower robe so as to cover the three circles all around (see Sk 1 & 2). Having put on the waistband, having arranged the upper robe as a lining for the outer one and having put them on, having fastened the (lower) fastener, having washed and taken a bowl, be the preceptor’s attendant. Do not walk too far behind him; do not walk too close. [C: One to two steps behind him is appropriate.] Receive the contents of the preceptor’s bowl. [C: If the preceptor’s bowl is heavy or hot to the touch, take his bowl and give him one’s own bowl (which is presumably lighter or cooler to the touch) in return.] (In a Community where the bowls are carried in their bowl bags during alms round, one may receive the preceptor’s bowl.)

“Do not interrupt the preceptor when he is speaking. If he is bordering on an offense [C: e.g., Pc 4 or Sg 3], one should stop him. [C: Speak in an indirect way so as to call him to his senses. These two protocols apply everywhere, not only on alms round.] {SC: Unlike the other protocols toward one’s preceptor, these must also be observed even when one is ill.}

“Returning ahead of the preceptor, one should arrange a seat. Put out washing water for the feet, a foot stand, and a pebble foot wiper. Having gone to meet him, receive his bowl and robe. Give him his spare lower robe; receive the lower robe [C: that he has been wearing] in return. If the upper and outer robes are damp with perspiration, dry them for a short time in the sun’s warmth, but do not leave them in the sun’s warmth for long. Fold up the robes {SC: separately}, keeping the edges four fingerbreadths apart so that neither robe becomes creased in the middle. (This, the Vinaya-mukha notes, helps extend the life of the cloth.) Place the waistband in the fold of the robe. (From these statements it would appear that when bhikkhus were in their dwelling places they wore only their lower robes, even while eating.)

“If there is almsfood, and the preceptor wishes to eat, give him water and offer the almsfood to him. Ask if he wants drinking water. [C: If there is enough time before noon, one should wait by the preceptor while he is eating, in order to offer him drinking water, and eat one’s own meal only when he is finished. If there is not enough time for this, one should simply set out the water and proceed to one’s own meal.]

“When he has finished his meal, then having given him water, receive the bowl, lower it, and wash it carefully without scraping it. Then, having dried it, set it out for a short time in the sun’s warmth, but do not leave it in the sun’s warmth for long.

“Put away his bowl and robes. When putting away the bowl, one should take the bowl in one hand, run one’s hand under the bed or bench with the other hand (to check for things on the floor that would harm the bowl), and put away the bowl (there), but should not put it away on the bare ground [C: any place where it will get soiled]. When putting away the robe, one should take the robe with one hand, stroke the other hand along the rod or cord for the robes [C: to check for any rough spots or splinters on the cord or rod that will rip the cloth], and put away the robe (over the cord or rod) with the edges away from one and the fold toward one. [C: The fold shouldn’t be placed on the side of the wall, for if there is a splinter in the wall, it may rip the robe in the middle (making its determination lapse).]

“When the preceptor has gotten up, take up the seat. Put away the washing water for the feet, the foot-stand, and the foot wiper. If the place is dirty, sweep it.

“If the preceptor wishes to bathe, prepare a bath. Prepare a cold bath if he wants a cold one, a hot bath if he wants a hot one.

“If the preceptor wishes to enter the sauna, knead the powder for bathing, moisten the bathing clay, take a sauna-bench, and follow closely behind him. Give him the bench, receive his robe in return, and lay it to one side [C: where there is no soot or smoke]. Give him the (moistened) powder for bathing and clay. If one is able to, enter the sauna. When entering the sauna, one should do so having smeared one’s face with the bathing clay and covering oneself front and back (i.e., one shouldn’t expose oneself, but there is no need to cover the three “circles”).

“Sit so as not to encroach on the senior bhikkhus, at the same time not preempting the junior bhikkhus from a seat. Perform services for the preceptor [C: stoking the fire, providing him with clay and hot water]. When leaving the sauna, one should do so taking the sauna-bench and having covered oneself front and back. Perform a service for the preceptor even in the bathing water. Having bathed, the pupil should come out of the water first, dry himself, and put on his lower robe. Then he should rub the water off his preceptor, give him his lower robe and then his outer robe.

“Taking the sauna-bench, the pupil should return first, arrange a seat, put out washing water for the feet, a foot stand, and a pebble foot wiper. (When the preceptor has sat down,) ask him if he wants drinking water.

“If the preceptor wants one to recite [C: memorize passages of Dhamma or Vinaya], one should recite. If he wants to interrogate one [C: on the meaning of the passages], one should answer his interrogation.

“If the place where the preceptor is staying is dirty, the pupil should clean it if he is able to. First taking out the bowl and robes, he should lay them to one side. Taking out the sitting cloth and sheet, he should lay them to one side. Taking out the mattress and pillow, he should lay them to one side. Having lowered the bed, he should take it out carefully, without scraping it [C: along the floor] or knocking it against the door or doorposts, and then lay it to one side. Having lowered the bench, he should take it out carefully, without scraping it [C: along the floor] or knocking it against the door or doorposts, and then lay it to one side. Taking out the spittoon… the leaning board, he should lay them to one side. Taking note of how the ground-covering is arranged, he should take it out and lay it to one side.

“If there are cobwebs in the dwelling, he should remove them, starting first with the ceiling covering-cloth (§) (and working down). He should wipe areas around the window frames and the corners (of the room) (§). If the wall has been treated with ochre and has become moldy (§), he should moisten a rag, wring it out, and wipe it clean. If the floor of the room is treated with blackening (polished) and has become moldy (§), he should moisten a rag, wring it out, and wipe it clean. If the floor is bare ground, he should sprinkle it all over with water before sweeping it, (with the thought,) ‘May the dust not fly up and soil the room.’ He should look for any rubbish and throw it away to one side.

“Having dried the ground-covering in the sun, he should clean it, shake it out, bring it back in, and arrange it in its proper place. Having dried the supports for the bed in the sun, he should wipe them, bring them back in, and set them in their proper places. Having dried the bed… the bench in the sun, he should clean them, shake them out, lower them, bring them back in carefully without scraping them [along the floor] or knocking them against the door or doorposts, and arrange them in their proper places. Having dried the mattress and pillow… the sitting cloth and sheet in the sun, he should clean them, shake them out, bring them back in, and arrange them in their proper places. Having dried the spittoon in the sun, he should wipe it, bring it back in, and set it in its proper place. Having dried the leaning board in the sun, he should wipe it, bring it back in, and set it in its proper place.

“He should put away his bowl and robes. When putting away the bowl, he should take the bowl in one hand, run his hand under the bed or bench with the other hand, and put away the bowl (there), but should not put it away on the bare ground. When putting away the robe, he should take the robe with one hand, stroke the other hand along the rod or cord for the robes, and put away the robe (over the cord or rod) with the edges away from him and the fold toward him.

“If dusty winds blow from the east, he should close the eastern windows. If from the west, he should close the western windows. If from the north, he should close the northern windows. If from the south, he should close the southern windows. If the weather is cool, he should open the windows by day and close them at night. If the weather is hot, he should close them by day and open them at night.

“If the surrounding area (§) is dirty, he should sweep it. If the porch… assembly hall… fire hall… restroom is dirty, he should sweep it. If there is no drinking water, he should set it out. If there is no washing water, he should set it out. If there is no water in the pot for rinsing (in the restroom), he should pour it into the pot.

“If dissatisfaction (with the holy life) arises in the preceptor, one should allay it or get someone else to allay it or one should give him a Dhamma talk. If anxiety (over his conduct with regard to the rules) arises in the preceptor, one should dispel it or get someone else to dispel it or one should give him a Dhamma talk. If a viewpoint (diṭṭhigata, usually a fixed opinion with regard to a question not worth asking—see MN 72) arises in the preceptor, one should pry it away or get someone else to pry it away or one should give him a Dhamma talk.

“If the preceptor has committed an offense against a heavy (saṅghādisesa) rule and deserves probation, the pupil should make an effort, (thinking,) “How can the Community grant my preceptor probation?” If the preceptor deserves to be sent back to the beginning… deserves penance… deserves rehabilitation, the pupil should make an effort, (thinking,) “How can the Community grant my preceptor rehabilitation?”

“If the Community wants to carry out a transaction against the preceptor—censure, demotion, banishment, reconciliation, or suspension—the pupil should make an effort, (thinking,) ‘How can the Community not carry out that transaction against my preceptor or else change it to a lighter one?’ But if the transaction—censure… suspension—is carried out against him, the pupil should make an effort, (thinking,) ‘How can my preceptor behave properly, lower his hackles, mend his ways, so that the Community will rescind that transaction?’

“If the preceptor’s robe should be washed, the pupil should wash it or make an effort, (thinking,) ‘How can my preceptor’s robe be washed?’ If the preceptor’s robe should be made, the pupil should make it or make an effort, (thinking,) ‘How can my preceptor’s robe be made?’ If the preceptor’s dye should be boiled, the pupil should boil it or make an effort, (thinking,) ‘How can my preceptor’s dye be boiled?’ If the preceptor’s robe should be dyed, the pupil should dye it or make an effort, (thinking,) ‘How can my preceptor’s robe be dyed?’ While dyeing the robe, he should carefully let it take the dye properly (while drying), turning it back and forth (on the line), and shouldn’t go away until the drips have become discontinuous (§).

“Without having taken the preceptor’s leave, the pupil should not give an alms bowl to anyone [C: on bad terms with the preceptor] nor should he receive an alms bowl from that person. He shouldn’t give robe-cloth to that person or receive robe- cloth from that person, shouldn’t give a requisite to that person or receive a requisite from that person. He shouldn’t cut that person’s hair or have his own hair cut by that person. He shouldn’t perform a service for that person or have that person perform a service for him. He shouldn’t act as that person’s steward or have that person act as his own steward. He shouldn’t be that person’s attendant or take that person as his own attendant. He shouldn’t bring back almsfood for that person or have that person bring back almsfood for him.

“Without having taken the preceptor’s leave, he shouldn’t enter a town, shouldn’t go to a cemetery, shouldn’t leave the district. (Mv.II.21.1 adds (translating from the Burmese edition): “There is the case where a number of inexperienced, incompetent bhikkhus, traveling to distant locations, ask leave of their teachers and preceptors. They should be asked by their teachers and preceptors, ‘Where will you go? With whom will you go?’ If those inexperienced, incompetent bhikkhus name other inexperienced, incompetent bhikkhus, the teachers and preceptors should not give them permission. If they give permission: an offense of wrong doing. And if those inexperienced, incompetent bhikkhus, not having received permission, go anyway: an offense of wrong doing (for them).)

“If the preceptor is ill, he (the pupil) should tend to him as long as life lasts; he should stay with him until he recovers.”

*    *    *

As noted in Chapter 2, a pupil who is not ill is expected to perform these services for his mentor unless the mentor tells him that he already has another pupil acting as his attendant or the other pupil says that he will accept responsibility for them. On the other hand, if the pupil is ill, the mentor is expected to perform these services for the pupil until the latter recovers. This reflects the Buddha’s statement that the pupil should regard the mentor as his father; and the mentor, the pupil as his son. If both bear this relationship in mind, they are sure to prosper in the practice of the Dhamma-Vinaya.

Glossary

This glossary is designed to help the reader in two sorts of situations: (1) when encountering a Pali term in this book in a passage where it is not explained; and (2) when encountering Vinaya terminology in other books or conversations and wanting to know how it is defined and/or where it is discussed here. For terms that have entire chapters devoted to them—such as nissaya and pācittiya—see the relevant chapter.

Abbhantara: a unit for measuring distance, approximately equal to 14 meters.

Ācariya: teacher. See Chapter 2 and Appendix X.

Acittaka: a class of offenses carrying a penalty even when committed unintentionally or with incorrect perception.

Adhikaraṇa: issue. See Pc 63, Chapter 11, and BMC2, Chapter 12.

Adhiṭṭhāna: determining for use. See NP 1, 3, 21, & 24 and Appendix IV.

Akkosa-vatthu: a topic for abuse. See Pc 2 & 3.

Anupasampanna: anyone who has not received full Acceptance (ordination). Under some rules, this includes bhikkhunīs; under others, it doesn’t.

a

Apalokana: announcement; the simplest form for a Community transaction, in which a decision is proposed to the Community in the announcer’s own words. See BMC2, Chapter 12.

Bhattuddesaka: a meal distributor—the Community official in charge of distributing meals and invitations to meals. See Pc 32, Appendix III, and BMC2, Chapter 18.

Bhikkhu: a male mendicant ordained in the Bhikkhu Saṅgha, subject to the training rules of the Bhikkhu Pāṭimokkha and the Khandhakas (the Mahāvagga and Cullavagga).

Bhikkhunī: a female mendicant ordained by both the Bhikkhunī and the Bhikkhu Saṅghas, subject to the training rules of the Bhikkhunī Pāṭimokkha and the eight rules of respect (garu-dhamma). See Pc 21 and BMC2, Chapter 23.

Bhojana/Bhojaniya: staple food. See the introduction to the Food Chapter in Chapter 8.

Bhūtagāma: a living plant in its place. See Pc 11.

Bījagāma: a plant or part of a plant removed from its place but capable of growing again if replanted. See Pc 11.

Chanda: consent by proxy. See Pc 79.

Deva (devatā): literally, a “shining one”—a terrestrial spirit or celestial being.

Dubbhāsita: wrong speech. See Pc 2.

Dukkaṭa: wrong doing, the lightest penalty.

Garu-bhaṇḍa: a heavy or expensive article. Garu-bhaṇḍa belonging to the Saṅgha includes monasteries and monastery land; dwellings, land on which dwellings are built; furnishings such as beds, chairs, and mattresses; metal vessels and tools; building materials, except for such things as rushes, reeds, grass, and clay; and articles made of pottery or wood. See Pr 2, Sg 6, Pc 81, and BMC2, Chapter 7.

Garu-dhamma: any of eight rules of respect observed by bhikkhunīs. See Pc 21 and BMC2, Chapter 23.

Hatthapāsa: a distance of 2 ½ cubits, or 1.25 meters.

Jhāna: mental absorption. See Pr 4.

Kappiya-vohāra: a proper expression, i.e., a way of expressing a hint or desire allowable in the context of a rule where an outright command would be a breach of the rule.

Kaṭhina: a ceremony, held in the fourth month of the rainy season, in which a Community of bhikkhus receives a gift of cloth from lay people, bestows it on one of their members, and then makes it into a robe before dawn of the following day. See NP 1-3, Pc 81, and BMC2, Chapter 17.

Khādaniya: non-staple food. See the introduction to the Food Chapter in Chapter 8.

Lahu-bhaṇḍa: a light or inexpensive article. Lahu-bhaṇḍa of the Saṅgha includes such things as cloth, food, and medicine; and small personal accessories such as scissors, sandals, and water strainers. See Pr 2, Sg 6, and Pc 81.

Leḍḍupāta: the distance a man of average height can toss a clod of dirt underarm—approximately 18 meters.

Loka-vajja: acts criticized by people in general. See Chapter 1.

Lokuttara-dhamma: a transcendent state. See Pr 4.

Mahāpadesa: Great Standard for deciding what is and is not in line with the Dhamma and Vinaya. See Chapter 1.

Mānatta: penance. See the conclusion to Chapter 5 and BMC2, Chapter 19 and Chapter 23.

Nāga: a special kind of serpent, classed as a common animal but having magical powers, including the ability to assume human appearance. Nāgas have long been regarded as protectors of the Buddha’s teachings. See BMC2, Chapter 14.

Ñatti-kamma: a form for a Community transaction in which a decision is proposed to the Community in a motion following a set wording. See BMC2, Chapter 12.

Ñatti-dutiya-kamma: a form for a Community transaction in which a decision is proposed to the Community in a motion and one proclamation. See BMC2, Chapter 12.

Ñatti-catuttha-kamma: a form for a Community transaction in which a decision is proposed to the Community in a motion and three proclamations. See BMC2, Chapter 12.

Niyasa-kamma: demotion (also called nissaya-kamma, an act of dependence)—a transaction whereby a bhikkhu released from dependence is required to return to dependence under a mentor until he mends his ways. See Chapter 2 and BMC2, Chapter 20.

Pabbājanīya-kamma: banishment—a transaction whereby a bhikkhu is denied membership in a particular Community until he mends his ways. See Sg 13 and BMC2, Chapter 20.

Pabbajjā: Going-forth—ordination as a sāmaṇera or sāmaṇerī. See BMC2, Chapters 14 and 24.

Paccuddharaṇa: rescinding from use. See Appendix IV.

Palibodha: constraint. See NP 1.

Pāna: juice drink. See the introduction to the Food Chapter in Chapter 8, and Pc 38.

Paṇḍaka: a eunuch or person born neuter. See Sg 2.

Paṇṇatti-vajja: acts criticized by the training rules. See Chapter 1.

Parivāsa: probation. See the conclusion to Chapter 5 and BMC2, Chapter 19.

Pavāraṇā: (1) an invitation whereby a donor gives permission to a bhikkhu or a Community of bhikkhus to ask for requisites. See Pc 47. (2) A ceremony, held at the end of the Rains-residence (see vassa), in which each bhikkhu invites the rest of the Community to confront him with any transgressions they may have seen, heard, or suspected that he has committed. See BMC2, Chapter 16.

Peta: (1) a hungry ghost—one of a class of beings in the lower realms, sometimes capable of appearing to human beings. (2) A corpse.

Pubbayoga: a preliminary effort leading up to the commission of an offense.

Sacittaka: a class of offenses that carry a penalty only when committed intentionally and with correct perception.

Samaṇa: contemplative; monk. This word is derived from the adjective sama, which means “in tune” or “in harmony.” The samaṇas in ancient India were wanderers who tried through direct contemplation to find the true nature of reality—as opposed to the conventions taught in the Vedas—and to live in tune or in harmony with that reality. Buddhism is one of several samaṇa movements. Others included Jainism, Ājivakan fatalism, and Lokāyata, or hedonism.

Sāmaṇera: literally, a small samaṇa—a novice monk observing ten precepts. See Pc 70.

Saṅgha: Community. This may refer to the entire Community of bhikkhus or of bhikkhunīs, or to the Community living in a particular location. In this book I have tried to distinguish between the two by calling the first Saṅgha, and the second Community, but there are some contexts where it is difficult to draw a clear line between the two.

Saṅgha-bheda: a schism in the Saṅgha. See Sg 10 & 11 and BMC2, Chapter 21 and Appendix V.

Saṅgha-rāji: a crack in the Saṅgha. See Sg 10.

Sīmā: a territory related to the performance of Community transactions. See Pc 79 and BMC2, Chapter 13.

Sugata: Well-gone, an epithet for the Buddha. Sugata measures are discussed in Appendix II.

Sutta (suttanta): discourse.

Tajjanīya-kamma: censure, a transaction whereby a Community strips a bhikkhu of some of his communal rights if he is a maker of strife; if he is defective in virtue, conduct, or views; or if he criticizes the Buddha, Dhamma, or Saṅgha. If he mends his ways, the act may be repealed. See Sg 8, Ay 1, Chapter 11, and BMC2, Chapter 19.

Thullaccaya: grave offense, the most serious derived offense and the most serious offense not included in the Pāṭimokkha rules. See Appendix IX.

Tiracchāna-kathā: “animal talk,” topics of conversation inappropriate for bhikkhus. See Pc 46 & 85.

Tiracchāna-vijjā: “animal knowledge,” occult abilities or other traditional skills inappropriate for bhikkhus to study or practice. See Pr 4 and BMC2, Chapter 10.

Ukkhepanīya-kamma: suspension—a transaction whereby a Community deprives a bhikkhu of his right to associate with the Saṅgha as a whole until he mends his ways. See Pc 68 & 69 and BMC2, Chapter 19.

Upajjhāya: preceptor (literally, “supervisor” or “overseer”). See Chapter 2, Appendix X, and BMC2, Chapter 14.

Upasampadā: Full Acceptance—ordination as a bhikkhu or bhikkhunī. See BMC2, Chapter 14.

Uposatha: Observance day, the day of the new and of the full moon; traditionally, in India, a time of special spiritual practices. The Buddha adopted this as the day for reciting the Pāṭimokkha. See BMC2, Chapter 15.

Vassa: Rains-residence—a three-month period, generally beginning the day after the full moon in July (or the second, if there are two), during which certain restrictions are placed on the bhikkhus’ wanderings; usually considered a time to accelerate one’s efforts in study or practice. See BMC2, Chapter 11.

Vikappana: an arrangement whereby an item not in use is placed under shared ownership. See NP 1, Pc 59, and Appendix V.

Vissāsa: trust between friends. See Pr 2 and Pc 59.

Yakkha: one of a class of powerful “non-human” beings—sometimes kindly, sometimes murderous and cruel—corresponding roughly to the fairies and ogres of Western fairy tales. The female (yakkhinī) is generally considered more treacherous than the male.

Yojana: a distance of approximately ten miles or sixteen kilometers.

Rule Index

This index lists the summaries of the training rules given in this book, organized by topic. The Sekhiya rules have not been included, because they are short, deal almost exclusively with etiquette, and are already organized by topic in their own chapter. I have included short summaries of the adhikaraṇa-samatha rules, even though these summaries do not appear in the chapter discussing those rules.

The rules are divided into five major categories, dealing with Right Speech, Right Action, Right Livelihood, Communal harmony, and the etiquette of a contemplative. The first three categories—the factors of the Noble Eightfold Path that make up the training in heightened virtue—show in particular how the training rules relate to the Buddhist path as a whole.

These five categories are not sharply distinct types. Instead, they are more like the colors in the band of light thrown off by a prism—discernibly different, but shading into one another with no sharp dividing lines. Right Speech, for instance, often shades into Communal harmony, just as Right Livelihood shades into personal etiquette. Thus the placement of a particular rule in one category rather than another is occasionally somewhat arbitrary. There are a few cases—such as Pc 46 & 85—where the reason for the placement of the rule will become clear only after a reading of the detailed discussion of the rule in the text.

Right Speech

MN 117 defines wrong speech as lying, divisive speech, abusive speech, and idle chatter.

Lying

Making an unfounded charge to a bhikkhu that he has committed a pārājika offense, in hopes of having him disrobed, is a saṅghādisesa offense. (Sg 8)

Distorting the evidence while accusing a bhikkhu of having committed a pārājika offense, in hopes of having him disrobed, is a saṅghādisesa offense. (Sg 9)

The intentional effort to misrepresent the truth to another individual is a pācittiya offense. (Pc 1)

Making an unfounded charge to a bhikkhu—or getting someone else to make the charge to him—that he is guilty of a saṅghādisesa offense is a pācittiya offense. (Pc 76)

Divisive speech

Telling a bhikkhu about insulting remarks made by another bhikkhu—in hopes of winning favor or causing a rift—is a pācittiya offense. (Pc 3)

Abusive speech

An insult made with malicious intent to another bhikkhu is a pācittiya offense. (Pc 2) 

Idle chatter

Visiting lay families—without having informed an available bhikkhu—before or after a meal to which one has been invited is a pācittiya offense except during the robe season or any time one is making a robe. (Pc 46)

Entering a village, town, or city during the period after noon until the following dawn, without having taken leave of an available bhikkhu—unless there is an emergency—is a pācittiya offense. (Pc 85)

Right Action

MN 117 defines wrong action as killing living beings, taking what is not given, and engaging in sexual misconduct.

Killing

Intentionally bringing about the death of a human being, even if it is still a fetus—whether by killing the person, arranging for an assassin to kill the person, inciting the person to die, or describing the advantages of death—is a pārājika offense. (Pr 3)

Pouring water that one knows to contain living beings—or having it poured—on grass or clay is a pācittiya offense. Pouring anything that would kill the beings into such water—or having it poured—is also a pācittiya offense. (Pc 20)

Deliberately killing an animal—or having it killed—is a pācittiya offense. (Pc 61)

Using water, or getting others to use it, knowing that it contains living beings that will die from that use, is a pācittiya offense. (Pc 62)

Taking what is not given

The theft of anything worth 1/24 ounce troy of gold or more is a pārājika offense. (Pr 2)

Having given another bhikkhu a robe on a condition and then—angry and displeased—snatching it back or having it snatched back is a nissaggiya pācittiya offense. (NP 25)

Making use of cloth or a bowl stored under shared ownership—unless the shared ownership has been rescinded or one is taking the item on trust—is a pācittiya offense. (Pc 59)

Sexual Misconduct

Voluntary sexual intercourse—genital, anal, or oral—with a human being, non-human being, or common animal is a pārājika offense. (Pr 1)

Intentionally causing oneself to emit semen, or getting someone else to cause one to emit semen—except during a dream—is a saṅghādisesa offense. (Sg 1)

Lustful bodily contact with a woman whom one perceives to be a woman is a saṅghādisesa offense. (Sg 2)

Making a lustful remark to a woman about her genitals, anus or about performing sexual intercourse is a saṅghādisesa offense. (Sg 3)

Telling a woman that having sexual intercourse with a bhikkhu would be beneficial is a saṅghādisesa offense. (Sg 4)

Getting an unrelated bhikkhunī to wash, dye, or beat a robe that has been used at least once is a nissaggiya pācittiya offense. (NP 4)

Getting an unrelated bhikkhunī to wash, dye, or card wool that has not been made into cloth or yarn is a nissaggiya pācittiya offense. (NP 17)

Lying down at the same time in the same lodging with a woman is a pācittiya offense. (Pc 6)

Teaching more than six sentences of Dhamma to a woman, except in response to a question, is a pācittiya offense unless a knowledgeable man is present. (Pc 7)

Exhorting a bhikkhunī about the eight vows of respect—except when one has been authorized to do so by the Community or asked a question by a bhikkhunī—is a pācittiya offense. (Pc 21)

Exhorting a bhikkhunī on any topic at all after sunset—except when she requests it—is a pācittiya offense. (Pc 22)

Going to the bhikkhunīs’ quarters and exhorting a bhikkhunī about the eight vows of respect—except when she is ill or has requested the instruction—is a pācittiya offense. (Pc 23)

Giving robe-cloth to an unrelated bhikkhunī without receiving anything in exchange is a pācittiya offense. (Pc 25)

Sewing a robe—or having it sewn—for an unrelated bhikkhunī is a pācittiya offense. (Pc 26)

Traveling by arrangement with a bhikkhunī from one village to another—except when the road is risky or there are other dangers—is a pācittiya offense. (Pc 27)

Traveling by arrangement with a bhikkhunī upriver or downriver in the same boat—except when crossing a river—is a pācittiya offense. (Pc 28)

When aiming at privacy, sitting or lying down alone with a bhikkhunī in an unsecluded but private place is a pācittiya offense. (Pc 30)

When aiming at privacy, sitting or lying down with a woman or women in a private, secluded place with no other man present is a pācittiya offense. (Pc 44)

When aiming at privacy, sitting or lying down alone with a woman in an unsecluded but private place is a pācittiya offense. (Pc 45)

Traveling by arrangement with a woman from one village to another is a pācittiya offense. (Pc 67)

Right Livelihood

MN 117 defines wrong livelihood as scheming, persuading, hinting, belittling, and pursuing gain with gain.

General

Deliberately lying to another person that one has attained a superior human state is a pārājika offense. (Pr 4)

Acting as a go-between to arrange a marriage, an affair, or a date between a man and a woman not married to each other is a saṅghādisesa offense. (Sg 5)

Engaging in trade with anyone except one’s co-religionists is a nissaggiya pācittiya offense. (NP 20)

Persuading a donor to give a gift to oneself, knowing that he or she had planned to give it to a Community, is a nissaggiya pācittiya offense. (NP 30)

Telling an unordained person of one’s actual superior human attainments is a pācittiya offense. (Pc 8)

Persuading a donor to give to another individual a gift that he or she had planned to give to a Community—when one knows that it was intended for the Community—is a pācittiya offense. (Pc 82)

Robes

Keeping a piece of robe-cloth for more than ten days without determining it for use or placing it under shared ownership—except when the robe-season or kathina privileges are in effect—is a nissaggiya pācittiya offense. (NP 1)

Being in a separate zone from any of one’s three robes at dawn—except when one’s kathina privileges are in effect or one has received formal authorization from the Community—is a nissaggiya pācittiya offense. (NP 2)

Keeping out-of-season robe-cloth for more than 30 days when it is not enough to make a requisite and one has expectation for more—except when the robe-season and kathina privileges are in effect—is a nissaggiya pācittiya offense. (NP 3)

Accepting robe-cloth from an unrelated bhikkhunī without giving her anything in exchange is a nissaggiya pācittiya offense. (NP 5)

Asking for and receiving robe-cloth from an unrelated lay person, except when one’s robes have been snatched away or destroyed, is a nissaggiya pācittiya offense. (NP 6)

Asking for and receiving excess robe-cloth from unrelated lay people when one’s robes have been snatched away or destroyed is a nissaggiya pācittiya offense. (NP 7)

When a lay person who is not a relative is planning to get robe-cloth for one but has yet to ask one what kind of cloth one wants: Receiving the cloth after making a request that would improve it is a nissaggiya pācittiya offense. (NP 8)

When two or more lay people who are not one’s relatives are planning to get separate pieces of robe-cloth for one but have yet to ask one what kind of cloth one wants: Receiving cloth from them after asking them to pool their funds to get one piece of cloth—out of a desire for something fine—is a nissaggiya pācittiya offense. (NP 9)

Making a felt blanket/rug with silk mixed in it for one’s own use—or having it made—is a nissaggiya pācittiya offense. (NP 11)

Making a felt blanket/rug entirely of black wool for one’s own use—or having it made—is a nissaggiya pācittiya offense. (NP 12)

Making a felt blanket/rug that is more than one-half black wool for one’s own use—or having it made—is a nissaggiya pācittiya offense. (NP 13)

Unless one has received authorization to do so from the Community, making a felt blanket/rug for one’s own use—or having it made—less than six years after one’s last one was made is a nissaggiya pācittiya offense. (NP 14)

Making a felt sitting rug for one’s own use—or having it made—without incorporating a one-span piece of old felt is a nissaggiya pācittiya offense. (NP 15)

Seeking and receiving a rains-bathing cloth before the fourth month of the hot season is a nissaggiya pācittiya offense. Using a rains-bathing cloth before the last two weeks of the fourth month of the hot season is also a nissaggiya pācittiya offense. (NP 24)

Taking thread that one has asked for improperly and getting weavers to weave cloth from it—when they are unrelated and have not made a previous offer to weave—is a nissaggiya pācittiya offense. (NP 26)

When donors who are not relatives—and have not invited one to ask—have arranged for weavers to weave robe-cloth intended for one: Receiving the cloth after getting the weavers to improve it is a nissaggiya pācittiya offense. (NP 27)

Keeping robe-cloth offered in urgency past the end of the robe season after having accepted it during the last eleven days of the Rains-residence is a nissaggiya pācittiya offense. (NP 28)

When one is living in a dangerous wilderness abode during the month after the Rains-residence and has left one of one’s robes in the village where one normally goes for alms: Being away from the abode and the village for more than six nights at a stretch—except when authorized by the Community—is a nissaggiya pācittiya offense. (NP 29)

Wearing an unmarked robe is a pācittiya offense. (Pc 58)

Obtaining an overly large sitting cloth after making it—or having it made—for one’s own use is a pācittiya offense requiring that one cut the cloth down to size before confessing the offense. (Pc 89)

Obtaining an overly large skin-eruption covering cloth after making it—or having it made—for one’s own use is a pācittiya offense requiring that one cut the cloth down to size before confessing the offense. (Pc 90)

Obtaining an overly large rains-bathing cloth after making it—or having it made—for one’s own use is a pācittiya offense requiring that one cut the cloth down to size before confessing the offense. (Pc 91)

Obtaining an overly large robe after making it—or having it made—for one’s own use is a pācittiya offense requiring that one cut the robe down to size before confessing the offense. (Pc 92)

Food

Eating any of the five staple foods that a lay person has offered as the result of a bhikkhunī’s prompting—unless the lay person was already planning to offer the food before her prompting—is a pācittiya offense. (Pc 29)

Eating food obtained from the same public alms center two days running—without leaving in the interim—unless one is too ill to leave the center, is a pācittiya offense. (Pc 31)

Eating a meal to which four or more individual bhikkhus have been specifically invited—except on special occasions—is a pācittiya offense. (Pc 32)

Eating a meal before going to another meal to which one was invited, or accepting an invitation to one meal and eating elsewhere instead, is a pācittiya offense except when one is ill or during the time of giving cloth or making robes. (Pc 33)

Accepting more than three bowlfuls of food that the donors prepared for their own use as presents or as provisions for a journey is a pācittiya offense. (Pc 34)

Eating staple or non-staple food that is not left-over, after having earlier in the day finished a meal during which one turned down an offer to eat further staple food, is a pācittiya offense. (Pc 35)

Eating staple or non-staple food in the period from noon till the next dawn is a pācittiya offense. (Pc 37)

Eating food that a bhikkhu—oneself or another—formally received on a previous day is a pācittiya offense. (Pc 38)

Eating finer staple foods, after having asked for them for one’s own sake—except when ill—is a pācittiya offense. (Pc 39)

Eating food that has not been formally given is a pācittiya offense. (Pc 40)

Eating staple or non-staple food, after having accepted it from the hand of an unrelated bhikkhunī in a village area, is a pāṭidesanīya offense. (Pd 1)

Eating staple food accepted at a meal to which one has been invited and where a bhikkhunī has given directions, based on favoritism, as to which bhikkhu should get which food, and none of the bhikkhus have dismissed her, is a pāṭidesanīya offense. (Pd 2)

Eating staple or non-staple food, after accepting it—when one is neither ill nor invited—at the home of a family formally designated as “in training,” is a pāṭidesanīya offense. (Pd 3)

Eating an unannounced gift of staple or non-staple food after accepting it in a dangerous wilderness abode when one is not ill is a pāṭidesanīya offense. (Pd 4)

Lodgings

Building a plastered hut—or having it built— without a sponsor, destined for one’s own use, without having obtained the Community’s approval, is a saṅghādisesa offense. Building a plastered hut—or having it built—without a sponsor, destined for one’s own use, exceeding the standard measurements, is also a saṅghādisesa offense. (Sg 6)

Building a hut with a sponsor—or having it built—destined for one’s own use, without having obtained the Community’s approval, is a saṅghādisesa offense. (Sg 7)

When a bhikkhu is building or repairing a large dwelling for his own use, using resources donated by another, he may not reinforce the window or door frames with more than three layers of roofing material or plaster. To exceed this is a pācittiya offense. (Pc 19)

Obtaining a bed or bench with legs longer than eight sugata fingerbreadths after making it—or having it made—for one’s own use is a pācittiya offense requiring that one cut the legs down before confessing the offense. (Pc 87)

Obtaining a bed or bench stuffed with cotton down after making it—or having it made—for one’s own use is a pācittiya offense requiring that one remove the stuffing before confessing the offense. (Pc 88)

Medicine

Keeping any of the five tonics—ghee, fresh butter, oil, honey, or sugar/molasses—for more than seven days, unless one determines to use them only externally, is a nissaggiya pācittiya offense. (NP 23)

When a supporter has made an offer to supply medicines to the Community: Asking him/her for medicine outside of the terms of the offer when one is not ill is a pācittiya offense. (Pc 47) 

Money

When a fund for one’s individual use has been set up with a steward, obtaining an article from the fund as a result of having prompted the steward more than the allowable number of times is a nissaggiya pācittiya offense. (NP 10)

Accepting gold or money, having someone else accept it, or consenting to its being placed down as a gift for oneself, is a nissaggiya pācittiya offense. (NP 18)

Obtaining gold or money through trade is a nissaggiya pācittiya offense. (NP 19)

Bowls and other requisites

Carrying wool that has not been made into cloth or yarn for more than three yojanas is a nissaggiya pācittiya offense. (NP 16)

Keeping an alms bowl for more than ten days without determining it for use or placing it under shared ownership is a nissaggiya pācittiya offense. (NP 21)

Asking for and receiving a new alms bowl when one’s current bowl is not beyond repair is a nissaggiya pācittiya offense. (NP 22)

Obtaining a needle box made of bone, ivory, or horn after making it—or having it made—for one’s own use is a pācittiya offense requiring that one break the box before confessing the offense. (Pc 86)

Communal Harmony

To persist—after the third proclamation of a formal rebuke in the Community—in trying to form a schismatic group or in taking up a position that can lead to schism is a saṅghādisesa offense. (Sg 10)

To persist—after the third proclamation of a formal rebuke in the Community—in supporting a potential schismatic is a saṅghādisesa offense. (Sg 11)

To persist—after the third proclamation of a formal rebuke in the Community—in being difficult to admonish is a saṅghādisesa offense. (Sg 12)

To persist—after the third proclamation of a formal rebuke in the Community—in criticizing a banishment transaction performed against oneself is a saṅghādisesa offense. (Sg 13)

When a trustworthy female lay follower accuses a bhikkhu of having committed a pārājika, saṅghādisesa, or pācittiya offense while sitting alone with a woman in a private, secluded place, the Community should investigate the charge and deal with the bhikkhu in accordance with whatever he admits to having done. (Ay 1)

When a trustworthy female lay follower accuses a bhikkhu of having committed a saṅghādisesa or pācittiya offense while sitting alone with a woman in an unsecluded but private place, the Community should investigate the charge and deal with the bhikkhu in accordance with whatever he admits to having done. (Ay 2)

Telling an unordained person of another bhikkhu’s serious offense—unless one is authorized by the Community to do so—is a pācittiya offense. (Pc 9)

Persistently replying evasively or keeping silent in order to conceal one’s own offenses when being questioned in a meeting of the Community—after a formal charge of evasive speech or being frustrating has been brought against one—is a pācittiya offense. (Pc 12)

If a Community official is innocent of bias: Criticizing him within earshot of another bhikkhu is a pācittiya offense. (Pc 13)

When one has set a bed, bench, mattress, or stool belonging to the Community out in the open: Leaving its immediate vicinity without putting it away, arranging to have it put away, or taking leave is a pācittiya offense. (Pc 14)

When one has spread bedding out in a dwelling belonging to the Community: Departing from the monastery without putting it away, arranging to have it put away, or taking leave is a pācittiya offense. (Pc 15)

Intruding on another bhikkhu’s sleeping or sitting place in a dwelling belonging to the Community, with the sole purpose of making him uncomfortable and forcing him to leave, is a pācittiya offense. (Pc 16)

Causing a bhikkhu to be evicted from a dwelling belonging to the Community—when one’s primary impulse is anger—is a pācittiya offense. (Pc 17)

Sitting or lying down on a bed or bench with detachable legs on an unplanked loft in a dwelling belonging to the Community, is a pācittiya offense. (Pc 18)

Saying that a properly authorized bhikkhu exhorts the bhikkhunīs for the sake of worldly gain—when in fact that is not the case—is a pācittiya offense. (Pc 24)

Deliberately tricking another bhikkhu into breaking Pācittiya 35, in hopes of finding fault with him, is a pācittiya offense. (Pc 36)

Speaking or acting disrespectfully after having been admonished by another bhikkhu for a breach of the training rules is a pācittiya offense. (Pc 54)

Agitating to re-open an issue, knowing that it was properly dealt with, is a pācittiya offense. (Pc 63)

Not informing another bhikkhu of a serious offense that one knows a third bhikkhu has committed—out of a desire to protect the third bhikkhu either from having to undergo the penalty or from the jeering remarks of other bhikkhus—is a pācittiya offense. (Pc 64)

Acting as the preceptor in the full Acceptance (ordination) of a person one knows to be less than 20 years old is a pācittiya offense. (Pc 65)

Refusing—after the third proclamation of a formal rebuke in a meeting of the Community—to relinquish the evil view that there is nothing wrong in intentionally transgressing the Buddha’s ordinances is a pācittiya offense. (Pc 68) 

Communing, affiliating, or lying down under the same roof with a bhikkhu who has been suspended and not been restored—knowing that such is the case—is a pācittiya offense. (Pc 69)

Befriending, receiving services from, communing, or lying down under the same roof with an expelled novice—knowing that he has been expelled—is a pācittiya offense. (Pc 70)

When being admonished by another bhikkhu with regard to a training rule formulated in the Vinaya, saying something as a ploy to excuse oneself from training under the rule is a pācittiya offense. (Pc 71)

Criticizing the discipline in the presence of another bhikkhu, in hopes of preventing its study, is a pācittiya offense. (Pc 72)

Using half-truths to deceive others into believing that one is ignorant of the rules in the Pāṭimokkha—after one has already heard the Pāṭimokkha in full three times, and a transaction exposing one’s deceit has been brought against one—is a pācittiya offense. (Pc 73)

Giving a blow to another bhikkhu when impelled by anger—except in self-defense—is a pācittiya offense. (Pc 74)

Making a threatening gesture against another bhikkhu when impelled by anger—except in self-defense—is a pācittiya offense. (Pc 75)

Intentionally provoking anxiety in another bhikkhu that he may have broken a rule, when one has no other purpose in mind, is a pācittiya offense. (Pc 77)

Eavesdropping on bhikkhus involved in an argument over an issue—with the intention of using what they say against them—is a pācittiya offense. (Pc 78)

Complaining about a Community transaction to which one gave one’s consent—if one perceives the transaction as having been carried out in accordance with the rule—is a pācittiya offense. (Pc 79)

Getting up and leaving a meeting of the Community in the midst of a valid transaction that one knows to be valid—without having first given one’s consent to the transaction and with the intention of invalidating it—is a pācittiya offense. (Pc 80) 

After participating in a Community transaction giving robe-cloth to a Community official: Complaining that the Community acted out of favoritism is a pācittiya offense. (Pc 81)

When the Community is dealing formally with an issue, the full Community must be present, as must all the individuals involved in the issue; the proceedings must follow the patterns set out in the Dhamma and Vinaya. (As 1)

If the Community unanimously believes that a bhikkhu is innocent of a charge made against him, they may issue a transaction declaring him innocent on the basis of his memory of the events. (As 2)

If the Community unanimously believes that a bhikkhu was insane while committing offenses against the rules, they may issue a transaction absolving him of any responsibility for the offenses. (As 3)

If a bhikkhu commits an offense, he should willingly undergo the appropriate penalty in line with what he actually did and the actual seriousness of the offense. (As 4)

If an important dispute cannot be settled by a unanimous decision, it should be submitted to a vote. The opinion of the majority, if in accord with the Dhamma and Vinaya, is then considered decisive. (As 5)

If a bhikkhu admits to an offense only after being interrogated in a formal meeting, the Community should carry out a further-punishment transaction against him, rescinding it only when he has mended his ways. (As 6)

If, in the course of a dispute, both sides act in ways unworthy of contemplatives, and the sorting out of the penalties would only prolong the dispute, the Community as a whole may make a blanket confession of its light offenses. (As 7)

The Etiquette of a Contemplative

Training a novice or lay person to recite passages of Dhamma by rote is a pācittiya offense. (Pc 4)

Lying down at the same time, in the same lodging, with a novice or layman for more than three nights running is a pācittiya offense. (Pc 5)

Digging soil or commanding that it be dug is a pācittiya offense. (Pc 10)

Intentionally cutting, burning, or killing a living plant is a pācittiya offense. (Pc 11)

Handing food or medicine to a person ordained in another religion is a pācittiya offense. (Pc 41)

Sending another bhikkhu away so that he won’t witness any misconduct one is planning to indulge in is a pācittiya offense. (Pc 42)

To sit down intruding on a man and a woman in their private quarters—when one or both are sexually aroused, and when another bhikkhu is not present—is a pācittiya offense. (Pc 43)

Watching a field army—or similar large military force—on active duty, unless there is a suitable reason, is a pācittiya offense. (Pc 48)

Staying more than three consecutive nights with an army on active duty—even when one has a suitable reason to be there—is a pācittiya offense. (Pc 49)

Going to a battlefield, a roll call, an array of the troops in battle formation, or to see a review of the battle units while one is staying with an army is a pācittiya offense. (Pc 50)

Taking an intoxicant is a pācittiya offense regardless of whether one is aware that it is an intoxicant. (Pc 51)

Tickling another bhikkhu is a pācittiya offense. (Pc 52)

Jumping and swimming in the water for fun is a pācittiya offense. (Pc 53)

Attempting to frighten another bhikkhu is a pācittiya offense. (Pc 55)

Lighting a fire to warm oneself—or having it lit—when one does not need the warmth for one’s health is a pācittiya offense. (Pc 56)

Bathing more frequently than once a fortnight when residing in the middle Ganges Valley, except on certain occasions, is a pācittiya offense. (Pc 57)

Hiding another bhikkhu’s bowl, robe, sitting cloth, needle case, or belt—or having it hidden—either as a joke or with the purpose of annoying him, is a pācittiya offense. (Pc 60) 

Traveling by arrangement with a group of thieves from one village to another—knowing that they are thieves—is a pācittiya offense. (Pc 66)

Entering a king’s sleeping chamber unannounced, when both the king and queen are in the chamber, is a pācittiya offense. (Pc 83)

Picking up a valuable, or having it picked up, with the intention of putting it in safe keeping for the owner—except when one finds it in a monastery or in a dwelling one is visiting—is a pācittiya offense. (Pc 84)

Select Bibliography

Primary sources

For the Pali Canon, I have used the Thai edition published in Bangkok by Mahāmakut Rājavidyālaya Press and the BUDSIR CD-ROM version prepared by Mahidol University; the European edition edited by Hermann Oldenberg and published in England by the Pali Text Society; and the version of the Sri Lankan edition made available online by the Journal of Buddhist Ethics. For readings from the Sixth Council Burmese edition, I have relied on the help of Thomas Patton.

For the Pali commentaries, I have used the Thai editions of the Samantapāsādikā, the Sāratthadīpanī, and the Atthayojanā published in Bangkok by Mahāmakut Rājavidyālaya Press; the Thai edition of the Vimati-vinodanī published in Bangkok by the Bhūmibalo Bhikkhu Foundation Press; the PTS edition of the Samantapāsādikā, edited by J. Takakusu, Makoto Nagai, and Kogen Mizuno; the PTS edition of the Kaṅkhā-vitaraṇī, edited by Dorothy Maskell; the Harvard Oriental Series’ edition of the Visuddhimagga, edited by Henry Clarke Warren and Dharmananda Kosambi; and the Thai edition of the Kaṅkhā-vitaraṇī-purāṇa-ṭīkā and the Kaṅkhā-vitaraṇ-abhinava-ṭīkā published in Bangkok by Mahāchulālongkorn Rājavidyālaya.

Secondary sources and translations

Amarābhirakkhit (Amaro Koed), Phra. Pubbasikkhā-vaṇṇanā (in Thai). Bangkok: Mahāmakut Rājavidyālaya Press, 1970.

Bodhi, Bhikkhu, trans. The Discourse on the Fruits of Recluseship: The Sāmaññaphala Sutta and its Commentaries. Kandy: Buddhist Publication Society, 1989.

Buddhaghosa, Bhadantācariya. The Path of Purification (Visuddhimagga). Translated from the Pali by Bhikkhu Ñāṇamoli. Kandy: Buddhist Publication Society, 1975.

__________. Samanta-Pāsādikā. 7 vols. Translated from the Pali into Thai by H. H. the Supreme Patriarch, Juan Utthayi Mahathera. Bangkok Mahāmakut Rājavidyālaya Press, 1974-85.

Dhirasekhera, Jotiya. Buddhist Monastic Discipline: A Study of its Origins and Development in Relation to the Sutta and Vinaya Piṭakas. Colombo: M. D. Gunasena, 1982.

v. Hinüber, Oskar. A Handbook of Pāli Literature. Berlin: Walter deGruyter & Co., 1996.

Holt, John C. Discipline: The Canonical Buddhism of the Vinayapiṭaka. Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1981.

Horner, I. B., trans. The Book of Discipline. 6 vols. London: Pali Text Society, 1970-86.

Jacobi, Hermann, trans. Jaina Sūtras. 2 vols. Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1989.

Jayawickrama, n.a., trans. The Inception of Discipline and the Vinaya Nidāna. London: Pali Text Society, 1986.

Ñāṇadassana, Bhikkhu. When Is Dawn (aruṇa)? When Is Dawnrise (aruṇuggamana)? Dehiwala: Sridevi Printers, 2002.

Ñāṇamoli, Bhikkhu. The Life of the Buddha. Kandy: Buddhist Publication Society, 1972.

__________, trans. The Pāṭimokkha: 227 Fundamental Rules of a Bhikkhu. Bangkok: The Social Science Association, 1966.

Pachow, W. A Comparative Study of the Prātimokṣa Sūtra. Santiniketan: Sino-Indian Cultural Society, 1958.

Prebish, Charles S. Buddhist Monastic Discipline: The Sanskrit Prātimokṣa Sūtras of the Mahāsā˙ghikas and Mūlasarvāstivādins. University Park: Pennsylvania University Press, 1975.

Pruitt, William, ed.; Norman, K.R., trans. The Pātimokkha. Oxford: Pali Text Society, 2001.

Vajirañāṇavarorasa, Krom Phraya. The Entrance to the Vinaya (Vinaya-mukha). 3 vols. Translated from the Thai. Bangkok: Mahāmakut Rājavidyālaya Press, 1969-83.

__________. Ordination Procedure and Preliminary Duties of a New Bhikkhu. Translated from the Thai. Bangkok: Mahāmakut Rājavidyālaya Press, 1989.

__________. Vinaya-mukha (in Thai). 3 vols. Bangkok: Mahāmakut Rājavidyālaya Press, 1992.

Warder, A. K. Indian Buddhism. 2d. ed. Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1980.

__________. Introduction to Pali. 2d. ed. London: Pali Text Society, 1974.

__________. Outline of Indian Philosophy. Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1971.

Wijayaratna, Mohan. Buddhist Monastic Life. Translated from the French by Claude Grangier and Steven Collins. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990.

Addendum

A factor analysis for the Pāṭimokkha rules whose explanations were not framed in that format:

Sg 12:

1) Effort: a) One makes oneself unadmonishable

b) even when rebuked three times in a properly performed Community transaction.

Sg 13:

1) Effort: a) One criticizes a valid act of banishment imposed on oneself or one criticizes those who imposed it

b) even when rebuked three times in a properly performed Community transaction.

Pc 19:

1) Object: a large dwelling, having a sponsor and intended for oneself.

2) Effort: One has more than three layers of roofing material applied
(directing the work, or doing it oneself).  

Pc 31:

1) Object: any one of the five staple foods.

2) Effort: One eats such food at a public alms center when one is not ill, or when any of the other conditions listed in the non-offense clauses do not apply.

Pc 32:

1) Object: a group meal—consisting of any of the five types of staple foods to which four or more bhikkhus are invited.

2) Effort: One eats the meal except on the proper occasions.

Pc 57:

1) Effort: When living in the middle Ganges Valley, one bathes at intervals of less than half a month except at the proper occasions.

Pc 68:

1) Effort: a) One insists that an obstruction is not an obstruction

b) even when rebuked three times in a properly performed Community transaction.

The

Buddhist

Monastic

Code II

The Khandhaka Rules

Translated & Explained

by Ṭhānissaro Bhikkhu

(Geoffrey DeGraff)

third edition, revised: 2013 Ṭhānissaro Bhikkhu

This work is licensed under the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 3.0 Unported. To see a copy of this license visit http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/3.0/. “Commercial” shall mean any sale, whether for commercial or non-profit purposes or entities.

questions about this book may be addressed to:

Metta Forest Monastery

Valley Center, CA 92082-1409

U.S.A.

additional resources

More Dhamma talks, books and translations by Thanissaro Bhikkhu are available to download in digital audio and various ebook formats at dhammatalks.org.

printed copy

A paperback copy of this book is available free of charge. To request one write to: Book Request, Metta Forest Monastery, PO Box 1409, Valley Center, CA 92082 USA.

Abbreviations

AN | Aṅguttara Nikāya
As | Adhikaraṇa-samatha
Ay | Aniyata
BD | Book of Discipline
BMC1 | The Buddhist Monastic Code, vol. I
C | Commentary
Cp | Cariyāpiṭaka
Cv | Cullavagga
DN | Dīgha Nikāya
Dhp | Dhammapada
Iti | Itivuttaka
Khp | Khuddakapāṭha
MN | Majjhima Nikāya
Mv | Mahāvagga
NP | Nissaggiya Pācittiya
Pc | Pācittiya
Pd | Pāṭidesanīya
Pr | Pārājika
PTS | Pali Text Society
Pv | Parivāra
SN | Saṁyutta Nikāya
Sn | Sutta Nipāta
SC | Sub-commentary
Sg | Saṅghādisesa
Sk | Sekhiya
Thag | Theragāthā
V | Vimati-vinodanī

Numbers in the references to Mv, Cv, and Pv denote chapter, section and sub-section; in the references to DN, Iti, Khp, and MN, discourse (sutta); in the references to AN, Cp, SN, and Sn, section (saṁyutta or nipāta) and discourse; in the references to Dhp, verse.

Preface

This volume is an attempt to give an organized, detailed account of the training rules found in the Khandhakas that govern the life of bhikkhus, together with the traditions that have grown up around them. It is a companion to The Buddhist Monastic Code, Volume One (BMC1), which offers a similar treatment of the Pāṭimokkha training rules.

There is some overlap between the material in this volume and that in BMC1, primarily because the Khandhaka rules and Pāṭimokkha rules also overlap. Although each set of rules has some topics to itself, there are other topics covered by both sets, and a full knowledge of the topic requires acquaintance with both. In some cases, the Pātimokkha rules and the explanations that accompany them in the Sutta Vibhaṅga seem to presuppose the Khandhaka rules; in other cases, the relationship is the other way around. Thus, just as it was necessary in BMC1 to make frequent references to the Khandhakas to gain a full sense of the range of some of the Pāṭimokkha rules, I have found it necessary in this volume to refer to material in BMC1 to make the Khandhaka rules more fully intelligible. In some instances, this has simply meant cross-referencing; in others, it has meant lifting whole passages from BMC1 into the discussion. I hope that the reader will not find these recapitulations tedious, for they give a sense of the complex interrelationships among the rules and help provide the sort of understanding that comes with viewing an item in all its relevant contexts.

Many people have helped with the writing of this book. Most responsible for my originally undertaking the task was Ajaan Suwat Suvaco (Phra Bodhidhammācariya Thera), who in 1997 convinced me that the job had to be done and that I was in a good position to do it. When the draft of the first edition was completed, Ven. Vajiro Bhikkhu and the bhikkhus at Abhayagiri Buddhist Monastery and Wat Pa Nanachat all read it and offered useful suggestions for improvements, as did the late Paññāvuḍḍho Bhikkhu. In Bangkok, Phra Ñāṇavorodom also offered encouragement and support. For this second edition, Ven. Ñāṇatusita, of the Forest Hermitage in Kandy, Sri Lanka, provided a detailed critique that helped clear up many of the inaccuracies and inconsistencies in the first edition. The bhikkhus here at Metta Forest Monastery also provided valuable feedback on the many drafts leading to this revision. Any errors remaining in the book, of course, are my own responsibility. If you spot them, please let me know so that they can be corrected in future editions.

I ask to dedicate this volume to the memory of Ajaan Suwat Suvaco, in gratitude not only for his encouragement in this endeavor, but also for the many valuable lessons he has kindly taught me in Dhamma and Vinaya, through word and example, over the years.

Ṭhānissaro Bhikkhu

(Geoffrey DeGraff)

Metta Forest Monastery

Valley Center, CA 92082-1409 U.S.A.

March, 2007

INTRODUCTION

The Khandhakas

The Khandhakas—literally, “Collections”—form the second major portion of the Vinaya Piṭaka, following the Sutta Vibhaṅga and preceding the Parivāra. There are 22 Khandhakas in all, divided into two groups: the Mahāvagga (Mv.), or Great Chapter, composed of ten Khandhakas; and the Cullavagga (Cv.), or Lesser Chapter, composed of twelve. Each Khandhaka is loosely organized around a major topic, with minor topics inserted in a fairly haphazard fashion. The major topics are these:

Mv.I—Ordination

Mv.II—Uposatha

Mv.III—Rains-residence

Mv.IV—Invitation

Mv.V—Footwear

Mv.VI—Medicine

Mv.VII—Kaṭhina

Mv.VIII—Robe-cloth

Mv.IX—Principles for Community Transactions

Mv.X—Unanimity in the Community

Cv.I—Disciplinary Transactions

Cv.II—Penance & Probation

Cv.III—Imposing Penance & Probation

Cv.IV—Settling Issues

Cv.V—Miscellany

Cv.VI—Lodgings

Cv.VII—Schism

Cv.VIII—Protocols

Cv.IX—Canceling the Pāṭimokkha

Cv.X—Bhikkhunīs

Cv.XI—The First Council

Cv.XII—The Second Council

Aside from their opening and closing narratives, there seems little overall plan to the Khandhakas’ arrangement. The first Khandhaka opens with a narrative of the events beginning with the Buddha’s Awakening; continuing through the conversion of his two major disciples, Vens. Sāriputta and Moggallāna; and concluding with the Buddha’s authorization of the Saṅgha to accept new members into its fold.

The account of the Awakening and the Buddha’s success in leading others to Awakening establishes his legitimacy as a lawgiver, the source of all the rules the Khandhakas contain.

The story of the conversion of the two major disciples establishes two principles: The awakening of the Dhamma Eye in Ven. Sāriputta shows that the path to Awakening can be successfully taught outside of the Buddha’s presence, using words other than the Buddha’s own; the awakening of the Dhamma Eye in Ven. Moggallāna shows that the path to Awakening can be successfully taught by disciples who have not even met the Buddha. These two principles indicate that the path to Awakening did not necessarily depend on personal contact with the Buddha, and that it can thus be legitimately and effectively taught in times and places such as ours, far removed from his physical presence.

The story of the Buddha’s authorizing the Saṅgha to accept new members establishes the legitimacy of each new bhikkhu accepted in line with the prescribed pattern. The Saṅgha that has accepted him owes its status to an allowance coming from the Buddha, and his preceptor belongs to a lineage stretching back to the Buddha himself.

In this way, the opening narratives establish the legitimacy of the Bhikkhu Saṅgha and of the training for the bhikkhus as embodied in the Khandhakas and the Vinaya as a whole.

As for the closing narratives, both the Mahāvagga and Cullavagga end with accounts that juxtapose misbehaving city bhikkhus with well-behaved wilderness bhikkhus. The placement of these accounts seems intended to make a point: that the survival of the Dhamma-Vinaya will depend on bhikkhus who practice in the wilderness. This is in keeping with a passage from the discourses (AN 7:21) that “as long as the bhikkhus see their own benefit in wilderness dwellings, their growth can be expected, not their decline.”

Between these framing narratives, however, the Khandhakas seem randomly ordered, and the internal arrangement of individual Khandhakas is often even more haphazard. This lack of clear organization creates a problem for any bhikkhu who wants to train by the Khandhaka rules, as rules related in practice are often scattered in widely different spots of the text. The purpose of this volume is to bring related rules together in a coherent way that will make them easier to understand and put into practice.

Format

Topically, the rules in the Khandhakas fall into three major categories, dealing with (1) general issues, (2) Community transactions, and (3) relations between bhikkhus and their co-religionists, i.e., bhikkhunīs and novices. To reflect these categories, this volume is organized into the same three parts. Each part is further divided into chapters, with each chapter devoted to a particular topic. With one exception (Chapter 9), each chapter falls into two sections: translations of the rules related to that topic, preceded by an explanatory discussion. The discussion provides an overview of the topic of the chapter, explaining the individual rules related to the topic, at the same time showing the relationships among the rules. Its purpose is to provide an understanding of the rules sufficient for any bhikkhu who wants to live by them. The rule translations are included to show the raw material from the Canon on which the discussion is based. As for Chapter 9, its topic—the protocols—is contained in detailed rules requiring little discussion, so its format is that of rule translations with brief annotations.

Rules

Formally, the rules in the Khandhakas are of three sorts: prohibitions, allowances, and directives. Most of the directives are de facto prohibitions: If a bhikkhu does not do as directed, he incurs a penalty. However, some of the directives—such as the protocols (Chapter 9) and the directions on how not to wear one’s robes—give more room for leeway. If a bhikkhu has good reason to deviate from them, he incurs no penalty in doing so. The penalty applies only when he deviates from them out of disrespect. Throughout this volume, the reader should assume all directives to be de facto prohibitions unless otherwise noted.

In terms of their seriousness, the vast majority of rules in the Khandhakas involve dukkaṭas (offenses of wrong doing), with a small number of thullaccayas (grave offenses) scattered among them. The text makes occasional references to the rules in the Pāṭimokkha, and—as anyone who has read BMC1 will have noted—these references play an important role in determining the range of those rules. In this volume, where the seriousness of a particular offense is not mentioned, the reader should assume it to be a dukkaṭa. Other grades of offenses will be specifically noted.

In most cases, the citations in the Rules section of each chapter are straight translations from the Canon. However, there are passages—especially among the directives—where a straight translation would prove unduly long and repetitive, adding nothing to the discussion, so I have simply given a synopsis of the main points in the passage. For procedures and transaction statements (kamma-vācā) used in Community transactions (saṅgha-kamma), I have simply noted the chapter and section number where these passages can be found in The Book of Discipline (BD). Frequently-used transaction statements are provided in the Appendices. Passages where my translation differs from that in BD are marked with a (§).

A few of the passages in the Rules sections are not mentioned in their respective discussions. In most cases, this is because these rules are discussed elsewhere, either in BMC1 or in this volume. However, there are also cases where a particular rule or transaction developed over time. For instance, Mv.I shows that the procedures for Acceptance—the Community transaction whereby new members are admitted to the Saṅgha—underwent many changes in response to incidents before achieving their final form. In cases like this, the text-locations of the earlier forms of the rules and transaction patterns are cited in the Rules section, but only the final forms are translated and discussed. Rules in Cv.X that affect only the bhikkhunīs and not the bhikkhus are best understood in the context of the Bhikkhunī Pāṭimokkha, and so are not translated or discussed here.

Discussions

Unlike its treatment of the Pāṭimokkha rules, the Canon does not provide word-commentaries for the Khandhaka rules. And, although it does provide an origin story for each rule, there are unfortunately very few cases where the story actually helps to explain the rule. In some cases, the origin story is terse, adding little information to what is in the rule. In others, the origin story is extremely long (the English translation of the origin story to the first rule in Mv.I takes up 51 pages in BD) and yet has very little to do with the rule it introduces. For instance, the origin story to the rule permitting bhikkhus to accept gifts of robe-cloth from lay donors tells the life story of Jīvaka Komārabhacca, the first lay person to give such a gift to the Buddha. Although Jīvaka’s story is fascinating in and of itself, providing many interesting insights into attitudes in the early Saṅgha, it is largely irrelevant to the rule at hand.

Thus the primary way the discussions use the Canon in helping to explain the rules is by placing each rule in connection to those related to it. From this placement one may gain a picture of how the rules fit into a coherent whole.

Given this picture, it is then possible to add explanatory material from other sources. These sources include Buddhaghosa’s Commentary to the Vinaya (the Samanta-pāsādikā), two sub-commentaries (Sāriputta’s Sārattha-dīpanī and Kassapa’s Vimati-vinodanī), two Thai Vinaya guides (the Pubbasikkhā-vaṇṇanā and Prince Vajirañāṇa’s Vinaya-mukha), and—occasionally—oral traditions concerning the rules. Very few scholars have written on the Khandhakas of other early Buddhist schools, so references in this volume to other early Buddhist canons are rare. As in BMC1, I give preference to the earlier Theravādin sources when these conflict with later ones, but I do so with a strong sense of respect for the later sources, and without implying that my interpretation of the Canon is the only one valid. There is always a danger in being too independent in interpreting the tradition, in that strongly held opinions can lead to disharmony in the Community. Thus, even in instances where I think the later sources misunderstand the Canon, I have tried to give a faithful account of their positions—sometimes in great detail—so that those who wish to take those sources as their authority, or who wish to live harmoniously in Communities that do, may still use this book as a guide.

And—again, as in BMC1—I have tried to include whatever seems most worth knowing for the bhikkhu who aims at using the Khandhaka rules to foster the qualities of discipline in his life—so as to help train his mind and live in peace with his fellow bhikkhus—and for anyone who wants to support and encourage the bhikkhus in that aim.

part one

General

CHAPTER ONE

Personal Grooming

A bhikkhu should be clean, neat, and unostentatious in his appearance, as a reflection of the qualities he is trying to develop in his mind.

Bathing

Although Pc 57 forbids a bhikkhu from bathing at intervals of less than half a month, we noted in the discussion of that rule that it was apparently intended as a temporary disciplinary measure for bhikkhus who had inconvenienced King Bimbisāra when he wanted to bathe in the hot spring near Rājagaha. When the Buddha later added exemptions to the rule, he so relaxed it that he virtually rescinded it. In addition, Mv.V.13 explicitly rescinds the rule in all parts of the world outside of the central Ganges Valley.

In the time of the Buddha, bathing was done in a river, a bathing tank, a sauna, or a showering place. Instead of soap, people used an unscented powder called chunam, which was kneaded with water into a dough-like paste. Bhikkhus are explicitly allowed to use powdered dung, clay, or dye-dregs; according to the Commentary, ordinary chunam would come under “dye-dregs.” A bhikkhu with an itching rash, a small boil, or a running sore, or whose body smells bad (in the words of the Commentary, “with a body odor like that of a horse”) may use scented fragrant powders. At present, the Great Standards would allow soap under the allowance for clay, and scented soaps or deodorants under the allowance for scented powders for a bhikkhu with a strong body odor. Otherwise, the use of scents is listed among the bad habits prohibited by Cv.V.36 (see Chapter 10).

The etiquette when bathing in a group is that a junior bhikkhu should not bathe in front of an elder bhikkhu or, if bathing in a river, upstream from him. If one is able and willing (and, of course, if the elder bhikkhus are amenable), one may look after the needs of elder bhikkhus while they are bathing. An example of this, given in the Commentary, is scrubbing them. When scrubbing another or oneself, one may use one’s hand or a rope or pad of cloth. Sponges, which apparently were not known in the time of the Buddha, would probably be included under pad of cloth.

One is not allowed to rub one’s body with a wooden hand, a string of red powder beads—according to the Commentary, this means bathing powder mixed with powdered stone (cinnabar?) and formed into beads—or with a scrubber incised with a “dragon-teeth” pattern. A bhikkhu who is ill, however, may use an unincised scrubber. In the time of the Buddha, young men while bathing would rub their bodies against trees, against walls, against one another (this was called a “fully immersed massage”), or against rubbing posts (aṭṭhāna, which according to the Commentary, took their name from their being incised with a pattern like a chess board (aṭṭhapada)) in order to toughen their muscles. Bhikkhus are explicitly forbidden from rubbing their bodies in any of these ways. However, they are allowed to massage themselves and one another with their hands.

In another context—cleaning one’s feet before entering a dwelling—one is allowed to step on foot wipers made of stone, stone fragments, and pumice (“sea-foam stone”), so it would seem reasonable that the use of pumice or other stones to scrub off stubborn dirt while bathing would also be permitted.

When leaving the water after bathing, one should make way for those entering the water.

One is allowed to dry oneself with a water wiper—which the non-offense clauses for Pc 86 say may be made of ivory, horn, or wood—or with a piece of cloth.

Care of the teeth

Toothbrushes, dental floss, toothpaste, and tooth powders were unknown in the time of the Buddha. However, there is an allowance for tooth wood, which is the same thing as the tooth-cleaning stick discussed under Pc 40. The Buddha extolled the virtues of using tooth wood as follows: “There are five advantages in chewing tooth wood: It is good for the eyes, the mouth does not smell foul, the taste buds are cleaned, bile and phlegm do not coat one’s food, one enjoys one’s food.” At present, toothbrushes and dental floss would come under the allowance for tooth wood. Because tooth wood should not be less than four fingerbreadths long, many Communities extend this prohibition to include toothpicks less than four fingerbreadths as well. Toothpaste and tooth powder, because they are composed of mineral salts, would come under the allowance of salts for medicine.

Hair of the head

The hair of the head should not be worn long. It should be shaved at least every two months or when the hair has grown to a length of two fingerbreadths—whichever occurs first, says the Commentary. In Thailand there is the custom that all bhikkhus shave their heads on the same day, the day before the full moon, so that the Community can present a uniform appearance. Although this is not obligatory, a bhikkhu who does not follow the custom tends to stand out from his fellows.

A razor is one of a bhikkhu’s eight basic requisites. He is also allowed a whetstone, a razor case, a piece of felt (to wrap the razor in), and all razor accessories (such as a strop). At present, this allowance would cover all types of safety razors as well. The Commentary to Pr 2 insists that the razor case not be multicolored.

Unless ill—e.g., he has a sore on his head—a bhikkhu may not use scissors to cut his hair or have it cut. The question of using electric razors to shave the head is a controversial one. Because their cutting action—even in rotary shavers—is like that of scissors, many Communities will not allow their use in shaving the head.

A bhikkhu may not have gray hairs pulled out. (The wording of the Commentary here suggests that this prohibition covers hair of the body as well as hair of the head, but it goes on to say that ugly hairs growing, e.g., on the eyebrows, forehead, or beard-area may be removed.) He may not arrange the hair of his head with a brush, a comb, with the fingers used as a comb, with beeswax mixed with oil, or with water mixed with oil. Hair dressing mousse and creams would also come under this prohibition. The Commentary gives permission to use one’s hand to smooth down the curled-up ends of one’s body hair—for example, on the arm or chest—and to rub the head with a wet hand to cool it off or to remove dust.

Beard

The beard should not be grown long, although—unlike the hair of the head—there is no explicit maximum length, unless the two month/two fingerbreadth rule is meant to apply here as well. One may not dress the beard as a goatee, a rectangle, or in any other design. The moustache may not be dressed, e.g., by making its ends stand up. Because there is no prohibition against using scissors to cut the beard, electric razors are clearly allowed in shaving the face.

Face

One may not gaze at the reflection of one’s face in a mirror or bowl of water unless the face has a wound or a disease. According to the Commentary, mirror here covers any reflective surface; bowl of water, any liquid surface. The Commentary also gives permission to look at one’s reflection to check for any signs of aging to be used in meditating on the theme of impermanence. The Vinaya-mukha, noting that the prohibition against using a mirror comes in the context of rules against beautifying the face, argues that looking at one’s reflection for other purposes—for example, as an aid in shaving the head or the beard—should be allowed. Alternatively, it might be argued that the use of a mirror while shaving would lessen the danger of wounding oneself with the razor, and so should be allowed under the exemption made for “disease.”

Except in the case of an illness, one should not apply lotions, powders, or pastes to the face. The reference here is apparently to beautifying lotions, etc. Medicinal lotions, powders, and pastes are allowable (see Chapter 5). There is also a prohibition against applying a mark to the face (such as a caste mark or auspicious mark) with red arsenic. The Commentary interprets red arsenic as covering any coloring agent. The face and body are also not to be painted or dyed (e.g., with cosmetics, henna, or greasepaint). This rule would prohibit a bhikkhu from having his body tattooed as well, although any tattoos done before his ordination would not have to be removed (see Chapter 14).

Although medicinal eye ointments are allowed, the above rules would prohibit eye cosmetics as well.

Hair of the body

Nasal hairs should not be grown long. (In the origin story to this rule, people objected to bhikkhus with long nasal hairs “like goblins”). Tweezers are allowed for pulling them out; by extension, scissors should also be allowed for trimming them. The Vinaya-mukha notes that nasal hair performs a useful function in keeping dust out of the lungs, and so interprets this rule as applying only to nasal hairs so long that they grow outside the nostrils.

The hair of the chest or stomach should not be dressed. Hair in a “confining” region—which the Vibhaṅga to the bhikkhunī’s parallel rule, their Pc 2, identifies as the armpits and the pubic area—should not be removed unless there is a sore in those areas and a need to apply medicine.

Nails

Fingernails and toenails are not to be grown long.

Now on that occasion a certain bhikkhu with long nails was going for alms. A certain woman, on seeing him, said to him, ‘Come, venerable sir. Engage in sexual intercourse.’

“Enough, sister. That isn’t allowable.”

“But, venerable sir, if you don’t engage (in sexual intercourse), I’ll scratch my limbs now with my own nails and make a fuss: ‘I’ve been wronged by this bhikkhu!’”

“Do you know (what you’re doing) (§), sister?”

Then the woman, having scratched her limbs with her own nails, made a fuss: “I’ve been wronged by this bhikkhu!”

People, rushing up, grabbed hold of the bhikkhu. But they saw skin and blood on the woman’s nails. On seeing this, (and saying,) “This was done by this woman herself. The bhikkhu is innocent,” they let him go.

The nails should be cut even with the flesh—a nail clipper is allowed for this purpose—and may be polished only to the extent of removing dirt and stains. The Commentary interprets this last point as an allowance also to remove the dirt under the nails.

Ears

Instruments for removing dirt from the ears are allowed but may not be made of fancy materials. Allowable materials are bone, ivory, horn, reed, bamboo, wood, lac (resin), fruit (§) (e.g., coconut shell), copper (metal), or conch-shell. Under the Great Standards, plastic would currently come under this list as well. This list of ten items should be memorized, as it recurs frequently in the Khandhakas.

Ornamentation

The following ornaments are not to be worn (the Pali word for wear here—dharati—also means to keep or to own): an ear ornament (according to the Commentary, this includes any decoration of the ear, even a palm leaf), a chain, a necklace, an ornament for the waist (even a thread, says the Commentary), an ornamental girdle, an armlet, a bracelet, and a finger ring. None of these rules make an exception when one’s motivation is other than ornamentation. Thus a wristwatch worn for practical purposes, a copper bracelet worn for reasons of health, or mala beads worn for meditative purposes would all be forbidden under these rules.

Rules

Bathing

“I allow powders as medicines for one who has an itch, a small boil, a running sore, or an affliction of thick scabs; or for one whose body smells bad. I allow (powdered) dung, clay, and dye-dregs for one who is not ill. I allow a pestle and mortar.”—Mv.VI.9.2

“The body is not to be rubbed against a tree by a bhikkhu who is bathing. Whoever should rub it (in such a way): an offense of wrong doing.”—Cv.V.1.1

“The body is not to be rubbed against a wall by a bhikkhu who is bathing. Whoever should rub it (in such a way): an offense of wrong doing.”—Cv.V.1.2

“One should not bathe at a rubbing post. Whoever should bathe (there): an offense of wrong doing”…. “One should not bathe with a wooden hand. Whoever should bathe (with one): an offense of wrong doing”…. “One should not bathe with a string of cinnabar-powder beads. Whoever should bathe (with one): an offense of wrong doing.”—Cv.V.1.3

“One should not have a ‘fully immersed’ massage made [C: rubbing one’s body up against another person’s body]. Whoever should do so: an offense of wrong doing”…. “One should not bathe with a scrubber incised like dragon teeth. Whoever should do so: an offense of wrong doing”…. “I allow an unincised scrubber for one who is ill.”—Cv.V.1.4

“I allow a pad of cloth (or: a rope of cloth) (for scrubbing the body)”…. “I allow ordinary hand [C: massaging].”—Cv.V.1.5

“I allow three kinds of foot-wipers: stone, stone fragment(s), pumice (literally, ‘sea-foam stone’) (§).”—Cv.V.22.1

“I allow a water wiper, and to wipe oneself dry even with a cloth.”—Cv.V.17.1

“If one is able/willing, one may perform a service for the elder bhikkhus even in the water. One should not bathe in front of the elder bhikkhus or upstream from them. When coming out of the water after bathing, make way for those entering the water.”—Cv.VIII.8.2

Care of the Teeth

“There are five advantages in chewing tooth wood: It is good for the eyes (§), the mouth does not smell foul, the taste buds are cleaned, bile and phlegm do not coat one’s food, one enjoys one’s food. I allow tooth wood.”—Cv.V.31.1

“A long piece of tooth wood is not to be chewed. Whoever should chew one: an offense of wrong doing. I allow tooth wood eight fingerbreadths long at most. And novices are not to be flicked with it. Whoever should do so: an offense of wrong doing”…. “An overly short piece of tooth wood is not to be chewed. Whoever should chew one: an offense of wrong doing. I allow tooth wood four fingerbreadths long at the very least.”—Cv.V.31.2

Hair of the Head

“The hair of the head should not be worn long. Whoever should do so: an offense of wrong doing. I allow two-month (growth) or two fingerbreadths.”—Cv.V.2.2

“I allow a razor, a whetstone, a razor case, a piece of felt, and all razor accessories.—Cv.V.27.3

“One should not have the hair of the head cut with scissors. Whoever should do so: an offense of wrong doing. I allow that you have the hair of the head cut with scissors in the case of illness (origin story: a bhikkhu had a sore on his head and couldn’t shave)”…. “Hair of the nostrils should not be worn long. Whoever should do so: an offense of wrong doing”…. “I allow tweezers”…. “One should not have gray hairs taken out. Whoever should do so: an offense of wrong doing.”—Cv.V.27.5

“One should not arrange the hair of the head with a brush… with a comb… with the fingers used as a comb… with beeswax mixed with oil… with water mixed with oil. Whoever should do so: an offense of wrong doing.”—Cv.V.2.3

Beard & Hair of the Body

“The beard is not to be dressed. The beard is not to grown long. It is not to be dressed as a goatee. It is not to be trimmed as a rectangle. The hair of the chest is not to be dressed. The hair of the stomach is not to be dressed. (The translation of these last two statements follows the Commentary. An alternative translation, not supported by the Commentary, reads them as prohibitions connected with facial hair, in which the first one (parimukhaṁ) could be read as “moustache” and the second (aḍḍharukaṁ or aḍḍhadukaṁ) as “a mutton-chop beard.”) Whiskers are not to be arranged (made to stand up). Hair in a confining region is not to be removed. Whoever should do so: an offense of wrong doing”…. “I allow that hair in a confining region be removed in the case of illness.”—Cv.V.27.4

Face

“One should not gaze at the reflection of one’s face in a mirror or in a bowl of water. Whoever should do so: an offense of wrong doing”…. “I allow that, on account of a disease, one gaze at the reflection of one’s face in a mirror or in a bowl of water.”—Cv.V.2.4

“The face is not to be smeared (with lotion). The face is not to be rubbed with paste. The face is not to be powdered. The face is not to be marked with red arsenic. The limbs are not to be painted/dyed. The face is not to be painted/dyed. The limbs and face are not to be painted/dyed. Whoever should do so: an offense of wrong doing”…. “I allow that, on account of a disease, the face be smeared (with lotion).”—Cv.V.2.5

Nails

“Nails are not to be worn long. Whoever should do so: an offense of wrong doing.”—Cv.V.27.1

“I allow a nail-clipper”…. “I allow that the nails be cut down to the extent of the flesh”…. “One’s 20 nails should not be polished. Whoever should do so: an offense of wrong doing. I allow them to be polished away to the extent of dirt/stains.”—Cv.V.27.2

Ears

“I allow an instrument for removing dirt from the ears”…. “One should not use fancy instruments for removing dirt from the ears. Whoever should use one: an offense of wrong doing. I allow that they be made of bone, ivory, horn, reed, bamboo, wood, lac (resin), fruit (§) (e.g., coconut shell), copper (metal), or conch-shell.”—Cv.V.27.6

Ornamentation

“An ear ornament should not be worn. A chain should not be worn. A necklace… an ornament for the waist… an ornamental girdle (§)… an armlet… a bracelet… a finger ring should not be worn. Whoever should wear one: an offense of wrong doing.”—Cv.V.2.1

CHAPTER TWO

Cloth Requisites

A bhikkhu has four primary requisites—robe-cloth, food, lodgings, and medicine—and a variety of secondary ones. This and the following five chapters discuss requisites that are allowable and not, along with the proper use of allowable requisites. The suttas provide a background for these discussions by highlighting the proper attitudes that a bhikkhu should develop toward his requisites: He should reflect on their role, not as ends in themselves, but as mere tools toward the training of the mind; and he should develop an attitude of contentment with whatever requisites he receives.

“And what are the effluents to be abandoned by using? There is the case where a bhikkhu, reflecting appropriately, uses robe-cloth simply to counteract cold, to counteract heat, to counteract the touch of flies, mosquitoes, wind, sun, and reptiles; simply for the purpose of covering the parts of the body that cause shame.

“Reflecting appropriately, he uses almsfood, not playfully, nor for intoxication, nor for putting on bulk, nor for beautification; but simply for the survival and continuance of this body, for ending its afflictions, for the support of the holy life, thinking, ‘Thus will I destroy old feelings (of hunger) and not create new feelings (from overeating). I will maintain myself, be blameless, and live in comfort.’

“Reflecting appropriately, he uses lodging simply to counteract cold, to counteract heat, to counteract the touch of flies, mosquitoes, wind, sun, and reptiles; simply for protection from the inclemencies of weather and for the enjoyment of seclusion.

“Reflecting appropriately, he uses medicinal requisites that are used for curing illness simply to counteract any pains of illness that have arisen and for maximum freedom from disease.

“The effluents, vexation, or fever that would arise if he were not to use these things (in this way) do not arise for him when he uses them (in this way). These are called the effluents to be abandoned by using”—MN 2

“And how is a bhikkhu content? Just as a bird, wherever it goes, flies with its wings as its only burden, so too is he content with a set of robes to provide for his body and almsfood to provide for his hunger. Wherever he goes, he takes only his barest necessities along. This is how a bhikkhu is content.”—DN 2

“‘This Dhamma is for one who is content, not for one who is discontent.’ Thus was it said. With reference to what was it said? There is the case where a bhikkhu is content with any old robe-cloth at all, any old almsfood, any old lodging, any old medicinal requisites for curing illness at all. ‘This Dhamma is for one who is content, not for one who is discontent.’ Thus was it said. And with reference to this was it said.”—AN 8:30

Furthermore, for a bhikkhu truly to embody the traditions of the noble ones, he should not only be reflective and content in his use of the requisites, but he should make sure that his reflection and contentment do not lead to pride.

“There is the case where a bhikkhu is content with any old robe-cloth… any old almsfood… any old lodging at all. He does not, for the sake of robe-cloth… almsfood… lodging, do anything unseemly or inappropriate. Not getting robe-cloth… almsfood… lodging, he is not agitated. Getting robe-cloth… almsfood… lodging, he uses it unattached to it, uninfatuated, guiltless, seeing the drawbacks (of attachment to it), and discerning the escape from them. He does not, on account of his contentment with any old robe-cloth… almsfood… lodging at all, exalt himself or disparage others. In this he is diligent, deft, alert, & mindful. This is said to be a bhikkhu standing firm in the ancient, original traditions of the noble ones”—AN 4:28.

In this way, the requisites fulfill their intended purpose—as aids, rather than obstacles, to the training of the mind.

Robe material

A candidate for ordination must have a set of robes before he can be admitted to the Community as a bhikkhu (Mv.I.70.2). Once ordained he is expected to keep his robes in good repair and to replace them when they get worn beyond use.

The robes may be made from any of six types of robe material: linen, cotton, silk, wool, jute, or hemp. As noted under the discussion of NP 1, the Sub-commentary to that rule includes mixtures of any or all of these types of cloth under “hemp.” There are separate allowances for cloaks, silk cloaks, woolen shawls, and woolen cloth, but these apparently predated and should be subsumed under the list of six. Nylon, rayon, and other synthetic fabrics are now accepted under the Great Standards.

A bhikkhu may obtain cloth by collecting cast-off cloth, accepting gifts of cloth from householders, or both. The Buddha commended being content with either.

Robes made from cast-off cloth are one of the four supports, or nissaya, of which a new bhikkhu is informed immediately after ordination. Keeping to this support is one of the thirteen dhutaṅga practices (Thag&16:7). Mv.VIII.4 contains a series of stories concerning groups of bhikkhus who, traveling together, stop and enter a charnel ground to gather cast-off cloth from the corpses there. The resulting rules: If a group goes in together, the members of the group who obtain cloth should give portions to those who don’t. If some of the bhikkhus enter the charnel ground while their fellows stay outside or go in afterward, those who enter (or enter first) don’t have to share any of the cloth they obtain with those who come in afterwards or stay outside and don’t wait for them. However, they must share portions of the cloth they obtain if their fellows do wait or if they have made an agreement beforehand that all are to share in the cloth obtained. The Commentary to Pr 2 discusses the etiquette for taking a piece of cloth from a corpse: Wait until the corpse is cold, to ensure that the spirit of the dead person is no longer in the body.

As for gifts of robe-cloth, Mv.VIII.32 lists eight ways in which a donor may direct his/her gift of cloth:

1. within the territory,

2. within an agreement,

3. where food is prepared,

4. to the Community,

5. to both sides of the Community,

6. to the Community that has spent the Rains,

7. having designated it, and

8. to an individual.

There are complex stipulations governing the ways in which each of these types of gifts is to be handled. Because they are primarily the responsibility of the robe-cloth-distributor, they will be discussed in Chapter 18. However, when bhikkhus are living alone or in small groups without an authorized robe-cloth-distributor, they would be wise to inform themselves of those stipulations, so that they can handle gifts of robe-cloth properly and without offense.

Once a bhikkhu has obtained cloth, he should determine it or place it under shared ownership as discussed under NP 1, NP 3, and Pc 59.

Making Robes: Sewing Instructions

The basic set of robes is three: a double-layer outer robe, a single-layer upper robe, a single-layer lower robe. Up to two of these robes may be made of uncut cloth with a cut border (an anuvāta—see below). Robes without cut borders may not be worn; the same holds true for robes with long borders, floral borders, or snakes’ hood borders. If one obtains a robe without cut borders or with long borders, one may add the missing borders or cut the long borders to an acceptable size and then wear them.

At least one of the robes, however, must be cut. The standard pattern, “like the rice fields of Magadha,” was first devised by Ven. Ānanda at the Buddha’s suggestion. There is no penalty for not following the standard pattern, but keeping to the standard ensures that rag cloth robes will look uniform throughout the Community. It also encourages that large pieces of cloth will get cut, thus reducing the monetary value of any robes made from them and making them less likely to be stolen. See the accompanying diagram.

Each cut robe made to the standard pattern has at least five sections, called khaṇḍas. Although more than five khaṇḍas are allowed, only odd numbers should be used, and not even. The Canon lists names for the parts of the cut robe without explanation. The Commentary interprets them as follows: Each khaṇḍa is composed of a larger piece of cloth, called a maṇḍala (field-plot), and a smaller piece, called an aḍḍhamaṇḍala (half-plot), separated by a small strip, like the dike in a rice field, called an aḍḍhakusi (half-dike). Between each khaṇḍa is a long strip, again like the dike in a rice field, called a kusi (dike). None of the texts mention this point, but it is customary that if the maṇḍala is in the upper part of its khaṇḍa, the maṇḍalas in the neighboring khaṇḍas will be in the lower part of theirs, and vice versa. The central khaṇḍa is called the vivaṭṭa (turning-back); the two khaṇḍas on either side of it, the anuvivaṭṭas; and the remaining khaṇḍas, bāhantas (armpieces), as they wrap around the arms. An alternative interpretation, which the Commentary attributes to the Mahā Aṭṭhakathā, is that all khaṇḍas between the vivaṭṭa and the outermost khaṇḍas are called anuvivaṭṭas, while only the outermost khaṇḍas are called bāhantas. The entire robe is surrounded by a border, called an anuvāta.

Two remaining pieces are mentioned in the Canon, the gīveyyaka (throat-piece) and the jaṅgheyyaka (calf-piece). The Commentary gives two interpretations of these names. The first, which it prefers, is that these are extra layers of cloth, sewn respectively onto the upper robe at the anuvāta wrapping around the neck and onto the lower robe at the anuvāta rubbing against the calves, to protect the robes from the extra wear and tear they tend to get in those places. With the current large size of the upper robe, a jaṅgheyyaka is useful on its lower anuvāta as well. The second interpretation, which for some reason the Vinaya-mukha prefers, is that these pieces are, respectively, the vivaṭṭa and the anuvaṭṭas in the upper robe.

Mv.VIII.12.2 notes that Ven. Ānanda sewed the pieces of cloth together with a rough stitch, so that the robes would be appropriate for contemplatives and not provoke thieves, but this is not a required part of the pattern.

If one needs to make a cut robe but the amount of cloth available is enough only for an uncut robe (i.e., folding the edges of the cut pieces to make a proper seam would use up too much of the cloth), one may use a seam-strip to connect the pieces. This is apparently a long narrow strip of material to which one could stitch the cut pieces without folding them.

Pc 92 sets the maximum size for robes at 6x9 sugata spans. See the discussion under that rule.

A fastener paired with a cloth/thread loop to hold the fasteners may be added to the robe at the neck, and another fastener-loop pair at the lower corners. The fasteners should not be made of fancy materials. Allowable materials are the standard list of ten (mentioned under “Ears” in the preceding chapter) plus thread or cord (tied into a knot). Cloth backings for the fasteners and loops are allowed, to strengthen them. For the fasteners and loops connecting the lower corners of the robe, the cloth backing for the fastener should be put at the edge of the robe, and the cloth backing for the tying loops seven or eight fingerbreadths in from the edge at the other corner.

Repairing Robes

When robes become ragged and worn, one is encouraged to patch them, even—if necessary—to the extent of turning a single-layer robe into a double-layer robe, and the double-layer outer robe into a four-layer one. One is also encouraged to get as much patching material as needed from cast-off cloth and shop-remnant cloth. Mv.VIII.14.2 lists five allowable means of repairing damaged cloth: patching, stitching, folding, sealing (with wax? tree gum?), and strengthening. As often happens with the technical vocabulary of sewing and other skills, there is some doubt about a few of these terms, especially the fourth. The Commentary defines the first as adding a patch after cutting out the old, damaged cloth; and the last as adding a patch without removing the damaged part. Folding would probably cover folding the cloth next to a rip or a frayed edge over the damaged part and then stitching it. Mv.VIII.21.1 lists four additional ways of repairing damaged cloth: a rough stitch, the removing of an uneven edge (according to the Commentary, this refers to cases where one of two pieces at the edge of the robe gets pulled out longer than the other when a thread gets yanked), a border and a binding for the edge of the border (to strengthen a frayed edge), and a network of stitches (the Commentary says that this is a network sewn like the squares on a chess board to help keep two pieces of cloth together; it probably refers to the network of stitches that forms the basis for darning a hole).

Making Robes: Sewing Equipment

One is allowed to cut cloth with a small knife with or without a handle. According to the Commentary, folding knives come under “knife with a handle,” and scissors would probably come here as well. Needles and thimbles may be used in sewing. At present, sewing machines have been accepted under the Great Standards. Knife-handles and thimbles may not be made of fancy materials. Allowable materials are the standard list of ten. To protect these items, one is allowed a piece of felt to wrap the knife and a needle tube for the needles; Pc 60 also indicates that a needle box would be one of a bhikkhu’s standard requisites, although none of the texts explain the difference between the box and the tube. Because Pc 86 forbids needle boxes made of bone, ivory, or horn, both the tube and the box could apparently be made of any of the seven remaining materials in the standard list of ten.

Cv.V.11.2 reports that various substances were used without success to keep needles from rusting—filling the needle tube with yeast, with dried meal, with powdered stone—and the bhikkhus finally settled on powdered stone pounded with beeswax. The Commentary reports that dried meal mixed with turmeric is also an effective rust deterrent. To keep the powdered stone mixture from cracking, one may encase it in a cloth smeared with beeswax. The Commentary reports that the Kurundī includes any cloth-case under “cloth smeared with beeswax,” while the Commentary itself also includes knife-sheaths under this allowance.

To keep these items from getting lost, one is allowed small containers for storing them. To keep the containers orderly, one is allowed a bag for thimbles, with a cord for tying the mouth of the bag that, when the mouth of the bag is closed, can be used as a carrying strap.

To keep cloth aligned while sewing it, one is allowed to use a frame, called a kaṭhina, attached with strings for tying down the pieces of cloth to be sewn together. According to the Commentary, these strings are especially useful in sewing a double-layer robe. Apparently, a Community would have a common frame used by all the bhikkhus, as there are many rules covering its proper use and care. It is not to be set up on uneven ground. A grass mat may be placed under it to keep it from getting worn; and if the edges of the frame do wear out, a binding may be wrapped around them to protect them. If the frame is too big for the robe to be made, one may add extra sticks within the frame to make a smaller frame to the right size. There are also allowances for cords to tie the smaller frame to the larger frame, for threads to tie the cloth to the smaller frame, and for slips of wood to be placed between two layers of cloth. One may also fold back the mat to fit the smaller frame. A ruler or other similar measuring device is allowed to help keep the stitches equidistant; and a marking thread—a thread smeared with turmeric, similar to the graphite string used by carpenters, says the Commentary—to help keep them straight.

There is a dukkaṭa for stepping on the frame with unwashed feet, wet feet, or shod feet. This indicates that the frame is meant to be placed horizontally on the ground when in use. The frame is apparently jointed, for when not in use it may be rolled or folded up around a rod, tied with a cord, and hung from a peg in the wall or an elephant-tusk peg. A special hall or pavilion may be built for storing and using the frame. This is discussed in Chapter 7.

Making Robes: Dyeing

Robes of the following colors should not be worn: entirely blue (or green—the Commentary states that this refers to flax-blue, but the color nīla in the Canon covers all shades of blue and green), entirely yellow, entirely blood-red, entirely crimson, entirely black, entirely orange, or entirely beige (according to the Commentary, this last is the “color of withered leaves”). Apparently, pale versions of these colors—gray under “black,” and purple, pink, or magenta under “crimson”—would also be forbidden. As white is a standard color for lay people’s garments, and as a bhikkhu is forbidden from dressing like a lay person, white robes are forbidden as well. The same holds true for robes made from patterned cloth, although the Vinaya-mukha makes allowances for subtle patterns, such as the ripple pattern called “squirrel’s tail” that Thais sometimes weave into their silk. The Commentary states that if one receives cloth of an unallowable color, then if the color can be removed, remove it and dye the cloth the proper color. It is then allowable for use. If the color can’t be removed, use the cloth for another purpose or insert it as a third layer inside a double-layer robe.

The standard color for robes is brown, although this may shade into reddish, yellow-, or orange-brown. In an origin story, bhikkhus dyed their robes with dung and yellow clay, and the robes came out looking wretched. So the Buddha allowed six kinds of dye: root-dye, stem (wood) dye, bark-dye, leaf-dye, flower-dye, fruit-dye. The Commentary notes, however, that these six categories contain a number of dyes that should not be used. Under root dyes, it advises against turmeric because it fades quickly; under bark dyes, Symplocos racemosa and Mucuna pruritis because they are the wrong color; under wood dyes, Rubia munjista and Rottleria tinctora for the same reason; under leaf dyes, Curculigo orchidoidis and indigo for the same reason—although it also recommends that cloth already worn by lay people should be dyed once in Curculigo orchidoidis. Under flower-dyes, it advises against coral tree (Butea frondosa) and safflower because they are too red. Because the purpose of these dye allowances is that the bhikkhus use dyes giving a fast, even color, commercial chemical dyes are now accepted under the Great Standards.

The following dyeing equipment is allowed: a small dye-pot in which to boil the dye, a collar to tie around the pot just under its mouth to prevent it from boiling over, scoops and ladles, and a basin, pot, or trough for dyeing the cloth. Once the cloth has been dyed, it may be dried by spreading it out on grass matting, hung over a pole or a line, or hung from strings tied to its corners.

The following dyeing techniques are recommended. When the dye is being boiled, one may test to see if it’s fully boiled by placing a drop in clear water or on the back of one’s fingernail. If fully boiled, the Commentary notes, the dye will spread slowly. Once the cloth is hung up to dry, one should turn it upside down repeatedly on the line so that the dye does not run all to one side. One should not leave the cloth unattended until the drips have become discontinuous. If the cloth, once dry, feels stiff, one may soak it in water; if harsh or rough, one may beat it with the hand.

Washing Robes

The Commentary to Pr 2 notes that, when washing robes, one should not put perfume, oil, or sealing wax in the water. This, of course, raises the question of scented detergent. Because unscented detergents are often hard to find, a bhikkhu should be allowed to make use of what is available. If the detergent has a strong scent, he should do his best to rinse it out after washing.

Other Cloth Requisites

In addition to one’s basic set of three robes, one is allowed the following cloth requisites: a felt sitting rug (see NP 11-15); a sitting cloth (see Pc 89); a skin-eruption covering cloth (see Pc 90); and a rains-bathing cloth (see Pc 91). The following articles are also allowed and may be made as large as one likes: a sheet; a handkerchief (literally, a cloth for wiping the face/mouth); requisite-cloth; bags for medicine, sandals, thimbles, etc., with a cord for tying the mouth of the bag as a carrying strap; bandages (listed in the Rules section of Chapter 5); and knee straps. The Canon makes no mention of the shoulder cloth (aṅsa) that many bhikkhus wear at present. It would apparently come under the allowance for requisite-cloths (parikkhāra-cola).

According to the Commentary, the color restrictions applying to robes do not apply to sheets, handkerchiefs, or other cloth requisites. However, they do apply at present to shoulder cloths.

There is some disagreement about which cloth items should be included under “requisite-cloth.” The Commentary allows that spare robes be determined as “requisite-cloth,” but these should be made to the standard size and follow the color restrictions for the basic set of three robes. The Vinaya-mukha prefers to limit the category of requisite-cloth to small cloth items such as bags, water strainers, etc. See the discussion of spare robes under NP 1.

The knee strap is a strip of cloth to help keep the body erect while sitting cross-legged. It is worn around the torso and looped around one or both knees. There is a prohibition against using the outer robe in this manner (see the origin story to Sg 6); and even if the strap is of an allowable sort, only an ill bhikkhu may use it while in an inhabited area (see Sk 26). To make knee straps, bhikkhus are allowed a loom, shuttles, strings, tickets, and all accessories for a loom.

Two styles of waistband are allowed: cloth strips and “pig entrails.” According to the Commentary, the cloth strip may be made of an ordinary weave or a fish-bone weave; other weaves, such as those with large open spaces, are not allowed; a “pig-entrails” waistband is like a single-strand rope with one end woven back in the shape of a key-loop (apparently for inserting the other end of the waistband); a single-strand rope without the hole and other round belts are also allowed. The Canon forbids the following types of waistbands: those with many strands, those like a water-snake head, those braided like a tambourine frame, those like chains.

If the border of the waistband wears out, one may braid the border like a tambourine frame or a chain. If the ends wear out, one may sew them back and knot them in a loop. If the loops wear out, one is allowed a belt fastener, which must be made of one of the allowable materials in the standard list of ten. The Commentary to Pr 2 notes that the fastener should not be made in unusual shapes or incised with decorative patterns, letters, or pictures.

Dressing

There are rules concerning garments that may not be worn at any time, as well as rules concerning garments that must be worn when entering an inhabited area.

Forbidden garments

A bhikkhu who wears any of the following garments, which were the uniform of non-Buddhist sectarians in the Buddha’s time, incurs a thullaccaya: a kusa-grass garment, a bark-fiber garment, a garment of bark pieces, a human-hair blanket, a horse tail-hair blanket, owls’ wings, black antelope hide. The prohibition against black antelope hides covers other animal hides as well.

A bhikkhu who adopts nakedness as an observance also incurs a thullaccaya. If he goes naked for other reasons—as when his robes are stolen—the Vibhaṅga to NP 6 states that he incurs a dukkaṭa. Three kinds of covering are said to count as covering one’s nakedness: a cloth-covering, a sauna-covering, and a water-covering. In other words, there is no offense in being uncovered by cloth in a sauna or in the water (as while bathing). Because saunas in the Buddha’s time were also bathing places, the allowance for sauna-covering would extend to include modern bathrooms as well. In other situations, one should wear at least one’s lower robe. Chapter 8 lists the normally allowable activities that are not allowed while one is naked.

To wear any of the following garments incurs a dukkaṭa: a garment made of swallow-wort (Calotropis gigantea) stalks, a garment made of makaci fiber, jackets or corsets, tirīta-tree (Symplocos racemosa) garments, turbans, woolen cloth with the fleece on the outside, and loincloths. The Commentary states that jackets/ corsets and turbans may be taken apart and the remaining cloth used for robes; that tirīta-tree garments can be used as foot wipers; and that woolen cloth with the fleece inside is allowable. As for loincloths, it says that these are not allowed even when one is ill.

One is also not allowed to wear householder’s upper or lower garments. This refers both to garments tailored in styles worn by householders—such as shirts and trousers—as well as folding or wrapping one’s robes around oneself in styles typical of householders in countries where the basic householder’s garments are, like the bhikkhu’s upper and lower robes, simply rectangular pieces of cloth. According to the Commentary, the prohibition against householder’s upper garments also covers white cloth, no matter how it is worn.

Householder’s ways of wearing the lower garment mentioned in the Canon are the “elephant’s trunk” [C: a roll of cloth hanging down from the navel], the “fish’s tail” [C: the upper corners tied in a knot with two “tails” to either side], the four corners hanging down, the “palmyra-leaf fan” arrangement, the “100 pleats” arrangement. According to the Commentary, one or two pleats in the lower robe when worn in the normal way are acceptable.

The Canon does not mention specific householder ways of wearing an upper garment, but the Commentary lists the following:

1) “like a wanderer” with the chest exposed and the robe thrown back over both shoulders

2) as a cape, covering the back and bringing the two corners over the shoulders to the front;

3) “like drinkers” as a scarf, with the robe wrapped around neck with two ends hanging down in front over the stomach or thrown over the back;

4) “like a palace lady” covering the head and exposing only the area around the eyes;

5) “like wealthy householders” with the robe cut long so that one end can wrap around the whole body;

6) “like plowmen in a hut” with the robe tucked under one armpit and the rest thrown over the body like a blanket;

7) “like brahmans” with the robe worn as a sash around the back, brought around front under the armpits, with the ends thrown over shoulders;

8) “like text-copying bhikkhus” with the right shoulder exposed, and the robe draped over the left shoulder, exposing the left arm.

To wear the robe in any of these ways out of disrespect, in a monastery or out, it says, entails a dukkaṭa. However, if one has a practical reason to wear the robe in any of these ways—say, as a scarf while sweeping the monastery grounds in cool weather, or “like a palace lady” in a dust storm or under blisteringly hot sun—there should be no offense. The wilderness protocol (Chapter 9) indicates that bhikkhus in the Buddha’s time, while going through the wilderness, wore their upper robe and outer robe folded on or over their heads, and that they did not necessarily have their navels or kneecaps covered with the lower robe.

It was also common, when in the wilderness or in a monastery, to spread out the outer robe, folded, as a groundsheet or sitting cloth (see DN 16, SN 16:11). However, the protocols for eating in a meal hall (Chapter 9) state that there is an offense in spreading out the outer robe and sitting on it in an inhabited area. Some Communities (and the Vinaya-mukha) interpret this as a prohibition against sitting on the outer robe in inhabited areas even when wearing it around the body. This not only creates an awkward situation when visiting a lay person’s house but is also a misinterpretation of the rule.

Required garments

Except on certain occasions, a bhikkhu entering an inhabited area must wear his full set of three robes and take along his rains-bathing cloth. The purpose here is to help protect his robes from being stolen: Any robes left behind could easily fall prey to thieves. Valid reasons for not wearing any of the basic set of three robes while entering an inhabited area are: One is ill, there is sign of rain, one is crossing a river, one’s dwelling is protected with a latch, or the kaṭhina has been spread. Valid reasons for not taking along the rains-bathing cloth are: One is ill, one is going outside the “territory,” one is crossing a river, the dwelling is protected with a latch, the rains-bathing cloth is not made or is unfinished. According to the Commentary, ill here means too sick to carry or wear the robe. Sign of rain refers solely to the four months of the rains. (Some Communities disagree with this definition, and interpret sign of rain as when there is actual rain or sign of approaching rain during any time of the year.) None of the commentaries discuss why “going outside the territory” should be a valid reason for not taking along one’s rains-bathing cloth. If territory (or boundary—sīmā) here means a physical territory, such as the territory of a monastery’s grounds, the allowance makes no sense. If, however, it means a temporal territory—i.e., a set period of time—then it makes perfect sense: If one is traveling outside the four and a half months during which one is allowed to determine and use a rains-bathing cloth (see NP 24), one need not take it along.

Strangely, the Commentary goes on to say that, aside from the allowance to go without one’s full set of robes after the kaṭhina has been spread (see NP 2), only one of the allowances here really counts: that the robes are protected by a latch. In the wilderness, it says, even a latch is not enough. One should put the robe in a container and hide it well in a rock crevice or tree hollow. This may be good practical advice, but because the other allowances are in the Canon they still stand.

The proper way to wear one’s robes in an inhabited area is discussed under Sk 1 & 2: Both the upper and lower robes should be wrapped even all around, and one should be well-covered when entering inhabited areas. These rules provide room for a wide variety of ways of wearing the robe. Some of the possibilities are pictured in the Vinaya-mukha. This, though, is another area where the wisest policy is to adhere to the customs of one’s Community.

Finally, one may not enter an inhabited area without wearing a waistband.

Now at that time a certain bhikkhu, not wearing a waistband, entered a village for alms. Along the road, his lower robe fell off. People, seeing this, hooted and hollered. The bhikkhu was abashed.

According to the Sub-commentary, breaking this rule incurs an offense even when done unintentionally.

Rules

Types of Cloth

“I allow a cloak… I allow a silk cloak… I allow a woolen shawl (§).”—Mv.VIII.1.36

“I allow woolen cloth.”—Mv.VIII.2.1

“I allow six kinds of robe-cloth: linen, cotton, silk, wool, jute (§), and hemp (§).”—Mv.VIII.3.1

Obtaining Cloth

“I allow householder robe-cloth. Whoever wants to, may be a rag-robe man. Whoever wants to, may consent to householder robe-cloth. And I commend contentment with whatever is readily available (§).”—Mv.VIII.1.35

“I allow that one who consents to householder robe-cloth may also consent to rag robes. And I commend contentment with both.”—Mv.VIII.3.2

“And there is the case where people give robe-cloth for bhikkhus who have gone outside the (monastery) territory, (saying,), ‘I give this robe-cloth for so-and-so.” I allow that one consent to it, and there is no counting of the time-span as long as it has not come to his hand (see NP 1, 3, & 28).”—Mv.V.13.13

Gathering Rag-robes in Cemeteries

“I allow you, if you don’t want to, not to give a portion to those who do not wait.”—Mv.VIII.4.1

“I allow, (even) if you don’t want to, that a portion be given to those who wait.”—Mv.VIII.4.2

“I allow you, if you don’t want to, not to give a portion to those who go in afterwards.”—Mv.VIII.4.3

“I allow, (even) if you don’t want to, that a portion be given to those who go in together.”—Mv.VIII.4.4

“I allow, when an agreement has been made, that—(even) if you don’t want to—a portion be given to those who go in.”—Mv.VIII.4.5

Determining/Shared Ownership

“I allow that the three robes be determined but not placed under shared ownership; that the rains-bathing cloth be determined for the four months of the rains, and afterwards placed under shared ownership; that the sitting cloth be determined, not placed under shared ownership; that the sheet be determined, not placed under shared ownership; that the skin-eruption cover cloth be determined as long as one is sick, and afterwards placed under shared ownership; that the handkerchief be determined, not placed under shared ownership; that requisite-cloth be determined, not placed under shared ownership.”—Mv.VIII.20.2

“I allow you to place under shared ownership a cloth at least eight fingerbreadths in length, using the sugata-fingerbreadth, and four fingerbreadths in width.”—Mv.VIII.21.1

Extra Robe-cloth

“Extra robe-cloth (a spare robe) should not be kept/worn. Whoever should keep/wear it is to be dealt with in accordance with the rule (NP 1).”—Mv.VIII.13.6

“I allow that extra robe-cloth (a spare robe) be kept/worn for ten days at most.”—Mv.VIII.13.7

“I allow that extra robe-cloth (a spare robe) be placed under shared ownership.”—Mv.VIII.13.8

Making Robes: Sewing Instructions

“I allow three robes: a double-layer outer robe, a single-layer upper robe, a single-layer lower robe.”—Mv.VIII.13.5

“I allow a cut-up outer robe, a cut-up upper robe, a cut-up lower robe.”—Mv.VIII.12.2

“When the cloths are undamaged, or their damage is repaired, I allow a double-layer outer robe, a single-layer upper robe, a single-layer lower robe; when the cloths are weathered [C: ragged from being kept a long time] and worn, a four-layer outer robe, a double-layer upper robe, a double-layer lower robe. An effort may be made, as much as you need, with regard to cast-off cloth and shop-remnant cloth. I allow a patch [C: a patch after cutting out old, damaged cloth], stitching, folding, sealing (§), reinforcing [C: a patch without removing old damaged cloth] (§).”—Mv.VIII.14.2

“I allow that a rough stitch be made… I allow that the uneven edge be removed… I allow that a border and a binding (for the edge of the border) be put on… I allow a network (of stitches) be made.”—Mv.VIII.21.1

“One should not wear robes that have not been cut up. Whoever should wear one: an offense of wrong doing.”—Mv.VIII.11.2

“I allow two cut-up robes, one not cut up… I allow two robes not cut up, one cut up… I allow that a seam-strip (§) be added. But a completely uncut-up (set of robes) should not be worn. Whoever should wear it: an offense of wrong doing.”—Mv.VIII.21.2

“I allow a fastener (for the robe), a loop to tie it with”… “One should not use fancy robe fasteners. Whoever should use one: an offense of wrong doing. I allow that they be made of bone, ivory, horn, reed, bamboo, wood, lac (resin), fruit (§) (e.g., coconut shell), copper (metal), conch-shell, or thread”…. “I allow a cloth backing for the fastener, a cloth backing for the tying loop”… “I allow that the cloth backing for the fasteners be put at the edge of the robe; the cloth backing for the tying loops, seven or eight fingerbreadths in from the edge.”—Cv.V.29.3

Making Other Cloth Requisites

“I allow rains-bathing cloths.”—Mv.VIII.15.15

“I allow a sitting cloth for protecting the body, protecting one’s robes, protecting the lodging.”—Mv.VIII.16.1

Is a sitting cloth without a border permissible?

That is not permissible.

Where is it objected to?

In Sāvatthī, in the Sutta Vibhaṅga (Pc 89)

What offense is committed?

A pācittiya involving cutting down.—Cv.XII.2.8

“I allow felt”…. “Felt is neither to be determined nor placed under shared ownership.”—Cv.V.19.1

“One should not be without (separated from) a sitting cloth for four months. Whoever should do so: an offense of wrong doing.”—Cv.V.18

“I allow that a sheet be made as large as one wants.”—Mv.VIII.16.4

“I allow a skin-eruption covering cloth for anyone with rashes, pustules, running sores, or thick scab diseases.”—Mv.VIII.17

“I allow a bandage.”—Mv.VI.14.5

“I allow a handkerchief (cloth for wiping the face/mouth).”—Mv.VIII.18

“I allow requisite-cloth.”—Mv.VIII.20.1

“I allow a bag for medicine.” “I allow a thread for tying the mouth of the bag as a carrying strap (§).” “I allow a bag for sandals.” “I allow a thread for tying the mouth of the bag as a carrying strap.”—Cv.V.12

“I allow a knee strap (§) for one who is ill”…. (How it is to be made:) “I allow a loom, shuttles, strings, tickets, and all accessories for a loom.”—Cv.V.28.2

Making Robes: Sewing Equipment

“I allow a small knife (a blade), a piece of felt (to wrap around it)”… “I allow a small knife with a handle”… “One should not use fancy small-knife-handles (§). Whoever should use one: an offense of wrong doing. I allow that they be made of bone, ivory, horn, reed, bamboo, wood, lac (resin), fruit (e.g., coconut shell), copper (metal), or conch-shell.”—Cv.V.11.1

“I allow a needle”…. “I allow a needle-tube”…. The needles got rusty. “I allow that (the tube) be filled with yeast”…. “I allow that (the tube) be filled with dried meal”…. “I allow powdered stone”…. “I allow that it (the powdered stone) be pounded with beeswax”…. The powdered stone cracked. “I allow a cloth smeared with beeswax for tying up the powdered stone.”—Cv.V.11.2

“I allow a thimble”…. “One should not use fancy thimbles. Whoever should use one: an offense of wrong doing. I allow that they be made of bone, ivory, horn, reed, bamboo, wood, lac (resin), fruit (e.g., coconut shell), copper (metal), or conch-shell.” Needles, small knives, thimbles got lost. “I allow a small container (for storing these things). The small containers got disordered. “I allow a bag for thimbles.” “I allow thread for tying the mouth of the bag as a carrying strap (§).”—Cv.V.11.5

“I allow a kaṭhina frame, cords for the kaṭhina frame, and that a robe be sewn having tied it down at intervals there.” [C: “Kaṭhina frame” includes mats, etc., to be spread on top of the frame. “Cords” = strings used to tie cloth to the frame when sewing a double-layer robe.]…. “A kaṭhina frame should not be set up on an uneven place. Whoever should do so: an offense of wrong doing”…. “I allow a grass mat (to be placed under the kaṭhina frame)”…. The frame got worn. “I allow a binding for the edge (§)”…. The frame was not the right size (§) [C: too big for the robe being made]. “I allow a stick-frame, a ‘splitting’ (§) [C: folding the edges of the mat to a double thickness to put them in line with the smaller frame], a slip of wood [C: for placing between two layers of cloth], and, having tied the tying cords [C: for tying a smaller frame to a larger frame] and tying threads [C: for tying the cloth to the smaller frame], that a robe be sewn”…. The spaces between the threads were unequal… “I allow a ruler (§).” The stitching was crooked… “I allow a marking thread.”—Cv.V.11.3

“A kaṭhina frame is not to be stepped on with unwashed feet. Whoever should do so: an offense of wrong doing. A kaṭhina frame is not to be stepped on with wet feet. Whoever should do so: an offense of wrong doing. A kaṭhina frame is not to be stepped on with sandaled (feet). Whoever should do so: an offense of wrong doing.”—Cv.V.11.4

“I allow a hall for the kaṭhina-frame, a building for the kaṭhina-frame”…. “I allow that it be made high off the ground”…. “I allow three kinds of pilings to be put up: made of brick, made of stone, made of wood”…. “I allow three kinds of staircases: a staircase made of brick, made of stone, made of wood”…. “I allow a stair railing”…. “I allow that, having lashed on (a roof), it be plastered inside and out with plaster—white, black, or ochre (§)—with garland designs, creeper designs, dragon-teeth designs, five-petaled designs (§), a pole for hanging up robe material (or robes), a cord for hanging up robe material (or robes).”—Cv.V.11.6

“I allow that the kaṭhina frame be folded (rolled) up”…. “I allow that the kaṭhina frame be rolled up around a stick”…. “I allow a cord for tying it up”…. “I allow that it be hung from a peg in the wall or an elephant-tusk peg.”—Cv.V.11.7

Making Robes: Dyeing

“I allow six kinds of dye: root-dye, stem (wood) dye, bark-dye, leaf-dye, flower-dye, fruit-dye.”—Mv.VIII.10.1

“I allow a little dye-pot in which to boil the dye… I allow that a collar (§) be tied on to prevent boiling over… I allow that a drop be placed in water or on the back of the fingernail (to test whether the dye is fully boiled or not).”—Mv.VIII.10.2

“I allow a dye-scoop, a ladle with a handle… I allow a dyeing basin, a dyeing pot… I allow a dyeing trough.”—Mv.VIII.10.3

“I allow a grass matting (on which to dry dyed cloth)… I allow a pole for the robe, a cord (clothesline) for the robe… I allow that it (the cloth) be tied at the corners… I allow a thread/string for tying the corners”… The dye dripped to one side. “I allow that it take the dye being turned back and forth, and that one not leave until the drips have become discontinuous (§).”—Mv.VIII.11.1

“I allow that (stiff dyed cloth) be soaked in water… I allow that (harsh dyed cloth) be beaten with the hand.”—Mv.VIII.11.2

Dressing

“Nakedness, a sectarian observance, is not to be followed. Whoever follows it: a grave offense.”—Mv.VIII.28.1

“I allow three kinds of covering (to count as covering for the body): sauna-covering, water-covering, cloth-covering.”—Cv.V.16.2

“A kusa-grass garment… a bark-fiber garment… a garment of bark pieces… a human hair blanket… a horse tail-hair blanket… owls’ wings… black antelope hide, (each of which is) a sectarian uniform, should not be worn. Whoever should wear one: a grave offense.”—Mv.VIII.28.2

“A garment made of swallow-wort stalks… of makaci fibers (§) should not be worn. Whoever should wear one: an offense of wrong doing.”—Mv.VIII.28.3

“Robes that are entirely blue (or green) should not be worn. Robes that are entirely yellow… entirely blood-red… entirely crimson… entirely black… entirely orange… entirely beige (§) should not be worn. Robes with uncut borders… long borders… floral borders… snakes’ hood borders should not be worn. Jackets/corsets, tirīta-tree garments… turbans should not be worn. Whoever should wear one: an offense of wrong doing.”—Mv.VIII.29

“Woolen cloth with the fleece on the outside should not be worn. Whoever should wear it: an offense of wrong doing.”—Cv.V.4

“Householders’ lower garments (ways of wearing lower cloth)—the ‘elephant’s trunk,’ the ‘fish’s tail,’ the four corners hanging down, the palmyra-leaf fan arrangement, the 100 pleats arrangement—are not to be worn. Whoever should wear them: an offense of wrong doing”…. “Householders’ upper garments are not to be worn. Whoever should wear them: an offense of wrong doing.”—Cv.V.29.4

“A loincloth is not to be worn. Whoever should wear one: an offense of wrong doing.”—Cv.V.29.5

“One should not sit with the outer robe tied as a strap to hold up the knees (§). Whoever should do so: an offense of wrong doing”…. “I allow a knee strap (§) for one who is ill.”—Cv.V.28.2

“One should not enter a village with just an upper and lower robe. Whoever does so: an offense of wrong doing.”—Mv.VIII.23.1

“There are these five reasons for putting aside the outer robe… upper robe… lower robe: One is ill, there is sign of rain, one is crossing a river, the dwelling is protected with a latch, or the kaṭhina has been spread. These are the five reasons for putting aside the outer robe… upper robe… lower robe.

“There are these five reasons for putting aside the rains-bathing cloth: One is ill, one is going outside the territory, one is crossing a river, the dwelling is protected with a latch, the rains-bathing cloth is not made or is unfinished. These are the five reasons for putting aside the rains-bathing cloth.”—Mv.VIII.23.3

“A village is not to be entered by one not wearing a waistband. I allow a waistband.”—Cv.V.29.1

“One should not wear fancy waistbands—those with many strands, those like a water-snake head, those braided like tambourine frames, those like chains. Whoever should wear one: an offense of wrong doing. I allow two kinds of waistbands: cloth strips and ‘pig entrails.’…. The border wore out. “I allow (that the border) be braided like a tambourine frame or like a chain”…. The ends wore out. “I allow that they be sewn back and knotted in a loop”…. The loops wore out. “I allow a belt fastener”…. “One should not use fancy belt fasteners. Whoever should use one: an offense of wrong doing. I allow that they be made of bone, ivory, horn, reed, bamboo, wood, lac (resin), fruit (e.g., coconut shell), copper (metal), conch-shell, or thread.”—Cv.V.29.2

CHAPTER THREE

Alms Bowls & Other Accessories

Alms bowls

The alms bowl is another requisite that a candidate for ordination must have before he can be accepted into the Community as a bhikkhu (Mv.I.70.1). Bowls made either of clay or iron are allowed, while bowls made of or with the following materials are prohibited: gold, silver, gems, lapis lazuli, crystal, bronze, glass, tin, lead, or copper. The Commentary extrapolates from these prohibitions to state that gold serving-vessels of any kind shouldn’t even be touched, whereas serving-vessels of the other substances—although they should not be used as one’s own personal property—are all right to use if they are Community property or remain the property of a lay person. It also states that the word copper in the prohibition covers copper alloys, although other serving-vessels made of copper alloys are all right to use (even as one’s own personal property, apparently). At present, stainless steel alms bowls are allowed because they come under iron, whereas aluminum alms bowls are not, because aluminum is weak like tin. Lacquer bowls are classified under “clay” bowls in Burma, but not in other Theravāda countries.

The Commentary to Pr 2 insists that the bowl not be painted or incised with writing or other decorations, or polished to the point of being “glossy like a gem.” If it is, one must scrape off the decorations or spoil the gloss before using it. However, that same section of the Commentary states that an “oil-colored” bowl is acceptable. This apparently refers to the practice of coating an iron bowl with oil before firing it to give it a glossy protective surface.

The stipulations for determining a bowl for use are discussed under NP 21.

In addition to the rules against using bowls made of prohibited materials, there are rules against going for alms with a gourd or a water pot, and against using a skull as a bowl.

Now at that time a certain bhikkhu was one who used nothing but thrown away things. He carried a skull as a bowl. A woman, seeing him, screamed out in terror: “My god, what a demon this is!” People criticized and complained and spread it about, “How can these Sakyan-son monks carry a skull as a bowl, like goblins?” (§—following the Sub-commentary for the last sentence, and the Thai and Sri Lankan editions of the Canon for the reading pisāco vatāyanti in the woman’s scream).

To protect the bowl from being scratched, one is allowed a circular bowl rest made either of tin or of lead. Many Communities interpret these two materials as setting the limits for the fanciest materials allowable for such a rest, and so they regard bamboo, wood, and other less valuable materials as allowable, too. There is an explicit prohibition against using bowl rests made from fancy materials or decorated with little figures or other ornamentation. Bowl rests may be planed to fit tightly with the bowl, and dragon teeth may be cut in them to keep them from slipping.

The Canon does not mention lids for bowls, although these are now used universally throughout Theravādin countries. The Great Standards would seem to apply here in not allowing them to be made from fancy materials or to be decorated with little figures or other ornamentation, but for some reason the Commentary to Pr 2 allows them to be decorated. It doesn’t explain why.

There is a strict etiquette in using, washing, and storing the bowl. Scraps, bones, and waste water should not be thrown away in the bowl. A waste receptacle is allowed for this purpose. According to the Commentary, waste water here means water used to rinse the mouth, but it also covers water used for washing the hands or feet. The Commentary goes on to say that, when eating, one may put down the remainder of half-eaten food in the bowl, but not if it has already been in the mouth.

When the bowl has been washed, it should be put away only after having been dried (in the sun, if the sun is out). Before drying it in the sun, one should first pour out and wipe away any water in it. And one should not leave it in the sun longer than is needed to ensure that it is fully dry.

To avoid dropping the bowl, one should not open a door while carrying a bowl in one’s hand. According to the Commentary, this prohibition covers opening the door with any part of one’s body; opening a door includes opening the latch or the lock; in one’s hand means supported by any part of one’s body (as, for example, holding the bowl between the knees), although there is an exception if the bowl is hanging by a strap from one’s shoulder.

To prevent damage to the bowl, one should not leave it aside at the edge of a ledge (and, by extension, a table), at the edge of a small ledge outside a wall, on a bed, a bench, an umbrella, or on one’s lap. (“Now at that time, bhikkhus left their bowls on their laps; in a lapse of mindfulness, they got up. The bowls broke.”) The bowl should also not be hung up (e.g., from a strap over a hook or from a peg in the wall). The Commentary notes that if a ledge is wide enough so that the bowl, if tipped over, would remain on the ledge, one is permitted to place it there. The same allowance would apply to placing a bowl on a table as well. The Commentary also states that one may leave the bowl on one’s lap if the bowl is hanging from one’s shoulder by a strap.

Different Communities differ in how they interpret the rule against leaving the bowl on one’s lap. Some interpret the word leaving as meaning holding the bowl on one’s lap without at the same time holding it with one’s hand, and apply it to the way one dries the bowl. Some interpret the word lap as meaning the lap formed when sitting on a chair or similar piece of furniture, and not the lap formed when sitting cross-legged on the floor. Others include the cross-legged lap under the word lap here, and insist that one should kneel on the ground, for example, while drying the bowl and refrain from placing the bowl on the lap in any way.

A bowl may be stored on a mat or a piece of cloth. For further protection one is allowed to store it in a bowl-holder, a bowl-shelf, or a bowl-chest. According to the Commentary, the bowl-holder is something placed on the ground, and may be made of creepers, sticks, or wood. It notes that one should not stack more than three bowls on top of one another in a bowl-holder. As for the bowl-chest, it says that it may be made of wood or brick/tile. One is also allowed a bowl-bag for storing the bowl in any of these places, although the Commentary to Pr 2 insists that the bag not be decorated.

The Commentary to Cv.V states that if there are no mats, cloths, holders, shelves, or chests, one may place a bowl—always upside down—on sand or on a floor that won’t scratch or otherwise harm it. It imposes a dukkaṭa for leaving the bowl on a hard, scratchy floor, on dirt, or on dust. This is probably based on the incoming bhikkhu’s duties (see Chapter 9): “When putting away the bowl, take the bowl in one hand, feel under the bed or bench with the other hand, and place the bowl there, but do not place it on bare ground.”

Footwear

The Canon mentions two kinds of footwear, leather footwear (upahana) and non-leather footwear (pāduka). Generally speaking, leather footwear—of very specific sorts—is allowable, while non-leather is not. At present, using the Great Standards, rubber is included under leather for the purposes of these rules.

Leather footwear

A bhikkhu in the middle Ganges Valley may wear new leather sandals only if the soles are made from a single layer of leather. He may wear multi-layer sandals if they are cast-off, which according to the Commentary means that they have been worn (presumably, by someone else) at least once. Outside of the middle Ganges Valley, one may wear multi-layer sandals even if they are new.

Sandals may not be worn if the soles or the straps are entirely blue (or green), entirely yellow, entirely blood-red, entirely crimson, entirely black, entirely orange, or entirely beige. According to the Commentary, if one takes a cloth and wipes the soles and straps with dye to spoil the color, even if only a little, the sandals will then be acceptable. At present, one may use a pen to mark them to serve the same purpose.

The following types of footwear, even when made with leather, are not allowed: footwear with heel-coverings (such as sandals with heel straps), boots (or sandals with straps up the calf), shoes, footwear stuffed with cotton (or kapok), decorated with partridge (or quail) wings, with toes pointed like rams’ horns, with toes pointed like goats’ horns, with toes pointed like scorpion tails, footwear with peacock feathers sewn around it, and other types of decorated footwear. Also not allowed is leather footwear embellished with lion skin, tiger skin, leopard skin, black antelope skin, otter skin, cat skin, squirrel skin, or flying fox skin. The Commentary states that if one removes the offensive part of the footwear, one is allowed to wear what remains. It also states that the allowance for new multi-layer leather footwear in outlying areas implies that all skins (except human skin) are allowable for footwear there as well, but it is hard to understand why this would be so.

As bhikkhus come to the West, the question inevitably arises as to whether boots and shoes should be allowed during colder weather, especially when there is snow. Although there is no specific allowance for using any of these types of footwear when ill (or when illness threatens), there is the precedence of the Buddha’s allowing multi-layer leather footwear outside of the Ganges Valley because the ground in outlying areas was rocky and rough. Taking this as a precedent, it seems reasonable to assume that there should be similar allowances for appropriate footwear in areas where there is ice and snow.

The original intent of allowing leather footwear was apparently for use in the wilderness, for there are rules allowing its use in inhabited areas only when ill (in a way that would be aggravated by going barefoot), and in monasteries only when one’s feet are split, when one is suffering from corns, or when one plans to get up on a bed or bench. (What this last allowance apparently means is that, prior to getting up on a bed or bench, a bhikkhu walking on the ground or a dirt floor may wear leather footwear to keep his feet from getting dirty, but when actually getting up on the bed or bench he should remove his footwear.) Eventually, however, leather footwear was generally allowed in monastery grounds (but not in dwellings or other buildings with treated floors, and not on furniture) even without these special circumstances. The Commentary, however, indicates that footwear should be removed in the vicinity of stūpas and other places deserving respect.

Non-leather footwear

The only allowable types of non-leather footwear are the shoes kept in urinals, privies, and rinsing-rooms (rooms where one wipes oneself clean after using a restroom). The Commentary indicates that this allowance refers to footrests fixed permanently on the floor in these places, and the rules covering these places (Cv.V.35.2-4, see Chapter 7; Cv.VIII.10.3, see Chapter 9) suggest that this is so: The footrests are designed to make it more comfortable while urinating, defecating, and rinsing oneself off.

Non-leather footwear meant for walking is not allowed under any circumstances. Under this category the Canon lists the following: wooden footwear, footwear woven of palmyra-leaves, bamboo-leaves, grass, muñja grass, reeds, marshy date-palm, lotus fibers, footwear knitted from wool, footwear made with gold, silver, gems, lapis lazuli, crystal, bronze, glass (mirrors), tin, lead, or copper. The prohibition against footwear knitted from wool raises the question of socks. Using the Great Standards, the allowance for appropriate footwear in outlying-districts, mentioned above, has been applied here as well.

Water strainers

A water strainer is another basic requisite, used to provide clean water and to protect small beings in the water from being harmed (see Pc 20 & 62). Three kinds of personal water strainers are allowed, although the first is not defined in any of the texts: a water strainer, a ladle strainer (according to the Commentary, this consists of three sticks tied together as a frame for the straining cloth), a water strainer cylinder (somewhat like a can with one end open, covered with straining cloth, and a small hole on the other end). The Commentary to Pr 2 insists that water strainers not have painted or incised decorations.

Cv.V.13.3 tells the following cautionary tale:

Now at that time two bhikkhus were traveling along a main road among the Kosalans. One of them indulged in bad habits. The other said, “Don’t do that sort of thing, my friend. It’s not proper.” The (first) bhikkhu carried a grudge. Then the (second) bhikkhu, overcome with thirst, said to the bhikkhu carrying the grudge, “Give me your water strainer, my friend. I want to take a drink.” The bhikkhu carrying the grudge didn’t give it. The bhikkhu overcome with thirst died.

As a result of this incident, the Buddha formulated two rules: “When a traveling bhikkhu is asked for a water-strainer, it is not not to be given… And a bhikkhu is not to go traveling without a water strainer… If there is no water-strainer or water-strainer cylinder, even the corner of the outer robe may be determined (saying):

‘Iminā parissavetvā pivissāmi (Having strained with this, I will drink).’”

For straining large amounts of water, two methods are allowed: The first is using a water-strainer mounted on sticks. This, according to the Commentary, is like a dyer’s strainer for lye-water: a ladder with four steps is placed over a basin, with cloth draped over the steps. Water is poured in the middle section, between steps two and three, and then flows through the cloth to fill the sections of the basin on either side.

The second allowance is for using a filter cloth spread in the water (of a lake, river, or other large body of water). The Commentary’s directions: Tie a filter cloth to four stakes, let it sag in the middle to below the surface of the water, and take water from the filtered water in the middle above the cloth.

Miscellaneous accessories

A bhikkhu is allowed to own an umbrella/sunshade and to use it in the area of the monastery—although again, as with footwear, he should lower the umbrella as a sign of respect near a stūpa. He is also allowed to use it outside the monastery when he is ill. According to the Commentary, ill here includes when he is feverish or in an irritable mood, when he has weak eyes or any other condition that might be aggravated by not using an umbrella. The Commentary goes on to say that when there is rain, one may use an umbrella to protect one’s robes; and when on a journey, one may use an umbrella as a protection against wild animals and thieves (!). The objection against using an umbrella without good reason seems to be that in ancient times it was considered a sign of rank and ostentation. Thus the Commentary goes on to say that an umbrella made out of a single very large leaf—as is sometimes used in Sri Lanka—is allowable in all circumstances, probably because it carries no connotations of rank. The Commentary to Pr 2 adds that umbrellas with fancy decorations should never be used. If the decorations are on the handle, one may use the umbrella only after scraping them off or wrapping the entire handle in thread so that they cannot be seen.

The following personal requisites are also allowed: a mosquito net, a little water jar (as is still common in India; a small water kettle would also come under here), a broom, a fan, a palmyra-leaf fan (a fan with a handle), a torch, a lamp (flashlights would come under here), a mosquito whisk, and a staff (or a cane). There are two qualifications here: (1) The mosquito whisk cannot be made of yak-tail hairs (a whisk of this sort was considered a luxurious item) and instead should be made of bark fibers, khus-khus grass, or peacock feathers (why this last was not considered a luxury item is hard to tell). (2) Conflicting with the allowance for a staff at Mv.V.6.2 is a prohibition at Cv.V.24.1-3 against using a staff with a wicker loop (for carrying bundles) unless formally authorized by the Community to do so. The Commentary’s resolution of this conflict is that the prohibition applies only to staffs two meters long. Any staff shorter or longer than that, it says, requires no authorization.

When carrying a load, one is not allowed to use a carrying pole for the shoulder with loads at both ends (as is used by farmers and small vendors in Thailand). One is allowed a carrying pole with the weight at one end or a carrying pole for two bearers (with the load hanging from the middle of the pole). One is also allowed to carry a weight on the head, on the shoulders, on the hips, or slung from a strap (over the shoulder).

All metal goods except weapons are allowed, as are all wooden goods except a dais and a throne (see Chapter 6), wooden alms bowls, and wooden shoes; all clay goods except a foot wiper and a potter’s hut. According to the Commentary, this last is a reference to the large baked earthenware hut mentioned in Pr 2. Although metal goods are allowed, one is not allowed to make a hoard of them. An appropriate collection is one limited to items that one is actually using. Cv.V.28.2 mentions a collection “to the extent of an ointment box, an ointment stick, and an instrument for removing dirt from the ears.” The Commentary to Pr 2 insists that knives, scissors, and other similar tools be free of fancy decorations.

And finally, although the Buddha praised frugality and the practice of finding use in cast-off things, the incident of the bhikkhu using a skull for a bowl, mentioned above, inspired him to prohibit the practice of using cast-off things exclusively.

Rules

Bowls

“A bowl made of/with gold should not be used. A bowl made of/with silver… gems… lapis lazuli… crystal… bronze… glass… tin… lead… copper should not be used. Whoever should use one: an offense of wrong doing. I allow two kinds of bowl: an iron bowl, a clay bowl.”—Cv.V.9.1

“One should not go for alms with a gourd… with a water pot. Whoever should do so: an offense of wrong doing.”—Cv.V.10.1

“One should not use a skull as a bowl. Whoever should do so: an offense of wrong doing.”—Cv.V.10.2

“I allow a circular bowl rest”… “One should not use fancy circular bowl rests. Whoever should use one: an offense of wrong doing. I allow two kinds of circular bowl rests: made of tin, made of lead”… “I allow that they be planed (to fit tightly with the bowl)”… “I allow that dragon teeth be cut in them (to keep them from slipping)”… “Decorated circular bowl rests—full of little figures, made with ornamentations (§—missing in BD)—should not be used. Whoever should use one: an offense of wrong doing. I allow ordinary circular rests.”—Cv.V.9.2

“A wet bowl should not be put away. Whoever should do so: an offense of wrong doing. I allow that a bowl be put away after having dried it (in the sun)”… “A bowl with water in it should not be dried in the sun. Whoever should do so: an offense of wrong doing. I allow that a bowl be dried in the sun after it has been made free of water”… “A bowl should not be left in the heat. Whoever should do so: an offense of wrong doing. I allow that a bowl be put away after having been dried for a moment in the heat.”—Cv.V.9.3

“I allow a bowl-holder (§)”… “A bowl should not be left aside at the edge of a ledge (§).Whoever should do so: an offense of wrong doing”… “A bowl should not be left aside at the edge of a small ledge outside a wall (§). Whoever should do so: an offense of wrong doing”… “I allow a grass mat (on which to place bowls upside down)”… Termites chewed the grass mat. “I allow a piece of cloth”… Termites chewed the cloth. “I allow a bowl-shelf (§)”… “I allow a bowl-chest (§)”… “I allow a bowl bag”… “I allow a string for tying the mouth of the bag as a carrying strap.”—Cv.V.9.4

“A bowl should not be hung up. Whoever should do so: an offense of wrong doing”… “A bowl should not be kept on a bed… a bench… a lap… an umbrella. Whoever should do so: an offense of wrong doing”… “A door should not be opened by a bhikkhu with a bowl in his hand. Whoever should open one: an offense of wrong doing.”—Cv.V.9.5

“One should not throw away scraps, bones, and waste water in the bowl. Whoever should do so: an offense of wrong doing. I allow a (waste-)receptacle.”—Cv.V.10.3

Footwear

“I allow single-soled leather footwear. Double-soled leather footwear should not be worn. Triple-soled leather footwear should not be worn. Multi-soled leather footwear should not be worn. Whoever should wear it: an offense of wrong doing.”—Mv.V.1.30

“I allow multi-soled leather footwear that has been cast off (or thrown away). But new multi-soled leather footwear should not be worn. Whoever should wear it: an offense of wrong doing.”—Mv.V.3.2

“In all outlying districts I allow multi-soled leather footwear.”—Mv.V.13.13

“Leather footwear that is entirely blue (or green) should not be worn. Leather footwear that is entirely yellow… entirely blood-red… entirely crimson… entirely black… entirely orange… entirely beige (§) should not be worn. Whoever should wear it: an offense of wrong doing.”—Mv.V.2.1

“Leather footwear with blue/green straps should not be worn. Leather footwear with yellow straps… with blood-red straps… with crimson straps… with black straps… with orange straps… with beige (§) straps should not be worn. Whoever should wear it: an offense of wrong doing.”—Mv.V.2.2

“Leather footwear with heel-coverings should not be worn. Boots (or sandals with straps up the calf) (§)… shoes (§)… leather footwear stuffed with cotton (or kapok)… leather footwear decorated with partridge (or quail) wings… leather footwear with toes pointed like rams’ horns… leather footwear with toes pointed like goats’ horns… leather footwear with toes pointed like scorpion tails… leather footwear with peacock feathers sown around… decorated leather footwear should not be worn. Whoever should wear it: an offense of wrong doing.”—Mv.V.2.3

“Leather footwear embellished with lion skin should not be worn. Leather footwear embellished with tiger skin… with leopard skin… with black antelope skin… with otter skin… with cat skin… with squirrel skin… with flying fox skin should not be worn. Whoever should wear it: an offense of wrong doing.”—Mv.V.2.4

“And one should not wear leather footwear in a monastery. Whoever should wear it: an offense of wrong doing.”—Mv.V.4.3

“I allow one whose feet are painful or one whose feet are split or one who is afflicted with corns to wear leather footwear.”—Mv.V.5.2

“I allow you, when thinking, ‘I will now get up on a bed or a bench,’ to wear leather footwear.”—Mv.V.6.1

“I allow you to wear leather footwear in a monastery.”—Mv.V.6.2

“One should not enter a village while wearing leather footwear. Whoever should enter: an offense of wrong doing”… ”I allow that an ill bhikkhu enter a village while wearing leather footwear.”—Mv.V.12

“Wooden footwear should not be worn. Whoever should wear it: an offense of wrong doing.”—Mv.V.6.4

“Palmyra-leaf footwear should not be worn. Whoever should wear it: an offense of wrong doing.”—Mv.V.7.2

“Bamboo footwear should not be worn. Whoever should wear it: an offense of wrong doing.”—Mv.V.7.3

“Footwear (woven) of grass should not be worn. Footwear (woven) of muñja grass… (woven) of reeds… (woven) of marshy date-palm… (woven) of kamala-grass… knitted from wool… made with gold… made with silver… made with gems… made with lapis lazuli… made with crystal… made with bronze… made with glass (mirrors)… made with tin… made with lead… made with copper should not be worn. Whoever should wear it: an offense of wrong doing. Any non-leather footwear that is meant for walking (§) should not be worn. Whoever should wear it: an offense of wrong doing. I allow three kinds of non-leather footwear if fixed permanently in place: restroom footrests, urinal footrests, rinsing-room footrests (see Cv.V.35.2-4).”—Mv.V.8.3

Water Strainers

“I allow a strainer (for water).”…. “I allow a ladle-strainer”…. “I allow a water-strainer cylinder (§).”—Cv.V.13.1

“When a traveling bhikkhu is asked for a water-strainer, it is not not to be given. Whoever doesn’t give it: an offense of wrong doing. And a bhikkhu is not to go traveling without a water strainer. Whoever should go: an offense of wrong doing. If there is no water-strainer or water-strainer cylinder, even the corner of the outer robe may be determined: ‘Having strained with this, I will drink.’”—Cv.V.13.2

“I allow a water-strainer mounted on sticks (§).”…. “I allow that a filter cloth be spread in the water (§).”—Cv.V.13.3

Miscellaneous

“I allow an umbrella (sunshade)”… “An umbrella is not to be used.”—Cv.V.23.2

“I allow an umbrella for one who is ill”… “I allow that an umbrella be used in a monastery and the vicinity of a monastery both by one who is ill and one who isn’t.”—Cv.V.23.3

“I allow a mosquito net.”—Cv.V.13.3

“I allow a little water jar and a broom.”—Cv.V.22.1

“I allow a fan and a palmyra-leaf fan (a fan with a handle).”—Cv.V.22.2

“I allow a mosquito whisk”… “A yak-tail whisk is not to be used. Whoever should use one: an offense of wrong doing. I allow three kinds of whisk: made of bark fibers, made of khus-khus grass, made of peacock tail feathers.”—Cv.V.23.1

“I allow you… a torch, a light, a staff (a cane).”—Mv.V.6.2

“Staffs with wicker carriers (§) are not to be used. Whoever should use one: an offense of wrong doing.”—Cv.V.24.1

“I allow that a staff-authorization be given for a bhikkhu who is ill.” Procedure and transaction statement. —Cv.V.24.2

“I allow that a staff-and-wicker-carrier-authorization be given for a bhikkhu who is ill.” Procedure and transaction statement. —Cv.V.24.3

“A carrying pole (for the shoulder) with loads at both ends is not to be carried. Whoever should carry one: an offense of wrong doing. I allow a carrying pole with the load at one end, a carrying pole for two bearers, (carrying) a weight on the head, a weight on the shoulders, a weight on the hips, a weight slung on (over the shoulder, etc.).”—Cv.V.30

“I allow all metal goods except weapons, all wooden goods except a dais (§), a throne (§), a wooden alms bowl, and wooden shoes; all clay goods except a foot wiper and a potter’s (hut) (§).”—Cv.V.37

“A collection of metal (§) and bronze goods is not to be made. Whoever should make one: an offense of wrong doing.”—Cv.V.28.1

“I allow a collection to the extent of an ointment box, an ointment stick, and an instrument for removing dirt from the ears.”—Cv.V.28.2

“And the practice of using nothing but thrown away things (§) should not be followed. Whoever should do so: an offense of wrong doing.”—Cv.V.10.2

CHAPTER FOUR

Food

The three main classes of food—staple foods, non-staple foods, and juice drinks—have already been discussed in BMC1 under the Food Chapter of the pācittiya rules. The question of making fruit allowable has been discussed under Pc 11. Here we will discuss aspects of the topic of food not covered in those passages.

Cooking & storing foods

One may not consume food stored indoors, cooked indoors, or cooked by oneself. There is a separate dukkaṭa for each of these actions. Thus, if one consumes food stored indoors that one has cooked oneself, one incurs two dukkaṭas. According to the Commentary, indoors here means in an akappiya-kuṭi (a building that has not been designated as a food storage place) that would count as a “same lodging” with a bhikkhu under Pc 5 & 6. Stored means kept overnight, even if the food has not been formally offered. (Pc 38 imposes a pācittiya on eating food kept overnight after it has been formally offered, regardless of where it has been kept. For further analysis of this point, see the article, Stored-up Food: A Discussion of Pācittaya 38.) Food stored or cooked in a food storage place (kappiya-kuṭi—see Chapter 7) doesn’t count as stored or cooked indoors. A lay person’s residence automatically counts as a kappiya-kuṭi, so a bhikkhu staying in such a place would be able to eat food that the lay person had stored and cooked there. These storing and cooking prohibitions apply only to staple foods, non-staple foods, and juice drinks, and not to medicines and tonics. However, if a medicine or tonic stored indoors is later mixed with food that has been kept in a kappiya-kuṭi, the resulting mixture counts as food stored indoors.

None of the texts discuss whether cooked oneself under this prohibition means that a bhikkhu may eat food cooked by another bhikkhu, or if it should also be translated as cooked oneselves, meaning that bhikkhus may not eat food fixed by any bhikkhus. The origin story to the rule suggests the second interpretation, in that the rule was formulated after Ven. Ānanda had fixed medicinal conjey, intending not to eat it himself but to present it to the Buddha. The Buddha refused to eat it, and chided Ānanda, saying, “How can you be intent on luxury of this sort?” Because the conjey itself was not luxurious, the Buddha was apparently referring to the luxury of bhikkhus’ providing food of their choice for one another, rather than depending on the choices made by their supporters. This may explain why the allowance under this prohibition mentions not food cooked “by another,” but food cooked “by others”: i.e., people who are not bhikkhus.

Although bhikkhus may not cook their food themselves, the Canon allows a bhikkhu to reheat for his own use—or for the use of his fellow bhikkhus—food that has already been cooked by others.

The Meṇḍaka allowance (Mv.VI.34.21) for gathering provisions for a journey is discussed under Pc 39.

Eating

A bhikkhu should not eat from the same dish or drink from the same cup with anyone else at all, lay or ordained. The Commentary adds here, however, that if Bhikkhu X takes fruit from a dish and goes away, Bhikkhu Y may then take food from the same dish. After Bhikkhu Y goes away, Bhikkhu X may then come back for more. In other words, the prohibition is against using the same dish, etc., in the presence of another person who is also using it.

There is also a prohibition against eating from a food warmer (made of metal or wood, says the Commentary), which the V/Sub-commentary explains as a bowl-like container into which hot water is poured, and over which is placed a bowl for keeping the food. A bhikkhu who is ill, however, may eat from a raised tray. The Commentary says that this allowance extends to trays made of wickerware or wood.

A bhikkhu who regurgitates his food is allowed to swallow it again as long as it has not come out of his mouth. The Commentary defines out of his mouth as meaning sticking in the mouth. In other words, when regurgitated food comes into the mouth, one may swallow it if it flows back down the throat, but not if it stays in the mouth. The Commentary here is interpreting mukha-dvāra, literally the door of the face, as the larynx, and not the opening of the lips. Under Pc 40 I argued against this interpretation, noting that MN 140 treats the mukha-dvāra as separate from the space “whereby what has been eaten, drunk, consumed, and savored gets swallowed.” The larynx belongs to the second space; this leaves the mouth for the first. The awkwardness of the Commentary’s interpretation here is yet another argument against taking mukha-dvāra to mean larynx—why food stuck in the mouth would be counted as outside the larynx but food that doesn’t get stuck would not, is hard to explain. A more reasonable interpretation would be the common-sense one: Regurgitated food may be swallowed again, even if it gets stuck in the mouth, but not if brought out of the mouth.

Famine allowances

Once, during a famine, the Buddha made the following allowances: A bhikkhu could eat what had been stored indoors, cooked indoors, and cooked by oneself. If there was non-staple fruit and no one to make it allowable, he could pick it up and carry it away. If he met an unordained person who could make it allowable, he could put the fruit on the ground and then consume it after having formally received it from that person. If he had eaten and turned down an offer of further food, he could still consume food that had not been made “leftover” (see Pc 35) if it was brought back from where the meal was, if it was formally accepted before the meal, or if it was food that had grown in the woods or in a lotus pond—apparently these last two were places where people would go foraging during a famine.

After the famine, however, the Buddha rescinded these allowances without any provision for invoking them again during a similar crisis. Thus they are no longer available to the Community.  

Garlic

There is a prohibition against eating garlic unless one is ill. According to the Commentary, ill here means any illness for which garlic is a cure. Traditionally, garlic is used as an antibiotic and to ward off colds and flu. According to current medical knowledge, it also helps prevent high blood cholesterol. Although Asian food often contains garlic as an ingredient, none of the texts mention the use of garlic mixed in with food. Perhaps it is allowable on the grounds of being a digestive aid. An alternative interpretation, accepted by many Communities, is that the original prohibition is against eating garlic by itself. Following this interpretation, garlic mixed with other ingredients would be allowable even when one is not ill.

Green gram

Mv.VI.16.2 tells of an incident in which Ven. Kaṅkha-Revata saw a heap of excrement out of which green gram (a mung bean) had sprouted. Noting that green gram, even when digested, can still sprout, he wondered if it might be allowable. The Buddha assured him that it was.

Rules

“I allow anything falling while being presented to be picked up by oneself and eaten. Why is that? Because it has been relinquished by the benefactors.”—Cv.V.26

“One should not consume human flesh. Whoever should do so: a grave offense. And one should not consume meat without having reflected on it (on what it is). Whoever should do so: an offense of wrong doing.”—Mv.VI.23.9

“One should not consume elephant flesh… horse flesh… dog flesh… snake flesh… lion flesh… tiger flesh… leopard flesh… bear flesh… hyena flesh. Whoever should do so: an offense of wrong doing.”—Mv.VI.23.10-15

“One should not knowingly consume meat killed on purpose (for a bhikkhu). Whoever should consume it: an offense of wrong doing. I allow fish and meat that is pure in three respects: One has not seen, heard, or suspected (that it was killed on purpose for a bhikkhu).”—Mv.VI.31.14

“I allow all fruit that is non-staple.”—Mv.VI.38

“A mango is not to be consumed. Whoever should consume one: an offense of wrong doing.”—Cv.V.5.1 (This rule was later repealed by the rules at Cv.V.5.2)

“I allow mango peels”… “I allow that fruit made allowable for contemplatives in any of five ways be consumed: damaged by fire, damaged by a knife, damaged by a fingernail, seedless, or with the seeds removed. I allow that fruit made allowable for contemplatives in any of these five ways be consumed.”—Cv.V.5.2

“I allow that fruit that has not been made allowable be consumed if it is without seeds, or if the seeds are discharged.”—Mv.VI.21

“Although green gram, even when digested, sprouts, I allow that green gram be consumed as much as you like (§).”—Mv.VI.16.2

“I allow conjey and honey-lumps.”—Mv.VI.24.7

“When invited to a certain place, one should not consume the eating-conjey of another (donor). Whoever should consume it is to be dealt with in accordance with the rule (Pc 33).”—Mv.VI.25.7

“I allow the five products of a cow: milk, curds, buttermilk, butter, ghee.”—Mv.VI.34.21

“I allow eight juice drinks: mango juice drink, rose apple juice drink, seed-banana juice drink, seedless banana juice drink, madhu (Bassia pierrei? Bassia latifolia?) juice drink, grape juice drink, water-lily root juice drink, phārusaka (Bouea burmanica (Anacardiaceae)?) juice drink. I allow all fruit juice except for the juice of grain. I allow all leaf-juice except for the juice of cooked (§) vegetables. I allow all flower juice except for the juice of licorice flowers. I allow fresh sugar cane juice.”—Mv.VI.35.6

“I allow all vegetables and all non-staple foods made with flour.”—Mv.VI.36.8

“Garlic should not be eaten. Whoever should eat it: an offense of wrong doing.”—Cv.V.34.1

“I allow that garlic be eaten in the event of illness.”—Cv.V.34.2

Cooking & Storing

“One should not consume what has been stored (§) indoors, cooked indoors, or cooked by oneselves. Whoever should consume it: an offense of wrong doing. If one should consume what has been stored indoors, cooked indoors, cooked by others: an offense of two wrong doings. If one should consume what has been stored indoors, cooked outside, cooked by oneselves: an offense of two wrong doings. If one should consume what has been stored outside, cooked indoors, cooked by oneselves: an offense of two wrong doings. If one should consume what has been stored indoors, cooked outside, cooked by others: an offense of wrong doing. If one should consume what has been stored outside, cooked indoors, cooked by others: an offense of wrong doing. If one should consume what has been stored outside, cooked outside, cooked by oneselves: an offense of wrong doing. If one should consume what has been stored outside, cooked outside, cooked by others: no offense.”—Mv.VI.17.3-5

“I allow reheating.”—Mv.VI.17.6

“There are badland roads with little water, little food. It is not easy to go along them without provisions for a journey. I allow that provisions for a journey be sought out: husked rice by one who has need of husked rice, green gram by one who has need of green gram, black-eyed peas (§) by one who has need of black-eyed peas, salt by one who has need of salt, sugar-lumps by one who has need of sugar-lumps, oil by one who has need of oil, ghee by one who has need of ghee.”—Mv.VI.34.21

Eating

“One should not eat from the same dish (with another person) (or) drink from the same cup…. Whoever should do so: an offense of wrong doing.”—Cv.V.19.2

“One should not eat from a food-warmer (§). Whoever should do so: an offense of wrong doing”…. (A sick bhikkhu couldn’t hold his bowl in his hand while eating) “I allow a raised tray.”—Cv.V.19.1

“I allow ruminating for a ruminator. But one should not take in (ingest) anything brought outside of the mouth. Whoever should do so is to be dealt with in accordance with the rule (Pc 37).”—Cv.V.25

Famine Allowances

“I allow storing indoors… I allow cooking indoors… I allow that one cook for oneself… I allow what is stored indoors, cooked indoors, and cooked by oneself.“—Mv.VI.17.7

“I allow that where one sees non-staple fruit, and there is no one to make it allowable, having picked it up and carried it away, having seen someone to make it allowable, having placed it on the ground, having formally received it, one may consume it. I allow that one formally accept what one has picked up.”—Mv.VI.17.9

“I allow that, having eaten and been satisfied, one may consume what has not been made left over if it is brought back from there (where the meal was).”—Mv.VI.18.4

“I allow that, having eaten and been satisfied, one may consume what has not been made left over if it was formally accepted before the meal.”—Mv.VI.19.2

“I allow that, having eaten and been satisfied, one may consume what has not been made left over if it grows in the woods, if it grows in a lotus pond.”—Mv.VI.20.4

“Those things that were allowed by me for the bhikkhus when food was scarce, crops bad, and almsfood difficult to obtain: what was stored indoors, cooked indoors, cooked by oneself, accepting formally what was picked up; what was taken back from there; what was formally accepted before the meal; what grows in the woods; what grows in a lotus pond: From this day forward I rescind them. One should not consume what is stored indoors, cooked indoors, cooked by oneself; or what was formally accepted after having been picked up: Whoever should consume it: an offense of wrong doing. Nor should one, having eaten and been satisfied, consume food that is not left over if it is brought back from there (the place where the meal was offered), if it was formally accepted before the meal, if it grows in the woods or a lotus pond. Whoever should consume these is to be dealt with in accordance with the rule (Pc 35).”—Mv.VI.32.2

“Day-long food (juice drinks) mixed with time-period (morning) food, when received that day, is allowable in the time period, but not outside of the time period. Seven-day medicine (tonics) mixed with time-period food, when received that day, is allowable in the time period, but not outside of the time period. Life-long medicine mixed with time-period food, when received that day, is allowable in the time period, but not outside of the time period. Seven-day medicine mixed with day-long food, when received that day, is allowable through the watches of the night, but not when the watches of the night have passed. Life-long medicine mixed with day-long food, when received that day, is allowable through the watches of the night, but not when the watches of the night have passed. Life-long medicine mixed with seven-day medicine, when received, is allowable for seven days, but not when the seven days have passed.”—Mv.VI.40.3

From the Second Council

1) Is the permission for a salt horn permissible?

What is the permission for a salt horn?

“It is permissible to carry a salt horn, (thinking,) ‘I will enjoy whatever is unsalted.’”

That is not permissible.

Where is it objected to?

In Sāvatthī, in the Sutta Vibhaṅga (Pc 38).

What offense is committed?

A pācittiya for stored-up food.

2) Is the permission for two fingerbreadths permissible?

What is the permission for two fingerbreadths?

“When the sun’s shadow has passed two fingerbreadths into the ‘wrong time,’ it is still permissible to eat food.”

That is not permissible.

Where is it objected to?

In Rājagaha, in the Sutta Vibhaṅga (Pc 37).

What offense is committed?

A pācittiya for eating in the wrong time.

3) Is the permission for among villages permissible?

What is the permission for among villages?

“Having eaten and turned down an offer of further food, it is permissible for one who thinks, ‘I will now go among villages/into the village,’ to eat food that is not left over.”

That is not permissible.

Where is it objected to?

In Sāvatthī, in the Sutta Vibhaṅga (Pc 35).

What offense is committed?

A pācittiya for eating what is not left over.

7) Is the permission for thin sour milk (§) permissible?

What is the permission for thin sour milk?

“Having eaten and turned down an offer of further food, it is permissible to drink milk that is not left over that has passed the state of being milk but not yet arrived at the state of being buttermilk.”

That is not permissible.

Where is it objected to?

In Sāvatthī, in the Sutta Vibhaṅga (Pc 35).

What offense is committed?

A pācittiya for eating what is not left over.

8) Is the permission for unfermented toddy permissible?

What is the permission for unfermented toddy?

“It is permissible to drink toddy which is not yet alcoholic, which has not yet become an intoxicant.”

That is not permissible.

Where is it objected to?

In Kosambī, in the Sutta Vibhaṅga (Pc 51).

What offense is committed?

A pācittiya for drinking alcohol and fermented liquor.—Cv. XII.1.10

CHAPTER FIVE

Medicine

The Great Section on Virtue in the Sāmaññaphala Sutta (DN 2) lists the types of wrong livelihood from which a bhikkhu should abstain. Among them is the practice of medicine, or in the words of the sutta:

“Administering emetics, purges, purges from above, purges from below, head-purges; ear-oil, eye-drops, treatments through the nose, ointments, and counter-ointments; practicing eye-surgery (or: extractive surgery), general surgery, pediatrics; administering root-medicines and binding medicinal herbs—he abstains from wrong livelihood, from lowly arts such as these. This, too, is part of his virtue.”

The Commentary to Pr 3 states that a bhikkhu should not act as a doctor for lay people unless they are:

his parents, people who care for his parents, his other blood relatives;

his preceptor and teacher’s parents or other blood relatives;

applicants for ordination;

his own steward;

travelers who arrive ill at his monastery;

people who fall ill while in the monastery.

In none of these cases, however, should he expect material reward for his services.

Bhikkhus are, however, expected to know enough medicine to care for their own and for one another’s illnesses. This point is beautifully illustrated by one of the most inspiring passages in the Canon:

Now at that time a certain bhikkhu was sick with dysentery. He lay fouled in his own urine and excrement. Then the Blessed One, on an inspection tour of the lodgings with Ven. Ānanda as his attendant, went to that bhikkhu’s dwelling and, on arrival, saw the bhikkhu lying fouled in his own urine and excrement. On seeing him, he went to the bhikkhu and said, “What is your illness, bhikkhu?”

“I have dysentery, O Blessed One.”

“But do you have an attendant?”

“No, O Blessed One.”

“Then why don’t the bhikkhus tend to you?”

“I don’t do anything for the bhikkhus, venerable sir, which is why they don’t tend to me.”

Then the Blessed One addressed Ven. Ānanda: “Go fetch some water, Ānanda. We will wash this bhikkhu.”

“As you say, venerable sir,” Ven. Ānanda responded, and he fetched some water. The Blessed One sprinkled water on the bhikkhu, and Ven. Ānanda washed him off. Then—with the Blessed One taking the bhikkhu by the head, and Ven. Ānanda taking him by the feet—they lifted him up and placed him on a bed.

Then the Blessed One, with regard to this cause, to this incident, had the bhikkhus assembled and asked them: “Is there a sick bhikkhu in that dwelling over there?”

“Yes, O Blessed One, there is.”

“And what is his illness?”

“He has dysentery, O Blessed One.”

“But does he have an attendant?”

“No, O Blessed One.”

“Then why don’t the bhikkhus tend to him?”

“He doesn’t do anything for the bhikkhus, venerable sir, which is why they don’t tend to him.”

“Bhikkhus, you have no mother, you have no father, who might tend to you. If you don’t tend to one another, who then will tend to you? Whoever would tend to me, should tend to the sick.”

The Buddha then sets out precise duties both for the sick and for those who nurse them:

“If one’s preceptor is present, the preceptor should tend to one as long as life lasts (or) should stay until one’s recovery. If one’s teacher is present, the teacher should tend to one as long as life lasts (or) should stay until one’s recovery. If one’s pupil is present, the pupil should tend to one as long as life lasts (or) should stay until one’s recovery. If one’s student is present, the student should tend to one as long as life lasts (or) should stay until one’s recovery. If a fellow pupil of one’s preceptor is present, the fellow pupil of one’s preceptor should tend to one as long as life lasts (or) should stay until one’s recovery. If a fellow student of one’s teacher is present, the fellow student of one’s teacher should tend to one as long as life lasts (or) should stay until one’s recovery. If no preceptor, teacher, pupil, student, fellow pupil of one’s preceptor, or fellow student of one’s teacher is present, the Community should tend to one. If he/it (i.e., the bhikkhu or the Community responsible for the care, as the case may be) does not: an offense of wrong doing.

“A sick person endowed with five qualities is hard to tend to: He does what is not amenable to his cure; he does not know the proper amount in things amenable to his cure; he does not take his medicine; he does not tell his symptoms, as they actually are present, to the nurse desiring his welfare, saying that they are getting worse when they are getting worse, improving when they are improving, or remaining the same when they are remaining the same; and he is not the type who can endure bodily feelings that are painful, fierce, sharp, wracking, repellent, disagreeable, life-threatening. A sick person endowed with these five qualities is hard to tend to.

“A sick person endowed with five qualities is easy to tend to: He does what is amenable to his cure; he knows the proper amount in things amenable to his cure; he takes his medicine; he tells his symptoms, as they actually are present, to the nurse desiring his welfare, saying that they are getting worse when they are getting worse, improving when they are improving, or remaining the same when they are remaining the same; and he is the type who can endure bodily feelings that are painful, fierce, sharp, wracking, repellent, disagreeable, life-threatening. A sick person endowed with these five qualities is easy to tend to.

“A nurse endowed with five qualities is not fit to tend to the sick: He is not competent at mixing medicine; he does not know what is amenable or unamenable to the patient’s cure, bringing to the patient things that are unamenable and taking away things that are amenable; he is motivated by material gain, not by thoughts of good will; he gets disgusted at cleaning up excrement, urine, saliva (§), or vomit; and he is not competent at instructing, urging, rousing, and encouraging the sick person at the proper occasions with a talk on Dhamma. A nurse endowed with these five qualities is not fit to tend to the sick.

“A nurse endowed with five qualities is fit to tend to the sick: He is competent at mixing medicine; he knows what is amenable or unamenable to the patient’s cure, taking away things that are unamenable and bringing things that are amenable; he is motivated by thoughts of good will, not by material gain; he does not get disgusted at cleaning up excrement, urine, saliva, or vomit; and he is competent at instructing, urging, rousing, and encouraging the sick person at the proper occasions with a talk on Dhamma. A nurse endowed with these five qualities is fit to tend to the sick.”—Mv.VIII.26.1-8

Issues related to two of the last five qualities are discussed in detail in the Khandhakas: competence in mixing medicine and the question of material gain, i.e., the rewards given to nurses who have faithfully tended to the sick. The latter issue is a communal one, and so will be discussed in Chapter 22. Here we will discuss issues related to medicine, which fall under four main topics: the basic “support” medicine; general classes of edibles that count as tonics and medicines; medical treatments recommended for specific diseases; and medical procedures.

Support medicine

A bhikkhu’s basic medicinal support is pūti-mutta-bhesajja, which translates literally as “rancid urine medicine” (Mv.I.30.4). Strangely, none of the texts define the term. The commentaries to the Khuddakapātha, Udāna, and Sutta Nipāta give an example of this sort of medicine—rancid urine with yellow myrobalan—but without a formal definition to indicate the full range of the term. The Sub-commentary to the Vinaya defines rancid urine as any sort of urine at all, citing as a parallel the Pali expression pūti-kāya, decomposing body, which refers to any human body, living or dead, “even one with golden skin.” However, it does not say whether rancid urine medicine is the rancid urine itself or, as suggested by the example from the commentaries, rancid urine in which medicinal fruits are pickled.

Because the texts are vague about this term, various oral traditions have developed around it. In Sri Lanka, rancid urine medicine is interpreted as rancid cow’s urine, in which different types of myrobalan are sometimes pickled. In Thailand, some Communities interpret it as one’s own first urine in the morning, following the ancient Indian tradition of using this urine as a tonic. (Modern scientists have discovered that this urine contains a high level of melatonin.) Given the silence of the texts, the best policy here is to follow the traditions of one’s own Community.

The five tonics

The five tonics are discussed in detail under NP 23, but the issue of flour mixed with sugar bears repeating. The Canon states that if sugar is mixed with flour or ashes as a binding agent and is still called sugar, then it counts as one of the five tonics. Some have argued that this allowance extends to candies that have small amounts of flour or other food starch mixed in, but if the candies are not called sugar they do not meet the terms of the allowance and so should be classed as food.

Life-long medicines

Six types of edibles are classed as life-long medicines: root medicine, astringent decoction medicine, leaf medicine, fruit medicine, resin medicine, and salt medicine. The Canon lists specific examples for each type. Although some of the examples are hard to identify precisely, each of the classes when taken as a whole is clear enough to form a guideline for applying the Great Standards to similar medicines today. Thus I have made no effort to identify the more obscure examples. As the Canon itself makes clear, any medicine that would come under these six classes—as long as it does not serve as a staple or non-staple food—is allowed here.

Root medicine

The Canon defines life-long root medicine as follows: turmeric, ginger, sweet flag, white orris root, ativisa, black hellebore, khus-khus, nut-grass, or whatever other roots are medicines and do not serve as staple or non-staple food. With this, and all the remaining classes of life-long medicine, one may keep the medicine for life and consume it when there is a medicinal reason for doing so. If there is no such reason, there is a dukkaṭa for consuming it. As mentioned in the preceding chapter, there is a specific prohibition against eating garlic when not ill. In connection with the allowance for root medicine, there is also an allowance for a grindstone and a grinding wheel to reduce the medicine to a powder.

Astringent-decoction medicine

Here the Canon lists astringent decoctions from the neem-tree (Azadirachta indica), from the kuṭaja (Wrightia dysenterica), from the pakkava, from the nattamāla (Pongamia glabra), or any other astringent decoctions that are medicines and do not serve as staple or non-staple food.

Leaf medicine

The Canon’s list includes neem leaves, kuṭaja leaves, cucumber leaves (Trichosanthes dioeca), basil leaves, cotton-tree leaves, or any other leaves that are medicines and do not serve as staple or non-staple food. Aromatic oils made from such leaves would also fall under this category.

Fruit medicine

Here the Canon lists vilaṅga (Embelia ribes), long pepper (Erycibe paniculata), black pepper, yellow myrobalan (Terminalia chebula or citrina), beleric myrobalan (Terminalia balerica), embric myrobalan (Phyllantus embelica) (these last three form the triphala mixture still used in modern Ayurveda), goṭha-fruit, or any other fruits that are medicines and do not serve as staple or non-staple food.

Resin medicine

The Canon lists assafoetida, assafoetida-resin, assafoetida-gum, gum, gum-patti, gum-panni, or any other resins that are medicines and do not serve as staple or non-staple food.

Salt medicine

The Canon allows the following salts: sea salt, black salt, rock salt, culinary salt, red salt (which the Commentary defines as salt mixed with other medicinal ingredients), or any other salts that are medicines and do not serve as staple or non-staple food. The Parivāra (VI.2) mentions both natural and man-made salts as allowable. Modern medicines that are organic or inorganic salts would fit under this category.

Specific treatments

In addition to the general classes of medicines, Mv.VI lists allowable treatments for specific diseases. The stress here is on the word allowable: A bhikkhu is not required to use these treatments but he might want to familiarize himself with them so that he can apply the Great Standards to modern medicine in an informed way. Historically, this list, together with similar lists in the Vinayas of the other early schools, has played an important part in the spread of medical knowledge from India to the lands to which Buddhism spread in the rest of Asia. At present, it gives a fascinating picture of the state of medical art in the Buddha’s time.

For itch, small boils, running sores, an affliction of thick scabs, or bad body odor: One may use powders. To refine the powder, one may use powder sifters, including cloth sifters. As mentioned in Chapter 1, the Commentary states that for bad body odor all fragrant powders are allowable. The Canon allows the use of (powdered) dung, clay, and dye-dregs for one who is not ill. According to the Commentary, ordinary (unscented) chunam comes under “dye-dregs.”

For possession by non-human beings: Raw flesh and raw blood are allowed (!). The texts do not say whether this a medicine per se, or—if the non-human being is blood-thirsty—the bhikkhu should simply not be held responsible for eating such things.

For eye diseases: Ointments such as black collyrium, rasa-ointment (made with vitriol?), sota-ointment (made with antimony?), yellow orpiment (§), and lamp-black are allowed. Sandalwood, tagara (Tabernaemontana coronaria), benzoin gum, tālīsa (Flacourtia cataphracta), and nut-grass—all of which are fragrant—may be mixed in with the ointments. The ointments may be kept in boxes made of any of the standard ten materials (except for human bone, says the Commentary) but not in boxes made of fancy materials. The boxes may have lids, which may be tied to the boxes with thread or string. If an ointment box gets split, it may be bound together with thread or string. Ointment sticks may be used to apply the ointments, but again they must be made of one of the ten standard allowable materials. A bhikkhu may keep the ointment sticks in a case, and the ointment box in a bag. The bag may have a string for tying the mouth of the bag as a carrying strap.

For pains in the head: Apply oil to the head; give treatments (such as snuff medicine) up the nose; or have the patient inhale smoke. Nose-tubes (or nose-spoons), double nose-tubes (double nose-spoons), and smoke inhaling tubes are allowed but must be made from any of the standard allowable materials. One may keep lids, bags, and double bags for the smoke-inhaling tubes, and the bags may be tied at the mouth with a string for use as a carrying strap.

For wind afflictions: According to ancient Indian medicine, sharp pains in the body result from the provocation of the wind property. Dizziness is also counted as a wind affliction. The basic treatment is for the patient to drink a decoction of oil. The oil may be kept in a flask made of metal, wood, or fruit (e.g., coconut shell). Alcohol may be mixed in with the decoction, but not so much that the color, smell, or taste of the liquor could be detected. To drink oil mixed with excessive alcohol violates Pc 51. If too much alcohol has been mixed in with the oil, it may be determined for use as rubbing oil.

For wind afflictions in the limbs: Sweating treatments, sweating treatments with herbs, and a “great sweating” treatment are allowed. The Commentary gives directions for this last treatment: Use a hole dug lengthwise the size of a human being and fill it with burning embers, charcoal, or coals; cover it with sand or dirt, and then with various leaves that are good for wind diseases. Have the ill bhikkhu cover his body with oil and lie down on top of the leaves, turning over as necessary. Other treatments for wind afflictions in the limbs include hemp water (according to the Commentary, this means water boiled with hemp leaves; pour it over the body, cover the body with the leaves, and then get into a sweating-treatment tent) and a water tub, which the Commentary says is a tub big enough for a bhikkhu to get into. Hot tubs would come under here.

For wind affliction in the joints: Blood-letting and moxibustion are allowed.

For split feet: Rubbing-oil and foot salves are allowed. The Commentary states that the foot salve may include whatever liquor will help split feet to heal.

For boils: Lancing (surgery) is allowed unless the boil is on the genitals or near the anus (see below). Allowable post-operative treatments include astringent water, pounded sesame paste, a compress, and a bandage. The scar may be sprinkled with mustard-seed powder to prevent itching. It may also be fumigated, and the scar-tissue cut off with a piece of salt-crystal. The scar may also be treated with oil. An old piece of cloth is allowed for soaking up the oil, and every kind of treatment for sores or wounds is allowed.

For snakebite: A medicine may be made of the “four great filthy things”: excrement, urine, ashes, and clay (!). If there is someone present to make these things allowable, one should have him/her make them allowable. If not, one may take them for oneself and consume them. The Commentary notes that this allowance covers not only snakebite, but also any other poisonous animal bite. The Sub-commentary adds that for oneself here also includes cases where Bhikkhu X fetches these items himself for Bhikkhu Y, who has been bitten. Y, in such cases, is allowed to consume them. None of the texts mention this point, but an oral tradition in Thailand asserts that the excrement to be used in this medicine should first be burnt in a fire.

For drinking poison: Water mixed with excrement (!!) may be drunk. If one receives the excrement while excreting it, it does not need to be formally received again. The Commentary interprets this last statement by saying that if, while excreting, one catches the excrement before it falls to the ground, one need not have it formally offered. If it falls to the ground, one does. This, however, seems overly scrupulous. The parallel in the case of offering food is that if the food falls to the ground while being offered, it still counts as offered. The same principle should hold here.

For a sorcery concoction: According to the Commentary, a sorcery concoction is voodoo medicine made by a woman to put a man under her power. The antidote given in the Canon is to drink mud turned up by a plow. The Commentary recommends that it be mixed with water.

For constipation: The Canon recommends drinking alkaline liquid, and the Commentary gives directions for how to make it: Take cooked rice, dry it in the sun, burn it, and drink the liquid coming from the ashes.

For jaundice: Urine and yellow myrobalan are allowed, which the Commentary defines as yellow myrobalan pickled in cow urine. This raises the question: If this were the meaning of rancid urine medicine in the four supports, why would there be this special allowance?

For skin disease: A scented rubbing is allowed.

For a body full of bad humors: One may drink a purgative. After the purgative has worked, one may take clarified conjey (which, according to the Commentary, is the clear liquid from rice porridge, strained to remove all rice grains), clear green gram broth, slightly thick green gram broth (which the Commentary interprets as green gram broth that is not oily or greasy), or meat broth (which again, the Commentary says, is just the broth without any meat). Some Communities extend these last allowances for any occasion, but the Canon gives them in the context of an antidote to the effects of a strong purgative, so there are those who will extend the allowance only to cases where a bhikkhu is weakened by diarrhea or other similarly severe conditions.

As a general tonic: Loṇasovīraka (or loṇasocīraka—“salty sour gruel”), a fermented medicine, is discussed under Pc 37.

Medical procedures

A bhikkhu who has surgery (lancing) or hemorrhoid removal performed in the crotch or within the area two fingerbreadths around it incurs a thullaccaya. The word for crotch (sambādha) literally means “confining place,” and the area two fingerbreadths around it covers the anus and genitals.

Now at that time a certain bhikkhu had a fistula. Ākāsagotta the surgeon lanced it. Then the Blessed One, on a tour of the lodgings, headed to that bhikkhu’s dwelling. Ākāsagotta the surgeon saw the Blessed One coming from afar and, on seeing him, said, “Come, Master Gotama. Look at this bhikkhu’s anus (§). It’s like an iguana’s mouth.” Then the Blessed One, (thinking,) “This worthless man is making fun of me,” turned back right there (§—reading tato’va with the Thai and Sri Lankan editions). (He then convened a meeting of the bhikkhus, at which he said,) “How can this worthless man have surgery done in the crotch? In the crotch the skin is tender, a wound is hard to heal, the knife hard to guide.”—Mv.VI.22.1-3

It is interesting to note that brain surgery was known in the Buddha’s time (see Mv.VIII.1.16-20), and yet he did not regard it as dangerous as the procedures forbidden here. The Vinaya-mukha maintains that surgical technique has developed to the point where this prohibition is counterproductive, but post-operative complications from hemorrhoid surgery, for example, still arise fairly frequently. The Commentary states that if the scrotum is enlarged, one may apply medicines to it and warm it over the fire. None of the texts discuss alternatives to prostate surgery. Some Communities, following the Vinaya-mukha, would allow it whenever needed.

The Pali term translated here as hemorrhoid removal—vatthi-kamma—is a cognate of the Sanskrit term, vasti-karman, usually translated as the administration of an enema. However, the Commentary restricts its meaning to hemorrhoid removal, and it is possible that the Commentary is right, for Pali terms do not always have the same meaning as their Sanskrit cognates, and the idea of administering medicines through the anus may have first developed in the context of hemorrhoid treatment. The Commentary adds that even trying to remove a hemorrhoid by squeezing it with a piece of hide or cloth would come under this prohibition. However, it recommends as a safer alternative that one apply an astringent decoction to the hemorrhoid and tie off the end with string. If the hemorrhoid then falls off on its own, well and good. Furthermore, the Commentary allows any equipment, such as tubes, used to apply medicine through the anus—an explicit allowance for enemas.

As mentioned above, blood letting is allowed as a treatment for wind afflictions of the joints. For some reason, the PTS and Burmese editions of the Canon contain a separate general allowance for blood-letting at Cv.V.6. This passage is not in the Thai or Sri Lankan editions.

The Great Standards

Appropriately, the Khandhaka dealing with medicine ends with the Great Standards, as medical knowledge is so changeable over time, and variable from location to location, that there is a need for general principles to apply the rules of the Buddha’s time to our own. In this chapter, the rules about practicing medicine and the classifications of tonics and life-long medicines are timeless. In the sections on specific treatments and medical procedures, however, the only hard and fast rules are the prohibitions. Outside of the prohibitions, all modern medical procedures are allowed.

Rules

The Five Tonics

“I allow that the five tonics, having been accepted at the right time, be consumed at the right time.”—Mv.VI.1.3

“I allow that the five tonics, having been accepted, be consumed at the right time or the wrong time.”—Mv.VI.1.5

“There are these tonics to be taken by sick bhikkhus: ghee, butter, oil, honey, sugar-molasses. Having been received, they may be used from storage seven days at most. Beyond that, one is to be dealt with in accordance with the rule (NP 23).”—Mv.VI.15.10

“Even though, to bind it together, they mix flour or ashes (§) into sugar lumps and it still counts as sugar, I allow that sugar be consumed as much as you like.”—Mv.VI.16.1

“I allow sugar lumps for a bhikkhu who is ill, and sugar-lump water for one who is not ill.”—Mv.VI.27

“I allow that tallow-medicine—i.e., tallow from bears, tallow from fish, tallow from alligators, tallow from pigs, tallow from donkeys—be consumed as oil if received in the right time, rendered in the right time, and filtered (§) in the right time.”—Mv.VI.2.1

Life-long Medicines

“I allow that, having accepted root-medicine—i.e., turmeric, ginger, sweet flag, white orris root, ativisa, black hellebore, khus-khus, nut-grass, or whatever other roots are medicines and do not serve, among non-staple food, the purpose of non-staple food; or, among staple food, the purpose of staple food—one may keep it for life and, when there is reason, consume it. If there is no reason, there is an offense of wrong doing for one who consumes it.”—Mv.VI.3.1

“Garlic should not be eaten. Whoever should eat it: an offense of wrong doing”… “I allow that garlic be eaten in the case of illness.”—Cv.V.34.1-2

“I allow a grindstone and a grinding wheel.”—Mv.VI.3.2

“I allow that, having accepted astringent-decoction medicine—i.e., astringent decoctions from the neem-tree, from the kuṭaja, from the pakkava, from the nattamāla, or whatever other astringent decoctions are medicines and do not serve, among non-staple food, the purpose of non-staple food; or, among staple food, the purpose of staple food—one may keep it for life and, when there is reason, consume it. If there is no reason, there is an offense of wrong doing for one who consumes it.”—Mv.VI.4

“I allow that, having accepted leaf-medicine—i.e., neem leaves, kuṭaja leaves, cucumber leaves, basil leaves, cotton tree leaves, or whatever other leaves are medicines and do not serve, among non-staple food, the purpose of non-staple food; or, among staple food, the purpose of staple food—one may keep it for life and, when there is reason, consume it. If there is no reason, there is an offense of wrong doing for one who consumes it.”—Mv.VI.5

“I allow that, having accepted fruit-medicine—i.e., vilaṅga, long pepper, black pepper, yellow myrobalan, beleric myrobalan, embric myrobalan, goṭha, or whatever other fruits are medicines and do not serve, among non-staple food, the purpose of non-staple food; or, among staple food, the purpose of staple food—one may keep it for life and, when there is reason, consume it. If there is no reason, there is an offense of wrong doing for one who consumes it.”—Mv.VI.6

“I allow that, having accepted resin-medicine—i.e., assafoetida, assafoetida-resin, assafoetida-gum, gum, gum-patti, gum-panni, or whatever other resins are medicines and do not serve, among non-staple food, the purpose of non-staple food; or, among staple food, the purpose of staple food—one may keep it for life and, when there is reason, consume it. If there is no reason, there is an offense of wrong doing for one who consumes it.”—Mv.VI.7

“I allow that, having accepted salt-medicine—i.e., sea salt, black salt, rock salt, culinary salt, red salt, or whatever other salts are medicines and do not serve, among non-staple food, the purpose of non-staple food; or, among staple food, the purpose of staple food—one may keep it for life and, when there is reason, consume it. If there is no reason, there is an offense of wrong doing for one who consumes it.”—Mv.VI.8

Specific Treatments

“I allow powders as medicines for one who has an itch, a small boil, a running sore, or an affliction of thick scabs; or for one whose body smells bad; I allow (powdered) dung, clay, and dye-dregs for one who is not ill. I allow a pestle and mortar.”—Mv.VI.9.2

“I allow a powder sifter… I allow a cloth sifter.”—Mv.VI.10.1

“I allow, for one who is afflicted (possessed) by non-human beings, raw flesh and raw blood.”—Mv.VI.10.2

“I allow (eye) ointments: black collyrium, rasa-ointment (made with vitriol?), sota-ointment (made with antimony?), yellow orpiment (§), lamp-black”… “I allow (mixed in the ointments) sandalwood, tagara, benzoin gum, tālīsa, nut-grass.”—Mv.VI.11.2

“I allow an ointment box”… “One should not use fancy ointment boxes. Whoever does: an offense of wrong doing. I allow (ointment boxes) made of bone, ivory, horn, reed, bamboo, wood, lac (resin), fruit (§) (e.g., coconut shell), copper (metal), or conch-shell.”—Mv.VI.12.1

“I allow a lid”… “I allow, having tied it with thread/string, to tie it to the ointment-box”… “(An ointment box became split) I allow it to be bound together with thread/string.”—Mv.VI.12.2

“I allow an ointment stick”… “One should not use fancy ointment sticks. Whoever does: an offense of wrong doing. I allow (ointment sticks) made of bone, ivory, horn, reed, bamboo, wood, lac (resin), fruit (§) (e.g., coconut shell), copper (metal), or conch-shell.”—Mv.VI.12.3

“I allow a case for (ointment) sticks”… “I allow a bag for the ointment box”… “I allow a string for tying the mouth of the bag as a carrying strap.”—Mv.VI.12.4

“I allow oil for the head”… “I allow treatment through the nose”… “I allow a nose-tube (or nose-spoon)”… “One should not use fancy nose tubes. Whoever does: an offense of wrong doing. I allow (nose tubes) made of bone, ivory, horn, reed, bamboo, wood, lac (resin), fruit (§) (e.g., coconut shell), copper (metal), or conch-shell.”—Mv.VI.13.1

“I allow a double nose-tube”… “I allow that smoke be inhaled”… “I allow a tube for inhaling smoke”… “One should not use fancy smoke-inhaling tubes. Whoever does: an offense of wrong doing. I allow (smoke-inhaling tubes) made of bone, ivory, horn, reed, bamboo, wood, lac (resin), fruit (§) (e.g., coconut shell), copper (metal), or conch-shell”… “I allow a lid (for the smoke-inhaling tubes)”… “I allow a bag for the smoke-inhaling tubes”… “I allow a double bag”… “I allow a string for tying the mouth of the bag as a carrying strap.”—Mv.VI.13.1

(For wind afflictions): “I allow a decoction of oil”… “I allow that alcohol be mixed in the decoction of oil”… “Oil mixed with too much alcohol should not be drunk. Whoever drinks it is to be dealt with in accordance with the rule (Pc 51). I allow that when neither the color, the smell, nor the taste of alcohol can be detected in the decoction of oil, this sort of oil mixed with alcohol may be drunk.”—Mv.VI.14.1

(When too much alcohol has been mixed with oil): “I allow that it be determined as rubbing-oil”… “I allow (for oil) three kinds of flasks: a metal flask, a wood flask, a fruit flask.”—Mv.VI.14.2

(For wind affliction in the limbs): “I allow a sweating treatment”… “I allow a sweating treatment with herbs… a ‘great-sweating’ treatment… hemp water… a water tub.”—Mv.VI.14.3

(For wind afflictions in the joints): “I allow blood-letting… moxibustion (§)”… (For split feet): “I allow rubbing oil for the feet… I allow that a foot salve be prepared”… (For boils): “I allow lancing (surgery)… I allow astringent water… I allow pounded sesame paste.”—Mv.VI.14.4

(For boils, continued): “I allow a compress… a bandage… that it be sprinkled with mustard-seed powder (to prevent itching)”… “I allow fumigating”… “I allow that (scar-tissue) be cut off with a piece of salt-crystal”… “I allow oil for the sore/wound”… “I allow an old piece of cloth for soaking up the oil and every kind of treatment for sores/ wounds.”—Mv.VI.14.5

(For snakebite): “I allow that the four great filthy things be given: excrement, urine, ashes, clay”… “I allow, when there is someone to make them allowable, that one have him make them allowable; when there is no one to make them allowable, that having taken them oneself one consume them”… (For drinking poison): “I allow that water mixed with excrement be drunk”… “I allow (excrement) that one received while making it as having been received in and of itself (§). It does not need to be received again.”—Mv.VI.14.6

(For drinking a sorcery concoction): “ I allow that mud turned up by the plow be drunk”… (For constipation): “I allow that alkaline juice be drunk”… (For jaundice): “I allow that urine and yellow myrobalan be drunk”… (For skin disease): “I allow that a scented rubbing be done”… (For a body full of bad humors): “I allow that a purgative be drunk”… (After taking a purgative) “I allow clarified conjey… I allow clear green gram broth… I allow slightly thick green gram broth… I allow meat broth.”—Mv.VI.14.7

“I allow that a bhikkhu who is ill may consume loṇasovīraka (loṇasocīraka) as much as he likes, and that one who is not ill may consume it mixed with water as a beverage.”—Mv.VI.16.3

Medical Procedures

“Surgery should not be done in the crotch. Whoever should do it (have it done): a grave offense.”—Mv.VI.22.3

“Surgery and hemorrhoid removal (§) should not be done within the area two inches around the crotch. Whoever should do it (have it done): a grave offense.”—Mv.VI.22.4

[Included in the Burmese & PTS editions, but not the Thai or Sri Lankan editions: “I allow the letting of blood.”]—Cv.V.6

The Great Standards

“Whatever I have not objected to, saying, ‘This is not allowable,’ if it conforms with what is not allowable, if it goes against (literally, “preempts”) what is allowable, this is not allowable for you. Whatever I have not objected to, saying, ‘This is not allowable,’ if it conforms with what is allowable, if it goes against what is not allowable, this is allowable for you. And whatever I have not permitted, saying, ‘This is allowable,’ if it conforms with what is not allowable, if it goes against what is allowable, this is not allowable for you. And whatever I have not permitted, saying, ‘This is allowable,’ if it conforms with what is allowable, if it goes against what is not allowable, this is allowable for you.”—Mv.VI.40.1

CHAPTER SIX

Lodgings

The Pali word senāsana—literally meaning “sleeping place and sitting place” and translated here as “lodging”—covers outdoor resting spots, buildings used as dwellings, and the items used to furnish dwellings. This chapter covers all three aspects of the word, together with the etiquette to follow with respect to dwellings and furnishings. The protocols for looking after lodgings are discussed in Chapter 9; the procedures to follow in assigning lodgings, in Chapter 18.

Outdoor resting spots

A bhikkhu’s basic support in terms of lodging is a tree-root (rukkha-mūla—see Mv.I.30.4), which the commentaries interpret as the area shaded by a tree when the sun is overhead at noon. The Sub-commentary expands on this topic by mentioning other suitable outdoor spots for meditation, many of which are mentioned in the suttas: a mountain or boulder, a mountain cleft, a forest grove or wilderness, under the open sky (making a tent of one’s robe), a hay stack, a cave, a watch-tower platform, an open pavilion, a bamboo thicket, a tent.

Dwellings

The Canon allows five kinds of lodgings used as dwellings: a vihāra (usually translated as “dwelling”; the Commentary says it covers all kinds of buildings aside from the following four), a barrel-vaulted building, a multi-storied building, a gabled building, and a cell. The Commentary defines a gabled building as a multi-storied building with a gabled pavilion on top of a flat roof; as for the cell, it simply says that this may be made of brick, stone, wood, or earth. At present, concrete blocks would come under the category of brick. Given the way the Commentary defines vihāra, it would seem that no style of building would be forbidden as a dwelling, although the Vibhaṅga to Pr 2 contains a rule imposing a dukkaṭa on the act of building a hut entirely of earth. This the Commentary interprets as a hut fashioned of clay like a large jar and then fired. The Vibhaṅga to Pr 2 goes on to quote the Buddha as ordering the bhikkhus to destroy such a hut; and from this the Commentary gives permission for bhikkhus to destroy any bhikkhu’s hut built in an inappropriate way or an improper place. The example it gives is of a hut that a bhikkhu builds in a territory without getting permission from the resident senior bhikkhus in that territory (see Sg 6 & 7). It adds, however, that the hut should be dismantled in such a way that the building materials can be used again. Those who dismantle it should then inform the offender to take his materials back. If he delays, and the materials get damaged for one reason or another, the bhikkhus who dismantled the hut are in no way to be held responsible.

During the Rains-residence, one is not allowed to live in the hollow of a tree, in the fork of a tree, in the open air, in a non-lodging (according to the Commentary, this means a place covered with any of the five kinds of allowable facing/roofing but lacking a door that can be opened and closed), in a charnel house, under a canopy, or in a large storage vessel. However, there is no rule against living temporarily in any of these places during the rest of the year.

A bhikkhu building a hut for his own use must follow the additional protocols given under Sg 6 & 7.

The following allowances give an idea of the construction practices current when the Khandhakas were composed. As with medicines, the variations of building technology over time and from place to place require frequent use of the Great Standards to translate these allowances into a form suitable for present-day needs.

A dwelling may be built high off the ground to prevent flooding. The foundation and stairway leading up to the dwelling may be made of brick, stone, or wood; and the stairway may have a railing. The Commentary interprets the allowance for building “high off the ground” as permission to use landfill as well.

The roof may be lashed on and covered with any of five materials: tiles, stones, plaster, grass, or leaves. The same materials may be used as a facing on the walls (see Pc 19). The building may be plastered inside and out with any of three kinds of plastering: white, black, or ochre. Each of these requires different techniques for getting the plaster to stick to the walls. In all three cases, an undercoating of earth mixed with grain husks may be put on and spread with a trowel, after which the plaster may be applied. If this doesn’t work with white plaster, one may put on an undercoating of fine clay, spread it with a trowel, and then apply the white plaster. Tree sap and wet flour paste may be used as binding agents. If the basic undercoating doesn’t work for black plaster, one may apply earthworm clay (excrement), spread it with a trowel, and then apply the black plaster. Tree sap and astringent decoctions are allowed as binding agents. If the basic undercoating doesn’t work for ochre plaster, one may apply the red powder from beneath rice husks mixed with clay, spread it with a trowel, and then apply the ochre plaster. Mustard seed powder and beeswax oil are allowed as binding agents. If this last mixture is too thick, it may be wiped off with a cloth.

At present, arguing from the Great Standards, the allowance for plastering extends to cement plaster as well. Any materials or procedures that would help bind the cement plaster to a wall would also be allowable.

The plaster may be decorated with four types of designs: garland designs, creeper designs, dragon-teeth designs, five-petaled designs. According to the Commentary, one may make these drawings oneself. However, the Canon forbids drawings of male and female forms. (“Now at that time some group-of-six bhikkhus had an obscene picture with figures of women and men made in a dwelling. People touring the dwelling, on seeing it, criticized and complained and spread it about, ‘Just like householders who partake of sensual pleasures.’”) The Commentary extends this injunction to cover not only human forms, but also any animal forms, even earthworms (!). One should not draw these things oneself or get others to draw them, it says, but one may get others to illustrate inspiring stories such as the Jātakas or to draw pictures to inspire dispassion.

There is an allowance for a timber buttress, which the Commentary explains as a means of holding up an old wall. To keep out rain, eaves are allowed, as well as a paste of clay, ashes, and cow dung, which apparently is meant to plug leaks. When a snake fell through a roof onto a bhikkhu underneath, an allowance was made for ceilings and canopies.

Three kinds of window-openings are allowed: a window with a railing, a window covered with latticework, and a window with bars. Curtains, window shutters, and small window mats or bolsters are allowed to keep dust and pests from coming in the windows. Glass windowpanes were unknown in the Buddha’s time, but are allowable under the Great Standards.

Doors, doorposts, and lintels are allowed. A small upper dowel is allowed as a hinge for the door, and a hollow like a mortar for the door-dowel to revolve in may be made in the lintel. To secure the door, a hole may be made in it and a cord run through the hole and attached to the doorpost (or to another door, if the doors are double). The Commentary says that all kinds of cords are allowable here, even tigers’ tails (!). For greater security in keeping the door closed, bolts and crossbars are allowed, together with posts to hold them, holes to receive them, and pins to secure them. For still greater security, keys (made of metal, wood, or horn) are allowed, together with slotted keys, keyholes, and locks.

For privacy, one is allowed to divide the room inside with a curtain or a half-wall. Separate rooms—square or rectangular—may be divided off. The private room may be placed off to one side in a small dwelling, and in the middle of a large dwelling. A private room may also be made in the rafters. The Commentary defines this as a gabled room on top of a (flat) roof, but a loft would seem to come under this allowance as well.

Allowable construction details include a peg or an elephant-tusk on the wall for hanging bags, a pole for hanging up robes, a cord for hanging up robes, a verandah, a covered terrace, an inner court, a slat-roofed porch, a moveable (sliding?) screen, and a screen on rollers.

The area around the dwelling may be fenced with bricks, stones, or wood. The fence may have a porch that, like the dwelling, may be made high off the ground, plastered inside and out, and decorated with the four allowable patterns. It may also have a door, together with all the equipment needed for securing and locking it.

To keep the area around the dwelling from getting muddy, it may be strewn with gravel or paved with flagstones, and a water drain installed.

A foot wiper may be placed at the entrance, made of stone, stone fragment(s) (pebbles), or pumice. At present, a foot wiper made of cement would apparently also be allowable. The purpose of the foot wiper, according to the Commentary to Cv.V.22.1, is to provide a place to stand on before washing one’s feet or while wiping or drying them after they are washed. For some reason, an earthenware foot wiper was considered inappropriate, and so Cv.V.22.1 forbids a bhikkhu from using one. According to the Commentary to that rule, this means that he is also forbidden from accepting one.

As mentioned above, these allowances and prohibitions may be extended through the Great Standards to apply to construction practices at present.

If a dwelling is to be given to a Community, the procedure is to “establish” it for the Community of the four directions, present and to come. In other words, it becomes the common property of the entire Saṅgha, now and into the future, and not just of the bhikkhus currently residing in the monastery.

Furnishings

As the Vinaya-mukha points out, this is another area where the Great Standards have to be kept in mind. Furnishings are divided into two sorts: allowable and not.

Allowable

Grass matting is allowed, as are the following kinds of beds: a hard-board bed, a wicker bed (made of twisted (vines?) or woven of bamboo strips, says the Commentary), a bed or bench with a frame attached to the feet, a bed or bench made of slats, a bed or bench with curved legs, a bed or bench with detachable legs (see Pc 18), a bed woven of cord or rope, and a bed or bench covered with cloth.

A square seat not large enough to lie down on (āsandika—see Pc 87) is allowable even if its legs are tall, and the same holds true for a bench with a back and arms. The Commentary notes that these allowances mean that Pc 87 applies only to non-square rectangular seats without a back and arms. Other allowable seats include a wicker bench, a bench plaited with cloth, a ram-legged bench (this the Commentary defines as a bench with legs fastened on top of wooden blocks), a bench with interlocking legs, a wooden bench, a stool/chair, and a straw bench.

Five kinds of mattresses/cushions are allowed: stuffed with animal hair, cloth, bark fibers, grass, or leaves. According to the Commentary, animal hair includes all fur and feathers except for human hair, as well as woolen cloth used as stuffing. It also cites a reference to “masuraka” (defined by the Sub-commentary as leather cushions) in the ancient Kurundī commentary, to assert that these are also allowed. There is no maximum size for a mattress, so the Commentary recommends sizing it to one’s needs. Examples it gives: a mattress to cover a bed, one for a bench, one for a floor, one for a meditation path, and a foot-wiping cushion.

The Canon allows that cloth be used to cover mattresses/ cushions. Here the Commentary states that all six kinds of cloth allowed for robes are included under this allowance. The Canon also states that a mattress/cushion may be placed on a bed/bench only after a cloth underpad has been made and spread there. To identify mattress/cushion covers in the event that they are stolen, one may make a spot, a printed mark, or a handprint on it. The Commentary says that the spot may be made with dye or turmeric, and that the handprint should include all five fingers.

Cloth may be used as an under-pad for such things as floor mats (to protect a finished floor from getting scratched, the Commentary says). Cotton down—from the cotton of trees, creepers, or grass—may be used to make pillows (see Pc 88). The Commentary notes here that these three types of cotton include cotton from all kinds of plants, and that the five kinds of stuffing allowable for mattresses are also allowed for pillows. The largest pillow allowed by the Canon is the size of the head. This, the Commentary says, quoting the Kurundī, means for a triangular pillow, one span and four fingerbreadths from corner to corner, 1 and 1/2 cubits in length, 1 and 1/4 cubits in the middle (i.e., in circumference, says the Sub-commentary, but the numbers don’t add up). The Commentary also states that a bhikkhu who is not ill may use pillows only for his head and feet, whereas an ill bhikkhu may use many pillows, covered with cloth like a mattress. The Canon imposes a dukkaṭa on a bhikkhu using a pillow half the size of the body. Cotton batting, as a blanket or bed-covering, may not be used on its own, but may be combed out into cotton down from which pillows can then be made.

As mentioned in Chapter 3, a mosquito net is allowed.

For some reason, the Commentary to Pr 2—which contains a long list of items that should not be decorated—allows the following items to be decorated: beds, benches, chairs, stools, mattresses/ cushions, pillows, floor coverings, drinking glasses, water flasks, and foot wipers.

Not allowable

The Canon forbids the use of high and great furnishings. Here the Commentary defines high as above the allowable height (as in Pc 87), and great as covered with improper coverings and decorations. Examples listed in the Canon include: a dais (āsandi—a tall square platform, large enough to lie on—see Pc 87), a throne (pallaṅka—a seat with carvings of fierce animals on the feet), a long-haired coverlet, a decorated coverlet, a white spread made of animal hair, a wool coverlet with floral designs, a blanket of cotton batting, a wool coverlet decorated with animals, a wool covering with fleece on both sides, a wool covering with fleece on one side (I follow the Sub-commentary for these two translations), a silken sheet studded with jewels (or woven with silver or gold threads), a silken sheet decorated with jewels (or fringed with silver or gold), a dancer’s carpet, an elephant-back rug, a horse-back rug, a chariot rug, a spread of black antelope skins, a sheet of kadali-deer hide, a bed with a canopy above, a bed with red cushions at either end.

With regard to these items, the Commentary says that a plain silken sheet is allowable, as is a bed with a canopy if it has no improper coverings. As for the bed with red cushions at either end, this means pillows for the head and feet; if one pillow is red and the other another color, the bed is allowable.

In a related section, the Canon prohibits lying down to sleep on a high bed. Bed-leg supports are allowed, but only if they are no more than eight fingerbreadths in height. One should also not lie down on a bed strewn with flowers. A bhikkhu presented with scents may make a five-finger mark at the door. If given flowers, he may put them to one side in the dwelling. As the Vinaya-mukha notes, at present the proper use of scents and flowers is to place them in front of a Buddha image.

There is a prohibition against using large skins, such as lion skin, tiger skin, or leopard skin. This prohibition was partially relaxed for areas outside of the middle Ganges Valley, where a bhikkhu may use sheepskin, goatskin, or deerskin spreads. According to the Commentary, this allowance does not include the skins of monkeys, kadali deer, or any ferocious beast. In addition to beasts that are obviously ferocious, it says that this last category includes cattle, buffalo, rabbits, and cats (!). For some reason, however, the Canon says that a bear hide accruing to the Community—even in the middle Ganges Valley—may be used as a foot-wiping mat.

There is a separate rule forbidding the use of cowhide or any hide. This prohibition is not relaxed outside of the Ganges Valley, although two obvious exceptions everywhere are leather footwear and the leather goods listed as garubhaṇḍa in Chapter 7. The prohibition here seems aimed against hides used as furnishings or as covering for the body.

If visiting a householder’s home, one is allowed to sit on hides or high or great furnishings arranged by them (according to the Sub-commentary, this means belonging to them), with three exceptions: a dais, a throne, or anything covered with cotton batting. However, one is not permitted to lie down on any of these items. Even if a piece of furniture has leather bindings, one is allowed to sit on or lean against it.

Cv.VI.14 cites an instance where a multi-storied palace is presented to the Community, and an allowance is made for “all the appurtenances of a multi-storied building.” If a dais is included among these, it may be used after its legs are cut down to the proper length (see Pc 87); if a throne, it may be used after its fierce animal decorations have been cut off; if a cotton-batting blanket, it may be combed out into cotton down and made into pillows. Any other unallowable furnishings may be made into floor cloths.

The Commentary takes this allowance as carte blanche, including under “all the appurtenances of a multi-storied building” such things as windows, furniture, and fans embellished with silver or gold; water containers and dippers made of silver or gold; and beautifully decorated accessories. Any fancy cloths, it says, may be placed on Dhamma seats under the allowance for “what is arranged by householders;” while any slaves, fields, or cattle that come along with the building are allowable and automatically accepted when the building is accepted. This last statement is in direct contradiction to the Sāmaññaphala Sutta’s list of items that a virtuous bhikkhu does not accept:

“He abstains from accepting uncooked grain… raw meat… women and girls… male and female slaves… goats and sheep… fowl and pigs… elephants, cattle, steeds, and mares… fields and property.”

In saying that the Community as a whole may accept slaves and cattle, even though individual bhikkhus may not, the Commentary may be reasoning from the fact that a Community may own land while an individual bhikkhu may not. Still, in doing so, it is following a line of thought that allowed the extravagant monastic estates of medieval Sri Lanka and India to develop, much to the detriment of the Teaching.

A more reasonable interpretation would be to limit appurtenances to inanimate items, and to apply the rule concerning āsandis, pallaṅkas, and cotton batting to other fancy items inappropriate for a bhikkhu’s use as well. In other words, they should be used only after they have been converted into something more appropriate. As for items that cannot be converted that way, Cv.VI.19 allows that they be exchanged for something profitable and useful (see the following chapter). Slaves and cattle should not be regarded as appurtenances to a lodging, and should not be accepted, either by individual bhikkhus or by Communities.

Etiquette with regard to lodgings

One should not tread on a lodging with unwashed feet, with wet feet, or while wearing footwear. The Commentary defines lodging here as a Community bed or bench, a treated floor, or a floor covering. As for wet feet, it says that if only slight traces of dampness remain where one has stepped, there is no offense.

One should also not spit on a treated floor. Spittoons are allowed as an alternative. To prevent the feet of beds and benches from scratching a treated floor, they may be wrapped in cloth. Here the Commentary says that if there is no mat or other floor covering to protect the floor, the feet of beds and benches must be wrapped in cloth. If there is no cloth, put down leaves as a protection. To place furniture on a treated floor with no protection at all, it says, incurs a dukkaṭa.

One should not lean against a treated wall, so as to keep it from getting stained. Treated, according to the Commentary, means plastered or otherwise decorated. Wall it extends to include doors, windows, and posts of stone or wood. The Canon includes an allowance for a leaning board; and to keep it from scratching the wall or floor, its upper and lower ends may be wrapped in cloth. The Commentary notes that if there is no leaning board, one may use a robe or other cloth as protection for the wall.

One is allowed to lie down on lodgings after having spread a sheet there. According to the Commentary, this rule applies to places where feet must be washed (i.e., a Community bed or bench, a treated floor, or a floor covering, as above). It then proceeds to give an extreme interpretation of this point, saying that if, while one is sleeping, one’s sheet gets pulled away and any part of one’s body touches the lodging, there is a dukkaṭa for every body hair that makes contact. The same holds true for leaning against a bed or bench. The Vinaya-mukha and the Thai translator of the Commentary object strongly to this interpretation, the Vinaya-mukha adding sarcastically, “How fortunate we are that the Buddha allowed us to confess multiple offenses collectively under the term ‘sambahulā,’ for what would we do if we had to count such things?” The only leniency granted by the Commentary is an allowance for touching the lodging with the unprotected palms of one’s hands or soles of one’s feet, and for touching furnishings with one’s body when moving them.

A more reasonable interpretation would be to remember the context of this allowance: It follows on a prohibition aimed against soiling lodgings with dirty or wet feet, and deals specifically with the act of lying down. Thus, simply touching the lodgings with one’s arms, etc., should not entail a penalty. It is also important to remember that the Vinaya generally does not impose penalties for actions done while asleep. As the allowance gives explicit permission to lie down on a lodging after spreading a proper covering, that in itself should be enough to absolve one from any further offense with regard to touching the lodging while lying there. The penalty should be reserved for cases where one lies down on such a lodging without first having spread a proper covering.

Finally, the Vibhaṅga to Pr 1 contains an allowance to the effect that, if a bhikkhu is staying in a lodging with a door that can be closed, he may close the door if he lies down during the day.

Rules

Dwellings

“I allow five (kinds of) lodgings [reading senāsanāni with the Thai edition; the Sri Lankan, Burmese, and PTS editions read leṇāni/lenāni, “shelter,” but senāsana is the term most generally used in the Canon for dwelling places in general (see, for instance, Mv.VI.22.1 and Mv.VIII.26.1)]: a dwelling (vihāra), a barrel-vaulted building (§), a multi-storied building (§), a gabled building, a cell (§).”—Cv.VI.1.2

“I allow that (the dwelling) be made high off the ground”…. “I allow three kinds of pilings to be put up: made of brick, made of stone, made of wood”…. “I allow three kinds of staircases: a staircase made of brick, made of stone, made of wood”…. “I allow a stair railing.”—Cv.VI.3.3

“I allow that, having lashed on (a roof), it be plastered inside and out”…. “I allow three kinds of window-openings: a window with a railing, a window covered with lattice work, a window with bars (§)”…. “I allow curtains”…. “I allow window shutters, small window bolsters.”—Cv.VI.2.2

“I allow white, black, and ochre (§) plastering in a dwelling.” (The white plaster wouldn’t stick to rough walls) “I allow that earth mixed with grain husks be put on and spread with a trowel (§) and then to apply the white plaster”…. “I allow that fine clay be put on and spread with a trowel and then that white plaster be applied”…. “I allow tree sap and wet flour paste.”

(The ochre wouldn’t stick to rough walls) “I allow that earth mixed with grain husks be put on and spread with a trowel and then to apply the ochre plaster”…. “I allow that the red powder from beneath rice husks mixed with clay be put on and spread with a trowel and then that ochre plaster be applied”…. “I allow mustard seed powder and beeswax oil”… (The mixture was too thick) “I allow that it be wiped off with a cloth.”

(The black plaster wouldn’t stick to rough walls) “I allow that earth mixed with grain husks be put on and spread with a trowel and then to apply the black plaster”…. “I allow that earthworm clay (excrement) be put on and spread with a trowel and then that black plaster be applied”…. “I allow tree sap and astringent decoctions.”—Cv.VI.3.1

“One should not have a drawing made of male or female forms. Whoever should have one made: an offense of wrong doing. I allow garland designs, creeper designs, dragon-teeth designs, five-petaled designs.”—Cv.VI.3.2

(The base of a wall collapsed) “I allow a timber buttress”…. (To keep out rain blowing in from the side) “I allow eaves and a paste made of clay, ashes, and cow dung”…. (A snake fell from the roof onto a bhikkhu) “I allow a ceiling/canopy.”—Cv.VI.3.4

“I allow a door”…. “I allow a doorpost and lintel, a hollow like a mortar (for the door to revolve in), a small upper dowel (on the door)”…. (The doors didn’t meet) “I allow a hole for pulling (a cord) through, a cord for pulling through”…. (The doors didn’t stay closed) “I allow a post for the bolt (crossbar?), a ‘monkey’s head (a hole to receive the bolt?),’ a pin (to secure the bolt), a bolt”…. (The doors couldn’t be opened) “I allow a keyhole and three kinds of keys: made of metal, made of wood, made of horn”…. (Dwellings were still broken into) “I allow a lock and a slotted key (§).”—Cv.VI.2.1

(Bhikkhus were embarrassed to lie down in an exposed room) “I allow a curtain”…. “I allow a half-wall”…. “I allow a square private room, a rectangular private room, a private room in the rafters”…. “I allow that the private room be made to one side in a small dwelling, and in the middle of a large one.”—Cv.VI.3.3

“I allow a peg in the wall or an elephant-tusk peg (for hanging bags)”….“I allow a pole for hanging up robes, a cord for hanging up robes”…. “I allow a verandah, a vestibule (§), an inner court, a slat-roofed porch”…. “I allow a moveable (sliding?) screen, a screen on rollers (§).”—Cv.VI.3.5

“I allow (the dwelling) to be fenced in with three kinds of fence: a fence of bricks, a fence of stones, a fence of wood”…. “I allow a porch”…. “I allow that the porch be made high off the ground”…. “I allow a door, a door post and lintel, a hollow like a mortar (for the door to revolve in), a small upper dowel (on the door), a post for the bolt, a ‘monkey’s head (a hole to receive the bolt?),’ a pin (to secure the bolt), a bolt, a keyhole, a hole for pulling (a cord) through, a cord for pulling through”…. “I allow that, having lashed on (a roof), it be plastered inside and out with plaster—white, black, or ochre—with garland designs, creeper designs, dragon-teeth designs, five-petaled designs (§)”…. (The area (§) around the dwelling became muddy) “I allow that it be strewn with gravel”…. “I allow that flagstones be laid down”…. “I allow a water drain.”—Cv.VI.3.8

“I allow five kinds of roofing (facing): tiles, stones, plaster, grass, or leaves.”—Cv.VI.3.11

“An earthenware foot wiper is not to be used. Whoever should use one: an offense of wrong doing. I allow three kinds of foot wipers: stone, stone fragment(s), pumice.”—Cv.V.22.1

Dwellings are to be “established” for the Community of the four directions, present and to come.—Cv.VI.1.4

Furnishings

“I allow grass matting”… “I allow a bedplank”… “I allow a wicker bed [C: of twisted (vines/twigs) or woven of bamboo strips]”… “I allow a bed with a frame (attached to the feet)”… “I allow a bench with a frame”… “I allow a bed made of slats… a bench made of slats”… “I allow a bed with curved legs… a bench with curved legs”… “I allow a bed with detachable legs… a bench with detachable legs.”—Cv.VI.2.3

“I allow a square seat (āsandika)”… “I allow a square seat even if high”… “I allow a bench with a back and arms”… “I allow a bench with a back and arms even if tall”… “I allow a wicker bench… a bench plaited with cloth… a ram-legged bench… a bench with interlocking legs… a wooden bench… a stool (chair)… a straw bench.”—Cv.VI.2.4

“I allow that a bed be woven of string/rope”… (Not enough for a close weave) “I allow, having pierced holes (in the frame), to weave a checkerboard weave”… (A rag accrued) “I allow that an under-pad (§)be made”… (Cotton batting accrued) “I allow that, having combed it out, to make a pillow. Three kinds of cotton down: from trees, from creepers, from grass”… “A pillow half the size of the body should not be used. Whoever should use one: an offense of wrong doing. I allow a pillow to be made the size of the head.”—Cv.VI.2.6

“I allow five kinds of mattresses/cushions: (stuffed with) animal hair, cloth, bark fibers, grass, leaves”… (Cloth for lodging requisites accrued) “I allow that it be used to cover mattresses/cushions”… “I allow an upholstered bed, an upholstered bench”(i.e., covered with a cushion or mattress)… “I allow that a cushion/mattress be placed (on a bed/bench only) after a cloth under-pad (§) has been made and spread”… (To identify a mattress/cushion cover in case it is stolen) “I allow that a spot be made on it… that a printed mark be made on it… that a hand print be made on it.”—Cv.VI.2.7

“One should not use high and great furnishings for reclining, such as a dais (§), a throne (§), a long-haired coverlet, a decorated coverlet, a white spread made of animal hair, a wool coverlet with floral designs, a blanket of cotton batting, a wool coverlet decorated with animals, a wool covering with fleece on both sides, a wool covering with the fleece on one side, a silken sheet studded with jewels (woven with silver or gold threads), a silken sheet decorated with jewels (fringed with silver or gold), a dancer’s carpet, an elephant-back rug, a horse-back rug, a chariot rug, a spread of black antelope skins, a sheet of kadali-deer hide, a bed (§) with a canopy above, a bed with red cushions at either end. Whoever should use them: an offense of wrong doing.”—Mv.V.10.5

“Large skins, such as a lion skin, a tiger skin, a leopard skin, should not be used. Whoever should use them: an offense of wrong doing.”—Mv.V.10.6

“And one should not make use of a cow-hide. Whoever should make use of one: an offense of wrong doing. Nor should one make use of any hide. Whoever should make use of one: an offense of wrong doing.”—Mv.V.10.10

(A bear hide accrued to the Community) “I allow that it be made into a foot-wiping mat.”—Cv.VI.19

“I allow in all outlying districts hide-coverings: sheepskin, goatskin, deerskin.”—Mv.V.13.13

“One should not lie down to sleep on a high bed. Whoever should do so: an offense of wrong doing”… (A bhikkhu was bitten by a snake while lying on a low bed) “I allow bed-leg supports”… “High bed-leg supports should not be used. Whoever should use them: an offense of wrong doing. I allow bed-leg supports eight fingerbreadths at most.”—Cv.VI.2.5

“One should not lie down on a sleeping place strewn with flowers. Whoever should do so: an offense of wrong doing”… “I allow taking scents and making a five-finger mark on the door post, and taking flowers and putting them to one side in a dwelling.”—Cv.V.18

“I allow one to sit on what is arranged by householders, but not to lie down on it… I allow one to sit on (lean against) the amount of hide used for binding.”—Mv.V.11

(Householders, in their own homes, arranged sitting places for bhikkhus that included all the objects forbidden in Mv.V.10.5) “I allow that—aside from a dais, a throne, and a blanket of cotton batting—one sit on (furnishings) arranged for/by householders but not to lie on them”…. (With reference to benches and beds upholstered with cotton down:) “I allow one to sit on what is arranged for/by householders, but not to lie down on it.”—Cv.VI.8

“I allow all the appurtenances (furnishings) of a multi-storied building”… “I allow that a dais with its legs cut off be used; that a throne whose fierce animals (§) have been cut off be used; that a blanket of cotton batting, having been combed out (into cotton down), be made into a pillow (see Cv.VI.2.6); that the remaining unallowable furnishings (see Mv.V.10.5) be made into floor coverings.”—Cv.VI.14

Etiquette in Lodgings

“A lodging should not be trodden on with unwashed feet. Whoever should do so: an offense of wrong doing”… “A lodging should not be trodden on with wet feet. Whoever should do so: an offense of wrong doing”… “A lodging should not be trodden on with sandals on. Whoever should do so: an offense of wrong doing.”—Cv.VI.20.1

“A polished (treated) floor should not be spat on. Whoever should do so: an offense of wrong doing. I allow a spittoon.” Now at that time the feet of beds and benches scratched the polished floor. “I allow that they be wrapped in cloth”… “A treated wall is not to be leaned on. Whoever should do so: an offense of wrong doing. I allow a leaning board.” The lower end scratched the floor; the upper end, the treated wall [following the reading in the Thai and Sri Lankan editions; the PTS edition says that the upper end damaged the treated wall]. “I allow that the upper and lower ends be wrapped in cloth.” (Bhikkhus with washed feet were doubtful about lying down:) “I allow you to lie down having spread a sheet.”—Cv.VI.20.2

CHAPTER SEVEN

Monastery Buildings & Property

Monasteries

One of the earliest allowances in the Buddha’s teaching career was for accepting the donation of a monastery. The context of the allowance suggests that the monastery should be donated to the entire Saṅgha, rather than to individual Communities or bhikkhus. This point is supported by the passage from DN 2, cited in the preceding chapter, which states that a virtuous bhikkhu does not accept fields and property. However, none of the texts discuss this point in detail.

There is an allowance in Mv.VI.15.2 for monastery attendants: lay people whose job is to look after the affairs of the monastery. In feudal and pre-feudal days, these attendants would be given to a monastery by a king or other feudal lord. The origin story to the allowance suggests that in some cases the gift would encompass the inhabitants of an entire village. The tax revenues and corvée labor from the village, instead of going to the secular authorities, would go to the monastery. Again, the Pali Canon and commentaries do not discuss this arrangement in any detail. This is in sharp contrast to the Vinayas of some of the other early schools, such as the Mūlasarvāstivādins, who went to great lengths to prohibit non-Buddhist kings from later rescinding such arrangements. This point argues for the relative lateness of these rules in the other Vinayas: The Buddha was not so foolish as to try to legislate for kings.

The Canon does, however, give a detailed discussion of the buildings allowed in a monastery and of the proper use and distribution of monastic property. In some cases, the distribution of monastic property is handed over to officials chosen by the Community. As this choice involves a Community transaction, all issues related to the responsibilities of Community officials will be discussed in Chapter 18. Here we will discuss monastic buildings and the issues concerning monastic property for which Community officials are not responsible.

Buildings

In addition to dwellings, the monastery may include an uposatha hall (for the chanting of the Pāṭimokkha), an assembly hall (according to the Commentary, this covers halls for holding meetings or for eating meals), a drinking water hall or pavilion, a fire hall (apparently used for boiling water, dyeing robes, etc.), a storehouse, a food storage place, walking meditation paths, a well, a sauna, a hall or pavilion for the kaṭhina frame, bathing and restroom facilities, and surrounding enclosures. (The hall (sāla) in each of these cases is apparently a roofed building without walls; the pavilion (maṇḍapa) is also an open building, but smaller.) The construction details allowed for these buildings resemble those allowed for dwellings. Anyone interested may check the rules at the end of this chapter. Here we will discuss details peculiar to some of these buildings.

Uposatha hall & storehouse

No construction details are given for these buildings. The only rules related to them concern communal transactions, so they will be discussed in Chapters 15 and 18.

Food storage place (kappiya-kuṭi)

This is a space designated within the monastic compound where food may be stored and yet not count as “stored indoors” under Mv.VI.17.3. The Canon allows for a building on the perimeter of the monastery to be designated as a food storage place, but the Commentary maintains that the building may be located anywhere in the monastery.

The Canon lists, without explanation, four types of allowable food storage places. The Commentary quotes a variety of opinions on their precise definitions, which indicates that no one by that time was absolutely sure of what they were. To summarize its discussion:

Ussāvanantika (“limited to the proclamation“ or “conterminous with the proclamation”): According to Buddhaghosa, the ancient Sinhalese commentaries mention several ways for making a storage space of this sort, but he himself recommends this: When starting construction of the storage place, after the foundation has been laid, a group of bhikkhus should gather around and, as the first post is being put in place, say (not in unison),

“Kappiya-kuṭiṁ karoma (We make this allowable hut).”

The statement should end as the post settles in place. If the end of the statement does not coincide with the placing of the post, the statement is invalid. This is why the Mahā Paccarī recommends that several bhikkhus say this not in unison, so that the placing of the post will occur at the end of the statement made by at least one of them. If, instead of setting up a post, the walls of the storage place are built out of stone or brick, the same thing should be done when the first stone/brick is placed on the foundation.

Gonisādikā (“where cattle can rest”): This is an unenclosed or semi-enclosed space that may be built only in an unenclosed monastery. If none of the bhikkhus’ residences are enclosed, the storage space is called an ārāma-gonisādikā. If the monastery as a whole is not enclosed but some of the residences are, it’s called a vihāra-gonisādikā. In either case, the important factor is that the monastery not be enclosed. (The image here is that if a place is unenclosed, cattle can enter and rest at their leisure.)

Gahapatika (set up by or belonging to a lay person): This sort of space is built and donated by the donors specifically to be used as a proper storage place. Buddhaghosa quotes approvingly from the Andhaka, saying that the dwelling of anyone aside from a member of a Bhikkhu Saṅgha counts as a gahapatika. Thus a novice’s dwelling would come under this category, as would a lay person’s dwelling in or outside a monastery.

Sammatikā (authorized): Any of the five allowable types of lodging (Cv.VI.1.2) authorized by a communal transaction (see Appendix I). The Commentary says that a simple announcement to the assembled bhikkhus is sufficient to authorize such a space, but this conflicts with the principle in Mv.IX.3.3 that if a shorter format is used for a transaction requiring a longer format, the transaction is invalid.

The rules concerning this last type of space are confusing. In one passage, the Canon imposes a dukkaṭa for using one; and then, in the following passage, allows its use. Some Communities interpret the first passage as a prohibition against a bhikkhu’s staying in such a place, and the second as an allowance to store food there.

Of the four types, the ussāvanantika loses its status when all the posts or all the walls are taken down. The gonisādikā becomes an improper storage place when it is enclosed. If, however, the enclosure begins to fall down to the point where a cow could enter it, the status of proper storage place returns. As for the remaining two types, they lose their status as proper storage places when all the roofing is destroyed.

Walking meditation paths

Walking meditation paths may be made either by leveling the ground or by building a path on a foundation of brick, stone, or wood. In the latter case, a stairway may be built up to the path, with a railing allowed both for the stairway and surrounding the path. The path may be roofed, the roof may be plastered and decorated with the four allowable designs, and there may be a cord or a pole for hanging up one’s robes.

Wells

Wells may be lined with bricks, stones, or wood, and covered with a roofed hall. Other allowable well equipment includes a rope for drawing water, a well-sweep (a long stick on a pivot with a counter-weight at one end, to help pull a water bucket up from the well), a pulley, a water-wheel, three kinds of buckets—made of metal, wood, or strips of hide—a lid for the well, and a trough or pot/basin for keeping water.

Saunas

In addition to the usual construction details, saunas may be faced (as in Pc 19) and may be built with a projecting gable (on all sides, says the Sub-commentary). A fireplace is to be built to one side in a small sauna, and in the middle of a large one. It may be provided with a chimney. One may smear one’s face with clay as protection against being scorched by the fire; if the clay smells foul, one is allowed to cure it (with perfumed substances, says the Commentary). To protect one’s body from being scorched, one may bring in water. A tank is allowed for storing it, and a dipper is allowed as well. To keep the floor from getting muddy, the sauna may be floored with bricks, stones, or wood. There is also an allowance for washing the floor and providing a water drain. In response to an incident where bhikkhus sitting on the floor of the sauna found their limbs growing numb, there is an allowance for using a chair in the sauna.

Bathing facilities

Separate places for showering and bathing are allowed. The showering place (udaka-candanika) may be enclosed and floored with any of three kinds of material—brick, stone, or wood—and provided with a water drain. A bathing tank may be lined with any of the same sorts of materials and, if necessary, built up high off the ground.

Restroom facilities

Separate places are allowed for urinating, defecating, and rinsing oneself with water after defecating. The urinal in use at the Buddha’s time consisted of a pot with footrests on either side. The restroom (outhouse) for defecating was built over a cesspool lined with brick, stones, or wood. The cesspool had a cover with a hole in the middle and footrests on either side. (The cover was allowed after bhikkhus “defecating as they sat on the edge (of the cesspool) fell in.”) In both cases, the Commentary says, the footrests could be made of brick/tile, stone, or wood. A lid was allowed for the cesspool opening, as was a urine trough. The construction details allowed for the restroom built over the cesspool are similar to those for a dwelling. A sling was also allowed so that old or sick bhikkhus could pull themselves up from the squatting position after defecating. Wood sticks were used for wiping—a receptacle was allowed for placing used sticks—and the job was finished by rinsing with water. A separate place was set aside for rinsing, with its own lidded water pot, ladle, and footrests. Further details concerning the etiquette in using the restroom facilities may be found in Chapter 9.

Enclosures

Three kinds of enclosures are allowed. Because there is a separate allowance for fences around dwellings, this list is apparently meant for the enclosures around the monastery as a whole: a hedge of bamboo, a hedge of thorns, and a moat. None of the texts explain why the three materials allowed for fences around a dwelling—bricks, stones, or wood—are not mentioned here as well. Two possible explanations come to mind: Perhaps bricks, stones, and wood were considered too expensive in the time of the Buddha for such a large enclosure; or perhaps the allowance for fences was meant to apply here as well. Since the medieval period, Communities have apparently assumed the second explanation, as there is evidence for brick enclosures around monastic ruins dating from that time, and brick and concrete block enclosures are still common around monasteries in Theravāda countries today.

The enclosure may have a roofed gatehouse, and the entrance may be provided with a gate of thorns and brambles, a double door, an archway, and a bar connected to a pulley. To keep the area within the enclosure from getting muddy, it may be strewn with gravel, laid with flagstones, and provided with a water drain.

Monastery property

If the Community is given fancy items of value—examples mentioned in the Canon include costly woolen blankets and costly woven cloths—they may be traded “for something profitable.” This, the Commentary says, means that they may be traded for allowable objects of equal or higher value. (However, the trade should be arranged in a way that does not violate the etiquette of kappiya vohāra as stipulated under NP 20.) If the Community receives bear hide, rags, and similar items that cannot be made into robes, they may be made into foot-wiping mats. (The allowance for bear hide here is unusual; it is apparently the only hide that can be used in this way, and there is no telling why.) Cloth that can be made into robes, when given to the Community, falls under the aegis of the Community official responsible for accepting, keeping, and distributing cloth (see Chapter 18).

Furnishings given for use in a particular dwelling are not to be moved elsewhere. However, they may be borrowed temporarily and also moved “to protect them” (e.g., if the roof of the dwelling in which they are located starts to leak). The Commentary adds here that if, when taking them to protect them, one uses them as Community property and they wear out with normal use, there is no need to make reimbursement. When the original dwelling is repaired and able to protect furnishings, one should return them if they are in shape to return. If one has used them as one’s own personal property and they wear out, one must reimburse the Community. The Commentary’s notion of reimbursement, however, comes under the idea of bhaṇḍadeyya, which—as we saw under Pr 2—has no basis in the Canon.

This arrangement—of giving furniture and other “lodging” items specifically for use in a particular dwelling—is the closest reference in the Canon to an arrangement that looms large in the Commentary and in the Vinayas of the other early schools: a dwelling given by a donor who continues to take a proprietary interest in the dwelling, its furnishings, and its inhabitants. This practice may have grown out of the arrangement mentioned in Sg 7, in which a donor sponsors the construction of a dwelling, but aside from the above rule the Canon does not recognize it.

Apparently, one of the possible duties for monastery attendants was to farm for the monastery. Thus there is a ruling in the Canon that when seed of the Community has been planted in the land of an individual, or if the seed of an individual has been planted in the land of the Community, it may be consumed by the bhikkhus after having given the individual a portion.

The Canon lists five classes of Community belongings that cannot be given out to any individual or divided up among the bhikkhus, even by a Community transaction or through the agency of a Community official. Any bhikkhu who does give out or divide up these belongings incurs a thullaccaya—and even then the belongings do not count as given out or divided up. They are still the property of the Community. The five classes are:

1) A monastery, the site of/for a monastery.

2) A dwelling, the site of/for a dwelling.

3) A bed, bench, mattress, pillow.

4) A metal pot, a metal basin, a metal jar/bottle, a metal vessel/frying pan (wok), a knife/machete, an axe, an adze, a hoe, a drill/chisel.

5) Vines, bamboo, coarse grass, reeds, tiṇa-grass, clay (all of these can be used as building materials), wooden goods, clay goods.

The Commentary has a fair amount to say about these items. The site of a monastery it interprets as land intended for a monastery or the site of an abandoned monastery; it gives a similar definition for the site of a dwelling. Under the fourth category, it says that knife means large knives (such as machetes) and large shears; chisel/drill means those with handles, while other metal tools of carpenters, lathe-workers, jewelers, and leather-workers would also come under this sub-category. However, small metal vessels of the sort designed to be carried on one’s person are all right to distribute.

Under the fifth category, it interprets vines as those at least a half-arm’s length. Vines, grass, and reeds that have already been used and are left over from construction work are all right to distribute. The word bamboo is meant to cover bamboo to be used for construction. Small bamboo items such as canes, small oil containers, or umbrella parts are all right to distribute. Buddhaghosa reports a disagreement between the Kurundī and the Mahā Aṭṭhakathā on what is included under wooden goods here. According to the Kurundī, this sub-category includes all leather goods and any wooden goods larger than an 8” needle. According to the Mahā Aṭṭhakathā, it includes all furniture and wooden articles (although furniture would seem to come under category (3)), with the exception of a water flask—whether made of real wood, bamboo, goat leather, or leaves. Allowable leather goods (such as sandals) are not included here. Also not included are: unfinished furniture parts, canes/staffs, shoes, fire-generating sticks, filters, water jugs/flasks, small horn flasks, ointment boxes, and buttons. As for clay goods, the Commentary says that this sub-category covers dishes, pottery, bricks, tiles, chimney tiles, and water or drain pipes. Alms bowls and small clay vessels of the sort designed to be carried on one’s person are not included here, and so are all right to distribute.

Reasoning from the Great Standards, we can say that all construction materials donated to the Community would come under category (5).

For purposes of generalization, the Commentary divides these five categories into two major classes:

thāvara-vatthu (permanent items), categories (1) and (2); and

garubhaṇḍa (heavy or expensive goods), categories (3), (4), and (5).

Although none of the items in either of these two classes may be given away, they may be exchanged for other items in the same class. Thus, a dwelling may be exchanged for the site of a monastery. Taking a loss in the trade is permissible if a good reason justifies it (although this would seem to contradict the Commentary’s own interpretation of Cv.VI.19). If the trade will turn a profit for the Community, the bhikkhus making the trade must point this out to the other side. If the other side still wants to go ahead with the trade, fine and good. It is also permissible to trade one expensive item for a larger number of inexpensive items in the same class; and to trade items inappropriate for the bhikkhus’ use—such as goods made of gold, silver, gold alloys, or crystal—for appropriate items.

The Sub-commentary gives permission to exchange garubhaṇḍa for thāvara-vatthu.

The Commentary adds that during a famine, the bhikkhus in a monastery may sell off garubhaṇḍa for food, so that enough bhikkhus will be able to stay there to look after the remaining property, but there is nothing in the Canon to support this.

Cetiya property

The Commentary to Pr 2 makes a clear distinction between belongings of the Community and belongings given to a cetiya. Under no circumstances should items given to a cetiya—this includes stūpas and Buddha images—be treated as Community property.

Rules

“Bhikkhus, I allow a park (monastery).”—Mv.I.22.18

“I allow a monastery attendant.”—Mv.VI.15.2

Assembly Hall

“ I allow an assembly hall”… “I allow that it be made high off the ground”… “I allow three kinds of pilings to be put up: made of brick, made of stone, made of wood”… “I allow three kinds of staircases: a staircase made of brick, made of stone, made of wood”… “I allow a stair railing”… “I allow that, having lashed on (a roof), it be plastered inside and out with plaster—white, black, or ochre (§)—with garland designs, creeper designs, dragon-teeth designs, five-petaled designs (§), a pole for hanging up robes, a cord for hanging up robes”… “I allow a pole for hanging up robes, a cord for hanging up robes in the open air.”—Cv.VI.3.6

Drinking Water Hall

“I allow a hall for drinking water, a pavilion for drinking water”… “I allow that it be made high off the ground”… “I allow three kinds of pilings to be put up: made of brick, made of stone, made of wood”… “I allow three kinds of staircases: a staircase made of brick, made of stone, made of wood”… “I allow a stair railing”… “I allow that, having lashed on (a roof), it be plastered inside and out with plaster—white, black, or ochre—with garland designs, creeper designs, dragon-teeth designs, five-petaled designs, a pole for hanging up robes, a cord for hanging up robes”… “I allow a conch-shell cup for drinking water [C: this includes a ladle and a tumbler or bowl], a small dipper for drinking water.”—Cv.VI.3.7

Fire Hall

“I allow a fire-hall off to one side (of the monastery)”…. “I allow that it be made high off the ground”… “I allow three kinds of pilings to be put up: made of brick, made of stone, made of wood”…. “I allow three kinds of staircases: a staircase made of brick, made of stone, made of wood”… “I allow a stair railing”…. “I allow a door, a door post and lintel, a hollow like a mortar (for the door to revolve in), a small upper dowel (on the door), a post for the bolt, a ‘monkey’s head (a hole to receive the bolt?),’ a pin (to secure the bolt), a bolt, a keyhole, a hole for pulling (a cord) through, a cord for pulling through”…. “I allow that, having lashed on (a roof), it be plastered inside and out with plaster—white, black, or ochre—with garland designs, creeper designs, dragon-teeth designs, five-petaled designs, a pole for hanging up robes, a cord for hanging up robes.”—Cv.VI.3.9

Storage for Food

“In that case, Ānanda, the Community, having authorized a building on the perimeter as a proper storage place, let it (food) be kept there—wherever the Community desires: a dwelling, a barrel-vaulted building, a multi-storied building, a gabled building, a cell.” Transaction statement—Mv.VI.33.2

“One should not make use of an authorized proper storage place. Whoever makes use of one: an offense of wrong doing. I allow three types of proper storage places: conterminous with the proclamation, a cattle-resting (place), a lay-person’s (place).”—Mv.VI.33.4

“I allow that an authorized proper storage place be used. I allow four types of proper storage places: conterminous with the proclamation, a cattle-resting (place), a lay-person’s (place), and authorized.”—Mv.VI.33.5

Walking Meditation Path

“I allow a walking meditation path.”—Cv.V.14.1

“I allow that it (the walking meditation path) be made level”… “I allow that it be made high off the ground”… “I allow three kinds of pilings to be put up: made of brick, made of stone, made of wood”… “I allow three kinds of staircases: a staircase made of brick, made of stone, made of wood”… “I allow a stair railing”… (Bhikkhus fell off the high path) “I allow a railing around the walking meditation path”… (Bhikkhus were bothered by the cold and heat while doing walking meditation ) “I allow a walking meditation hall”… “I allow that, having lashed on (a roof), it be plastered inside and out with plaster—white, black, or ochre—with garland designs, creeper designs, dragon-teeth designs, five-petaled designs, a pole for hanging up robe material, a cord for hanging up robe material.”—Cv.V.14.2

Well

“I allow a well”… “I allow that it be lined with three kinds of lining: a lining of bricks, a lining of stones, a lining of wood”… (Too low) “I allow that it be made high off the ground”… “I allow three kinds of pilings to be put up: made of brick, made of stone, made of wood”… “I allow three kinds of staircases: a staircase made of brick, made of stone, made of wood”… “I allow a stair railing”… “I allow a rope for drawing water”…“ I allow a well-sweep… a pulley… a water-wheel”… “I allow three kinds of buckets: metal, wooden, and made from strips of hide”… “I allow a hall for the well”… “I allow that, having lashed on (a roof), it be plastered inside and out with plaster—white, black, or ochre—with garland designs, creeper designs, dragon-teeth designs, five-petaled designs, a pole for hanging up robes, a cord for hanging up robes”… “I allow a lid (for the well)”… “I allow a trough for keeping water, a basin for keeping water.”—Cv.V.16.2

Sauna

“I allow a sauna (§).”—Cv.V.14.1

“I allow that the sauna be made high off the ground”… “I allow three kinds of pilings to be put up: made of brick, made of stone, made of wood”… “I allow three kinds of staircases: a staircase made of brick, made of stone, made of wood”… “I allow a stair railing”… “I allow a door, a door post and lintel, a hollow like a mortar (for the door to revolve in), a small upper dowel (on the door), a post for the bolt (crossbar), a ‘monkey’s head,’ a pin (to secure the bolt), a bolt, a keyhole, a hole for pulling (a cord) through, a cord for pulling through”….

“I allow a facing (see Pc 19)”… “I allow a chimney (§)”… “I allow that a fireplace be built to one side in a small sauna, and in the middle of a large one”… (Fire scorched the face) “I allow clay for the face”… “I allow a small trough for the clay”… (The clay smelled foul) “I allow that it be cured [C: with perfumed substances]”… (Fire scorched their bodies) “I allow that water be brought in”… “I allow a tank for the water, a dipper (without a handle) for the water”… (A sauna with a grass roof didn’t make them sweat) “I allow that, having lashed on (a roof), it be plastered inside and out”… (It became muddy) I allow it to be floored with three kinds of flooring: a flooring of bricks, a flooring of stones, a flooring of wood”… “I allow that it be washed”… “I allow a water drain”… (Sitting down on the floor, bhikkhus got numb in their limbs) “I allow a chair for the sauna”… “I allow it to be fenced in with three kinds of fence: a fence of bricks, a fence of stones, a fence of wood.”—Cv.V.14.3

“I allow a sauna with a projecting gable (§).”—Cv.V.17.2

“I allow a porch”… “I allow that the porch be made high off the ground”… “I allow three kinds of pilings to be put up: made of brick, made of stone, made of wood”… “I allow three kinds of staircases: a staircase made of brick, made of stone, made of wood”… “I allow a stair railing”… “I allow a door, a door post and lintel, a hollow like a mortar (for the door to revolve in), a small upper dowel (on the door), a post for the bolt, a ‘monkey’s head,’ a pin (to secure the bolt), a bolt, a keyhole, a hole for pulling (a cord) through, a cord for pulling through”…. “I allow that, having lashed on (a roof), it be plastered inside and out with plaster—white, black, or ochre—with garland designs, creeper designs, dragon-teeth designs, five-petaled designs.”—Cv.V.14.4

(The area (§) around the sauna became muddy) “I allow that it be strewn with gravel”… “I allow that flagstones be laid down”… “I allow a water drain.”—Cv.V.14.5

(In the sauna): “I allow in the sauna a pole for hanging up robes, a cord for hanging up robes”… (Robes got wet in rain) “I allow a sauna-hall”… “I allow that it be made high off the ground”… “I allow three kinds of pilings to be put up: made of brick, made of stone, made of wood”… “I allow three kinds of staircases: a staircase made of brick, made of stone, made of wood”… “I allow a stair railing”… “I allow that, having lashed on (a roof) it be plastered inside and out with plaster—white, black, or ochre—with garland designs, creeper designs, dragon-teeth designs, five-petaled designs, a pole for hanging up robes, a cord for hanging up robes.”—Cv.V.16.1

Kaṭhina Hall

“I allow a hall for the kaṭhina-frame, a pavilion for the kaṭhina-frame”… “I allow that it be made high off the ground”… “I allow three kinds of pilings to be put up: made of brick, made of stone, made of wood”… “I allow three kinds of staircases: a staircase made of brick, made of stone, made of wood”… “I allow a stair railing”… “I allow that, having lashed on (a roof), it be plastered inside and out with plaster—white, black, or ochre—with garland designs, creeper designs, dragon-teeth designs, five-petaled designs, a pole for hanging up robes/robe-cloth, a cord for hanging up robes/robe-cloth.”—Cv.V.11.6

Bathing & Restroom Facilities

(see also: Protocols, Chapter 9)

“I allow a showering place (§)” .… “I allow it to be fenced in with three kinds of fence: a fence of bricks, a fence of stones, a fence of wood” .… “I allow it to be floored with three kinds of flooring: a flooring of bricks, a flooring of stones, a flooring of wood”… “I allow a water drain.”—Cv.V.17.1

“I allow a bathing tank”… “I allow that it be lined with three kinds of lining: a lining of bricks, a lining of stones, a lining of wood”… (Too low) “I allow that it be made high off the ground”…. “I allow three kinds of pilings to be put up: made of brick, made of stone, made of wood”… “I allow three kinds of staircases: a staircase made of brick, made of stone, made of wood”… “I allow a stair railing”…. (The water became stale) “I allow an aqueduct, I allow a water drain.”—Cv.V.17.2

“I allow that you urinate off to one side (of the monastery)”… (The place smelled foul) “I allow a urine pot”… “I allow urinal footrests (see Mv.V.8.3)”… “I allow it to be fenced in with three kinds of fence: a fence of bricks, a fence of stones, a fence of wood”… “I allow a lid (for the pot).”—Cv.V.35.1 (see Cv.VII.9-10)

“I allow that you defecate off to one side (of the monastery)”… (The place smelled foul) “I allow a cesspool”… (The wall of the cesspool caved in) “I allow that it be lined with three kinds of lining: a lining of bricks, a lining of stones, a lining of wood”… (Too low) “I allow that it be made high off the ground”… “I allow three kinds of pilings to be put up: made of brick, made of stone, made of wood”… “I allow three kinds of staircases: a staircase made of brick, made of stone, made of wood”… “I allow a stair railing.” (Defecating as they sat on the edge (§) (of the cesspool), they fell in)… “I allow that you defecate having covered (the cesspool) and put a hole in the middle”… “I allow restroom footrests.”—Cv.V.35.2

“I allow a urine trough (in the restroom (§))”… “I allow wood for wiping”… “I allow a receptacle for wiping wood”… “I allow a lid (for the cesspool opening)”… “I allow a restroom hut”… “I allow a door, a door post and lintel, a hollow like a mortar (for the door to revolve in), a small upper dowel (on the door), a post for the bolt, a ‘monkey’s head,’ a pin (to secure the bolt), a bolt, a keyhole, a hole for pulling (a cord) through, a cord for pulling through”…. “I allow that, having lashed on (a roof), it be plastered inside and out with plaster—white, black, or ochre—with garland designs, creeper designs, dragon-teeth designs, five-petaled designs, a pole for hanging up robes, a cord for hanging up robes”… “I allow a sling (to pull oneself up with) (§)”…. “I allow it to be fenced in with three kinds of fence: a fence of bricks, a fence of stones, a fence of wood.”—Cv.V.35.3

“I allow a porch”… “I allow that the porch be made high off the ground”… “I allow three kinds of pilings to be put up: made of brick, made of stone, made of wood”…. “I allow three kinds of staircases: a staircase made of brick, made of stone, made of wood”…. “I allow a stair railing”…. “I allow a door, a door post and lintel, a hollow like a mortar (for the door to revolve in), a small upper dowel (on the door), a post for the bolt, a ‘monkey’s head,’ a pin (to secure the bolt), a bolt, a keyhole, a hole for pulling (a cord) through, a cord for pulling through”…. “I allow that, having lashed on (a roof), it be plastered inside and out with plaster—white, black, or ochre—with garland designs, creeper designs, dragon-teeth designs, five-petaled designs”…. (The area (§) around the restroom hut became muddy) “I allow that it be strewn with gravel”… “I allow that flagstones be laid down”… “I allow a water drain”… “I allow a pot for rinsing water”…. “I allow a dipper for rinsing water”…. “I allow rinsing footrests”…. “I allow it to be fenced in with three kinds of fence: a fence of bricks, a fence of stones, a fence of wood.” “I allow a lid for the pot for rinsing water.”—Cv.V.35.4

Enclosures

“I allow three kinds of enclosures: an enclosure (hedge) of bamboo, an enclosure (hedge) of thorns, a moat (§)”… “I allow a gatehouse, a gate of thorns and brambles, a double door (§), an archway, a bar connected to a pulley”… “I allow that, having lashed on (a roof), it be plastered inside and out with plaster—white, black, or ochre—with garland designs, creeper designs, dragon-teeth designs, five-petaled designs”… (The area (§) around the monastery became muddy) “I allow that it be strewn with gravel”… “I allow that flagstones be laid down”… “I allow a water drain.”—Cv.VI.3.10

Communal Belongings

“The furnishings of one place are not to be used in another place. Whoever should do so: an offense of wrong doing”…. “I allow that things be taken temporarily”…. “I allow that they be taken for the sake of protecting (them).”—Cv.VI.18

(A costly woolen blanket, the appurtenance of a lodging, accrued to the Community… a costly woven cloth) “I allow that it be traded for something profitable”…. (A bear hide… a wheel-like foot wiper covered with wool (§)… a rag accrued to the Community) “I allow that it be made into a foot mat.”—Cv.VI.19

“When seed of the Community has been planted in the land of an individual, it may be consumed after having given (the individual) a portion. When seed of an individual has been planted in the land of the Community, it may be consumed after having given (the individual) a portion.”—Mv.VI.39

“These five things not-to-be-given-out should not be given out by a Community, a group, or an individual. Even when they have been given out, they are not (to be considered as) given out. Whoever should give them out: a grave offense. Which five?

1) A monastery, the land of a monastery (a site for a monastery). This is the first thing not to be given out….

2) A dwelling, the land of a dwelling (a site for a dwelling). This is the second thing not to be given out….

3) A bed, bench, mattress, pillow. This is the third thing not to be given out….

4) A metal pot, a metal vessel, a metal jar/bottle, a metal frying pan/wok, a knife/machete, an axe, an adze, a hoe, a drill/chisel. This is the fourth thing not to be given out….

5) Vines, bamboo, coarse grass, reeds, tiṇa-grass, clay (all of which can be used as building materials), wooden goods, clay goods. This is the fifth thing not to be given out….

These are the five things not-to-be-given-out that should not be given out by a Community, a group, or an individual. Even when they have been given out, they are not (to be considered as) given out. Whoever should give them out: a grave offense.”—Cv.VI.15.2

“These five things not-to-be-divided-up (not-to-be-distributed).” See (as above) Cv.VI.16.2

CHAPTER EIGHT

Respect

An attitude of proper respect is a sign of intelligence. As SN 6:2 indicates, it is a requisite condition for gaining knowledge and skill, for it creates the atmosphere in which learning can take place. This is especially true in a bhikkhu’s training, where so little can be learned through impersonal means such as books, and so much must be learned through personal interaction with one’s teachers and fellow bhikkhus. AN 8:2 notes that the first prerequisite for the discernment basic to the holy life is living in apprenticeship to a teacher for whom one has established a strong sense of respect. This attitude of respect opens the heart to learn from others, and shows others one’s willingness to learn. At the same time, it gives focus and grounding to one’s life. SN 6:2 reports the Buddha as saying, “One suffers if dwelling without reverence or deference.” This was why, after his Awakening—when he had nothing further to learn in terms of virtue, concentration, discernment, release, or knowledge and vision of release—he decided to honor and respect the Dhamma to which he had awakened.

However, an attitude of respect benefits not only the individual who shows respect, but also the religion as a whole. AN 7:56 maintains that for the true Dhamma to stay alive, the bhikkhus, bhikkhunīs, male lay followers, and female lay followers must show respect and deference for the Buddha, Dhamma, and Saṅgha; for the training, concentration, heedfulness, and the duties of hospitality. If the proper respect and deference were lacking, how would the true Dhamma survive?

In response to these reflections, the Saṅgha has developed an etiquette of respect that is quite elaborate, with many variations from country to country, and Community to Community. A wise policy is to become fluent in the “respect vocabulary” of one’s Community, even in areas not covered by the Vinaya, for the sake of the Community’s smooth functioning. It is also wise to know which aspects of respect are required by the Vinaya and which are open to variation, so that one will learn tolerance for those variations wherever they occur.

Some of the Vinaya’s rules concerning respect—such as duties toward one’s mentors, the proper hospitality to show to bhikkhus newly-arrived in one’s monastery, and the etiquette for showing respect for Saṅgha property—are included in the protocols discussed in the following chapter. Here we will cover the rules concerning respect that lie outside of those protocols. These rules cover five areas: paying homage, respect for the Dhamma, seniority, the proper response to criticism, and prohibitions against improper jokes.

Paying homage

A regular bhikkhu should pay homage to three sorts of people: the Buddha, a bhikkhu senior to him, and a senior bhikkhu of a separate affiliation (see Appendix V) who speaks (teaches) what is Dhamma. Homage here means bowing down, rising up to greet, doing añjali (placing the hands palm-to-palm over the heart), and performing other forms of respect due to superiors. At the same time, a regular bhikkhu is prohibited from paying homage to ten sorts of people: a bhikkhu junior to him, an unordained person, a woman, a paṇḍaka, a senior bhikkhu of a separate affiliation who speaks (teaches) what is not Dhamma; a bhikkhu undergoing probation; a bhikkhu deserving to be sent back to the beginning; a bhikkhu deserving penance; a bhikkhu undergoing penance; a bhikkhu deserving rehabilitation. (These last five are bhikkhus in various stages of undergoing the procedures for rehabilitation from a saṅghādisesa offense. For the duties of respect incumbent on them, see Chapter 19.) However, it is the custom in Thailand for a senior bhikkhu to do añjali to a junior bhikkhu when the latter is bowing down to him. This is an area where the wise policy is to follow the standards of one’s own Community.

The Vinaya-mukha questions the propriety of bhikkhus’ not paying homage to people outside of their own group, but this misses the symbolism of this simple act: that bhikkhus have renounced the benefits and responsibilities that come from the normal give-and-take of lay society in favor of the freedom that comes from living on society’s edge.

Teaching Dhamma

Sk 57-72 prohibit one from teaching the Dhamma to a person whose attitude shows disrespect, and other rules also demand respect for the Dhamma. For instance, when in the midst of the Community, the only bhikkhus allowed to teach Dhamma are the most senior bhikkhu or any bhikkhu he has invited to teach. If a junior bhikkhu has been invited to teach the Dhamma, he should sit on a seat no lower than that of the most senior bhikkhu; the senior bhikkhu may sit on a seat equal to that of the bhikkhu teaching the Dhamma or on a lower one.

One is not allowed to deliver the Dhamma with a drawn-out singing voice (sara, the word for “voice” here, also means “vowel” and “sound”). The disadvantages to such a delivery are that one becomes impassioned with one’s voice; others become impassioned with it; householders look down on one; as one desires to contrive the sound of one’s voice, one’s concentration lapses; and people coming after will take it as an example. However, there is an allowance for “sarabhañña”—translated as vowel-reciting. The Commentary notes here that “all 32 techniques of vowel-reciting—such as ‘waves’ (trills? vibrato?) ‘pulling the cow’s teat (!),’ and ‘rough’—are allowable as long as they don’t ‘lose’ the consonants, distort the meaning, or deviate from the etiquette of a contemplative.” What precisely this means is hard to decipher. Many of the sarabhañña chanting styles that have developed in Asia are quite song-like. Different Communities have different ways of drawing the line between drawn-out singing voice and vowel-intoning, and a wise policy for the individual bhikkhu is to hold to an interpretation no less strict than that of the Community to which he belongs.

Cv.V.33.1 reports the efforts of two brahman bhikkhus who set the Buddha’s teachings to meter after objecting to the fact that bhikkhus who had gone forth from different clans, different nationalities, different families were spoiling the Buddha’s words by putting it in “own dialect.” The Buddha however forbade that his teachings be set to meter, and allowed that they be learned by each in “own dialect.”

There are two controversies surrounding these two rules. The first is over the meaning of own dialect. The Commentary insists that it means the Buddha’s own dialect, and that therefore the Dhamma must be memorized in Pali. The context of the story, however, suggests that own dialect means each bhikkhu’s own native dialect. The original reference to bhikkhus of different clans, etc., was a snobbish one (the same phrase shows up in the snobbish comments of Ven. Channa in the origin story to Sg 12), and the two brahman bhikkhus were objecting to the lowly nature of some of the dialects spoken by their fellow bhikkhus. Otherwise, their reference to bhikkhus of different clans, etc., would make no sense in the context of the origin story: The other bhikkhus would have been just as likely to mangle the Buddha’s teachings in metrical form as they would had they tried to memorize them in the Buddha’s own dialect. Also, it is hard to imagine them making a sneering reference to “own dialect” in the Buddha’s presence if, by that, they meant his own dialect. There is epigraphic evidence showing that Pali was not the Buddha’s original dialect—it was instead related to the dialect of Avanti, the area from which Ven. Mahinda left on his mission to Sri Lanka. If the bhikkhus were required to memorize the Buddha’s teachings in the latter’s own dialect, those teachings would never have been put into Pali. So the allowance must have been for bhikkhus to memorize the Buddha’s teachings each in his own dialect. In showing respect for the Dhamma, there is thus no need to state it in Pali.

The second controversy centers on what is meant by setting the teachings to meter. The Commentary states that it means translating them into a Sanskrit text “like a Veda,” and here the Commentary seems on more solid ground. However, its explanation needs to be further refined for the Buddha’s prohibition to make sense. Meter (chandas) was a Sanskrit term for the Vedas. Thus, to set (literally, “raise”) the Buddha’s teaching into meter meant turning it not just into a text like a Veda, but into an actual Veda, with all the long-term limitations that that would have entailed. After the passage of a few generations, only specialists would be in a position to understand and interpret it. Because the brahmans had made a specialty of mastering the Vedas, the “Buddha-veda” most likely would have become their exclusive possession, subject to interpretations that would have favored their caste. Also, the Buddha’s words would not have easily spread outside of India. Thus, to avoid these limitations, the Buddha forbade that his teachings be turned into a Veda, and instead allowed his followers to memorize the Dhamma each in his own language.

 Seniority. A formal hierarchy exists within the Community, in which senior bhikkhus not only receive homage from junior bhikkhus but are also granted other privileges as well. This is one aspect of communal life that Westerners find most difficult to adjust to, largely because they interpret it through assumptions and attitudes picked up from hierarchies in Western institutions.

The Community hierarchy does not entail total obedience. This point is illustrated in the duties of a pupil to his mentor: If the pupil feels that the mentor does not have his (the pupil’s) best interests in mind, he is free to leave his mentor. At the same time, position in the hierarchy is not an expression of personal worth. In fact, the Buddha explicitly made it dependent on a totally neutral factor. This is clear from the origin story to the relevant rule:

(The Buddha:) “Who, bhikkhus, is worthy of the best seat, the best water, the best food?”

Some of the bhikkhus said, “Whoever went forth from a noble warrior family is worthy of the best seat, the best water, the best food.” Some of them said, “Whoever went forth from a brahman family… from a householder family… whoever is an expert on the discourses… whoever is an expert on the discipline… whoever is a Dhamma teacher… whoever has gained the first jhāna… the second jhāna… the third jhāna… the fourth jhāna… whoever is a stream-winner… a once-returner… a non-returner… an arahant… a master of the three knowledges… a master of the six cognitive skills is worthy of the best seat, the best water, the best food.”

Then the Blessed One said to the bhikkhus: “Once, bhikkhus, there was a great banyan tree on the slopes of the Himalayas. Three friends lived dependent on it: a partridge, a monkey, and an elephant. They were disrespectful, discourteous, and impolite (§) toward one another. Then the thought occurred to the three friends: ‘Let’s find out which among us is the most senior by birth. We would then pay homage and respect to him, revere him, and honor him. We would then abide by his advice.’

“Then the partridge and the monkey asked the elephant: ‘What ancient thing do you remember?’

“‘When I was young, friends, I used to walk over this banyan tree with it between my thighs, and the topmost buds brushed against my belly. This, friends, is an ancient thing that I remember.’

“Then the partridge and the elephant asked the monkey: ‘What ancient thing do you remember?’

“‘When I was young, friends, I used to sit on the ground and chew off the topmost buds from this banyan tree. This, friends, is an ancient thing that I remember.’

“Then the monkey and the elephant asked the partridge, ‘What ancient thing do you remember?’

“‘Over there in that spot (§), friends, was once a great banyan tree. Having eaten one of its fruits, I relieved myself in this spot. From that, this banyan tree was born. Thus, friends, I am the most senior among us by birth.’

“So the monkey and elephant said to the partridge, ‘You, friend, are the most senior among us by birth. We will pay homage and respect to you, revere you, honor you, and abide by your advice.’

“Then the partridge had the monkey and elephant undertake the five precepts and he himself practiced, having undertaken the five precepts. They—having lived respectful, courteous, and polite toward one another—on the break-up of the body, after death, reappeared in the good bourn, the heavenly world.

“This came to be known as the Partridge’s Holy Life.

They—people skilled in the Dhamma,

who revere their elders—

are praised in the here-and-now,

and have a good destination hereafter.

“Now, if common animals can live respectful, courteous, and polite toward one another, shouldn’t it shine forth that you, having gone forth in such a well-taught Dhamma and Discipline, live respectful, courteous, and polite toward one another?”—Cv.VI.6.2-3

The bhikkhus in the origin-story wanted to make privilege dependent on merit, but the fact that they measured merit in different ways meant that any merit-based hierarchy would have been based on a standard of measurement not acceptable to all. A hierarchy based on seniority, however, is both objective and, in the long run, less oppressive: One’s place in the hierarchy is not a measure of one’s worth. Such a hierarchy also discourages the pride and competition that would come if bhikkhus could fight their way up the hierarchy by outdoing the measurable merit of others. And the fact that junior members in the hierarchy do not take vows of obedience helps keep the senior members in line. If the senior bhikkhus abuse their privileges, the junior bhikkhus are free to leave.

The etiquette surrounding seniority is fairly limited. Junior bhikkhus are expected to pay homage to the senior bhikkhus by bowing down, rising up to greet, doing añjali, and performing other duties of respect (such as scrubbing their backs in the common bath). Senior bhikkhus are entitled to the best seat, the best water, the best food. However, things such as lodgings that belong to the Community or are dedicated to the Community may not be preempted in line with seniority.

Bhikkhus who have more than three years difference in seniority should not sit on the same seat unless the seat is long enough to sit at least three people. (No bhikkhu is allowed to sit on the same seat, regardless of how long it is, with a woman, a paṇḍaka, or a hermaphrodite.)

If one’s preceptor, teacher, or a bhikkhu with enough seniority to be one’s preceptor or teacher is pacing back and forth—e.g., doing walking meditation—without wearing footwear (and within six meters and in plain view, adds the Commentary), one should not pace back and forth wearing footwear. The Commentary interprets preceptor’s seniority as either a friend of one’s preceptor or any other bhikkhu with at least ten years seniority to oneself; teacher’s seniority it interprets as any bhikkhu with at least six years seniority to oneself.

If bathing in the same place, one should not bathe in front of a senior bhikkhu or upstream from him.

The duties of a host bhikkhu to one newly arrived at his monastery are determined by seniority. See the relevant section in Chapter 9.

Exceptions to seniority

There are certain situations where the rules of seniority do not apply.

As mentioned above, one may not preempt Community lodgings on basis of seniority, either for oneself or for others, such as one’s preceptor or teacher.

When two bhikkhus are naked, the senior bhikkhu should not get the junior bhikkhu to bow down to him or to perform a service for him. The junior bhikkhu, even if pressured by the senior bhikkhu, should not bow down to him or perform a service for him. Neither of them should give anything to the other. When these rules were laid down, bhikkhus had scruples about scrubbing or massaging the backs of senior bhikkhus in the sauna or in the water. Therefore—as mentioned in Chapter 2—the Buddha allowed three kinds of covering to count as covering for the body: sauna-covering (i.e., being in the sauna), water-covering (being in the water), and cloth-covering. The Commentary adds that the sauna-covering and water covering count as proper covering for back-scrubbing and massaging but not for the other services mentioned in the above rules. For instance, a junior bhikkhu should not bow down to a senior bhikkhu when both are unclothed in the sauna. Cloth-covering, however, counts as proper covering for all services.

Bhikkhus arriving at a toilet should use it in order of arrival, and not in order of seniority.

If a senior bhikkhu arrives late to a meal and finds a junior bhikkhu in his place in the line-up, he should not get the junior bhikkhu to move as long as the latter has not finished his meal. If he deliberately ignores this rule and tells the junior bhikkhu to move, he is automatically classed as having refused an offer of further food from a donor, which means that after he has finished his meal he falls under Pc 35 for the rest of the day. Also, the junior bhikkhu may tell him, “Go fetch water” (for the junior bhikkhu to rinse out his mouth and bowl)—one of the few instances where a junior bhikkhu can tell a senior bhikkhu to perform a service for him. If this can be arranged, well and good. If not, then the junior bhikkhu should swallow whatever food he has in his mouth and then get up to give the seat to the senior bhikkhu. Under no circumstances should he preempt the senior bhikkhu’s seat.

Finally, there is the case of a Community in which none of the bhikkhus knows the Pāṭimokkha or the proper transactions for the uposatha (see Chapter 15). If a learned bhikkhu comes along, the Canon says that the members of the Community should “further, help, encourage, support” him with chunam, clay (soap), tooth wood, and water for rinsing the mouth/washing the face. If they don’t, they incur a dukkaṭa. The purpose of these services, of course, is to encourage the learned bhikkhu to stay so that he can pass on his knowledge to the other members of the Community. The Commentary adds that the members of the Community should offer other forms of help to the learned bhikkhu as well, such as speaking politely to him and providing him with the four requisites. If no one helps him, all the bhikkhus in the residence—senior and junior—incur a dukkaṭa. If a schedule is set up for looking after him, the offense is incurred only by a bhikkhu who doesn’t fulfill his scheduled duties. If one or two of the resident bhikkhus are capable and volunteer to take over all the duties, the rest of the bhikkhus are freed from any responsibilities. As for the learned bhikkhu, he shouldn’t consent to having more senior bhikkhus perform services such as sweeping his lodging or bringing tooth wood to him. If he already has an attendant traveling with him, he should ask his hosts not to burden themselves with looking after him.

Responding to criticism

Pc 54 requires that a bhikkhu show respect to anyone who criticizes him, regardless of the status of the person, as long as the criticism deals with rules in the Vinaya or with standards of behavior aimed at being “self-effacing, scrupulous, or inspiring; at lessening (defilement) or arousing energy.” For more details, see the explanation of that rule in BMC1.

Jokes

The Vibhaṅga to Sk 51 prohibits a bhikkhu from making a joke about the Buddha, Dhamma, or Saṅgha. The Vibhaṅga to Pc 2 imposes a pācittiya on making insulting fun of another bhikkhu’s race, class, nationality, or any of the other akkosa-vatthu. It imposes a dubbhāsita for joking about the same things with no insult intended. See the explanation of that training rule in BMC1 for further details.

Rules

Paying Homage

“These ten are not to be paid homage: one accepted (ordained) later is not to be paid homage by one accepted earlier; an unordained person; a senior (bhikkhu) of a separate affiliation who teaches what is not Dhamma; a woman; a eunuch; a bhikkhu undergoing probation; a bhikkhu deserving to be sent back to the beginning; a bhikkhu deserving penance; a bhikkhu undergoing penance; a bhikkhu deserving rehabilitation.”

“These three are to be paid homage: one accepted (ordained) earlier is to be paid homage by one accepted later; a senior (bhikkhu) of a separate affiliation who teaches what is Dhamma; the Tathāgata, worthy and rightly self-awakened.”—Cv.VI.6.5

“Bowing down, rising up to greet, greeting with hands raised palm-to-palm over the heart, or performing other forms of respect due to superiors are not to be done to a woman. Whoever should do so: an offense of wrong doing.”—Cv.X.3

Teaching Dhamma

“Dhamma is not to be spoken in the midst of the Community by anyone who is not invited to do so. Whoever should speak it (uninvited): an offense of wrong doing. I allow that the senior bhikkhu speak Dhamma or that he invite another to do so.”—Mv.II.15.5

“I allow a junior bhikkhu explaining Dhamma to sit on an equal seat or a higher one, out of respect for the Dhamma; and a senior bhikkhu to whom the Dhamma is explained to sit on an equal seat or a lower one, out of respect for the Dhamma.”—Cv.VI.13.1

“There are these five disadvantages for one who sings the Dhamma with a drawn-out singing vowel-sound: He himself is impassioned with the vowel-sound. Others are impassioned with the vowel-sound. Householders look down on him. As one desires to contrive (§) the vowel-sound, one’s concentration lapses. People coming after will take it as an example (§)… The Dhamma should not be sung with a drawn-out singing vowel-sound. Whoever should sing it: an offense of wrong doing.”—Cv.V.3.1

“I allow vowel-reciting.”—Cv.V.3.2

“The speech of the Awakened One is not to be raised into meter (a Veda) (§). Whoever should do so: an offense of wrong doing. I allow that the speech of the Awakened One be learned in one’s own dialect.”—Cv.V.33.1

Seniority

“I allow, in accordance with seniority, bowing down, rising up to greet, greeting with hands raised palm-to-palm over the heart, performing forms of respect due to superiors, the best seat, the best water, the best food. But what belongs to the Community should not be preempted (§) in accordance with seniority. Whoever should do so: an offense of wrong doing.”—Cv.VI.6.4

“I allow you to sit together (on the same piece of furniture) with those entitled to an equal seat”… “I allow you to sit together with one within three years of standing”… “I allow (you to sit) three to a bed, three to a bench (§)”… (The bed and bench broke) “I allow you to sit two to a bed, two to a bench”… “Except for a paṇḍaka, a woman, or a hermaphrodite, I allow you to sit together on a long seat with one not entitled to an equal seat”… “I allow one sufficient for three people as the shortest (§) long seat.”—Cv.VI.13.2

“When one’s teacher, one with a teacher’s seniority, one’s preceptor, (or) one with a preceptor’s seniority is pacing back and forth without wearing leather footwear, one should not pace back and forth wearing leather footwear. Whoever should wear it: an offense of wrong doing.”—Mv.V.4.3

“One should not bathe in front of the elder bhikkhus or upstream from them.”—Cv.VIII.8.2

Exceptions to Seniority

“But what belongs to the Community should not be preempted (§) in accordance with seniority. Whoever should do so: an offense of wrong doing.”—Cv.VI.6.4

“Whatever is dedicated (to the Community) should not be preempted (§) in accordance with seniority. (In the origin story, this refers to spots that aren’t dwellings per se, but can be used as dwellings.) Whoever should do so: an offense of wrong doing.”—Cv.VI.7

Following the Burmese and PTS editions: “One who is naked should neither bow down to nor be bowed down to by one who is naked. One who is naked should not cause another to bow down (to him). One who is naked should not be caused to bow down. One who is naked should not do a service (parikamma) for one who is naked. One who is naked should not be caused to do a service for one who is naked. One who is naked should not be given anything by one who is naked. Nothing is to be accepted by one who is naked. Nothing is to be chewed…. eaten…. tasted… drunk by one who is naked. Whoever should (chew… eat… taste …) drink: an offense of wrong doing.”—Cv.V.15

Now at that time bhikkhus had scruples about back-scrubbing/massaging (piṭṭhi-parikamma) (§) in the sauna and in the water. “I allow three kinds of covering (to count as covering for the body): sauna-covering, water-covering, cloth-covering.”—Cv.V.16.2

“One should not defecate in the toilet in order of seniority. Whoever should do so: an offense of wrong doing. I allow that one defecate in order of arrival.”—Cv.VIII.10.1

“When (his) meal is unfinished, a bhikkhu should not be made to get up [following the Burmese and PTS editions; the Thai edition says, “When (his) meal is unfinished, an adjacent bhikkhu should not be made to get up”]. Whoever should make him get up: an offense of wrong doing. If one makes him get up, one counts as having been invited (and having refused further food—see Pc 35) (§) and is to be told (by the junior bhikkhu), ‘Go fetch water (for me).’ If that can be managed, well and good. If not, then having properly swallowed his rice (i.e., the food in his mouth) he (the junior bhikkhu) should give the seat to the more senior bhikkhu. But in no way should the seat of a senior bhikkhu be preempted (§). Whoever should do so: an offense of wrong doing.”—Cv.VI.10.1

“There is the case where many bhikkhus—inexperienced, incompetent—are staying in a certain residence. They do not know the uposatha or the uposatha transaction, the Pāṭimokkha or the recital of the Pāṭimokkha. Another bhikkhu arrives there: learned, erudite, one who has memorized the Dhamma, the Vinaya, the Mātikā (the headings that were eventually developed into the Abhidhamma). He is wise, experienced, astute, conscientious, scrupulous, desirous of training. This bhikkhu should be furthered by those bhikkhus, helped, encouraged, supported with bath powder, clay (soap), tooth wood, water for rinsing the mouth/washing the face. If they do not further him, help, encourage, or support him with bath powder, clay (soap), tooth wood, water for rinsing the mouth/washing the face: an offense of wrong doing.”—Mv.II.21.2

CHAPTER NINE

Protocols

The Pali word vatta, translated here as protocol, is usually translated as duty. There are two reasons for translating it anew. The first is that there is another Pali word—kicca—that more precisely means duty, and so to avoid confusing the two, vatta needs an alternate equivalent. The second is that the word vatta covers a range of standards—dealing with etiquette, tasks to be done, and the best procedures for performing those tasks—that more closely corresponds to what we mean by the word protocol.

Cv.VIII details 14 protocols altogether, collectively called the khandhaka-vatta. These cover five major areas:

1) The protocols to be followed by a bhikkhu newly arriving at a monastery, by a host bhikkhu when a new bhikkhu arrives at his monastery, and by a bhikkhu about to leave a monastery

or Community dwelling.

2) The protocols to be followed when going to eat in a meal hall (i.e., when invited to eat at a donor’s place) and when giving anumodanā there.

3) The protocols to be followed when going for alms and when living in the wilderness.

4) The protocols to be followed in a lodging, in a sauna, and in a restroom.

5) The protocols to be followed toward one’s teacher and preceptor; those to be followed by a teacher or preceptor toward his students.

There is some overlap among the protocols. For example, the wilderness protocol includes large parts of the alms-going protocol; the protocol toward one’s teacher and preceptor overlaps with the incoming bhikkhu’s protocol as well as the lodging and sauna protocols. These points of overlap will be noted in the following passages.

The Canon does not stipulate any penalty for disobeying these protocols. The Commentary imposes a dukkaṭa if one’s reason for disobedience is disrespect. As with the other Khandhaka rules affected by changes in technology, some of these protocols have to be translated through the Great Standards in order to fit with modern technology. The restroom protocols, for instance, were designed for a very different kind of restroom than is found in monasteries today even in Asia, to say nothing of the West. Thus, if one disobeys the protocols because of changes in time and culture, that would not count as disrespect and so carries no penalty. Still, these protocols are important to know even when their precise details are dated, for the more fully a bhikkhu knows them, the better he is able to apply them in a useful way to modern situations.

Because the protocols are so detailed and require so little explanation, this chapter differs in format from the others in this volume. I have simply translated the fourteen protocols, together with a few of the origin stories describing the events that led to their formulation. Where the protocols are essentially identical to the rules of the Sekhiya section of the Pāṭimokkha, I have simply noted the fact, without listing the rules here. These may easily be found in BMC1. I say “essentially” because the Sekhiya rules are given in the first person, whereas the corresponding passages in the protocols are given in the third. (Some scholars have asserted that the Sekhiya rules were simply lifted from the protocols, but that is not the case. Sk 57-75 have no parallels here.) The protocols a student follows with regard to his teacher, and a teacher follows with regard to his student, are identical to those governing the relationship between preceptor and pupil, and so have not been repeated. Explanations from the Commentary are given in brackets and marked with a capital C; those from the Sub-commentary, in braces marked with an SC. Passages in parentheses are my own observations.

At the end of the chapter I have quoted the ruling from the Second Council dealing with the issue of whether it is proper to follow one’s preceptor’s and teachers’ customary habits. The ruling states simply that it is sometimes proper to do so, and sometimes not, without detailing how the distinction is to be drawn. The Great Standards, however, would suggest that it is proper to do so when those habits are in accordance with what the Buddha allowed, and improper when they are not. If the preceptor’s or teacher’s customary habits deal with areas neither forbidden nor allowed by the Vinaya, the wise policy would be to abide by those habits for the sake of communal harmony. This ruling should apply to all instances when Communities attempt to translate the protocols into modern situations.

Incoming Bhikkhus’ Protocol

A certain incoming bhikkhu, unfastening the bolt and pushing open the door, rushed into an unoccupied dwelling. A snake fell on his shoulder from the lintel above. Frightened, he let out a yelp.

“An incoming bhikkhu, [C: having come into the immediate area around a monastery,] thinking, ‘I will now enter the monastery,’ having taken off his sandals, having put them down (close to the ground) and beaten off the dust, having lowered his sunshade, having uncovered his head, having put his robe on his upper back/shoulder (khandha) (the wilderness protocol, below, shows that bhikkhus walking through the wilderness during the heat of the day went with their robes folded on or over their heads), should enter the monastery carefully and unhurriedly. While entering the monastery he should notice where the resident bhikkhus are gathered. Having gone where they are gathered—at the assembly hall, a pavilion, or the root of a tree—having placed his bowl to one side, having placed his robe to one side, having taken an appropriate seat, he should sit down. (From this statement, and from a similar statement in the protocol toward one’s preceptor, it would appear that in those days the bhikkhus wore only their lower robes while in their monasteries. At present, it would be considered rude for a newcomer to remove his upper robe like this.) He should ask about the drinking water and washing water, ‘Which is the drinking water? Which is the washing water?’ If he wants drinking water, he should take drinking water and drink. If he wants washing water, he should take washing water and wash his feet. When washing his feet, he should pour water with one hand and wash them with one hand. He should not wash his feet with the same hand with which he is pouring water. (In other words, he should pour with one hand and wash with the other.)

“Having asked for a sandal-wiping rag, he should wipe his sandals. When wiping his sandals, he should wipe them first with a dry rag and then with a damp rag. (The Vinaya-mukha adds that these instructions apply when one’s sandals are dusty. If they are muddy or wet, one should wipe them first with a damp rag and then with a dry one.) Having washed the sandal-wiping rag, having wrung it out (this last phrase appears only in the Thai edition of the Canon), he should put it [C: spread it out (to dry)] to one side.

“If the resident bhikkhu is his senior, he (the incoming bhikkhu) should bow down to him. If he is junior, he (the incoming bhikkhu) should have him bow down. He should ask about his lodging, ‘Which lodging is allotted to me?’ He should ask whether it is occupied or unoccupied. He should ask as to which places are in ‘alms range’ and which places are not. [C: He should ask, “Is the alms range near or far? Should one go there early or late in the morning?’ Places that are not alms range include homes where the people have wrong views or where they have limited food.] He should ask as to which families are designated as in training (see Pd 3). He should ask about the excreting-place, the urinating-place, drinking water, washing water, walking staffs. He should ask about the Community’s agreed-on meeting place (§), asking, “What time should it be entered? What time should it be left?” (“Meeting place” seems to be the clear meaning of saṇṭhāna here, as in other spots in the Canon. However, the Commentary interprets this injunction as referring to the Community’s agreements as to what time certain places, such as those that might be occupied by wild animals or non-human beings, may be entered, what time they should be left.)

“If the dwelling is unoccupied, then—having knocked on the door, having waited a moment, having unfastened the bolt, having opened the door—he should watch while standing outside [C: in case he sees the tracks of a snake or a non-human being leaving]. If the dwelling is dirty or bed is stacked up on bed, bench on bench, with the bedding and seats piled on top, then if he is able, he should clean them. [C: If unable to clean the whole dwelling, he should clean just the section he plans to live in.]

“While cleaning the dwelling he should first take out the ground covering and lay it to one side. Taking out the bed supports, he should lay them to one side. Taking out the mattress and pillow, he should lay them to one side. Taking out the sitting cloth and sheet, he should lay them to one side. Having lowered the bed, he should take it out carefully, without scraping it [C: along the floor] or knocking it against the door or door posts, and then lay it to one side. Having lowered the bench, he should take it out carefully, without scraping it [C: along the floor] or knocking it against the door or door posts, and then lay it to one side. Taking out the spittoon… the leaning board (see Cv.VI.20.2 in Chapter 6), he should lay them to one side. Taking note of how the ground-covering is arranged, he should take it out and lay it to one side.

“If there are cobwebs in the dwelling, he should remove them, starting first with the ceiling covering-cloth (§) (and working down). He should wipe areas around the window frames and the corners (of the room) (§). If the wall has been treated with ochre and has become moldy (§), he should moisten a rag, wring it out, and wipe it clean. If the floor of the room is treated with blackening (i.e., polished) and has become moldy (§), he should moisten a rag, wring it out, and wipe it clean. If the floor is bare ground, he should sprinkle it all over with water before sweeping it, (with the thought,) ‘May the dust not fly up and soil the room.’ He should look for any rubbish and throw it away to one side.

“Having dried the ground-covering in the sun, he should clean it, shake it out, bring it back in, and arrange it in its proper place. Having dried the supports for the bed in the sun, he should wipe them, bring them back in, and set them in their proper places. Having dried the bed… the bench in the sun, he should clean them, shake them out, lower them, bring them back in carefully without scraping them [along the floor] or knocking them against the door or doorposts, and arrange them in their proper places. Having dried the mattress and pillow… the sitting cloth and sheet in the sun, he should clean them, shake them out, bring them back in, and arrange them in their proper places. Having dried the spittoon in the sun, he should wipe it, bring it back in, and set it in its proper place. Having dried the leaning board in the sun, he should wipe it, bring it back in, and set it in its proper place.

“He should put away his bowl and robes. When putting away the bowl, he should take the bowl in one hand, run his hand under the bed or bench with the other hand (to check for things on the floor that would harm the bowl), and put away the bowl (there), but should not put it away on the bare ground [C: any place where it will get soiled]. When putting away the robe, he should take the robe with one hand, stroke the other hand along the rod or cord for the robes [C: to check for any rough spots or splinters on the cord or rod that will rip the cloth], and put away the robe (over the cord or rod) with the edges away from him and the fold toward him. [C: The fold shouldn’t be placed on the side of the wall, for if there is a splinter in the wall, it may rip the robe in the middle (making its determination lapse).]

“If dusty winds blow from the east, he should close the eastern windows. If from the west, he should close the western windows. If from the north, he should close the northern windows. If from the south, he should close the southern windows. If the weather is cool, he should open the windows by day and close them at night. If the weather is hot, he should close them by day and open them at night.

“If the surrounding area (§) is dirty, he should sweep it. If the porch… assembly hall… fire hall… restroom is dirty, he should sweep it. If there is no drinking water, he should set it out. If there is no washing water, he should set it out. If there is no water in the pot for rinsing (in the restroom), he should pour it into the pot.” (These last five paragraphs are identical with the instructions on how to clean one’s preceptor’s lodging, in the protocol toward one’s preceptor, below.)

—Cv.VIII.1.2-5

Resident Bhikkhus’ Protocol

“A resident bhikkhu, on seeing an incoming bhikkhu who is his senior, should arrange a seat [C: If the resident bhikkhu is making robes or doing construction work, he should stop it to arrange a seat, etc., for the incoming bhikkhu. If he is sweeping the area around the cetiya, he should put away his broom to arrange the seat, etc. The incoming bhikkhu, if smart, should tell the resident bhikkhu to finish sweeping first. If the resident bhikkhu is making medicine for a sick bhikkhu, then if the sick bhikkhu is not seriously ill, stop making the medicine so as to perform the protocol for welcoming the incoming bhikkhu. If the sick bhikkhu is seriously ill, finish the medicine first. In either case, the incoming bhikkhu, if smart, should say, ‘Finish the medicine first.’] He should put out washing water for the feet, a foot stand, a pebble foot wiper. Going up to greet him, he should receive his bowl and robes, should ask if he needs water to drink, should ask if he needs water to wash (the last phrase is not in the PTS or Burmese versions) [C: if the incoming bhikkhu finishes the first beaker of water, ask him if he would like some more]; if he is able/willing he should wipe the incoming bhikkhu’s sandals. When wiping his sandals, he should wipe them first with a dry rag, and then with a damp rag. Having washed the sandal-wiping rag, having wrung it out, he should put it away [C: spread it out (to dry) to one side]. [C: The resident bhikkhu should fan the incoming bhikkhu first at the back of the feet, then at the middle of the body, then at the head. If the incoming bhikkhu says, ‘Enough,’ fan him more gently. If he says ‘Enough’ a second time, fan him still more gently. If he says, ‘Enough’ a third time, stop fanning him.]

“He should bow down to the senior incoming bhikkhu and arrange a lodging for him, (saying,) ‘That lodging is allotted to you.’ He should tell him whether it is occupied or unoccupied. [C: It is proper to beat the dust out of the sleeping mats, etc., before spreading them out for the incoming bhikkhu.] He should tell him which places are in ‘alms range’ and which places are not, should tell him which families are designated as in training. He should tell him where the excreting-place, the urinating-place, drinking water, washing water, walking staffs are. He should tell the Community’s agreed-on meeting place, (saying,) ‘This is the time for entering (it), this is the time for leaving.’

“If the incoming bhikkhu is his junior, then (the resident bhikkhu,) while sitting should tell him, ‘Put your bowl there, put your robes there, sit on this seat.’ He should tell him where the drinking water, the washing water, and the rag for wiping sandals are. He should have the junior incoming bhikkhu bow down to him. He should tell him where his lodging is, (saying,) ‘That lodging is allotted to you.’ He should tell whether it is occupied or unoccupied, should tell which places are in ‘alms range’ and which places are not, should tell which families are designated as in training. He should tell him where the excreting-place, the urinating-place, drinking water, washing water, walking staffs are. He should tell the Community’s agreed-on meeting place, (saying,) ‘This is the time for entering (it), this is the time for leaving.’ [C: The fact that one is in a large monastery does not exempt one from performing the appropriate protocol for greeting incoming bhikkhus.]”—Cv.VIII.2.2-3

Departing Bhikkhus’ Protocol

“A bhikkhu who is about to depart, having set the wooden goods and clay goods in order, having closed the windows and doors, may depart having taken leave (see Pc 14 & 15; the reading here follows the PTS and Burmese editions). [C: If the hut is not an appropriate place to store these goods, store them in the sauna, under an overhanging cliff, or any place that will protect them from the rain.] If there is no bhikkhu, he should take leave of a novice. If there is no novice, he should take leave of a monastery attendant. If there is no monastery attendant, he should take leave of a lay follower. If there is no bhikkhu, novice, monastery attendant, or lay follower, then having arranged the bed on four stones, having stacked bed on bed, bench on bench, having placed the (remaining) furnishings (bedding, seats, floor-coverings) in a heap on top, having set the wooden goods and clay goods in order, having closed the windows and doors, he may depart. [C: If the hut is not subject to termite attacks, there is no need to take anyone’s leave or to arrange the bed on four stones, etc. (Even if it is not subject to termite attacks, there would still be good reason to turn it over to a responsible person if such a person is available.)]

“If the dwelling is leaking, then if he is able he should roof it or make an effort, (thinking,) ‘How can the dwelling be roofed?’ If he succeeds in this, well and good. If not, then having arranged the bed on four stones in a place where it is not leaking, having stacked bed on bed, bench on bench, having placed the furnishings in a heap on top, having set the wooden goods and clay goods in order, having closed the windows and doors, he may depart.

“If the entire dwelling is leaking, then if he is able he should convey the furnishings (bedding and other perishable goods) to a village or make an effort, (thinking,) ‘How can the furnishings be conveyed to the village?’ If he succeeds in this, well and good. If not, then having arranged the bed on four stones in the open air, having stacked bed on bed, bench on bench, having placed the furnishings in a heap on top, having set the wooden goods and clay goods in order, having covered them over with grass or leaves, he may set out (thinking,) ‘I hope that at least parts of them will remain.’”

—Cv.VIII.3.2-3

Anumodanā Protocol

“I allow that the anumodanā (rejoicing in the merit of the donors) be given in the meal hall”…. “I allow that the anumodanā be given in the meal hall by the eldest bhikkhu.” [C: If the hosts ask another bhikkhu to give the anumodanā instead of the eldest bhikkhu, it is all right for him to do so. Neither he nor the eldest bhikkhu commits an offense, although he should inform the eldest bhikkhu first before giving the anumodanā.]… “I allow that four or five bhikkhus who are elders or near-elders stay behind in the meal hall (with the senior bhikkhu who is giving the anumodanā).” [C: If he gives them permission to leave early, however, they may go. They may also ask for permission to go.] …

Now at that time a certain elder stayed behind in the meal hall although he had to relieve himself [C: the need to relieve himself was oppressive]. Holding himself in, he keeled over in a faint…. “When there is reason, I allow you to leave after having taken leave of the next bhikkhu in line.”

—Cv.VIII.4.1

Meal-hall Protocol

“If the time is announced in the monastery, having put on the lower robe covering the three circles (the navel and kneecaps) all around (see Sk 1), having tied his waistband, having made the upper robe a lining for the outer robe (§), having put on the outer robes, having fastened the (lower) fastener, having washed (the bowl—see the protocol toward one’s preceptor), having taken the bowl, he should enter the village carefully and unhurriedly. He shouldn’t walk cutting in front of the elder bhikkhus. SEKHIYAS 1-26.

“He shouldn’t sit encroaching on the elder bhikkhus, nor should the newer bhikkhus be preempted from a seat. He shouldn’t spread out the outer robe and sit on it in inhabited areas. When water [C: for washing the bowl] is being given, he should receive the water, having grasped the bowl with both hands. Having been put down low, the bowl should be carefully washed [C: without letting the water make a sound] without scraping it (against the floor (§)). If there is someone to receive the water, having placed the bowl low he should pour the water into the water receptacle, (thinking,) ‘May the person receiving the water not be splashed, may the bhikkhus around me not be splashed, may my outer robe not be splashed.’ If there is no one to receive the water, then having placed the bowl down low, he should pour the water on the ground, (thinking,) ‘May the bhikkhus around me not be splashed, may my outer robe not be splashed.’

“When rice is being given, he should receive the rice, having grasped the bowl with both hands. A space should be made for the bean curry. If there is ghee or oil or condiments [C: or any food, even rice], the elder bhikkhu should say, ‘Arrange an equal amount for all.’ [C: If there is enough of a particular dish for only two bhikkhus, the elder bhikkhus shouldn’t say this. One or two of the bhikkhus should take what is offered even though others won’t get any.] SEKHIYAS 27-30. The elder bhikkhu shouldn’t eat as long as not everyone has been served rice. SEKHIYAS 31-55.

“The elder bhikkhu shouldn’t accept [C: rinsing] water as long as not everyone has finished his meal. When water is being given, he should receive the water, having grasped the bowl with both hands. Having been put down low, the bowl should be carefully washed without scraping it (against the floor (§)). If there is someone to receive the water, having placed the bowl low he should pour the water into the water receptacle, (thinking,) ‘May the person receiving the water not be splashed, may the bhikkhus around me not be splashed, may my outer robe not be splashed.’ If there is no one to receive the water, then having placed the bowl down low, he should pour the water on the ground, (thinking,) ‘May the bhikkhus around me not be splashed, may my outer robe not be splashed.’ SEKHIYA 56.

“When they are returning, the newer bhikkhus should return first, followed by the elder bhikkhus. [C: The newer bhikkhus should wait near the door for the elder bhikkhus, and then the bhikkhus should go in line with seniority. When walking through the village or town, they should leave room between themselves so that other people can cross their path conveniently.] (The Commentary may be wrong here, for this injunction may be related to the injunctions under the anumodanā protocol for the elders to stay behind, and the injunction under the pupil’s duty to his mentor to return first to the monastery to arrange a seat, etc., for his mentor.) SEKHIYAS 1-26.”

—Cv.VIII.4.3-6

Relevant to the above protocols is a passage in MN 91 describing how the Buddha conducted himself during and after a meal:

(Prior to the meal:) ““When receiving bowl-water, he does not raise or lower the bowl or tip it forwards or back. He receives neither too little nor too much bowl-water. He washes the bowl without making a sloshing sound. He washes the bowl without turning it over. He does not wash his hands having put the bowl on the ground. When his hands are washed, the bowl is washed. When the bowl is washed, his hands are washed. He pours the bowl-water not too near, not too far, and without splashing.

“When receiving rice, he does not raise or lower the bowl or tip it forwards or back. He receives neither too little nor too much rice. And he receives (this verb is not in the PTS edition) curry, takes curry in the proper proportion. He does not put too much curry in his mouthful. Having turned the mouthful over two or three times in his mouth, he swallows it. No unchewed rice grain enters his body; no rice grain remains in his mouth. Then he takes another mouthful. He takes his food experiencing the taste but not experiencing passion for the taste.…

“When he has finished his meal and receives bowl-water, he does not raise or lower the bowl or tip it forwards or back. He receives neither too little nor too much bowl-water. He washes the bowl without making a sloshing sound. He washes the bowl without turning it over. He does not wash his hands having put the bowl on the ground. When his hands are washed, the bowl is washed. When the bowl is washed, his hands are washed. He pours the bowl-water not too near, not too far, and without tossing it around… He puts his bowl on the floor, not too near, not too far. He is not careless of the bowl, nor overly solicitous about it… He sits in silence for a moment, but does not exceed the time for the anumodanā… He gives the anumodanā, does not criticize the meal, does not expect another meal. He instructs, urges, rouses, and encourages the gathering with a talk purely on Dhamma. Having done so, he rises from his seat and departs.”

Alms-going Protocol

A certain bhikkhu going on alms round entered a house compound without observing. Mistaking an inner door for an outer door, he entered an inner chamber. And in that inner chamber a naked woman was lying on her back. The bhikkhu saw the naked woman lying on her back, and on seeing her, the thought occurred to him, “This isn’t an outer door. This is an inner chamber.” He got out of the inner chamber. The woman’s husband saw her lying naked on her back, and on seeing her he thought, “My wife has been raped by this bhikkhu.” Seizing the bhikkhu, he gave him a good beating. Then the woman, awakening at the noise, said to the man, “Why, master, are you beating this bhikkhu?”

“You were raped by this bhikkhu.”

“I wasn’t raped by this bhikkhu. He’s innocent.” And she made him let the bhikkhu go.

“A bhikkhu going for alms, thinking, ‘Now I will enter the village,’ having put on the lower robe covering the three circles all around, having tied his waistband, having made the upper robe a lining for the outer robe (§), having put on the outer robes, having fastened the (lower) fastener, having washed (the bowl), having taken the bowl, he should enter the village carefully and unhurriedly. ODD-NUMBERED SEKHIYAS 1-25.

“When entering a house compound (§) he should observe, ‘I will enter by this way and leave by this way.’ He shouldn’t enter quickly, shouldn’t leave quickly. He shouldn’t stand too far away, shouldn’t stand too near. He shouldn’t stand for too long a time, shouldn’t turn away too soon. While standing, he should observe whether they want to give alms or not. If (the potential donor) puts down his/her work or rises from his/her seat or grabs (§) a spoon, grabs a dish, or sets one out, he should stay, (thinking,) ‘He/she wants to give.’ When alms are being given, he should receive the alms having raised the outer robe with his left hand, having stretched out (§) the bowl with his right hand, having grasped the bowl with both hands. He shouldn’t look up at the face of a female alms-giver (§). [C: This injunction applies to male alms-givers as well.] He should then observe, ‘Do they want to give bean curry or not?’ If the donor grabs a spoon, grabs a dish, or sets one out, he should stay, (thinking,) ‘He/she wants to give.’ When alms have been given, he should leave carefully and unhurriedly, having concealed the bowl under his outer robe. ODD-NUMBERED SEKHIYAS 1-25.

“Whoever returns first from alms-going in the village should arrange the seat(s), should put out washing water for the feet, a foot stand, a pebble foot wiper. Having washed the left-over food container, he should set it out. He should set out drinking water and washing water. Whoever returns last from alms-going in the village, if there is left-over food and he wants it, he may eat it. If he doesn’t want it, he should throw it away where there are no crops to speak of or drop it in water where there are no living creatures to speak of (so as not to foul the water and kill the creatures). He should take up the seat(s) and set the washing water for the feet, the foot stand, and the pebble foot wiper in order. Having washed the left-over food container, he should put it away. He should set the drinking water and washing water in order. He should sweep the meal hall. Whoever sees that the vessel for drinking water, the vessel for washing water, or the vessel (for rinsing water) in the restroom is empty should set out water. If he cannot do this, then inviting a companion by signaling with his hand, they should have the water set out by joining hands (§), but shouldn’t for that reason break into speech.”

—Cv.VIII.5.2-3

Wilderness Protocol

At that time a number of bhikkhus were living in the wilderness. They neither had drinking water set out nor washing water set out nor fire set out nor fire-generating sticks set out. They did not know the zodiac asterisms (the major stars used to mark the progress of the moon through the sky), they did not know the cardinal directions. Thieves, on coming there, said to them, “Is there drinking water, venerable sirs?”

“No, friends.”

“Is there washing water… fire, venerable sirs? Are there fire-generating sticks, venerable sirs?”

“No, friends.”

“With what (constellation) is there a lunar conjunction today, venerable sirs?”

“We don’t know, friends.”

“Which direction is this, venerable sirs?”

“We don’t know, friends.”

Then the thieves, (thinking,) “These people have neither drinking water nor washing water nor fire nor fire-generating sticks; they don’t know the zodiac asterisms, they don’t know the cardinal directions; these are thieves, not bhikkhus,” gave them a good beating and left.

(In the following passage, the protocols that differ from the ordinary alms-going protocol are given in italics.) “A bhikkhu living in the wilderness, getting up early, having inserted his bowl in a bag, having slung it over his shoulder, having placed his robe(s) over his shoulder/upper back, having put on his sandals, having set his wooden goods and clay goods in order, having closed the windows and doors, may come down from his lodging. Thinking, ‘I will now enter the village,’ having taken off his sandals, having put them down (close to the ground) and beaten off the dust, having inserted them in the bag and slung them over his shoulder, having put on the lower robe covering the three circles (navel and kneecaps) all around, having tied his waistband, having made the upper robe a lining for the outer robe (§), having put on the outer robe, having fastened the (lower) fastener, having washed (the bowl), having taken the bowl, he should enter the village carefully and unhurriedly. ODD-NUMBERED SEKHIYAS 1-25. (Notice that the protocol mentions adjusting one’s robes to the standard pattern only when about to enter the village. From this passage it would appear that, while in the wilderness, one is allowed to wear one’s robes in any fashion so long as one is not exposing oneself. This would indicate that the Commentary to Sk 1 & 2 is wrong in insisting that those rules be followed in the wilderness as well as in inhabited areas. The protocol for returning to the wilderness after one’s alms (see below) shows that bhikkhus walking through the wilderness in the Buddha’s time went with their robes folded on or over their heads.)

“When entering a house compound (§) he should observe, ‘I will enter by this way and leave by this way.’ He shouldn’t enter quickly, shouldn’t leave quickly. He shouldn’t stand too far away, shouldn’t stand too near. He shouldn’t stand for too long a time, shouldn’t turn away too soon. While standing, he should observe whether they want to give alms or not. If (the potential donor) puts down his/her work or rises from his/her seat or grabs (§) a spoon, grabs a dish, or sets one out, he should stay, (thinking,) ‘He/she wants to give.’ When alms are being given, he should receive the alms having raised the outer robe with his left hand, having stretched out (§) the bowl with his right hand, having grasped the bowl with both hands. He shouldn’t look up at the face of a female alms-giver (§). He should then observe, ‘Do they want to give bean curry or not?’ If the donor grabs a spoon, grabs a dish, or sets one out, he should stay, (thinking,) ‘He/she wants to give.’ When alms have been given, he should leave carefully and unhurriedly, having concealed the bowl under his outer robe. ODD-NUMBERED SEKHIYAS 1-25 [C: If there is no water in the wilderness area, one may have one’s meal in the village, wash up, and then return to one’s dwelling. If there is water in the wilderness area, one should take one’s meal outside of the village.]

“Having left the village, having inserted the bowl in the bag and slung it over his shoulder, having folded up his robe and placed it on (over?) his head, having put on his sandals, he may continue on his way.

“A bhikkhu living in the wilderness should set out drinking water, should set out washing water, should set out fire (keep at least embers burning), should set out fire-generating sticks (at present, matches or lighters would take the place of fire-generating sticks and would make it unnecessary to keep embers burning at all times), should set out a walking staff (staffs apparently were used to intimidate wild animals), should memorize the zodiac asterisms, in whole or in part (in order to be able to calculate the date of the uposatha); should be skilled in the cardinal directions (in order to find his way if he gets lost). [C: If there are not enough vessels, one may have one vessel for drinking water (which would then also be used for washing water). If one has fire-generating sticks, there is no need to set out fire.]”

—Cv.VIII.6.2-3

Lodging Protocol

Now at that time a number of bhikkhus were making robes in the open air. Some group-of-six bhikkhus were beating their lodgings in a clearing upwind. Those (the other) bhikkhus were covered with dust.

“In whatever dwelling one is living, if the dwelling is dirty and one is able, one should clean it. (As in the incoming bhikkhus’ protocol, plus two insertions:)

After “Look for any rubbish and throw it away to one side”: “Furnishings are not to be beaten in the vicinity of bhikkhus… dwellings… drinking water… washing water. And furnishings are not to be beaten in a clearing upwind. Furnishings are to be beaten downwind.”

After, “If there is no water in the pot for rinsing in the restroom, pour it into the pot”: “If one is staying in a dwelling with a more senior bhikkhu, then—without asking the senior—one shouldn’t give a recitation, give an interrogation, shouldn’t chant, shouldn’t give a Dhamma talk, shouldn’t light a lamp, shouldn’t put out a lamp, shouldn’t open windows, shouldn’t close windows. [C: There is no need to ask permission before opening or closing doors. The junior bhikkhu may ask in advance for permission to do any of these things at any time. Also, there is no need to ask if the senior bhikkhu is on congenial terms.] If doing walking meditation on the same meditation path with the senior, one should turn when the senior turns but should not hit him with the corner of one’s outer robe.”

—Cv.VIII.7.2-4

Sauna Protocol

Now at that time some group-of-six bhikkhus, hindered from (entering) the sauna by some elder bhikkhus, out of disrespect stacked up a large number of sticks, set them on fire, closed the door, and sat in the door. The elder bhikkhus, oppressed by the heat, unable to get out the door, keeled over in a faint….

“Being hindered from (entering) the sauna by elder bhikkhus, one should not, out of disrespect, bring up a large number of sticks and set them on fire. Whoever should set them on fire: an offense of wrong doing. Having closed the door, one shouldn’t sit in the door. Whoever should do so: an offense of wrong doing.”—Cv.VIII.8.1

“Whoever goes first to the sauna, if ashes have accumulated, should throw out the ashes. If the sauna is dirty, he should sweep it. If the outside ledge (§)… the surrounding area… the porch… the sauna-hall is dirty, he should sweep it. He should knead the powder for bathing (see Chapter 1), moisten clay, pour water into the small water trough. One entering the sauna may do so after smearing his face with clay and covering himself front and back. (Apparently this means that a bhikkhu on his way to and from the sauna does not have to worry that his lower robe covers the three circles (the navel and kneecaps) all around, as long as it covers his private parts front and rear; Cv.V.16.2 shows that he could remove the robe while in the sauna.) He should sit not encroaching on the senior bhikkhus and not preempting the junior bhikkhus from a seat. If he is able/willing, he may perform a service for the elder bhikkhus in the sauna [C: e.g., stoking the fire, providing them with clay and hot water]. One leaving the sauna may do so after taking the sauna-bench and covering oneself front and back. If he is able/willing, he may perform a service for the elder bhikkhus even in the water [C: e.g., scrubbing them]. He shouldn’t bathe in front of the elder bhikkhus or upstream from them. When coming out of the water after bathing, he should make way for those entering the water.

“Whoever is the last to leave the sauna, if the sauna is splattered/muddy, should wash it. He may leave after having washed the small clay-trough, having set the sauna-bench(es) in order, having extinguished the fire, and having closed the door.”

—Cv.VIII.8.2

Restroom Protocol

Now at that time a certain bhikkhu, a brahman by birth, didn’t want to rinse himself after defecating, (thinking,) “Who would touch this vile, stinking stuff?” A worm took up residence in his anus. So he told this matter to the bhikkhus. “You mean you don’t rinse yourself after defecating?” (they asked). “That’s right, my friends.” Those bhikkhus who were of few wants… criticized and complained and spread it about, “How can a bhikkhu not rinse himself after defecating?” They reported this matter to the Blessed One….

“If there is water, one should not not rinse after having defecated. Whoever does not rinse: an offense of wrong doing.”—Cv.VIII.9 [C: If there is no vessel to dip in the water, that counts as “there being no water.”]

“One should not defecate in the restroom in order of seniority. Whoever should do so: an offense of wrong doing. I allow that one defecate in order of arrival.”—Cv.VIII.10.1

“Whoever goes to a restroom should, while standing outside, clear his throat. The one sitting inside should also clear his throat. Having put aside the (upper) robe on a bamboo pole or a cord, one should enter the restroom carefully and unhurriedly. (At present, there is no need to remove one’s upper robe before entering a public restroom.) One shouldn’t enter too quickly, shouldn’t pull up one’s lower robe while entering (§). One should pull up one’s lower robe while standing on the restroom-footrests (§). One shouldn’t groan/grunt while defecating. One shouldn’t defecate while chewing tooth-wood. [C: This rule applies wherever one may be defecating, and not just in a restroom.] (At present this protocol would also apply to defecating while brushing one’s teeth.) One shouldn’t defecate outside of the toilet (literally, the “excrement trough”). One shouldn’t urinate outside of the urinal trough. One shouldn’t spit into the urinal trough. One shouldn’t wipe oneself with a rough stick. One shouldn’t drop the wiping stick into the cesspool. One should cover oneself (with one’s lower robe) while standing on the restroom-footrests (§). One shouldn’t leave too quickly. One shouldn’t leave with one’s lower robe pulled up (§). One should pull it up while standing on the rinsing-room footrests (§). One shouldn’t make a smacking sound (§) while rinsing. One shouldn’t leave any water remaining in the rinsing dipper. [C: It is all right to leave water in the rinsing dipper in a restroom for one’s private use or if one has to go to the toilet repeatedly, as after taking a purgative.] (At present, the Canon’s rules around emptying the water in the rinsing dipper would apply to flushing the toilet, although the Commentary’s exemptions for not emptying the water would not seem to apply.) One should cover oneself (with one’s lower robe) while standing on the rinsing-room footrests (§).

“If the restroom is soiled (with excrement) it should be washed. If the basket/receptacle for wiping sticks is full, the wiping sticks should be thrown away. If the restroom is dirty it should be swept. If the outside ledge (§)… the surrounding area… the porch is dirty, it should be swept. If there is no water in the rinsing pot, water should be poured into the rinsing pot.”

—Cv.VIII.10.3

Protocol toward one’s Preceptor

“Having gotten up early, having taken off his sandals, having arranged his upper robe over one shoulder, the pupil should provide tooth wood (see Pc 40) and water for washing the face/rinsing the mouth. [C: On the first three days when one is performing these services, one should provide the preceptor with three lengths of tooth wood—long, medium, and short—and notice which one he takes. If he takes the same length on all three days, provide him only with that length from then on. If he is not particular about the length, provide him with whatever length is available. A similar principle holds for the water: On the first three days, provide him with both warm and cold water. If he consistently takes either the warm or the cold, provide him only with that kind of water from then on. If not, provide him with whatever water is available.] (The Commentary suggests that in “providing” these things, one need only set them out, rather than hand them to the preceptor. Once they have been set out, one should proceed to sweep out the restroom and its surrounding area while the preceptor is using the tooth wood and water. Then, while the preceptor is using the restroom, one should proceed to the next step.)

“Arrange a seat. If there is conjey, then having washed a shallow bowl, offer the conjey to the preceptor. When he has drunk the conjey, then having given him water, having received the bowl, having lowered it (so as not to let the washing water wet one’s robes), wash it carefully without scraping it [C: knocking it against the floor] and then put it away. When the preceptor has gotten up, take up the seat. If the place is dirty, sweep it.

“If the preceptor wishes to enter the village for alms, give him his lower robe, receiving the spare lower robe (he is wearing) from him in return. (This is one of the few passages showing that the practice of having spare robes was already current when the Canon was being compiled.) Give him his waistband; give him his upper and outer robe arranged so that the upper robe forms a lining for the outer one (§). Having rinsed out the bowl, give it to him while it is still wet (i.e., pour out as much of the rinsing water as possible, but don’t wipe it dry).

“If the preceptor desires an attendant, one should put on one’s lower robe so as to cover the three circles all around (see Sk 1 & 2). Having put on the waistband, having arranged the upper robe as a lining for the outer one and having put them on, having fastened the (lower) fastener, having washed and taken a bowl, be the preceptor’s attendant. Do not walk too far behind him; do not walk too close. [C: One to two steps behind him is appropriate.] Receive the contents of the preceptor’s bowl. [C: If the preceptor’s bowl is heavy or hot to the touch, take his bowl and give him one’s own bowl (which is presumably lighter or cooler to the touch) in return.] (In a Community where the bowls are carried in their bowl bags during alms round, one may receive the preceptor’s bowl.)

“Do not interrupt the preceptor when he is speaking. If he is bordering on an offense [C: e.g., Pc 4 or Sg 3], one should stop him. [C: Speak in an indirect way so as to call him to his senses. These two protocols apply everywhere, not only on alms round.] {SC: Unlike the other protocols toward one’s preceptor, these must also be observed even when one is ill.}

“Returning ahead of the preceptor, one should arrange a seat. Put out washing water for the feet, a foot stand, and a pebble foot wiper. Having gone to meet him, receive his bowl and robe. Give him his spare lower robe; receive the lower robe [C: that he has been wearing] in return. If the upper and outer robes are damp with perspiration, dry them for a short time in the sun’s warmth, but do not leave them in the sun’s warmth for long. Fold up the robes {SC: separately}, keeping the edges four fingerbreadths apart so that neither robe becomes creased in the middle. (This, the Vinaya-mukha notes, helps extend the life of the cloth.) Place the waistband in the fold of the robe. (From these statements it would appear that when bhikkhus were in their dwelling places they wore only their lower robes, even while eating.)

“If there is almsfood, and the preceptor wishes to eat, give him water and offer the almsfood to him. Ask if he wants drinking water. [C: If there is enough time before noon, one should wait by the preceptor while he is eating, in order to offer him drinking water, and eat one’s own meal only when he is finished. If there is not enough time for this, one should simply set out the water and proceed to one’s own meal.]

“When he has finished his meal, then having given him water, receive the bowl, lower it, and wash it carefully without scraping it. Then, having dried it, set it out for a short time in the sun’s warmth, but do not leave it in the sun’s warmth for long.

“Put away his bowl and robes. When putting away the bowl, one should take the bowl in one hand, run one’s hand under the bed or bench with the other hand (to check for things on the floor that would harm the bowl), and put away the bowl (there), but should not put it away on the bare ground [C: any place where it will get soiled]. When putting away the robe, one should take the robe with one hand, stroke the other hand along the rod or cord for the robes [C: to check for any rough spots or splinters on the cord or rod that will rip the cloth], and put away the robe (over the cord or rod) with the edges away from one and the fold toward one. [C: The fold shouldn’t be placed on the side of the wall, for if there is a splinter in the wall, it may rip the robe in the middle (making its determination lapse).]

“When the preceptor has gotten up, take up the seat. Put away the washing water for the feet, the foot-stand, and the foot wiper. If the place is dirty, sweep it.

“If the preceptor wishes to bathe, prepare a bath. Prepare a cold bath if he wants a cold one, a hot bath if he wants a hot one.

“If the preceptor wishes to enter the sauna, knead the powder for bathing, moisten the bathing clay, take a sauna-bench, and follow closely behind him. Give him the bench, receive his robe in return, and lay it to one side [C: where there is no soot or smoke]. Give him the (moistened) powder for bathing and clay. If one is able to, enter the sauna. When entering the sauna, one should do so having smeared one’s face with the bathing clay and covering oneself front and back (i.e., one shouldn’t expose oneself, but there is no need to cover the three “circles”).

“Sit so as not to encroach on the senior bhikkhus, at the same time not preempting the junior bhikkhus from a seat. Perform services for the preceptor [C: stoking the fire, providing him with clay and hot water]. When leaving the sauna, one should do so taking the sauna-bench and having covered oneself front and back. Perform a service for the preceptor even in the bathing water. Having bathed, the pupil should come out of the water first, dry himself, and put on his lower robe. Then he should rub the water off his preceptor, give him his lower robe and then his outer robe.

“Taking the sauna-bench, the pupil should return first, arrange a seat, put out washing water for the feet, a foot stand, and a pebble foot wiper. (When the preceptor has sat down,) ask him if he wants drinking water.

“If the preceptor wants one to recite [C: memorize passages of Dhamma or Vinaya], one should recite. If he wants to interrogate one [C: on the meaning of the passages], one should answer his interrogation.

“If the place where the preceptor is staying is dirty, the pupil should clean it if he is able to. First taking out the bowl and robes, he should lay them to one side. Taking out the sitting cloth and sheet, he should lay them to one side. Taking out the mattress and pillow, he should lay them to one side. Having lowered the bed, he should take it out carefully, without scraping it [C: along the floor] or knocking it against the door or doorposts, and then lay it to one side. Having lowered the bench, he should take it out carefully, without scraping it [C: along the floor] or knocking it against the door or doorposts, and then lay it to one side. Taking out the spittoon… the leaning board, he should lay them to one side. Taking note of how the ground-covering is arranged, he should take it out and lay it to one side.

“If there are cobwebs in the dwelling, he should remove them, starting first with the ceiling covering-cloth (§) (and working down). He should wipe areas around the window frames and the corners (of the room) (§). If the wall has been treated with ochre and has become moldy (§), he should moisten a rag, wring it out, and wipe it clean. If the floor of the room is treated with blackening (polished), he should moisten a rag, wring it out, and wipe it clean. If the floor is bare ground, he should sprinkle it all over with water before sweeping it, (with the thought,) ‘May the dust not fly up and soil the room.’ He should look for any rubbish and throw it away to one side.

“Having dried the ground-covering in the sun, he should clean it, shake it out, bring it back in, and arrange it in its proper place. Having dried the supports for the bed in the sun, he should wipe them, bring them back in, and set them in their proper places. Having dried the bed… the bench in the sun, he should clean them, shake them out, lower them, bring them back in carefully without scraping them [along the floor] or knocking them against the door or doorposts, and arrange them in their proper places. Having dried the mattress and pillow…the sitting cloth and sheet in the sun, he should clean them, shake them out, bring them back in, and arrange them in their proper places. Having dried the spittoon in the sun, he should wipe it, bring it back in, and set it in its proper place. Having dried the leaning board in the sun, he should wipe it, bring it back in, and set it in its proper place.

“If dusty winds blow from the east, he should close the eastern windows. If from the west, he should close the western windows. If from the north, he should close the northern windows. If from the south, he should close the southern windows. If the weather is cool, he should open the windows by day and close them at night. If the weather is hot, he should close them by day and open them at night.

“If the surrounding area (§) is dirty, he should sweep it. If the porch… assembly hall… fire hall… restroom is dirty, he should sweep it. If there is no drinking water, he should set it out. If there is no washing water, he should set it out. If there is no water in the pot for rinsing (in the restroom), he should pour it into the pot.

“If dissatisfaction (with the holy life) arises in the preceptor, one should allay it or get someone else to allay it or one should give him a Dhamma talk. If anxiety (over his conduct with regard to the rules) arises in the preceptor, one should dispel it or get someone else to dispel it or one should give him a Dhamma talk. If a viewpoint (diṭṭhigata) arises in the preceptor, one should pry it away or get someone else to pry it away, or one should give him a Dhamma talk. (Diṭṭhigata has two meanings in the Canon: either a firmly held view on a question not worth asking (see MN 72); or an out-and-out wrong view, such as the idea that an obstructive act is not a genuine obstruction (see both Pc 68 and MN 22).

“If the preceptor has committed an offense against a heavy (saṅghādisesa) rule and deserves probation, the pupil should make an effort, (thinking,) ‘How can the Community grant my preceptor probation?’ If the preceptor deserves to be sent back to the beginning… deserves penance… deserves rehabilitation, the pupil should make an effort, (thinking,) ‘How can the Community grant my preceptor rehabilitation?’

“If the Community wants to carry out a transaction against the preceptor—censure, demotion, banishment, reconciliation, or suspension—the pupil should make an effort, (thinking,) ‘How can the Community not carry out that transaction against my preceptor or else change it to a lighter one?’ But if the transaction—censure… suspension—is carried out against him, the pupil should make an effort, (thinking,) ‘How can my preceptor behave properly, lower his hackles, mend his ways, so that the Community will rescind that transaction?’

“If the preceptor’s robe should be washed, the pupil should wash it or make an effort, (thinking,) ‘How can my preceptor’s robe be washed?’ If the preceptor’s robe should be made, the pupil should make it or make an effort, (thinking,) ‘How can my preceptor’s robe be made?’ If the preceptor’s dye should be boiled, the pupil should boil it or make an effort, (thinking,) ‘How can my preceptor’s dye be boiled?’ If the preceptor’s robe should be dyed, the pupil should dye it or make an effort, (thinking,) ‘How can my preceptor’s robe be dyed?’ While dyeing the robe, he should carefully let it take the dye properly (while drying), turning it back and forth (on the line), and shouldn’t go away until the drips have become discontinuous (§).

“Without having taken the preceptor’s leave, the pupil should not give an alms bowl to anyone [C: on bad terms with the preceptor] nor should he receive an alms bowl from that person. He shouldn’t give robe- cloth to that person or receive robe- cloth from that person, shouldn’t give a requisite to that person or receive a requisite from that person. He shouldn’t cut that person’s hair or have his own hair cut by that person. He shouldn’t perform a service for that person or have that person perform a service for him. He shouldn’t act as that person’s steward or have that person act as his own steward. He shouldn’t be that person’s attendant or take that person as his own attendant. He shouldn’t bring back almsfood for that person or have that person bring back almsfood for him.

“Without having taken the preceptor’s leave, he shouldn’t enter a town, shouldn’t go to a cemetery, shouldn’t leave the district. (Mv.II.21.1 adds (translating from the Burmese edition): “There is the case where a number of inexperienced, incompetent bhikkhus, traveling to distant locations, ask leave of their teachers and preceptors. They should be asked by their teachers and preceptors, ‘Where will you go? With whom will you go?’ If those inexperienced, incompetent bhikkhus name other inexperienced, incompetent bhikkhus, the teachers and preceptors should not give them permission. If they give permission: an offense of wrong doing. And if those inexperienced, incompetent bhikkhus, not having received permission, go anyway: an offense of wrong doing (for them).)

“If the preceptor is ill, he (the pupil) should tend to him as long as life lasts; he should stay with him until he recovers.”

—Cv.VIII.11.2-18

Protocol toward one’s Pupil

“The pupil should be helped, assisted, with recitation, interrogation, exhortation, instruction. If the preceptor has a bowl but the pupil does not, the preceptor should give the bowl to the pupil, or he should make an effort, (thinking,) ‘How can a bowl be procured for my pupil?’ If the preceptor has robe-material… a requisite but the pupil does not, the preceptor should give the requisite to the pupil, or he should make an effort, (thinking,) ‘How can a requisite be procured for my pupil?’

“If the pupil is ill, the preceptor should (perform services that the pupil performs for him, from attending to him in the morning to cleaning the room and grounds, except that he does not have to remove his sandals or arrange his robe over his shoulder before performing the services before the alms round, does not have to go as the pupil’s attendant on the alms round, and is not forbidden from interrupting the pupil while the latter is speaking.)

“If dissatisfaction (with the holy life) arises in the pupil, the preceptor should allay it or get someone else to allay it or he should give him a Dhamma talk. If anxiety [C: over his conduct with regard to the rules] arises in the pupil, the preceptor should dispel it or get someone else to dispel it or he should give him a Dhamma talk. If a viewpoint (see above) arises in the pupil, the preceptor should pry it away or get someone else to pry it away or he should give him a Dhamma talk.

“If the pupil has committed an offense against a heavy (saṅghādisesa) rule and deserves probation, the preceptor should make an effort, (thinking,) ‘How can the Community grant my pupil probation?’ If the pupil deserves to be sent back to the beginning… deserves penance… deserves rehabilitation, the preceptor should make an effort, (thinking,) ‘How can the Community grant my pupil rehabilitation?’

“If the Community wants to carry out a transaction against the pupil—censure, demotion, banishment, reconciliation, or suspension—the preceptor should make an effort, (thinking,) ‘How can the Community not carry out that transaction against my pupil or else change it to a lighter one?’ But if the transaction—censure… suspension—is carried out against him, the preceptor should make an effort, (thinking,) ‘How can my pupil behave properly, lower his hackles, mend his ways, so that the Community will rescind that transaction?’

“If the pupil’s robe should be washed, the preceptor should tell him, ‘This is how it should be washed (§),’ or make an effort, (thinking,) ‘How can my pupil’s robe be washed?’ If the pupil’s robe should be made, the preceptor should tell him, ‘This is how it should be made (§),’ or make an effort, (thinking,) ‘How can my pupil’s robe be made?’ If the pupil’s dye should be boiled, the preceptor should tell him, ‘This is how it should be boiled (§),’ or make an effort, (thinking,) ‘How can my pupil’s dye be boiled?’ If the pupil’s robe should be dyed, the preceptor should tell him, ‘This is how it should be dyed (§),’ or make an effort, (thinking,) ‘How can my pupil’s robe be dyed?’ While dyeing the robe, he should carefully let it take the dye (while drying), turning it back and forth (on the line), and shouldn’t go away until the drips have become discontinuous (§).

“If the pupil is ill, the preceptor should tend to him as long as life lasts; he should stay with him until he recovers.”

—Cv.VIII.12.2-11

Cullavagga XII.2.8

Is the permission for what is customary permissible?

What is the permission for what is customary?

“(Thinking,) ‘This is customarily done by my preceptor, this is customarily done by my teacher,’ it is permissible to behave accordingly.”

That is permissible in some cases, not permissible in others.

CHAPTER TEN

Misbehavior

The material in this chapter draws on rules scattered widely through the Khandhakas and the Pāṭimokkha, as well as on passages from the suttas. The misdeeds covered here range from simple childishness to more serious wrong doings, such as cruel mistreatment of animals.

Bad habits

The origin story to Cv.V.36 lists bad habits from which a bhikkhu should abstain. The list is long and varied, and can be divided into the following sub-topics:

Corrupting families

The bhikkhus in question planted flowering trees and had them planted; watered them and had them watered; plucked them and had them plucked; tied the flowers into garlands and had them tied; made garlands with stalks on one side and had them made; made garlands with stalks on two sides and had them made; made branching stalk arrangements (stringing flowers on thorns or palm-frond stems) and had them made; made floral arrangements in bunches (BD: wreaths) and had them made; made forehead garlands and had them made; made floral ear ornaments and had them made; made floral breast-plates and had them made. They took these garlands or had them sent to wives of reputable families, daughters of reputable families, girls of reputable families, daughters-in-law of reputable families, female slaves of reputable families. They ate from the same dish with wives of reputable families, daughters of reputable families, girls of reputable families, daughters-in-law of reputable families, female slaves of reputable families; drank from the same beaker, sat down on the same seat, shared the same bench, shared the same mat, shared the same blanket, shared the same mat and blanket.

The Commentary has a great deal to say on these topics. It begins by listing five methods by which a bhikkhu might get someone else to do something for him: (1) improper wording, (2) proper wording, (3) description (saying that doing such-and-such is good), (4) physical gesture (e.g., standing with a shovel in one’s hand as a gesture that a plant should be planted), and (5) a sign (e.g., leaving a shovel on the ground next to an unplanted plant for the same purpose). A bhikkhu who wants flowering trees planted for the sake of corrupting families incurs a dukkaṭa if he uses any of these methods to get someone else to do the planting. If he wants fruiting trees planted so that he can eat the fruit, only (1) and (2) are improper. If he wants trees planted for the sake of having a forest, a garden, or shade, or for having flowers to give in offering to the Triple Gem, only (1) is improper (i.e., one cannot say, “Dig this soil” in violation of Pc 10). There is no offense in taking or getting someone to take flower-garlands or other flower arrangements as an offering to the Triple Gem.

However, the Commentary insists that under no circumstances should a bhikkhu arrange flowers in any of the ways mentioned above, even as an offering to the Triple Gem. It fields the questions as to why there is the discrepancy here—i.e., why it is all right to take flower arrangements for the Triple Gem, but not to make them—but its answer is simply that the ancient commentaries say so, and what they say must be right. This is not supported by the Canon, in which flower arranging is criticized only in the context of corrupting families. Bhikkhus obviously have better things to do with their time than arranging flowers on altars, etc., but that is no reason for imposing an offense for doing so. Nevertheless, to summarize the Commentary’s long discussion of the matter: To arrange flowers in any of the ways described in the above passage incurs a dukkaṭa; to arrange them in other ways, no matter how elaborately, is an offense only if one is planning to corrupt families with the arrangement; to get others to make flower arrangements as an offering to the Triple Gem is no offense if one uses any of the methods from (2) to (5) listed in the preceding paragraph.

Violations of the eight precepts

The bhikkhus in the origin story to Cv.V.36 ate at the wrong time, drank strong drink, wore garlands, scents, and cosmetics; they danced, they sang, they played instruments, they directed (§). (According to the Commentary, to Sg 13, this last word means that, “Having gotten up, floating as if in rapture, they get a dramatic dancer to dance; they give the revaka.” The Sub-commentary states that revaka, which is found nowhere in the Canon and nowhere else in the Commentary, means that they demonstrated expressive or dramatic gestures (abhinaya): “Having declared their intent, ‘This is how to dance,’ they get up first and demonstrate the motions of the dance.” The Thai translator of the Commentary suggests instead that revaka might mean the musical beat. Under either interpretation, conducting a musical performance at present would also come under this term.) They danced while a woman danced, sang while she danced, played instruments while she danced, directed while she danced. They danced… sang… played instruments… directed while she sang. They danced… sang… played instruments… directed while she played instruments. They danced… sang… played instruments… directed while she directed…. Having spread out their outer robes as a stage, they said to a dancing girl, “Dance here, sister.” They applauded her (according to the Commentary, they placed their fingers first on their own foreheads, then on her forehead, saying “Good, good!” This, however, would seem to be a violation of Sg 2).

Games and other playful behavior

The bhikkhus played eight-row chess/checkers, ten-row chess/checkers, chess/checkers in the air, hopscotch, spillikins, dice games, stick games, hand-pictures, marble-games; blew through toy pipes, played with toy plows, turned somersaults, played with toy windmills, toy measures, toy chariots, toy bows; guessed letters drawn in the air or on the back of the body, guessed thoughts, mimicked deformities. Reasoning from the Great Standards, other toys and games, such as computer games, would be forbidden as well.

Athletics, military skills, and acrobatics

The bhikkhus trained in elephant skills (how to catch, care for, ride elephants), horse skills, chariot skills, archery skills, swordsmanship. They ran in front of elephants… horses… chariots. They ran forwards and backwards. They whistled (cheered?—this term, usseḷhenti, is uncertain), they clapped their hands, wrestled, boxed.

This list, though long, is not intended to be exhaustive. The origin story adds that the bhikkhus in question indulged in other bad habits as well. Cv.V.36 states simply that a bhikkhu who engages in bad habits should be dealt with in accordance with the rule. This, the Commentary says, means that if no higher penalty is assigned elsewhere, the bhikkhu incurs a dukkaṭa.

We have noted elsewhere—for example, under the discussions of NP 10 and Pc 11 in BMC1—that the Commentary seems to have used the open-ended nature of this list of bad habits to impose dukkaṭas on activities that, according to DN 2, a bhikkhu consummate in virtue would abstain from but are not explicitly mentioned in the Vinaya. Because the Commentary has a canonical source for these judgments, this seems a legitimate use of this rule.

If a bhikkhu engages in any of these bad habits repeatedly to the point where his bad habits are seen and heard about, and the families corrupted by his behavior are seen and heard about, he is further subject to the procedures and penalties given under Sg 13.

Other rules

Other rules related to the list of bad habits include the following:

A bhikkhu should not eat from the same dish, drink from the same beaker, share the same bed, share the same mat, share the same blanket, or share the same mat and blanket with anyone at all, lay or ordained. According to the Commentary, this means that one should not eat from a dish or drink from a beaker in the presence of another person who is also eating from that dish or drinking from that beaker (see Chapter 4). As for sharing bedding, a similar principle would apply: One may use bedding that someone else has used or is planning to use, but not at the same time that the other person is actually using it.

There is a dukkaṭa for going to see dancing, singing, or music. According to the Commentary, dancing includes going to see even peacocks dancing. It also includes dancing oneself and getting others to dance. (The Roṇa Sutta—AN 3:108—notes that, in the discipline of the noble ones, dancing counts as insanity.) Singing includes drama music as well as “sādhu music,” which the Commentary to Bhikkhunī Pc 10 defines as songs sung “at the time of the total Unbinding of a noble one, connected with the virtues of the Triple Gem.” The Sub-commentary to Cv.V.36 defines it as music dealing with Dhamma themes such as impermanence. Other religious music would come under this prohibition as well. The Commentary adds that “singing” also includes singing oneself and getting others to sing. The same holds true for “playing music.” (The Roṇa Sutta also notes that, in the discipline of the noble ones, singing counts as wailing.) However, there is no offense in snapping one’s fingers or clapping one’s hands in irritation or exasperation. There is also no offense if, within the monastery, one happens to see/hear dancing, singing, or music, but if one goes from one dwelling to another with the intention to see/hear, one incurs a dukkaṭa. The same holds true for getting up from one’s seat with the intention to see/hear; or if, while standing in a road, one turns one’s neck to see.

DN 2’s list of forbidden shows includes the following: dancing, singing, instrumental music, plays, legend recitations, hand-clapping, cymbals and drums, magic-lantern scenes, acrobatic and conjuring tricks; elephant fights, horse fights, buffalo fights, bull fights, goat fights, ram fights, cock fights, quail fights; fighting with staves, boxing, wrestling, war-games, roll calls, battle arrays, and regimental reviews (see Pc 50). Reasoning from this list, it would seem that a bhikkhu would be forbidden from watching athletic contests of any type. Movies and shadow-puppet plays would fit under the category of magic lantern scenes, and—given the Commentary’s prohibition against “sādhu music,” above—it would seem that fictional movies, plays, etc., dealing with Dhamma themes would be forbidden as well. Non-fictional documentary films would not seem to come under the rule, and the question of their appropriateness is thus an issue more of Dhamma than of Vinaya. Because many of even the most serious documentaries treat topics that come under “animal talk” (see Pc 85), a bhikkhu should be scrupulously honest with himself when judging whether watching such a documentary would be beneficial for his practice.

Arguing from the Great Standards, a bhikkhu at present would commit an offense if he were to turn on an electronic device such as a television, radio, VCR, computer, or CD/DVD player for the sake of entertainment, or if he were to insert a CD or a tape into such a device for the sake of entertainment. He would also commit an offense if he went out of his way to watch or listen to entertainment on such a device that was already turned on.

In connection with the rules against playful behavior, there is a rule that a bhikkhu should not climb a tree. (“People criticized and complained… saying, ‘Like monkeys!’”) However, if there is good reason to do so, one may climb a tree up to the height of a man. If there are dangers, one may climb as high as is necessary in order to escape the danger. An example of a good reason, according to the Commentary, is to collect dry kindling. Examples of dangers include dangerous animals, being lost, or an approaching flood or fire: In the latter cases, one may climb a tree to escape the rising water or to get a sense of direction.

There are rules forbidding a bhikkhu from riding in a vehicle unless he is ill, in which case he may ride in a handcart or a cart yoked with a bull. In modern times, ill is interpreted here as meaning too weak to reach one’s destination on foot in the time available, and the allowance for a cart yoked with a bull is extended to cover motorized vehicles such as automobiles, airplanes, and trucks, but not to motorcycles or bicycles, as the riding position in the latter cases is more like riding on an animal’s back. There is also a rule allowing a bhikkhu to ride in a sedan-chair, although the origin story to that rule suggests that the allowance is intended specifically for a bhikkhu too ill to ride in a vehicle. In discussing these rules, the Commentary states that the sedan-chair may be carried by women or men, and the vehicle may be driven by a woman or a man (although see the discussion under Pc 67 in BMC1). Even then, though, the Commentary does not extend permission for the bhikkhu to drive the vehicle himself. Thus it is improper for a bhikkhu to drive a motorized vehicle of any sort.

Also, to prevent the kind of harm that can come from negligence, the Vibhaṅga to Pr 3 imposes a dukkaṭa each on throwing a stone over a precipice in fun, on throwing oneself over a precipice, and on sitting in a seat without first checking it.

Wrong livelihood

A bhikkhu lives in an economy of gifts, entrusting his livelihood to the gifts of the faithful. To maintain the purity of this arrangement, he must not try to influence their faith for his own material benefit through inappropriate means or for the sake of items inappropriate for his use. We have already discussed this topic briefly under Sg 13. Here we will treat it more fully.

Cv.I.14.1 states that a bhikkhu who engages repeatedly in wrong livelihood may be subject to banishment. Only a few of the rules dealing with wrong livelihood are given in the Khandhakas. More information is given in the Pāṭimokkha and in the suttas.

Inappropriate items

NP 18 & 19 forbid a bhikkhu from accepting gold and silver (money) or from engaging in an exchange that would result in his receiving such things. Even when he has forfeited these items after confessing his offense under those rules, he is not allowed to receive them in return. (However, there is an allowance for a steward to accept money to be used for a bhikkhu’s needs. This is called the Meṇḍaka allowance, after the lay man who inspired it, and is discussed under NP 10.)

In addition, DN 2 states that the bhikkhu consummate in virtue “abstains from accepting uncooked grain… raw meat… women and girls… male and female slaves… goats and sheep… fowl and pigs… elephants, cattle, steeds, and mares… fields and property.” The Commentary to NP 19 terms these items dukkaṭa-vatthu, items entailing a dukkaṭa when accepted.

Inappropriate means

The section on wrong livelihood in the Rule Index to Volume One lists the rules in the Pāṭimokkha related to the issue of wrong livelihood, the most serious being the pārājika for making false claims to superior human attainments. Most discussions of the type of wrong livelihood that would be grounds for banishment, however, focus on the issue of acting as a go-between (Sg 5) and that of asking for items in inappropriate situations or from inappropriate people.

In general, a bhikkhu may ask for food and tonics only when ill (Pc 39, Sk 37), and for robe-cloth only when two or more of his own robes have been lost or stolen (NP 6). He may ask for enough construction materials for his own purposes only when the hut he is building is no larger than the prescribed measure (Sg 6). For further details, see the discussions under these rules. In all circumstances a bhikkhu may ask for items from his relatives and from those who have given him an invitation to ask—although, in this latter case, he must stay within the bounds of the invitation.

In addition to asking outright, there are other inappropriate ways of influencing donors to make donations. MN 117 defines wrong livelihood as dissembling, talking, hinting, belittling, and pursuing gain with gain. The Visuddhimagga’s long discussion of these terms (I.60-82) may be summarized as follows:

dissembling means making a show of not wanting fine food, etc., in hopes that donors will be impressed with one’s fewness of wants and offer fine food as a result;

talking means speaking with donors in any way that will make them want to give donations—examples include persuading, suggesting, ingratiating oneself with them, and showing affection for their children;

hinting means speaking or gesturing in an indirect way that will get donors to give donations;

belittling means speaking of or to a person in a reproachful or sarcastic way, in hopes that he/she will be shamed into giving;

pursuing gain with gain means making a small gift in hopes of getting a large gift in return (this would include making investments in hopes of profit, and offering material incentives to those who make donations).

Under the category of hinting fall three rules given in the Vibhaṅga to Pr 2 (Pr.II.7.25). Dealing with three variables, they cover the case where Bhikkhu X is going to a place where supporters of Bhikkhu Y live. In the first variable, X volunteers to take Y’s greetings to the supporters (apparently in hopes that they will send gifts to Y, which is what happens). In the second, Y asks X to take his greetings. In the third, they put their heads together and agree for X to take Y’s greetings. In all three cases, the bhikkhu who says, “I will take your greetings,” or “Take my greetings” incurs a dukkaṭa. Although the rules seem aimed at preventing a form of wrong livelihood, they make no exception for a bhikkhu taking another bhikkhu’s greetings with other, more innocent purposes in mind.

DN 2 contains an even more detailed description of inappropriate means for gaining a livelihood. The ideal bhikkhu, it says,

“abstains from conveying messages and running errands… from buying and selling… from dealing with false scales, false metals, and false measures… from bribery, deception, fraud, and crooked practices in general. He abstains from mutilating, executing, imprisoning, highway robbery, plunder, and violence….

“Whereas some contemplatives and brahmans, living off food given in faith, are intent on conveying messages and running errands for people such as these—kings, ministers of state, noble warriors, brahmans, householders, or youths (who say), ‘Go here,’ ‘Go there,’ ‘Take this there,’ ‘Fetch that here’—he abstains from conveying messages and running errands for people such as these….

“Whereas some contemplatives and brahmans, living off food given in faith, maintain themselves by wrong livelihood, by such “animal” arts as:

reading marks on the limbs (e.g., palmistry);

reading omens and signs;

interpreting celestial events (falling stars, comets);

interpreting dreams;

reading features of the body (e.g., phrenology);

reading marks on cloth gnawed by mice;

offering fire oblations, oblations from a ladle, oblations of husks, rice powder, rice grains, ghee, and oil;

offering oblations from the mouth;

offering blood-sacrifices;

making predictions based on the fingertips;

geomancy;

making predictions for state officials;

laying demons in a cemetery;

placing spells on spirits;

earth-skills (divining water and gems?);

snake-skills, poison-skills, scorpion-skills, rat-skills, bird-skills, crow-skills;

predicting life spans;

giving protective charms;

casting horoscopes—

he abstains from wrong livelihood, from “animal” arts such as these.

“Whereas some contemplatives and brahmans, living off food given in faith, maintain themselves by wrong livelihood, by such “animal” arts as: determining lucky and unlucky gems, staffs, garments, swords, arrows, bows, and other weapons; women, men, boys, girls, male slaves, female slaves; elephants, horses, buffaloes, bulls, cows, goats, rams, fowl, quails, lizards, rabbits, tortoises, and other animals—he abstains from wrong livelihood, from “animal” arts such as these.

“Whereas some contemplatives and brahmans, living off food given in faith, maintain themselves by wrong livelihood, by such “animal” arts as (forecasting):

the rulers will march forth;

the rulers will not march forth;

our rulers will attack, and their rulers will retreat;

their rulers will attack, and our rulers will retreat;

there will be triumph for our rulers and defeat for their rulers;

there will be triumph for their rulers and defeat for our rulers;

thus there will be triumph this one, defeat for that one—

he abstains from wrong livelihood, from “animal” arts such as these.

“Whereas some contemplatives and brahmans, living off food given in faith, maintain themselves by wrong livelihood, by such “animal” arts as (forecasting):

there will be a lunar eclipse;

there will be a solar eclipse;

there will be an occultation of (a conjunction of the moon or a planet with) an asterism;

the sun and moon will be favorable;

the sun and moon will be unfavorable;

the asterisms will be favorable;

the asterisms will be unfavorable;

there will be a meteor shower;

there will be a flickering light on the horizon (an aurora?);

there will be an earthquake;

there will be thunder coming from dry clouds;

there will be a rising, a setting, a darkening, a brightening of the sun, moon, and asterisms;

such will be the result of the lunar eclipse… the rising, setting, darkening, brightening of the sun, moon, and asterisms—

he abstains from wrong livelihood, from “animal” arts such as these.

“Whereas some contemplatives and brahmans, living off food given in faith, maintain themselves by wrong livelihood, by such “animal” arts as (forecasting):

there will be abundant rain; there will be a drought;

there will be plenty; there will be famine;

there will be rest and security; there will be danger;

there will be disease; there will be freedom from disease;

or they earn their living by accounting, counting, calculation, composing poetry, or teaching hedonistic arts and doctrines (lokāyata)—

he abstains from wrong livelihood, from “animal” arts such as these.

“Whereas some contemplatives and brahmans, living off food given in faith, maintain themselves by wrong livelihood, by such “animal” arts as:

calculating auspicious dates for marriages—both those in which the bride is brought home and those in which she is sent out; calculating auspicious dates for betrothals and divorces; for collecting debts or making investments and loans; reciting charms to make people attractive or unattractive; curing women who have undergone miscarriages or abortions;

reciting spells to bind a man’s tongue, to paralyze his jaws, to make him lose control over his hands, or to bring on deafness;

getting oracular answers to questions addressed to a spirit in a mirror, in a young girl, or to a spirit medium;

worshipping the sun, worshipping the Great Brahmā, bringing forth flames from the mouth, invoking the goddess of luck—

he abstains from wrong livelihood, from “animal” arts such as these.

“Whereas some contemplatives and brahmans, living off food given in faith, maintain themselves by wrong livelihood, by such “animal” arts as:

promising gifts to deities in return for favors; fulfilling such promises;

demonology;

reciting spells in earth houses (see earth skills, above);

inducing virility and impotence;

preparing sites for construction;

consecrating sites for construction;

giving ceremonial mouthwashes and ceremonial baths;

offering sacrificial fires;

administering emetics, purges, purges from above, purges from below, head-purges; ear-oil, eye-drops, treatments through the nose, ointments, and counter-ointments; practicing eye-surgery (or: extractive surgery), general surgery, pediatrics; administering root-medicines and binding medicinal herbs—

he abstains from wrong livelihood, from “animal” arts such as these. This, too, is part of his virtue.”

The Khandhakas contain only a few rules related to wrong livelihood. A bhikkhu who learns or teaches any of the “animal” arts mentioned above incurs a dukkaṭa. The same holds true for a bhikkhu who learns or teaches lokāyata, a term whose meaning is controversial. SN 12:48 indicates that lokāyata is a form of metaphysics, cosmology, or systematic ontology. The four main tenets of lokāyata, it says, are: everything exists, nothing exists, everything is a oneness, everything is a plurality. The Commentary defines lokāyata as sophistry (“For this and this reason, crows are white, herons are black”) and the teachings of other religions. Because the lokāyatans of the Buddha’s time tended to use their first principles to argue for a life of hedonism, some modern scholars translate lokāyata as hedonism. Whatever the term’s precise definition, it can be extended through the Great Standards to cover all philosophical and religious systems at variance with Buddhist practice.

The Vinaya-mukha objects to this particular prohibition, saying that it would make bhikkhus narrow and ill-informed, unable to argue effectively against non-Buddhist teachings. We must remember, however, that when the Canon was first composed, “learning” a philosophical system meant apprenticing oneself to one of its teachers and memorizing its texts. Thus it is possible to argue that this prohibition does not extend to the simple act of reading about systems whose teachings would undermine Buddhist practice. Still, one must be sensitive to one’s motivation for reading about such things, and to the question of whether such reading is taking up valuable time better spent in the practice.

A bhikkhu is allowed to take another person’s belongings on trust and make them his own only if the original owner is endowed with five characteristics: He/she is an acquaintance, he/she is an intimate, he/she has spoken of the matter, he/she is still alive, and one knows that “he/she will be pleased with my taking this.” This topic is discussed in detail under Pr 2. As noted under that discussion, the Commentary states that only three characteristics have to be met: the fourth, the fifth, and any one of the first three. Mv.VIII.31.2-3 lists the conditions that have to be met to legitimately take an item on trust when conveying it from a donor to an intended recipient. These conditions, too, are discussed under Pr 2.

Mv.VI.37.5 tells the story of a former barber who had ordained late in life and still kept his barber’s equipment at hand. Giving his equipment over to his sons, who were also skilled barbers, he had them go from house to house taking the equipment along to ask for offerings of food. The boys were very successful. Donors, feeling intimidated by the razors, etc., gave donations even though they didn’t want to. As a result, the Buddha laid down a double rule: that a bhikkhu should not get others to do what is unallowable, and that one who was formerly a barber should not keep barber’s equipment. The first rule seems to mean that one should not get others to dissemble, talk, hint, etc., for the sake of material gain. The second rule seems related to the fear that people in those days had of barbers, who were reputed to be so skilled with their razors that they could kill without leaving a visible wound. Thus, to make sure that a bhikkhu who was formerly a barber cannot intimidate anyone, he should not have barber’s equipment at hand. The Commentary states that a former barber is allowed to use barber’s equipment (e.g., to shave the heads of his fellow bhikkhus) but is not allowed to keep it or to accept payment for using it. Other bhikkhus may keep barber’s equipment without offense.

To prevent a bhikkhu from pursuing gain with gain—and from displeasing his donors—there is a rule that a bhikkhu living off the gifts of the faithful should not take those gifts and give them to lay people. To do so is called bringing a gift of faith (saddhā-deyya) to waste. The one exception is that one may always give those gifts to one’s mother or father. The Commentary notes that this allowance holds even if one’s parents are royalty. However, it does not extend to other relatives.

None of the texts define which gains do and do not constitute gifts of faith, but the term itself suggests that it would not apply to gains accruing to a bhikkhu for reasons other than the faith of the donor, such as an inheritance from his parents or funds derived from work done before his ordination.

Gifts of almsfood, however, are obviously gifts of faith, which raises the question: What is to be done with leftovers? Mv.III.7.8 mentions a person called a bhikkhu-bhatika (vl.: bhikkhu-gatika), which the Commentary defines as a man living in the same dwelling with bhikkhus. There may have been a custom for bhikkhus to give their leftovers to such people, but the Canon does not explicitly address the issue. The Vinaya-mukha does, saying that a bhikkhu may take any gains beyond his own needs and give them as compensation to lay people who do work in the monastery. (The Commentary to Cv.X.15.1 says that a bhikkhu may take the best part of what is given to him and then give the remainder to others. Also, if the gift is not congenial to him, he may relinquish it to others. He may also use a robe or alms bowl for a day or two and then give it away.) If a bhikkhu gains an excess of items of a more permanent nature, he may give them to his fellow bhikkhus or to the Community. If the Community has an excess, it may have the items exchanged for something more needed (see Chapter 7). Or, as the origin story to Pc 41 shows, it may arrange to have them distributed to “those who eat scraps (vighāsāda),” which, as that story also shows, may include wanderers of other sects.

Cruelty

A bhikkhu should not grab cattle by the horns, ears, dewlaps, or by their tails, nor should he mount on their backs. (In some Communities, this rule is extended so that a bhikkhu is forbidden from riding on the back of any animal and, as noted above, from riding bicycles and motorcycles.) Furthermore, there is a thullaccaya for touching, with lustful thoughts, the sexual organs of cattle. The Commentary explains that this applies only to touching their sexual organs with one’s own sexual organ, but there is nothing in the Canon to indicate that this is the case. The Sub-commentary adds that it is all right to grab cattle by their horns, etc., if one’s intention is to free them from difficulty or danger.

Destructive behavior

The Vibhaṅga to Pr 2 states that a bhikkhu who breaks, scatters, burns, or otherwise renders unusable the property of another person incurs a dukkaṭa. Cv.V.32.1 adds that a bhikkhu is not allowed to burn underbrush. However, if a brush fire is burning, a counter-fire may be lit and protection (paritta) made. This last phrase apparently means reciting a protective charm, such as the Vaṭṭaka Paritta (Cp 3.9), but the Commentary interprets it in a different way: Making protection includes cutting grass and digging a trench, activities otherwise forbidden (see Pc 10-11); if an unordained person (this includes novices) is present, have him/her light the counter-fire; one may light it oneself only when no unordained person is present (although if that person needs help, there should be no offense in providing that help). The same holds true, the Commentary adds, for cutting underbrush, digging a trench, and cutting fresh branches used to stamp out fire: These things are all right to do regardless of whether the fire has reached one’s dwelling. If, however, the fire can be put out using nothing but water, these other special allowances don’t hold.

Although the Commentary may be mistaken in reading making protection in this way, one could argue from the Great Standards that in a situation where a bhikkhu is allowed to light a counter-fire he should also be allowed to do any of the activities needed to guarantee that the counter-fire does not turn around and burn the area he is trying to protect.

Self-mutilation

A bhikkhu who cuts off his own genitalia incurs a thullaccaya.

Now at that time a certain bhikkhu, tormented by dissatisfaction, cut off his own penis. They reported this matter to the Blessed One (who said), “When one thing should have been cut off, that foolish man cut off something else.”

The “thing that should have been cut off,” the Sub-commentary notes, was the obsession for passion.

The Commentary adds that cutting off any other part of one’s body—such as an ear, nose, or finger—out of spite entails a dukkaṭa. However, one is allowed to cut or cut off any part of one’s body for a medical purpose (as in an amputation); or to let blood, for example, when bitten by a snake or an insect, or to treat a disease that calls for blood-letting (see Chapter 5; Mv.VI.14.4).

Charms & omens

A prince once invited the Community of bhikkhus headed by the Buddha to a meal at his residence. Having spread out a strip of cloth in the entrance to his palace, he the Buddha to step on it but didn’t say why. According to the Commentary he planned to take it as a sign: If the Buddha stepped on the cloth, that meant that he, the prince, would have a son. In any event, the Buddha did not step on the cloth and furthermore forbade the bhikkhus from ever stepping on a strip of cloth in a similar situation. The Commentary explains that this rule was formulated to keep lay people from looking down on bhikkhus who couldn’t accurately predict the future. The Canon contains two exceptions, however: The first is that if lay people spread out a strip of cloth and specifically ask a bhikkhu to step on it for their good luck, he is allowed to do so (although the examples of allowable good luck omens given in the Commentary—that a woman might either have a miscarriage or become pregnant—seem bizarre at the least); the second is that one may step on a cloth for drying the feet after they are washed.

A similar pattern of prohibitions and allowances surrounds wishes for health and long life after a sneeze. The Buddha once sneezed while giving a Dhamma talk, and the talk was interrupted as the bhikkhus said, “May you live!” He asked them, “Bhikkhus, when ‘May you live!’ is said when someone has sneezed, can he for that reason live or die?” The answer, of course, was No, and the Buddha went on to forbid bhikkhus from saying “May you live!” (modern equivalents would be “Gesundheit!” or “Bless you!”) when someone sneezed. However, an exception was made for the case where a bhikkhu sneezes and lay people wish him a long life. The custom in those days was for the person who had sneezed to respond, “And a long life to you!” and the Buddha allowed the bhikkhu to respond in the customary fashion.

As noted in the section on wrong livelihood, above, a bhikkhu is forbidden from giving protective charms, or paritta. However, the Commentary to Pr 3 applies the above pattern surrounding cloths and sneezes to instances when lay people, for the sake of good luck, ask a bhikkhu to chant paritta or make paritta-water. Whether this is allowable or not, it says, depends on the way in which the invitation is phrased and the ceremony arranged. If they ask him to do these things for an ill person, he should not accept the invitation (as it would count as a way of practicing medicine); but if they simply ask him to do so for good luck, he may. If, when he is invited to their home, they ask him to make paritta-water, he may stir the water with his hand or touch the string attached to its vessel only if the lay people provide these things. If he provides them himself, he incurs a dukkaṭa. The Commentary’s allowances on this topic are controversial, and not all Communities follow them.

However, the Canon clearly allows a bhikkhu to chant a paritta protection for himself. Cv.V.6 allows him to protect himself from being bitten by snakes through suffusing the four royal families of snakes with an attitude of good will (mettā) and to make a self-protection, stipulating the paritta to be chanted (AN 4:67). DN 32 and Sn&2:1 (= Khp 6) contain similar charms for protecting oneself against the depredations of unruly spirits. And, as noted above, one is allowed to recite a self-protective charm if a brush fire is approaching.

What is worth noting here is that all of these parittas stake their power on skillful qualities in the mind of the person chanting them: good will, respect for the Triple Gem, and truthfulness. Thus, other self-protective charms that stake their power on skillful qualities of mind would seem to be allowable under the Great Standards. Charms based on unskillful mental states, such as the desire to bring harm to whatever is threatening one’s safety, would not. One might also argue that charms staking their powers on other principles—such as the Mahāyāna charms whose powers are said to come from the supposed magical qualities of words and syllables or from the power of an external being—would also not be allowable, but this is a controversial point.

Displaying psychic powers

In AN 3:61, the Buddha tells a brahman that many hundreds of his bhikkhu disciples are endowed with psychic powers. Nevertheless, he forbade them from displaying those powers to householders. The origin story to this prohibition—which we cited briefly in connection with Pc 8—shows why:

Now at that time a costly block of sandalwood, from sandalwood heartwood, accrued to the Rājagaha financier. The thought occurred to him, “What if I were to have an alms bowl carved from this block of sandalwood? The chips will be for my own enjoyment, and I’ll give the bowl as a gift.” So the financier, having had a bowl carved from the block of sandalwood, having looped a string around it, having hung it from the top of a bamboo pole, having had the bamboo pole fastened on top of a series of bamboo poles, one on top of another, announced: “Any brahman or contemplative who is a worthy one (arahant) with psychic powers: Fetch down the bowl and it is given to you.”

Then Pūraṇa Kassapa went to the Rājagaha financier and, on arrival, said to him, “Because I am a worthy one with psychic powers, give me the bowl.” “If, venerable sir, you are a worthy one with psychic powers, fetch down the bowl and it is given to you.”

Then Makkali Gosāla… Ajita Kesakambalin… Pakudha Kaccāyana… Sañjaya Belaṭṭhaputta… Nigaṇṭha Nāṭaputta went to the Rājagaha financier and, on arrival, said to him, “Because I am a worthy one with psychic powers, give me the bowl.” “If, venerable sir, you are a worthy one with psychic powers, fetch down the bowl and it is given to you.”

Now at that time Ven. Mahā Moggallāna and Ven. Piṇḍola Bhāradvāja, each having dressed early in the morning, each taking his robe and bowl, had gone into Rājagaha for alms. Ven. Piṇḍola Bhāradvāja was a worthy one with psychic powers, and Ven. Mahā Moggallāna was a worthy one with psychic powers (§). Then Ven. Piṇḍola Bhāradvāja said to Ven. Mahā Moggallāna: “Go, friend Moggallāna, and fetch down the bowl. That bowl is yours.” Then Ven. Mahā Moggallāna said to Ven. Piṇḍola Bhāradvāja: “Go, friend Bhāradvāja, and fetch down the bowl. That bowl is yours.”

So Ven. Piṇḍola Bhāradvāja, rising up into the sky, took the bowl and circled three times around Rājagaha. Now at that time the Rājagaha financier was standing in his house compound with his wife and children, paying homage with his hands palm-to-palm over his heart, (saying,) “May Master Bhāradvāja land right here in our house compound.” So Ven. Piṇḍola Bhāradvāja landed in the financier’s house compound. Then the financier, having taken the bowl from Ven. Piṇḍola Bhāradvāja’s hand, having filled it with costly non-staple foods, presented it to Ven. Piṇḍola Bhāradvāja. Ven. Piṇḍola Bhāradvāja, taking the bowl, returned to the monastery.

People, hearing that “Master Piṇḍola Bhāradvāja, they say, has fetched down the financier’s bowl,” followed right after him, making a shrill noise, a great noise. The Blessed One, hearing the shrill noise, the great noise, asked Ven. Ānanda, “Ānanda, what is that shrill noise, that great noise?”

“Ven. Piṇḍola Bhāradvāja has fetched down the Rājagaha financier’s bowl, venerable sir. People, hearing that ‘Master Piṇḍola Bhāradvāja, they say, has fetched down the financier’s bowl,’ are following right after him, making a shrill noise, a great noise. That is the shrill noise, the great noise, that the Blessed One (hears).”

Then the Blessed One, with regard to this cause, to this incident, had the Community of bhikkhus convened and questioned Ven. Piṇḍola Bhāradvāja: “Is it true, as they say, Bhāradvāja, that you fetched down the financier’s bowl?”

“Yes, venerable sir.”

The Awakened One, the Blessed One, rebuked him: “It’s not appropriate, Bhāradvāja, not fitting for a contemplative, improper, and not to be done. How can you display a superior human state, a wonder of psychic power, to lay people for the sake of a miserable wooden bowl? Just as a woman might expose her sexual organ for the sake of a miserable wooden coin, so too have you displayed a superior human state, a wonder of psychic power, to lay people for the sake of a miserable wooden bowl.”—Cv.V.8

Strangely, the Commentary insists that the prohibition against displaying psychic powers applies only to vikubbana (harmful/ violent)-iddhi, not to adhiṭṭhāna (mental determination) -iddhi. It doesn’t elucidate the difference between the two, but the Sub-commentary notes that vikubbana-iddhi means, for example, changing one’s appearance to that of another being, such as a child or a nāga (as Devadatta did with Prince Ajātasattu) or to a manifold army in battle formation; whereas adhiṭṭhāna-iddhi means simply multiplying one’s ordinary appearance 100, 1,000, or 100,000 times through the power of a determination “May I be many.” The distinction is fascinating but bears no relation to the origin story—Ven. Piṇḍola did not engage in vikubbana-iddhi—and has no basis in the Canon.

Notice that the dukkaṭa here is for displaying psychic powers. If one tells an unordained person of one’s actual psychic powers, the penalty would be a pācittiya offense under Pc 8. Unlike the dukkaṭa here, the pācittiya applies to telling novices as well. If one displays one’s powers to a novice or an ordained person, or tells an ordained person of one’s actual powers, there is no offense.

Off-limits

The Vibhaṅga to Sg 1 imposes a dukkaṭa on the act of staring lustfully at a woman (or girl’s) private parts.

Also, the second book to the Abhidhamma—the Vibhaṅga—lists individuals and places that are “out-of-range” (agocara) to a bhikkhu, i.e., off-limits for him to associate with. The commentaries list items that are “untouchable” (anāmāsa), i.e., off-limits for him to touch. As neither of these lists comes from the canonical Vinaya, they are discussed in Appendix V.

Rules

Bad Habits

“Various kinds of bad habits are not to be indulged in. Whoever should indulge in them is to be dealt with in accordance with the rule.”—Cv.V.36

“One should not eat from the same dish (with another person), drink from the same beaker, share the same bed, share the same mat, share the same blanket, share the same mat and blanket. Whoever should do so: an offense of wrong doing.”—Cv.V.19.2

“One should not go to see dancing, singing, or music. Whoever should do so: an offense of wrong doing.”—Cv.V.2.6

“A tree should not be climbed. Whoever should climb one: an offense of wrong doing”…. “I allow that, when there is a reason, a tree be climbed to the height of a man, and as high as is necessary in case of dangers.”—Cv.V.32.2

“One should not ride in a vehicle. Whoever should ride: an offense of wrong doing.”—Mv.V.9.4… “I allow a vehicle for one who is ill.”—Mv.V.10.2… “I allow a hand cart and a cart yoked with a bull (§)“… “I allow a sedan-chair and a hammock sedan-chair.”—Mv.V.10.3

Wrong Livelihood

“There are people of conviction and confidence who place gold and silver in the hands of stewards, saying, ‘Give the master whatever is allowable.’ I allow that whatever is allowable coming from that be accepted. But in no way at all do I say that money is to be accepted or sought for.”—Mv.VI.34.21

“Cosmology (hedonism—lokāyata) should not be learned. Whoever should learn it: an offense of wrong doing”… “Cosmology (hedonism) should not be taught. Whoever should teach it: an offense of wrong doing”… “‘Animal’ arts should not be learned. Whoever should learn them: an offense of wrong doing”… “‘Animal’ arts should not be taught. Whoever should teach them: an offense of wrong doing.”—Cv.V.33.2

“I allow that an object be taken on trust when (the owner) is endowed with five qualities: he is an acquaintance, an intimate, has spoken (of the matter), is still alive, and one knows, ‘ He will be pleased with my taking (it).’ I allow that an object be taken on trust when (the owner) is endowed with these five qualities.”—Mv.VIII.19

When a bhikkhu conveying robe-cloth may, along the way, rightly take it on trust in the original owner: (The original owner says: “Give this robe-cloth to so-and-so”)… When, along the way, he may rightly take it on trust in the intended receiver: (The original owner says: “I give this robe-cloth to so-and-so”).—Mv.VIII.31.2-3

“One who has gone forth should not get others to undertake what is not allowable. Whoever should do so: an offense of wrong doing. And one who was formerly a barber should not keep barber equipment. Whoever should keep it: an offense of wrong doing.”—Mv.VI.37.5

“I allow giving to one’s mother and father. But a gift of faith should not be brought to waste. Whoever does so: an offense of wrong doing.”—Mv.VIII.22

Are gold and silver permissible?

They are not permissible.

Where is it objected to?

In Rājagaha, in the Sutta Vibhaṅga (NP 18)

What offense is committed?

A pācittiya for accepting gold and silver.—Cv.XII.2.8

Cruel Behavior

“One should not grab cattle by their horns… by their ears… by their dewlaps, by their tails. One should not mount on their backs. Whoever should mount (one): an offense of wrong doing. One should not touch their sexual organs with lustful thoughts. Whoever touches (one): a grave offense. One should not kill a young calf. Whoever kills (one) is to be dealt with in accordance with the rule (Pc 61).”—Mv.V.9.3

“One should not incite another to kill an animal. Whoever should incite is to be dealt with in accordance with the rule (Pc 61).”—Mv.V.10.10

Destructive Behavior

“Underbrush should not be burned. Whoever should burn it: an offense of wrong doing”… “I allow that when a brush fire is burning that a counter-fire be lit (and) protection made (§).”—Cv.V.32.1

Self-mutilation

“One’s own penis/genitals are not to be cut off. Whoever should cut them off: a grave offense.”—Cv.V.7

Charms & Omens

“A strip of cloth (celapaṭṭika) should not be stepped on. Whoever should do so: an offense of wrong doing.”—Cv.V.21.3

“I allow that, when requested by householders for the sake of good luck, one step on a strip of cloth”… “I allow that a cloth for drying washed feet be stepped on.”—Cv.V.21.4

“‘May you live!’ should not be said when someone has sneezed. Whoever should say it: an offense of wrong doing”… “I allow that, when householders say to you, ‘May you live!’ you respond, ‘Long life (to you).’”—Cv.V.33.3

“(Following the Sri Lankan, Burmese, and PTS editions) “I allow that these four royal families of snakes be suffused with an attitude of good will; and that a self-protection be made for the sake of self-guarding, for the sake of self-warding. And this is how it is to be made:

“I have good will for the Virūpakkhas,

good will for the Erāpathas,

good will for the Chabyāputtas,

good will for the Dark Gotamakas.

I have good will for footless beings,

good will for two-footed beings,

good will for four-footed beings,

good will for many-footed beings.

May footless beings        do me no harm.

May two-footed beings        do me no harm.

May four-footed beings        do me no harm.

May many-footed beings        do me no harm.

May all creatures,

all breathing things, all beings

—each & every one—

meet with good fortune.

May none of them come to any evil.

Limitless is the Buddha,

limitless the Dhamma,

limitless the Saṅgha.

There is a limit to creeping things:

snakes, scorpions, centipedes,

spiders, lizards, & rats.

I have made this safeguard,

I have made this protection.

May the beings depart.

I pay homage

to the Blessed One,

homage

to the seven

rightly self-awakened ones.”—Cv.V.6

Psychic Powers

“A superior human state, a miracle of psychic power, should not be displayed to householders. Whoever should display it: an offense of wrong doing.”—Cv.V.8.2

CHAPTER ELEVEN

Rains-residence

Well before the Buddha’s time there was a custom in India that wanderers would stay in place for the rainy season, both to avoid having to negotiate muddy roads and to avoid trampling plants. Bhikkhus in the early years of the Buddha’s teaching career were criticized by the Jains for not observing this custom, so the Buddha gave his permission for them to stop their wandering for three months of the Rains. Later he imposed a penalty for not observing this custom.

Periods of residence

Because the rainy season in South Asia is roughly four months, bhikkhus are allowed to choose between two periods of Rains-residence: the first, starting the day after the full moon of the month of Asāḷhi (roughly July); and the second, starting the day after the following full moon. At present, the first Rains-residence starts on the full moon in July, or the second if there are two. Why the Buddha formulated two periods of Rains-residence, the Canon does not say. From the Commentary’s discussion of Mv.II.21.4, it would appear that if one enters the first Rains and then, for one reason or another, “breaks” the Rains (see below) within the first month, one would still be eligible to enter the second Rains so as to receive the privileges contingent on its successful completion.

In the Buddha’s time, the determination of the lunar calendar was one of the responsibilities of the government in each kingdom or republic. Thus, to avoid controversy, the Buddha allowed that the wishes of kings be respected in this matter: If a king wanted to postpone the designation of the Asāḷhi full moon another month, bhikkhus were allowed to comply. (The rule coming from this origin story is stated in more general terms—“I allow that kings be complied with”—showing the general principle that we noted under Chapter 7, that the Buddha was not so foolish as to try to legislate for kings. The Commentary notes, however, that this principle applies only in matters in which the king’s wish is in line with the Dhamma. No one, it says, should be complied with in matters where their wishes are not in line with the Dhamma.) At present, the governments of only a few countries concern themselves with calculating the lunar calendar for the sake of the general population. In other countries this point is not an issue, and the bhikkhus are free to calculate the lunar calendar without regard to the government’s calculations.

Entering for the Rains

The first day of the Rains-residence is when lodgings in a monastery are assigned for the duration of the Rains, so the Commentary recommends that a bhikkhu planning to spend the Rains in another monastery should start heading there a month before the start of the Rains so as not to inconvenience the assigner of lodgings and other bhikkhus there. As for bhikkhus planning to stay on in the monastery where they are already residing, they should spend the month before the beginning of the Rains preparing any worn-down buildings so that those who come for the Rains will study and/or practice meditation in comfort. The assigner of lodgings should assign lodgings for the Rains at dawn of the day the Rains begins. If other bhikkhus come later in the day and there are no extra spaces for them, they should be told that the lodgings have been assigned and that they should go to other lodgings, such as the foot of a tree. (What this means, apparently, is that they should enter the second Rains somewhere else, as the Canon contains a rule against entering the Rains in anything less than a proper dwelling. See below.)

Mv.III.4.2 states that on a day for beginning the Rains one should not intentionally pass by a residence/monastery not desiring to enter for the Rains. How this applies to the beginning of the second Rains period is obvious: A bhikkhu must stop for the Rains on that day. As for the beginning of the first Rains period, the Commentary notes simply that if there are obstacles (see below), one may choose to enter the second Rains period instead. One obstacle not mentioned in the list below, however, is discussed in Mv.II.21.4. This is the case of a monastery where many (i.e., four or more) bhikkhus—“inexperienced and incompetent”—are staying for the Rains and none of them knows the uposatha or the uposatha transaction, the Pāṭimokkha or the recital of the Pāṭimokkha. One of them should be sent to a neighboring monastery immediately to master the Pāṭimokkha in brief or in its full extent. If he can manage it immediately, well and good. If not, one of them should be sent to a neighboring monastery for a period of seven days to master the Pāṭimokkha in brief or in its full extent. If he can manage it within seven days, well and good. If not, then all the bhikkhus should go stay for the Rains in the neighboring monastery. If they stay where they are, they all incur a dukkaṭa. None of the texts discuss the point, but apparently “going to stay for the Rains” in the neighboring monastery means entering the second Rains there.

The Commentary adds here that if a monastery has only one bhikkhu who knows the Pāṭimokkha and he dies, leaves, or disrobes in the first month of the first Rains, the remainder should go where there is someone who knows the Pāṭimokkha and stay there for the second Rains. If the knowledgeable bhikkhu dies, leaves, or disrobes in the latter two months of the first Rains, the remainder may stay there for the remainder of the Rains without offense.

However, one does not have to spend the Rains in a monastery. One may also live alone or in a small, ad hoc group as long as one stays in a proper lodging and knows the uposatha transaction appropriate for one’s number (see Chapter 15). In general, the Commentary says that a proper lodging is one with a door that can be opened and closed. Improper lodging arrangements listed in the Canon include living in the hollow of a tree (“like goblins”), in the fork of a tree (“like hunters”), in the open air, in a non-lodging (according to the Commentary, this means a place covered with the five kinds of allowable facing/roofing but lacking a door that can be opened and closed), in a charnel house (a place for keeping corpses, says the Commentary, adding that other proper lodgings within a charnel ground are all right), under a canopy, or in a large storage vessel (the Commentary interprets this as a shield). The Commentary notes that if one fixes up a hut in the hollow of a tree or the fork of a tree with a platform, a proper roof, walls, and a door, it is all right to stay there. The same holds true with a canopy or a shield if it is fitted with walls nailed to four posts and provided with a door that can be opened and closed. Yurts would thus be allowable.

The Canon also gives permission to stay in a cowherd camp, with a caravan, or in a boat. If, during the Rains, any of these picks up and moves, one is allowed to go along. The Commentary adds that if one is planning to stay with a caravan, one should inform the caravan people that one needs a small hut on one of the carts. If they provide that, one may take that hut as one’s residence for the Rains. If not, one may take as one’s residence the space under a tall cart. If that is not possible, one should not enter the Rains with that caravan. If one is joining the caravan in hopes of arriving at a particular destination, then if the caravan reaches that destination one is allowed to remain there even if the caravan continues on its way. If the caravan breaks up, one should remain at the spot where it breaks up until the end of the Rains. If one has entered the Rains in a boat, then if the boat ends its trip, one should stay at that spot. If the boat is following the river bank or sea coast and arrives at one’s destination, one may stay there even if the boat continues its journey.

At present, these allowances would extend to caravan/trailers, mobile homes, and other similar vehicles.

Breaking one’s promise

If a bhikkhu has accepted an invitation to stay at a certain place for the Rains but then does not fulfill his promise by not staying at the place, he incurs a dukkaṭa for the broken promise and becomes ineligible for the privileges contingent on having completed that Rains-residence. (Literally, the rule says that his first Rains “isn’t discerned,” which means that it doesn’t count.) The Sub-commentary misses the point of this rule, which has led to its general misinterpretation. In the origin story, Ven. Upananda accepts an invitation to spend the Rains at one spot and then decides to spend the Rains at two other locations. The Sub-commentary maintains that his Rains was invalidated by the fact that he determined two locations for his Rains; however, Mv.VIII.25.4 shows that spending the Rains in two locations, spending half of one’s time at one and half at the other, is perfectly legitimate. Thus the only possible reason for Ven. Upananda’s first Rains not to count is because he broke his promise.

The Canon also states that one also incurs the dukkaṭa for breaking one’s promise in this situation if one goes to the agreed location and then “breaks” one’s Rains (see below). The Commentary notes in either case that if one originally made the promise with the intention of breaking it, one incurs both the dukkaṭa for the broken promise and a pācittiya for lying. From the way these rules are phrased in the Canon—“one’s first (Rains) isn’t discerned”—it would appear that if one promised to stay for the first Rains but then broke the promise, one would still be eligible to stay at the promised place, or elsewhere, for the second Rains and be eligible for the lesser privileges contingent on having completed the second Rains, but none of the commentaries mention this point.

Determination

The only formality mentioned in the Canon for starting a Rains-residence is that one prepares one’s lodging, sets out drinking-water and washing-water, and sweeps the area. The Commentary, however, recommends making a formal determination: After paying respects to the cetiya, etc., one should say one or two times:

“Imasmiṁ vihāre imaṁ te-māsaṁ vassaṁ upemi. (I am entering this three-month Rains in this dwelling.)”

If staying in a place that does not qualify as a vihāra—as in a hut on a cart in a caravan—one should say three times:

“Idha vassaṁ upemi. (I am entering the Rains here.)”

If staying under a cart, one need only think, “I am going to stay here for the Rains.”

Different Communities have developed the Commentary’s recommendations in different ways. In some, the phrase “paying respects to the cetiya, etc.,” has been expanded to a tradition where the bhikkhus formally ask forgiveness of the Triple Gem and of one another in line with seniority. Because the word vihāra can be translated either as “dwelling” or as “monastery,” some Communities have avoided ambiguity first by formally announcing the boundaries of the area of one’s residence for the three months—usually covering the entire territory of the monastery—and by changing the determination to:

 “Imasmiṁ āvāse imaṁ te-māsaṁ vassaṁ upemi. (I am entering this three-month Rains in this monastery.)”

A common practice is to say this three times, instead of the one or two times recommended in the Commentary.

If, however, a bhikkhu prefers to limit his boundaries to the area around his hut, he is free to make that determination on his own.

Duration

Once a bhikkhu has entered the Rains, he must not go wandering off for the next three months. According to the Commentary, this means that he must greet the rising of dawn each day during those three months within the area he has determined for his residence. If he greets even one dawn outside of his determined area, his residence is broken. In breaking his residence, he both incurs a dukkaṭa and becomes ineligible for the privileges contingent on having completed the Rains.

There are, however, two exceptions to this rule: going on legitimate seven-day business and breaking the residence because of valid obstacles.

Seven-day business

The first exception to the rule concerning duration is that if one has legitimate business, one is allowed to go away for up to seven days. In the Commentary’s terms, this means that one may be away from one’s residence for up to six dawns and must return to greet the rising of the seventh dawn within the area that one has determined for one’s residence.

The legitimacy of the business is determined by the nature of the business, the person who needs one’s help, and whether that person sends for one to come.

If any one of seven classes of people asks for one’s help—a fellow bhikkhu, a bhikkhunī, a female trainee, a male novice, a female novice, a male lay follower, a female lay follower—one may go if sent for, but not if not sent for, if the business concerns that person’s desire to make merit, to hear the Dhamma, or to see the bhikkhus. The Canon gives a long list of situations in which a person—lay or ordained—might want a bhikkhu to come for these purposes. The list is not meant to be exhaustive, but it provides an interesting glimpse of the merit-making occasions of the time: The donor has arranged the construction of a building, either for the Community, for a group of bhikkhus, or a single bhikkhu; he/she has arranged the construction of a building for his/her own use. Other occasions, given only in the case of a lay follower, include the following: His/her son or daughter is getting married; he/she has fallen ill; or he/she has memorized an important discourse and wants to pass it on so that it does not disappear with his/her death (which, in the days before written transmission, could easily have happened). In all these cases, the Sub-commentary says that if one goes without being sent for, one has broken one’s Rains-residence and incurred an offense.

There are other cases in which one may go, even if not sent for—all the more if sent for—if any of the following situations arises concerning a fellow bhikkhu, a bhikkhunī, a female trainee, a novice, or a female novice, and one plans to be of help:

he/she has fallen ill,

he/she is suffering from dissatisfaction with the holy life,

he/she is suffering from anxiety over the possibility of having broken a training rule, or

he/she has fallen into a viewpoint (diṭṭhigata—see the discussion in Chapter 9).

Furthermore, in the case of a bhikkhu or bhikkhunī, one may go if he/she has committed a saṅghādisesa offense and needs help in the steps leading to rehabilitation, is about to become the object of a Community disciplinary transaction (such as censure), or has had a Community disciplinary transaction imposed on him/her. In the case of a female trainee, one may go if she has broken her training rules and interrupted her training, and one wants to help her undertake her training again. In the case of a male novice or female trainee, one may also go if he/she wants to determine his/her eligibility for ordination or wants to be ordained. In the case of a female novice, one may go if she wants to determine her eligibility to become a female trainee or to take on the female trainee’s training.

If either of one’s parents falls ill, one may go even if not sent for, all the more if sent for. If any of one’s other relatives fall ill, or if a person who lives in dependence on the bhikkhus falls ill, one may go only if sent for, not if not sent for.

In all of the cases where one may go if not sent for, the Canon depicts the person in question as sending a messenger with a general invitation for bhikkhus to come. The Commentary notes, though, that the invitation is not a prerequisite for being allowed to go. Even if no message or messenger is sent, one may still go on seven-day business as long as one goes with the purpose of being of help.

One may also go on Community business. The example given in the Canon: A Community dwelling has fallen into disrepair and a lay follower has taken the goods from the dwelling and stashed them away in the wilderness. He asks for bhikkhus to come and take them to put them into safe keeping. Examples given in the Commentary: One may go to help with construction work on a cetiya, a hall, or even the hut of an individual bhikkhu. However, this last example—because it is for individual rather than Community business—seems to go beyond the Canon’s intent.

Finally, as noted above, if one has started spending the Rains in a residence with four or more bhikkhus, none of whom knows the Pāṭimokkha in full or in brief, one of the bhikkhus may go to a neighboring residence for up to seven days to learn the Pāṭimokkha.

Under the heading of seven-day business, the Commentary gives some extra allowances that it admits do not come from the Canon. If, before the Rains, a group of bhikkhus set a date for a meeting during the Rains—the context of the Commentary’s allowance suggests that the meeting would be to listen to a Dhamma talk—one may treat it as seven-day business, but not if one’s intention in going is simply to wash one’s belongings. However, if one’s mentor sends one there for whatever purpose (even for washing one’s robes, says the Sub-commentary) one may go for seven days. If one goes to a monastery that is not far away, intending to return that day, but for some reason cannot return in time, one may treat it as seven-day business. One may not use the seven-day allowance for recitation and interrogation—i.e., memorizing and studying the meaning of the Dhamma—yet if one goes with the purpose of visiting one’s mentor and returning that day, but the mentor tells one to stay on, it is all right to stay. The Sub-commentary adds here that one may even stay on for more than seven days without incurring an offense, although one’s Rains will be broken. Because these allowances have no basis in the Canon, many Communities do not recognize them as valid.

The Commentary notes, citing a passage in Mv.III.14.6, that one may leave for seven-day business even on the first day of the Rains, and there is apparently no limit to the number of times one may go for seven-day business during the following three months. This opens the possibility of taking up Rains-residence in more than one place, alternating short periods in one residence and then the other. We will deal with the implications of this possibility below. Mv.III.14.7 indicates that if one leaves on seven-day business less than seven days before the end of the Rains-residence, one need not return.

None of the texts make exemption for the case where a bhikkhu, going on legitimate seven-day business and planning to return in time, ends up spending more than seven days, either through forgetfulness or through circumstances beyond his control. In other words, whether he intends to or not, if he overstays his seven-day limit, his Rains-residence is broken and he incurs an offense.

Obstacles

The second exception to the rule concerning duration is that a bhikkhu may break his Rains-residence at any time if there are valid obstacles for doing so. He does not incur an offense, but does relinquish his right to the privileges that come with having completed the Rains.

Mv.III.9.1–Mv.III.11.13 gives a long list of valid obstacles, which Pv.VI.4 divides into four sorts: dangers to life, dangers to the holy life, a threatened split in the Community, and an actual split in the Community.

Dangers to life

Bhikkhus may break the Rains without offense if they are

—harassed by beasts who seize and attack them;

—harassed by creeping things who bite and attack them;

—harassed by criminals who rob them and beat them;

—harassed by demons who possess them and sap their vitality.

With regard to the beasts, the Commentary notes that “seize and attack” also includes cases where the beasts, having surrounded one, chase one away, frighten one, or kill someone else in the vicinity.

Also, if the village where the bhikkhus have entered for the Rains is burned or carried away by a flood, and the bhikkhus suffer in terms of alms; or if their own lodgings are burned or carried away by a flood and they suffer in terms of lodgings, they may leave without offense.

If the village on which they depend moves to a new location, the bhikkhus may follow along. If the village splits, they are to go to the location where the majority of villagers have gone or to the location where the faithful supporters have gone. However, the Commentary recommends that if the village moves only a short distance away and is still within range for alms-going, one should stay in place. If it goes farther than that, one may follow the village to its new location but should try to return to one’s original place every seven dawns to keep the Rains. If that isn’t possible, one should stay with congenial bhikkhus in the village’s new location.

If the bhikkhus do not get enough food for their needs; or if the food is plentiful but uncongenial to them; or if the food is plentiful and congenial, but they don’t receive congenial medicine; of it they don’t get a suitable attendant, they may leave without offense. The Vinaya-mukha interprets the allowance in these instances as valid only if one’s health is in serious jeopardy.

Dangers to the holy life

If anyone tries to tempt a bhikkhu, offering him wealth or a wife (or to be his wife), or if he sees abandoned treasure, and in any of these cases he reflects, “The Blessed One says that the mind is easily changed. This could be an obstacle to my holy life,” he may break the Rains without offense.

A threatened split in the Community

If many bhikkhus are striving for a schism in the Community where one is living and one doesn’t want the Community to be split in one’s presence, one may leave. However, if bhikkhus in another residence are striving for a schism in their Community and one feels that one might be able to talk them out of it, one may go to their residence. The same holds true if bhikkhunīs are striving for a split in the Community. The Commentary—assuming that Community here means the Bhikkhu Saṅgha—objects to this allowance on the grounds that bhikkhunīs cannot split the Bhikkhu Saṅgha. However, the original meaning of the Pali may have been that the bhikkhunīs were striving for a schism in their own Community. In this case, one may break the Rains without offense in order to try to prevent the split.

A split in the Community

If bhikkhus or bhikkhunīs in another residence have split their Community, one may break the Rains to go there. The Commentary raises another objection here, on the grounds that once the Community has split nothing can be done; and that the Pali should thus read, “the bhikkhus are about to split the Community.” This, however, ignores the very real possibility that both sides of the split have been acting in good faith, and that one may bring them to a reconciliation. (See Chapter 21, especially Mv.X.5.14 & Mv.X.6.1.)

If any of these four kinds of obstacles arises and one can handle the situation by going away for no more than seven days, the Commentary recommends returning within seven days so as not to break the Rains. In other words, the situation is to be treated as legitimate seven-day business. If this cannot be managed, one commits no offense, but one becomes ineligible for the privileges that come with having completed the Rains.

In addition to these four categories, there is also the rule mentioned above that if many bhikkhus have begun the Rains in a residence where none of them knows the Pāṭimokkha and they cannot arrange for one of their number to memorize the Pāṭimokkha in a nearby residence within seven days, they are to leave their original to residence to spend the Rains in the neighboring residence.

Non-dhamma agreements

Traditionally, the Rains-residence is a time for becoming more stringent in one’s practice. Often, bhikkhus staying together will make group vows as a way of offering encouragement to one another. However, there is a rule against making agreements that are not in accord with the Dhamma. In the origin story for this rule, a group of bhikkhus agreed not to ordain any new bhikkhus during the Rains. A relative of Lady Visākhā wanted to ordain during that period but the bhikkhus refused, telling him to wait to the end of the Rains. Yet when the Rains had ended, he had abandoned his desire to ordain. So the Buddha made a ruling that “This sort of agreement should not be made: ‘During the Rains, the Going-forth is not to be given.’”

The Commentary to Mv.III.13.2 cites two other agreements that are of this sort: taking a vow of silence and agreeing that those who go away for seven-day business should not get a share of the Community’s gains distributed while they are away. The rule against taking a vow of silence comes in Mv.IV.1.13. In the origin story to that rule, the Buddha learns that a group of bhikkhus have observed a vow of silence for the duration of the Rains and his response is this: “These worthless men, having spent the Rains uncomfortably, claim to have spent the Rains comfortably. Having spent the Rains in cattle (-like) affiliation, they claim to have spent the Rains comfortably. Having spent the Rains in sheep (-like) affiliation, they claim to have spent the Rains comfortably. Having spent the Rains in heedless-affiliation, they claim to have spent the Rains comfortably. How can these worthless men undertake a vow of dumb silence, the undertaking of sectarians?”

More generally, the Commentary says that agreements “of this sort” are the non-dhamma agreements that the Buddha criticized in the Sutta Vibhaṅga. Apparently, this is a reference to the origin story to NP 15, in which the Buddha, criticizing a group of bhikkhus for inventing their own pācittiya rule, says, “What has not been formulated (as a rule) should not be formulated, and what has been formulated should not be rescinded, but one should dwell in conformity and in accordance with the rules that have been formulated.”

The Commentary to Pārājika 4 expands on this point with a long list of agreements that should not be made for the Rains: refusing to give the Going-forth, prohibiting the study or teaching of the Dhamma, deciding to share in-season gifts to the Community with bhikkhus staying outside the monastery precincts, or compelling the observance of the dhutaṅga (ascetic) practices. The Commentary to Cv.VI.11.3 adds other agreements to this list: refusing to give Acceptance, refusing to give dependence, refusing to give the opportunity to listen to the Dhamma, and not sharing Community gains with those who go away on seven-day business. It then adds a list of agreements that would accord with the Dhamma, such as encouraging one another to know moderation in speech, to converse on the ten proper subjects of conversation (AN 10:69), to show consideration to meditators when one is reciting the Dhamma, to willingly undertake any of the dhutaṅga practices in line with one’s abilities, and to be heedful at all times.

Gifts of cloth

Mv.VIII.32 lists eight ways in which a donor may designate gifts of cloth, and one of them is that a gift of cloth may be for the bhikkhus who are residing or have resided in a particular residence for the Rains. We will discuss this arrangement in more detail in Chapter 18, but here we will simply note the Commentary’s observation that, during the Rains-residence, this arrangement applies only to bhikkhus who have kept the residence up to that point without break; for one month after the Rains, it applies only to the bhikkhus who have successfully kept the entire Rains-residence. According to the Canon, if the kaṭhina has been spread, this arrangement extends until the end of the kaṭhina privileges.

The Canon also adds that, if a donor has designated a gift of cloth for the bhikkhus who are residing/have resided for the Rains, a bhikkhu who is not residing/has not resided for the Rains in that residence should not accept a portion. To do so is to incur a dukkaṭa. The Commentary adds that if he does accept such a portion, he should return it. If it gets worn out or lost before he returns it, he should make compensation. If, when the Community asks for its return, he doesn’t return it, the offense is to be determined by the value of the cloth, which could well amount to a pārājika. In saying this, the Commentary is following the theory of bhaṇḍadeyya, which—as we stated in the discussion of Pr 2—has no basis in the Canon. Here in particular it seems excessive punishment for what the Canon explicitly says is an act incurring only a dukkaṭa. If we follow the Canon, the bhikkhu who has accepted such a portion need not return it. Once it has been given to him, it is his—even though he incurs an offense in accepting it.

As mentioned above, under the topic of seven-day business, there is the technical possibility that a bhikkhu may enter the Rains in two residences. If donors at both places designate gifts of Rains-residence cloth, then if the bhikkhu spends half the time at one residence and half the time at the other, he should be given half a portion here and half a portion there. Or if he spends more time at one than the other, he should be given a full portion at his main residence and nothing at the other.

Privileges

The Commentary, in scattered places, explicitly mentions five privileges to which a bhikkhu who completes the first period of Rains-residence without break is entitled. The first four are:

he may participate in the Invitation (pavāraṇā) transaction marking the end of the Rains-residence (see Chapter 16);

he may continue receiving gifts of Rains-residence cloth at that residence for a month after the end of the Rains-residence;

he may keep one of his robes in his alms-village if he is staying in a wilderness area (see NP 29); and

he may participate in the spreading of a kaṭhina (see Chapter 17).

In each of these cases, the Commentary is basing its judgment on the fact that the Canon’s permission for these activities is given for “bhikkhus who have lived for (i.e., completed) the Rains-residence.”

The fifth privilege is based on three passages in Mv.VIII.24 (sections 2, 5, & 6). In each of the three, donors present gifts of cloth “to the Community” and in each case the bhikkhus who have spent the Rains in that residence have sole rights to these gifts until their kaṭhina privileges are ended (see Chapter 17). If the bhikkhus do not spread a kaṭhina, the Commentary states that they hold this right for the month after the end of the Rains-residence.

A bhikkhu who completes the second period of Rains-residence without break is entitled to one privilege: He may participate in the Invitation transaction marking the end of his period of Rains-residence. If the bhikkhus in his residence have delayed their Invitation to that date, he may join in their Invitation. If not, he may participate in an Invitation with any fellow bhikkhus who have completed the second period of Rains-residence along with him. Because Pv.XIV.4 limits the period for receiving a kaṭhina to last month of the rainy season, and because a bhikkhu can participate in the spreading of a kaṭhina only after having completed his Rains-residence, this means that a bhikkhu who has completed the second period of Rains-residence is not entitled to this privilege.

The Vinaya-mukha follows an old tradition that NP 1, 2, & 3; and Pc 32, 33, & 46 are also rescinded for one month for a bhikkhu who has completed the first period of Rains-residence. I have tried to trace the source of this tradition in the Canon and commentaries, but without success. The Vibhaṅgas to NP 3, Pc 32, 33, & 46 make clear that the fourth month of the rainy season—the month after the first period of Rains-residence, and the last month of the second period of Rains-residence—is the cīvara-kāla, the robe season (also called the cīvara-dāna-samaya, the occasion for giving robe-cloth), during which those rules, along with NP 1, are rescinded. However, neither the Canon nor the commentaries to these rules make these privileges contingent on having completed the Rains.

As for rescinding NP 2, the texts mention this only as one of the privileges for participating in the spreading of a kaṭhina. It might seem reasonable to regard NP 2 as rescinded during the cīvara-kāla, as all of the other privileges for participating in the kaṭhina are simply extensions of other cīvara-kāla privileges, but neither the Canon nor the commentaries support this idea. For instance, Mv.VIII.23.3 allows a bhikkhu to enter a village without his full set of robes if he has spread a kaṭhina, but does not extend the same privilege to a bhikkhu who has simply completed the Rains. Furthermore, the Commentary to Mv.VII indicates that the Buddha’s purpose in instituting the kaṭhina was to give the bhikkhus the privilege of traveling without their full set of robes during the last month of the rains, when roads were still wet. If this privilege came automatically with the completion of the Rains-residence, there would be no need to institute the kaṭhina for this purpose.

Thus the only privileges contingent on completing the Rains-residence without break are:

the five for completing the first period of Rains-residence (participating in the Invitation transaction; receiving gifts of Rains-residence robe-cloth for an extra month; having sole rights to cloth presented “to the Community” in that residence for an extra month; keeping one of one’s robes in a village while living in a wilderness; and participating in the spreading of a kaṭhina); and

the one—participating in the Invitation—for completing the second.

Rules

“I allow that you enter for the Rains.”—Mv.III.1.3

“I allow that you enter for the Rains during the rainy season.”—Mv.III.2.1

“There are these two beginnings for the Rains: the earlier and the later. The earlier is to be entered the day after (the full moon of ) Asāḷhi, the later is to be entered a month after (the full moon of) Asāḷhi. These are the two beginnings for the Rains.”—Mv.III.2.2

“One should not not enter for the Rains. Whoever does not enter: an offense of wrong doing.”—Mv.III.4.1

“On a day for beginning the Rains, one should not intentionally pass by a residence not desiring to enter for the Rains. Whoever should pass by: an offense of wrong doing.”—Mv.III.4.2

“I allow that kings be complied with.”—Mv.III.4.2

Places

“There is the case where many bhikkhus—inexperienced, incompetent—are staying for the Rains in a certain residence. They do not know the uposatha or the uposatha transaction, the Pāṭimokkha or the recital of the Pāṭimokkha… One bhikkhu should be sent by the bhikkhus to a neighboring residence immediately: ‘Go, friend. Having mastered the Pāṭimokkha in brief or in its full extent, come back.’ If he manages it, well and good. If not, then one bhikkhu should be sent to a neighboring residence for a period of seven days: ‘Go, friend. Having mastered the Pāṭimokkha in brief or in its full extent, come back.’ If he manages it, well and good. If not, then the bhikkhus should not stay for the Rains in that residence. If they stay: an offense of wrong doing.”—Mv.II.21.4

“I allow that you enter for the Rains in a cowherd camp (§)… I allow that you go wherever the cowherd camp is moved.”—Mv.III.12.1

“I allow that you enter for the Rains in a caravan… I allow that you enter for the Rains in a boat.”—Mv.III.12.2

“One should not enter for the Rains in the hollow of a tree… in the fork of a tree… in the open air… in a non-lodging… in a charnel house… under a canopy… in a large storage vessel. Whoever should do so: an offense of wrong doing.”—Mv.III.12.3-9

Breaking Promises

“There is the case where a bhikkhu has assented to the Rains-residence for the earlier period. While going to that residence he sees two residences along the way with much cloth. The thought occurs to him, ‘What if I were to stay for the Rains in these two residences? That way a lot of cloth would accrue to me.’ He spends the Rains in those two residences. That bhikkhu’s earlier period is not discerned (i.e., doesn’t count), and there is an offense of wrong doing in the assent.”—Mv.III.14.4

“… While going to that residence he performs the uposatha outside it, reaches the dwelling on the day after the uposatha day. He prepares his lodging, sets out drinking-water and washing-water, sweeps the area. Having no business he departs that very day… That bhikkhu’s earlier period is not discerned, and there is an offense of wrong doing in the assent.”—Mv.III.14.5

“… While going to that residence he performs the uposatha outside it, reaches the dwelling on the day after the uposatha day… having some business he departs that very day… That bhikkhu’s earlier period is not discerned, and there is an offense of wrong doing in the assent.”—Mv.III.14.5

“… While going to that residence he performs the uposatha outside it, reaches the dwelling on the day after the uposatha day… having entered (the Rains) for two or three days and having no business he departs… having some business he departs… having some seven-day business he departs, but he overstays seven days outside. That bhikkhu’s earlier period is not discerned, and there is an offense of wrong doing in the assent.”—Mv.III.14.6

“… having some seven-day business he departs, and he returns within seven days. That bhikkhu’s earlier period is discerned, and there is no offense in the assent.”—Mv.III.14.6

“… seven days before the Invitation he departs on some business. Whether or not he returns to that residence, his earlier period is discerned, and there is no offense in the assent.”—Mv.III.14.7

“… performs the uposatha at the residence to which he had given assent” (all other details identical to Mv.III.14.5-7)—Mv.III.14.8-10

“… has assented to the Rains for the later period” (all other details identical to Mv.III.14.5-10)—Mv.III.14.11

Seven-day Business

“Having entered for the Rains, one should not set out on tour without having stayed either the first three months or the last three months. Whoever should set out: an offense of wrong doing.”—Mv.III.3.2

“I allow you to go for seven-day business (§) for seven (classes of people) when sent for, but not if not sent for: a bhikkhu, a bhikkhunī, a female trainee, a novice, a female novice, a male lay follower, a female lay follower. I allow you to go for seven-day business for these seven (classes of people) when sent for, but not if not sent for. The return should be made in seven days.”—Mv.III.5.4

“There is the case where a dwelling dedicated to the Community has been built by a male lay follower. If he should send a messenger to the presence of the bhikkhus, saying, ‘May the reverend ones please come; I want to give a gift, to hear the Dhamma, to see the bhikkhus,’ one may go on seven-day business if sent for, but not if not sent for. The return should be made in seven days. (Similarly if the lay follower has arranged to have other kinds of buildings, a cave, a lotus pond, a monastery, a monastery site for the Community, for several bhikkhus, for one bhikkhu; for the Community of bhikkhunīs, for several bhikkhunīs, for one bhikkhunī; for several female trainees, for one female trainee; for several male novices, for one male novice; for several female novices, for one female novice; for himself.)… or his son’s marriage takes place or his daughter’s marriage takes place or he falls ill or he recites a well-known discourse. If he should send a messenger to the presence of the bhikkhus, saying, ‘May the reverend ones please come. They will master this discourse before it disappears.’ Or he has some duty, some business. If he should send a messenger to the presence of the bhikkhus, saying, ‘May the reverend ones please come; I want to give a gift, to hear the Dhamma, to see the bhikkhus,’ one may go on seven-day business if sent for, but not if not sent for. The return should be made in seven days.”—Mv.III.5.5-9

(The above is then repeated, substituting “female lay follower” for “male lay follower.”)—Mv.III.5.10-12

(The above, except for the section on marriage, falling ill, and reciting a well-known discourse is repeated, substituting for “lay male follower” the following: a bhikkhu, a bhikkhunī, a female trainee, a male novice, a female novice).—Mv.III.5.13

“I allow you to go for seven-day business for five (classes of people) even when not sent for, all the more if sent for: a bhikkhu, a bhikkhunī, a female trainee, a novice, a female novice. I allow you to go for seven-day business for these five (classes of people) even when not sent for, all the more if sent for. The return should be made in seven days.”—Mv.III.6.1

“There is a case where a bhikkhu falls ill. If he should send a messenger to the presence of the bhikkhus, saying, ‘Because I am ill, may the bhikkhus come. I want bhikkhus to come,’ one may go on seven-day business even if not sent for, all the more if sent for, thinking, ‘I will look for a meal for the sick person or a meal for the nurse or medicine; I will ask after his health or will tend to him.’ The return should be made in seven days.

“There is the case where dissatisfaction (with the holy life) has arisen in a bhikkhu. If he should send a messenger to the presence of the bhikkhus, saying, ‘Because dissatisfaction has arisen in me, may the bhikkhus come. I want bhikkhus to come,’ one may go on seven-day business even if not sent for, all the more if sent for, thinking, ‘I will allay his dissatisfaction, or get someone to allay it, or I will give a Dhamma talk.’ The return should be made in seven days.

(Similarly if anxiety over the rules or a viewpoint (diṭṭhigata) has arisen in a bhikkhu.)

“There is the case where a bhikkhu has committed a heavy offense (a saṅghādisesa) and deserves probation. If he should send a messenger to the presence of the bhikkhus, saying, ‘Because I have committed a heavy offense and deserve probation, may the bhikkhus come. I want bhikkhus to come,’ one may go on seven-day business even if not sent for, all the more if sent for, thinking, ‘I will make an effort to grant him probation or will make the proclamation or will complete the group (needed to grant him probation).’ The return should be made in seven days.

(Similarly if a bhikkhu deserves to be sent back to the beginning, deserves penance, deserves rehabilitation.)

“There is the case where a Community desires to carry out a transaction against a bhikkhu—one of censure or of demotion or of banishment or of reconciliation or of suspension. If he should send a messenger to the presence of the bhikkhus, saying, ‘Because the Community desires to carry out a transaction against me… may the bhikkhus come. I want bhikkhus to come,’ one may go on seven-day business even if not sent for, all the more if sent for, thinking, ‘How then may the Community not carry out the transaction or change it to something lighter?’ The return should be made in seven days.

“There is the case where a Community has carried out a transaction against a bhikkhu…. If he should send a messenger to the presence of the bhikkhus, saying, ‘Because the Community has carried out a transaction against me, may the bhikkhus come. I want bhikkhus to come,’ one may go on seven-day business even if not sent for, all the more if sent for, thinking, ‘How then may he conduct himself properly, lower his hackles, and mend his ways so that the Community can rescind the transaction?’ The return should be made in seven days.”—Mv.III.6.2-11

(Mv.III.6.2-5 is then repeated, substituting “bhikkhunī” for “bhikkhu,” down to the case where a viewpoint has arisen. Then—) “There is the case where a bhikkhunī has committed a heavy offense (a saṅghādisesa) and deserves penance. If she should send a messenger to the presence of the bhikkhus, saying, ‘Because I have committed a heavy offense and deserve penance, may the masters come. I want the masters to come,’ one may go on seven-day business even if not sent for, all the more if sent for, thinking, ‘I will make an effort to grant her penance.’ The return should be made in seven days.

(Similarly if a bhikkhunī deserves to be sent back to the beginning or deserves rehabilitation.)

“There is the case where a Community desires to carry out a transaction against a bhikkhunī—one of censure or of demotion or of banishment or of reconciliation or of suspension. If she should send a messenger to the presence of the bhikkhus, saying, ‘Because the Community desires to carry out a transaction against me, may the masters come. I want the masters to come,’ one may go on seven-day business even if not sent for, all the more if sent for, thinking, ‘How then may the Community not carry out the transaction or change it to something lighter?’ The return should be made in seven days.

“There is the case where a Community has carried out a transaction against a bhikkhunī…. If she should send a messenger to the presence of the bhikkhus, saying, ‘Because the Community has carried out a transaction against me, may the masters come. I want the masters to come,’ one may go on seven-day business even if not sent for, all the more if sent for, thinking, ‘How then may she conduct herself properly, lower her hackles, and mend her ways so that the Community can rescind the transaction?’ The return should be made in seven days.”—Mv.III.6.12-20

(Mv.III.6.2-5 is then repeated, substituting “female trainee” for “bhikkhu,” down to the case where a viewpoint has arisen. Then—) “There is the case where a female trainee’s training has been interrupted… ‘I will make an effort for her to undertake the training (again)’… There is the case where a female trainee desires Acceptance…. ‘I will make an effort for her Acceptance or will make the proclamation or will complete the group (needed for her Acceptance)’….”

(Mv.III.6.2-5 is then repeated, substituting “male novice” for “bhikkhu,” down to the case where a viewpoint has arisen. Then—) “There is the case where a male novice wants to ask about his age (in preparation for ordination)… ‘I will ask or I will explain’… There is the case where a male novice desires Acceptance…. ‘I will make an effort for his Acceptance or will make the proclamation or will complete the group (needed for his Acceptance)’….”

(Mv.III.6.2-5 is then repeated, substituting “female novice” for “bhikkhu,” down to the case where a viewpoint has arisen.

Then—) “There is the case where a female novice wants to ask about her age (in preparation for undertaking the female trainee’s training)…. There is the case where a female novice desires to undertake the (female trainee’s) training…. ‘I will make an effort for her to undertake the training’….”—Mv.III.6.21-29

“I allow you to go for seven-day business even when not sent for by seven (classes of people), all the more if sent for: a bhikkhu, a bhikkhunī, a female trainee, a novice, a female novice, mother, father. I allow you to go for seven-day business even when not sent for by these seven (classes of people), all the more if sent for. The return should be made in seven days.”—Mv.III.7.2

“There is the case where a bhikkhu’s mother falls ill. If she should send a messenger to her son, saying, ‘Because I am ill, may my son come. I want my son to come,’ one may go for seven-day business even if not sent for, all the more if sent for, thinking, ‘I will look for a meal for the sick person or a meal for the nurse or medicine; I will ask after her health or will tend to her.’ The return should be made in seven days.”—Mv.III.7.3

“There is the case where a bhikkhu’s father falls ill. If he should send a messenger to his son, saying, ‘Because I am ill, may my son come. I want my son to come,’ one may go for seven-day business even if not sent for, all the more if sent for, thinking, ‘I will look for a meal for the sick person or a meal for the nurse or medicine; I will ask after his health or will tend to him.’ The return should be made in seven days.”—Mv.III.7.4

“There is the case where a bhikkhu’s brother falls ill. If he should send a messenger to his brother, saying, ‘I am ill. May my brother come. I want my brother to come,’ one may go for seven-day business if sent for, but not if not sent for. The return should be made in seven days.”—Mv.III.7.5

“… a bhikkhu’s sister falls ill… a bhikkhu’s relative falls ill… a person living with the bhikkhus falls ill. If he should send a messenger to the bhikkhus, saying, ‘I am ill. May the bhikkhus come. I want the bhikkhus to come,’ one may go for seven-day business if sent for, but not if not sent for…. The return should be made in seven days.”—Mv.III.7.6-8

“I allow that you go on Community business. The return should be made in seven days.”—Mv.III.8

See also Mv.II.21.4 under “Places,” above.

Leaving without Breaking the Rains

“There is the case where bhikkhus who have entered for the Rains are harassed by beasts who seize them and attack them. (Thinking,) ‘This is indeed an obstacle,’ one may depart. There is no offense for breaking the Rains. There is the case where bhikkhus who have entered for the Rains are harassed by creeping things who bite and attack them. (Thinking,) ‘This is indeed an obstacle,’ one may depart. There is no offense for breaking the Rains.”—Mv.III.9.1

“There is the case where bhikkhus who have entered for the Rains are harassed by criminals who rob them and beat them. (Thinking,) ‘This is indeed an obstacle,’ one may depart. There is no offense for breaking the Rains. There is the case where bhikkhus who have entered for the Rains are harassed by demons who possess them and sap their vitality. (Thinking,) ‘This is indeed an obstacle,’ one may depart. There is no offense for breaking the Rains.”—Mv.III.9.2

“… the village where bhikkhus have entered for the Rains is burned. The bhikkhus suffer in terms of alms… the lodgings where bhikkhus have entered for the Rains are burned. The bhikkhus suffer in terms of lodging… the village where bhikkhus have entered for the Rains is carried away by water. The bhikkhus suffer in terms of alms… the lodgings where bhikkhus have entered for the Rains are carried away by water. The bhikkhus suffer in terms of lodging. (Thinking,) ‘This is indeed an obstacle,’ one may depart. There is no offense for breaking the Rains.”—Mv.III.9.3-4

(The village where bhikkhus have entered for the Rains has moved because of robbers:) “I allow you to go where the village moves.” “I allow you to go where there is more of the village (when the village is split in two).” “I allow you to go where the people are faithful and confident.”—Mv.III.10

“There is the case where bhikkhus who have entered for the Rains do not get enough coarse or refined foods for their needs. (Thinking,) ‘This is indeed an obstacle,’ one may depart. There is no offense for breaking the Rains. There is the case where bhikkhus who have entered for the Rains get enough coarse or refined foods for their needs, but no congenial food. (Thinking,) ‘This is indeed an obstacle,’ one may depart. There is no offense for breaking the Rains.”—Mv.III.11.1

“There is the case where bhikkhus who have entered for the Rains get enough coarse or refined foods for their needs, get congenial food, but no congenial medicine… (or) they get congenial medicines but not a suitable attendant. (Thinking,) ‘This is indeed an obstacle,’ one may depart. There is no offense for breaking the Rains.”—Mv.III.11.2

“There is the case where a woman invites a bhikkhu, saying, ‘I will give you silver, I will give you gold… a field… a building site… a bull… a cow… a male slave… a female slave… I will give a daughter to be your wife, I will be your wife, or I will get another wife for you;’… where a “fat princess” (male transvestite? old maid?—this term is uncertain) invites a bhikkhu… a paṇḍaka invites a bhikkhu… where relatives invite a bhikkhu… kings… robbers… mischief-makers invite a bhikkhu, saying, ‘I will give you silver, I will give you gold… a field… a building site… a bull… a cow… a male slave… a female slave… I will give a daughter to be your wife or I will get another wife for you’… He sees abandoned treasure. If the thought occurs to the bhikkhu, ‘The Blessed One says that the mind is quick to reverse itself (AN 1:48); this could be an obstacle to my holy life,’ he may depart. There is no offense for breaking the Rains.”—Mv.III.11.3-4

“He sees many bhikkhus striving for a schism in the Community. If the thought occurs to him, ‘The Blessed One says that schism is a serious thing. Don’t let the Community be split in my presence,’ he may depart. There is no offense for breaking the Rains.” “He hears many bhikkhus striving for a schism in the Community… no offense for breaking the Rains.”—Mv.III.11.5

“He hears, ‘They say that many bhikkhus in that residence over there (§) are striving for a schism in the Community. Now, these bhikkhus are my friends. I will speak to them, saying, “The Blessed One says that schism is a serious thing. Don’t be pleased by a schism in the Community.” They will follow my words, they will listen, they will lend ear,’ he may depart. There is no offense for breaking the Rains.”—Mv.III.11.6

“Now these bhikkhus are not my friends, but friends of theirs are friends of mine… they will listen…”—Mv.III.11.7

“Many bhikkhus have split the Community… they are my friends…” —Mv.III.11.8

“Many bhikkhus have split the Community… they are not my friends, but friends of theirs are friends of mine …”—Mv.III.11.9

(The same as Mv.III.11.6-9, substituting “bhikkhunīs” for “bhikkhus”)—Mv.III.11.10-13

See also Mv.II.21.4, under “Places,” above.

Non-dhamma Agreements

“This sort of agreement should not be made: ‘During the Rains, the Going-forth is not to be given.’ Whoever should make this agreement: an offense of wrong doing.”—Mv.III.13.2

“The vow of dumb silence, the undertaking of sectarians, is not to be undertaken. Whoever should undertake it: an offense of wrong doing.”—Mv.IV.1.13

Gifts of Cloth

(One of the eight standards for the arising of robe-cloth:) “One gives to the Community that has spent the Rains… It is to be divided among however many bhikkhus have spent the Rains in that residence.”—Mv.VIII.32

“One who has entered the Rains in one place should not consent to a portion of robe-cloth from another place. Whoever should do so: an offense of wrong doing.”—Mv.VIII.25.3

“There is the case where a bhikkhu enters the Rains in two residences, thinking, ‘In this way a great deal of robe-cloth will come to me.’ If he spends half the time here and half the time there, he should be given half a portion here and half a portion there. Or wherever he spends more time, he should be given a portion there.”—Mv.VIII.25.4

“There is the case where a bhikkhu is spending the Rains alone. There, people (saying,) ‘We are giving to the Community,’ give robe-cloths. I allow that those robe-cloths be his alone until the dismantling of the kaṭhina.”—Mv.VIII.24.2

Now at that time two elder brothers, Ven. Isidāsa and Ven. Isibhatta, having spent the Rains in Sāvatthī, went to a certain village monastery. People (saying), “At long last the elders have come,” gave food together with robe-cloths. The resident bhikkhus asked the elders, “Venerable sirs, these Community robe-cloths have arisen because of your coming. Will you consent to a portion?” The elders said, “As we understand the Dhamma taught by the Blessed One, these robe-cloths are yours alone until the dismantling of the kaṭhina.”—Mv.VIII.24.5

Now at that time three bhikkhus were spending the Rains in Rājagaha. There, people (saying), “We are giving to the Community,” gave robe-cloths. The thought occurred to the bhikkhus, “It has been laid down by the Blessed One that a Community is at least a group of four, but we are three people. Yet these people (saying), ‘We are giving to the Community,’ have given robe-cloths. So how are these to be treated by us?” Now at that time a number of elders—Ven. Nīlvāsī, Ven. Sāṇavāsī, Ven. Gopaka, Ven. Bhagu, and Ven. Phalidasandāna were staying in Pāṭaliputta at the Rooster Park. So the bhikkhus, having gone to Pāṭaliputta, asked the elders. The elders said, “As we understand the Dhamma taught by the Blessed One, these robe-cloths are yours alone until the dismantling of the kaṭhina.”—Mv.VIII.24.6

Other Privileges

“I allow that bhikkhus who have spent the Rains invite (one another) with respect to three things: what is seen, what is heard, and what is suspected. That will be for your mutual conformity (§), for your arising out of offenses, for your esteem for the Vinaya.”—Mv.IV.1.13

“I allow that the kaṭhina be spread (§) by bhikkhus who have spent the Rains.”—Mv.VII.1.3

part two

Community

Transactions

CHAPTER TWELVE

Community Transactions

In Chapter 11 of BMC1, Adhikaraṇa-samatha, we discussed the four types of issues (adhikaraṇa)—dispute-issues, accusation-issues, offense-issues, and duty-issues—along with the seven means for their settlement. The fourth type of issue—duty-issue (kiccādhikaraṇa)—treated only briefly in that discussion, is the topic of this chapter and all the remaining chapters in this section.

Cv.IV.14.2 defines a duty-issue as “any duty or business of the community:

an announcement (apalokana-kamma),

a motion (ñatti-kamma),

a motion with one proclamation (ñatti-dutiya-kamma),

a motion with three proclamations (ñatti-catuttha-kamma).”

This definition refers to the four types of statements that can constitute a formal Community transaction (saṅgha-kamma), in which the Community meets and issues a statement that it is taking an action as a group. In this, duty-issues are substantially different from the other three types of issues. Other issues are problems that have to be settled in a formal way. Duty-issues, however, are formal ways of settling problems. They themselves, as Community transactions, are problems only in the sense that they have to be conducted strictly according to the correct formal pattern. If they aren’t, they are invalid, open to question, and have to be conducted again.

When a Community performs a transaction, it is in effect acting in the name of the Saṅgha as a whole. This means that it is not the ultimate authority in judging the validity of its transactions, for other Communities do not have to accept its transactions simply on its say-so. Because it is acting in their name, they have the right to question whether its transactions are fit to stand. When a Community adheres to the correct forms in its transactions, it is showing that—on that level at least—it deserves the trust of its fellow Communities. Thus, adherence to the correct forms is not a mere formality. It is one of the ways in which Communities earn one another’s trust.

Because some duty-issues function as means of settling other types of issues, this section will cover not only duty-issues pure and simple but also a few of the major duty-issues used in settling other issues. In particular, these include (1) the transactions involved in settling the most complicated offense-issues—(a) saṅghādisesa offenses and (b) the disciplinary transactions used to settle offense-issues following on accusation-issues—and (2) those for ending the most serious dispute-issue, a schism. The duty-issues used to settle issues aside from these have already been discussed in BMC1, Chapter 11.

The standard pattern for a Community transaction is that the Community meets and one of its members recites a transaction statement (kamma-vācā), while the other members of the Community show their assent by remaining silent. If a regular bhikkhu in common affiliation with the Community speaks up to register protest during the recitation, that aborts the transaction. The length of the statement, measured in the number of times the proclamation must be repeated, is a rough indication of the importance of the relevant act. The more repetitions, the more time the members of the Community have to deliberate, and the more chance they have to speak up.

In certain cases, the issuing of the transaction statement must follow on certain preliminary actions, some of which—as in the case of full Acceptance—may involve transaction statements of their own. Often the transaction statement itself constitutes the act of the Community: Simply in issuing the statement, the Community gives full Acceptance, imposes a disciplinary transaction, rehabilitates an individual who has been disciplined, authorizes an individual to perform a certain act, etc.

Cv.IV.14.34 states that a duty-issue (and, by definition, a Community transaction) is settled by means of one principle: “face-to-face.” The Khandhakas’ discussion of what constitutes a valid transaction divides this principle into two broad factors: The transaction must be in accordance with the Dhamma—in other words, the Community follows the proper procedure in issuing the statement; and it must be united—the Community issuing the statement is qualified to do so.

We can follow the Vinaya-mukha in borrowing terms from the Parivāra to divide each of these two factors into two “consummations” (sampatti). Acting in accordance with the Dhamma requires two consummations:

consummation as to the object—the person or item acting as the object of the transaction fulfills the qualifications required for that particular transaction; and

consummation as to the transaction statement—the statement issued follows the correct form for the transaction.

The unity of the Community requires two further consummations:

consummation as to the assembly—the meeting contains at least the minimum number (the quorum) of bhikkhus required to perform that particular transaction; and

consummation as to the territory—any bhikkhus in the territory where the meeting is being held whose consent needs to be conveyed are either present at the meeting or their consent has been conveyed, and no one who is qualified to do so protests the transaction while it is being carried out.

To conform with English usage, our discussion will render the word consummation as “validity.” (For a further discussion of these terms, see Appendix V.)

A transaction valid in all four of these ways is fit to stand. A transaction lacking validity in any one of them is not. Another Community may meet at a later time and redo the transaction or reverse it. Meanwhile, whatever the first Community announced that it was doing does not legitimately count as done.

The validity of the object

The object of the transaction may be either a person (such as the candidate for Acceptance) or a physical item (such as the site to build a dwelling) or both (as when the Community gives a kaṭhina-cloth to one of its members). Different transactions, of course, have different requirements for their objects. However, four general comments can be made. (1) If the object fulfills the requirements for one type of transaction but the Community performs another transaction for which the object does not fulfill the requirements, the transaction is invalid in terms of its object. (2) If the object is a person, then if that person is a bhikkhu he must be present in the gathering of the Community performing the transaction. If the person is not a bhikkhu, he/she does not need to be present—examples being when the Community “overturns its bowl” to a lay person who has harmed bhikkhus or when it ordains a bhikkhunī through a messenger. (3) The object of the transaction cannot be an entire Community. At most, only three people can be the object of any one transaction. (4) If the procedure set out for the transaction requires that the object, a bhikkhu, be interrogated prior to the transaction about an offense and acknowledge having done the offense, then if these preliminary procedures have not been done, the transaction is invalid in terms of its object.

The validity of the transaction statement

The transaction statement must follow the pattern given in the Canon, with none of the parts left out. If, for instance, the pattern calls for a motion and three proclamations, a transaction in which the statement is given as four motions or a motion and one proclamation is invalid. Also, the parts of the statement must be given in the proper order. If the pattern calls for a motion followed by one proclamation, and the announcing bhikkhu gives the proclamation first, that is called a transaction “having a semblance of the Dhamma,” which invalidates the proceeding. The texts, however, do not forbid stating any of the parts of the statement more than the required number of times. For instance, if the pattern calls for a motion and one proclamation, there is nothing wrong with giving a motion followed by three proclamations.

The customary practice is to recite the transaction statement word-for-word as given in the Canon, inserting the name of the transaction’s object and other relevant individuals where necessary. Pv.XIX.1.3-4, however, allows for some variation in the wording as long as the following points are not omitted from either the motion or the proclamation(s): the object of the transaction, the fact that the Community is the agent of the transaction, and—where applicable—the individual member of the Community who is playing a special role in the transaction, such as the preceptor when giving full Acceptance. This allowance is especially relevant for the statements used in disciplinary transactions (Chapter 20), for in these instances the Canon gives only the statement tailored to the particular case that inspired the first instance of each of these transactions, and not to any of the other cases for which the transactions are also valid. If there were no leeway in wording these statements, the transactions could not be applied to any other cases. See Appendix IV on this point.

Mv.I.74.1 allows for the transaction statement to mention a bhikkhu by his clan name, rather than his given name. This allowance dates to the time when bhikkhus had Pali clan names, and the formality of referring to a bhikkhu by his clan name was a sign of respect. Now that bhikkhus no longer have Pali clan names the allowance is moot.

Every description of a transaction statement stipulates that the bhikkhu reciting it must be experienced and competent. According to the Commentary to Mv.I.28.3, this means that at the very least he is able to memorize the transaction statement and recite it with proper pronunciation. Also, the Canon invariably refers to the reciter of the transaction statement in the singular—i.e., a single bhikkhu making the statement. However, at present it is common, especially in transactions where lay people will be present—such as Acceptance or the kaṭhina—for two bhikkhus to recite the transaction statement(s) in unison, as a way of guarding against errors.

Announcement-transactions differ from the other three types of Community transactions in that the Canon gives no set pattern for the transaction statement. Thus the validity of the statement is not at issue in cases of this sort. In some instances, the Commentary recommends ways to phrase the announcement, but its recommendations are not binding.

To streamline communal business in matters not likely to be controversial, the Commentary to Cv.IV.14.2 contends that the following motion-with-one-proclamation transactions may be done as simple announcements: an authorization to lay claim to a dwelling (apparently this refers to the transaction for giving building responsibility—see Chapter 18), the act of giving a robe or bowl as an inheritance (see Chapter 22), and all authorizations aside from: authorizing a territory (sīmā), revoking a territory, giving kaṭhina cloth, ending kaṭhina privileges, and pointing out an area for building a hut or dwelling (under Sg 6 & 7). In making this contention, however, the Commentary is in conflict with the principle set forth in Mv.IX.3.3 and discussed above, that if a shorter format is used for a transaction requiring a longer format, the transaction is invalid.

The validity of the assembly

Most transactions require a quorum of four bhikkhus. However, three transactions—Acceptance, Invitation, and rehabilitation—require more. Acceptance outside of the Middle Ganges Valley requires five, with the stipulation that at least one of the five be expert in the Vinaya. Invitation (pavāraṇā) requires five; Acceptance in the Middle Ganges Valley, ten; and rehabilitation after observing penance for a saṅghādisesa offense, twenty.

To fill a quorum, a bhikkhu who is to be the object of the transaction (e.g., a bhikkhu receiving a kaṭhina-cloth, a bhikkhu being given probation) cannot be counted. Also, the quorum cannot be filled by:

a person who does not count as a true bhikkhu (e.g., a bhikkhunī, a lay person, a matricide who has somehow received ordination, a schismatic who knew or suspected that he joined the schism not on the side of the Dhamma (see Chapter 21),

a bhikkhu who has been suspended (see Chapter 20),

a bhikkhu of a separate affiliation (see Appendix V),

a bhikkhu standing outside the territory (according to the Commentary, this refers to the case where a group is meeting on the edge of a territory and the bhikkhu in question is within hatthapāsa but not within the bounds of the territory), or

a bhikkhu levitating off the ground through his psychic powers.

If the meeting contains such people but the quorum is filled without counting them, the validity of the assembly is still fulfilled. If such people need to be counted to complete the quorum, it is not.

Some Communities are very strict in not allowing anyone who is not a bhikkhu in common affiliation and in good standing to sit within hatthapāsa of their transaction meetings, but the Canon requires this sort of strictness only for two transactions: the uposatha (see Chapter 15) and the Invitation (see Chapter 16). For other transactions—such as Acceptance, the kaṭhina, etc.—there is no offense in allowing other individuals to sit within hatthapāsa, and their presence does not invalidate the proceedings. (This point is nowhere directly stated in the Canon, but it can be inferred from the ruling in Mv.IX.4.7 that even if such a person within the meeting protests the transaction, the protest does not count. If the protest does not invalidate the transaction, the presence of the person making the protest would not invalidate it, either.)

The validity of the territory

This factor is fulfilled when all the qualified bhikkhus in the valid territory in which the meeting is held are present at the meeting, or their consent has been conveyed to the meeting, and no one qualified to do so protests the transaction while it is being carried out.

The territory

The territory may either be one correctly authorized by a Community transaction or one defined by natural or political boundaries. This topic will be discussed in detail in the following chapter.

Unqualified bhikkhus

The Canon gives one explicit exception to the requirement for the consent or attendance of all the bhikkhus in a territory, and that is the case of a bhikkhu who is insane. Mv.II.25.1 cites two types of insanity: one in which the insane person has periods of sanity during which he remembers and comes to the uposatha and other Community transactions, alternating with bouts of insanity during which he doesn’t; and another, who is continually insane, never remembering or coming to these transactions at all. In the first case, the Canon allows for the Community to meet and, by means of a formal transaction consisting of a motion and proclamation, to identify the insane bhikkhu as insane and to authorize the unity of the Community as valid with or without his presence or consent (see Appendix I). As for the other type of insane bhikkhu, the Commentary states that there is no need for an authorization. His absence or lack of consent does not invalidate any Community transactions.

In addition, two passages in the Canon—Mv.II.34.10 and Mv.X.1.9-10—allow bhikkhus of separate affiliations to perform separate Community transactions within the same territory, which implies that the presence of a bhikkhu of a separate affiliation within the territory but not at the meeting does not invalidate a transaction, so there is no need to obtain his consent. Because a suspended bhikkhu is considered to be of a separate affiliation (see Mv.X.1.10 and Pc 69), there is no need to obtain his consent, either.

Because a bhikkhu levitating over the territory through his psychic powers does not count as legitimately present in the territory, his consent is also not required.

In short, consent does not have to be brought from any bhikkhu whose protest would not invalidate a Community transaction (see below).

Being present

None of the Khandhaka texts give a precise definition of what counts as being present at a Community meeting. The Vibhaṅga to Pc 80 defines being present in the meeting as sitting within hatthapāsa of at least one of the other bhikkhus also present in the meeting (see the discussion under that rule). Not being present would thus mean being located outside hatthapāsa. The question has arisen as to whether the Pc 80 definition applies in every case, or only in the case covered by that rule, i.e., that of a bhikkhu hoping to invalidate a meeting by getting up and leaving hatthapāsa, yet staying within the territory. Given that it is the only definition of present and not present provided anywhere in the Canon, and given the need for a clear definition in this area, there seems every reason to assume that the Pc 80 definition would apply by default in all cases. If it did not apply, there would be no logic to that rule, in that there would be no reason for a bhikkhu’s getting up and leaving hatthapāsa to have an impact on the conduct of the meeting.

There may be occasions where a territory is not large enough to accommodate all the bhikkhus attending a meeting. This would not invalidate the territory or the meeting, but the bhikkhus sitting outside the territory would not count as present. They could not be counted toward the quorum; and if any of them protested the conduct of the meeting (see below), the protest would carry no weight. One special exception, however, is that if the bhikkhus are meeting to listen to the Pāṭimokkha (see Chapter 15) and the gathering is so large that not all the bhikkhus can fit in the designated uposatha-hall or area in front of the uposatha-hall, all the bhikkhus within earshot count as having heard the Pāṭimokkha. If, when meeting for other purposes, the assembly wants to count all the bhikkhus as present at the meeting, they may move the meeting outside the territory to an adjacent territory large enough to accommodate everyone. In most cases, this would mean moving out of a small baddha-sīmā (see the following chapter) to the larger abaddha-sīmā surrounding it.

Consent

A bhikkhu too ill to come to the meeting may give his consent as follows: Going to another bhikkhu, he arranges his upper robe over one shoulder, kneels down, performs añjali, and says to the other:

“Chandaṁ dammi. Chandaṁ me hara. Chandaṁ me ārocehi. (I give consent. Convey my consent. Report my consent.)”

If he makes this understood by physical gesture, by voice, or by both, his consent counts as given. If not, his consent does not count as given. The texts do not mention this point, but it seems reasonable that a bhikkhu too ill to go to another bhikkhu or to get in the kneeling position should be allowed to give his consent from his sick-bed. The Vinaya-mukha adds that if the bhikkhu giving consent is junior to the one conveying his consent, he should change hara to the more formal haratha, and ārocehi to ārocetha.

As for the bhikkhu to whom the consent has been given, his duty is to join the meeting and report the other bhikkhu’s consent when he has arrived. If, however, Bhikkhu Y—instead of going to the meeting—goes away immediately after Bhikkhu X gives him his consent, the consent does not count as given; X must give his consent to another bhikkhu (although none of the texts mention a penalty for not doing so). The same holds true if, at that moment, Y dies, disrobes, admits to not being a true bhikkhu, or admits to being insane, possessed, delirious with pain, or suspended. If, however, any of these things happens while Y is on the way to the meeting, X does not have to re-give his consent, even though it does not count as having been conveyed. (This, however, would still invalidate any action taken at the meeting.) If any of these things happens after Y arrives at the meeting, the consent counts as having been conveyed. If Y arrives at the meeting and unintentionally neglects to report X’s consent either because he is heedless, falls asleep, or enters a meditative attainment, the consent still counts as conveyed, and Y incurs no offense. If, however, Y intentionally does not report X’s consent, the consent counts as conveyed, but Y incurs a dukkaṭa.

The Commentary also notes that if Bhikkhu X gives his consent to Bhikkhu Y, and Y then asks Z to convey X’s consent and his own to the assembly, then when Z tells the assembly, only Y’s consent is conveyed. X’s is called a “leashed-cat consent”—which means that it doesn’t come no matter how hard you pull at it.

Although the relevant passage allows an ill bhikkhu to give his consent in this way, the texts do not define how ill a bhikkhu must be in order to qualify for this allowance. The origin story to Pc 79 describes a case where bhikkhus are too busy making robes to go to the meeting and so send their consent. The transaction carried out by the meeting was considered valid. Thus ill here apparently can mean not only physically ill but also seriously inconvenienced in other ways as well.

If a bhikkhu unable to attend the meeting is too ill to give his consent in the above way, he should be carried into the midst of the Community on a bed or a bench. If he is too ill to be moved—either because his disease would worsen or he could die—the Community should go to where he is staying and carry out the transaction there.

If the transaction is the uposatha observance, a bhikkhu not attending the meeting must send his purity instead of his consent. Similarly, if the transaction is the Invitation, he must send his invitation. If, in addition to the uposatha or the Invitation, the Community is planning to conduct other business at the meeting, he must send his consent as well. (For a full discussion of this point, see Chapter 15.) Again, the texts do not define how ill one must be in order to be allowed to send one’s purity or invitation in this way, but because these meetings are regularly scheduled, the general consensus in most Communities is that only a serious physical illness would be legitimate grounds for taking advantage of this allowance.

One of the issues at the Second Council was whether an incomplete Community could carry out a transaction and then have it ratified by the bhikkhus who came later. The Council’s decision was No.

Protest

If, during a transaction, a bhikkhu is displeased with it—for whatever reason, in line with the Dhamma or not—he has the right to protest. If he wants to, he may speak loudly enough to interrupt the proceedings, but if he feels intimidated by the group he may simply register his protest by informing the bhikkhu sitting right next to him. If his protest carries weight, that invalidates the transaction, and the issue may be reopened at a later time.

The protest of the following people does not carry weight:

anyone who is not rightly a bhikkhu;

a bhikkhu who is insane, possessed, or delirious with pain;

a bhikkhu who has been suspended;

a bhikkhu of a separate affiliation;

a bhikkhu standing outside the territory;

a bhikkhu levitating in the sky through psychic power;

the person who is the object of the transaction.

If any of these people protest a transaction, that does not invalidate the proceeding, and the transaction is still fit to stand.

If the protest of a regular bhikkhu of common affiliation halts a transaction that would have been in accordance with the Dhamma and fit to stand, he is subject to having his Pāṭimokkha canceled (Cv.IX.3—see Chapter 15), after which the Community would look into his attitude to see if he would benefit from a disciplinary transaction.

Announcements

There is some disagreement as to how the validity of the territory applies to announcement-transactions. The Commentary’s discussion of the “shaving” announcement (Mv.I.48.2—see Chapter 14) recommends gathering all the bhikkhus in the territory and making the announcement or sending word to all of them. In the latter case, it says, the transaction is still valid even if some of the bhikkhus are missed in the latter procedure either because they are meditating or asleep. It does not say whether this option applies to other announcements as well. The Vinaya-mukha, on the other hand, cites another case from the Commentary to Cv.VI.21.1—the announcement when food is being distributed in the meal hall—to put forth the theory that an announcement-transaction does not have to be performed in a territory, the bhikkhus gathered do not have to be within hatthapāsa of one another, and there is no need to have consent conveyed. However, there is the question of whether the announcement mentioned in the Commentary was meant to be a Community transaction. There is no other support for this theory in the texts. Nevertheless, both of these precedents are in agreement in suggesting that the validity of only two factors is at issue in an announcement-transaction: the validity of the object and the validity of the assembly.

Offenses

Any bhikkhu who, knowing that a transaction is valid in terms of all the above factors, nevertheless agitates for it to be reopened incurs a pācittiya under Pc 63. For further details, see the discussion under that rule. For related offenses, see also the discussions under Pc 79-81.

According to Mv.II.16.5, a bhikkhu who participates in a transaction not in accordance with the Dhamma incurs a dukkaṭa. The same passage discusses a case in which some group-of-six bhikkhus conduct a transaction not in accordance with the Dhamma and physically threaten any members of the meeting who protest. In a case like this, there is an allowance for four or five to protest, two or three to voice an opinion, and one to determine silently, “I do not approve of this.” Any bhikkhu who does so is exempt from the offense. However, the silent determination does not count as a protest and so does not invalidate the proceeding. Still, the fact that the transaction is not in accordance with the Dhamma already invalidates it; the fact that one perceives it as such means that one may reopen the issue at a later date.

The penalty for participating in a factional transaction is also a dukkaṭa. This penalty applies even if the only bhikkhus within the territory not participating in the meeting or sending consent are too sick to be carried into the assembly (Mv.II.23.2).

Rules

Issues

“There are these four issues: dispute-issues; accusation-issues, offense-issues; duty-issues.

“What here is a dispute-issue? There is the case where bhikkhus dispute: ‘This is Dhamma,’ ‘This is not Dhamma’; ‘This is Vinaya,’ ‘This is not Vinaya’; ‘This was spoken by the Tathāgata,’ ‘This was not spoken by the Tathāgata’; ‘This was regularly practiced by the Tathāgata,’ ‘This was not regularly practiced by the Tathāgata’; ‘This was formulated by the Tathāgata,’ ‘This was not formulated by the Tathāgata’; ‘This is an offense,’ ‘This is not an offense’; ‘This is a light offense,’ ‘This is a heavy offense’; ‘This is a curable offense,’ ‘This is an incurable offense’; or ‘This is a serious offense,’ ‘This is not a serious offense. ‘Whatever strife, quarreling, contention, dispute, differing opinions, opposing opinions, heated words, abusiveness based on this are called a dispute-issue.

“What here is an accusation-issue? There is the case where bhikkhus accuse a bhikkhu of a defect in virtue or a defect in conduct or a defect in views or a defect in livelihood. Any accusation there, any condemnation, scolding, blaming, denunciation, ganging up is called an accusation-issue.

“What here is an offense-issue? Any offense-issue from the five categories of offenses or the seven categories of offenses. This is called an offense-issue.

“What here is a duty-issue? Any duty or business of the Community: an announcement, a motion, a motion with one proclamation, a motion with three proclamations. This is called a duty-issue.”

—Cv.IV.14.2

Sources of disputes: three unskillful & three skillful.

[A list is inserted giving six unskillful traits:] a bhikkhu who is

1) easily angered & bears a grudge;

2) mean & spiteful;

3) jealous & possessive;

4) scheming & deceitful;

5) has evil desires & wrong views;

6) is attached to his own views, obstinate, unable to let them go.

Such a bhikkhu lives without deference or respect for the Buddha, the Dhamma, the Saṅgha; does not complete the training. When he causes a dispute in the Community, it comes to be for the harm, the unhappiness, the detriment of many people, for the pain and harm of human and divine beings.—Cv.IV.14.3

Three unskillful sources: states of mind that are covetous, corrupt, or confused. Three skillful sources: states of mind that are not covetous, corrupt, or confused.—Cv.IV.14.4

Sources of accusations: three unskillful & three skillful, plus the inserted list as with disputes. Also body & speech as sources of accusations.

“What is the body as a source of accusation? There is the case where a certain person has bad coloring, is ugly, deformed, very ill, purblind, paralyzed down one side, lame, or a cripple, on account of which they accuse (denounce?) him. This is the body as a source of accusation.

“What is speech as a source of accusation? There is the case where a certain person is a poor speaker, stuttering, drooling in his speech, on account of which they accuse (denounce?) him. This is speech as a source of accusation.”—Cv.IV.14.5

Sources of offense-issues: six—

body, not speech or mind;

speech, not body or mind;

body & speech, not mind;

body & mind, not speech;

speech & mind, not body;

body & speech & mind.—Cv.IV.14.6

Source of duty-issues: the Community.—Cv.IV.14.7

Dispute-issues may be skillful, unskillful, neutral (depending on the mind states of the bhikkhus involved).—Cv.IV.14.8

Accusation-issues may be skillful, unskillful, neutral (depending on the mind states of the bhikkhus making the accusation).—Cv.IV.14.9

Offense-issues may be unskillful or neutral (depending on whether the offense is committed knowingly and deliberately or not). There are no offense-issues that are skillful.—Cv.IV.14.10

Duty-issues may be skillful, unskillful, neutral (depending on the mind states of the bhikkhus involved).—Cv.IV.14.11

[Analysis of terms:]

1) Dispute & issue; 2) dispute & no issue, 3) issue but not dispute:

1) dispute-issue

2) mother disputes with son, son with mother,… father,… brother,… sister

3) accusation-issues, offense-issues, duty-issues—Cv.IV.14.12

1) Accusation & issue; 2) accusation & no issue, 3) issue but not accusation:

1) accusation-issue

2) mother accuses son, son mother,… father,… brother,… sister

3) dispute-issues, offense-issues, duty-issues—Cv.IV.14.13

1) Offense & issue; 2) offense (“falling”) & no issue, 3) issue but not offense:

1) offense-issue

2) the attainment of stream “falling” (i.e., stream entry) [this is a pun on “āpatti”]

3) dispute-issues, accusation-issues, duty-issues—Cv.IV.14.14

1) Duty & issue; 2) duty & no issue, 3) issue but not duty:

1) duty-issue

2) one’s duties to teacher, preceptor, those on a level with one’s teacher, those on a level with one’s preceptor

3) dispute-issues, accusation-issues, offense-issues—Cv.IV.14.15

“A dispute-issue is settled by means of how many ways of settling? A dispute-issue is settled by means of two ways of settling: a face-to-face verdict and acting in accordance with the majority.”

Face-to-face with: the Community, the Dhamma, the Vinaya, the individuals:

—face-to-face with the Community: the full number of bhikkhus competent for the transaction has come, if the consent of those who should send consent has been conveyed, if those who are present do not protest ( = united transaction —Mv.IX.3.6);

— face-to-face with the Dhamma, the Vinaya: when the issue is settled by means of the Dhamma, the Vinaya, the Teacher’s instruction;

— face-to-face with the individuals: both whoever quarrels & whoever he quarrels with, opposed on the issue, are present.

When the issue has been settled in this way, whoever involved in the transaction reopens it: a pācittiya offense (Pc 63); whoever, having given consent to it, complains: a pācittiya offense (Pc 79).—Cv.IV.14.16

Steps 2 & 3 if the original bhikkhus can’t settle the issue themselves—see BMC1, Chapter 11—Cv.IV.14.17-18

Steps 4 & 5 if bhikkhus at another residence can’t settle the issue—see BMC1, Chapter 11—Cv.IV.14.19-23

In accordance with the majority: BMC1, Chapter 11—Cv.IV.14.24-26

“An accusation-issue is settled by means of how many ways of settling? An accusation-issue is settled by means of four ways of settling: a face-to-face verdict, a verdict of mindfulness (innocence), a verdict of past insanity, a further-punishment (transaction).”

Procedure, request, and transaction statement for verdict of mindfulness—Cv.IV.14.27

Procedure, request, and transaction statement for verdict of past insanity—Cv.IV.14.28

Procedure, request, and transaction statement for a further punishment-transaction—Cv.IV.14.29 [ = Cv.IV.11.2]

“An offense-issue is settled by means of how many ways of settling? An offense-issue is settled by means of three ways of settling: a face-to-face verdict, in accordance with (the offender’s) admission, covering over as with grass.”

Confession of offenses: face-to-face with the Dhamma, the Vinaya, the individuals (the bhikkhu making confession and the bhikkhu to whom confession is made are face-to-face)

Confession to an individual—Cv.IV.14.30

Confession to a group—Cv.IV.14.31

Confession to a Community—Cv.IV.14.32 (here “face-to-face” includes face-to-face with the Community)

Covering over as with grass—Cv.IV.14.33

“A duty-issue is settled by means of how many ways of settling? A duty-issue is settled by means of one way of settling: a face-to-face verdict.”—Cv.IV.14.34

Methods of settling

Face-to-face

“A transaction of censure, demotion, banishment, reconciliation, or suspension is not to be imposed on bhikkhus who are not present: whoever does so, an offense of wrong doing.”—Cv.IV.1

An individual, group, or Community who speaks what is not Dhamma influences an individual, group, or Community who speaks what is Dhamma to go over to their side: Any issue settled in this way is settled by what is not Dhamma with the appearance of a face-to-face verdict.—Cv.IV.2

The opposite: Any issue settled in this way is settled by what is Dhamma with a face-to-face verdict.—Cv.IV.3

Mindfulness

Request and transaction statement for a verdict of mindfulness (innocence)—Cv.IV.4.10 (see BMC1, Appendix VIII)

Requirements for a verdict of mindfulness:

1) the bhikkhu is pure and has not committed the offense (in question);

2) he is accused of it;

3) he requests (the verdict of mindfulness);

4) the Community gives it;

5) in accordance with Dhamma, united.—Cv.IV.4.11

Past Insanity

Request and transaction statement for a verdict of past insanity—Cv.IV.5.2 (see BMC1, Appendix VIII)

The verdict is not valid if

—on being asked if he remembers offenses, he says he doesn’t even when he does;

—on being asked if he remembers offenses, he says he remembers as if in a dream even when he actually remembers;

—on being asked if he remembers offenses, he—though not actually insane—acts insane.—Cv.IV.6.1

The verdict is valid if

—on being asked if he remembers offenses, he says he doesn’t when he actually doesn’t;

—on being asked if he remembers offenses, he says he remembers as if in a dream when that is actually the case;

—on being asked if he remembers offenses, he is actually insane and acts (§) insane.—Cv.IV.6.2

In Accordance with What is Admitted

“A transaction of censure, demotion, banishment, reconciliation, or suspension is not to be imposed on bhikkhus (§) who have not admitted (the offense in question): whoever does so, an offense of wrong doing.”—Cv.IV.7

The verdict is not valid if the bhikkhu admits to an offense other than what he actually committed (even when admitting to an offense heavier than what he actually did).—Cv.IV.8.1

The verdict is valid if the bhikkhu admits to the offense he actually committed.—Cv.IV.8.2

In Accordance with the Majority

Procedure and transaction statement for choosing a bhikkhu to be the distributor of voting tickets—Cv.IV.9

A distribution of voting tickets is not valid if:

the issue is trifling;

it has not gone its course;

it is not remembered or made to be remembered;

one knows that the non-Dhamma side is in the majority;

one hopes (§) that the non-Dhamma side may be in the majority;

one knows that the Community will be split;

one hopes (§) that the Community will be split;

they take the tickets in a non-Dhamma way;

a faction takes the tickets;

they take them not in accordance with their views.

 (see BMC1, Chapter 11)—Cv.IV.10.1

A distribution of voting tickets is valid if:

the issue is not trifling;

it has gone its course;

it is remembered or made to be remembered;

one knows that the Dhamma side is in the majority;

one hopes (§) that the Dhamma side may be in the majority;

one knows that the Community will not be split;

one hopes (§) that the Community will not be split;

they take the tickets in a Dhamma way;

(the Community) takes the tickets in unity;

they take them in accordance with their views.

 (see BMC1, Chapter 11)—Cv.IV.10.2

Further Punishment

Procedure (charged (§), made to remember, made to disclose the offense [the PTS version here has ropetabbo; the Burmese and Sri Lankan versions, āropetabbo]) and transaction statement for a further-punishment transaction—Cv.IV.11.2

Five requirements for a further-punishment transaction:

1) he (the bhikkhu in question) is impure;

2) he is unconscientious;

3) he stands accused (sānuvāda);

4-5) the Community gives him a further-punishment transaction

—in accordance with the Dhamma

—united.—Cv.IV.12.1

Twelve qualities of a further-punishment transaction that is not-Dhamma, not-Vinaya, poorly settled (§) (lists of threes) [ = Cv.I.2-3] —Cv.IV.12.2

Nine qualities of a bhikkhu against whom a further-punishment transaction may be carried out [ = Cv.I.4] (§ —BD omits the passages indicating that any one of these qualities is enough)—Cv.IV.12.3

Eighteen duties of a bhikkhu against whom a further-punishment transaction has been carried out [ = Cv.I.5]—Cv.IV.12.4

Covering over as with Grass

Procedure and transaction statements—Cv.IV.13.2-3

“Those bhikkhus are risen up from their offenses except for those that are grave faults [C: pārājika and saṅghādisesa offenses]; except for those connected with the laity; except for those of anyone whose views go against the transaction; and except for those of anyone who is not present”—Cv.IV.13.4

Transactions

“A non-Dhamma transaction is not to be performed in the midst of a Community. Whoever should do so: an offense of wrong doing… I allow when a non-Dhamma transaction is being performed that it be protested.”—Mv.II.16.4

“I allow that even an opinion be voiced.” “I allow four or five to protest, two or three to voice an opinion, and one to determine, ‘I do not approve of this.’”—Mv.II.16.5

Transactions that are not transactions and are not to be done:

a factional transaction that is non-Dhamma;

a united (samagga) transaction that is non-Dhamma;

a factional transaction that is a semblance of the Dhamma;

a united transaction that is a semblance of the Dhamma;

a factional transaction that is Dhamma;

one suspends one;

one suspends two;

one suspends many;

one suspends a Community;

two suspend one;

two suspend two;

two suspend many;

two suspend a Community;

many (not a Community) suspend one;

many suspend two;

many suspend many;

many suspend a Community;

a Community suspends a Community.—Mv.IX.2.3

“There are these four transactions: a factional transaction that is non-Dhamma; a united transaction that is non-Dhamma; a factional transaction that is Dhamma; a united transaction that is Dhamma.

“Of these, the factional transaction that is non-Dhamma is—because of its factionality, because of its lack of accordance with the Dhamma—reversible and unfit to stand. This sort of transaction is not to be done, nor is this sort of transaction allowed by me.

“The united transaction that is non-Dhamma is—because of its lack of accordance with the Dhamma—reversible and unfit to stand. This sort of transaction is not to be done, nor is this sort of transaction allowed by me.

“The factional transaction that is Dhamma is—because of its factionality—reversible and unfit to stand. This sort of transaction is not to be done, nor is this sort of transaction allowed by me.

“The united transaction that is Dhamma is—because of its unity, because of its accordance with the Dhamma—irreversible and fit to stand. This sort of transaction is to be done; this sort of transaction is allowed by me.

“Thus (thinking), ‘We will perform this sort of transaction, i.e., the united transaction that is Dhamma.’ That is how you should train yourselves.”—Mv.IX.2.4

More transactions that are not transactions and are not to be carried out:

an invalid motion and valid proclamation;

an invalid proclamation and valid motion;

an invalid motion and invalid proclamation;

apart from the Dhamma;

apart from the Vinaya;

apart from the Teacher’s instruction;

one that has been protested, is reversible, is not fit to stand—Mv.IX.3.2

“There are these six transactions: a non-Dhamma transaction; a factional transaction; a united transaction; a factional transaction that is a semblance of the Dhamma; a united transaction that is a semblance of the Dhamma; a united transaction that is Dhamma.

“And what is the non-Dhamma transaction?

“If, in a transaction with a motion and one proclamation, one performs the transaction by means of a single motion but does not proclaim the transaction statement (kamma-vācā), that is a non-Dhamma transaction.

“If, in a transaction with a motion and one proclamation, one performs the transaction by means of a double motion but does not proclaim the transaction statement, that is a non-Dhamma transaction.

“If, in a transaction with a motion and one proclamation, one performs the transaction by means of a single transaction statement but does not set forth the motion, that is a non-Dhamma transaction.

“If, in a transaction with a motion and one proclamation, one performs the transaction by means of a double transaction statement but does not set forth the motion, that is a non-Dhamma transaction.” —Mv.IX.3.3

“If, in a transaction with a motion and three proclamations, one performs the transaction by means of a single motion but does not proclaim the transaction statement, that is a non-Dhamma transaction.

“If, in a transaction with a motion and three proclamations, one performs the transaction by means of a double motion, a triple motion, (or) a quadruple motion but does not proclaim the transaction statement, that is a non-Dhamma transaction.

“If, in a transaction with a motion and three proclamations, one performs the transaction by means of a single transaction statement but does not set forth the motion, that is a non-Dhamma transaction.

“If, in a transaction with a motion and three proclamations, one performs the transaction by means of a double, a triple, (or) a quadruple transaction statement but does not set forth the motion, that is a non-Dhamma transaction.”—Mv.IX.3.4

“And what is a factional transaction? If, in a transaction with a motion and one proclamation, the full number of bhikkhus competent for the transaction have not come, if the consent of those who should send consent has not been conveyed, (or) if those who are present protest, it is a factional transaction.

“If, in a transaction with a motion and one proclamation, the full number of bhikkhus competent for the transaction have come, if the consent of those who should send consent has not been conveyed, (or) if those who are present protest, it is a factional transaction.

“If, in a transaction with a motion and one proclamation, the full number of bhikkhus competent for the transaction have come, if the consent of those who should send consent has been conveyed, (but) if those who are present protest, it is a factional transaction.”

(Similarly for a transaction with a motion and three proclamations.)—Mv.IX.3.5

Is the permission for assent permissible?

What is the permission for assent?

“It is permissible to carry out a transaction with an incomplete Community, (thinking,) ‘We will get the assent of the bhikkhus who arrive later.’”

That is not permissible.

Where is it objected to?

In the Campeyyaka-Vinayavatthu (Mv.IX.3.5)

What offense is committed?

A dukkaṭa for overstepping the discipline.—Cv.XII.2.8

“And what is a united transaction? If, in a transaction with a motion and one proclamation, the full number of bhikkhus competent for the transaction have come, if the consent of those who should send consent has been conveyed, (and) if those who are present do not protest, it is a united transaction.”

(Similarly for a transaction with a motion and three proclamations.)—Mv.IX.3.6

“And what is a factional transaction that is a semblance of the Dhamma? If, in a transaction with a motion and one proclamation, one proclaims the transaction statement first and sets forth the motion afterwards, and the full number of bhikkhus competent for the transaction have not come, if the consent of those who should send consent has not been conveyed, (or) if those who are present protest, it is a factional transaction that is a semblance of the Dhamma. (Complete as in Mv.IX.3.5)”—Mv.IX.3.7

“And what is a united transaction that is a semblance of the Dhamma? If, in a transaction with a motion and one proclamation, one proclaims the transaction statement first and sets forth the motion afterwards, and the full number of bhikkhus competent for the transaction have come, if the consent of those who should send consent has been conveyed, (and) if those who are present do not protest, it is a united transaction that is a semblance of the Dhamma.”

(Similarly for a transaction with a motion and three proclamations.)—Mv.IX.3.8

“And what is a united transaction in accordance with the Dhamma? If, in a transaction with a motion and one proclamation, one sets forth the motion first and performs the transaction by means of one transaction statement afterwards, and the full number of bhikkhus competent for the transaction have come, if the consent of those who should send consent has been conveyed, (and) if those who are present do not protest, it is a united transaction in accordance with the Dhamma.”

(Similarly for a transaction with a motion and three proclamations.)—Mv.IX.3.9

A bhikkhu with no offense to be seen, who sees no offense in himself: if suspended for not seeing an offense—a non-Dhamma transaction.

A bhikkhu with no offense for which he should make amends: if suspended for not making amends for an offense—a non-Dhamma transaction.

A bhikkhu with no evil view: if suspended for not relinquishing an evil view—a non-Dhamma transaction.—Mv.IX.5.1

Combinations of the above factors—Mv.IX.5.2-5

A bhikkhu with an offense to be seen; sees (admits to) the offense: if suspended for not seeing an offense—a non-Dhamma transaction.

A bhikkhu with an offense for which he should make amends; promises to make amends: if suspended for not making amends for an offense—a non-Dhamma transaction.

A bhikkhu with an evil view; promises to relinquish it: if suspended for not relinquishing an evil view—a non-Dhamma transaction.—Mv.IX.5.6

Combination of the above factors—Mv.IX.5.7

A bhikkhu with an offense to be seen; refuses to see the offense (to admit that it is an offense): if suspended for not seeing an offense— a Dhamma transaction.

A bhikkhu with an offense for which he should make amends; refuses to make amends: if suspended for not making amends for an offense—a Dhamma transaction.

A bhikkhu with an evil view; refuses to relinquish it: if suspended for not relinquishing an evil view—a Dhamma transaction.—Mv.IX.5.8

Combination of the above factors—Mv.IX.5.9

“Any Community that, in unity, performs a transaction that should be done face-to-face not face-to-face: That is a non-Dhamma transaction, a non-Vinaya transaction, and the Community is one that has overstepped its bounds. Any Community that, in unity, performs a transaction that should be done with interrogation without interrogation… that should be done with the acknowledgment (of the accused bhikkhu) without his acknowledgment… who gives a verdict of past insanity to one who deserves a verdict of mindfulness… who imposes a further-punishment transaction on one who deserves a verdict of past insanity… who imposes a censure transaction on one who deserves a further-punishment transaction… who imposes a demotion transaction on one who deserves a censure transaction… who imposes a banishment transaction on one who deserves a demotion transaction… who imposes a reconciliation transaction on one who deserves a banishment transaction… who imposes a suspension transaction on one who deserves a reconciliation transaction… who grants probation to one who deserves a suspension transaction… who sends back to the beginning one who deserves probation… who grants penance to one who deserves to be sent back to the beginning… who grants rehabilitation to one deserves penance… who grants Acceptance to one who deserves rehabilitation: That is a non-Dhamma transaction, a non-Vinaya transaction, and the Community is one that has overstepped its bounds.”—Mv.IX.6.3

Any Community in unity that performs a transaction in a proper way for one who deserves it (see the cases above): That is a Dhamma-transaction, a Vinaya-transaction, and the Community is not one that has overstepped its bounds.—Mv.IX.6.4

Other combinations of wrongly applied transactions—Mv.IX.6.6

Other combinations of rightly applied transactions—Mv.IX.6.8

Bhikkhus deserving a censure transaction, etc., but it is improperly carried out many times—Mv.IX.7.1-11

Bhikkhus deserving to have a censure transaction, etc., revoked, but it is improperly revoked many times—Mv.IX.7.12-14

Those who say these transactions should be carried out again are those who speak Dhamma—Mv.IX.7.15-20

“I allow one to be mentioned in the proclamation by clan name.”—Mv.I.74.1

Quorum

“Five communities: a four-fold community of bhikkhus; a five-fold community of bhikkhus; a ten-fold community of bhikkhus; a twenty-fold community of bhikkhus; a more than twenty-fold community of bhikkhus.

“Of these, the four-fold community of bhikkhus is competent for the transaction of all transactions—if united and in accordance with the Dhamma—except for three: Acceptance, Invitation, and rehabilitation.

“The five-fold community of bhikkhus is competent for the transaction of all transactions—if united and in accordance with the Dhamma—except for two: Acceptance in the Middle Country and rehabilitation.

“The ten-fold community of bhikkhus is competent for the transaction of all transactions—if united and in accordance with the Dhamma—except for one: rehabilitation.

“The twenty-fold… the more than twenty-fold community of bhikkhus is competent for the transaction of all transactions—if united and in accordance with the Dhamma.”—Mv.IX.4.1

“If, in a transaction requiring a four-fold (community), the transaction is performed with a bhikkhunī as the fourth member, it is not a transaction and is not to be performed. If it is performed with a female trainee… a novice… a female novice… a renouncer of the training… one who has committed an extreme (pārājika) offense… one who is suspended for not seeing an offense… one who is suspended for not making amends for an offense… one who is suspended for not relinquishing an evil view… a paṇḍaka… one who lives in affiliation by theft… one who has gone over (while a bhikkhu) to another religion… an animal… a matricide… a patricide… a murderer of an arahant… a molester of a bhikkhunī… a schismatic… one who has shed (a Tathāgata’s) blood… a hermaphrodite… a bhikkhu of a separate affiliation… one standing in a different territory… one standing (levitating) in the sky through psychic power as the fourth member, it is not a transaction and is not to be performed. If he concerning whom the community is performing the action is the fourth member, it is not a transaction and is not to be performed.”—Mv.IX.4.2

(Similarly for transactions requiring five-fold, ten-fold, and twenty-fold communities.)—Mv.IX.4.3-5

Two kinds of madmen: “There is the madman who sometimes remembers the uposatha and sometimes doesn’t, who sometimes remembers a Community transaction and sometimes doesn’t. There is the madman who doesn’t remember at all (§). There is the madman who sometimes comes to the uposatha and sometimes doesn’t, who sometimes comes to a Community transaction and sometimes doesn’t. There is the madman who doesn’t come at all (§).” “When there is a madman who sometimes remembers the uposatha and sometimes doesn’t, who sometimes remembers a Community transaction and sometimes doesn’t, who sometimes comes to the uposatha and sometimes doesn’t, who sometimes comes to a Community transaction and sometimes doesn’t: I allow that an authorization of madness be given to a madman like this.”—Mv.II.25.1-2

Community transaction stating that whether the madman comes or not, the transactions of the Community are still valid—Mv.II.25.3-4

“If the followers of the suspended bhikkhu perform the uposatha, perform a Community transaction in that very same territory in accordance with the motion and announcement formulated by me (§), those transactions of theirs are in accordance with the Dhamma, irreversible, and fit to stand. If you, the bhikkhus who suspended (him) perform the uposatha, perform a Community transaction in that very same territory in accordance with the motion and announcement formulated by me (§), those transactions of yours are in accordance with the Dhamma, irreversible, and fit to stand. Why is that? Those bhikkhus belong to a separate affiliation from you, and you belong to a separate affiliation from them. There are these two grounds for being of a separate affiliation: Oneself makes oneself of a separate affiliation or a united Community suspends one for not seeing (an offense), for not making amends (for an offense), or for not relinquishing (an evil view). These are the two grounds for being of a separate affiliation. There are these two grounds for being of common affiliation: Oneself makes oneself of a common affiliation or a united Community restores one who has been suspended for not seeing (an offense), for not making amends (for an offense), or for not relinquishing (an evil view). These are the two grounds for being of common affiliation.”—Mv.X.1.9-10

Consent

“I allow that an ill bhikkhu give his consent (to a Community transaction) (§). This is how it is to be given. The ill bhikkhu, going to one bhikkhu, arranging his upper robe over one shoulder, kneeling down, performing añjali, should say to him, ‘I give consent. Convey my consent. Announce my consent (Chandaṁ dammi. Chandaṁ me hara. Chandaṁ me ārocehīti.)’ If he makes this understood by physical gesture, by voice, or by both physical gesture and voice, his consent is given. If he does not make this understood by physical gesture, by voice, or by both physical gesture and voice, his consent is not given.

“If he manages it thus, well and good. If not, then having carried the ill bhikkhu to the midst of the Community on a bed or bench, the transaction may be carried out. If the thought occurs to the nurse-bhikkhus, ‘If we move the ill one from this spot his disease will grow worse or he will die,’ then the ill one should not be moved from that place. The transaction is to be carried out when the Community has gone there. Not even then should a transaction be performed by a faction of the Community. If it should perform it: an offense of wrong doing.”—Mv.II.23.1-2

“If the conveyor of consent, on being given consent, goes away then and there, consent should be given to another. If the conveyor of consent, on being given consent forsakes the Community… dies… admits (§) to being a novice… to having renounced the training… to having committed an extreme (pārājika offense)… to being insane… possessed… delirious with pain… suspended for not seeing an offense… suspended for not making amends for an offense… suspended for not relinquishing an evil view; if he admits to being a paṇḍaka… one who lives in affiliation by theft… one who has gone over (while a bhikkhu) to another religion… an animal… a matricide… a patricide… a murderer of an arahant… a molester of a bhikkhunī… a schismatic… one who has shed the Tathāgata’s blood… a hermaphrodite then and there, consent should be given to another. If the conveyor of consent, having been given consent, on the way (to the meeting) goes away… admits to being a paṇḍaka, the consent is not conveyed. If the conveyor of consent, on being given consent, goes away… admits to being a hermaphrodite on arriving at the Community, the consent is conveyed. If the conveyor of consent, on being given consent, arrives at the Community but, falling asleep… being heedless… entering a (meditative) attainment, does not announce it, the consent is conveyed and the conveyor of consent is without offense. If the conveyor of consent, having been given (another bhikkhu’s) consent, on arriving in the Community intentionally does not announce it, the consent is conveyed but the conveyor of consent incurs an offense of wrong doing. I allow that, on the uposatha day, when purity is given, that consent be given as well, when the Community has something to be done (§).”—Mv.II.23.3

Protest

“The protest of some in the midst of the Community carries weight, while that of others does not carry weight. And whose protest in the midst of the Community does not carry weight? The protest of a bhikkhunī… a female trainee… a novice… a female novice… a renouncer of the training… one who has committed an extreme (pārājika) offense… one who is insane… one possessed… one delirious with pain… one who is suspended for not seeing an offense… one who is suspended for not making amends for an offense… one who is suspended for not relinquishing an evil view… a paṇḍaka… a person in affiliation through theft… a bhikkhu who has gone over (while a bhikkhu) to another religion… an animal… a matricide… a patricide… a murderer of an arahant… a molester of a bhikkhunī… a schismatic… a shedder of (a Tathāgata’s) blood… a hermaphrodite… a bhikkhu of a separate affiliation… one standing in a different territory… one standing (levitating) in the sky through psychic power does not carry weight. The protest of the one concerning whom the Community is performing the action, in the midst of the Community, does not carry weight.”—Mv.IX.4.7

“And whose protest in the midst of the Community does carry weight? The protest of a regular bhikkhu in the midst of the Community carries weight if he is of the same affiliation, is staying within the same territory, even if he just informs the bhikkhu right next to him.”—Mv.IX.4.8

CHAPTER THIRTEEN

Territories

As stated in the preceding chapter, the unity of a Community transaction depends on the assent—expressed either through consent or non-protesting presence—of all the regular bhikkhus of common affiliation within the territory (sīmā) where the meeting is held. Thus, whenever the Community meets for a transaction, the territory of the meeting must be clearly defined. (The word sīmā is sometimes translated as “boundary,” but this leads to confusion in instances where a body of water, such as a river, cannot be a sīmā but can act as the boundary line for a sīmā. To avoid this sort of confusion, “territory” seems to be a preferable rendering for the word.)

A valid territory may either be one that has been correctly authorized by a Community transaction or one defined by natural or political boundaries. The Commentary’s terms for these two types of territory are baddha-sīmā, a tied-off territory; and abaddha-sīmā, a territory not tied-off. The term “tied-off” is derived from a general Canonical idiom—to “tie off” a territory or boundary is to set a limit (see NP 1)—but here it refers specifically to the way in which the Commentary recommends establishing the boundaries of a formally authorized territory: Boundary markers (nimitta) are placed around the perimeter of the territory, and a group of bhikkhus formally designates each marker, going from one to the next around the perimeter, leaving in their wake a boundary line, like an imaginary rope, running straight from one marker to the next. Finally, they return to the first marker and formally designate it once more, so that the boundary line is brought back to the starting point, completing the act of “tying off” the territory within the boundary line, separating it from the area outside the line.

In the early years of the religion there was a tendency to authorize large territories, covering several monasteries and sometimes even entire cities. The purpose was to create a large sense of common affiliation. Bhikkhus had the opportunity to meet the larger Community face to face on a regular basis; any gifts of requisites that donors dedicated “to the territory” (see Chapter 18) would be shared among all. However, large territories create their own difficulties. To begin with, there is the difficulty in ensuring that, during a meeting, no unknown bhikkhus have wandered into the territory, invalidating any transaction carried out at the meeting. And as was mentioned in the preceding chapter, if a bhikkhu too ill to give consent or to be carried into the meeting is staying in the territory, the meeting has to be held in his presence. This is no great problem if there is only one such bhikkhu, but it is a problem if there are more than one in widely separated places. To avoid these difficulties, the tendency since before the time of the Commentary has been to authorize smaller territories: either subsidiary territories within larger territories, or—what is more common at present—territories covering only a fragment of a monastery’s grounds.

The Canon’s discussion of territories is extremely brief: A formally authorized territory may not be larger than three yojanas (30 miles; 48 km.) across; it may not include both sides of a river unless there is a permanent bridge or boat connecting the two; once a territory has been formally authorized for common affiliation and a common uposatha, it may be further authorized—except for any villages within the territory—as an area where one is not apart from one’s robes (in connection with NP 2); a new territory may not be mixed with or submerge a pre-existing formally authorized territory; to insure that it doesn’t, a buffer zone should be left between one authorized territory and another; and a territory, once authorized, may be revoked. In an area where no territories have been formally authorized, the following may be used as territories: a village or town territory; in a non-village or wilderness area, a radius of seven abbhantaras (see below) around the meeting; also, in a river, sea, or natural lake, a radius around the meeting the distance a man of average size can splash water.

The commentaries expand on these points considerably—and understandably so, as the validity of a territory affects the validity of all subsequent Community transactions performed within it. This creates a need to be scrupulously precise in authorizing a new territory. Over the centuries, whenever reform movements aimed at reviving the Vinaya have started, one of the first orders of business has been to authorize new territories for just this reason. Thus we will have to follow the commentaries in treating the topic in considerable detail. Where not stated otherwise, the following discussion draws on the Commentary to Mv.II.6-13. Territories that are not tied-off will be discussed first, followed by territories that are.

Territories not tied off

As the Canon says, the following territories may be used in a location that has not been authorized as a territory: a village or town territory; in a non-village or wilderness area, a radius of seven abbhantaras around the meeting; and—in a river, sea, or natural lake—a radius around the meeting the distance a man of average size can splash water.

The Commentary states that village and town territories include large-city territories as well. The territory in each case would include not only the actual built-up area of the municipality but also any surrounding areas from which it collects tribute or taxes—which, in those days, meant private land or land under cultivation. To put the Commentary’s definition in modern political terms: In an incorporated municipality, the territory would include the entire area within the municipality boundaries. Outside of incorporated municipalities, the territory would cover all built-up areas, cultivated land, and private uncultivated land within a particular county or similar jurisdiction. Public forest or other public wilderness lands would not count as part of the territory. The Commentary adds that if the rulers have declared part of a village as not subject to taxes or tribute—this is called a “separated-from-the-village” (visuṅgāma) territory—that counts as a separate village territory. Modern examples would include any areas within a municipality where the municipality’s powers of jurisdiction do not extend. None of these territories—village, town, or separated-from-the-village—can serve as a ticīvara-avippavāsa (see below). For some reason, the Commentary states that other territories not tied off can serve this function, even though the Canon’s allowance for ticīvara-avippavāsa states specifically that this allowance applies only to formally authorized territories.

A wilderness is any land lying outside of a village, town, or city territory as defined in the last paragraph. For example, state, provincial, or national forests; state, provincial, or national parks; public wilderness or wildlife reserves; and any other unused government land (such as unused BLM land in the United States) would count as wilderness here. Any meeting held in such a wilderness creates its own temporary territory, lasting for the duration of the meeting, with a radius of seven abbhantaras measured from the outermost bhikkhus in the assembly—provided that the entire territory lies within the wilderness. (A Thai calculation puts seven abbhantaras at 98 meters; a Sri Lankan calculation, at 80. As the Thai calculation is the stricter of the two, it seems the wiser one to follow.) This means that a Community meeting in a wilderness should be at least 98 meters, plus a small buffer zone, from the wilderness’ edge. The Commentary adds that if another Community meeting is held in the same wilderness at the same time, there should be another 98-meter buffer zone between the territories of the two assemblies. In other words, the two assemblies should be at least 294 meters apart.

The Canon’s statement that all rivers, oceans, and natural lakes are non-territories means that they are not territories in and of themselves, and they cannot be made into tied-off territories. However, as in the case of a wilderness meeting, a meeting held in any of these bodies of water automatically creates its own temporary territory lasting for the duration of the meeting. The radius in this case is a water-splash (udak’ukkhepa)—the distance an average man can splash water or toss a handful of sand. This distance is measured out from the outermost bhikkhus in the assembly. And again as in the case of a temporary wilderness territory, this water-splash territory is valid only if the entire area marked by the water-splash lies within the body of water. In other words, the meeting has to be held just over a water-splash from shore.

The Commentary defines each of these bodies of water as follows:

A river can be any stream that flows continuously during the rainy season, at least deep enough to wet the lower robe of a properly-robed bhikkhunī walking across. Rocks and islands normally flooded in an average rainy season count as part of the river, as do areas normally covered by the river during the rains but dry during the dry season. Canals or lakes made by damming a river, however, do not.

An ocean includes only the area that waves normally reach at low tide, not the high-tide mark or any areas that waves reach only when there is wind. Rocks in the ocean count as part of the ocean only if covered at low tide, with or without waves. Uninhabited islands and mountains in the ocean, if not part of fishermen’s routes—according to the Sub-commentary, this means that they are too far for fishermen to reach and return to their home village in one day—count as wilderness areas. If more accessible to inhabited land, they count as part of the nearest village territory.

If a river or ocean covers an area within the boundaries of a village/town/city territory, the area covered by water counts as part of the river or ocean. If the river or ocean is flooding an authorized territory, the flooded area still counts as the authorized territory. If the flood is temporary, this ruling seems reasonable, but the Vinaya-mukha mentions an actual case in which a river in Thailand changed course and washed away part of an authorized territory. It does not try to resolve the question of whether the part of the riverbed that was once an authorized territory should still be regarded as part of that territory, but the Canon’s statement that a river is a non-territory would seem to take precedence here.

A natural lake: If during the rains a body of water doesn’t hold enough water to drink or to wash one’s hands or feet, it does not count as a lake. As for a body of water larger than that, the area it covers during the rainy season counts as a lake all year around, even if dry during the dry season. However, if people dig wells in the lake bottom or plant crops in it during the dry season, the area dug or planted doesn’t count as a lake. A lake filled in or dammed on one side no longer counts as a natural lake, and thus can be authorized as a tied-off territory (see below).

Natural salt-flats also count as lakes. Transactions may be done in the part of the flat covered by water in the rainy season.

When meeting in any of these bodies of water, the members of the Community—if they want to—may get down into the water and perform their transaction wearing only their rains-bathing cloths. (Although it’s possible to imagine scenarios where this allowance might prove useful, it seems more likely that this statement was inserted in the Commentary to wake up sleepy students in the back of the room. In actual practice, the members of such a meeting could easily drown while laughing themselves silly, especially if the transaction requires the person who is the object of the transaction to arrange his upper robe over his shoulder and bow down to their feet.) More practically, the members of the meeting may get in a boat, but they should not recite the transaction statement while the boat is moving. Instead, they should put down anchor or tie the boat to a post or tree in the water (not to a post or tree standing on the bank). Alternatively, they may meet in a pavilion built in the middle of the water or a tree growing in the water, as long as no bridge connects the pavilion or tree to the bank(s). In the case of a river or lake, they may also meet on a bridge crossing the water—again, as long as the bridge does not touch the banks.

Tied-off territories

A Community, through a formal transaction, may set off part of a wilderness or an untied-off territory as a separate territory. This, in the Commentary’s terminology, is called authorizing a tied-off territory.

The Canon requires that an authorized territory be no larger than three yojanas. This, the Commentary says, means that if one is standing in the middle of the territory, it should extend no more than 1.5 yojanas in any of the four cardinal directions. If the territory is rectangular or triangular, it should be no more than three yojanas on any one side.

On the other extreme, the Commentary states that the smallest valid territory is one that can hold 21 bhikkhus, the number required for rehabilitating a bhikkhu who has completed his penance for a saṅghādisesa offense.

The Canon also requires that a new territory neither be mixed with nor submerge a pre-existing territory. Here the V/Sub-commentary notes that pre-existing territory means a pre-existing authorized territory. The Commentary’s discussion of “mixed” builds on its assertion that, strictly speaking, a boundary marker lies just outside the territory; the territory begins just inside the marker. Thus it illustrates mixed territories with the following example: A mango and rose-apple tree are growing adjacent to one another with mingled forks. The mango tree is a boundary marker for a tied-off territory; the rose-apple tree, just to its west, lies just inside the territory. If someone comes and ties off another territory to the east, using the rose-apple tree as a marker, with the mango just inside the new territory, the new territory is “mixed with” the pre-existing territory. What this seems to mean is that the two trees are growing smack against each other, and so the two territories are immediately adjacent, with the mingling of their branches creating a confusion in their boundaries.

Submerged means overlapping a part or the whole of a pre-existing territory.

An alternative way of interpreting “mixing” and “submerging” would be to say that territory A is mixed with territory B if it overlaps part of B, and that it submerges B when it covers B entirely. This interpretation, however, is not supported by the Commentary.

To prevent submerging or mixing, the Canon requires a buffer zone between two tied-off territories. Different commentarial authorities give different minimum measurements for this zone. According to Buddhaghosa, it should be at least one cubit; according to the Kurundī, at least one half cubit; and according to the Mahā Paccarī, at least four fingerbreadths. Because the boundary marker strictly speaking lies just outside the territory, a marker as wide as or wider than the minimum buffer zone may be used as a marker for two neighboring territories. However, the Commentary notes that a tree should not be used in this way, as it will grow; when it extends into both territories it will somehow connect them. The Sub-commentary notes that this will not invalidate the territories, but simply make them into one.

The Vinaya-mukha, however, strongly objects to this type of thinking, saying that a tree “bridging” the buffer zone does not connect the territories any more than they were in the first place. As it points out, the purpose of the buffer zone is to prevent disputes as to where one territory begins and another ends. The growth of a tree bridging a buffer zone does not affect the boundary lines once they are drawn. Although in general it is a wise policy to hold to the stricter interpretation in areas where the Canon is silent, this is one area where the Vinaya-mukha’s looser interpretation appears to have common sense on its side.

The Canon’s allowance for a territory incorporating two sides of a river is explained as follows: The requirement for a permanent boat or bridge means that there must be a boat at least big enough for three people to cross; or a bridge made at least of wood, big enough for one person to cross. Either may be one quarter yojana ( = 2.5 miles or 4 km.) upstream or downstream from the two parts of the territory. The river itself is not part of the territory.

Any bhikkhus who authorize territories in defiance of the above rules—i.e., territories that are too large, territories mixed with or submerging pre-existing formally authorized territories, territories incorporating two sides of a river without a permanent boat or bridge between the two—each incur a dukkaṭa. Because the transaction authorizing any such territory is not in accordance with the Dhamma—in the Parivāra’s terms, the object lacks validity—it is not fit to stand. The territory thus retains its earlier status as part of the surrounding untied-off territory.

Boundary markers

A tied-off territory is defined by its boundary markers. In accordance with the laws of geometry—that a plane can be defined by no fewer than three points—at least three boundary markers are required to define a territory, although more than that is perfectly acceptable. The boundary connecting the markers runs straight from the inner side of one marker to the inner side of the next. The Canon permits eight types of markers: a mountain, a rock, a forest, a tree, a path, a termite’s nest, a river, and water. Common sense dictates that the markers be fairly permanent, but the Commentary’s explanations do not all meet this requirement.

Pabbato: mountain

To qualify as a marker, a mountain must be composed of rock, dirt, or a combination of the two. The minimum size is that of an elephant. A rock smaller than that is a valid marker (see below) but cannot be called a mountain. Piles of dust or sand do not count as mountains. If a monastery is surrounded by a single mountain chain, the chain should not be used as a marker in more than one direction. In other directions, the Community may use other markers inside or outside the chain, depending on whether they want to include part of the chain in the territory. This principle applies to other long, continuous markers (flat rock layers, forests, connected roads, etc.) as well.

Pasāṇo: rock

A rock used as a boundary marker can extend in size from a large bullock or buffalo down to a stone weighing 32 palas. The Thai translator of the Commentary calculates this as approximately 3 kilograms; a Sri Lankan method of calculation puts it at 8 lbs. As the latter calculation is the stricter of the two, it is the wiser one to follow. A flat stone slab, either lying down or standing up, may also be used as a “rock,” as can an iron ball. If the monastery is built on top of rock slab or ledge, the slab/ledge should not be used as a marker.

Vano: forest

To qualify as a marker, a forest must include at least four to five trees with hardwood. Forests of grassy plants or palms do not qualify. If a monastery is surrounded by forest, the same conditions apply as those to a monastery surrounded by a mountain chain, i.e., it may be used as a marker in only one direction. In other directions, other markers—either inside or outside the forest—should be used.

Rukkho: tree

To qualify as a marker, a tree must have heartwood and be at least 8 fingerbreadths tall, and at least the diameter of a “needle-rod (suci-daṇḍa),” which has been variously translated as a baluster or an incising needle. Whatever it is, the Old K/Sub-commentary puts its diameter as equal to that of the nail on the small finger. The tree must be planted in the ground, even if just that day (thus potted trees are not appropriate). With an extensive banyan tree, consisting of many trunks surrounding a monastery, the same conditions apply as with a forest and a mountain chain.

Maggo: path/road

To qualify as a marker, a path must be a usable walking or carriage path extending for at least two to three villages. Thus paths through a field, through a forest, along a riverside, or along a reservoir are not appropriate. If two or more connected paths surround a monastery, they may be used as a marker in only one direction.

Vammiko: termite nest

Even if appearing that very day, a termite’s nest is a valid marker if it is at least eight fingerbreadths tall and the diameter of a cattle horn.

Nadī: river

Any stream meeting the definition of “river” under untied-off territories qualifies as a river here. A single river or four connecting rivers surrounding a monastery may be used as a marker in only one direction. If dammed, the non-flowing section of the river counts as a water (udaka) boundary, not a river boundary. A canal should not be used as a river boundary marker unless the flow of water has turned it into what resembles a natural river course.

Udako: water

This refers to water on land (i.e., not in a bowl, etc.) that is not flowing. The smallest allowable bodies of water are: a puddle dug by a pig, a puddle in which children play, a hole in the ground that will keep water long enough to recite the transaction statement. In this last case, after the transaction, the Commentary recommends placing a pile of rocks or sand, or a post of rock or wood on the site to mark it. The Vinaya-mukha objects to the idea of using such an ephemeral body of water as a marker, stating that this last allowance misses the whole point of having a marker in the first place. In such a case, the pile of rock, etc., should have been used as the marker to begin with.

The Commentary also discusses the issue of marking boundaries within a building. In such a case, it says, one should not use a wall as a marker. Stone posts are appropriate (at present, concrete or steel posts would qualify as well). For some reason, it says that in a multi-story building, if the markers are placed in the building on an upper floor, the territory does not go down to the ground unless there is a wall surrounding the lower story(s) and connected to the upper stories. Similarly, if the markers are posts as part of a wall on a lower floor, the territory includes the upper story(s) only if there is a continuous wall from the lower stories to the upper ones. If markers are placed outside the building (e.g., where water falls off the eaves), the whole building is in the territory regardless of how it is walled.

In Thailand, the custom is to use buried stones as markers. Each stone is placed in a hole in the ground, formally recognized as a marker, and then covered with dirt. Another stone marker is then placed on top, to indicate where the real marker is buried. This custom is probably based on the idea that a buried stone is more permanent than a stone aboveground; even when the aboveground marker is removed, the buried stone is likely to stay in place. There is nothing in the Canon, however, to either confirm or refute this practice.

Authorization procedure

The two Vinaya experts that Buddhaghosa cites throughout the Commentary—Mahā Sumana Thera and Mahā Paduma Thera—offer differing opinions on how a territory should be authorized. Their differences center on the fact that in a district—such as a county or town—all parts of the district outside of the authorized territories within it count as a single territory. Thus the question: When authorizing a new territory, in what territory are the bhikkhus meeting as they issue the transaction statement—the new territory itself or the district as a whole (excluding other authorized territories)?

Mahā Sumana Thera holds to the second alternative, and so recommends first asking the other monasteries in the district as to where their formally authorized territories are. The Community authorizing the new territory should make sure there is a buffer zone between the intended territory and the pre-existing ones. It should then choose a time when bhikkhus aren’t wandering and then send an announcement to the neighboring monasteries with formally authorized territories so that the bhikkhus don’t leave their territories at the time the new territory is being authorized. As for the bhikkhus in all the monasteries in the district without formally authorized territories, they should be invited to join in the transaction. If they can’t come, their consent must be conveyed.

Mahā Paduma Thera, however, holds to the opinion that the bhikkhus authorizing the new territory are meeting in the territory they are authorizing. Thus there is no need to invite or get the consent of bhikkhus from other parts of the district. The only bhikkhus who need to be gathered in the transaction are the ones within the boundaries being marked. He goes on to state that not all the bhikkhus within the markers need be present (or have their consent sent) for declaring a territory for common affiliation (why, he doesn’t say), but they do need to be present (or have their consent sent) for declaring a territory for not being absent from one’s robes (see below).

Although in the reported disputes between these two Vinaya experts both sides usually seem reasonable, in this dispute Mahā Sumana Thera seems clearly in the right. It’s hard to see how bhikkhus can be said to be meeting in a territory they have yet to authorize. Although Mahā Sumana Thera’s interpretation creates difficulties, in Thailand these are avoided by having the civil authorities declare an area about to be authorized as a territory a “separated-from-the-village” territory, thus removing it from the village district and eliminating any need to invite or get the consent of the bhikkhus in the surrounding district.

Apart from this disagreement between Mahā Sumana Thera and Mahā Paduma Thera, the Vinaya experts are in general agreement as to how to conduct the formal procedure for authorizing a territory. The first step, the Canon says, is to designate the boundary markers. It gives no instructions as to how to do this, but the Commentary—perhaps reasoning from the pattern for inspecting a building site under Sg 6 & 7, recommends the following: Beginning in the east, a bhikkhu should stand just to the west of the eastern marker, facing the marker, and ask, “Puratthimāya disāya kiṁ nimittaṁ? (What is the marker in the eastern direction?)” Someone—either ordained or not—should say, (if a stone) “Pasāṇo, bhante.” The first bhikkhu responds, “Eso pasāṇo nimittaṁ (This stone is the marker).” The two of them then continue clockwise around the directions—SE, S, SW, W, NW, N, NE—and then return to designate the first marker once more. In this way all markers are connected in a circle. In Thailand, the custom is for three bhikkhus to accompany the bhikkhu designating the boundary markers. All four are to stand just inside the marker, while the person/people identifying the markers (these are usually lay people) stand outside the marker. (See Appendix I for the full procedure.)

If the new territory is to incorporate two sides of a river, the procedure is as follows: The bhikkhus designating the markers should start with the upstream marker on the left bank and then designate the markers going away from the river and back to the downstream marker on the same bank. Then they should designate the marker across the river from the downstream marker, followed by the markers going away from the river and back around to the marker on the right bank across from the original upstream marker. Then they re-designate the original upstream marker. If there is an island in the river, smaller or larger than territories on either banks, they should designate a marker at the lower end of island while crossing the river from one downstream marker to the other, and then designate the marker at the upper end of the island while crossing the river from one upstream marker to the other. Or, if they want to include only part of the island, they should locate markers on both sides of the island, at the desired extremes upstream and downstream, and designate them in the above sequence.

When the boundary markers have been designated, the bhikkhus should all assemble at one spot in the new territory for the transaction statement (see Appendix I). When the transaction statement is done, the Commentary says that the area inside the markers down to “the water holding up the earth” (the water table? the magma?) is the territory. Any landfill later added to the territory or any pool later dug within the territory does not affect the territory’s status.

The Commentary also recommends that when authorizing a territory on a rock slab or ledge, the Community should arrange to have stones placed on the rock for markers. After the transaction statement, lines should be incised in the rock to record the markers’ location in case these later get moved.

Once the territory has been authorized, it may be further authorized as an area where one is not apart from one’s set of three robes (ticīvara-avippavāsa). In other words, if one is inside the area at dawnrise, one is not counted as separate from one’s robes no matter where else in the territory they may be. The reason for this allowance is indicated by the origin story:

Now at that time Ven. Mahā Kassapa, coming from Andhakavinda to Rājagaha for the uposatha, crossing a river on the way, was nearly swept away and his robes got wet. Bhikkhus said to him, “Why, friend, are your robes wet?”

“Just now, friends, as I was coming from Andhakavinda to Rājagaha… I was nearly swept away. That’s why my robes are wet.”

With the new allowance, a bhikkhu in Ven. Mahā Kassapa’s position—traveling to a Community transaction in a distant part of a large territory—would not have to take all his robes with him, and so they would not all get wet. Once this authorization has been made, it covers all parts of the territory except for any villages within it. The Commentary states that if the village is fenced in, everything inside the fence counts as village. If not, its immediate surroundings do—which in all other instances is measured as a distance of two leḍḍupātas from the village’s outermost buildings. An abandoned village does not count as a village. If a village is started or grows after the transaction statement, the new village or the new part of the village is still part of the original ticīvara-avippavāsa. This last comment, though, would defeat the purpose of exempting villages from the allowance in the first place, which was to prevent bhikkhus from leaving their robes in the houses of lay people.

When a new territory has been authorized, the remainder of the pre-existing untied-off territory in which it is contained still counts as an untied-off territory.

Subsidiary territories

One way of avoiding the problems of large territories is to create a subsidiary territory (khaṇḍa-sīmā) within a larger one. The larger one—covering, say, an entire monastery—may be used as a ticīvara-avippavāsa, and the smaller one for Community meetings. As the territories are separate, there is no need—when holding a meeting in the subsidiary territory—to bring the consent of any ill bhikkhus in the larger one.

The Commentary recommends locating the subsidiary territory in a quiet corner of the monastery. The smallest allowable size for such a territory is the same as that for any authorized territory: large enough to hold 21 bhikkhus. When authorizing a subsidiary territory and the larger territory surrounding it, the procedure is to start with the subsidiary territory first. Stand inside the proposed markers for the subsidiary territory and designate them according to the common pattern. Recite the transaction statements for the new territory. Then place the inside markers for the large territory just outside the markers for the subsidiary territory, leaving at least the minimum buffer zone between the two territories. Designate the markers for the large territory—first the inner markers surrounding the subsidiary territory, then the outside markers—while standing in the large territory, then recite the transaction statements, again while standing in the large territory. Alternatively, the Commentary says, designate all the markers while standing in the appropriate locations (inside the subsidiary territory while designating its markers, inside the large territory while designating its). Then, while meeting in the appropriate locations, recite the transaction statements for the subsidiary territory, followed by transactions statements for the larger territory. The buffer zone between the two territories remains part of the untied-off territory from which the two new territories were tied off.

The Commentary adds that if a tree in a subsidiary territory touches a tree in the larger territory, or if a banyan tree in one territory sets down shoots in the other, the two territories are connected and must be treated as one until the connection is broken. The V/Sub-commentary argues that this principle does not apply between an ordinary tied-off territory and the untied-off territory around it. The Vinaya-mukha, as we noted above, argues further that it shouldn’t apply in any case—and rightly so. Plant life bridging a buffer zone does not erase it.

Revoking territories

The Canon states that when an authorized territory is to be revoked, the steps in the proceedings reverse those in the proceedings that authorized the territory to begin with. In other words, the ticīvara-avippavāsa is revoked first, then the territory for common affiliation. The Commentary adds that there are only two valid reasons for revoking a territory: to expand it or to contract it. If a Community doesn’t know where an old territory is, they can’t revoke it, much less establish a new one in its place. A territory becomes a non-territory for only two reasons: a transaction statement revoking it or the disappearance of the Buddha’s teachings.

These last two statements create all sorts of difficulties, as it is entirely possible that a Community once authorized a territory at a particular spot but left no record of its transaction. There would be no way of knowing precisely where it was or what the markers were, so there would be no way of revoking it when authorizing a new territory in its place. If, as the Commentary says, a territory remains such until the disappearance of the Buddha’s teachings and any territory authorized so as to overlap it would be invalid—there being no exemption for doing so unknowingly—no one would know for sure whether a new territory was truly valid or not.

Communities have sidestepped this dilemma by ignoring the Commentary’s assertion that a Community ignorant of an old territory’s location cannot revoke it. The procedure at present is first to revoke any possible pre-existing territory in the area where a new territory is to be authorized before authorizing the new territory. In Thailand, this is done as follows: At least four bhikkhus stand within hatthapāsa of one another while one of their number recites the statements for revoking the ticīvara-avippavāsa and the territory for common affiliation. This revokes any pre-existing territory within their hatthapāsa. They then move to an adjoining segment of the area they want to authorize, repeating the procedure as many times as is necessary to cover the entire area. The transaction statements for this procedure are in Appendix I.

Summary checklist

The Commentary to Pv.XIX.1 and the K/Commentary to the Nidāna give a checklist of eleven factors peculiar to the tying-off of a territory that can invalidate the resulting territory: (1) the territory is too small, (2) the territory is too large, (3) there is a break in the markers, (4) it has shadow-markers (e.g., the shadow of a mountain instead of an actual mountain used as a marker), (5) it is without any markers at all, (6) it is authorized by a Community standing outside the territory, (7) it is in a river, (8) it is in an ocean, (9) it is in a natural lake, (10) it is mixed with another territory, or (11) it submerges another territory. As the Commentary notes, a tied-off territory with any of these features does not count as a tied-off territory and maintains whatever status it had prior to the attempt to tie it off. For instance, if it is located in a village-territory, it is still part of that territory.

Of the items on this list, one actually covers two factors. “A break in the markers” can mean one of two things: (a) The process of tying off the markers is left incomplete—say, it starts with the eastern marker, goes clockwise around the directions to the northern marker, and then stops there, without returning to the eastern marker; or (b) one of the markers does not actually qualify as a valid marker. The Vinaya-mukha objects to the idea that either of these faults would actually invalidate the territory, but as the Canon is silent on this point, and as the Commentary’s position is the stricter of the two, the wise policy would be to follow its judgment here.

Still, there are problems with the Commentary’s list. The factors are given in random order, some of them are redundant (it’s hard to see why “shadow markers” would not fall under “invalid markers”), and some possible faults in a territory are missing: a territory on both sides of a river but without a permanent boat or bridge, a territory with only one or two markers, and a territory whose markers were misidentified when they were designated—e.g., a rock too small to be a mountain called a “mountain,” a canal called a “river.” Thus, to make the list more useful, it seems preferable to expand and rearrange it as thirteen factors under the following three categories:

Invalid as to the actual territory: (1) too small, (2) too large, (3) in a river, (4) in an ocean, (5) in a natural lake, (6) on two sides of a river not connected with a permanent boat or bridge, (7) mixed with a previous tied-off territory, (8) submerging a previous tied-off territory.

Invalid as to the markers: (9) a break in the markers (i.e., the tying-off process is left incomplete), (10) invalid markers, (11) misidentified markers, (12) fewer than three markers.

Invalid as to the authorization: (13) the territory is authorized by an assembly standing outside the markers.

Of course, all the standard “consummations” required for Community transactions in general have to be met as well.

The validity of the territory

When seeking the unity of the Community in a Community transaction, it is important that the territory defining the Community be valid. Given the way tied-off and untied-off territories are defined, there is hardly a spot on Earth that is not already part of a valid territory or could not be made so by meeting there. The only problem lies in identifying the territory’s extent. If a Community meets in an improperly authorized tied-off territory, the actual territory of the meeting is the larger untied-off territory from which the tied-off territory was supposedly set off. In this case, if the bhikkhus in the meeting get the consent of all the non-attending bhikkhus in the tied-off territory while there are other bhikkhus in other parts of the untied-off territory who have not sent their consent, any transaction carried out in the meeting is invalid as to territory. But if they get the consent of all non-attending bhikkhus in the original untied-off territory, this factor is valid. Thus it is important, when authorizing a tied-off territory, that the procedures be followed to the letter and that adequate records be kept of the transaction so that bhikkhus in later generations can be confident of how far the territory of their meeting extends.

Rules

Abaddha-sīmā

“When a territory has not been authorized, not set aside (§), the village-territory or town-territory of the village or town on which one depends is (the territory for) common affiliation and a single uposatha there. In a non-village, in a wilderness, seven abbhantaras all around is the (territory for) common affiliation and a single uposatha there. All rivers are non-territories. All oceans are non-territories. All natural lakes are non-territories. In a river, ocean, or natural lake, (the area) a man of average size can splash water all around is the (territory for) common affiliation and a single uposatha there.”—Mv.II.12.7

Baddha-sīmā

“I allow that a territory be authorized.”—Mv.II.6.1

Procedure and transaction statement—Mv.II.6.1-2

“An excessively large territory—of four, five, or six yojanas—should not be authorized. Whoever should authorize one: an offense of wrong doing. I allow that a territory be authorized for three yojanas at most.”—Mv.II.7.1

“A territory should not be mixed with (another) territory. Whoever should do so: an offense of wrong doing.”—Mv.II.13.1

“A territory should not submerge (another) territory. Whoever should do so: an offense of wrong doing. I allow, when a territory is being authorized, that it be authorized having set aside a buffer zone.”—Mv.II.13.2

“A territory including the far side of a river should not be authorized. Whoever should authorize one: an offense of wrong doing. I allow that a territory including the far side of a river be authorized if it has a permanent boat or permanent bridge.”—Mv.II.7.2

“Wherever a territory is authorized by the Community for a common affiliation, for a single uposatha, let the Community authorize it as an area where one is not apart from one’s set of three robes.”—Mv.II.12.1

Transaction statement—Mv.II.12.2

“Wherever a territory is authorized by the Community for a common affiliation, for a single uposatha, let the Community authorize it —except for any village or village area—as an area where one is not apart from one’s set of three robes.”—Mv.II.12.3

Revised transaction statement—Mv.II.12.4

Revoking territories: transaction statements—Mv.II.12.5-6

CHAPTER FOURTEEN

Ordination

Like so many other aspects of the Vinaya, the procedures for ordination—the patterns to be followed in accepting applicants into the Community—were not determined all at once, but grew in response to events over time. There were three main stages in their development. In the first stage, during the very early years of the Buddha’s career, when an applicant asked to join the Community the Buddha would simply say, Ehi bhikkhu… (Come, bhikkhu.) That constituted the applicant’s acceptance into the Community. As the Community grew, the Buddha sent his bhikkhu disciples their separate ways to spread the teaching. When they inspired in others a desire to join the Community, they had to bring the applicants back to the Buddha for him to accept. Seeing the difficulties this entailed—roads were poor; the bhikkhus and their applicants had to travel great distances on foot—the Buddha allowed individual disciples to accept applicants on their own, using the formula of going for the Triple Refuge. This was the second stage. In the third stage, when the Buddha saw that the Community required a more formal organization, he rescinded the going for the Triple Refuge as a means of acceptance and replaced it with a formal Community transaction, using a motion and three proclamations.

Even then, however, the rules and procedures governing ordination continued to develop in response to events recorded in the Canon. And after the closing of the Canon, traditions continued to build up around the act of ordination, so that different sects within the Theravāda school have differing customs surrounding the basic core of instructions included in the Canon and explained in the commentaries. In this chapter, we will focus on the common core: the aspects of the ordination procedure that are absolutely necessary for it to be a valid Community transaction. After a few general remarks, our discussion will start with the validity of the object, i.e., the applicant for ordination, followed by the validity of the assembly and the validity of the transaction statements. Anyone interested in learning the complete patterns for ordination as currently practiced in the various Theravādin sects should consult the ordination guides issued by those sects.

Going-forth & Acceptance

Ordination falls into two parts: Going-forth (pabbajjā) and Acceptance (upasampadā). The first has traditionally been treated as a prerequisite for the second, but nothing in the Canon indicates that it need be so. The transaction for Acceptance was first formulated when there was no ceremony for Going-forth; and even after the Going-forth ceremony was instituted, no directives required that it form a prelude for Acceptance. However, the pattern of giving the Going-forth prior to Acceptance is ancient—the standard short description of a full ordination in Mv.I is, “x obtained the Going-forth; he obtained Acceptance”—so that is the pattern discussed here.

In the Going-forth, one leaves the home life for the homeless life, becoming a novice (sāmaṇera). After one’s head is shaved, one dons the ochre robes, takes refuge in the Triple Gem, and undertakes the ten precepts. In the Acceptance, one becomes a full-fledged bhikkhu, with full rights to live in common affiliation with the Bhikkhu Saṅgha. The Going-forth is not a Community transaction, whereas Acceptance is.

The validity of the object

An applicant for ordination must be a male who meets the age requirements, and he must not have any characteristics that would disqualify him from ordination.

Age requirements

An applicant for the Going-forth must be at least fifteen years old or, if not yet fifteen, “capable of chasing crows away.” According to the Commentary, this means that, while holding a clod of earth in one hand, he can chase crows away from food placed in front of him while he is eating it with his other hand.

An applicant for full Acceptance must be at least twenty years old, counting from the time his consciousness first arose at conception in his mother’s womb. As this is difficult—if not impossible—to date with any accuracy, the usual practice in calculating a person’s age is to add six months to the number of years since his birth, to allow for his having been born prematurely. As the Commentary notes, a baby born after seven months in the womb may survive, but one born after only six months won’t. Pc 65 states that if an applicant less than twenty years old receives full Acceptance, he does not count as a bhikkhu; the Commentary says that he remains a novice. Any bhikkhu who acts as his preceptor, knowing that he is too young to be accepted, incurs a pācittiya; any other bhikkhus in the assembly performing the ordination who also know the applicant’s age incur a dukkaṭa.

Disqualifications

The factors that would disqualify an applicant from receiving ordination are of three sorts:

those absolutely disqualifying him for life—even if he receives ordination, he does not count as properly ordained;

those marking him as an undesirable member of the Community—if he happens to be ordained, he counts as ordained, but the bhikkhus participating in the ordination incur a dukkaṭa; and

those indicating that he is formally unprepared for full Acceptance (for instance, he lacks robes and an alms-bowl or does not have a valid preceptor)—the Canon does not state whether these factors absolutely invalidate the applicant’s Acceptance, but the Commentary puts them in the same class as the undesirables, above.

Absolutely disqualified

A person may be absolutely disqualified if he:

1) has an abnormal gender;

2) has committed any of the five deeds leading to immediate retribution in hell (ānantariya/ānantarika-kamma);

3) has seriously wronged the Dhamma-Vinaya; or

4) is an animal.

The Canon states that such people may not receive full Acceptance. The Commentary adds (with one exception, noted below) that they may not receive the Going-forth. Even if they receive ordination, they do not count as ordained. Once the truth about them is discovered, they must immediately be expelled.

1) The prohibition for abnormal gender covers paṇḍakas and hermaphrodites. According to the Commentary, there are five kinds of paṇḍakas, two of whom do not come under this prohibition: voyeurs and those whose sexual fever is allayed by performing fellatio. The three who do come under this prohibition are: castrated men (eunuchs), those born neuter, and half-time paṇḍakas (those with the sexual desires of a paṇḍaka during the dark fortnight, and none during the bright fortnight (?)). In the origin story for this prohibition, a paṇḍaka who had received Acceptance unsuccessfully propositioned some bhikkhus and novices, then succeeded in propositioning some horse- and elephant-trainers, who spread it about, “These Sakyan-son monks are paṇḍakas. And those among them who are not paṇḍakas molest paṇḍakas.”

2) The five deeds of immediate retribution are:

a) killing one’s mother (matricide),

b) killing one’s father (patricide),

c) killing an arahant,

d) maliciously injuring the Tathāgata to the point of drawing blood, and

e) successfully creating a schism in the Community.

(a & b) The prohibition against ordaining a matricide or patricide, the Commentary says, applies only to a person who has intentionally killed his human birth mother or father. Limiting the prohibition to one’s birth parents is understandable, but—assuming that human/non-human matches are possible—it is hard to understand why the prohibition would not include murdering a non-human parent. The Commentary states further that the prohibition does not apply if the applicant’s act of killing his mother or father was unintentional, but that it does apply regardless of whether the act was done knowingly. In other words, it applies even to an applicant who—like Oedipus—has intentionally killed a person not knowing that the person is his true mother or father.

(c) Likewise, the prohibition against one who has killed an arahant does not apply to unintentional acts of homicide, but does apply regardless of whether the applicant knew at that time that his victim was an arahant.

(d) The prohibition against one who has caused the Tathāgata to shed blood applies only to those who wound the Tathāgata with hurtful intentions. It does not apply to doctors performing surgery.

(e) The prohibition against a schismatic applies to one who, knowing or suspecting that his position is contrary to the Dhamma-Vinaya, has succeeded in creating a schism. This applies both to the initiator and to any of his followers. As mentioned under Sg 10, if a bhikkhu instigates or joins a schismatic faction not knowing that its position is contrary to the true Dhamma and Vinaya, he is not excluded from the Community. If, prior to a full resolution of the schism, he leaves the faction and returns to the correct side, he need only confess a thullaccaya and he is a member of the Community in full standing, as before (see Chapter 21). If it so happened that he disrobed before confessing the thullaccaya, he should still be allowed to reordain if he so desires.

3) The prohibition for having seriously wronged the Dhamma-Vinaya covers any person who has:

a) committed a pārājika while previously a bhikkhu (Pr.I.7);

b) taken affiliation by theft;

c) gone over to another religion while still a bhikkhu; or

d) molested a bhikkhunī.

(a) The Commentary to Pr 1 states that, although a person who committed a pārājika while previously a bhikkhu may not rightly receive full Acceptance again in this lifetime, this is the one case among these absolute disqualifications where the disqualification does not extend to the Going-forth. The Vinaya-mukha, however, dismisses the idea of giving the Going-forth to such a person as unwise. The Commentary itself, in its summary of the pārājika rules, classifies the other members of the list of absolute disqualifications as “equivalent pārājikas,” and it seems inconsistent to give more rights to actual pārājikas than to equivalent ones. Moreover, the Vinaya-mukha would appear to have the Canon on its side here. In the origin story leading up to the final formulation of Pr 1, some ex-bhikkhus who had committed pārājikas come to Ven. Ānanda and request the Going-forth, request full Acceptance, but the Buddha refuses to give them either. Although his remarks leading up to the final formulation of the rule explicitly mention only the fact that the ex-bhikkhus in question cannot receive full Acceptance, his actions indicate that they should be denied the Going-forth as well.

(b) The Commentary contains a long discussion on the question of what it means to take affiliation by theft. It distinguishes three kinds of theft: theft of status (putting on robes without the authorization of the Community), theft of affiliation (claiming rights of novicehood or bhikkhuhood, such as seniority, participating in Community transactions, etc.), and theft of both. The above prohibition applies to all three but not to cases where a person dresses as a bhikkhu or novice to escape danger from kings, famine, wasteland travel, disease, or hostile enemies. This allowance applies as long as he doesn’t claim rights of affiliation with the bhikkhus and has pure intent (which the Sub-commentary defines as no intention of deceiving the bhikkhus). The case of an actor who wears robes while playing the part of a bhikkhu in a movie or play would probably come under this allowance as well, as would the case—mentioned elsewhere in the Commentary—of a candidate for the Going-forth who arrives at the Community meeting already wearing the robes he plans to wear after ordained (see below). The Commentary to Pc 65 recommends that when a bhikkhu who assumes that he is properly ordained but later discovers that his ordination was invalid, he should reordain as quickly as possible. This shows that such a bhikkhu is also not guilty of theft of status or of affiliation.

However, a lay person who dresses as a bhikkhu to go for alms would come under the category of “theft of status”; the Commentary explicitly states that a novice who claims to be a bhikkhu so as to gain a bhikkhu’s privileges would come under “theft of affiliation.” When a lay person intends to attempt a theft of affiliation, the theft is committed when he assumes the status of a bhikkhu even if he has not yet deceived bhikkhus into allowing him to join in their Community.

Buddhaghosa maintains that this category does not apply to a bhikkhu who has committed a pārājika and still claims the status and rights of a bhikkhu. He quotes the Andhaka as holding the opposing opinion on this matter, but does not say why he disagrees. One possible reason for disagreement might be that the Canon often lists a bhikkhu who has committed a pārājika as a category separate from that of one who has committed theft of affiliation.

There is a peculiar passage in the Commentary in which this category is said to apply to a bhikkhu, novice, or bhikkhunī who, thinking of disrobing, tries on lay clothing (either white clothing or monastic robes worn in the style of lay clothing) beforehand to see how they will look. If he/she decides that they look good, then from that moment on he/she is in affiliation through theft. This seems baseless, for the simple act of wearing lay clothing is only a dukkaṭa (Cv.V.29.4), and the factors for disrobing are not complete.

(c) A bhikkhu going over to another religion is one who—while still a bhikkhu—takes on that religion’s mode of dress or, in the case of naked ascetics, goes naked and adopts with approval any of their modes of practice. At present, it could be argued that the Mahāyāna and Vajrayāna, with their separate canons and modes of practice at odds with the Pali Canon, are different enough from the Theravāda to count as separate religions under this prohibition, but this is a controversial point.

If one’s robes are stolen or one needs to escape danger from kings, etc., one may take on the costume of other religions without falling into this category. If one disrobes, becomes a member of another religion, and then changes one’s mind and wishes to be reordained as a bhikkhu, one would be allowed to do so after undergoing the probation period mentioned below.

According to the Commentary, a person who has gone over to another religion while only a novice is not included in this category.

(d) A molester of a bhikkhunī is one who has sexual intercourse with her. The Commentary says that even if one first forces her to put on lay clothing and then has sex with her against her will, it counts as molesting a bhikkhunī. If, however, she willingly disrobes and has sex, it doesn’t.

4) The prohibition against ordaining an animal comes from one of the more poignant origin stories in the Canon:

Now at that time a certain nāga was horrified, humiliated, and disgusted with the nāga-birth. Then the thought occurred to him: “Now, by what strategy might I be freed from the nāga-birth and quickly regain the human state?” Then he thought, “These Sakyan-son monks practice the Dhamma, practice in tune (sama), practice the holy life, speak the truth, are virtuous and fine-natured. If I went forth among the Sakyan-son monks I would be freed from the nāga-birth and quickly regain the human state.”

So, in the form of a brahman youth, he went to the bhikkhus and requested the Going-forth. The bhikkhus gave him the Going-forth; they gave him full Acceptance.

Now at that time the nāga lived together with a certain bhikkhu in a dwelling on the perimeter of the (monastery) territory. Then the bhikkhu, getting up in the last watch of the night, walked back and forth in the open air. The nāga, when the bhikkhu had left, fell asleep with his guard down. The entire dwelling was filled with snake; coils were coming out through the windows. Then the bhikkhu, (thinking,) “I’ll enter the dwelling,” opened the door. He saw the entire dwelling filled with snake; coils were coming out through the windows. On seeing this, frightened, he let out a shriek. Bhikkhus, running up, said to him, “Why, friend, did you let out a shriek?”

“This entire dwelling, friends, is filled with snake; coils are coming out through the windows.” Then the nāga, having awakened at the noise, sat in his own seat. The bhikkhus said, “Who are you, friend?”

“I am a nāga, venerable sirs.”

“But why did you act in this way?”

Then the nāga told the matter to the bhikkhus. The bhikkhus told the matter to the Blessed One. Then the Blessed One, with regard to this cause, to this incident, had the Community of bhikkhus convened and addressed the nāga: “You nāgas are not liable to growth in this Dhamma and discipline. Go, nāga. Observe the uposatha on the fourteenth, fifteenth, and eighth of the fortnight. Thus you will be freed from the nāga-birth and quickly regain the human state.”

The nāga, (thinking,) “It’s said that I’m not liable to growth in this Dhamma and discipline!” sad and unhappy, shedding tears, let out a shriek and left.

Then the Blessed One addressed the bhikkhus, “Bhikkhus, there are two conditions for a male nāga’s reverting to his own state: when he engages in intercourse with a female of his own species, and when he falls asleep with his guard down. These are the two conditions for a male nāga’s reverting to his own state.”—Mv.I.63

The Commentary states that the term animal covers all types of non-human beings, “even Sakka, the king of the devas.” However, its statements under the topic of matricides and patricides, quoted above, show that—in its view of mixed unions—the offspring of a human/non-human union would either be human or non-human. In the first case he would qualify for ordination; in the second case, not.

Undesirable

Applicants falling into the following categories should not be given the Going-forth. As the Going-forth is the customary first step in full Acceptance, this means that they should not receive full Acceptance, either. Any bhikkhu who gives any of these applicants the Going-forth incurs a dukkaṭa. However, the applicant does count as having properly gone forth; if fully accepted he is properly accepted and need not be expelled.

1) Those with obligations. This general category includes the following:

(a) A son whose parents have not given their permission. According to the Commentary, this requirement includes foster parents as well as birth parents. There is no need to get a parent’s permission if he/she is no longer alive or has abandoned the son. From this it can be argued that if the parents are divorced and one of them has totally abandoned responsibility for the son, there is no need to get permission from that parent. If, however, both parents continued to assume responsibility for the son, he needs to get the permission of both.

The Commentary adds that if the parents are dead, and relatives have come to depend on the applicant, it’s a wise policy to inform the relatives before giving him the Going-forth so as to prevent disagreement, but there is no offense in not doing so. If an applicant ordains with his parents’ permission, later disrobes, and then wants to reordain, he must receive his parents’ permission again. If an applicant without his parents’ permission threatens suicide or other disturbances if not given the Going-forth, the Commentary recommends giving him the Going-forth and then explaining the situation to the parents, advising them to talk to him. If an applicant—even if he is an only child—is far from home and asks for the Going-forth, it’s allowable to give him the Going-forth and then to send him, with a number of bhikkhus, to inform the parents.

(b) A person in the king’s (government) service. The Commentary states that a person in government service may go forth if he gets official permission to ordain. If he is working for the government on an unfinished contract, he may go forth if he finds someone else to take over his duties, if he returns to the government any payment he received from them, or if he finishes the job he was paid to do. This prohibition would thus cover candidates who have deserted military service or any other government service for which they are being paid. The Commentary to Mv.I.42.2 indicates that a person who is being punished not for a crime but simply for not providing corvée labor would be eligible to ordain. This allowance would thus apply to any person fleeing any government service for which he is not being paid. However, it is wise to remember that not all government officials would view his ordination with equanimity, and to keep in mind the punishments contemplated by King Bimbisāra’s chief ministers (§) in the origin story to this prohibition: “Sire, the preceptor’s head should be cut off, the announcing teacher’s tongue pulled out, and half the ribs of the group broken.”

(c) A debtor. Here the Commentary says that debtor includes one who has inherited debts from his parents or grandparents, as well as one who has incurred debts on his own. If others agree to take on the debts or take over their payment, he may go forth. If Bhikkhu X gives the Going-forth to Y, not knowing that Y has debts but later learning the truth, he should take Y to his creditors if he can get hold of him. If he can’t, he is not responsible for the debts. If he feels so inspired, he may undertake to pay off Y’s debts if he feels that Y is serious about the practice. But he may not give the Going-forth to Y, knowing of Y’s debts beforehand, with the intention of paying them off himself. If he does, he incurs a dukkaṭa.

(d) A slave. According to the Commentary, if the slave is freed from slavery in line with the country’s customs and law, he may go forth. The commentaries differ as to whether a child of a slave counts as a slave under this rule. The Commentary says Yes; the Sub-commentary (quoting the Three Gaṇṭhīpadas), No. Whether these differing opinions are a reflection of the authors’ own feelings on the subject or of the laws current when they wrote their texts, no one knows. The Commentary, however, tells a touching story of a bhikkhu who learns, after his Acceptance, that his mother was an escaped slave from Anurādhapura. He goes to his mother’s owners and asks their permission to stay as a bhikkhu (even though he doesn’t need to—he is already a bhikkhu and may remain so, regardless of what they say). At any rate, they give their permission, provide him with support, and he eventually becomes an arahant.

2) Those with serious, disfiguring, or communicable diseases. The Canon separates this category into three types:

(a) A person afflicted with leprosy, boils, eczema, tuberculosis, or epilepsy. Some have questioned whether this prohibition is compassionate to the diseased, but the origin story behind the rule shows that it was formulated out of compassion for the bhikkhus and lay supporters who would be burdened with the diseased person’s care.

Now at that time five diseases were widespread among the Magadhans: leprosy, boils, eczema, tuberculosis, and epilepsy. People afflicted with the five diseases went to (the doctor) Jīvaka Komārabhacca and said, “It would be good, teacher, if you would treat us.”

“Masters, I have many duties. I am very busy. I have to tend to King Bimbisāra of Magadha, as well as his harem and the Community of bhikkhus headed by the Buddha. I cannot treat you.”

“All our wealth will be yours, teacher, and we will be your slaves. It would be good, teacher, if you would treat us.”

“Masters, I have many duties. I am very busy. I have to tend to King Bimbisāra of Magadha, as well as his harem and the Community of bhikkhus headed by the Buddha. I cannot treat you.”

Then it occurred to these people, “These Sakyan-son monks are of pleasant virtue and conduct. Having eaten fine meals, they lie down in beds sheltered from the wind (see Pc 65). What if we were to go forth among the Sakyan-son monks? There the bhikkhus would tend to us and Jīvaka Komārabhacca would treat us.” So, going to the bhikkhus, they requested the Going-forth. The bhikkhus gave them the Going-forth, they gave them the full Acceptance. The bhikkhus tended to them and Jīvaka Komārabhacca treated them. Now at that time the bhikkhus—tending to many sick bhikkhus—were continually begging, continually hinting, “Give a meal for the sick. Give a meal for those tending to the sick. Give medicine for the sick.” Jīvaka Komārabhacca—tending to many sick bhikkhus—neglected one of his duties to the king.

Then a certain man afflicted with the five diseases went to Jīvaka Komārabhacca… (as above). Then it occurred to him, “… What if I were to go forth among the Sakyan-son monks? There the bhikkhus would tend to me and Jīvaka Komārabhacca would treat me. When I am well I will disrobe.” So, going to the bhikkhus, he requested the Going-forth. The bhikkhus gave him the Going-forth; they gave him the full Acceptance. The bhikkhus tended to him and Jīvaka Komārabhacca treated him. When he was well he disrobed.

Then Jīvaka Komārabhacca saw the man disrobed. On seeing him, he addressed him, “Master, weren’t you gone forth among the bhikkhus?”

“Yes, teacher.”

“But why did you act in this way?”

Then the man told the matter to Jīvaka Komārabhacca. Jīvaka Komārabhacca criticized and complained and spread it about, “How can the revered ones give the Going-forth to a person afflicted with the five diseases?”

—Mv.I.39.1-6

Four of these diseases are explained in the commentaries. Leprosy includes scabies, yaws, and psoriasis as well. Apparently, any other disease that causes ulcerating lesions on the skin would also come under this heading. If the disease occurs in small patches the size of the back of a nail in areas covered when fully robed and is in a condition that won’t spread further, the applicant may go forth. If the patches are visible on the face or the backs of hands, then even if they are small and won’t spread, he shouldn’t go forth. If he has been treated so that the patches disappear completely, he may. The Sub-commentary adds here that the “back of the nail” means the back of the nail of the small finger or toe; if the patches are small and in a covered area but still spreading, the applicant should not go forth.

Boils, according to the Commentary, also covers skin excrescencies looking like fingers or cow nipples. If the boils are not spreading, no larger than jujube pits (the same size as olive pits), and in an area covered when fully robed, the applicant may go forth; if they are in an uncovered area, he shouldn’t. Acne and warts don’t count as boils under this rule.

Eczema covers a wide variety of skin diseases, differing from those included under “leprosy” in that they are not debilitating and do not ulcerate or ooze. Thus ringworm and athlete’s foot would come under this category. As under the preceding category, small, non-spreading infestations in an area covered when fully robed would be allowable.

Epilepsy includes both grand and petit mal, as well as cases of seizures caused by hostile spirit possession (!).

(b) A person with goiter. This was apparently incurable at the time. At present, if such a person is cured, he may go forth.

(c) A person afflicted with an “evil” disease. This, the Commentary says, includes such things as hemorrhoids, fistulas, upsets of bile or phlegm, cough, asthma, or any disease that is “chronically afflicting (reading niccātura with the Thai edition of the Commentary), exceedingly painful, disgusting, and disagreeable.” AIDS and cancer would come under here.

3) Disturbers of the peace. This category includes three types:

(a) A criminal “wrapped in a flag.” This, the Commentary says, means a notorious criminal. None of the texts mention this point, but this prohibition would seem to hold regardless of whether the person has served time for his crimes. The Commentary does note, however, that if he later becomes well-known for having mended his ways he may be given the Going-forth. If he is the king’s son, and it pleases the king that he go forth, he may. Minor criminals who have not been caught and have abandoned their criminal activity are not prohibited under this rule. This prohibition was inspired by the public reaction to Ven. Aṅgulimāla’s ordination (see MN 86). This is one of several instances in the Canon where the Buddha acted in ways that he forbade to his disciples, on the grounds that he could foretell the consequences of his actions but couldn’t trust his disciples—even the arahants—to have the same degree of foresight.

(b) A suspect or criminal for whom a warrant has been sent out. At present this would also include people on probation or parole.

(c) A criminal who has broken his shackles, i.e., escaped from prison or other internment. The Commentary notes that if the escapee is not a criminal but has simply been confined by the authorities to force him to comply to their wishes, he may receive the Going-forth. If he has been falsely accused and escapes, he should not go forth in that country, but may do so elsewhere. It is interesting to compare this judgment with the Commentary’s recommendations concerning children of slaves. Here the Commentary is willing to defy unjust applications of civil law, but it never challenges civil law itself, no matter how unjust.

4) Those marked with severe punishments. The Canon mentions two sorts of applicants here:

(a) A person who has been whipped or caned as a punishment. The Commentary extends this prohibition to other forms of beating as well—such as being hit with the elbows, the knees, coconuts, or rocks. The applicant may be given the Going-forth after the wounds have healed and bruises have subsided.

(b) A person who has been branded or tattooed as a punishment. Again, the applicant may be ordained after the wounds have healed as long as they don’t show when he is fully robed with his right shoulder open. The texts mention tattooing only in the context of punishment, so it would seem reasonable to assume that applicants who have voluntarily had themselves tattooed are not prohibited. Still, if tattoos visible when fully robed contain words or designs that are blatantly contrary to a bhikkhu’s ideals, it would be wise to have them removed.

5) Those who are physically handicapped, feeble, or deformed. The following list is from the Canon, with passages from the Commentary in brackets: an applicant with a hand cut off [C: at least from the palm]… a foot cut off [C: at least from the ball of the foot].. a hand and foot cut off… an ear cut off… a nose cut off… an ear and nose cut off [C: in the case of ears and nose, if the cut-off part can be reconnected, the applicant may go forth]… a finger or toe cut off [C: so that nothing of the nail appears]… a thumb or big toe cut off .. a cut tendon… one who has webbed fingers [C: if the fingers are separated by surgery, or if a sixth finger is removed, the applicant may go forth]… a bent-over person [C: bent-over forward (a hunchback), bent-over back (a swayback), bent-over to either side; a slight crookedness is to be expected in all candidates, as only a Buddha is perfectly straight]… a dwarf… one with a club foot (or elephantiasis) [C: if the foot is operated on so as to become a normal foot, he may go forth]… one who disgraces the assembly [C: through some deformity; (the list here is very long and includes many seemingly harmless characteristics, such as connected eyebrows, a lack of a beard or moustache, etc. This is one area where the Commentary seems to have gone overboard)]… one who is blind in one eye… one who has a crooked limb [C: limb = at least a hand, foot, or finger]… one who is lame… one half-paralyzed [C: paralyzed in one hand, one foot, or down one side]… a cripple [C: one who needs a crutch or stool to move along]… one feeble from old age… one who is blind… dumb [C: unable to speak or with such a bad stutter that he cannot pronounce the Three Refuges clearly]… deaf… blind and dumb… blind and deaf… deaf and dumb… blind and deaf and dumb.

Again, some people have questioned the compassion behind these prohibitions, but the point of the prohibitions is to keep the bhikkhus from being burdened with looking after those who are a burden or an embarrassment to their families. There is at least one case in the Canon of a dwarf who ordained and became an arahant (Ud.VII.1-2), but apparently he, like Aṅgulimāla, was accepted into the Community by the Buddha himself. If it so happens that a bhikkhu develops any of these handicaps after his ordination—e.g., he goes blind or loses a limb—he need not disrobe, and his fellow bhikkhus are duty-bound to care for him (see Chapter 5).

Formally unprepared

The Canon says that the following applicants should not be given full Acceptance. As the Vinaya-mukha points out, they should not receive the Going-forth, either. Although the Canon does not say whether—if they happen to receive Acceptance—their Acceptance stands, the Commentary affirms that it does. Because the disqualifications are formal and easy to correct, there should be no reason to overlook them. Anyone who participates in giving Acceptance to such an applicant incurs a dukkaṭa.

A person without an alms bowl or a full set of robes.

A person with a borrowed alms bowl or a borrowed set of robes.

A person without a proper preceptor. The preceptor must be an individual (a Community or a group may not fill this role) who is a true bhikkhu. His other qualifications are given in Volume One, Chapter 2.

Special cases

Previous suspension

If an applicant was previously ordained, the Community should check to see if, during his previous time as a bhikkhu, he was suspended for not seeing an offense, for not making amends for an offense, or for not relinquishing an evil view. If he was, then Mv.I.79.2 says he is to be treated as follows (taking suspension for not seeing an offense as an example):

Upon asking for Acceptance he is to be told, ‘Will you see this offense?’ If he says Yes, he may be given the Going-forth. If he says No, he is not to be given the Going-forth. Having gone forth, he is to be asked, ‘Will you see this offense?’ If he says Yes, he may be accepted. If No, he is not to be accepted. Having been accepted, he is to be asked, ‘Will you see this offense?’ If he says Yes, he may be restored. If No, he is not to be restored. Having been restored, he is to be asked, ‘Do you see this offense?’ If he says Yes, well and good. If No, then if unity can be obtained, he is to be suspended again. If unity cannot be obtained, there is no offense in communing or affiliating with him (see Pc 69).

Probation

Another special case is that of an applicant who has previously been ordained in another religion. Mv.I.38.1 states that he must first be granted four months’ probation. The Commentary maintains that this probation applies only to naked ascetics, but the Canon itself makes an exception only for those whose previous religion teaches a doctrine of kamma; therefore, the probation should apply to any religion that would deny the doctrine of kamma (saying, for instance, that one’s experiences are totally predetermined by a creator deity or an impersonal force) or would teach special dispensations from kamma (such as Buddhist religions that teach ritual ways to counteract the results of kamma).

The probation is granted as follows: The applicant takes the Going-forth (see below) and then three times requests probation. The Community, if it sees fit, may grant him probation using a motion and one proclamation. The request and transaction statement are given in Appendix II.

If, while on probation, the applicant behaves in any of the ways listed below, he fails in his probation and is not to be accepted. The Commentary adds that, if he still desires Acceptance, his probation automatically starts again at that point for another four months “even if he fails while in the ordination hall, even if he attains the eight attainments.” It adds, however, that if he attains stream-entry, he should be allowed to ordain on that very day. Given, however, that modern meditation traditions cannot agree on what constitutes stream-entry, such a claim would always be controversial, and so the wise policy would be to let the applicant complete his probation. If he has really attained stream-entry, he shouldn’t mind.

An applicant fails in his probation if:

1) He enters the village too early, returns too late in the day. According to the Commentary too early means while the bhikkhus are performing their morning duties; too late means that he stays to eat in the village, discussing worldly affairs with villagers; he doesn’t perform his duties for his mentor on his return; he just goes back to his dwelling and sleeps.

2) He associates with a prostitute, with a widowed or divorced woman, with a “fat princess” (a male transvestite? old maid?—see Chapter 11), with a paṇḍaka, or with a bhikkhunī (see Appendix V). According to the Sub-commentary, associates means treating as a friend or intimate. The Commentary adds that it is all right for him to visit these people as long as he goes with bhikkhus on bhikkhu business.

3) He is not adept at the major and minor affairs involving his fellows in the holy life, is not dexterous, not diligent, not quick-witted in the techniques involved in them, is not willing to do them or to get others to do them. The Commentary says that major affairs means such things as repair of the cetiya and other buildings for which bhikkhus are called together for work; minor affairs means the Khandhaka protocols (see Chapter 9); not diligent means, for example, knowing that there’s work to be done, he goes into town early for alms, returns to his room to sleep until late in the day; not willing to do them means making excuses based on illness or “just showing his head”—i.e., showing up briefly at the work site without actually doing any work.

4) He does not have a keen desire for recitation, interrogation (asking questions about the meaning of the Dhamma—see AN 8:2), heightened virtue, heightened mind, or heightened discernment. According to the Commentary, heightened virtue means the Pāṭimokkha; heightened mind, worldly concentration; heightened discernment, the transcendent paths.

5) He feels angered, displeased, and upset if dispraise is spoken of the teacher, the view, the persuasion, the preferences, the belief of the religion from which he has come over. He feels gratified, pleased, and elated if dispraise is spoken of the Buddha, Dhamma, or Saṅgha.

If, after four months, the applicant has not “failed” in any of these ways, he may be given full Acceptance. None of the texts discuss the case where he does fail and yet is given the full Acceptance. Apparently, the Acceptance would still be valid, and yet the bhikkhus giving it would each incur a dukkaṭa.

The validity of the assembly

The quorum for full Acceptance in the middle Ganges valley is ten bhikkhus. In the outlying districts (this covers the entire world outside the middle Ganges valley), the quorum is five as long as one of the five is a Vinaya-expert. Here the Commentary defines Vinaya-expert as one competent to recite the transaction statement, but this seems overly lenient. As the Commentary itself notes when explaining Mv.I.28.3, the presence of a “competent, experienced” bhikkhu capable of reciting the transaction statement is assumed in all Community transactions. Thus there would seem to be no reason to mention it here as a special requirement. A more likely definition for Vinaya-expert in this context would be a bhikkhu well-versed in the Pāṭimokkha and knowledgeable about the rules and procedures related to Going-forth and Acceptance.

Mv.V.13.12 defines the precise borders of the middle Ganges valley: Mahāsālā on the east, the Sallavatī River on the south-east, the town of Setakaṇṇika on the south, the village of Thūna on the west, and the mountain slope of Usīraddhaja on the north. Unfortunately the identity of these place names at present is largely conjectural. Notes to BD identify Thūna with Sthānesvara, and Usīraddhaja with Usiragiri, a mountain to the north of Kaṇkhal. For the others, see B. C. Law, Geography of Early Buddhism.

The validity of the transaction statement

Ordination, as set forth in the Canon, is a complex procedure involving not only a series of transaction statements but also several preliminary and subsequent steps. As mentioned above, the commentaries and the various national traditions have added steps of their own, but here we will focus on the steps required by the Canon, together with relevant explanations from the commentaries. The transaction statements and other standard passages for recitation are given in Appendix II.

Preliminary steps

Prior to ordination, an applicant must have his head shaved and be clothed in the ochre robes. Then he receives the Going-forth, after which he takes dependence on a preceptor. His robes and bowl are pointed out to him, and he is then sent outside the assembly, where an experienced, competent bhikkhu instructs him about the thirteen obstructing factors to Acceptance. The instructing bhikkhu returns to the assembly and then the applicant is called back into the assembly, where he requests Acceptance. He is then quizzed in the assembly about the obstructing factors, and when his answers are satisfactory he may be given the full Acceptance.

Some of these steps require further explanation.

Shaving the head

If the applicant comes with his hair longer than two fingerbreadths, the Community must be informed of the shaving of his head through a formal announcement. The reason for this is suggested by the origin story to the rule:

Now at that time a certain fledgling (§) metal smith, having quarreled with his parents, went to the monastery and went forth among the bhikkhus. Then his parents, searching for him, went to the monastery and asked the bhikkhus, “Have you seen a youth who looks like this?” The bhikkhus, actually not having known him (when he fit the parents’ description), said, “We don’t know him.” Actually not having seen him, they said, “We haven’t seen him.” Then the parents, searching for the fledgling metal smith and seeing him gone forth among the bhikkhus, criticized and complained and spread it about, “They’re shameless, these Sakyan-son monks. Unvirtuous. Liars. Actually having known, they say, ‘We don’t know him.’ Actually having seen, they say, ‘We haven’t seen him.’ This youth has gone forth among the bhikkhus.”—Mv.I.48

For this announcement, the Commentary recommends gathering all the bhikkhus in the territory and announcing, “I am informing the Community of this child’s head shaving,” or “This child wants to go forth.” Alternatively, it suggests sending word out to all the bhikkhus in the monastery. Even if some are missed because they are sleeping, meditating, etc., it is all right to go ahead, shave the applicant’s head, and give him the Going-forth. There is no need to inform the Community if the applicant’s head is already shaven or if his hair is two fingerbreadths or less in length. The Commentary also recommends teaching the five meditation objects (hair of the head, hair of the body, nails, teeth, and skin) to the applicant prior to or during his head shaving.

The Going-forth

The Going-forth is not a Community transaction. The Canon’s requirements for the procedure are simple: The applicant is given the Three Refuges three times. Although the Canon mentions that bhikkhus (plural) are present at the Going-forth, it does not set a minimum for the quorum or any specific qualifications for the bhikkhu officiating. However, a bhikkhu who does not meet the qualifications of a bhikkhu’s preceptor should not have a novice attend to him (Mv.I.36-37), which suggests that even if the applicant is simply going forth without yet taking full Acceptance, the bhikkhu officiating must meet the qualifications of a bhikkhu’s preceptor.

The Commentary states further that, before giving the Three Refuges, the preceptor must bestow the ochre robes on the applicant or must tell a bhikkhu, novice, or layman to put robes on the applicant. If the applicant comes with robes already on, he must take them off and then put them on again. (The tradition in Thailand and Sri Lanka is that a novice wear only the upper and under robes. The Commentary to Mv.I.12.4 mentions the outer robe as part of a novice’s set of robes as well. However, Mv.VIII.27.3 mentions a novice’s “robe,” whereas a parallel passage in Mv.VIII.27.2 mentions a bhikkhu’s “triple robe,” which suggests that novices in the time of the Canon did not wear the outer robe, either.) Arranging his upper robe over one shoulder, the applicant should pay homage to the feet of the bhikkhus and sit on his haunches with his hands raised in añjali. Then he should be told: “Evaṁ vadehi (Say this),” followed by the threefold formula for going for refuge in the Triple Gem. The Commentary insists that both sides—the preceptor and the applicant—must pronounce the refuge formula properly. That constitutes the applicant’s Going-forth. It is customary to have him undertake the ten precepts immediately after going for refuge (see Chapter 24).

Taking dependence

Taking dependence follows the standard formula given at Mv.I.32.2 and discussed in BMC1, Chapter 3.

Instruction

After the applicant has been sent out of the assembly, a competent, experienced bhikkhu is authorized through a formal motion to instruct him about the thirteen obstructing factors. One bhikkhu may give the motion to authorize another, or may give it to authorize himself. The “instruction” is a rehearsal of the questions the applicant will be asked in the midst of the Community just prior to his full Acceptance. It is interesting to note that not all the possible disqualifications for full Acceptance are included in the list of thirteen. The Vinaya-mukha postulates that, in the very beginning, these were either the only disqualifications or the ones reckoned most important. The second possibility is unlikely, as only three of the thirteen are absolute.

When the instruction is complete, the instructing bhikkhu returns first to the assembly and recites a formal motion to inform the assembly that the applicant has been instructed and that the applicant should be allowed into the assembly.

After the applicant comes and requests full Acceptance, an experienced, competent bhikkhu (usually the same one who instructed the applicant) recites a formal motion to authorize himself to quiz the applicant about the thirteen obstructing factors. When he has finished the quiz, the preliminary steps are done.

Full Acceptance

The transaction statement for full Acceptance consists of a motion and three proclamations. As with all other transaction statements, it should be recited by an experienced, competent bhikkhu. At present, it is often recited by two bhikkhus together. The applicant becomes a bhikkhu when the third proclamation is finished. If two or three applicants are requesting full Acceptance at the same time, they may all be included in a single transaction statement as long as they have the same preceptor, but not if their preceptors are different. No more than three may be included in a single transaction statement. The Commentary notes that this single transaction statement can mean either one statement covering all the candidates, recited by one bhikkhu, or a separate statement for each candidate all recited at the same time by an equal number of bhikkhus. This last possibility, although it would create a cacophony, is probably intended for Communities where none of the members can put the transaction statement into the plural forms required by more than one candidate.

Subsequent steps

Immediately after full Acceptance, the Canon says, the shadow (time of day) should be measured. The length of the season should be told, the portion of the day told, along with the “rehearsal,” which, according to the Commentary, means drilling the candidate to make sure that he has memorized these three pieces of information. At present, the time is marked with a reliable clock or watch, and then recorded together with the date and the names of the preceptor and the announcing teachers.

The Canon also states that the four supports should be told immediately, and that the new bhikkhu be given a companion who will tell him of the four things never-to-be-done (i.e., the four pārājika rules). At present, the common practice is for the preceptor to tell both the four supports and the four things never-to-be-done immediately after the transaction statement. That concludes the procedure.

Rules

Qualifications: Preceptor/Teacher

“Bhikkhus, I allow a preceptor. The preceptor will foster the attitude he would have toward a son (‘son-mind’) with regard to the student. The student will foster the attitude he would have toward a father (‘father-mind’) with regard to the preceptor. Thus they—living with mutual respect, deference, and courtesy—will arrive at growth, increase, and maturity in this Dhamma-Vinaya.”—Mv.I.25.6

“(A candidate) should not be given Acceptance by (a bhikkhu) with less than ten rains. Whoever should (so) give Acceptance: an offense of wrong doing. I allow (a candidate) to be given Acceptance by (a bhikkhu) with ten rains or more.”—Mv.I.31.5

“(A candidate) should not be given Acceptance by an inexperienced, incompetent bhikkhu. Whoever should (so) give Acceptance: an offense of wrong doing. I allow (a candidate) to be given Acceptance by a bhikkhu with ten rains or more who is experienced and competent.”—Mv.I.31.8

“I allow a teacher. The teacher will foster the attitude he would have toward a son (‘son-mind’) with regard to the student. The student will foster the attitude he would have toward a father (‘father-mind’) with regard to the teacher. Thus they—living with mutual respect, deference, and courtesy—will arrive at growth, increase, and maturity in this Dhamma-Vinaya. I allow one to live in dependence for ten rains, and for dependence to be given by one with ten rains.”—Mv.I.32.1 (See Mv.I.53.4, below)

“Endowed with five qualities, a bhikkhu should not give Acceptance, should not give dependence, and a novice should not be made to attend to him. He is not endowed with the aggregate of virtue of one beyond training… the aggregate of concentration of one beyond training… the aggregate of discernment of one beyond training… the aggregate of release of one beyond training… the aggregate of knowledge and vision of release of one beyond training. Endowed with these five qualities, a bhikkhu should not give Acceptance, should not give dependence, and a novice should not be made to attend to him.

“Endowed with five qualities, a bhikkhu may give Acceptance, may give dependence, and a novice may be made to attend to him. He is endowed with the aggregate of virtue of one beyond training… the aggregate of concentration of one beyond training… the aggregate of discernment of one beyond training… the aggregate of release of one beyond training… the aggregate of knowledge and vision of release of one beyond training. Endowed with these five qualities, a bhikkhu may give Acceptance, may give dependence, and a novice may be made to attend to him.

“Endowed with five (further) qualities, a bhikkhu should not give Acceptance, should not give dependence, and a novice should not be made to attend to him. He himself is not endowed with the aggregate of virtue of one beyond training, nor does he get others to undertake the aggregate of virtue of one beyond training. He himself is not endowed with the aggregate of concentration of one beyond training… the aggregate of discernment of one beyond training… the aggregate of release of one beyond training… the aggregate of knowledge and vision of release of one beyond training, nor does he get others to undertake the aggregate of knowledge and vision of release of one beyond training. Endowed with these five qualities, a bhikkhu should not give Acceptance, should not give dependence, and a novice should not be made to attend to him.

“Endowed with five (further) qualities, a bhikkhu may give Acceptance, may give dependence, and a novice may be made to attend to him. He himself is endowed with the aggregate of virtue of one beyond training and he gets others to undertake the aggregate of virtue of one beyond training. He himself is endowed with the aggregate of concentration of one beyond training… the aggregate of discernment of one beyond training… the aggregate of release of one beyond training… the aggregate of knowledge and vision of release of one beyond training and he gets others to undertake the aggregate of knowledge and vision of release of one beyond training. Endowed with these five qualities, a bhikkhu may give Acceptance, may give dependence, and a novice may be made to attend to him.

“Endowed with five (further) qualities, a bhikkhu should not give Acceptance, should not give dependence, and a novice should not be made to attend to him. He is without conviction, without a sense of shame, without compunction (in the American sense of the term, i.e., an unwillingness to do wrong for fear of its consequences), lazy, and of muddled mindfulness. Endowed with these five qualities, a bhikkhu should not give Acceptance, should not give dependence, and a novice should not be made to attend to him.

“Endowed with five (further) qualities, a bhikkhu may give Acceptance, may give dependence, and a novice may be made to attend to him. He has conviction, a sense of shame, compunction, his persistence is aroused, and his mindfulness established. Endowed with these five qualities, a bhikkhu may give Acceptance, may give dependence, and a novice may be made to attend to him.

“Endowed with five (further) qualities, a bhikkhu should not give Acceptance, should not give dependence, and a novice should not be made to attend to him. He is one who, in light of heightened virtue (§), is defective in his virtue. He is one who, in light of heightened conduct (§), is defective in his conduct. He is one who, in terms of higher views (§), is defective in his views. He is not learned. He is undiscerning. Endowed with these five qualities, a bhikkhu should not give Acceptance, should not give dependence, and a novice should not be made to attend to him.

“Endowed with five (further) qualities, a bhikkhu may give Acceptance, may give dependence, and a novice may be made to attend to him. He is one who, in light of heightened virtue, is not defective in his virtue. He is one who, in light of heightened conduct, is not defective in his conduct. He is one who, in terms of higher views, is not defective in his views. He is learned. He is discerning. Endowed with these five qualities, a bhikkhu may give Acceptance, may give dependence, and a novice may be made to attend to him.

“Endowed with five (further) qualities, a bhikkhu should not give Acceptance, should not give dependence, and a novice should not be made to attend to him. He is not competent to tend or to get someone else to tend to a sick pupil or student; to allay or to get someone else to allay dissatisfaction (with the celibate life); to dispel or to get someone else to dispel, in line with the Dhamma, anxiety that has arisen. He does not know what is an offense nor does he know the method for removing (lit: getting up out of) an offense. Endowed with these five qualities, a bhikkhu should not give Acceptance, should not give dependence, and a novice should not be made to attend to him.

“Endowed with five (further) qualities, a bhikkhu may give Acceptance, may give dependence, and a novice may be made to attend to him. He is competent to tend or to get someone else to tend to a sick pupil or student; to allay or to get someone else to allay dissatisfaction (with the celibate life); to dispel or to get someone else to dispel, in line with the Dhamma, anxiety that has arisen. He knows what is an offense, and he knows the method for removing an offense. Endowed with these five qualities, a bhikkhu may give Acceptance, may give dependence, and a novice may be made to attend to him.

“Endowed with five (further) qualities, a bhikkhu should not give Acceptance, should not give dependence, and a novice should not be made to attend to him. He is not competent to get his pupil or student to train in the training of the (bhikkhus’) customs. He is not competent to discipline him in the training that is basic to the celibate life; to discipline him in the higher Dhamma; to discipline him in the higher Vinaya; to pry away or to get someone else to pry away (following the PTS edition—the Thai and Sri Lankan editions simply say, “to pry away”), in line with the Dhamma, a (wrong) viewpoint that has arisen. Endowed with these five qualities, a bhikkhu should not give Acceptance, should not give dependence, and a novice should not be made to attend to him.

“Endowed with five (further) qualities, a bhikkhu may give Acceptance, may give dependence, and a novice may be made to attend to him. He is competent to get his pupil or student to train in the training of the (bhikkhus’) customs. He is competent to discipline him in the training that is basic to the celibate life; to discipline him in the higher Dhamma; to discipline him in the higher Vinaya; to pry away or to get someone else to pry away, in line with the Dhamma, a (wrong) viewpoint that has arisen. Endowed with these five qualities, a bhikkhu may give Acceptance, may give dependence, and a novice may be made to attend to him.

“Endowed with five (further) qualities, a bhikkhu should not give Acceptance, should not give dependence, and a novice should not be made to attend to him. He does not know what is an offense, what is not an offense, what is a light offense, what is a heavy offense. Both Pāṭimokkhas, in detail, have not been properly handed down to him, have not been properly explicated, have not been properly ‘revolved’ (§) (in terms of the ‘wheels’), have not been properly judged, clause by clause, letter by letter. Endowed with these five qualities, a bhikkhu should not give Acceptance, should not give dependence, and a novice should not be made to attend to him.

“Endowed with five (further) qualities, a bhikkhu may give Acceptance, may give dependence, and a novice may be made to attend to him. He knows what is an offense, what is not an offense, what is a light offense, what is a heavy offense. Both Pāṭimokkhas, in detail, have been properly handed down to him, properly explicated, properly ‘revolved,’ properly judged, clause by clause, letter by letter. Endowed with these five qualities, a bhikkhu may give Acceptance, may give dependence, and a novice may be made to attend to him.

“Endowed with five (further) qualities, a bhikkhu should not give Acceptance, should not give dependence, and a novice should not be made to attend to him. He does not know what is an offense, what is not an offense, what is a light offense, what is a heavy offense. He is of less than ten years’ standing. Endowed with these five qualities, a bhikkhu should not give Acceptance, should not give dependence, and a novice should not be made to attend to him.

“Endowed with five (further) qualities, a bhikkhu may give Acceptance, may give dependence, and a novice may be made to attend to him. He knows what is an offense, what is not an offense, what is a light offense, what is a heavy offense. He is of ten years’ standing or more. Endowed with these five qualities, a bhikkhu may give Acceptance, may give dependence, and a novice may be made to attend to him.”—Mv.I.36.2-17

(Mv.I.37 lists sets of six qualities that would qualify or disqualify a bhikkhu from giving Acceptance, giving dependence, or having a novice attend to him. These sets are identical to Mv.I.36.2-15, with the sentence, “He is of less than ten years standing,” added to each set of five disqualifying factors given there; and the sentence, “He is of ten years’ standing or more,” added to each set of five qualifying factors.)

Dependence

“Dependence should not be given by an inexperienced, incompetent (bhikkhu). Whoever should (so) give it: an offense of wrong doing. I allow dependence to be given by a bhikkhu with ten rains or more who is experienced and competent.”—Mv.I.35.2

“Dependence should not be given to one who is unconscientious. Whoever should give it: an offense of wrong doing”…. “One should not live in dependence under one who is unconscientious. Whoever should (so) live (in dependence): an offense of wrong doing”…. (Bhikkhus asked, “Now, how are we to know who is conscientious and who is not?”)…. “I allow that you wait four or five days (and can decide), ‘As far as I know from his compatibility (§) with (his fellow) bhikkhus.’”—Mv.I.72

“And here is how a preceptor is to be taken. Arranging the upper robe over one shoulder, bowing down to his feet, kneeling down with hands placed palm-to-palm over the heart, one is to say this: ‘Venerable sir, be my preceptor. Venerable sir, be my preceptor. Venerable sir, be my preceptor.’ If he (the preceptor) indicates by gesture, by speech, by gesture and speech, ‘Very well’ or ‘Certainly’ or ‘All right’ or ‘It is proper’ or ‘Attain consummation in an amicable way,’ he is taken as preceptor. If he does not indicate (this) by gesture, by speech, or by gesture and speech, he is not taken as preceptor.”—Mv.I.25.7

Duties of a student to his preceptor—Mv.I.25.8-24

Duties of a preceptor to his student—Mv.I.26

“A pupil is not not to behave rightly toward his preceptor. Whoever does not behave rightly: an offense of wrong doing.”—Mv.I.27.1

“One who behaves rightly is not to be dismissed. Whoever dismisses (him): an offense of wrong doing. One who does not behave rightly is not not to be dismissed. Whoever does not dismiss (him): an offense of wrong doing.”—Mv.I.27.5

“I allow that one who does not behave rightly be dismissed. And this is how he is to be dismissed. ‘I dismiss you,’ ‘Don’t come back here,’ ‘Take away your robes and bowl,’ or ‘I am not to be attended to by you’: If one communicates this by way of the body, by way of speech, or by way of body and speech, the pupil is dismissed. If one does not communicate this by way of the body, by way of speech, or by way of body and speech, the pupil is not dismissed.”—Mv.I.27.2

Now at that time, pupils, having been dismissed, did not ask for forgiveness…. “I allow that they ask for forgiveness.” They still didn’t ask for forgiveness…. “One who has been dismissed is not not to ask for forgiveness. Whoever does not ask for forgiveness: an offense of wrong doing.” Now at that time, preceptors, having been asked for forgiveness, did not forgive…. “I allow that forgiveness be given.” They still didn’t forgive. The pupils went away, renounced the training, and even joined other religions…. “One who has been asked to forgive should not not forgive. Whoever does not forgive: an offense of wrong doing.”—Mv.I.27.3-4

“A pupil endowed with five qualities may be dismissed. With regard to his preceptor he does not have strong affection, does not have strong confidence, does not have a strong sense of shame, does not have strong respect, does not have strong development (in the practice). A pupil endowed with these five qualities may be dismissed. A pupil endowed with five qualities should not be dismissed. With regard to his preceptor he has strong affection, has strong confidence, has a strong sense of shame, has strong respect, has strong development. A pupil endowed with these five qualities should not be dismissed.”—Mv.I.27.6

“When a pupil is endowed with five qualities he is properly dismissed (as in Mv.I.27.6).”—Mv.I.27.7

“When a pupil is endowed with five qualities, the preceptor, in not dismissing him, has transgressed; in dismissing him, he has not transgressed (as in Mv.I.27.6).”—Mv.I.27.8

Request for a teacher; a student’s duties to his teacher—Mv.I.32.2-3

Duties of a teacher to his student—Mv.I.33

Dismissing and forgiving a student—Mv.I.34 ( = Mv.I.27.1-8)

“There are these five lapses in dependence on one’s preceptor: The preceptor goes away, renounces the training, dies, joins (another) faction [according to the Commentary, this means another religion, but it could also mean another faction in a split Community], or, as the fifth, (gives) a command. These are the five lapses in dependence on one’s preceptor.

“There are these six lapses in dependence on one’s teacher: The teacher goes away, renounces the training, dies, joins (another) faction, or, as the fifth, (gives) a command. Or, one is joined with one’s preceptor. These are the six lapses in dependence on one’s teacher.”—Mv.I.36.1

“Endowed with five qualities, a bhikkhu should not live independently (of a preceptor or teacher). He is not endowed with the aggregate of virtue of one beyond training… the aggregate of concentration of one beyond training… the aggregate of discernment of one beyond training… the aggregate of release of one beyond training… the aggregate of knowledge and vision of release of one beyond training. Endowed with these five qualities, a bhikkhu should not live independently.

“Endowed with five qualities, a bhikkhu may live independently. He is endowed with the aggregate of virtue of one beyond training… the aggregate of concentration of one beyond training… the aggregate of discernment of one beyond training… the aggregate of release of one beyond training… the aggregate of knowledge and vision of release of one beyond training. Endowed with these five qualities, a bhikkhu may live independently.

“Endowed with five (further) qualities, a bhikkhu should not live independently. He is without conviction, without a sense of shame, without compunction, lazy, and of muddled mindfulness. Endowed with these five qualities, a bhikkhu should not live independently.

“Endowed with five (further) qualities, a bhikkhu may live independently. He has conviction, a sense of shame, compunction, his persistence is aroused, and his mindfulness established. Endowed with these five qualities, a bhikkhu may live independently.

“Endowed with five (further) qualities, a bhikkhu should not live independently. He is one who, in light of heightened virtue (§), is defective in his virtue. He is one who, in light of heightened conduct (§), is defective in his conduct. He is one who, in terms of higher views (§), is defective in his views. He is not learned. He is undiscerning. Endowed with these five qualities, a bhikkhu should not live independently.

“Endowed with five (further) qualities, a bhikkhu may live independently. He is one who, in light of heightened virtue, is not defective in his virtue. He is one who, in light of heightened conduct, is not defective in his conduct. He is one who, in terms of higher views, is not defective in his views. He is learned. He is discerning. Endowed with these five qualities, a bhikkhu may live independently.

“Endowed with five (further) qualities, a bhikkhu should not live independently. He does not know what is an offense, what is not an offense, what is a light offense, what is a heavy offense. Both Pāṭimokkhas, in detail, have not been properly handed down to him, have not been properly explicated, have not been properly ‘revolved’ (in terms of the ‘wheels’), have not been properly judged, clause by clause, letter by letter. Endowed with these five qualities, a bhikkhu should not live independently.

“Endowed with five (further) qualities, a bhikkhu may live independently. He knows what is an offense, what is not an offense, what is a light offense, what is a heavy offense. Both Pāṭimokkhas, in detail, have been properly handed down to him, properly explicated, properly ‘revolved,’ properly judged, clause by clause, letter by letter. Endowed with these five qualities, a bhikkhu may live independently.

“Endowed with five (further) qualities, a bhikkhu should not live independently. He does not know what is an offense, what is not an offense, what is a light offense, what is a heavy offense. He is of less than five years’ standing. Endowed with these five qualities, a bhikkhu should not live independently.

“Endowed with five (further) qualities, a bhikkhu may live independently. He knows what is an offense, what is not an offense, what is a light offense, what is a heavy offense. He is of five years’ standing or more. Endowed with these five qualities, a bhikkhu may live independently.”—Mv.I.53.5-9

(Mv.I.53.10-13 lists sets of six qualities that would qualify or disqualify a bhikkhu from living independently. These sets are identical to Mv.I.53.5-8, with the sentence, “He is of less than five years standing,” added to each set of five disqualifying factors; and the sentence, “He is of five years’ standing or more,” added to each set of five qualifying factors.)

“I allow an experienced, competent bhikkhu to live five years in dependence, and an inexperienced one all his life.”—Mv.I.53.4

“I allow a bhikkhu who is going on a journey and unable to get dependence, to live independently”…. “I allow a bhikkhu who is ill and unable to get dependence, to live independently”…. “I allow a bhikkhu who is tending to the ill and unable to get dependence, to live independently if he is requested (by the ill bhikkhu to stay)”…. “I allow a bhikkhu living in the wilderness and contemplating (§) in comfort to live independently, (thinking,) ‘When an appropriate giver of dependence comes along, I will live in dependence on him.’”—Mv.I.73

Qualifications: Applicant

“There are these two admittances (§). There is the individual who is not liable for admittance who, if the Community admits him, in some cases is wrongly admitted and in some cases rightly admitted. And which is the individual who has not been granted admittance who, if the Community admits him, is wrongly admitted? A paṇḍaka… one living in affiliation by theft… one who has gone over (while a bhikkhu) to another religion… an animal… a matricide… a patricide… a murderer of an arahant… a molester of a bhikkhunī… a schismatic… one who has shed (a Tathāgata’s) blood… a hermaphrodite not yet granted admittance, if the Community admits him, is wrongly admitted [C: No matter how many times that person may be granted Acceptance, he/she does not count as a bhikkhu].”—Mv.IX.4.10

“And which is the individual who is not liable for admittance who, if the Community admits him, is rightly admitted? One with a hand cut off… a foot cut off… a hand and foot cut off… an ear cut off… a nose cut off… an ear and nose cut off… a finger/toe cut off… a thumb or big toe cut off… a cut tendon… one who has webbed fingers… a bent-over person… a dwarf… one with a goiter… one who has been branded… one who has been whipped… one for whom a warrant has been sent out… one with a club foot/elephantiasis… one who has an evil illness… one who disgraces the assembly… one who is blind in one eye… one who has a crooked limb… one who is lame… one half-paralyzed… a cripple… one weak from old age… one who is blind… dumb… deaf… blind and dumb… blind and deaf… deaf and dumb… blind and deaf and dumb not yet granted admittance, if granted admittance, is rightly admitted.”—Mv.IX.4.11

Absolutely Unqualified

“An individual less than 20 years old should not knowingly be given Acceptance. Whoever should give him Acceptance is to be dealt with in accordance with the rule (Pc 65).”—Mv.I.49.6

“When in the mother’s womb the mind first arises and consciousness first appears, in dependence on that is one’s birth. I allow that Acceptance be given to one (at least) twenty years after becoming a fetus.”—Mv.I.75

“A paṇḍaka, if unaccepted (unordained), is not to be given Acceptance. If accepted, he is to be expelled.”—Mv.I.61.2

“A person in affiliation through theft, if unaccepted, is not to be given Acceptance. If accepted, he is to be expelled. One who has gone over (while a bhikkhu) to another religion, if unaccepted, is not to be given Acceptance. If accepted, he is to be expelled.”—Mv.I.62.3

“An animal, if unaccepted, is not to be given Acceptance. If accepted, he is to be expelled.”—Mv.I.63.5

“A matricide, if unaccepted, is not to be given Acceptance. If accepted, he is to be expelled.”—Mv.I.64.2

“A patricide, if unaccepted, is not to be given Acceptance. If accepted, he is to be expelled.”—Mv.I.65

“A murderer of an arahant, if unaccepted, is not to be given Acceptance. If accepted, he is to be expelled.”—Mv.I.66.2

“A molester of a bhikkhunī, if unaccepted, is not to be given Acceptance. If accepted, he is to be expelled. A schismatic, if unaccepted, is not to be given Acceptance. If accepted, he is to be expelled. One who has shed (a Tathāgata’s) blood, if unaccepted, is not to be given Acceptance. If accepted, he is to be expelled.”—Mv.I.67

“A hermaphrodite, if unaccepted, is not to be given Acceptance. If accepted, he is to be expelled.”—Mv.I.68

Undesirable

“A son whose parents have not given their permission should not be given the Going-forth. Whoever should give it: an offense of wrong doing.”—Mv.I.54.6

“One who is afflicted with any of the five diseases (leprosy, boils, eczema, tuberculosis, epilepsy) should not be given the Going-forth. Whoever should give it: an offense of wrong doing.”—Mv.I.39.7

“One who is in the king’s (government) service should not be given the Going-forth. Whoever should give it: an offense of wrong doing.”—Mv.I.40.4

“A criminal who is ‘wrapped in a flag’ should not be given the Going-forth. Whoever should give it: an offense of wrong doing.”—Mv.I.41.1

“A criminal who has broken his shackles should not be given the Going-forth. Whoever should give it: an offense of wrong doing.”—Mv.I.42.2

“A criminal for whom a warrant has been sent out should not be given the Going-forth. Whoever should give it: an offense of wrong doing.”—Mv.I.43.1

“A man who has been whipped (or caned) as punishment should not be given the Going-forth. Whoever should give it: an offense of wrong doing.”—Mv.I.44.1

“A man who has been branded (or tattooed) as punishment should not be given the Going-forth. Whoever should give it: an offense of wrong doing.”—Mv.I.45.1

“A debtor should not be given the Going-forth. Whoever should give it: an offense of wrong doing.”—Mv.I.46.1

“A slave should not be given the Going-forth. Whoever should give it: an offense of wrong doing.”—Mv.I.47.1

“One with a hand cut off… a foot cut off… a hand and foot cut off… an ear cut off… a nose cut off… an ear and nose cut off… a finger/toe cut off… a thumb or big toe cut off… a cut tendon (§)… one who has webbed fingers… a bent-over person… a dwarf… one with a goiter… one who has been branded… one who has been whipped… one for whom a warrant has been sent out… one with a club foot/elephantisis… one who has an evil illness… one who disgraces the assembly… one who is blind in one eye… one who has a crooked limb… one who is lame… one half-paralyzed… a cripple… one weak from old age… one who is blind… dumb… deaf… blind and dumb… blind and deaf… deaf and dumb… blind and deaf and dumb should not be given the Going-forth. Whoever should give it: an offense of wrong doing.”—Mv.I.71.2

Unprepared

“One without a preceptor is not to be given Acceptance. Whoever should give him Acceptance: an offense of wrong doing.”—Mv.I.69.1

“One who has a Community as his preceptor is not to be given Acceptance. Whoever should give him Acceptance: an offense of wrong doing.”—Mv.I.69.2

“One who has a group as his preceptor is not to be given Acceptance. Whoever should give him Acceptance: an offense of wrong doing.”—Mv.I.69.3

“One who has a paṇḍaka… a person living in affiliation by theft… a bhikkhu who has gone over (while a bhikkhu) to another religion… an animal… a matricide… a patricide… a murderer of an arahant… a molester of a bhikkhunī… a schismatic… one who has shed (a Tathāgata’s) blood… a hermaphrodite as his preceptor is not to be given Acceptance. Whoever should give him Acceptance: an offense of wrong doing.”—Mv.I.69.4

“One without a bowl is not to be given Acceptance. Whoever should give him Acceptance: an offense of wrong doing.”—Mv.I.70.1

“One without robes is not to be given Acceptance. Whoever should give him Acceptance: an offense of wrong doing.”—Mv.I.70.2

“One without a bowl and robes is not to be given Acceptance. Whoever should give him Acceptance: an offense of wrong doing.”—Mv.I.70.3

“One with a borrowed bowl is not to be given Acceptance. Whoever should give him Acceptance: an offense of wrong doing.”—Mv.I.70.4

“One with borrowed robes is not to be given Acceptance. Whoever should give him Acceptance: an offense of wrong doing.”—Mv.I.70.5

“One with borrowed robes and bowl is not to be given Acceptance. Whoever should give him Acceptance: an offense of wrong doing.”—Mv.I.70.6

Reordination

“There is the case where a bhikkhu, suspended for not seeing an offense, renounces the training. Having later returned, he asks the bhikkhus for Acceptance. He is to be told, ‘Will you see this offense?’ If he says Yes, he may be given the Going-forth. If he says No, he is not to be given the Going-forth. Having gone forth, he is to be asked, ‘Will you see this offense?’ If he says Yes, he may be given Acceptance. If he says No, he is not to be given Acceptance. Having been given Acceptance, he is to be asked, ‘Will you see this offense?’ If he says Yes, he may be restored. If he says No, he is not to be restored. Having been restored, he is to be asked, ‘Do you see this offense?’ If he says Yes, that is good. If he says No, then if unity can be obtained, he is to be suspended again. If unity cannot be obtained, there is no offense in communing or affiliating with him.”—Mv.I.79.2

One suspended for not making amends for an offense—Mv.I.79.3

One suspended for not relinquishing an evil view—Mv.I.79.4

Convert

“Bhikkhus, one who was previously a member of another religion and who, when spoken to by his preceptor regarding a rule, repudiates his preceptor and goes over to the fold of that very religion, on returning should not be given Acceptance. But whoever else was previously a member of another religion and desires the Going-forth, desires Acceptance in this Dhamma-Vinaya, is to be given probation for four months.”—Mv.I.38.1

Procedure for granting probation—Mv.I.38.1-4

“And how is one who was previously a member of another religion pleasing (to the bhikkhus), and how is one who was previously a member of another religion displeasing? There is the case where one who was previously a member of another religion enters the village too early, returns too late in the day. This is how one who was previously a member of another religion is displeasing.

“Then again one who was previously a member of another religion associates with a prostitute… with a widow/divorced woman… with a ‘fat princess’ (male transvestite? old maid?)… with a paṇḍaka… with a bhikkhunī. This, too, is how one who was previously a member of another religion is displeasing.

“Then again one who was previously a member of another religion is not adept at the major and minor affairs involving his fellows in the holy life, is not dexterous, not diligent, not quick-witted in the techniques involved in them, is not able/willing to do them or get others to do them. This, too, is how one who was previously a member of another religion is displeasing.

“Then again one who was previously a member of another religion does not have a keen desire for recitation, interrogation, heightened virtue, heightened mind, heightened discernment. This, too, is how one who was previously a member of another religion is displeasing.

“Then again one who was previously a member of another religion feels angered, displeased, and upset if dispraise is spoken of the teacher, the view, the persuasion, the preferences, the belief of the religion from which he has come over. He feels gratified, pleased, and elated if dispraise is spoken of the Buddha, Dhamma, or Saṅgha …

“When there comes one previously a member of another religion who is displeasing in this way, he should not be given Acceptance.

“And how is one who was previously a member of another religion pleasing? There is the case where one who was previously a member of another religion enters the village not too early, returns not too late in the day. This is how one who was previously a member of another religion is pleasing.

“Then again one who was previously a member of another religion does not associate with a prostitute… with a widow/divorced woman… with a “fat princess” (male transvestite?)… with a paṇḍaka… with a bhikkhunī. This, too, is how one who was previously a member of another religion is pleasing.

“Then again one who was previously a member of another religion is adept at the various affairs involving his fellows in the holy life, is dexterous, diligent, quick-witted in the techniques involved in them, is able/willing to do them or to get others to do them. This, too, is how one who was previously a member of another religion is pleasing.

“Then again one who was previously a member of another religion has a keen desire for recitation, interrogation, heightened virtue, heightened mind, heightened discernment. This, too, is how one who was previously a member of another religion is pleasing.

“Then again one who was previously a member of another religion feels gratified, pleased, and elated if dispraise is spoken of the teacher, the view, the persuasion, the preferences, the belief of the religion from which he has come over. He feels angered, displeased, and upset if dispraise is spoken of the Buddha, Dhamma, or Saṅgha …

“When there comes one previously a member of another religion who is pleasing in this way, he may be given Acceptance.”—Mv.I.38.5-10

“If one who was previously a member of another religion comes naked, the preceptor should be in charge of searching out a robe for him. If he comes without the hair of his head cut off, the Community should be informed for the sake of shaving it. (See Mv.I.48.2 below.) If fire-worshipping and coiled-hair ascetics come, they may be given Acceptance. They are not to be given probation. Why is that? They teach a doctrine of kamma, they teach a doctrine of action. If there comes one who was previously a member of another religion who is a Sakyan by birth, he may be given Acceptance. He is not to be given probation. I give this special privilege to my relatives.”—Mv.I.38.11

Procedure

“I allow that the Community be informed for the sake of shaving the head (of a person to be ordained).”—Mv.I.48.2

“Bhikkhus, I allow the Going-forth and the Acceptance by means of these three goings for refuge.”—Mv.I.12.4

“I rescind from this day forth the Acceptance by means of the three goings for refuge (previously) allowed by me. I allow Acceptance by means of a transaction with one motion and three proclamations.”—Mv.I.28.3

“(A candidate) should not be given Acceptance by a group of fewer than ten. Whoever should (so) give Acceptance: an offense of wrong doing. I allow that (a candidate) be given Acceptance by a group of ten or more.”—Mv.I.31.2

“I allow in all outlying districts Acceptance by a group with a Vinaya expert as the fifth.”—Mv.V.13.11

Definition of outlying districts—Mv.V.13.12

Original transaction statement—Mv.I.28.4-6

Transaction statement after the request—Mv.I.29.3-4 (See Mv.I.76.7-12 for the complete transaction statement)

Procedure for giving the Going-forth—Mv.I.54.3

Procedure for requesting dependence under a preceptor.—Mv.I.25.7

“(A candidate) should not be given Acceptance by (a Community) that has not been requested. Whoever should (so) give Acceptance: an offense of wrong doing. I allow that (a candidate) be given Acceptance by (a Community) that has been requested.”—Mv.I.29.1

Request—Mv.I.29.2

“I allow, when giving Acceptance, that the thirteen (§) obstructing factors be asked about.”—Mv.I.76.1

“I allow that, having first having instructed (the candidate), the thirteen (§) obstructing factors be asked about.”—Mv.I.76.2

“I allow that, having first having instructed (the candidate) off to one side, the thirteen (§) obstructing factors be asked about in the midst of the Community. And this is how he is to be instructed. First he is to be made to take a preceptor (see Mv.I.25.7). After he has been made to take a preceptor, he is to be told about the robes and bowl: ‘This is your bowl, this your outer robe, this your upper robe, this your lower robe. Go stand in that spot over there.’”—Mv.I.76.3

Words of instruction off to one side—Mv.I.76.7 (= Mv.I.76.1)

“(A candidate) is not to be instructed by an inexperienced, incompetent bhikkhu. Whoever should so instruct him: an offense of wrong doing. I allow that (a candidate) be instructed by an experienced, competent bhikkhu.”—Mv.I.76.4

“(A candidate) is not to be instructed by a bhikkhu who is not authorized. Whoever should so instruct him: an offense of wrong doing. I allow that (a candidate) be instructed by an authorized bhikkhu.”—Mv.I.76.5

Procedure for self-authorization—Mv.I.76.5

Procedure for authorization by another—Mv.I.76.6

(They—the instructing teacher and the candidate—returned together) “They should not return together. The Community is to be informed by the instructing teacher, who has returned first.”—Mv.I.76.8

Words for informing the Community and calling the candidate into the midst of the Community—Mv.I.76.8

Complete transaction statement—Mv.I.76.9-12

“I allow a single proclamation to be made for two or three if they have the same preceptor, but not if they have different preceptors.”—Mv.I.74.3

“The shadow (time of day) should be measured at once. The length of the season told, the portion of the day told, the rehearsal told, the four supports told.”—Mv.I.77

“I allow, when giving Acceptance, that the four supports be told.”—Mv.I.30.4

Wording of the four supports—Mv.I.30.4

“The supports should not be told beforehand. Whoever should tell (them beforehand): an offense of wrong doing. I allow the supports to be told immediately after one has been given Acceptance.”—Mv.I.31.1

“I allow that when one has been given Acceptance he be given a companion and that the four things never-to-be-done be told to him.”—Mv.I.78.2

The four things never-to-be-done—Mv.I.78.2-5

CHAPTER FIFTEEN

Uposatha

In the Mahāparinibbāna Sutta (DN 16) the Buddha lists seven conditions that will help prevent the decline of the Community. The first two are these: “(1) As long as the bhikkhus meet often, meet a great deal, their growth can be expected, not their decline. (2) As long as the bhikkhus meet in unity, adjourn from their meetings in unity, and conduct Community business in unity, their growth can be expected, not their decline.” The uposatha observance was formulated to help meet these conditions. It provides an opportunity on a fortnightly basis for the bhikkhus to meet with their fellows in the vicinity, to update their membership rolls, to deal with any wayward members, and to reaffirm their common adherence to the rules of the Vinaya. The act of observing the uposatha together is what defines common affiliation in any given territory.

Cv.IX.1 tells that the Buddha participated in the uposatha observance until one night when a sham bhikkhu sat in the meeting and, even when warned by the Buddha, refused to leave until Ven. Mahā Moggallāna had grabbed him by the arm and forcibly thrown him out. From that point onward, the uposatha was conducted entirely by the disciples.

The importance of the uposatha observance in the Buddha’s eyes is shown in Mv.II.5.5. Ven. Mahā Kappina, staying on the outskirts of Rājagaha after having attained arahantship, reflects that whether he goes to the uposatha observance or not, he is still purified with the highest purification and so he feels disinclined to go. The Buddha, staying nearby on Vulture Peak, reads his mind and—disappearing from Vulture’s Peak—appears right in front of him to ask, “If you brahmans (meaning arahants) do not revere, respect, esteem, and honor the uposatha, who is there who will revere, respect, esteem, and honor it? Go to the uposatha. Do not not go. Go as well to Community transactions. Do not not go.” Thus even arahants are not exempt from Community obligations in general, and the uposatha in particular.

A passage in MN 108 indicates the importance of the uposatha meeting in the governance of the Community after the Buddha’s parinibbāna, given the fact that the Buddha never appointed a successor to take charge of the Community after he was gone. Ven. Ānanda is speaking to the brahman Gopaka Moggallāna after the Buddha’s passing away:

“It’s not the case, brahman, that we’re without an arbitrator. We have an arbitrator. The Dhamma is our arbitrator…. There is a training rule that has been laid down by the Blessed One—the one who knows, the one who sees, worthy and rightly self-awakened—a Pāṭimokkha that has been codified. On the uposatha day, all of us who live dependent on a single township gather together in one place. Having gathered together, we invite the one whose turn it is (to recite the Pāṭimokkha). If, while he is reciting, a bhikkhu remembers an offense or transgression, we deal with him in accordance with the Dhamma, in accordance with what has been instructed. We’re not the ones who deal with that venerable one. Rather, the Dhamma is what deals with us.”

Uposatha days

The term uposatha comes from the Vedic Sanskrit upavasatha, a day of preparation, usually involving special observances, for the Soma ritual. These preparation days were held on the days of the half-moon, full moon, and new moon—the eighth and (depending on the precise timing of the new and full moons) fourteenth or fifteenth days of the lunar fortnight. Non-Vedic sects, prior to Buddhism, used these days for observances of their own, usually meeting to teach their Dhamma. The Buddha adopted this practice, setting these days aside for bhikkhus to meet and teach the Dhamma as well. He also established a purely monastic uposatha observance, which he limited to the final day of the lunar fortnight. To enable the bhikkhus to determine the date of this observance, he relaxed the rule against their studying astrology (see Chapter 10), which in those days had not yet separated from astronomy, allowing them to learn as much astronomy as needed to calculate whether the full and new moons fell on the fourteenth or fifteenth of a particular fortnight. (“At that time people asked the bhikkhus as they were going for alms, ‘Which day of the fortnight is it, venerable sirs?’ The bhikkhus said, ‘We don’t know.’ The people criticized and complained and spread it about, ‘These Sakyan-son monks don’t even know enough to calculate the fortnight, so how will they know anything else that’s admirable?’”—Mv.II.18.1)

The monastic observance may be held in one of four ways, depending on the size of the Community in a particular territory: If four bhikkhus or more, they meet for a recitation of the Pāṭimokkha; if three, they declare their mutual purity to one another; if two, they declare their purity to each other; if one, he marks the day by determining it as his uposatha. In addition to these regular observance days, the Buddha gave permission for a Community to recite the Pāṭimokkha only on one other occasion: when unity has been reestablished in the Community. This, the Commentary says, refers only to occasions when a major dispute in the Community has been settled (such as a schism—see Chapter 21), and not to occasions when the uposatha has been suspended for minor reasons. Thus there are two occasions on which the bhikkhus are allowed to meet for the uposatha: the last day of the lunar fortnight and the day for reestablishing unity.

Location

In order to prevent confusion about where the uposatha will be held in an established monastery, only one building may be authorized as the uposatha hall within any given monastery. If the hall becomes unusable, the authorization may be revoked and another hall authorized. If the hall is too small for the number of bhikkhus who have gathered for the uposatha, they may sit outside around the hall as long as they are within earshot of the Pāṭimokkha recitation. If the Community wants to, it may also authorize an area in front of the uposatha hall, marked with boundary markers, specifically for this purpose, but this is an optional step. (The markers are to be determined in the same way as the markers for a territory. See Chapter 13. Also, see Appendix I for the statements used in the transactions for authorizing and revoking an uposatha hall, and for authorizing an area in front of it.)

If many monasteries share a common territory, all the bhikkhus residing in the monasteries must meet together for a common uposatha. The Canon states that this may (but does not have to) be at the monastery where the most senior bhikkhu in the territory is staying. The Commentary suggests meeting in the oldest monastery in the territory unless it is inconvenient (e.g., its uposatha hall is too small). As for the most senior bhikkhu, if the monastery where he is staying is convenient, the bhikkhus may meet there. If not, he should be invited to move to a more convenient one. If he refuses to move, the bhikkhus should take his consent and purity, and meet in a more convenient place (assuming, of course, that he cannot manage to get there himself).

If a full Community of bhikkhus is staying in a particular monastery but none of them know “the uposatha or the uposatha transaction, the Pāṭimokkha or the recital of the Pāṭimokkha,” then the Canon enjoins the senior bhikkhu to order one of the junior bhikkhus to go to a neighboring monastery immediately to master the Pāṭimokkha in brief (see below) or in full (for the sake of reciting it that very day, says the Commentary). If ordered in this way, and unless he is ill, the junior bhikkhu must go or else incur a dukkaṭa. If he manages to learn the Pāṭimokkha, either in brief or in full, well and good. If not, then all the bhikkhus should go to a monastery where the uposatha and Pāṭimokkha are known. Otherwise they all incur dukkaṭas.

Unity

As with all Community transactions, the uposatha observance must be held in unity. Unlike ordinary transactions, however, any bhikkhu residing in the territory who does not participate in the meeting must send his purity (together with his consent, if the bhikkhus are planning to conduct other business at the meeting as well). This will be discussed under the preliminary duties, below.

The Canon deals with three special cases that can interfere with the unity of the meeting: People seize one of the bhikkhus in the territory; bhikkhus arrive late to the meeting; and incoming bhikkhus arrive prior to the meeting. As these incidents are rare, and the procedures for dealing with them fairly complex, they will be discussed below in the section on special cases.

Excluded individuals

Because the act of performing uposatha together is what defines common affiliation in any given territory, the uposatha transaction is unusual among Community transactions in that only bhikkhus in good standing in the Community and in common affiliation are allowed to join in—i.e., sit within hatthapāsa of—the assembly. (The only other Community transaction with the same requirement is the Invitation.) Anyone who recites the Pāṭimokkha (this includes not only the reciter, but anyone who listens to the recitation) in an assembly that includes lay people, bhikkhunīs, female probationers, novices, female novices, ex-bhikkhus, paṇḍakas, or any other types of individuals absolutely forbidden from gaining full Acceptance, incurs a dukkaṭa. There is also a dukkaṭa for reciting the Pāṭimokkha in an assembly that includes a bhikkhu of a separate affiliation, although this penalty holds only if one knows that he is of a separate affiliation and the differences between the affiliations have not been resolved. Anyone who recites the Pāṭimokkha in an assembly that includes a suspended bhikkhu incurs a pācittiya under Pc 69.

Preliminaries

One of the duties of the senior bhikkhu in any monastery is to announce to the others that, “Today is the uposatha day.” The Canon recommends that he announce this in good time (very early in the morning, says the Commentary), but allows him to announce it whenever he remembers during the day (even in the evening, the Commentary says). At an agreed-on time, the Community should meet, with the senior-most bhikkhu coming first. If he doesn’t come first, the Commentary states that he incurs a dukkaṭa.

The Commentary divides the preliminary duties before the uposatha observance into two sets: pubba-karaṇa and pubba-kicca. Both terms mean “preliminary duty,” although the pubba-karaṇa are concerned with preparing the place for the meeting, whereas the pubba-kicca are activities that should be done first when the meeting has convened.

Pubba-karaṇa

The senior bhikkhu has the duty of supervising the other bhikkhus in sweeping the uposatha hall, preparing the seats for the bhikkhus, lighting lamps (if the meeting is held at night or in a dark place), and setting out drinking water and washing water. The senior bhikkhu may order junior bhikkhus to do these things. If, when ordered and not ill, they do not comply, they incur dukkaṭas. The Commentary recommends that the following bhikkhus not be ordered for any of these duties: those doing construction work, those helping with other work, Dhamma teachers, and expert chanters. Others, it says, should be ordered on a rotating roster.

Pubba-kicca

The bhikkhus, once they have met, should convey the consent and purity of any bhikkhus within the territory who have not joined the meeting. Then they should tell the season, count the number of bhikkhus, and arrange for the exhortation of the bhikkhunīs.

Conveying consent has already been discussed in Chapter 12. The rules for conveying purity are the same as those for conveying consent, with two differences: (1) The bhikkhu giving his purity says to the bhikkhu conveying it:

“Pārisuddhiṁ dammi. Pārisuddhiṁ me hara [haratha]. Pārisuddhiṁ me ārocehi [ārocetha]. (I give purity. Convey my purity (or: Convey purity for me). Report my purity (or: Report purity for me.)”

The Sub-commentary notes that a bhikkhu with any unconfessed offenses should first confess them before giving his purity in this way.

(2) The conveying of purity allows the assembly to conduct the uposatha observance, while the conveying of consent allows it to conduct other business. The Commentary notes that if a bhikkhu staying within the territory but not participating in the meeting sends his purity but not his consent, the assembly may perform the uposatha but may not conduct other Community transactions. If he sends his consent but not his purity, they may conduct all Community transactions including the uposatha; he, however, incurs a dukkaṭa for not participating in the uposatha. In other words, the Commentary assumes that while purity cannot take the place of consent in authorizing other communal business, consent can take the place of purity in allowing the Community to conduct the uposatha.

This, however, contradicts Mv.II.22.2, in which an uposatha where an absent bhikkhu has not sent his purity is said to be factional. More importantly, it misses the point of the uposatha, which is not merely to gain the Community’s consent but also to establish its purity. So a better interpretation would be that if the absent bhikkhu has sent his consent but not his purity, the Community may deal with other business but may not perform the uposatha. In the event that there are two or more bhikkhus within the territory who are too ill to give their purity/consent or even to be carried into the meeting, and they are too far apart from each other for the assembly to include them within its hatthapāsa and still have all the bhikkhus within earshot of the reciter, there is no need to conduct the uposatha on that day. Given that this situation could last a long time, preventing any Community transactions within the territory, this may have been one of the inspirations for the practice of designating small territories that do not cover an entire monastery.

The Canon contains an obscure rule stating that the uposatha should not be performed with a “stale” giving of purity unless the gathering has not gotten up from its seats. The Commentary gives two relevant examples of what this might mean: (1) The bhikkhus have met to recite the Pāṭimokkha, and while they wait for late arrivals, the dawn of the next day arrives. If they had planned to hold a 14th day uposatha, then they may go ahead and hold a 15th day uposatha. (If they had planned to hold a 15th day uposatha, then they shouldn’t hold the uposatha, as it is no longer an uposatha day.) (2) The bhikkhus meet, the purity of the bhikkhus not present is conveyed, the assembled bhikkhus change their mind about meeting that day, and then change their mind again. If this last decision comes before they get up from their seats, they may go ahead with the uposatha. If not, they shouldn’t perform the uposatha unless they send some of their members back to reobtain the purity of the bhikkhus not present.

The duty of telling the season is not mentioned in the Canon. The standard procedure is to state the season—hot, rainy, or cold—together with how many uposatha days have passed in the season and how many remain. Even in areas where there are four rather than three seasons, this is a useful way of reminding the bhikkhus of where they are in the lunar calendar so that they don’t lose track of such dates as the beginning of the Rains-residence or the ending of kaṭhina privileges.

The Canon does mention counting the bhikkhus in the assembly, allowing either that names be called or counting-slips be taken.

The exhortation of the bhikkhunīs is discussed in Chapter 23. As the discussion there makes clear, this is a duty preliminary to the Pāṭimokkha only in the sense that the bhikkhu who will exhort the bhikkhunīs is chosen or authorized before the Pāṭimokkha is recited. The actual exhortation takes place later, at a time and place that the exhorter announces to the bhikkhunīs.

Confession

Because a bhikkhu with an unconfessed offense is not allowed to listen to the Pāṭimokkha, the tradition has developed that bhikkhus confess their confessable offenses immediately prior to the meeting. The procedures for doing so, and for dealing with the situation in which all the bhikkhus present have fallen into the same offense, are discussed in BMC1, Appendix VII.

If, prior to listening to the Pāṭimokkha, a bhikkhu has doubt about an offense, he may say so to one of his fellow bhikkhus, promising that when his doubts are cleared up, and it turns out to be an actual offense, he will make amends. He may then listen to the Pāṭimokkha.

If, while listening to the Pāṭimokkha, a bhikkhu either recollects an unconfessed offense or has doubt about one, he should inform a neighboring bhikkhu. He may then continue listening to the Pāṭimokkha. The Commentary adds that if the neighboring bhikkhu is uncongenial, one may simply tell oneself, “When I leave here, I’ll make amends for the offense.”

If Bhikkhu X knows that Bhikkhu Y has an unconfessed offense, he may accuse him of the offense prior to the Pāṭimokkha or, during the motion, may cancel Y’s right to listen to the Pāṭimokkha. As this is a rare event, and the rules surrounding the procedure are complex, they will be discussed below in the section on special cases.

Reciting the Pāṭimokkha

An assembly of four or more bhikkhus observes the uposatha by listening to a recitation of the Pāṭimokkha. The recitation is the duty of the senior bhikkhu or of any junior bhikkhu he invites. A junior bhikkhu who recites the Pāṭimokkha uninvited incurs a dukkaṭa.

The transaction statement for the recitation is a motion that the reciter states at the beginning of the nidāna, the first section of the Pāṭimokkha. While reciting the Pāṭimokkha, the reciter must strive to the best of his ability to make himself heard. If he intentionally tries not to make himself heard, the penalty is a dukkaṭa.

The Canon allows five ways of reciting the Pāṭimokkha:

1) Having recited the nidāna, one may announce the remainder as “heard.”

2) Having recited the nidāna and the four pārājikas, one may announce the remainder as “heard.”

3) Having recited the nidāna, the four pārājikas, and the thirteen saṅghādisesas, one may announce the remainder as “heard.”

4) Having recited the nidāna, the four pārājikas, the thirteen saṅghādisesas, and the two aniyatas, one may announce the remainder as “heard.”

5) In full detail.

Normally, the Pāṭimokkha should be recited in full. However, if any of ten obstructions arise while the Pāṭimokkha is being recited, the remainder of the recitation may be given in brief. As the Commentary says, this means that if an obstruction arises in any of the parts covered by the second through the fourth modes of recitation, the recitation may be cut off in mid-section, with the section in question and all the remaining sections announced as “heard.” If the obstructions arise before the recitation, the Commentary says, the recitation should simply be delayed.

Note that neither the Canon nor the Commentary gives any allowance for breaking off the recitation in the middle of any rule sections from the nissaggiya pācittiya rules onwards.

The ten obstructions (with explanations from the Commentary in brackets) are:

1) a king obstruction [C: a king arrives],

2) a thief obstruction [C: thieves come],

3) a fire obstruction [C: a forest fire approaches from outside the monastery, or a fire breaks out in the monastery (at present, in a village or city monastery, a fire approaching from nearby buildings would also qualify)],

4) a water obstruction [C: heavy rain, a flood],

5) a human being obstruction [C: large numbers of people come],

6) a non-human being obstruction [C: a spirit possesses one of the bhikkhus],

7) a beast obstruction [C: a fierce beast, such as a tiger, comes],

8) a creeping-pest obstruction [C: snakes, etc., bite a bhikkhu],

9) a life obstruction [C: a bhikkhu falls ill or dies; hostile people with murderous intent grab hold of a bhikkhu],

10) a celibacy obstruction [C: people catch hold of one or more bhikkhus with the intent of making them fall from celibacy].

The Canon does not specify how a rule section is to be announced as “heard.” The Commentary recommends the following formula for each “heard” section, replacing “cattāro pārājikā” with the appropriate name and number of the relevant rules in each case:

Sutā kho pan’āyasmantehi (cattāro pārājikā) dhammā….

One then ends with the usual conclusion: Ettakantassa bhagavato… avivādamānehi sikkhitabbaṁ.

The Vinaya-mukha, however, correctly notes that this formula would be more idiomatic if it followed the form of the standard conclusion to the Pāṭimokkha, as follows (giving the example of breaking off in the middle of the saṅghādisesa section):

Uddiṭṭhaṁ kho āyasmanto nidānam, uddiṭṭhā cattāro pārājikā dhammā, sutā terasa saṅghādisesā dhammā…. sutā sattādhikaraṇa-samathā dhammā. Ettakantassa… sikkhitabbaṁ.

Mutual purity

In a group of only three bhikkhus, the Pāṭimokkha may not be recited. Instead, the bhikkhus must declare their mutual purity. To do this, they meet in the uposatha hall, and one of the bhikkhus gives the motion:

Suṇantu me bhante [āvuso] āyasmantā, ajj’uposatho paṇṇaraso [cātuddaso], yad’āyasmantānaṁ pattakallaṁ, mayaṁ aññamaññaṁ pārisuddhi uposathaṁ kareyyāma.

This means: “May the venerable ones listen to me, sirs [friends]. Today is the uposatha of the fifteenth [fourteenth]. If the venerable ones are ready, we should perform our uposatha of mutual purity.”

Then the most senior bhikkhu, with his robe arranged over one shoulder, gets into the kneeling position and, with hands raised in añjali, says three times:

Pārisuddho ahaṁ āvuso. Pārisuddho’ti maṁ dhāretha.

This means: “I, friends, am pure. Remember me as pure.”

Then in descending order of seniority, the other two bhikkhus follow suit, saying (also three times):

Pārisuddho ahaṁ bhante. Pārisuddho’ti maṁ dhāretha.

This changes the “friends” to the more respectful “sirs.”

Purity

If there are only two bhikkhus in the group, they simply declare their purity to each other, without a motion. The more senior bhikkhu, with his robe arranged over one shoulder, gets into the kneeling position and, with hands raised in añjali, says three times:

Pārisuddho ahaṁ āvuso. Pārisuddho’ti maṁ dhārehi.

This means: “I, friend, am pure. Remember me as pure.”

The junior bhikkhu follows suit, with the difference that he says (again, three times):

Pārisuddho ahaṁ bhante. Pārisuddho’ti maṁ dhāretha.

This changes the “friend” to “sir,” and the verb ending to the more respectful plural form.

Determination

If there is only one bhikkhu, he should go to the place where the bhikkhus normally meet for the uposatha—the uposatha hall, a pavilion, or the root of a tree—should sweep the place, should set out drinking water and washing water, should prepare a seat and light a lamp (if it is dark), and then sit down. If other bhikkhus happen to arrive, he should perform the uposatha with them. If not, he should make the following determination:

Ajja me uposatho (Today is my uposatha).

If he does not do this, he incurs a dukkaṭa. The Commentary notes that he may also add the word paṇṇaraso (the fifteenth) or cātuddaso (the fourteenth), as appropriate, to the end of the determination, but this is optional.

Borderline quorums

The Canon states that if there are four bhikkhus in the territory, the Pāṭimokkha is not to be recited by three after the purity of one has been conveyed. The Commentary to Mv.II.14.2 adds that the three should not perform a mutual purity uposatha. This leaves only one option: All four must gather—if necessary, in the dwelling of the bhikkhu who was planning to send his purity—and recite the Pāṭimokkha. Similarly, if there are two or three bhikkhus in the territory, all must attend the uposatha meeting; none of them may have their purity conveyed.

Traveling

On an uposatha day, bhikkhus are forbidden to travel to a place where there are no bhikkhus or where there are only bhikkhus of a separate affiliation. This is to prevent them from avoiding a more difficult form of the uposatha—e.g., reciting the Pāṭimokkha—in favor of an easier one. They are allowed, however, to go to such places if they go as a Community of four or more, or if there are obstructions in the place where they currently are—according to the Commentary, this is a reference to the ten obstructions listed above. The Canon also states that one may go from one monastery to another if the bhikkhus in the second monastery are of the same affiliation and one knows that one can arrive there within the day.

The Commentary states that the prohibitions against traveling do not apply after the uposatha observance has been held or if it has been canceled. However, if one is living alone in the forest and goes to a village for alms on the uposatha day, one should go straight back to one’s residence. If one stops off at another residence, one shouldn’t leave until one has performed the uposatha with the bhikkhus there.

Special cases: unity

As mentioned above, the Canon discusses three special cases that have a bearing on the unity of an uposatha meeting: what to do when a bhikkhu is seized in the territory; when resident bhikkhus arrive late; and when incoming, non-resident bhikkhus arrive prior to the recitation on the uposatha day. These cases will be discussed here.

When a bhikkhu is seized

If relatives, kings (government officials), robbers, mischief-makers, or opponents of the bhikkhus happen to seize a bhikkhu in the territory on the uposatha day, bhikkhus should ask them to release him at least long enough to participate in the uposatha. If they do, well and good. If not, the bhikkhus should ask them to stand aside long enough for him to give his purity. If they do, well and good. If not, the bhikkhus should ask them to take him outside the territory while the Community performs its uposatha. If they do, well and good. If not, the Community may not meet in that territory for the uposatha that day.

When bhikkhus arrive late

If bhikkhus, having assembled for the Pāṭimokkha, begin the recitation only to have others arrive while the recitation is in progress, then if the late-arriving group is larger than the initial group, the Pāṭimokkha should be recited again from the beginning. If the late-arriving group is the same size or smaller than the initial group, then what has been recited is well recited and all that needs to be recited to the full assembly is the remainder of the text.

If the late-arriving bhikkhus come after the Pāṭimokkha has been finished, then—regardless of whether the initial assembly has disbanded—if the late-arriving group is larger than the initial assembly, the bhikkhus should all hear the Pāṭimokkha again. If the late-arriving group is the same size or smaller than the initial group, then the late-arriving group should declare its purity in the presence of the initial group.

These rulings apply regardless of whether either group, initial or late-arriving, is composed of residents or incoming bhikkhus. In all of these cases, the recitation of the initial group is considered valid even though, according to Mv.IX.3.5, the transaction in many of these cases would technically be factional, given that there are other bhikkhus in the territory. However, the perception and intention of the initial group determine whether the bhikkhus in that group incur an offense. If they do not know that the other group is coming, they incur no offense. If they know, see, or hear that the other group is coming, is entering the territory, or has entered the territory, then if they go ahead with the recitation anyhow—perceiving that what they are doing is right even though factional, in doubt as to whether it is right, or with an uneasy conscience—they incur dukkaṭas. If, knowing of the other group, they go ahead with the recitation aiming at schism, they incur thullaccayas.

The fact that intention and perception play an explicit role here is unusual in Community transactions. There is some disagreement as to whether the allowance for these factors here should be read as a special case, applicable only to the recitation of the Pāṭimokkha (and to the Invitation, which follows the same pattern), or as an example of how the general rules concerning the validity of transactions should be interpreted across the board. In particular, it has been argued that, because the initial group’s transaction is valid and free of offense when conducted with no perception of late-arriving bhikkhus, other Community transactions performed with no perception of invalidating factors should be valid and free of offense even if, in fact, such invalidating factors exist.

This argument, however, misses the full implications of the allowances granted in this section. Here all the transactions are valid, even when the initial group knows of the late-arriving bhikkhus and begins the recitation with corrupt motives. If this pattern were applied to all validating factors connected with all Community transactions, there would be no such thing as an invalid transaction. The Canon’s detailed discussions of what invalidates a transaction would be for naught. Thus it seems preferable to regard the allowances here as special exemptions from Mv.IX.3.5 applicable only to the recitation of the Pāṭimokkha and to the Invitation, in recognition of the fact that these transactions are compulsory and take so long.

When non-resident bhikkhus arrive prior

When non-resident bhikkhus arrive prior to the recitation on the uposatha day, if it so happens that the resident bhikkhus and incoming bhikkhus calculate different dates for uposatha, then the proper course of action depends on whether one side sees the date calculated by the other as (1) the fourteenth or fifteenth of the fortnight or (2) as the first day of the next fortnight. In the first case, if the incoming group is larger than the resident group, the latter should accommodate themselves to the former; if not, the former should accommodate themselves to the latter. In the second case, if the resident group sees the date calculated by the incoming group as the first, then if they are smaller, they should either accommodate the incoming group or go outside the territory while the incoming group holds its own uposatha. If they are equal in number or larger than the incoming group, the incoming group should go outside the territory to hold its own uposatha. If, on the other hand, the incoming group sees the date calculated by the resident group as the first, then if they are equal in number or smaller than the resident group, they may either meet with the resident group or go outside the territory while the resident group meets. If they are larger, then the resident group should hold its own uposatha outside the territory.

If, on the uposatha day, incoming bhikkhus detect signs of resident bhikkhus (or vice versa), they are duty bound to search for them. If they don’t, and go ahead and hold their own uposatha, they incur a dukkaṭa. If they search but don’t find them, there is no offense in their holding their own uposatha. If they find them but go ahead and hold their own uposatha anyway, they incur a dukkaṭa. If they do so in order to create a schism, the penalty is a thullaccaya.

When incoming bhikkhus find resident bhikkhus of a separate affiliation but assume that they are of the same affiliation, this is another special case where perception plays a role: There is no offense in their performing the uposatha together. If they find out that the residents are of a separate affiliation and, without resolving their differences (see Chapter 21), perform the uposatha together, both sides incur dukkaṭas. If, without resolving their differences, they hold separate uposathas, there is no offense.

When incoming bhikkhus find resident bhikkhus of the same affiliation but assume that they are of separate affiliations, perception again plays a role: If they perform the uposatha together they incur dukkaṭas. If they resolve their apparent differences but go ahead and perform separate uposathas, they all incur dukkaṭas. If they resolve their differences and perform the uposatha together, there is no offense.

Special cases: accusations

If, when the Community has met for the uposatha, Bhikkhu X suspects Bhikkhu Y of having an unconfessed offense, he may bring up the issue before the Pāṭimokkha is recited. The usual pattern is first to make a formal motion, authorizing oneself or another bhikkhu to ask a question about the Vinaya in the assembly. Similarly, the bhikkhu answering the question must be authorized through a formal motion, made by himself or another bhikkhu. Before asking and answering the question, both the asker and the answerer should look over the assembly and assess the individuals present. Only if they sense no danger in speaking openly should they go ahead with their question. (In the origin story for this rule, some group-of-six bhikkhus took umbrage at the issue being discussed and threatened the other bhikkhus with harm.)

The motion to authorize oneself to ask questions about the Vinaya is:

Suṇātu me bhante saṅgho. Yadi saṅghassa pattakallaṁ ahaṁ Itthannāmaṁ vinayaṁ puccheyyaṁ.

Venerable sirs, may the Community listen to me. If the Community is ready, I would ask so-and-so about the Vinaya.

The motion to authorize another person to ask questions about the Vinaya is:

Suṇātu me bhante saṅgho. Yadi saṅghassa pattakallaṁ Itthannāmo Itthannāmaṁ vinayaṁ puccheyya.

Venerable sirs, may the Community listen to me. If the Community is ready, so-and-so would ask so-and-so about the Vinaya.

The motion to authorize oneself to answer the questions is:

Suṇātu me bhante saṅgho. Yadi saṅghassa pattakallaṁ ahaṁ Itthannāmena vinayaṁ puṭṭho vissajjeyyaṁ.

Venerable sirs, may the Community listen to me. If the Community is ready, I—asked about the Vinaya by so-and-so—would answer.

To authorize another person to answer the questions, say:

Suṇātu me bhante saṅgho. Yadi saṅghassa pattakallaṁ Itthannāmo Itthannāmena vinayaṁ puṭṭho vissajjeyya.

Venerable sirs, may the Community listen to me. If the Community is ready, so-and-so—asked about the Vinaya by so-and-so—would answer.

The purpose of asking and answering questions about the Vinaya in this context is fourfold: (1) The bhikkhu planning to make the accusation has a chance to make sure that his accusation is well-informed; (2) the rules in question can be discussed impartially, for no one as yet has been accused; (3) each bhikkhu is alerted to the fact that an accusation is in the air, has the chance to reflect on whether he has infringed the rules in question, and can make amends before an accusation is made; and (4) the entire Community becomes equally well-informed about the rules in question and can deal knowledgeably with the case. For instance, if the accused bhikkhu has actually broken a rule, admits to the act, but refuses to see it as an offense or to make amends, the Community is in a good position legitimately to suspend him from the Community at large.

After the Vinaya discussion has been brought to a conclusion, and Bhikkhu X still feels that Y has an unconfessed offense, he may either ask Y’s leave to make an accusation before the Pāṭimokkha begins, or—during the motion at the beginning of the recitation—cancel Y’s right to listen to the Pāṭimokkha (see below). (If X believes that Y is pure of an offense but asks leave anyhow, he incurs a dukkaṭa.)

The procedures for asking leave, making an accusation, and settling the issue are discussed in BMC1, under Sg 8 and in Chapter 11.

Special cases: canceling the Pāṭimokkha

To cancel the Pāṭimokkha for another bhikkhu, one must speak up during the motion at the beginning of the recitation and make a formal motion:

Suṇātu me bhante saṅgho. [Itthannāmo puggalo] sāpattiko. Tassa pāṭimokkhaṁ ṭhāpemi. Na tasmiṁ sammukhī-bhūte pāṭimokkhaṁ uddi-sitabbaṁ.

This means: ”May the Community listen to me, venerable sirs. [The individual named so-and-so] has an offense. I cancel his Pāṭimokkha (or: I put the Pāṭimokkha aside for him). The Pāṭimokkha is not to be recited when face-to-face with him.”

If, without grounds, one cancels the Pāṭimokkha for another bhikkhu, one incurs a dukkaṭa. The Canon contains long, extremely redundant lists of requirements that must be met for the cancelation of a bhikkhu’s Pāṭimokkha to be valid. Eliminating redundancies, the requirements come down to any one of the following:

1) One has grounds for suspecting that the bhikkhu has committed a pārājika offense, and the discussion of the relevant offense has been brought to a conclusion.

2) One has grounds for suspecting that the bhikkhu has renounced the training, and the discussion of what it means to renounce the training has been brought to a conclusion.

3) The bhikkhu has not gone along with a Community transaction that was united and in accordance with the Dhamma. According to the Commentary, this means that he didn’t come to the meeting, didn’t give his consent, or he raised an objection to spoil the transaction. Simply in doing this, it says, he incurs a dukkaṭa and his Pāṭimokkha is to be canceled.

4) The bhikkhu has raised an objection to a Community transaction that was united and in accordance with the Dhamma. (This, the Commentary says, means that he insists that the transaction should be done again; in so doing he incurs a pācittiya (under Pc 63) and his Pāṭimokkha is to be canceled.) Furthermore, the discussion of what it means to raise objections to a Community transaction that was united and in accordance with the Dhamma has been brought to a conclusion.

5) The bhikkhu is seen, heard, or suspected to have committed an offense, ranging from a saṅghādisesa to a dukkaṭa or dubbhāsita.

6) The bhikkhu is seen, heard, or suspected to be defective in view (see the discussion in the following chapter). This would be grounds not only for canceling his Pāṭimokkha, but also—if he actually holds such a view and refuses to relinquish it—for imposing a censure transaction on him. If the view is an evil one, as explained under Pc 68, and he refuses to relinquish it, it would be grounds for suspending him. (See Chapter 20.)

Once the Pāṭimokkha has been canceled for Bhikkhu Y, an accusation may be brought against him, and the Community must settle the issue. If the meeting is interrupted because of any of the ten obstructions listed above, one may bring up the matter again later, either there or in another Community in Y’s presence, to have the matter investigated and settled. As long as the matter hasn’t been settled, one may continue canceling the Pāṭimokkha for Y again until it is.

Rules

Uposatha Days

“I allow you, bhikkhus, to gather on the fourteenth, fifteenth, and eighth day of the half-month.”—Mv.II.1.4

“I allow you, bhikkhus, having gathered on the fourteenth, fifteenth, and eighth day of the half-month, to speak Dhamma.”—Mv.II.2.1

“I allow that the Pāṭimokkha be recited.”—Mv.II.3.2

“The Pāṭimokkha should not be recited daily. Whoever should recite it daily: an offense of wrong doing. I allow that the Pāṭimokkha be recited on the uposatha day.”—Mv.II.4.1

“The Pāṭimokkha should not be recited three times in the half-month. Whoever should recite it three times in the half-month: an offense of wrong doing. I allow that the Pāṭimokkha be recited once during the half-month, on the fourteenth or fifteenth day.”—Mv.II.4.2

“I allow that the calculation of the half-month be learned.”—Mv.II.18.1

“I allow that the calculation of the half-month be learned by all.”—Mv.II.18.2

“And the uposatha should not be performed on a non-uposatha day unless for Community-unification.”—Mv.II.36.4

Unity

“The Pāṭimokkha should not be recited by grouping, each with his own grouping. I allow an uposatha transaction for those who are united (§).”—Mv.II.5.1

“I allow that the extent of unity be to the extent of one residence (monastery).”—Mv.II.5.2

Location

“The Pāṭimokkha should not be recited anywhere on the premises without appointing a place. Whoever should do so: an offense of wrong doing. I allow that the uposatha be held after having authorized an uposatha hall as the Community desires: a dwelling, a barrel-vaulted building, a multi-storied building, a gabled building, or a cell.”—Mv.II.8.1

Transaction statement—Mv.II.8.2

“Two uposatha halls should not be authorized in a single residence (monastery). Whoever should do so: an offense of wrong doing. I allow that the uposatha be held in one place, the other having been revoked.”—Mv.II.8.3

Transaction statement for revoking—Mv.II.8.4

“When sitting in a place, regardless of whether it has been authorized, where one hears the Pāṭimokkha, one’s uposatha has been done.”—Mv.II.9.1

Transaction statement for authorizing an area in front of an uposatha hall (§)—Mv.II.9.2

“There is the case where many residences have a common territory. All having been gathered by the bhikkhus in a single place, the uposatha may be held. Or having gathered where the most senior bhikkhu is staying, the uposatha may be held there. But the uposatha should not be held by a faction of the Community. Whoever should do so: an offense of wrong doing.”—Mv.II.11

Is the permission for residences permissible?

What is the permission for residences?

“It is permissible for various residences sharing the same territory to carry out separate uposathas.”

That is not permissible.

Where is it objected to?

In Rājagaha, in the Uposatha-saṁyutta (Mv.II.11 (§)).

What offense is committed?

A dukkaṭa for overstepping the discipline.—Cv.XII.2.8

“There is the case where many bhikkhus—inexperienced, incompetent—are staying in a certain residence on the uposatha day. They do not know the uposatha or the uposatha transaction, the Pāṭimokkha or the recital of the Pāṭimokkha… One bhikkhu should be sent by the bhikkhus to a neighboring residence immediately: ‘Go, friend. Having mastered the Pāṭimokkha in brief or in detail, come back.’—Mv.II.17.3-5

“I allow the senior bhikkhu to order a junior bhikkhu”… “One who is not ill and has been ordered by a senior bhikkhu should not not go. Whoever does not go: an offense of wrong doing.”—Mv.II.17.6

“There is the case where many bhikkhus—inexperienced, incompetent—are staying in a certain residence on the uposatha day. They do not know the uposatha or the uposatha transaction, the Pāṭimokkha or the recital of the Pāṭimokkha… One bhikkhu should be sent by the bhikkhus to a neighboring residence immediately: ‘Go, friend. Having mastered the Pāṭimokkha in brief or in detail, come back.’ If he manages it, well and good. If not, then all the bhikkhus should go to a residence where they know the uposatha or the uposatha transaction, the Pāṭimokkha or the recital of the Pāṭimokkha. If they do not go: an offense of wrong doing.”—Mv.II.21.3

Excluded Individuals

“The Pāṭimokkha should not be recited in a gathering including lay people. Whoever should recite it: an offense of wrong doing.”—Mv.II.16.8

“The Pāṭimokkha should not be recited with a bhikkhunī… a female probationer… a novice… a female novice… one who has renounced the training… one who has committed an extreme (pārājika) offense seated in the gathering. Whoever should recite it: an offense of wrong doing.”—Mv.II.36.1

“The Pāṭimokkha should not be recited with one who has been suspended for not seeing an offense… for not making amends for an offense… for not relinquishing an evil view seated in the gathering. Whoever should recite it is to be dealt with in accordance with the rule (Pc 69).”—Mv.II.36.2

“The Pāṭimokkha should not be recited with a paṇḍaka… a person in affiliation through theft… a bhikkhu who has gone over to another religion… an animal… a matricide… a patricide… a murderer of an arahant… a molester of a bhikkhunī… a schismatic… one who has shed (a Tathāgata’s) blood… a hermaphrodite seated in the gathering. Whoever should recite it: an offense of wrong doing.”—Mv.II.36.3

See also Mv.II.34.10, below.

Preliminaries

“I allow that it be announced, ‘Today is the uposatha day’”… “I allow that the senior bhikkhu announce it in good time”… “I allow that it be announced at the time of the meal”… “I allow that it be announced at whatever time he remembers it.”—Mv.II.19

“I allow that on the uposatha day (the bhikkhus) gather with the most senior bhikkhus coming first (§).”—Mv.II.10

Pubba-karaṇa

“I allow that the uposatha hall be swept.”—Mv.II.20.1

“I allow the senior bhikkhu to order a junior bhikkhu”… “One who is not ill and has been ordered by a senior bhikkhu should not not sweep. Whoever does not sweep: an offense of wrong doing.”—Mv.II.20.2

“I allow that seats be prepared in the uposatha hall.” “I allow the senior bhikkhu to order a junior bhikkhu”… “One who is not ill and has been ordered by a senior bhikkhu should not not prepare a seat. Whoever does not prepare a seat: an offense of wrong doing.”—Mv.II.20.3

“I allow that a light be made in the uposatha hall.” “I allow the senior bhikkhu to order a junior bhikkhu”… “One who is not ill and has been ordered by a senior bhikkhu should not not light a light. Whoever does not light a light: an offense of wrong doing.”—Mv.II.20.4

“I allow that drinking water and washing water be set out.”—Mv.II.20.5

“I allow the senior bhikkhu to order a junior bhikkhu”… “One who is not ill and has been ordered by a senior bhikkhu should not not set out drinking water and washing water. Whoever does not set it out: an offense of wrong doing.”—Mv.II.20.6

Pubba-kicca

“I allow that an ill bhikkhu give his purity (§).”—Mv.II.22.1

How purity is given, what to do if an ill bhikkhu is too ill to give his purity, what to do if he is too ill to move. “Not even then should the uposatha transaction be performed by a faction of the Community. If it should perform it: an offense of wrong doing.”—Mv.II.22.2

When purity has to be re-given (if the conveyor of purity goes away then and there, if he renounces the training, if he admits (§) to being a novice, to having renounced the training, to having committed an extreme offense, to being insane… possessed… delirious with pain… suspended for not seeing an offense… suspended for not making amends for an offense… suspended for not relinquishing an evil view… a paṇḍaka… one living in affiliation by theft, to having gone over to another religion, to being an animal, a matricide, a patricide, the murderer of an arahant, the molester of a bhikkhunī, a schismatic, one who has shed a Tathāgata’s blood, or a hermaphrodite).—Mv.II.22.3

When purity counts as conveyed and not conveyed (as with consent at Mv.II.23.3 (see Chapter 12)). “If the conveyor of purity, having been given (another bhikkhu’s) purity, on arriving in the Community intentionally does not announce it, the purity is conveyed but the conveyor of purity incurs an offense of wrong doing.”—Mv.II.22.4

“I allow on the uposatha day, when purity is given, that consent be given as well, when the Community has something to be done (§).”—Mv.II.23.3

“The uposatha should not be performed with a ‘stale’ giving of purity (§) unless the gathering has not gotten up from its seats.”—Mv.II.36.4

“I allow that the bhikkhus be counted.”—Mv.II.18.3

“I allow that on the uposatha day names be counted (roll call be taken (§)) or that tickets be taken.”—Mv.II.18.4

Confession

“The Pāṭimokkha should not be heard by a bhikkhu with an offense.”—Cv.IX.2

“Just as, when questioned individually, one should answer, the same holds true when in this assembly the declaration (at the end of each section) is made three times. Should any bhikkhu, when the declaration is made three times, remember an existing offense but not reveal it, that is a deliberate lie.…What is a deliberate lie? A dukkaṭa offense.”—Mv.II.3.3; Mv.II.3.7

Procedure for confessing an offense—Mv.II.27.1

Procedures to follow when a bhikkhu has doubts about an offense committed on an uposatha day—Mv.II.27.2

Procedures to follow when a bhikkhu remembers an offense or becomes doubtful about an offense while the Pāṭimokkha is being recited—Mv.II.27.4-5

“An offense common to one another should not be confessed. Whoever should confess it: an offense of wrong doing”… “An offense common to one another should not be received. Whoever should receive it: an offense of wrong doing.”—Mv.II.27.3

Procedures to follow when the Community has an offense in common—Mv.II.27.6-15 (See BMC1, Appendix VII.)

Recitation of the Pāṭimokkha

“I allow that the Pāṭimokkha be recited when there are four.”—Mv.II.26.1

“The Pāṭimokkha should not be recited in the midst of the Community by one who is uninvited. Whoever should recite it: an offense of wrong doing. I allow that the Pāṭimokkha be entrusted to the senior bhikkhu (reading therādheyyaṁ with the Sri Lankan edition).”—Mv.II.16.9

“I allow that the Pāṭimokkha be entrusted to any bhikkhu there who is experienced and competent.”—Mv.II.17.2

Motion—Mv.II.3.3

“One reciting the Pāṭimokkha should not intentionally not make himself be heard (§). Whoever should do so: an offense of wrong doing.”—Mv.II.16.6

“I allow that one reciting the Pāṭimokkha make an effort—‘How may I make myself be heard?’ For one making an effort: no offense.”—Mv.II.16.7

Five ways of reciting the Pāṭimokkha:

1) Having recited the nidāna, the rest may be announced as ‘heard.’

2) Having recited the nidāna, having recited the four pārājikas, the rest may be announced as ‘heard.’

3) Having recited the nidāna, having recited the four pārājikas, having recited the thirteen saṅghadisesas, the rest may be announced as ‘heard.’

4) Having recited the nidāna, having recited the four pārājikas, having recited the thirteen saṅghadisesas, having recited the two aniyatas, the rest may be announced as ‘heard.’

5) In full detail.—Mv.II.15.1

“The Pāṭimokkha is not to be recited in brief. Whoever should recite it in brief: an offense of wrong doing.”—Mv.II.15.2

“I allow that, when there is an obstruction, the Pāṭimokkha be recited in brief.”—Mv.II.15.3

“When there is no obstruction, the Pāṭimokkha is not to be recited in brief. Whoever should recite it in brief: an offense of wrong doing. I allow that, when there is an obstruction, the Pāṭimokkha be recited in brief. These are the obstructions there: a king obstruction, a thief obstruction, a fire obstruction, a water obstruction, a human being obstruction, a non-human being obstruction, a beast obstruction, a creeping-pest obstruction, a life obstruction, a celibacy obstruction. I allow, when there are obstructions of this sort, that the Pāṭimokkha be recited in brief.”—Mv.II.15.4

Mutual Purity & Determination

“I allow that a purity-uposatha be performed when there are three.”—Mv.II.26.2

Procedure.—Mv.II.26.3-4

“I allow that a purity-uposatha be performed when there are two.”—Mv.II.26.5

Procedure.—Mv.II.26.6-7

“There is the case where a bhikkhu is staying alone in a residence when the uposatha day comes. Having swept the place where the bhikkhus gather—an attendance hall, a pavilion, or the root of a tree—having set out drinking water and washing water, having made seats ready, having lit a light, he should sit down. If other bhikkhus arrive, the uposatha should be performed together with them. If not, it should be determined: ‘Today is my uposatha.’ If it is not determined: an offense of wrong doing.”—Mv.II.26.9

“Where four bhikkhus are staying, the Pāṭimokkha is not to be recited by three after having brought the purity of one. If they should recite it: an offense of wrong doing. Where three bhikkhus are staying, the purity-uposatha is not to be performed by two after having brought the purity of one. If they should perform it: an offense of wrong doing. Where two bhikkhus are staying, (the uposatha) is not to be determined by one after having brought the purity of the other. If he should determine it: an offense of wrong doing.”—Mv.II.26.10

“On an uposatha day, one should not go from a residence with bhikkhus to a residence without bhikkhus… to a non-residence without bhikkhus… to a residence or non-residence without bhikkhus, unless going with a Community, unless there are obstructions.”—Mv.II.35.1

“One should not go from a non-residence with bhikkhus…”—Mv.II.35.2

“One should not go from a residence or non-residence with bhikkhus…”—Mv.II.35.3

“One should not go from a residence with no bhikkhus to a residence with no bhikkhus… (all permutations)”—Mv.II.35.3 [This passage appears in the PTS edition, but in none of the others. Apparently, it is a mistake.]

“One should not go from a residence with bhikkhus to a residence with bhikkhus belonging to a separate affiliation, unless going with a Community, unless there are obstructions… (all permutations)”—Mv.II.35.4

“On an uposatha day, one may go from a residence with bhikkhus… to a non-residence… to either a residence or a non-residence… from a non-residence… etc., to another residence with bhikkhus belonging to the same affiliation and one knows, ‘I can arrive within the day.’”—Mv.II.35.5

Unity (Special Cases)

“There is the case where relatives seize a bhikkhu on an uposatha day. They should be addressed by the bhikkhus, ‘Please, sirs, will you release this bhikkhu for a moment while he performs the uposatha?’ If this can be managed, well and good. If not, the relatives should be addressed by the bhikkhus, ‘Please, sirs, will you move aside for a moment while the bhikkhu gives his purity?’ If this can be managed, well and good. If not, the relatives should be addressed by the bhikkhus, ‘Please, sirs, will you take this bhikkhu outside the territory for a moment while the Community performs the uposatha?’ If this can be managed, well and good. If not, then not even then should a transaction be performed by a faction of the Community. If it should perform it: an offense of wrong doing.”—Mv.II.24.1-2

Bhikkhus are seized by kings… robbers… mischief-makers… opponents of the bhikkhus—Mv.II.24.3

What to do when other resident bhikkhus unexpectedly arrive while the Pāṭimokkha is being recited: The transaction is valid, and there is no offense.—Mv.II.28

When other resident bhikkhus are expected but initial bhikkhus recite the Pāṭimokkha anyway: The transaction is valid, but an offense of wrong doing.—Mv.II.29

When other resident bhikkhus are expected and the initial bhikkhus, while in doubt about what to do, recite the Pāṭimokkha anyway: The transaction is valid, but an offense of wrong doing.—Mv.II.30

When other resident bhikkhus are expected and the initial bhikkhus decide that it’s all right to recite the Pāṭimokkha anyway, but do so with an uneasy conscience (§): The transaction is valid, but an offense of wrong doing.—Mv.II.31

When other resident bhikkhus are expected and the initial bhikkhus, aiming at schism, recite the Pāṭimokkha anyway: The transaction is valid, but a grave offense.—Mv.II.32

Rulings in Mv.II.28-32 applied to cases where the initial resident bhikkhus know, see, or hear that other resident bhikkhus are entering or have entered the territory. Rulings in Mv.II.28 through the first part of Mv.II.33 applied to cases where the first group of bhikkhus are incoming and the second group are residents; the first are residents and the second are incoming; and the first are incoming and the second are incoming.—Mv.II.33

Resident bhikkhus and incoming bhikkhus calculate different dates for the uposatha.—Mv.II.34.1-4

“There is the case where incoming bhikkhus see signs of resident bhikkhus, and on seeing them become doubtful: ‘Are there resident bhikkhus or not?’ Being doubtful, they do not search for them. Not searching, they perform the uposatha: an offense of wrong doing.

“Being doubtful, they search for them. Searching for them, they do not see them. Not seeing them, they perform the uposatha: no offense.

“Being doubtful, they search for them. Searching for them, they see them. Seeing them, they perform the uposatha together with them: no offense.

“Being doubtful, they search for them. Searching for them, they see them. Seeing them, they perform the uposatha separately: an offense of wrong doing.

“Being doubtful, they search for them. Searching for them, they see them. Seeing them, thinking ‘They are expelled. They are destroyed. Who has need of them? (§)’ they perform the uposatha separately, aiming at schism: a grave offense.”—Mv.II.34.5-6

Incoming bhikkhus hear signs of resident bhikkhus.—Mv.II.34.7

Resident bhikkhus see signs of incoming bhikkhus.—Mv.II.34.8

Resident bhikkhus hear signs of incoming bhikkhus.—Mv.II.34.9

“There is the case where incoming bhikkhus see resident bhikkhus of a separate affiliation. They get the idea that they are of the same affiliation. Having gotten the idea that they are of the same affiliation, they don’t ask. Not having asked, they perform the uposatha together: no offense.

“They ask. Having asked, they don’t resolve their differences (§). Not having resolved their differences, they perform the uposatha together: an offense of wrong doing.

“They ask. Having asked, they don’t resolve their differences. Not having resolved their differences, they perform the uposatha separately: no offense.”—Mv.II.34.10

“There is the case where incoming bhikkhus see resident bhikkhus of the same affiliation. They get the idea that they are of a separate affiliation. Having gotten the idea that they are of a separate affiliation, they don’t ask. Not having asked, they perform the uposatha together: an offense of wrong doing.

“They ask. Having asked, they resolve their differences. Having resolved their differences, they perform the uposatha separately: an offense of wrong doing.

“They ask. Having asked, they resolve their differences. Having resolved their differences, they perform the uposatha together: no offense.”—Mv.II.34.11

“There is the case where resident bhikkhus see incoming bhikkhus of a separate affiliation. They get the idea that they are of the same affiliation… ”—Mv.II.34.12

“There is the case where resident bhikkhus see incoming bhikkhus of the same affiliation. They get the idea that they are of a separate affiliation… ”—Mv.II.34.13

Accusations

“Vinaya is not to be asked about in the midst of the Community by one who is unauthorized. I allow that Vinaya be asked about in the midst of the Community by one who has been authorized (by oneself or by another).”—Mv.II.15.6

“I allow that Vinaya be asked about in the midst of the Community by one who has been authorized after having looked over the assembly and having assessed the individuals.”—Mv.II.15.8

“Vinaya (questioning) is not to be answered in the midst of the Community by one who is unauthorized. I allow that Vinaya (questioning) be answered in the midst of the Community by one who has been authorized (by oneself or by another).”—Mv.II.15.9

“I allow that Vinaya (questioning) be answered in the midst of the Community by one who has been authorized after having looked over the assembly and having assessed the individuals.”—Mv.II.15.11

“A bhikkhu who has not given leave is not to be charged with an offense. Whoever should charge (him): an offense of wrong doing”… “I allow you to charge a bhikkhu with an offense after having him give leave, ‘May the venerable one give leave. I want to speak with you’”… (Some group-of-six bhikkhus, after having given leave, took umbrage when charged with an offense and threatened their accusers with harm) “I allow you, even when leave has been given, to charge the individual after having assessed him”… “One should not—without ground, without reason—get pure bhikkhus without offenses to give leave. Whoever should get them to give leave: an offense of wrong doing. I allow you to give leave after having assessed the individual.” ((§)—reading kātuṁ with the Burmese edition; other editions read, “I allow you to make an individual give leave (kārāpetuṁ) after having assessed him.”)—Mv.II.16.1-3

Five questions to ask when one wants to take on an issue oneself (to involve oneself in an issue—attādānaṁ; according to the Commentary, atta here means both “self” and “taken up.”):

1)“Is it the right time or not?”

2) “Is it something that has actually happened (factual), or not?”

3) “Is it connected with the goal (or: the matter at hand) or not?”

4) “Will I gain as companions and associates bhikkhus who are partisans on the side of the Dhamma and Vinaya, or not?”

5) “Will there be from this source strife, quarrel, dispute, contention, a split in the Community, a crack in the Community, altercation in the Community, differences in the Community, or not?”—Cv.IX.4

Five questions to ask when one wants to level a charge against another:

1) “Am I pure in my bodily conduct, endowed with pure bodily conduct, flawless and without fault? Is this quality found in me or not?” (Otherwise, there will be those who will say to him: “Please, sir, train yourself in what pertains to the body.”)

2) “Am I pure in my verbal conduct, endowed with pure verbal conduct, flawless and without fault? Is this quality found in me or not?” (Otherwise, there will be those who will say to him: “Please, sir, train yourself in what pertains to speech.”)

3) “Have I established an attitude of good will, free of hatred, toward my fellows in the holy life? Is this quality found in me or not?” (Otherwise, there will be those who will say to him: “Please, sir, establish an attitude of good will toward your fellows in the holy life.”)

4) “Have I heard much, retained what I have heard, stored what I have heard? Those teachings that are admirable in the beginning, admirable in the middle, admirable in the end, that—in their meaning and expression—proclaim the holy life that is utterly complete, surpassingly pure: have I listened to them often, retained, discussed, accumulated, examined them with my mind, and well-penetrated them in terms of my views, or not?” (Otherwise, there will be those who will say to him: “Please, sir, master what has been handed down.”)

5) “Have both Pāṭimokkhas, in detail, been properly handed down to me, properly explicated; properly ‘revolved’ (in terms of the ‘wheels’); properly judged, clause by clause, letter by letter?” (Otherwise, there will be those who will say to him: “Please, sir, master the Vinaya.”)—Cv.IX.5.1

Five qualities to establish in oneself before leveling a charge:

1) “I will speak at the right time, not at the wrong time.” [C: “the right time” = one on one; “the wrong time” = e.g., in the midst of the Community, in the midst of a group, in a lottery hall, in a conjey hall, in a sitting hall, on an alms path, when supporters are giving an invitation to request requisites.]

2) “I will say what is factual, not what is not factual.”

3) “I will speak gently, and not harshly.”

4) “I will say what is connected with the goal (or: the matter at hand), not what is unconnected to the goal (the matter at hand).”

5) “I will speak with an attitude of good will, and not with inner aversion.”—Cv.IX.5.2

If one does not follow these considerations, one will have need for remorse for having leveled a charge not in accordance with the Dhamma, and the accused will have no need for remorse.—Cv.IX.5.3-4

If one does follow these considerations, one will have no need for remorse for having leveled a charge not in accordance with the Dhamma, whereas the accused will have need for remorse.—Cv.IX.5.5-6

Five qualities to attend to inwardly when leveling a charge: compassion, seeking (the other’s) welfare, sympathy, removal of offenses, esteem for the Vinaya.—Cv.IX.5.7

Two qualities to remain established in when being charged: the truth and unprovocabilty.—Cv.IX.5.7

Canceling the Pāṭimokkha

“The Pāṭimokkha should not be listened to by a bhikkhu with an offense. Whoever should listen to it (when with an offense): an offense of wrong doing. I allow that when (a bhikkhu) with an offense listens to the Pāṭimokkha that his Pāṭimokkha be canceled (or: that the Pāṭimokkha be canceled for him).” Procedure and transaction statement (motion). (The note in BD is mistaken here.)—Cv.IX.2

“The Pāṭimokkha is not to be canceled without grounds, without reason, for bhikkhus who are pure and without offense. Whoever should cancel it: an offense of wrong doing.”—Cv.IX.3.1

Lists of cancelations of the Pāṭimokkha that are and are not in accordance with the Dhamma. When eliminating redundancies, the following lists remain:

“Which seven cancelations of the Pāṭimokkha are not in accordance with the Dhamma? The Pāṭimokkha is canceled on an unfounded (charge of a) pārājika. The Pāṭimokkha is canceled on an unfounded (charge of a) saṅghādisesa. The Pāṭimokkha is canceled on an unfounded (charge of a) thullaccaya. The Pāṭimokkha is canceled on an unfounded (charge of a) pācittiya. The Pāṭimokkha is canceled on an unfounded (charge of a) pāṭidesanīya. The Pāṭimokkha is canceled on an unfounded (charge of a) dukkaṭa. The Pāṭimokkha is canceled on an unfounded (charge of a) dubbhāsita. These are seven cancelations of the Pāṭimokkha that are not in accordance with the Dhamma.

“Which seven cancelations of the Pāṭimokkha are in accordance with the Dhamma? The Pāṭimokkha is canceled on a founded (charge of a) pārājika. The Pāṭimokkha is canceled on a founded (charge of a) saṅghādisesa. The Pāṭimokkha is canceled on a founded (charge of a) thullaccaya. The Pāṭimokkha is canceled on a founded (charge of a) pācittiya. The Pāṭimokkha is canceled on a founded (charge of a) pāṭidesanīya. The Pāṭimokkha is canceled on a founded (charge of a) dukkaṭa. The Pāṭimokkha is canceled on a founded (charge of a) dubbhāsita. These are seven cancelations of the Pāṭimokkha that are in accordance with the Dhamma.

“Which eight cancelations of the Pāṭimokkha are not in accordance with the Dhamma? The Pāṭimokkha is canceled on an unfounded (charge of) a defect in virtue [a pārajika or saṅghādisesa offense—Mv.IV.16.12] that has not been done. The Pāṭimokkha is canceled on an unfounded (charge of) a defect in virtue that has been done (by someone else). The Pāṭimokkha is canceled on an unfounded (charge of) a defect in conduct [a thullaccaya, a pācittiya, a pāṭidesanīya, a dukkaṭa, or a dubbhāsita offense—Mv.IV.16.12] that has not been done. The Pāṭimokkha is canceled on an unfounded (charge of) a defect in conduct that has been done (by someone else). The Pāṭimokkha is canceled on an unfounded (charge of) a defect in view [a wrong view or a view holding to an extreme—Mv.IV.16.12] that has not been done. The Pāṭimokkha is canceled on an unfounded (charge of) a defect in view that has been done (by someone else). The Pāṭimokkha is canceled on an unfounded (charge of) a defect in livelihood that has not been done. The Pāṭimokkha is canceled on an unfounded (charge of) a defect in livelihood that has been done (by someone else). These are eight cancelations of the Pāṭimokkha that are not in accordance with the Dhamma.

“Which eight cancelations of the Pāṭimokkha are in accordance with the Dhamma? The Pāṭimokkha is canceled on a founded (charge of) a defect in virtue that has not (in fact) been done. The Pāṭimokkha is canceled on a founded (charge of) a defect in virtue that has been done. The Pāṭimokkha is canceled on a founded (charge of) a defect in conduct that has not (in fact) been done. The Pāṭimokkha is canceled on a founded (charge of) a defect in conduct that has been done. The Pāṭimokkha is canceled on a founded (charge of) a defect in view that has not (in fact) been done. The Pāṭimokkha is canceled on a founded (charge of) a defect in view that has been done. The Pāṭimokkha is canceled on a founded (charge of) a defect in livelihood that has not (in fact) been done. The Pāṭimokkha is canceled on a founded (charge of) a defect in livelihood that has been done. These are eight cancelations of the Pāṭimokkha that are in accordance with the Dhamma.

“Which ten cancelations of the Pāṭimokkha are not in accordance with the Dhamma?

1) One who has committed a pārājika is not sitting in that assembly.

2) Discussion of pārājika offenses has not been brought to a

conclusion.

3) One who has renounced the training is not sitting in that assembly.

4) Discussion of the renouncing of the training has not been brought to a conclusion.

5) He has gone along with (a transaction that is) in accordance with the Dhamma and united.

6) He has not raised an objection to (a transaction that is) in accordance with the Dhamma and united.

7) Discussion of raising objections to (a transaction that is) in accordance with the Dhamma and united has not been brought to a conclusion.

8) He is not seen, heard, or suspected to be defective in his virtue.

9) He is not seen, heard, or suspected to be defective in his conduct.

10) He is not seen, heard, or suspected to be defective in his views.

These are ten cancelations of the Pāṭimokkha that are not in accordance with the Dhamma.

“Which ten cancelations of the Pāṭimokkha are in accordance with the Dhamma?

1) One who has committed a pārājika is sitting in that assembly.

2) Discussion of pārājika offenses has been brought to a conclusion.

3) One who has renounced the training is sitting in that assembly.

4) Discussion of the renouncing of the training has been brought to a conclusion.

5) He has not gone along with (a transaction that is) in accordance with the Dhamma and united.

6) He has raised an objection to (a transaction that is) in accordance with the Dhamma and united.

7) Discussion of raising objections to (a transaction that is) in accordance with the Dhamma and united has been brought to a conclusion.

8) He is seen, heard, or suspected to be defective in his virtue.

9) He is seen, heard, or suspected to be defective in his conduct.

10) He is seen, heard, or suspected to be defective in his views.

These are ten cancelations of the Pāṭimokkha that are in accordance with the Dhamma.”—Cv.IX.3.3

An explanation of the above: For example, “one who has committed a pārājika is sitting in that assembly”—

Bhikkhu X either sees Bhikkhu Y acting in a way that looks like a pārājika; or someone else tells him that Y has committed a pārājika; or Y himself tells him that he (Y) has committed a pārājika. If X so desires, he may announce this fact in the midst of the assembly and cancel the Pāṭimokkha for Y. If for any of the ten obstructions the meeting is interrupted, then X may bring up the matter again, either there or in another Community in Y’s presence, to have the matter investigated. If he doesn’t succeed in having it investigated, he may cancel the Pāṭimokkha for Y again.—Cv.IX.3.4

Similarly for the rest of the ten reasons given above—Cv.IX.3.5-9

CHAPTER SIXTEEN

Invitation

As we noted in the preceding chapter, the uposatha observance regularly provides an opportunity for bhikkhus to accuse their fellows of any offenses that the latter may have committed without making amends. However, there are many factors that might dissuade a bhikkhu from taking advantage of these regular meetings to make such an accusation. The recitation of the Pāṭimokkha may be so time-consuming that he is reluctant to prolong the meeting. During the months outside of the Rains the composition of the Community may be so variable from week to week that he is uncertain of their ability or willingness to judge the issue fairly, and they themselves may be in a poor position to judge the reliability of the accused and his accuser. During the months of the Rains-residence, however, when the Community is more stable, his reluctance to break his Rains may prevent him from bringing up the issue if he senses that the person he wants to accuse, or the accused’s cohorts, are likely to retaliate. This being the case, he might feel tempted to put his personal convenience and comfort ahead of the Vinaya, and the accusation would never get a hearing.

For this reason, the Buddha allowed that, once a year at the end of the Rains-residence, bhikkhus who have observed the Rains without break may replace one uposatha observance with an Invitation (pavāraṇā), at which each gives the opportunity to his fellows to accuse him of any offense that they may have seen, heard, or suspected him of committing. If the Invitation proceeds without accusation, the bhikkhus are then free to go their separate ways, each with a clean reputation. If there is an accusation, this is the time to settle it once and for all.

The meeting at which this invitation is given is an ideal time to settle such issues. Because the Pāṭimokkha is not being recited—and because there are provisions for shortening the Invitation procedure in the event of a long, drawn-out discussion—there is more time to consider an accusation. Because the participating bhikkhus, for the most part, have lived together for three months, they are in a good position to assess the character both of the accuser and the accused. Because the Rains-residence ends the following morning, the accuser has less reason to fear retaliation from the accused, as he is under no compulsion to remain with the Community.

In addition, the rules surrounding the Invitation encourage an atmosphere in which accusations may be heard. On the one hand, with every participant expected to invite accusations, anyone who refuses to give leave for an accusation looks like he has something to hide. If the Community judges the accuser to be competent and knowledgeable, they can override the accused’s refusal to give leave and proceed to interrogate him. On the other hand, if a bhikkhu suspects one of his fellows of having committed an offense but does not at least bring up the issue in the Invitation meeting, he incurs an offense if he tries to bring it up at a later date. In this way, both sides are given incentives to put the Vinaya ahead of their own immediate convenience and comfort. As the Buddha said when making the original allowance for the Invitation, its purpose is to promote mutual conformity among the bhikkhus, to help them rise out of their offenses, and to foster their esteem for the Vinaya.

Because the Invitation acts as an alternate version of the uposatha observance, many of the rules surrounding it are the same as those surrounding the uposatha. In this chapter we will focus primarily on areas where the rules and procedures are different.

Invitation days

Invitation is normally held on the last day of the Rains-residence. However, if the bhikkhus so desire, they may delay the Invitation either one or two fortnights, but no more. In either case, the Invitation day, like a normal uposatha day, must be held on the last day of the fortnight. The possible reasons for delay are two:

1) The bhikkhus who have been living together have achieved a level of comfort and harmony that they would not like to lose. As the Invitation marks the time when the bhikkhus will begin to go their separate ways, they may delay the Invitation to prolong that sense of comfort and harmony for up to a month. The Commentary claims that this allowance applies only in cases where at least one of the members of the Community is meditating, his mental steadiness (samatha) and insight (vipassanā) are still weak, and he has not yet reached Stream-entry. There is nothing in the Canon, however, to support this claim.

2) Hostile bhikkhus in one monastery are planning to make use of the Invitation to open up strife and quarrels with the well-behaved group in a neighboring monastery. In this case, the bhikkhus in the neighboring monastery may delay the Invitation to elude the potential quarrel. The Canon’s recommendations for this move are long and involved, and so will be discussed as a special case, below.

If a Community decides to delay its Invitation, then all its members should attend a meeting on the full-moon day at the end of the first Rains. According to the Commentary, this means that none of them are allowed to send their consent instead. One of them then makes a motion and proclamation to delay the Invitation (see Appendix I). The bhikkhus then perform the uposatha as usual.

In addition to the fourteenth and fifteenth, there is also a unity Invitation day, on the model of the unity uposatha day. This, the Commentary says, may be held between the first day after the first Rains and the full moon day marking the end of the second Rains. Like the unity uposatha day, it adds, this Invitation may be held only after settling a major break in the Community.

Conveying invitation

Instead of giving his purity, a bhikkhu living in the territory who is too ill to attend the meeting must give his invitation. The rules surrounding the giving and conveying of an invitation are the same as those surrounding the giving and conveying of purity, with two exceptions:

1) The bhikkhu giving his invitation says to the bhikkhu conveying it,

“Pavāraṇaṁ dammi. Pavāraṇaṁ me hara [haratha]. Mam’atthāya pavārehi [pavāretha]. (I give (my) invitation. Convey my invitation (or: Convey the invitation for me). Invite on my behalf.)”

2) The Commentary says that the bhikkhu conveying the invitation, instead of simply announcing it to the assembly, must actually invite on behalf of the ill bhikkhu when that bhikkhu’s turn comes in terms of seniority, as follows:

Itthannāmo bhante bhikkhu saṅghaṁ pavāreti. Diṭṭhena vā sutena vā parisaṅkāya vā, vadatu taṁ bhante saṅgho anukampaṁ upādāya, passanto paṭikkarissati. Dutiyam-pi bhante Itthannāmo bhikkhu… Tatiyam-pi bhante Itthannāmo bhikkhu saṅghaṁ pavāreti…. Passanto paṭikkarissati.

This means: “Venerable sirs, the bhikkhu named so-and-so invites the Community. With regard to what is seen, heard, or suspected, venerable sirs, may the Community speak to him out of sympathy. On seeing (the offense), he will make amends. A second time…. A third time, venerable sirs, the bhikkhu named so-and-so invites the Community…. On seeing (the offense), he will make amends.”

If the bhikkhu giving his invitation is senior to the one conveying it, Itthannāmo bhante bhikkhu should be changed to Āyasmā bhante Itthannāmo. The Vinaya-mukha recommends adding the word gilāno after the bhikkhu’s name, which changes the first sentence to, “Venerable sirs, the bhikkhu named so-and-so, who is ill, invites the Community.” Neither the Commentary nor the Sub-commentary mentions this point.

As with the uposatha, if the Community is going to use the meeting to perform any other business in addition to the Invitation, they will require the ill bhikkhu’s consent as well.

Preliminary duties

Preliminary duties for the Invitation are the same as for the uposatha except that, as mentioned above, the conveying of an ill bhikkhu’s invitation takes place not before the motion, but after the motion when his turn comes in terms of seniority.

Quorum

If the assembly that has gathered for the Invitation numbers five or more, they invite as a Community. If two to four, they perform a mutual Invitation. If one, he determines his Invitation. The situation in which not all of the bhikkhus present can participate in the Invitation—either because they have broken their Rains, were ordained during the Rains, are observing the second Rains while the others have observed the first, or observed the first Rains while the others are finishing the second—will be discussed as a special case, below.

Community Invitation

Community Invitation starts with a motion, after which each of the bhikkhus invites the Community—normally, three times. If the Community is pressed for time, it may agree to have each bhikkhu invite only twice, only once, or it may have all the bhikkhus with the same number of Rains invite in unison. The Canon lists the following situations as valid reasons for shortening the procedure in these ways: Savages are menacing the Community, many people have come giving gifts until late at night, a Dhamma or Vinaya discussion has lasted until late at night, bhikkhus have been quarreling until late at night, a great cloud threatening rain has come up, or any of the ten obstructions mentioned in Mv.II.15.4 occurs. The Vinaya-mukha argues that an especially large number of bhikkhus in the assembly should also be a valid reason for shortening the procedure, so as not to inflict too great a hardship on the junior bhikkhus, who must stay in the kneeling position until they have given their invitation. Once the bhikkhus have decided how many times each one will invite, the motion should reflect the decision. The Canon indicates that if they choose not to have each bhikkhu state his invitation three times, the motion should include their reason for doing so. However, the Pubbasikkhā-vaṇṇanā cites an old tradition that treats this as optional, apparently for the sake of bhikkhus not well-versed in Pali who would find it hard to compose such a motion in the proper form. I have been unable to trace the source of this tradition in the commentaries, but it would fit under the allowance given in Pv.XIX.1.3-4 (see Chapter 12). I will give the Pubbasikkhā-vaṇṇanā’s recommendations here, and the Canon’s in Appendix I.

If each bhikkhu is to state his invitation three times, the motion is:

Suṇātu me bhante saṅgho. Ajja pavāraṇā paṇṇarasī [cātuddasī]. Yadi saṅghassa pattakallaṁ, saṅgho te-vācikaṁ pavāreyya.

This means: “Venerable sirs, may the Community listen to me. Today is the Invitation day on the fifteenth [fourteenth]. If the Community is ready, the Community should invite with three statements.”

For a unity Invitation, change paṇṇarasī to sāmaggī.

If each bhikkhu is to state his invitation twice, the word te-vācikaṁ should be changed to dve-vācikaṁ. If once, to eka-vācikaṁ.

The tradition cited by the Pubbasikkhā-vaṇṇanā states that when either of these two shortened forms is used, a bhikkhu may state his invitation up to three times if he likes, but he may not state it fewer times than called for in the motion. In other words, if the motion is for two times, he may state his invitation two or three times, but not just once.

If bhikkhus with equal rains are to invite in unison, the phrase saṅgho tevācikaṁ pavāreyya should be changed to saṅgho samāna-vassikaṁ pavāreyya, which means, “The Community should invite in the manner of equal Rains.”

The tradition cited by the Pubbasikkhā-vaṇṇanā also states that if the Community does not want to determine how many times each bhikkhu will state his invitation, the last phrase in the motion can be: saṅgho pavāreyya—“The Community should invite.” If this option is chosen, the tradition says, each bhikkhu may state his invitation one, two, or three times, but bhikkhus with equal Rains may not state their invitation in unison.

Once the motion has been made, all the bhikkhus are to get in the kneeling position—their robes arranged over one shoulder, their hands raised in añjali—and state their invitations in line with seniority. The most senior bhikkhu’s invitation statement is:

Saṅghaṁ āvuso pavāremi. Diṭṭhena vā sutena vā parisaṅkāya vā, vadantu maṁ āyasmanto anukampaṁ upādāya. Passanto paṭikkarissāmi. Dutiyam-pi āvuso saṅghaṁ pavāremi… Tatiyam-pi āvuso saṅghaṁ pavāremi…. Passanto paṭikkarissāmi.

This means: “Friends, I invite the Community. With regard to what is seen, heard, or suspected, may you speak to me out of sympathy. On seeing (the offense), I will make amends. A second time…. A third time, friends, I invite the Community…. On seeing (the offense), I will make amends.”

The remaining bhikkhus then state their invitations in line with seniority, changing Saṅghaṁ āvuso to Saṅgham-bhante, and āvuso to bhante, i.e., “friends” to “venerable sirs.”

Originally, all the bhikkhus remained in the kneeling position until everyone had made his invitation. However, in a monastery where there were many bhikkhus, the senior bhikkhus started keeling over, so the Buddha decreed that once a bhikkhu had made his invitation he could sit down.

Mutual Invitation

If the assembly contains four bhikkhus, the motion is as follows:

Suṇantu me āyasmanto. Ajja pavāraṇā paṇṇarasī [cātuddasī]. Yad’āyasmantānaṁ pattakallaṁ, mayaṁ aññamaññaṁ pavāreyyāma.

This means: “Listen to me, sirs. Today is the Invitation day on the fifteenth [fourteenth]. If you are ready, we should invite one another.”

The bhikkhus should then invite one another, in line with seniority. Because there are so few of them, each should invite three times, saying:

Ahaṁ āvuso [bhante] āyasmante pavāremi. Diṭṭhena vā sutena vā parisaṅkāya vā, vadantu maṁ āyasmanto anukampaṁ upādāya. Passanto paṭikkarissāmi. Dutiyam-pi āvuso [bhante] āyasmante pavāremi… Tatiyam-pi āvuso [bhante] āyasmante pavāremi…. Passanto paṭikkarissāmi.

This means: “Friends [venerable sirs], I invite you. With regard to what is seen, heard, or suspected, may you speak to me out of sympathy. On seeing (the offense) I will make amends. A second time…. A third time, friends [venerable sirs], I invite you…. On seeing (the offense) I will make amends.”

If the assembly contains three bhikkhus, they follow the same procedure as for four, except that āyasmanto is changed to āyasmantā, both in the motion and in the invitation, as is appropriate when addressing two rather than three people.

If the assembly contains only two bhikkhus, they do not make a motion. Each simply invites the other, saying:

Ahaṁ āvuso [bhante] āyasmantaṁ pavāremi. Diṭṭhena vā sutena vā parisaṅkāya vā, vadatu maṁ āyasmā anukampaṁ upādāya. Passanto paṭikkarissāmi. Dutiyam-pi āvuso [bhante] āyasmantaṁ pavāremi… Tatiyam-pi āvuso [bhante] āyasmantaṁ pavāremi…. Passanto paṭikkarissāmi.

Determination

If the assembly consists of only one bhikkhu, he is to prepare the place as he would for determining an uposatha observance, and then when he is sure that no one is coming he may determine his Invitation:

Ajja me pavāraṇā (Today is my Invitation).

As with the uposatha, the Commentary notes that one may add paṇṇarasī (the fifteenth) or cātuddasī (the fourteenth) at the end of the determination, but this is optional.

Borderline quorums

Following the pattern of the uposatha observance, if the bhikkhus in a given territory or monastery number five or fewer, an ill bhikkhu is not to send his consent or invitation so that the others can conduct the invitation in his absence. All must meet together, even if this means convening at the dwelling of the one who is ill.

Accusations

As with the uposatha, a bhikkhu may not invite if he has an offense for which he has not made amends. If, while giving his invitation, he recalls an offense he has committed or has doubt about having committed an offense, he may inform a neighboring bhikkhu as he would during an uposatha observance.

If Bhikkhu X wants to accuse Bhikkhu Y of an offense during the Invitation, the procedure is more streamlined than it is on an uposatha day in that there is no need first to ask or answer questions about Vinaya in the assembly. To eliminate some of the problems this might cause—in that not all the bhikkhus assembled would be conversant with the rules covering the offense in question—Mv.IV.16.19-22 indicates that if the accused admits to what is actually a minor offense but the assembly is divided as to how minor, the bhikkhus who are conversant with the rules are to handle the case apart from the assembly and then to return, making a motion for the Invitation to proceed, as explained below.

The steps in an accusation are these: If Bhikkhu X is convinced that Bhikkhu Y has an offense for which he (Y) has not made amends, Mv.IV.16.1-5 states that X may interrupt Y’s invitation, get him to give leave, and then accuse him of the offense. If Y refuses to give leave, X may then cancel his invitation, although he must do so before Y finishes his invitation. Mv.IV.16.4-5 seems to indicate that the only proper time to do this is during Y’s invitation, but the Commentary states that X may do this during the opening motion as well. The motion for canceling Y’s invitation is:

Suṇātu me bhante saṅgho. [Itthannāmo puggalo] sāpattiko pavāreti. Tassa pavāraṇaṁ ṭhāpemi. Na tasmiṁ sammukhī-bhūte pavāretabbaṁ.

This means: ”May the Community listen to me, venerable sirs. [The individual named so-and-so] is, with an offense, inviting. I cancel his invitation. One should not invite when face-to-face with him.” (BD mistakenly reads the sentence following this in the Canon as part of the motion.)

None of the texts state explicitly whether a bhikkhu whose invitation has been canceled in this way still has the right to refuse to give leave to his accuser, but the Canon’s silence on this matter when discussing the procedures to follow after the cancelation of an invitation suggests that he does not. The Community is to interrogate the accuser and then, if satisfied that the accusation is plausible, to interrogate the accused until the issue is settled.

Because the Invitation puts the accused in a vulnerable position, the Canon assigns the Community an active role in protecting him from an ill-founded accusation. If they know the accuser to be ignorant, inexperienced, and incompetent to respond to questioning, then regardless of whether he is pure or impure in his bodily behavior, verbal behavior, and livelihood, they should override his cancelation, telling him not to cause strife in the Community, and then proceed with the Invitation. But if they know him to be pure in his bodily behavior, verbal behavior, and livelihood, to be knowledgeable, experienced, and competent to respond to questioning, they should interrogate him as to whether the accusation deals with a defect in virtue, in conduct, or in view. (According to Mv.IV.16.12, a defect in virtue means a pārājika or a saṅghādisesa; a defect in conduct means any lesser offense; and a defect in view means wrong view or a view holding to an extreme. The Commentary to Pv.VI.10 identifies wrong view as mundane wrong view as defined in MN 117, and as classed as a defect in view in AN 3:117. It identifies a view holding to an extreme as any one of the ten standpoints on which the Buddha refused to take a stand. See, e.g., DN 9 and MN 72.) If the accuser can answer these questions properly, he is then to be asked the grounds—seeing, hearing, or suspecting—on which the accusation is based.

The passage describing the method of interrogation is worth reading as a lesson in the thoroughness with which the accuser is to be treated. However, because it is long and repetitive, I have placed it in the Rule section to this chapter, below.

If the accuser responds to the interrogation in an ignorant or inconsistent way, the Community may disregard his accusation and proceed with the Invitation. If, however, his responses are knowledgeable and consistent, they should interrogate the accused. If Y admits to having committed an offense, he should be dealt with in accordance with the gravity of the offense. If the offense is a pārājika, he is to be expelled. If a saṅghādisesa, he is to be told to prepare for probation and penance, with the actual procedures for rehabilitation left for later. If the offense is a lesser one, he is to be dealt with in accordance with the rule. The Invitation may then proceed.

Similarly, if X admits to having defamed Y, he must be dealt with in accordance with the gravity of the defamation—in line with Sg 8, Sg 9, or Pc 76—before the Invitation may proceed. The third possible outcome—that X has grounds for his accusation but Y is in fact innocent—does not require that either be punished. Once the truth is established, Y is to ask the Community for a verdict of mindfulness (see BMC1, Chapter 11), and the Community is to grant it. The assembly may then proceed with the Invitation from where it left off.

The Canon raises the possibility that the accusation may deal, not with a transgression of a rule, but with a defect in views. In a case such as this, it is up to the Community to determine if the view deserves to be treated under Sg 10 or Pc 68, or as grounds for censure. If so, the relevant procedures should be followed. If not, the Invitation may proceed.

As noted above, if a bhikkhu admits to an offense but the assembly is divided as to its seriousness, the bhikkhus who are conversant with the rules and who accurately know the seriousness of the offense are to take him aside and have him make amends for the offense in accordance with the rule. The group is then to return to the assembly and make the following announcement:

Yaṁ kho so āvuso bhikkhu āpattiṁ āpanno, sā’ssa yathā-dhammaṁ paṭikatā. Yadi saṅghassa pattakallaṁ, saṅgho pavāreyya.

This means: “Friends, the offense that that bhikkhu has fallen into: He has made amends for it in accordance with the rule. If the Community is ready, the Community should invite.”

The passage allowing for this departure from unanimity—Mv.IV.16.19-22—mentions only cases in which the highest actual offense is a thullaccaya, and the highest offense wrongly suspected is a saṅghādisesa. None of the commentaries discuss this point, but apparently it means that this allowance is not to be used in cases where there is a question as to whether the offense was a pārājika, or for cases in which the actual offense was a pārājika or a saṅghādisesa. If knowledgeable bhikkhus see that the offense in question is of this latter sort then—because unanimity in the verdict is still required—a wise policy would be, at some point in the interrogation, to initiate the formal procedure for appointing bhikkhus to ask and answer questions about Vinaya in the assembly so that all the bhikkhus present will be well informed about the relevant rules.

There is also the possible case where, prior to the Invitation, X announces to the assembly that an offense has been committed, but he is uncertain as to either who committed it or what the precise offense is. If he requests the assembly to place the issue on hold and to go ahead with the Invitation, they are to tell him that the Invitation was established by the Buddha for those who are pure and united, and that he should speak up about the matter immediately. If, after he states his case, the assembly cannot ascertain either the person or the precise offense, they may go ahead with the Invitation, and the matter may be brought up again when the uncertain factor is brought to light.

If X announces to the assembly that he knows the offense and who committed it but still requests the assembly to place the issue on hold, they are again to tell him to speak up immediately. In this case, the Invitation may not proceed until the matter is settled. If the assembly proceeds with the Invitation without having settled the matter, they cannot later reopen the case. Anyone who tries to reopen it incurs a pācittiya under Pc 63. The same holds true for X if he knows both the individual and the offense before the Invitation but does not speak up about it at all.

The Commentary insists that this pācittiya is only for cases where the Community has looked into the matter and settled it before the Invitation was made, but this seems to miss the point: The fact that the Invitation was allowed to proceed without a hitch is supposed to mean that the issue is settled. The Canon’s ruling here, however, places a special responsibility on X if he knows that Y has committed an offense but feels that he may get into trouble with Y’s cohorts in the assembly if he tries to press the issue. In essence, the Canon requires X to sacrifice his own immediate comfort for the sake of the Vinaya and of the Saṅgha as a whole. He should at least speak up about the matter, even if he anticipates that the assembly will not deal with the accusation in line with the Dhamma. If he later wants to bring the matter up in a more favorable assembly, he has the advantage: He can legitimately claim that he already broached the issue but that he was unjustly ignored. If he lets the matter slide now, Y will have the advantage in any future assembly: He can legitimately question why X had not brought up the matter before when explicitly invited to do so.

One exception to the requirement that accusations be settled before proceeding with the Invitation is when, on the Invitation day, either the accused or the accuser is ill. The accuser may bring up the issue, but the Community should authorize a delay of the interrogation on the grounds that an ill person—whether accuser or accused—is not up to being interrogated. If either the accuser or the accused refuses to go along with the delay, he incurs a pācittiya under Pc 54. Once the delay has been authorized, the Invitation may proceed.

Special cases: two groups

There are four situations in which not all of the bhikkhus present can participate in the Invitation: Some have broken their Rains, some were ordained during the Rains, some are observing the second Rains while the others have observed the first, or some observed the first Rains while the others are finishing the second.

The Canon does not discuss these situations, but the Commentary to Mv.IV.13.3 sets out the following pattern for how the Invitation should be handled in the last two cases. This pattern may also be applied to the first two. The basic rule is that two separate motions should not be made in the same day in the same territory, for that would resemble a schism. Therefore:

On the full-moon day at the end of the first Rains, if the number of bhikkhus observing the first Rains is at least five and is equal to or larger than the number of bhikkhus observing the second Rains, the first group should hold a Community Invitation, complete with a motion. When they have finished inviting, the second group should declare their purity in their presence.

If the first group isn’t enough for a Community motion, the members of the second group should not be included to make up the lack. In other words, the first group should hold a mutual Invitation.

If there is one bhikkhu in the first group and one in the second, the first bhikkhu should invite the second; the second bhikkhu should declare his purity in the presence of the first.

If the second group is larger, the second group should recite the Pāṭimokkha and then the first group should invite in their presence, using the formula for a mutual Invitation without a motion.

On the day before the end of the second Rains, if the group observing the second Rains is equal to or larger than the group who observed the first, they should invite, after which the first group should declare their purity in their presence.

If the group who observed the first Rains is larger than the group who observed the second, they should recite the Pāṭimokkha. Then the second group should invite in their presence, using the formula for a mutual Invitation without a motion.

Special cases: delayed Invitation

If the Community has decided to delay its Invitation but any of its members wishes to leave, he may go ahead and invite on the day that the Community is holding its uposatha. If, while he is inviting, any of the other bhikkhus cancels his invitation, the Community must look into the matter and settle it. He, however, cannot cancel the invitation of any of the other bhikkhus. If, after completing his business, he returns before the Community holds its Invitation, then on their Invitation day he may cancel the invitation of any of the other bhikkhus, but they may not retroactively cancel his.

Special cases: hostile neighbors

If a group of well-behaved bhikkhus knows that a group of trouble-making bhikkhus living in a nearby territory plans to join in their Invitation to make groundless accusations and create strife, the first group may try to elude the second in the following ways:

1) Hold the third, fourth, and fifth uposathas of the Rains on the fourteenth day. Then hold the Invitation on the fifteenth day after the fifth uposatha, which will be two days before the hostile bhikkhus will come for the Invitation (§). Then, when they arrive on the day they have calculated for the Invitation, tell them, “We have already invited. You may do what seems appropriate.”

2) If the hostile bhikkhus come unexpectedly on the Invitation day, the resident bhikkhus should welcome them respectfully and then, having distracted them (§), go outside the territory to invite. (The Commentary suggests, as a possible distraction, saying, “Please rest for a moment to relieve your fatigue.”)

3) If the resident bhikkhus cannot manage that (for example, the Commentary says, the young bhikkhus and novices of the trouble-making group follow them wherever they go), they should meet together with the hostile bhikkhus and move to delay the Invitation another fortnight.

4) If the hostile bhikkhus stay on to the following fortnight, the resident bhikkhus should meet together with them again and delay the Invitation another fortnight.

5) If the hostile bhikkhus stay on until then, the resident bhikkhus should hold the Invitation together with the trouble-makers, even if they are unwilling.

Other issues

The individuals excluded from sitting in the assembly for the Invitation are the same as those excluded from sitting in the assembly for the uposatha. For some reason, the rule against conducting an uposatha with a lay person in the assembly has no parallel in the Invitation Khandhaka, but this seems to be an oversight. With novices excluded from the assembly, there is no reason why lay people should be allowed in.

The rules concerning traveling and the special cases involving unity are the same for Invitation as they are for uposatha. See the preceding chapter for details.

Rules

Invitation Days

“I allow that bhikkhus who have spent the Rains to invite (one another) with respect to three things: what is seen, what is heard, and what is suspected. That will be for your mutual conformity (§), for your arising out of offenses, for your esteem (§) for the Vinaya.”—Mv.IV.1.13

“These are the two Invitations: on the fourteenth and on the fifteenth.” —Mv.IV.3.1

“And one should not invite on a non-Invitation day unless it is for unity in the Community.”—Mv.IV.14.4

“I allow that an Invitation-delay be made.”—Mv.IV.18.2

Transaction statement—Mv.IV.18.3-4

Four Invitation transactions: factional, not in accordance with the Dhamma; united, not in accordance with the Dhamma; factional, in accordance with the Dhamma; united, in accordance with the Dhamma. Of the first three: “This sort of Invitation transaction is not to be done and has not been allowed by me.” Of the last: “This sort of Invitation transaction may be done and has been allowed by me. Therefore, bhikkhus, ‘We will do this sort of Invitation transaction, i.e., united, in accordance with the Dhamma’: That is how you should train yourselves.”—Mv.IV.3.2

Conveying an Invitation

“I allow that an ill bhikkhu give his invitation.”—Mv.IV.3.3

Mv.IV.3.4-5 = Mv.II.22.3-4 (Giving and conveying invitation)

“I allow that, on the Invitation day, when an invitation is given, that consent be given as well when the Community has something to be done (§).”—Mv.IV.3.5

“The (Community) should not be invited with a ‘stale’ giving of invitation (§) unless the gathering has not gotten up from its seats.” —Mv.IV.14.4

Unity

Mv.IV.4.3 = Mv.II.24.1-3 (People seize a bhikkhu)

Mv.IV.7-13 = Mv.II.28-35 (Unexpected and expected late-comers, incoming bhikkhus, questions of separate and common affiliations)

Mv.IV.14.1-3 = Mv.II.36.1-3 (Excluded individuals)

Invitation Procedure

“I allow that the Community invite when there are five.”—Mv.IV.5.1

Transaction statement—Mv.IV.1.14

“I allow that the Invitation be made by two statements… by one statement”… “I allow those of the same Rains (in seniority) to invite in unison (§).”—Mv.IV.15.1

Motions to be made in cases where there is not enough time for a three-statement invitation (§)—Mv.IV.15.3-7

“One should not remain seated while senior bhikkhus, kneeling, are stating their invitation. Whoever should remain seated: an offense of wrong doing. I allow that the invitation be made while all are kneeling.”—Mv.IV.2.1

“I allow that one remain kneeling until stating his invitation and then to sit down.”—Mv.IV.2.2

“I allow mutual Invitation when there are four.”—Mv.IV.5.2

Procedure—Mv.IV.5.3

“I allow mutual Invitation when there are three.” Procedure—Mv.IV.5.4

“I allow mutual Invitation when there are two.”—Mv.IV.5.5

Procedure—Mv.IV.5.6

“There is the case where a bhikkhu is staying alone in a residence when the Invitation day comes. Having swept the place where the bhikkhus gather—an attendance hall, a pavilion, or the root of a tree—having set out drinking water and washing water, having made seats ready, having lit a light, he should sit down. If other bhikkhus arrive, he is to invite together with them. If not, he should determine: ‘Today is my Invitation.’ If he does not determined (this): an offense of wrong doing.”—Mv.IV.5.8

“Where five bhikkhus are staying, a Community of four is not to invite, having brought the invitation of one. Whoever should invite: an offense of wrong doing. Where four bhikkhus are staying, mutual Invitation is not to be done by three after having brought the invitation of one. If they should do it: an offense of wrong doing. Where three bhikkhus are staying, mutual Invitation is not to be done by two after having brought the invitation of one. If they should do it: an offense of wrong doing. Where two bhikkhus are staying, (the Invitation) is not to be determined by one after having brought the invitation of the other. If he should determine it: an offense of wrong doing.”—Mv.IV.5.9

Canceling the Invitation

“One who has an offense should not invite. Whoever should invite: an offense of wrong doing. I allow when one with an offense is inviting that, having gotten him to give leave (§), one accuse him of the offense.”—Mv.IV.16.1

Mv.IV.6.1 = Mv.II.27.2 (doubt about an offense)

Mv.IV.6.2-3 = Mv.II.27.4-5 (one remembers or becomes doubtful while the Invitation is in progress)

“I allow, when one does not give leave, that the Invitation be canceled (§).” Procedure.—Mv.IV.16.2

“One should not cancel, without grounds, without reason, the invitation of pure bhikkhus who are not offenders. Whoever should cancel it: an offense of wrong doing. And one should not cancel the invitation of those who have already made an invitation. Whoever should cancel it: an offense of wrong doing.”—Mv.IV.16.3

Proper and improper cancelation of an invitation—Mv.IV.16.4-5

How to treat a case where one bhikkhu has canceled another’s invitation:

when it can be rejected out of hand—Mv.IV.16.6-9

questioning of one who moves for cancelation:

He (the bhikkhu making the charge) should be asked: “Friend, the invitation of this bhikkhu that you are canceling: Why are you canceling it? Are you canceling it because of a defect in virtue? Or [following the Burmese edition] are you canceling it because of a defect in conduct? Or are you canceling it because of a defect in view?”

If he should say, “I am canceling it because of a defect in virtue or… because of a defect in conduct or… because of a defect in view,” he should be asked, “But does the venerable one know what a defect in virtue is, what a defect in conduct is, what a defect in view is?”

If he should say, “I know…,” he should be asked, “Then, friend, which is a defect in virtue, which is a defect in conduct, which is a defect in view?”

If he should say, “The four pārājikas and the thirteen saṅghādisesas: This is a defect in virtue. A thullaccaya, a pācittiya, a pāṭidesanīya, a dukkaṭa, a dubbhāsita: This is a defect in conduct. Wrong view and a view holding to an extreme: This is a defect in view,” then he should be asked, “Friend, the invitation of this bhikkhu that you are canceling, are you canceling it on the basis of what was seen… what was heard… (or) what is suspected?”

If he should say, “I am canceling it on the grounds of what was seen or… what was heard or… what is suspected,” he should be asked, “Friend, the invitation of this bhikkhu that you are canceling on the grounds of what was seen: What did you see? What exactly did you see? When did you see it? Where did you see it? Was he seen committing a pārājika? Was he seen committing a saṅghādisesa? Was he seen committing a thullaccaya, a pācittiya, a pāṭidesanīya, a dukkaṭa, a dubbhāsita? And where were you? And where was this bhikkhu? And what were you doing? And what was this bhikkhu doing?”

If he should say, “It’s not that I’m canceling the invitation of this bhikkhu on the grounds of what was seen. It’s on the grounds of what was heard that I’m canceling (his) invitation,” then he should be asked, “Friend, the invitation of this bhikkhu that you are canceling on the grounds of what was heard: What did you hear? What exactly did you hear? When did you hear it? Where did you hear it? Was he heard to have committed a pārājika? Was he heard to have committed a saṅghādisesa? Was he heard to have committed a thullaccaya, a pācittiya, a pāṭidesanīya, a dukkaṭa, a dubbhāsita? Was this heard from a bhikkhu? Was this heard from a bhikkhunī?… from one in training?… from a male novice?… from a female novice?… from a male lay follower?… from a female lay follower?… from kings?… from king’s ministers?… from the leaders of other sects?… from the disciples of other sects?”

If he should say, “It’s not that I’m canceling the invitation of this bhikkhu on the grounds of what was heard. It’s on the grounds of what is suspected that I’m canceling (his) invitation,” then he should be asked, “Friend, the invitation of this bhikkhu that you are canceling on the grounds of what is suspected: What do you suspect? What exactly do you suspect? When do you suspect (it happened)? Where do you suspect (it happened)? Do you suspect him to have committed a pārājika? Do you suspect him to have committed a saṅghādisesa? Do you suspect him to have committed a thullaccaya, a pācittiya, a pāṭidesanīya, a dukkaṭa, a dubbhāsita? Do you suspect from having heard a bhikkhu? Do you suspect from having heard a bhikkhunī?… one in training?… a male novice?… a female novice?… a male lay follower?… a female lay follower?… kings?… king’s ministers?… the leaders of other sects?… the disciples of other sects?”

If he should say, “It’s not that I’m canceling the invitation of this bhikkhu on the grounds of what is suspected. In fact, even I [following the Thai edition] don’t know on what grounds I’m canceling the invitation of this bhikkhu,” then if the bhikkhu making the charge does not satisfy the minds of his observant fellows in the holy life with his account, then it is enough to say that the bhikkhu who has been charged does not stand accused (§). But if the bhikkhu making the charge does satisfy the minds of his observant fellows in the holy life with his account, then it is enough to say that the bhikkhu who has been charged stands accused.—Mv.IV.16.10-16

settling of the case—Mv.IV.16.17-18

Disagreement over the gravity of the offense committed by the accused—Mv.IV.16.19-22

Case of either an unknown offense or unknown offender, request that it be shelved: must be settled before the Invitation can proceed—Mv.IV.16.23-24

Case in which both offense and offender are known, request that it be shelved: must be settled before the Invitation can proceed—Mv.IV.16.25

“If the matter is known before the Invitation, but the individual afterward, it is proper to speak up. If the individual is known before the Invitation, but the matter afterward, it is proper to speak up. If both the matter and the individual are known before the Invitation, and if one opens (the issue) up after the Invitation is done, then there is a pācittiya for opening up (Pc 63).”—Mv.IV.16.26

Delaying the issue if an ill bhikkhu cancels another’s invitation, or an ill bhikkhu’s invitation is canceled (if either one refuses to delay, a pācittiya for disrespect—Pc 54)—Mv.IV.17.7-9

“If, while the bhikkhus are inviting, a bhikkhu who is not ill cancels the invitation of a bhikkhu who is not ill, then when both have been questioned, interrogated, and dealt with in accordance with the rule by the Community, then the Community may invite.”—Mv.IV.17.10

Delayed Invitation

What to do if a bhikkhu wants to leave before the delayed Invitation—Mv.IV.18.5

If he returns in time for the delayed Invitation—Mv.IV.18.6

Hostile Neighbors

Strategies to follow when neighboring bhikkhus want to open up strife and quarrels with your well-behaved group on an Invitation day—Mv.IV.17.1-6

CHAPTER SEVENTEEN

Kaṭhina

As mentioned in Chapter 11, one of the rewards for having completed the first Rains-residence is being eligible to participate in the spreading of a kaṭhina. Donors present a Community numbering at least five bhikkhus with a gift of cloth that the bhikkhus then bestow on one of their members. With the help of the Community, the bhikkhu receiving the cloth must make it into a robe before the dawnrise of the following day. When the robe is finished, he announces to the other bhikkhus the “spreading of the kaṭhina,” after which they express their approval. As a reward of having spread the kaṭhina, the bhikkhu who spreads the kaṭhina and those who approve it receive a series of privileges that—depending on certain conditions—may last until the end of the cold season, five months after the end of the Rains (see NP 28.2).

The name of this procedure comes from the frame (kaṭhina) used in the time of the Buddha for sewing a robe, much like the frame used in an American quilting bee. However, there is no requirement that the bhikkhus making the robe in one day must use such a frame. Rather, the term kaṭhina is used figuratively for the time period during which the privileges that come from making the robe are in force. Similarly, the terminology used in connection with this time period is taken from that used in connection with the physical frame. As noted in Chapter 2, the frame could be rolled or folded up. Thus, when put into use, it was unrolled and spread out. When no longer needed, it was dismantled and rolled or folded back up. Similarly, the establishment of the privileges is called the spreading of the kaṭhina; the ending of the privileges, the kaṭhina’s dismantling.

The Canon does not explicitly state why the Buddha formulated this transaction. In the relevant origin story, he gives his allowance for the transaction when a group of bhikkhus coming to pay their respects to him—after the Rains-residence is over but while actual rains are still pouring—arrive with their robes soaking wet. The Commentary maintains that the Buddha’s purpose in allowing the kaṭhina was (1) so that bhikkhus traveling during this time period could be given the privilege of not having to carry their complete set of robes with them, and (2) so as to follow the custom of previous Buddhas. However, the first purpose could have been served simply by making this privilege contingent on completing the Rains-residence. So the question arises as to what further purpose the transaction might fulfill so that Buddhas would want to maintain it as a custom. The Commentary offers no explanation, but a few moments’ reflection will show that the transaction promotes cooperation and a sense of community among the bhikkhus: It encourages them to maintain the Rains without break and to work together on the project of making a robe. At the very least, it affords an opportunity for senior bhikkhus to pass on their sewing skills to their juniors. At the same time, because the privileges attendant on the spreading of the kaṭhina are in force as long as one has a sense of commitment to one’s monastery, they reward a bhikkhu who wants to maintain a relationship with a particular residence. This, in turn, encourages on-going relationships between bhikkhus and their lay supporters.

The discussion of the kaṭhina in Mv.VII is remarkably terse in some areas and obsessively detailed in others. Thus in this chapter we will draw heavily on the Parivāra and commentaries to fill in the gaps in the Canon’s discussion, while at the same time reducing the more elaborate parts of that discussion to their essential points. Because this chapter draws so heavily on the Parivāra, this is the one instance in which the Rules section at the end of the chapter includes passages from that book.

Unfortunately, the Commentary’s explanation of the kaṭhina differs from that of the Mahāvagga and Parivāra on several key issues, so we will have to deal with conflicting interpretations. The primary issues center on the relationship between the transaction by which the kaṭhina cloth is bestowed on an individual bhikkhu and the transaction whereby the kaṭhina is spread. The Commentary to Mv.VII.1.3 conflates the two, saying that the minimum quorum for the first—a complete Community—also applies to the second; and implying that the qualifications for participating fully in the second also apply to anyone completing the quorum for the first. However, the Mahāvagga (VII.1.6) states that the spreading of the kaṭhina is effective if “one standing in the territory” approves of it. The Parivāra follows the implications of this statement in maintaining that the spreading of the kaṭhina does not require a full Community. It may be accomplished when one bhikkhu spreads the kaṭhina and then gets the approval of either a full Community, a group of two or three, or a single bhikkhu. Thus the Parivāra treats the two transactions as separate: The bestowal of the cloth is a Community transaction; the spreading of the kaṭhina is not. Furthermore, nowhere does it say that a bhikkhu completing the quorum for the first must meet the qualifications for participating fully in the second.

The Vinaya-mukha notes the discrepancy here between the Commentary and the Parivāra, and—siding with the Commentary—advances the thesis that the authors of the Parivāra were simply careless when they mentioned that a kaṭhina could be spread not only by a Community but also by a group. However, the Parivāra’s explanations, when taken as a whole are—with the exception of one errant passage, discussed in Appendix V—thoroughly consistent, whereas the Commentary’s are not. Although the Commentary treats the spreading of the kaṭhina as if it were a Community transaction, the actual procedure it describes differs from the normal pattern for such a transaction. The spreading, it says, may be held in any part of the residence, and the bhikkhu spreading the kaṭhina may contact his fellows to get their approval individually, instead of having to assemble them all in the same place. Because of these inconsistencies in the Commentary, the Parivāra’s interpretation seems more solid.

The Commentary also assumes—following the Mahā Paccarī ancient commentary—that the bhikkhus expressing their approval for the kaṭhina must all have spent the Rains in that monastery or territory if their approval is to qualify them for the kaṭhina privileges. Bhikkhus who have spent the Rains elsewhere—alone, in a group, or in a Community—may not earn privileges from this Community’s kaṭhina. The Commentary does not say where in the Canon it finds evidence for this explanation, but it may come from Mv.VIII.25.3, which prohibits a bhikkhu who has entered the Rains in one place from consenting to a portion of robe-cloth from another place. However, that prohibition would seem to apply only to cases where bhikkhus are dividing up shares of Community robe-cloth for general distribution, for there is a passage in the Mahāvagga (VIII.24.2) allowing a bhikkhu who is spending the Rains alone to keep robe-cloth until the dismantling of the kaṭhina. This implies that even he would be allowed to participate in the spreading of a kaṭhina and to enjoy the resulting privileges, which would be possible only if he could join in the kaṭhina at another monastery or residence where enough bhikkhus had gathered to conduct the transaction of bestowing the cloth. For this reason, the Commentary’s position on this question seems at odds with the Canon. An interpretation closer to the Canon would be that a bhikkhu does not have to spend the Rains at a particular monastery in order to participate in that monastery’s kaṭhina or to receive the resulting privileges.

Thus wherever the Canon and Commentary disagree, the interpretation given here will follow the Canon. However, because the Commentary’s explanation is widely followed in many Communities, we will discuss it in some detail.

Time period

Mv.VII.1.3 says simply that the kaṭhina may be spread when the bhikkhus have completed the Rains. Pv.XIV.4 adds that it must be spread within the fourth month of the rainy season, i.e., the first month after the end of the first Rains-residence. There is a widespread oral tradition that the bhikkhus in a given residence may receive only one kaṭhina donation during this time period. The Commentary contains a statement that, in an oblique way, may have been the source of this tradition, and another that suggests that this tradition may already have been an unspoken assumption in its time (see below), but none of the texts state this principle explicitly. In the time of the Canon, there would have been little need to make this limitation, as the kaṭhina donation consisted simply of cloth with, perhaps, only a few accessory gifts; once the bhikkhus had spread the kaṭhina with that cloth, they would have earned their kaṭhina privileges, so there would be little or no reason for them to desire another kaṭhina donation. At present, however, the kaṭhina cloth is usually only a small part of the kaṭhina donation, which can often amount to the largest single donation a monastery will receive in the course of the year. The oral tradition thus serves the purpose of ensuring that these large kaṭhina donations will fan out to the largest number of monasteries and not get concentrated in only a few of the more popular ones.

The donor

The Commentary states that anyone, human or deva, ordained or not, may give the kaṭhina cloth to the Community. However, as Mv.VII.1.5 forbids the bhikkhus who are receiving the cloth from doing anything to obtain it, the Commentary’s statement must be amended to read that the donor of the cloth may be anyone—lay or ordained, human or not—who is not a part of the Community receiving it.

The cloth

Pv.XIV.3.5 states that the cloth must be any one of the six allowable types of robe material. Mv.VII.1.6 stipulates that it must be either unsoiled or “made unsoiled,” which the Commentary interprets as meaning washed once or twice. It may be a rag, cast-off, or obtained at a store. The Commentary interprets this last phrase as referring to cloths (cut-offs?) dropped at the door of a store. However, if this were the case, there would be no passage in the Canon to allow cloth bought at a store, so the phrase “obtained at a store” probably also covers cloth that the donor has purchased.

According to Mv.VII.1.6, the cloth may not be borrowed, kept overnight, or be cloth that is to be forfeited. Pv.XIV.1 distinguishes two ways in which cloth may be kept overnight: kept overnight in the doing and kept overnight in the accumulation. The Commentary explains the former as meaning cloth that has been put aside (apparently, after it has been received by the Community and bestowed on an individual bhikkhu) without having been finished that day. It explains the latter as meaning cloth given to a Community one day, while the Community gives it to an individual on a later day for him to spread kaṭhina. The same passage in the Parivāra interprets “to be forfeited” as meaning cloth that is still in the process of being made when dawn arises, but this is redundant with the category of “kept overnight.” The Vinaya-mukha prefers to interpret “to be forfeited” as referring to cloth that a bhikkhu must forfeit under any of the NP rules. This interpretation seems more reasonable. The cloth, in short, must be a gift free and clear.

Mv.VII.1.5 places stipulations on what the bhikkhus may and may not do to obtain a gift of kaṭhina cloth. Any cloth that the bhikkhus have received through insinuation or roundabout talking, it says, is unallowable. The Pv.XIV.1 defines insinuation and roundabout talk as anything a member of the Community might say with the purpose of getting cloth to spread for a kaṭhina. The Commentary’s example of insinuation is, “This is good cloth. One could spread a kaṭhina with this cloth.” Its example of roundabout talking is, “It’s proper to donate kaṭhina cloth. The donor of a kaṭhina acquires lots of merit.” It adds that one cannot ask for a kaṭhina cloth even from one’s own mother. The cloth should be “as if it floated down from the sky.”

However, the Commentary states that if a person who has decided to donate a kaṭhina cloth—but doesn’t know the proper procedure for doing so—comes and asks, “How should the kaṭhina be donated?” one may say, “One should donate, while the sun is in the sky, enough cloth to make one of the three robes, saying ‘We are donating the cloth for the kaṭhina.’ For the purpose of making the kaṭhina robe, one should donate so many needles, so much thread, so much dye, conjey and food for so many bhikkhus who will be doing the robe-making.” Speaking in this way does not invalidate the cloth.

Transaction

The transaction bestowing the kaṭhina cloth is accomplished by means of a motion and a proclamation, which are included in Appendix I.

Quorum

Mv.IX.4.1 states that this transaction requires a quorum of four bhikkhus, meaning at least five participants: four to bestow the cloth and one to receive it.

The Commentary’s treatment of the issue of quorum does not distinguish between the quorum for the transaction of bestowing the cloth and the quorum for the spreading of the kaṭhina. This creates some confusion. It maintains that at least five bhikkhus are needed to spread the kaṭhina and they must have stayed the Rains without break. The implication in the Commentary’s discussion is that this principle applies both to the act of spreading the kaṭhina and to the Community transaction of bestowing the cloth. The Canon supports neither idea. On the one hand, although the Canon would require a minimum total of five bhikkhus for the transaction bestowing the cloth, it does not require that they all must have spent the Rains without break. And although Mv.VII.1.3 mentions that the bhikkhu spreading the kaṭhina must have spent the Rains without break, the Canon nowhere says that the spreading requires a full Community. This may seem like splitting hairs, but the difference would be especially important in a case like the following: Five bhikkhus have spent the Rains together in an isolated place far from any other bhikkhus, but three of them have broken the Rains for various reasons. If we followed the Commentary’s interpretation, the remaining two would be deprived of their rightful privilege to spread the kaṭhina through no fault of their own. The Canon, however, would seem to allow for the five, as a Community, to receive a kaṭhina cloth and to bestow it on one of the two who had completed the Rains. After making a robe from the cloth, he and the other bhikkhu who had completed the Rains could participate in the formal procedure for spreading the kaṭhina (see below) and enjoy the resulting privileges.

The Commentary also maintains that the bhikkhus participating in the spreading of the kaṭhina must have already participated in the Invitation. Taken literally, this would mean that bhikkhus who delay their Invitation for a month would be ineligible for a kaṭhina. Again, nothing in the Canon supports the Commentary on this point. However, the Sub-commentary—perhaps sensing this problem—states that the Commentary’s assertion here simply means that the bhikkhus have completed the first Rains-residence and the first Invitation day has passed.

The Commentary adds that no bhikkhus from other monasteries (in different territories, says the Sub-commentary) may count toward the quorum, although they may join in the meeting. Again, there is nothing in the Canon to support the Commentary in excluding outside bhikkhus from counting toward the quorum. As we noted above, Mv.VIII.24.2 implies that a bhikkhu spending the Rains alone would be allowed to enjoy the privileges resulting from spreading a kaṭhina, which would be possible only if he could join in the kaṭhina at another residence. If he would be allowed to enjoy the privileges, there seems no reason not to count him toward the quorum when bestowing the cloth. However, the Commentary’s position on this point is widely accepted, and so it is worth knowing in full:

If none of the resident bhikkhus are competent to conduct the formalities of bestowing and spreading, they may invite a knowledgeable bhikkhu from elsewhere to recite the transaction statement, direct the spreading of the kaṭhina, receive alms, and then go. He does not count toward the quorum and is not eligible for the kaṭhina privileges earned at this residence. Bhikkhus staying the latter Rains in the same residence may count toward the quorum but they don’t get the benefits of spreading the kaṭhina. Thus a kaṭhina may be held only in a residence where the number of bhikkhus residing for the first and second Rains totals at least five. For some reason, the Commentary says that if a novice stays for the first Rains in the same monastery and ordains in the second Rains, he may be counted toward the quorum and gets the benefits of spreading the kaṭhina.

The Commentary further states—and here there is nothing in the Canon to contradict it—that if within one territory there are many monasteries, the bhikkhus in those monasteries should all meet to spread a kaṭhina in one place and not spread separate kaṭhinas. This statement may be the source of the tradition that there may be one kaṭhina per territory in a given year, but the Commentary does not explicitly make this point.

The recipient

Because the recipient is the person primarily responsible for spreading the kaṭhina, the Mahāvagga requires that he has spent the Rains without break. Pv.XIV.3.7 adds that he must be knowledgeable about eight things:

the preliminary activities to be done before spreading,

how to remove the determination of his old robe,

how to determine his new robe,

how to announce the spreading of the kaṭhina,

the eight headings (mātikā) covering the ways in which the kaṭhina is dismantled,

the two constraints preventing the dismantling of the kaṭhina,

the transaction through which the Community may withdraw the kaṭhina privileges, and

the privileges themselves.

All of these matters will be discussed below.

The Commentary, however, states simply that the recipient should be a bhikkhu with an old robe. Among bhikkhus with old robes, the Community should choose one with seniority; and, among the senior bhikkhus, the one who is a “great person” capable of spreading the kaṭhina within that day. If the senior bhikkhus are unable to do this, while a more junior bhikkhu is able, the Community may give it to him. However, as the Community should all assist in making the robe, the preferable course is to tell a senior bhikkhu, “Please accept the cloth. We’ll see that it gets done.”

Accessory gifts

The Commentary states that if kaṭhina-accessories—i.e., other gifts—come along with the cloth, their status depends on what the donors say. If they say, “These accessories are for that bhikkhu,” the Community has no right over them. They belong to the bhikkhu receiving the cloth. If the donors don’t say that, the accessories belong to the Community. If the bhikkhu spreading the kaṭhina has other robes that are wearing out, then—following a simple announcement to the Community—enough accessory cloths should be given to him for the purpose of replacing those robes. Remaining cloths should be distributed to the Community, beginning where the distribution of rains-bathing cloths left off (see Chapter 18). If there were no rains-bathing cloths, distribute the accessory cloths beginning with the senior bhikkhu. The same procedure holds for other goods that are light or inexpensive (lahubhaṇḍa). Any heavy or expensive goods (garubhaṇḍa—see Chapter 7) should not be distributed.

Making the robe

Mv.VII.1.6 states that the robe to be made from the cloth must be either an under robe, an upper robe, or an outer robe. In all cases it must be comprised of at least five sections (khaṇḍa—see Chapter 2). The Commentary advises making a robe to replace whichever robe in the recipient’s basic set of three is most worn out. Given the time constraints, however, the common practice is to use the cloth to make an under robe, as this takes the least time.

The Mahāvagga’s instructions on how to sew the robe are somewhat unclear. Mv.VII.1.5 contains a series of sentences of the form, “Not simply by x is the kaṭhina spread (§),” in which x is replaced by marking [C: measuring], washing, calculating the cloth [C: planning the number of sections to be made], cutting, tacking, basting, making a seam, reinforcing [Kurundī: doubling the thickness], making the border {SC: adding the border on the long side of the robe}, making a binding (for the edge of the border) {SC: adding the border on the short side of the robe}, patching [C: patching another robe with cloth from the kaṭhina cloth], insufficient dyeing [C: dyeing it just once so that it has the color of ivory or withered leaves]. This obviously means that the kaṭhina has to be spread with a completed, fully dyed robe made entirely of cloth donated for the purpose, but nowhere does the Canon say whether all of these activities have to be done by the bhikkhus, or if any of them may be skipped. The Parivāra, in its section on the preliminaries to the spreading of the kaṭhina, says simply that these preliminaries include washing, calculating the cloth, cutting, tacking, sewing, dyeing, and making it allowable (with the mark stipulated by Pc 58, says the Commentary). Again, it doesn’t state that all these activities have to be done by the bhikkhus themselves.

The Commentary maintains that if the cloth for the kaṭhina is presented to the bhikkhus as a finished robe, well and good, but this point is controversial. As the Vinaya-mukha points out, if one of the purposes of the kaṭhina procedure is to teach the bhikkhus to work together, the Commentary’s position would defeat that purpose.

If the cloth hasn’t been made into a finished robe, the Commentary describes the procedure is as follows: Wash the cloth so that it’s thoroughly clean. Prepare the robe-making accessories, such as needles. Gather all the bhikkhus to sew the robe, dye the sewn robe, make it allowable, and spread it that very day. No one may get out of this obligation on the grounds that he is senior, learned, or whatever. To qualify as properly dyed, the robe must be dyed enough times to give it the proper color. If, while the first cloth is being prepared, another person comes along with another cloth together with many accessory gifts, the bhikkhus may make the robe from the cloth donated with the more accessory gifts, having instructed the donors of the other cloth so that he/she/they are agreeable.

This last judgment is a little dubious, for it is hard to imagine that the donor of the first cloth wouldn’t despise the bhikkhus for passing over his/her cloth in favor of a cloth coming later with more material rewards. However, there are cases where many donors join the initial donor in giving accessory gifts of their own, which may include pieces of cloth of a higher quality than those given by the initial donor. In cases like this, after checking with the initial donor to see if he/she is amenable, it is permissible to pile the accessory cloths together with his/her gift of cloth and to include the whole pile in the transaction statement. In this way, the bhikkhus are free to choose which of the cloths they want to use when making the robe.

Regardless of the validity of the Commentary’s judgment on this point, it suggests that the principle of only one kaṭhina per monastery in a given year was an unspoken assumption when the Commentary was composed. If the Commentary had assumed that more than one kaṭhina were allowed, it could have easily advised the bhikkhus in this situation to hold two separate kaṭhina transactions, one using the cloth provided by the first donor, and the other using the cloth provided by the second. Nevertheless, as noted above, the principle of no more than one kaṭhina per year per residence is nowhere explicitly stated in the texts.

Spreading

Once the robe is finished and has been made allowable, the kaṭhina may be spread. Mv.VII.1.5 states that the kaṭhina must be spread by an individual, not by a group or a Community. According to the Commentary, that individual should be the bhikkhu to whom the Community gave the cloth in the first place.

Pv.XIV.3.4 states that after removing the determination of one’s old robe (for example, if the new robe is an under robe, one removes the determination of one’s current under robe), one determines the new robe for use. Once determined, the new robe may be used to spread the kaṭhina as long as it is the proper type of cloth, made into a robe on the day it was donated to the Community, and completed before the following dawn. Although the Parivāra states that the robe must be completed before dawnrise, only the Commentary insists that the kaṭhina must also be spread before dawn in order to be valid. Neither the Mahāvagga nor the Parivāra contains this requirement.

The Mahāvagga gives no details for the procedure of spreading the kaṭhina, other than that anyone who expresses his approval of the spreading of the kaṭhina must be standing within the territory. If anyone expresses approval while standing outside the territory, the spreading is not effective. This statement raises two questions:

1) If a bhikkhu standing outside the territory expresses his approval, does that make the spreading ineffective for the bhikkhus expressing their approval, or just for him? The texts don’t mention this directly, but they seem to assume that the spreading is ineffective just for that bhikkhu. In other words, he does not earn the privileges, but bhikkhus who express their approval while standing inside the territory do.

2) What does standing outside the territory mean? That the approval must be expressed in the “precinct” territory (upacāra-sīmā—see Chapter 18) of the monastery, says the Commentary. In other words, the “territory” here is not necessarily a formally authorized territory; it is simply the area of the monastery grounds. The person expressing his approval must still be in the monastery where the kaṭhina was spread for his approval to count. The Vinaya-mukha maintains that standing outside the territory means that one has spent the Rains in another monastery, but we have already noted above that the Canon does not support this position.

The Mahāvagga does not explicitly state that the person giving his approval must be a bhikkhu, or that he must have spent the Rains without break. However, the Parivāra states explicitly that he must be a bhikkhu. It also states that the kaṭhina is spread by two people—the bhikkhu who spreads it, and the person who gives his approval—and because the Mahāvagga allows the spreading of the kaṭhina only for those who have spent the Rains, this would imply that the bhikkhu giving his approval must have spent the Rains without break for his approval to count.

According to the Parivāra, the general requirements for spreading and giving approval are that:

to spread the kaṭhina, one must break into speech (i.e., declare the spreading of the kaṭhina out loud—a simple thought or gesture is not enough);

to give approval, a bhikkhu must break into speech—while standing in the territory—informing another person (usually the bhikkhu spreading the kaṭhina) of his approval.

The precise pattern it recommends is as follows:

If a bhikkhu wants to spread the kaṭhina with an under robe, he removes the determination of his old under robe, determines the new under robe, and then says out loud:

Iminā antaravāsakena kaṭhinaṁ attharāmi.

This means, “With this under robe I spread the kaṭhina (§).” If spreading the kaṭhina with an upper robe, he follows a similar procedure, replacing Iminā antaravāsakena with Iminā uttarāsaṅgena; if with an outer robe, he replaces Iminā antaravāsakena with Imāya saṅghāṭiyā.

Having approached the Community, with his robe arranged over one shoulder and his hands in añjali, he says,

Atthataṁ bhante [āvuso] saṅghassa kaṭhinaṁ. Dhammiko kaṭhinatthāro. Anumodatha.

This means, “Venerable sirs [friends], the Community’s kaṭhina has been spread. The spreading of the kaṭhina is in accordance with the Dhamma. Approve of it.” The bhikkhus—each of whom has his robes also arranged over one shoulder and his hands raised in añjali—respond by saying,

Atthataṁ bhante [āvuso] saṅghassa kaṭhinaṁ. Dhammiko kaṭhinatthāro. Anumodāma.

“Venerable sir [friend], the Community’s kaṭhina has been spread. The spreading of the kaṭhina is in accordance with the Dhamma. We approve of it.”

Pv.XIV.4 adds the alternative that instead of approaching the Community, the bhikkhu spreading the kaṭhina may go to bhikkhus individually or in smaller groups and follow the same procedure, with only one difference: If he is approaching an individual, he replaces the plural, Anumodatha, with the singular, Anumodasi; while the individual replaces anumodāma (“We approve”) with anumodāmi (“I approve”).

The allowance for getting the bhikkhus’ approval individually or in small groups reflects the fact that the spreading of the kaṭhina is not a Community transaction; the validity of the spreading does not require the entire Community’s presence or approval. This is an important point. If one cannot convene the entire Community after having finished the robe, then simply contacting at least one other member of the Community and gaining his approval of the spreading is enough for the kaṭhina to be properly spread.

In light of this fact, the phrase saṅghassa kaṭhinaṁ—“the Community’s kaṭhina”—would denote the Community as the owner of the kaṭhina only in the sense of its unity in authorizing the kaṭhina through having originally bestowed the cloth; the phrase would not necessarily mean that the entire Community is participating in the kaṭhina’s spreading or gaining the resulting privileges. For example, there is the case where, following the transaction by which the kaṭhina cloth is bestowed on one of the bhikkhus, so many of the other bhikkhus leave the monastery that less than a full Community remains. (The bhikkhus who leave may have joined in the transaction statement simply to please the donors but with no interest in making the robe or in taking advantage of the kaṭhina privileges.) In this case, the remaining group may still make the new robe and spread the kaṭhina with it. (Pv.XIV.5 offers another explanation for the phrase saṅghassa kaṭhinaṁ, but because its explanation is so problematic, and the problems so technical, I have relegated its discussion to Appendix V.)

There is also the case, mentioned above, where not all of the bhikkhus in the Community successfully completed the Rains. In this case, all the bhikkhus could participate in the transaction bestowing the cloth, but only those who had actually completed the Rains would be allowed to earn the privileges that come from spreading the kaṭhina.

If we follow the Commentary in maintaining that the kaṭhina must be spread before dawnrise of the following day, there is yet another case where this point would prove relevant: when the robe is finished near dawn, the bhikkhus for the most part have gone off to sleep, and the bhikkhu spreading the kaṭhina cannot track them all down before dawnrise. In this case, he would be duty-bound to inform only those he can track down in time.

Privileges

The Canon contains a discrepancy in its lists of the privileges earned by those who participate in the spreading of a kaṭhina. Mv.VII.1.3 maintains that the kaṭhina privileges are five:

1) They may go off without having asked permission (Pc 46).

2) They may go off without taking all three robes (NP 2).

3) They may participate in a group meal (Pc 32).

4) They may keep robe-cloth as long as they need or want without having to determine it or place it under dual ownership (NP 1, NP 3).

5) Whatever robe-cloth arises there will be theirs. This means that they have sole rights to any cloth accruing to the Community in the residence where they spent the Rains—see Mv.VIII.24.2; Mv.VIII.24.5-6. (The Commentary to Mv.VIII.32 adds, rightly so, that this privilege also applies to gifts of cloth dedicated to the Community that has spent the Rains in that residence. See Chapter 18.) If a bhikkhu who spent the Rains alone has joined in the kaṭhina at another residence, the word “there” in the allowance means the residence where he spent the Rains, not the residence where the kaṭhina was held. According to the Commentary, “accruing to the Community” covers not only gifts of cloth dedicated to the Community, but also the robes of a dead bhikkhu that have accrued to the Community, robe-cloth bought with proceeds from Community land, or robe-cloth coming any other legitimate way into the Community’s possession.

Note that privileges (1), (3), (4,) and (5) are simply extensions of the automatic privileges for the cīvara-kāla, or robe-season (see Chapter 11). Privilege (2), however, is exclusively a kaṭhina privilege that does not come automatically with the robe-season.

For some reason, the list at Mv.VII.1.3 does not include an extension of the one remaining automatic robe-season privilege: the rescinding of the rule against out-of-turn meals (Pc 33). This is where the discrepancy lies, for the Vibhaṅga to Pc 33 states that the rule is rescinded not only during the fourth month of the rainy season but also throughout the period when the kaṭhina privileges are in effect. None of the texts mention this discrepancy, so there is no precedent for deciding whether the list at Mv.VII.1.3 is incomplete or the Vibhaṅga to Pc 33 is wrong. Because the allowance for rescinding Pc 33 during the occasion for giving cloth (cīvara-dāna-samaya) is written into the training rule, and because this period, in all other contexts, is said to be extended throughout the kaṭhina privileges, we can assume that the list at Mv.VII.1.3 is incomplete, and that there is actually a sixth privilege for those who have participated in the spreading of a kaṭhina:

6) They may participate in an out-of-turn meal (Pc 33).

According to Pv.XIV.1, these privileges apply both for the bhikkhu who has spread the kaṭhina and for any bhikkhu who has approved the spreading of the kaṭhina. As long as certain conditions are in place, these privileges extend until the end of the cold season, five months after the end of the first Rains-residence.

Dismantling the kaṭhina

There are two ways in which a bhikkhu’s kaṭhina privileges may be ended—this is called the dismantling of the kaṭhina—before the end of the cold season:

1) He participates in a Community transaction whereby all the bhikkhus in the monastery voluntarily withdraw their kaṭhina privileges. The statement for this transaction is given in Appendix I.

2) He comes to the end both of his constraint with regard to the monastery (āvāsa-palibodha) and of his constraint with regard to making a robe (cīvara-palibodha).

The Vinaya-mukha questions the purpose of the transaction mentioned in point (1), but there are a number of possible reasons for withdrawing the privileges. Some Communities do so on the grounds that there is value in not relaxing one’s observance of the rules, even when allowed. This attitude acts as a deterrent to any lazy bhikkhu who might want to join a Community simply to take advantage of its kaṭhina privileges. Another reason to withdraw the privileges would be as a favor to new bhikkhus joining the Community after the kaṭhina has been spread. Once the privileges are withdrawn, the new bhikkhus would have a share in all gifts of cloth given to the Community in that monastery.

As for point (2), one’s monastery constraint ends when one leaves the monastery without intending to return. The Mahāvagga does not mention this specifically, but the Parivāra’s analysis of the Mahāvagga’s scenarios for ways in which the kaṭhina is dismantled indicate that one’s monastery constraint is also ended when one hears that the bhikkhus in one’s monastery have held the Community transaction to withdraw the kaṭhina privileges.

One’s robe constraint ends when one’s new robe is finished, lost, destroyed, or burned, or when one’s expectation for cloth has been disappointed (i.e., the cloth has not been provided as expected).

Mv.VII.1.7 lists eight headings that cover the various ways these conditions for the dismantling of the kaṭhina can combine in practice. One’s kaṭhina may be dismantled:

1) through going away;

2) through (the robe’s) being settled;

3) through a resolution (not to make a robe or to come back);

4) through (the cloth’s) being lost;

5) through hearing (of the agreement to end the privileges);

6) through a disappointment of an expectation (for robe-cloth);

7) through going beyond the territory;

8) through dismantling together.

Headings (1) and (5) cover cases where the robe constraint has already ended, so the kaṭhina is dismantled when the monastery constraint is ended in one of two ways: One leaves the monastery with the thought of not returning, or one leaves with the thought of returning but then hears that the Community there has agreed to withdraw the privileges. Headings (2), (4), and (6) cover cases where the monastery constraint has already ended, so the kaṭhina is dismantled when the robe constraint is ended in one of three ways: One finishes one’s robe, one loses the cloth needed to make a robe, or one’s expectation of cloth is disappointed. Heading (3) covers the case where the constraints are ended simultaneously, when—after leaving the monastery—one resolves simultaneously not to return and not to make a robe. Heading (8) covers the case where one’s privileges end simultaneously with those of the other bhikkhus in the Community—the Canon does not say so specifically, but this seems to refer to the situation in which one participates in the meeting at which the kaṭhina privileges are formally withdrawn.

Heading (7) is problematic. The Commentary and Parivāra interpret going beyond the territory as referring to a physical territory, but this does not fit the examples given in the Mahāvagga. The Sub-commentary prefers to interpret territory as meaning the time-territory for the privileges. Thus, going beyond the territory would mean passing the end of the cold season, an interpretation that fits with the Mahāvagga and makes much more sense. Otherwise, none of the eight headings would cover this possibility.

Mv.VII.2-12 works out a total of ninety possible scenarios covered by these headings, a few examples of which are given in the Rules section at the end of this chapter. And, with a little imagination, one could work out many more possible scenarios as well. Fortunately, there is no need to know all the scenarios. Simply keeping in mind the two ways in which one’s kaṭhina can be dismantled before the end of the cold season, as mentioned above—participating in the Community transaction to withdraw the privileges, or ending both one’s robe- and one’s monastery-constraints—is enough to ensure that one will recognize when one’s privileges are still in effect and when they no longer are.

Rules

“I allow that the kaṭhina be spread (§) by bhikkhus who have spent the Rains.”—Mv.VII.1.3

“‘The month for making the kaṭhina cloth should be known’ means the last month of the rains should be known.”—Pv.XIV.4

Transaction statement for bestowing the kaṭhina-cloth—Mv.VII.1.4

Cloth

Six materials (six allowable types of cloth)—Pv.XIV.3.5

Improper ways of receiving cloth:

nimittakatena—through insinuation,

parikathakatena—through roundabout talking.

Insinuation: One makes an insinuation (nimitta), “I will spread the kaṭhina with this cloth.” Roundabout talking: One makes roundabout talk, (thinking,) “By means of this roundabout talk I will cause a kaṭhina-cloth to appear.”—Pv.XIV.1

Improper types of cloth:

kukkukata—borrowed (§)

sannidhikata—kept overnight (§)

nissaggiya—to be forfeited (§)—Mv.VII.1.5

Kept overnight (§): kept overnight in the doing (karaṇa-sannidhi), kept overnight in the accumulation (nicaya-sannidhi),

To be forfeited: If dawn rises while it is being made.—Pv.XIV.1

Proper types of cloth:

ahata—unsoiled,

ahata-kappa—made unsoiled,

pilotikā—a rag,

paṅsukūla—cast off

āpaṇika—from a tradesman/shopkeeper, picked up at the door to a store.

Proper ways of receiving cloth: not through insinuation, not through roundabout talking.

Proper types of cloth: not borrowed (§), not kept overnight (§), not to be forfeited (§).—Mv.VII.1.6

Recipient

A person endowed with eight qualities is capable of spreading the kaṭhina: He knows the preliminary activities, removal, determination, spreading, headings, constraints, withdrawal, and rewards.—Pv.XIV.3.7

Making the Robe

Not simply by —- is the kaṭhina spread (§).

ullikhita—marking

dhovana—washing

cīvara-vicāraṇa—calculating the cloth

chedana—cutting

bandhana—tacking

ovaṭṭika-karaṇa—folding (§)

kaṇḍūsa-karaṇa—making a seam (§)

daḷhikamma-karaṇa—reinforcing (§)

anuvāta-karaṇa—making the border (§)

paribhaṇḍa-karaṇa—making a binding (for the edge of the border) (§)

ovaddheyya-karaṇa—patching

kambala-maddana—insufficient dyeing (§)—Mv.VII.1.5

Improper garments: anything but an outer robe, upper robe, or under robe, each of five sections or more, cut and made with “plots” (maṇḍala) on that very day.—Mv.VII.1.5

Proper garments: an outer robe, upper robe, or under robe, each of five sections or more, cut and made with “plots” on that very day.—Mv.VII.1.6

Seven preliminary activities: washing, calculating the cloth, cutting, tacking, sewing, dyeing, making allowable.—Pv.XIV.3.4

Spreading & Approval

Improper spreading of the kaṭhina: with a robe that is not made allowable.—Mv.VII.1.5

Improper procedure: if not spread by an individual; if, although otherwise correctly done, one standing outside the territory (§) expresses approval of it (§).—Mv.VII.1.5

Proper spreading of the kaṭhina: with a robe made allowable.—Mv.VII.1.6

Proper procedure: if spread by an individual; if, otherwise correctly done, one standing within the territory (§) expresses approval of it (§).—Mv.VII.1.6

Determination (of the new robe).—Pv.XIV.3.4

Spreading: breaking into speech.—Pv.XIV.3.4

Kaṭhina-spreading is effective only if: One is standing in the territory while giving approval, one breaks into speech while giving approval, one informs another while breaking into speech.—Pv.XIV.3.8

Three ways in which kaṭhina spreading is not effective: a defect in the object, a defect in the time, a defect in the making.—Pv.XIV.3.9

The Community is to give (the cloth) to the kaṭhina-spreading bhikkhu with a motion and announcement transaction. Having washed, smoothed (this is added only in this list), calculated, cut sewn, dyed, and made it allowable, he is to spread the kaṭhina with it. If he wants to spread the kaṭhina with an outer robe, he is to remove the determination of his old outer robe, he is to determine the new outer robe, he is to break into speech, saying “With this outer robe I spread the kaṭhina.” (§) (Similarly with other two types of robes.) Having approached the Community, having arranged his robe over one shoulder, having placed his hands palm-to-palm over his heart, he is to say this: “Venerable sirs, the Community’s kaṭhina has been spread. The spreading of the kaṭhina is in accordance with the Dhamma. Approve of it.” He should be addressed by the bhikkhus: “The Community’s kaṭhina has been spread. The spreading of the kaṭhina is in accordance with the Dhamma. We approve of it.” (Alternatively, he may go to the bhikkhus individually or in smaller groups, and follow the same procedure.)—Pv.XIV.4

Appendix V)">“The Community does not recite the Pāṭimokkha, a group does not recite the Pāṭimokkha, an individual recites the Pāṭimokkha. If the Community does not recite the Pāṭimokkha, a group does not recite the Pāṭimokkha, an individual recites the Pāṭimokkha, then the Pāṭimokkha is not recited by the Community, the Pāṭimokkha is not recited by a group, the Pāṭimokkha is recited by an individual. But through the Community’s unity, the group’s unity, and the reciting by the individual, the Pāṭimokkha is recited by the Community… by the group… by the individual. In the same way, the Community does not spread the kaṭhina, a group does not spread the kaṭhina, an individual spreads the kaṭhina, but through the Community’s approval, the group’s approval, and the spreading by the individual, the kaṭhina is spread by the Community… by a group… by an individual.”—Pv.XIV.5 (See Appendix V)

Kaṭhina Privileges

Whose kaṭhina is spread (§)? The kaṭhina of two individuals is spread (§): the one who does the spreading and the one who approves of it.—Pv.XIV.1

“For those of you who have spread the kaṭhina (§), five things will be proper: going away without have asked permission (see Pc 46), going away without taking (all three robes) (see NP 2), a group meal (see Pc 32), (undetermined) robe-cloth as long as (§) is needed/wanted (see NP 1 & NP 3), and whatever robe-cloth arises there will be theirs (see Mv.VIII.24.2, Mv.VIII.24.5-6, & Mv.VIII.32, below).”—Mv.VII.1.3

“There is the case where a bhikkhu is spending the Rains alone. There, people (saying,) ‘We are giving to the Community,’ give robe-cloths. I allow that those robe-cloths be his alone until the dismantling of the kaṭhina.”—Mv.VIII.24.2

Now at that time two elder brothers, Ven. Isidāsa and Ven. Isibhatta, having spent the Rains in Sāvatthī, went to a certain village monastery. People (saying), “At long last the elders have come,” gave food together with robe-cloths. The resident bhikkhus asked the elders, “Venerable sirs, these Community robe-cloths have arisen because of your coming. Will you consent to a portion?” The elders said, “As we understand the Dhamma taught by the Blessed One, these robe-cloths are yours alone until the dismantling of the kaṭhina.”—Mv.VIII.24.5

Now at that time three bhikkhus were spending the Rains in Rājagaha. There, people (saying), “We are giving to the Community,” gave robe-cloths. The thought occurred to the bhikkhus, “It has been laid down by the Blessed One that a Community is at least a group of four, but we are three people. Yet these people (saying), ‘We are giving to the Community,’ have given robe-cloths. So how are these to be treated by us?” Now at that time a number of elders—Ven. Nīlvāsī, Ven. Sāṇavāsī, Ven. Gopaka, Ven. Bhagu, and Ven. Phalidasandāna were staying in Pāṭaliputta at the Rooster Park. So the bhikkhus, having gone to Pāṭaliputta, asked the elders. The elders said, “As we understand the Dhamma taught by the Blessed One, these robe-cloths are yours alone until the dismantling of the kaṭhina.”—Mv.VIII.24.6

Dismantling the Kaṭhina

“There are these two constraints for (maintaining) the kaṭhina. Which two? The residence constraint and the robe constraint.

“And how is there the residence constraint? There is the case where a bhikkhu, either dwelling in a residence or intent on that residence goes away (thinking,) ‘I will return.’ This is how there is the residence constraint.

“And how is there the robe constraint? There is the case where a bhikkhu’s robe is unfinished or half-finished or his expectation for robe-cloth has not yet been disappointed. This is how there is the robe constraint.

“These are the two constraints for the kaṭhina.”—Mv.VII.13.1

“There are these two non-constraints for the kaṭhina. Which two? The residence non-constraint and the robe non-constraint.

“And how is there the residence non-constraint? There is the case where a bhikkhu goes away from that residence with a sense of abandoning, a sense of disgorging, a sense of being freed, a lack of intent (to return), (thinking,) ‘I won’t return.’ This is how there is the residence non-constraint.

“And how is there the robe non-constraint? There is the case where a bhikkhu’s robe is finished or lost or destroyed or burned or his expectation for robe-cloth has been disappointed. This is how there is the robe non-constraint.

“These are the two non-constraints for the kaṭhina.”—Mv.VII.13.2

“And how is the kaṭhina dismantled? These eight are the headings for the dismantling of the kaṭhina: reaching through going away, reaching through (the robe’s) being settled, reaching through a resolution (not to make a robe or to return), reaching through (the cloth’s) being lost, reaching through hearing (of the agreement to end the privileges), reaching through a disappointment of an expectation (for robe-cloth), reaching through going beyond the territory, dismantling together (§).”—Mv.VII.1.7

Some examples:

1) “A bhikkhu, when the kaṭhina has been spread, taking a robe that has been finished, goes away (thinking,) ‘I won’t return.’ That bhikkhu’s kaṭhina-dismantling is reached through going away.

2) “A bhikkhu, when the kaṭhina has been spread, goes away, taking robe-cloth (that has not been made into a robe). Having gone outside the territory, the thought occurs to him, ‘I will make this robe right here. I won’t return.’ He makes the robe. That bhikkhu’s kaṭhina-dismantling is reached through (the robe’s) being settled.

3) “A bhikkhu, when the kaṭhina has been spread, goes away, taking robe-cloth. Having gone outside the territory, the thought occurs to him, ‘I’ll neither make this robe nor return.’ That bhikkhu’s kaṭhina-dismantling is reached through a resolution.

4) “A bhikkhu, when the kaṭhina has been spread, goes away, taking robe-cloth. Having gone outside the territory, the thought occurs to him, ‘I will make this robe right here. I won’t return.’ He makes a robe. While he is making the robe, it gets lost. That bhikkhu’s kaṭhina-dismantling is reached through (the cloth’s) being lost.

5) “A bhikkhu, when the kaṭhina has been spread, goes away, taking robe-cloth, thinking, ‘I will return.’ Having gone outside the territory, he makes a robe. When he has finished the robe, he hears that ‘The bhikkhus in that monastery, they say, have dismantled the kaṭhina (privileges).’ That bhikkhu’s kaṭhina-dismantling is reached through hearing.”—Mv.VII.2

6) “A bhikkhu, when the kaṭhina has been spread, goes away with the expectation of (receiving) robe-cloth. Having gone outside the territory the thought occurs to him, ‘I will attend to that expectation of robe-cloth right here. I won’t return.’ He attends to that expectation of robe-cloth. His expectation of robe-cloth is disappointed. That bhikkhu’s kaṭhina-dismantling is reached through the disappointment of an expectation.”—Mv.VII.8.2

7) “A bhikkhu, when the kaṭhina has been spread, goes away, taking robe-cloth, thinking, ‘I will return.’ Having gone outside the territory, he makes a robe. Having finished the robe, thinking, ‘I will return. I will return,’ he spends time outside (the monastery) until the dismantling of the kaṭhina. That bhikkhu’s kaṭhina-dismantling is reached through going beyond the (time) territory.

8) “A bhikkhu, when the kaṭhina has been spread, goes away, taking robe-cloth, thinking, ‘I will return.’ Having gone outside the territory, he makes a robe. Having finished the robe, thinking, ‘I will return. I will return,’ he is present for (§) the dismantling of the kaṭhina. That bhikkhu’s kaṭhina-dismantling is together with (that of the other) bhikkhus.”—Mv.VII.2

Transaction statement for dismantling the kaṭhina—Bhikkhunī Pc 30

CHAPTER EIGHTEEN

Community Officials

The Bhaddāli Sutta (MN 65) reports that, as a general principle, the Buddha preferred small Communities over large ones as more conducive to the practice. Nevertheless, large Communities kept developing in his time, sometimes with favorable results (see, for example, MN 118), sometimes not (see Mv.X). In either case, the sheer size of the larger Communities multiplied the burdens of management. To help lighten these burdens, the Buddha allowed Communities to appoint officials to deal with two responsibilities that grow exponentially with an increase in Community size: the allotment of material gains and the supervision of work.

On at least two separate occasions the Buddha compared material gains to excrement (SN 17:5; AN 5:196), but only a rare person will not feel mistreated if he senses that he has received less than his share when excrement of this sort is apportioned out. At the same time, supporters who have donated to the Community’s store of material gains will get upset if they feel that their contributions are being treated like excrement. This is why the proper management of Community property is crucial to peace and harmony within the Community and to continued good will from the Community’s supporters. In receiving and storing goods, care must be taken that they not become damaged or lost through negligence. Otherwise, donors will feel slighted and the potential for future contributions will disappear. In distributing lahubhaṇḍa—light or inexpensive goods—to individual members of the Community, and in assigning garubhaṇḍa—heavy or expensive goods—for their temporary use, special care must be taken to ensure that everyone gets his fair share. Otherwise, inequities will lead to disharmony, and disharmony to an atmosphere unconducive for practice. So, for smooth relationships both within the Community and between the Community and its supporters, the bhikkhus must take a responsible attitude toward Community property.

As for the Community work, arrangements must be made to keep Community buildings in good repair. Any novices and lay monastery attendants must be supervised to ensure that their work gets done. Otherwise, signs of mismanagement will soon become apparent, leading to dissatisfaction both within the Community and without.

In small Communities the members may take care of these matters on an informal basis. But with larger Communities there is a need for formal accountability. Any area where no one has clear-cut responsibility will tend to be neglected or else fitfully managed. Any area where everyone shares responsibility will take on an unhealthy and disproportionate importance, as the time spent in meetings and discussions would interfere with the training of the mind. This was why the Buddha allowed the Community to assign responsibilities to individual bhikkhus so that the remainder of the Community could focus on the real issues at hand: the training in heightened virtue, heightened mind, and heightened discernment. As for the officials to whom these tasks are assigned, there is no hierarchy among them. Each has full and final authority in his particular sphere, which means that he, too, is freed from having to spend time in long meetings and discussions. Thus he, too, will have more time to devote to his own practice.

Although the standard procedure is to choose officials from among the bhikkhus, the Vibhaṅgas to Pc 13 and Pc 81 indicate that non-ordained people—e.g., novices—can be authorized as officials as well.

To manage material gains, the Canon allows each Community to appoint officials dealing with:

robe-cloth (robe-cloth receiver, robe-cloth keeper, storehouse guardian, robe-cloth distributor, cloth (rains-bathing cloth) bestower);

food (meal designator, conjey distributor, fruit distributor, non-staple food distributor);

lodgings (lodging bestower (senāsana-gāhāpaka), lodging assignor (senāsana-paññāpaka)); and

miscellaneous items (bowl bestower, dispenser of minor items).

To oversee the work of the Community, each Community may appoint officials to supervise:

the work of monastery attendants, and

the work of novices.

It may also appoint bhikkhus to be responsible for the construction of individual buildings, although strictly speaking these bhikkhus do not count as Community officials.

For each Community official, the Canon lists the qualifications that a candidate must meet to be appointed to the office and gives a few rough guidelines for how he should fulfill his duties once appointed. We will follow the same pattern in this chapter, dealing first with the general qualifications applicable to all Community officials, followed by duties specific to each. The Commentary expands on the Canon’s guidelines with long lists of recommendations covering almost every imaginable contingency. Although the Commentary’s recommendations are not binding—and in some cases conflict with the Canon—they reflect generations of experience in these matters. Thus we will give a fairly detailed report of these recommendations, especially with regard to the duties of the most important officials: those responsible for the distribution of cloth and food and for the assigning of lodgings. At the same time we will keep the Commentary’s recommendations clearly separate from the Canon’s so as to maintain a sharp line between those that are binding and those that are not.

It might be useful to point out from the very beginning that the major area of difference between the Canon and the Commentary is that the latter is more consistent in recommending that Community property be allotted in line with seniority. Where the Canon recommends distributing robe-cloth by lot and praises a lodging assignor for housing bhikkhus in like-minded neighborhoods within a monastery, the Commentary in both cases ignores the Canon’s guidelines and recommends giving the best cloth and the best lodgings to the most senior bhikkhus.

In reading this chapter, bear in mind that the Canon’s guidelines and Commentary’s recommendations are directed to all bhikkhus and not just to officials authorized by the Community. As the Vibhaṅga to Pc 13 points out, other bhikkhus—in the absence of formally authorized officials—may also take on the officials’ duties. In fact, the norm in small Communities is that the bhikkhus performing these duties will not be formally authorized. Instead, the abbot will appoint them, or their fellows will encourage them to take on these duties through informal consensus. In these cases, the Canon’s guidelines for the relevant duties still apply. At the same time, bhikkhus who receive allotments of Community property should know the factors that the officials must take into consideration so that they will understand when their allotment is and isn’t fair.

General qualifications

All Community officials must be free of four types of bias: bias based on desire, bias based on aversion, bias based on delusion, and bias based on fear. The Commentary illustrates these biases with examples from the possible behavior of two officials: the robe-cloth receiver and the robe-cloth distributor. A robe-cloth receiver might show bias based on desire by accepting gifts of robe-cloth earlier from those who came later because they’re his relatives, etc., by showing preference to some donors, or by diverting gifts to himself out of greed. He might show bias based on aversion by accepting gifts later from those who came earlier because he dislikes them, or by showing disdain for poor people. He might show bias based on delusion by lacking mindfulness and alertness; and bias based on fear by first accepting gifts, out of fear of their rank, from high-ranking people who came later. A robe-cloth distributor might show bias based on desire by giving expensive cloth to friends even when it isn’t their turn to receive it; bias based on aversion by giving inexpensive cloth to those whose turn it is to receive expensive cloth; bias based on delusion by being so stupid that he doesn’t know the procedures for dividing and distributing cloth; and bias based on fear by being afraid of sharp-tongued younger bhikkhus and so giving them expensive cloth when it isn’t their turn to receive it.

In addition to being free of these four forms of bias, a Community official must be knowledgeable in the duties of his office. For example, a robe-cloth receiver must know when cloth has been properly received and when it hasn’t, a meal designator must know when a meal has been properly distributed and when it hasn’t, and so forth.

Once the Community has found an appropriate candidate for one of these offices, he must first be asked if he is willing to take on the responsibility. Only if he gives his consent may the Community formally authorize him to fill the office. In each case, the transaction statement consists of a motion and a proclamation, although for some undivulged reason the Commentary maintains that a simple announcement is also sufficient. Full transaction statements for some of the more common offices are given in Appendix I.

Robe-cloth officials

The Canon allows that responsibility for managing gifts of cloth to the Community be divided among five officials: one to receive the gifts of cloth, one to put them away, one to guard the storehouse in which they are kept, one to distribute them, and one to bestow bathing cloths. The Vinaya-mukha recommends that a relatively small Community might want to appoint one bhikkhu to fill all of these offices. Only in a very large monastery would it be necessary or desirable to keep the offices separate—in which case the officials would have the added responsibility of coordinating their efforts. The Commentary notes, by way of reminder, that these offices were not created by the Buddha to encourage greed or lack of contentment among the officials, but as a way of helping the Community ensure that cloth is shared out fairly and properly to all.

Receiving & storing

The Commentary states that a robe-cloth receiver should ideally be endowed with good practices in terms of precepts and behavior; wise, mindful, and able to give a blessing with a pleasing voice and clear enunciation so as to inspire confidence in the donors. Once authorized, he should be given residence in a part of the monastery easy for donors to find.

The Canon allows for a building to be formally authorized as the monastery storehouse. The Commentary recommends that the storehouse be located away from the middle of the monastery in a building that is not a general meeting place and is vacant of novices and monastery attendants (for fear that they might steal the cloth). At the same time, it shouldn’t be at the farthest reaches of the monastery where outside thieves might break in. When authorizing the storehouse, the bhikkhus should be in the same territory in which the storehouse is located. In other words, if the monastery has both a main and a subsidiary territory, then if the storehouse is in the main territory that’s the territory where the bhikkhus should assemble to authorize it.

The duty of the storehouse guard, according to the Commentary, is to inspect the storehouse for holes in the roofing, walls, or floor where rain, mice, or termites, etc., could enter, and then arrange to have them fixed. He should also keep the storehouse windows closed in the cold season to keep the cloth from getting moldy, and open in the hot season to let in the breeze. Although this office was created to give protection for robe-cloth, scattered passages in the Canon (e.g., Cv.VI.21.3) show that other items—such as bowls and minor accessories—may be kept in the storehouse, so the storehouse guard should look after them as well.

A common duty of the robe-cloth receiver, the robe-cloth keeper, and the storehouse guard is to note whether the donated cloth provided is of a special sort (e.g., in-season or out-of-season robe-cloth (kāla-cīvara or akāla-cīvara)—see NP 3) and also for whom it is meant. The Canon lists eight ways in which a donor may direct his/her gift of cloth:

1. within the territory,

2. within an agreement,

3. where food is prepared,

4. to the Community,

5. to both sides of the Community,

6. to the Community that has spent the Rains,

7. having designated it, and

8. to an individual.

These terms will be discussed in detail under the duties of the robe-cloth distributor, below. The other robe-cloth officials need only know these terms well enough to make sure that they understand the donor’s wishes as clearly as possible, and then can arrange that cloth of special sorts or donated to different groups be kept in separate lots. This is to help the robe-cloth distributor distribute the cloth in line with the donor’s wishes.

Distributing

The Canon’s guidelines for the robe-cloth distributor fall into two main sorts: general procedures for distribution and specific instructions for robe-cloth given to specific groups.

General procedures

The general procedures are as follows: First sort the cloth by type and estimate it by price. Equalize the portions by mixing attractive and unattractive cloth in each, and then tie them in bundles. Assemble all the bhikkhus and novices who are eligible to receive the cloth, arrange them in groups, and then set out the bundles of cloth for them. Novices may be given half-bundles. If a bhikkhu is setting out on a journey, he may be given a bundle beforehand, and more than his share if he gives compensation to the Community. If there are any inequalities in the cloth bundles, even after one has tried one’s best to equalize them, find ways to make up for the inequalities and then have the bhikkhus draw lots.

The Commentary has a fair amount to say about these procedures. When sorting the cloth by type, sort it into piles of coarse and fine, loose-weave and tight-weave, heavy and light, used and unused. Then form shares of cloth, making sure that each share is as equal as possible a mixture of attractive and unattractive cloth. If there is not enough time for individual distribution, bundle up ten shares per bundle and divide the bhikkhus into groups of ten. Have the groups draw lots to determine which group gets which bundle. Then, within each group, have the individual bhikkhus draw lots to determine which bhikkhu gets which share.

As for novices: When distributing akāla-cīvara, if a novice keeps to himself or looks after only his mentor, give him half a portion. If he performs duties for the whole Community, give him a full portion. When distributing kāla-cīvara, give equal portions to all. When Rains cloth is being distributed, have the novices do services—such as making brooms—in exchange for their shares, but if they complain that they already do all kinds of work—boiling porridge, cooking rice, frying foods—go ahead and give them their full portion.

If a bhikkhu has made arrangements to go with a caravan on a journey and doesn’t have time to stay for the entire distribution, give him his portion only after the Community has gathered for distribution. If his share is slightly more or less than that of the others, the Commentary gives two contradictory instructions as to how it should be handled. In one passage it says that there is no need for the cloth-distributor to make up the lack if it is slightly less, nor for the bhikkhu to provide compensation if it is slightly more. Then, a few lines later, it quotes the Buddha as saying that there is no such thing as “slight” with regard to things of the Community or of a group, and that is why he allows inequalities only when compensation is given. Thus, following the Canon, if the bhikkhu gets slightly more than his share he should provide compensation for it.

There are two sorts of inequality that the distributor must keep in mind: inequality in terms of cloth and inequality in terms of individuals.

In terms of cloth: If, after sharing out cloth, there remain a few pieces not enough to share out to all, cut them up into pieces no smaller than four by eight fingerbreadths and share them out as far as possible. The Andhaka Old Commentary adds that when this has been done, add other objects appropriate for a bhikkhu’s use to shares that didn’t get the extra cloth. Give those shares to any bhikkhus who volunteer to take them, then draw lots for the remaining shares.

As for inequality in terms of individuals: One group may have eight or nine bhikkhus instead of ten. Give it a bundle with only eight or nine shares. When the bhikkhus in that group are satisfied with their shares, the remaining bhikkhus should draw lots for the remaining bundles.

Specific groups

The Canon gives the following instructions for dealing with cloth donated in the eight ways mentioned above.

1. If the donor gives within the territory, the cloth is to be divided among however many bhikkhus are within the territory.

2. “If the donor gives within the agreement” refers to cases where a number of monasteries have made an agreement to pool their gains. Whatever is given in one residence is shared among all the residences that have entered into the agreement.

3. If the donor gives “where food is prepared,” the gift is to be shared out among all the monasteries for which the donor provides constant upkeep.

4. If the donor gives to the Community, the cloth is to be shared among all the members of the Bhikkhu Saṅgha who are present for the distribution, and not just among the residents in the monastery. If the bhikkhus in a monastery have spread a kaṭhina, then all cloth given at that monastery for the Community up until the dismantling of the kaṭhina goes only to the bhikkhus who have earned the privileges for that particular kaṭhina and not to any other bhikkhus. If a bhikkhu is living alone for the Rains and is presented with cloth “for the Community,” it is his until his kaṭhina is dismantled. If he receives cloth “for the Community” while he is living alone outside of the Rains, he may determine the cloth for himself. If another bhikkhu comes along before the first bhikkhu has determined the cloth, the first bhikkhu must share the cloth with the newcomer. If a third bhikkhu comes along before the first two have drawn lots for their shares, they must share with him as well. If a fourth bhikkhu comes along before the first three have drawn lots, they do not need to share with him if they don’t want to.

5. If the donor gives to both sides of the Community, one half is to be given to the Bhikkhu Saṅgha and the other half to the Bhikkhunī Saṅgha, regardless of the respective sizes of the two.

6. If the donor gives to the Community that has spent the Rains, the cloth is to be divided among the bhikkhus who have been spending or have spent the Rains in that monastery. A bhikkhu who accepts a share from a monastery where he has not spent the Rains incurs a dukkaṭa. If a bhikkhu has been spending the Rains in two monasteries, then if he has split his time evenly between the two he may receive a half-share at each. If he has spent more time at one than at the other, he may receive a full share at the one where he has spent more time but, apparently, nothing at the other. If a bhikkhu has been spending the Rains but—before cloth is distributed—goes insane, becomes possessed, or is suspended from the Community, another bhikkhu should receive his share for him and give it to him when he recovers or his suspension is revoked. If a bhikkhu dies, disrobes, or admits to not having been a true bhikkhu before the cloth is distributed, his share falls to the Community. If the Community splits before receiving cloth or after receiving cloth but before dividing it up, the cloth is to be shared equally by all the bhikkhus on both sides of the split. If, however, the donors give cloth, etc., to one faction after the split, saying that their gift is for the faction, it is for that faction alone and is not to be shared with the other.

7. If the donor gives having designated, the designation may be expressed in terms of conjey, meals, non-staple foods, robe-cloths, lodgings, or medicines. The Canon has nothing more to say on this topic, but it is explained by the Commentary, below.

8. If the donor gives to an individual, it goes to the individual the donor has named.

The Commentary expands on these instructions as follows:

1. Giving within the territory. There are fifteen kinds of territories, some of which we have already encountered in Chapter 13:

a subsidiary (khaṇḍa) territory;

a precinct (upacāra) territory (the area within the enclosure of a monastery with an enclosure; two leḍḍupātas (36 meters) around the outmost perimeter of a monastery without an enclosure);

a common affiliation territory (this includes all the baddha-sīmās and khaṇḍa-sīmās within the bounds of the territory);

a not-dwelling-apart ((ticīvara-)avippavāsa) territory;

a gains territory (when a king gives the produce of a certain area around the monastery to the monastery, that area is called a gains territory);

a village territory;

a town territory;

a city territory;

a bow-length territory (the territory in a wilderness);

a water-splash territory (the territory in a lake, river, or ocean);

a province territory;

a country territory;

a kingdom territory (the territory of a king’s rule, which may cover more than one country);

an island territory; and

a world-system territory (all the area within the mountains surrounding the world-system (!)).

If a donor says, “I give this cloth to the bhikkhus in x territory,” it goes to all the bhikkhus in that territory, but not to those outside. If the donor doesn’t specify which type of territory, the bhikkhu receiving the cloth should ask him/her to be specific. If he/she doesn’t understand the different types of territories and just says, “in the territory,” give it to the bhikkhus in the precinct territory, i.e., the bounds of the monastery.

2. Giving within the agreement. Because the Canon does not give a procedure for the agreement by which monasteries may pool their gains, the Commentary recommends a simple announcement, with the following procedure. If the bhikkhus in Monastery X want to share their gains with those in Monastery Y, they should meet in X. (None of the texts address the point explicitly, but it would seem to be appropriate that the bhikkhus who reside in Y should be present to accept or reject the agreement as well.) One of the bhikkhus should state the reason for sharing gains with the bhikkhus in Y, and then announce three times, “The Community is agreeable to making this monastery and that monastery a single-gains territory.”

3. Giving where food is prepared. The request that the cloth be distributed where food is prepared should be treated as follows: If the donor provides regular food for two or more monasteries, the goods should be distributed to all of them. If they have unequal populations, inform the donor. If he/she says, “Divide in line with the number of bhikkhus,” then it is all right to do so. Otherwise, each monastery should get an equal share. If there are articles, such as furniture, that can’t be divided, ask where they should go. If the donor doesn’t say, they should go to the dwelling of the most senior bhikkhu. If that dwelling is already complete in terms of a particular article, the article should go to where it is lacking.

4. Giving to the Community. In all of the Commentary’s examples under this heading, cloth is distributed by seniority, in defiance of the Canon, which as noted above recommends drawing lots. In the phrase, “divide it among all the members of the Bhikkhu Saṅgha who are present for the distribution,” the Commentary says that the word “present” means present within the precinct territory. If within the territory there are slow-moving elder bhikkhus who can’t make it to the distribution in time, the robe-cloth distributor should set aside shares for them and continue with the distribution. If bhikkhus from other monasteries come for shares on hearing that there is to be a cloth distribution, they should be included, too. If they come in the middle of the distribution, have them sit in line with their seniority and continue handing out the cloth in line with seniority (in other words, if they come too late for their turn, they have to wait to see if there is enough cloth for another round). If they are within the precinct territory but haven’t yet entered the line-up, give a share of cloth to their students for their (the teachers’) sake. If they are not within the precinct territory, don’t give that extra portion to the students. If there is enough cloth for a second round, begin again with the most senior bhikkhu.

A bhikkhu observing the discarded-robes dhutaṅga should not take a portion of robe-cloth in the distribution, although a bhikkhu who is not observing that dhutaṅga may give his portion to one who is, and the latter does not thereby break his observance. If cloth or thread is given for purposes other than robes, a bhikkhu observing the discarded-robes dhutaṅga may take a portion. If, after using it for its intended purpose, there is enough cloth or thread left over for making a robe, he may go ahead and use it for that purpose without breaking his observance.

In the case of a bhikkhu who has received cloth “for the Community” while he has entered the Rains alone, if there is no kaṭhina then the cloth is his until the end of the robe season. A similar principle holds true for bhikkhus who enter the Rains as a group: If there is no kaṭhina, any cloth they receive up through the end of the robe season is theirs and need not be shared with visiting bhikkhus who may arrive during the robe season. As for the bhikkhu who has received cloth “for the Community” while living alone outside of the Rains, he should ring a bell, and announce the time for sharing out the robes. (Apparently he should do this regardless of whether he thinks there is anyone to hear the bell.) Whether or not he does so, if he thinks, “Only I am here. These robes are only for me,” that is taking them improperly. If he thinks, “There is no one else here. These fall to me,” he is taking them properly. The Canon’s phrase, “before the first two have drawn lots for their shares” means before they have begun drawing lots. Latecomers who come while lots are being drawn don’t get a share.

5. Giving to both sides of the Community. If the donor says to the robe-cloth receiver, “I’m giving this to both Communities and to you,” then if there are ten bhikkhus and ten bhikkhunīs, 21 portions should be made. The robe-cloth receiver gets the first portion and then has the right to receive another portion in line with his seniority in the distribution to the ten bhikkhus. If the donor doesn’t say that he/she is giving to the two Communities, but just to “the bhikkhus and bhikkhunīs,” the gift is not to be divided half-and-half between the two Communities. Instead, equal portions should be made in line with the total number of bhikkhus and bhikkhunīs, and each individual should receive one portion. If the donor says, “I’m giving this to the bhikkhus and the bhikkhunīs and to you,” the robe-cloth receiver gets only one portion.

6. Giving to the Community that has spent the Rains. If a bhikkhu spending the Rains in one place consents to a portion of robe-cloth from another place, he should return it. If it is worn out or lost, he should make compensation. If when the Community asks for its return he doesn’t return it, the offense is to be determined by the value of the cloth. (?—This follows the theory of bhaṇḍadeyya, which we rejected in the discussion of Pr 2; here in particular it seems excessive punishment for what the Canon explicitly says is only a dukkaṭa.)

If, up through the time of the kaṭhina privileges, the donor says, “I give this cloth to the bhikkhus who have spent the Rains here (this makes it a kāla-cīvara), then the cloth is for all the bhikkhus who spent the first Rains there without break. If any of them have gone off wandering, their portions may be given to their trusted friends for the wandering bhikkhus’ sake.

If the donor says, “I give this cloth to the bhikkhus who are spending the Rains,” then (a) if it’s during the first Rains, it goes to all those who are currently spending the Rains there and have done so without break. (b) If during the fourth month of the rainy season, it’s just for those spending the second Rains who have done so without break.

If the donor says, “I am giving this cloth intended for Rains-dwellers,” then if (a) during the cold season (the first four months of the dry season), it goes to all those who have just spent the Rains. If (b) during the hot season (the last four months of the dry season), the donor should be asked, “For those who have spent the last Rains or those who will spend the next Rains?” If the gift is for the latter but there is no way to keep it, tell this to the donor. If he/she says, “Give it to the Community who is present,” distribute it as cloth given to the Community (as under (4)).

7. Giving having designated. If the designation is related to conjey, meals, or non-staple foods, then the cloth is for those who have been invited to partake of these things and do so. It is not for anyone else.

A designation involving robe-cloths covers the case where the donor says, “This is for those to whom I’ve given cloth in the past.” Whatever item the donor then gives is for them and no one else.

A designation involving lodgings covers the case where the donor says, “This is for those living in the lodging I’ve built.” Whatever item the donor then gives is for them and no one else.

A designation involving medicine covers the case where the donor says, “This is for those to whom I’ve regularly given medicine in the past.” Whatever item the donor then gives is for them and no one else.

8. Giving to an individual. The donor may do this in the individual’s presence by saying, “I’m giving this to you,” or in his absence by saying, “I’m giving this to so-and-so.” If the donor says, “I give this to you and your students,” it goes to the recipient and to all his present and past students (“those who’ve come to study and those who’ve studied and gone”).

Bestowing bathing cloths

The Commentary to AN, in discussing the formulaic suttas at the end of the Fives, defines the office of cloth-bestower (sāṭiya-gāhāpaka) as a bestower of rains-bathing cloths. None of the texts explain why there is a separate official for this purpose or why he is called a bestower (gāhāpaka) rather than a distributor/divider (bhājaka). Cv.II.1 states that a bhikkhu on probation still has the right to receive a rains-bathing cloth in line with seniority, which implies that regular bhikkhus receive them in line with seniority as well. The Commentary to Mv.VII.1.4 states that if any accessory gifts of cloth are donated along with a kaṭhina, they should be handed out beginning where the rains-bathing cloths left off. This suggests that, shortly before the beginning of the Rains, the bathing cloth bestower would take any rains-bathing cloths that have been given to the Community and hand them out in line with seniority, making note of where the cloths run out. This further suggests a possible reason why he is not called a “divider”: i.e., he is not expected to cut up the bathing cloths and distribute equal pieces to everyone in the Community. Instead, he hands out whole bathing cloths even when there are not enough to go around.

Food officials

Responsibility for gifts of food may be divided among four officials: a meal designator, a distributor of conjey, a distributor of fruit, and a distributor of non-staple food. As is the case with the offices dealing with robe-cloth, a Community may decide on the basis of its size whether it wants to appoint one bhikkhu to fill all of these offices or to keep the offices separate. Of the four offices, the texts describe only one—the meal designator—in any detail. The duties of the remaining three, however, can easily be inferred from his.

The Canon’s guidelines

The meal designator is responsible for determining which bhikkhus will be given any of the following meals: Community meals, designated meals, invitational meals, lottery meals, meals given regularly on a particular day (or particular days) of the fortnight (this can include daily meals), meals given regularly on the uposatha day, meals given regularly on the day after the uposatha, meals for newcomers, meals for those going away, meals for the sick, and meals for those tending to the sick.

We have already discussed the first six types of meals in Appendix III to BMC1. A Community meal is one to which the donor invites all members of the Community. A designated meal is one for which the donor requests x number of bhikkhus from the Community. An invitational meal is one where the donor specifies which individual bhikkhus are to receive the meal. A lottery meal is one in which the recipients are chosen by drawing lots. The periodic meals are given regularly to a rotating roster of x number of bhikkhus every time the specified date comes around.

Meals for newcomers are meant specifically for any bhikkhus who have newly arrived at a monastery; meals for those going away are meant for bhikkhus about to leave the monastery on a journey. Meals for the sick and for those tending to the sick are self-explanatory.

The first six types of meals may either be (1) gifts of food that are sent to the monastery or (2) meals outside the monastery, either at the donor’s home or at another place specified by the donor. In the prior case, Cv.VI.21.1 allows the meal designator to divide the food into portions, tying a ticket or leaf to each portion, and then to appoint the portions to the bhikkhus who are to receive them. In the latter case, the origin story to Sg 8 shows that the bhikkhus who will be taking the meal would be informed of the fact two days before the meal.

In the case of designated, lottery, fortnight, uposatha, and day-after-the-uposatha meals, the origin story to Sg 8 shows that the meal designator should keep rotating rosters for the designated category, and apparently the other categories as well, to make sure that all the bhikkhus have an equal chance to receive meals of each sort.

The Commentary’s recommendations

The Commentary’s recommendations are as follows:

Community meals

These are for bhikkhus who have already come to the monastery on that day. Those who come on later days have no right to ask for special consideration to compensate for not receiving Community meals on days when they were not present in the monastery.

Designated meals

The meal designator should announce the time that the designation will be made. When the bhikkhus have assembled he should ask them where the last designated meal left off. If it left off at the end of the line, or if—after he has asked them three times—no one can remember where it left off, he should start with the most senior bhikkhu. But if, for example, someone remembers that the roster left off with bhikkhus of ten Rains, then all those with ten Rains should be gathered and told to stay quiet. Then precise seniority—in terms of month, day, and hour—should be worked out. If, while seniority is being determined, other ten-Rains bhikkhus come, they should be included in the group. If they come after the requisite number of bhikkhus have been designated to go, they (the latecomers) lose their turn. Even those who have undertaken the dhutaṅga practice of eating only alms meals should not be skipped over: If they want to maintain their dhutaṅga, they will ask to be skipped over on their own.

If a donor tells a bhikkhu that he/she will give a designated meal for ten bhikkhus tomorrow, the bhikkhu should inform the meal designator today. If he forgets, he should inform the meal designator early in the morning. If he forgets and remembers to inform the meal designator only after some of the bhikkhus have left for their alms round, the bhikkhus to be designated for the meal should be taken from those who haven’t left the precinct of the monastery. All bhikkhus present are eligible to be designated, whether they come from this monastery or not (e.g., they have heard that a lot of designated meals have been arranged for the bhikkhus of this monastery and they come for a share). To determine whether a bhikkhu is “present,” follow the guidelines given above under the discussion of the Commentary’s recommendations for distributing robe-cloth given to the Community.

In addition to the two sorts of meals mentioned in the Canon—food sent to the monastery and meals outside the monastery—the Commentary mentions a third, in which the donors or their workers come to the monastery, take the bowls of x number of bhikkhus back to their home, and then return with the bowls filled with food. The Commentary then discusses a difficulty that might come with this arrangement: If the donor takes the bowls of eight bhikkhus, fills seven with food and one with water, the food is to be treated in line with what the donor says. If he/she tells all eight to share the food and water, then it must be shared out among all eight. If he/she says nothing and leaves, the seven who get food don’t have to share the food with the eighth, while the eighth should be first in line for the next designated meal. (In the meantime, apparently, he is to content himself with the water if the bowls are returned when it is too late to go for alms.)

If the donor specifically asks to provide a designated meal for senior bhikkhus, he/she should be told that their turn hasn’t yet come. The meal designator should then send bhikkhus in line with the regular roster. If a king or king’s minister provides especially fine designated meals on a regular basis, the meal designator should make a separate roster for these meals so that every bhikkhu in the monastery gets to go. If a donor brings a tray of food “for the Community,” divide it—into meal-sized rather than bite-sized portions—and distribute it according to the roster for designated meals. If there’s enough for everyone, don’t follow the roster but distribute it beginning with the most senior bhikkhu. If the donor designates a gift of tonics or medicines for the Community, these should have their separate rosters—i.e., one each for ghee, oil, sugar, honey, and other medicines.

Invitational meals

The Commentary says that the meal designator should not be involved with meals of this sort, but a common practice at present is for donors to ask him to inform the bhikkhus who have been invited to their meal. As we noted under Pc 32, no more than three bhikkhus may be invited to such meals unless the proper occasions are in effect. If the donor wants more than three to attend the meal, the remaining bhikkhus should be taken from the roster for designated meals.

Lottery meals

The lottery should be held in the monastery, not outside. The meal designator should write the names of the donors on slips of wood, bamboo, or palm leaf (paper would be appropriate at present), and then pile them in a basket or in a fold of his robe. Mix them together thoroughly—left and right, up and down—and have the bhikkhus take them beginning where the last lottery allocation left off. If, for some reason, a bhikkhu refuses to go to the meal he has drawn by lot, he shouldn’t be allowed to draw lots for the next three days (or turns). After that, he may be allowed to draw one more lot. If he draws a ticket for a house nearer than the one he rejected before and then accepts it, he should not be allowed to draw lots again. He should also be heavily punished: If the punishment is to fetch water, it should be no less than 50-60 pails; if it’s to carry firewood, no less than 50-60 bundles; if it’s to carry sand, no less than 50-60 alms bowls full. (!—This seems excessive. The Canon contains no allowance for punishing a bhikkhu in this way.)

Lotteries for fruit, sweets, tonics, etc., should be held separately.

Bhikkhus observing the alms-goer’s practice should not accept items distributed by lottery, even if they are tonics and medicines. (The Sub-commentary disagrees with this last point, on the grounds that a lottery counts as special gains only in the area of meals, and not for tonics and medicines. Also note that the Commentary allows such bhikkhus to receive shares of medicines, and tonics given to the Community, below.)

Meals for newcomers

If a visiting bhikkhu comes every day, he should be included in these meals only on the first day of his repeated visits. If there’s a gap between visits, he should be allowed to accept newcomers’ meals for the first two or three days of each visit.

If the donor says that, on days when there are no newcomers, the resident bhikkhus may have shares of his/her meals, it is all right for them to do so. If he/she doesn’t give this permission, they may not take shares of the meals—although if there are bhikkhus who are about to leave on a trip, they may take shares of the meals for newcomers.

Meals for bhikkhus who are leaving

A bhikkhu may have a share in this meal for only one day unless he is prevented from leaving as planned, in which case he is allowed to take a share again on the next day. If his plans to leave are thwarted by robbers, floods, etc., he may continue to take a share of these meals for two or three days while waiting for the obstacles to pass.

Meals for the sick

These are meant for any bhikkhu with an illness that will get worse if he eats “mixed” food, which apparently means food acquired at random (see Pc 47). In other words, he requires a special diet so as not to aggravate his condition. (From the Commentary’s other explanations, it would seem reasonable that these meals would also be meant for bhikkhus who do not require a special diet but are too weak or disabled to go for alms.) If there is not enough food in these meals for all the sick bhikkhus in the monastery, the food should first be given to those who are too sick to go for alms. Among those who are that sick, it should be given first to those who do not have other sources of support. There is no time limit on how long a sick bhikkhu may have a share in these meals. He may continue taking them until he is well enough to eat “mixed” food without adversely affecting his health.

Meals for those who are tending to the sick

These should be distributed along the same principles as meals for the sick: i.e., with first preference to those who are nursing patients who are very sick, and to those who are nursing those with no other sources of support.

In addition to the meals mentioned in the Canon, the Commentary mentions the following types of meals for which the meal designator is responsible:

Dwelling meals

These are for bhikkhus resident in a specific dwelling and go to whichever bhikkhu(s) are residing in the dwelling that day. If the dwelling was given to an individual and not to the Community, the dwelling meal is for him alone. If he goes elsewhere, his students may eat it in his stead.

Roster meals

These are meals in which donors take turns in providing food for bhikkhus during a time of famine. If they use the word food or meal in announcing their gift, bhikkhus observing the alms-goer’s dhutaṅga practice may not have a share. If the donors don’t use the word “food” or “meal,” they may (?).

Monastery meals

These are meals made from food growing on monastery land. Bhikkhus observing the alms-goers practice may accept these meals (?). They are to be treated as a gift to the Saṅgha as a whole, and not just to the residents of the monastery.

Gifts of tonics/medicines

If a large donation is given, the meal designator should ring the bell and hand out portions to fill the containers the bhikkhus bring. If an elderly bhikkhu comes after his spot in line has been passed, back up to give him his portion. Bhikkhus observing the alms-goer’s dhutaṅga practice may also accept portions. Bhikkhus from other monasteries should be given portions as well; the question of their being present or not is to be decided in line with the guidelines given under gifts of cloth to the Community. (If the donation of a tonic or medicine is not enough for everyone, it becomes the responsibility of the dispenser of minor items—see below.)

Lodging officials

The Canon allows for two officials related to lodgings: the lodging bestower (senāsana-gāhāpaka) and the lodging assignor (senāsana-paññāpaka). Neither the Canon nor the Commentary clearly distinguishes between the duties of the two. The Vinaya-mukha suggests a rather unnatural division of labor between them, with the lodging bestower responsible for assigning bhikkhus to particular dwellings, while the lodging assignor assigns them to sleeping places within the lodgings.

A more likely division of labor is suggested by the Canon’s accounts of how the two offices were established to begin with. The lodging assignor was one of the very first offices to be established, while the office of the lodging bestower was established only after bhikkhus were allowed to lay claim to lodgings. Because these claims are good only during the three months of a bhikkhu’s Rains-residence, it would seem that the lodging bestower is responsible for granting claims to lodgings during the Rains, while the lodging assignor assigns them during the rest of the year, when bhikkhus are more mobile. This fits with the origin story in Sg 8, which tells how Ven. Dabba Mallaputta, the first lodging assignor, had to assign lodgings to visiting bhikkhus who would arrive at all hours of the day and night. This division of labor also fits with the various guidelines covering the allotment of lodgings, which differ considerably for the two different time periods. The discussion in this section will be arranged around this division of labor, discussing first some general guidelines that apply to both officials, followed by the guidelines for giving lodging claims for the Rains and then by guidelines for assigning lodgings outside of the Rains.

General guidelines

The lodging officials are responsible only for lodgings belonging to the Community. They cannot move bhikkhus into or out of lodgings belonging to individual bhikkhus. Within certain limits, they may move a bhikkhu from one Community lodging to another as they see fit. The limitations, set by the Vibhaṅga to Pc 16, Cv.VI.10.2, and Mv.VIII.8.2, are these:

A senior bhikkhu is not to be moved to make room for a junior bhikkhu.

The storehouse guardian is not to be moved.

In general, an ill bhikkhu is not to be moved, but there are provisions to make sure that this privilege is not abused. For example, a bhikkhu may not use a slight illness (such as a headache, says the Commentary) as a pretext for not being moved. When some group-of-six bhikkhus made their illness an excuse to hold onto the best lodgings, the Buddha gave permission for “appropriate lodgings” to be provided for ill bhikkhus. This is apparently an allowance to set aside a sick ward in the monastery and to move sick bhikkhus into the ward. This hypothesis is supported by a reference to a sick ward in SN 36:7. The Commentary adds that appropriate lodgings also be provided for bhikkhus who mix medicines and administer medical treatments—these would be lodgings adjacent to the sick ward—and that these bhikkhus not be moved.

The Commentary states further that a bhikkhu who has received a lodging from the Community should not be moved. An obvious example of this case is that of a bhikkhu who has been allowed to lay claim to a lodging for the Rains. He is not to be moved for the duration of his Rains-residence. The Commentary, however, gives another example, that of a bhikkhu who is learned: The Community, seeing the service he performs in teaching others, may provide him with a lodging and decree that he not be moved from that lodging at all. Because the Commentary was compiled by learned bhikkhus, this judgment seems a little self-serving.

A bhikkhu may not be moved from his lodging by anyone other than the lodging official(s), except in the circumstances discussed under Pc 17.

The texts do not mention this point, but all of these prohibitions against moving a bhikkhu apparently refer to cases of moving him against his will. If he requests to be moved to a place that seems fitting to the lodging official, the latter may move him in line with his request.

As noted in Cv.VI.6.4 and Cv.VI.7, bhikkhus may not preempt Community lodgings in line with seniority, either for themselves or for their mentors (see Chapter 8). The lodgings official may want to take seniority into consideration when allotting lodgings, but as the origin story to Sg 8 shows, he should take other factors into consideration as well.

Having been authorized (as the lodging assignor), Ven. Dabba Mallaputta assigned lodgings in the same place for bhikkhus congenial with one another. For those who knew the suttas, he assigned lodgings in the same place, (thinking,) “They will rehearse the suttas with one another.” For Vinaya experts, he assigned lodgings in the same place, (thinking,) “They will investigate the Vinaya with one another.” For Dhamma teachers, he assigned lodgings in the same place, (thinking,) “They will discuss the Dhamma with one another.” For those who practiced jhāna, he assigned lodgings in the same place, (thinking,) “They will not disturb one another.” For those who spent their time in animal talk and body-building, he assigned lodgings in the same place, (thinking,) “In this way, these venerable ones will be left to their wishes.”

This passage suggests that the Commentary is off the mark in requiring that the best lodgings must be allotted in line with seniority. Given the many different features that different bhikkhus might regard as ideal in a lodging, there can be no one criterion for deciding what constitutes a “best” lodging. The lodging official must have an eye more for human psychology than for material comforts when deciding which lodging is best for which bhikkhu.

As the Vinaya-mukha points out, the Commentary also seems mistaken in requiring that each Community appoint two lodging officials so that each may assign a lodging for the other. The Commentary does not say why this is necessary in the case of lodging officials and not in the case of other officials. Perhaps it is trying to account for the two separate offices dealing with lodgings, but as we have mentioned above, the two offices are more likely based on a different division of labor.

Lodging claims for the Rains

There are three periods for laying claim to lodgings for the Rains: earlier, for the first Rains-residence (beginning the day after the full moon of Āsāḷha); later, for the second Rains-residence (beginning the day after the following full moon); and free in the interval, lasting from the day after the Invitation day to the beginning of the following Rains, during which one may lay claim to a lodging for the sake of the next Rains but must leave it free for more senior bhikkhus to use in the interim.

An individual bhikkhu may hold only one lodging claim at a time (although see below). He may not accept a claim for a lodging at a monastery where he is not currently dwelling. Once he has received a lodging claim, it is good only for the three months of his Rains-residence. He may not hold a lodging claim for the “season time,” which the Sub-commentary interprets as the cold and hot seasons.

Earlier & later claims

The Canon recommends that the lodging bestower allot lodgings at the beginning of the first Rains as follows: He is to count the bhikkhus, then count the sleeping spaces, and then assign claims by sleeping spaces. If many sleeping spaces are left over, he may give each bhikkhu a claim to an entire dwelling. If many dwellings are left over, he may give each bhikkhu a claim to an entire neighborhood of dwellings. If there are many neighborhoods left over, he may give extra shares. This would seem to contradict the rule against laying claim to more than one lodging, but that rule is apparently meant to prevent two things:

laying claims in more than one monastery; and

laying claims in one monastery in a way that would deny a lodging to another bhikkhu already present in the monastery.

The purpose behind the present allowance is to arrange for every dwelling in the monastery to have a bhikkhu responsible for looking after it to ensure that it does not fall into disrepair. However, the Cv.VI.11.3 adds that even when a bhikkhu has received an extra share he does not have to relinquish it against his will to another bhikkhu who comes later (e.g., for the second Rains).

As for the rule against holding claims for two lodgings, the origin story to Cv.VI.12 states that if a bhikkhu lays claim to lodging X and then to lodging Y, the claim to X expires when he lays claim to Y. The Commentary adds that if he leaves the monastery shortly before the beginning of the Rains with the intent of laying claim to a lodging elsewhere, his claim to X expires when he sets foot outside the monastery precinct. If he goes thinking, “I’ll lay claim to a lodging elsewhere if it’s comfortable,” but can find no comfortable lodging, his claim to X still holds.

The Commentary to Cv.VI.11.4 also gives the following recommendations for bhikkhus in general as they are about to enter the Rains: If a bhikkhu wants to spend the Rains in a monastery other than the one in which he is currently dwelling, he should start heading there a month before the start of the Rains, both so as to see if the place is congenial in terms of teachings, meditation, and requisites, and so as not to inconvenience the lodging bestower and other bhikkhus in that monastery by arriving just before the Rains begins. Resident bhikkhus (planning to stay on in their monastery) should spend the month preparing any worn-down buildings so that those who come for the Rains will study or practice meditation in comfort.

The lodging bestower should allot lodgings for the Rains at dawn of the day the Rains begins. If other bhikkhus come on that day, they should be told that the lodgings have been laid claim to and that they should go to other lodgings, such as the foot of a tree. What this means is that they should enter the second Rains somewhere else.

Free in the interval

The Canon does not explain the allowance for claims of this sort, but the Commentary says that it is for the sake of dwellings whose sponsors give special gifts to the residents once a year at the end of the Rains, and where those residents tend to be visiting bhikkhus who take the gifts and leave. Such places are in danger of not being looked after by the resident bhikkhus during the non-Rains period, so the lodging bestower should offer claims to such places to the bhikkhus in the monastery in line with seniority. Whoever accepts such a claim is responsible for looking after the lodging for the eight non-Rains months. Visiting senior bhikkhus should be allowed to stay there during that time, but when the following Rains comes the person responsible for it gets to live there.

A reasonable policy would be for the lodging bestower to make a similar arrangement for any other dwelling that is falling into disrepair, whatever the cause.

Building responsibility

The Canon does mention another arrangement that allows a bhikkhu to lay claim to a space in a dwelling for several Rains in a row. That is by taking on building responsibility for the dwelling. The stipulations here are as follows: A bhikkhu may be given this responsibility only in a monastery where he is dwelling, and for only one dwelling at a time. His responsibility consists of building a new dwelling or finishing an unfinished dwelling. Repairing a finished dwelling does not qualify as taking on building responsibility. Before giving a bhikkhu the responsibility for a dwelling, the Community is to consider the type of dwelling (or to inspect the dwelling, if it is half-finished) and then determine the number of Rains that he may hold the right to reserve a sleeping space in it when it is finished. This length of time depends on the dwelling’s size: five to six Rains for a small dwelling, seven to eight for a barrel-vaulted dwelling, and ten to twelve for a large dwelling. The transaction statement for giving building responsibility is included in Appendix I.

A bhikkhu who has been given building responsibility is to make an effort for the dwelling to be finished quickly. Once it is finished, he is responsible for repairing things that get cracked or broken during the period in which he has a right to reserve a sleeping space there. The Commentary quotes the Kurundī as saying that he should not use tools himself, but should simply oversee the work. However, the Canon’s many stories of bhikkhus’ doing construction work suggest that the Kurundī’s recommendation is not binding.

The Canon notes that a bhikkhu who has been given building responsibility maintains his right to his sleeping space even if he goes insane, gets possessed, is delirious with pain, or gets suspended. However, he may not transfer it to anyone else. Also, he may not use this right to preempt a sleeping place outside of the Rains-residence, nor may he preempt the entire dwelling. If he decides to spend the Rains elsewhere during the period when his claim to this right is still in force, no one else—not even his students, says the Commentary—may stay in the sleeping place he has claimed. This prohibition, together with that against having a bhikkhu take on responsibility for more than one dwelling at a time, is to prevent bhikkhus from forming cliques by building multiple dwellings and then passing along their special lodging rights to their friends. If, however, a bhikkhu with building responsibility leaves the Saṅgha or admits to not having been a true bhikkhu to begin with, his claim to the resulting sleeping space is rendered null and void. The lodging bestower may then assign that space to any bhikkhu as he sees fit.

If a bhikkhu takes on building responsibility but any of the following events takes place before he has finished the building work—he leaves the monastery, disrobes, dies, admits to not being a true bhikkhu, goes insane, gets possessed, gets delirious with pain, or is suspended—the Community may give building responsibility for that dwelling over to another bhikkhu, and the right to the sleeping space passes on to him.

The Commentary has only a few points to add here: The length of the claim should be in proportion to the length of the building, one Rains for each half-meter in length, up to twelve Rains. When the dwelling needs repair, one should ask for material help from people in this order:

1) the original sponsor of the monastery or his heir,

2) one’s own relatives/supporters,

3) the Community.

If help is not forthcoming from any of these sources, one may sell off monastic property to get the funds needed for repairs. This, though, would require the consent of the Community. The Commentary quotes the Kurundī as saying that if a bhikkhu doesn’t feel up to repairing Community property, he should be told to repair it as his own; it then becomes the Community’s again after his death. This, however, contradicts the Canon’s prohibition against giving Community lodgings over to individuals (see Chapter 7).

The Vinaya-mukha, citing a story in the Dhammapada Commentary in which the Buddha appoints Ven. Mahā Moggalāna to oversee construction of the Eastern Monastery in Sāvatthī, maintains that giving building responsibility to a bhikkhu is tantamount to appointing him as a Community official in charge of monastery construction work in general. However, because a bhikkhu may accept building responsibility for no more than one building at a time, and because there is no limit to the number of bhikkhus who may be granted building responsibility in a monastery at any given time, the Vinaya-mukha seems mistaken on this point. The purpose of the allowance for giving building responsibility seems aimed more at sharing building tasks out among the bhikkhus and getting them to care for the Community property they use.

Assigning lodgings outside of the Rains

The Canon has nothing to say on this topic beyond the general guidelines mentioned above, but the Commentary says this: When visiting bhikkhus come to stay, reassign lodgings right away in keeping with seniority. Keep an extra sleeping space or two set aside for visiting bhikkhus so that if senior bhikkhus arrive at night there’s no need to reassign lodgings at that time. If, however, more senior bhikkhus arrive at night than there are sleeping spaces set aside, reassign the bhikkhus then. It’s possible to assign up to three bhikkhus per sleeping space, with the arrangement that one bhikkhu will sleep during the first watch of the night, another during the second, and another during the third. The second bhikkhu has the right to wake the first, and the third the second.

All of this assumes that the lodgings have a clear order of desirability that can be assigned by seniority. And, as we noted above, the Commentary’s insistence on rights of seniority in this area runs counter to the Canon. The Commentary, however, does quote “some bhikkhus in India” as saying that certain lodgings are comfortable for some but not for others (i.e., there’s no clear order of desirability) and so they recommend re-assigning lodgings both for resident bhikkhus and for visiting bhikkhus every day.

All of this would make life in a monastery outside of the Rains-residence fairly unsettled. And perhaps that is why the Buddha did not allow bhikkhus to preempt lodgings outside of the Rains. Those who disliked the uncertainty of being forced to move from dwelling to dwelling without warning would be inclined to spend the dry months wandering in the wilderness rather than trying to become settled monastery dwellers. Those who stayed on at the monastery would be forced to keep their possessions to a minimum so that they could move at a moment’s notice with ease.

Miscellaneous

There are two officials responsible for miscellaneous goods: the bowl bestower and the dispenser of minor items.

The bowl bestower

The bowl bestower is the official mentioned under NP 22, responsible for supervising the bowl exchange when a bhikkhu has received a bowl in defiance of that rule. See the discussion there for details. It would seem reasonable to assume that the Community might have a store of bowls and that it would need an official to bestow those bowls as needed, but none of the texts mention this possibility.

The dispenser of minor items

The dispenser of minor items may hand out the following items—which have been donated to the Community—to individual bhikkhus who request them (comments from the Commentary are in brackets): a needle, a small knife [to be given out to those who need them], a pair of sandals [to be given out to those who are going on a rough journey], a waistband [to those who need them], a shoulder strap (for the alms bowl or for carrying loads—see Chapter 3) [to those whose shoulder straps are getting old], a straining cloth [to those who need them], a water strainer [to those who need them], pieces of cloth [to those who ask for them, although there are limits here: If a bhikkhu asks for cloth to apply to a robe (as a patch), he may be given enough to make a “dike” and a “half dike”; if he asks for a “plot,” he may be given enough for a single plot or two half plots, but not enough for two full plots; if he asks for border pieces, he may be given enough to provide a border for a whole robe]. If the Community has ghee, oil, honey, or molasses, an individual is to be given one sip. If he has need of more, he is to be given another. If he has need of still more, he is to be given yet another. [If he needs a fourth portion, the Community should be informed first before giving it to him.]

Work supervisors

To oversee the work of the Community, each Community may appoint officials to supervise the work of monastery attendants and the work of novices. The Canon has little to say about the duties of these officials other than that they should make sure that the work of the monastery attendants and novices gets done.

Removing officials from office

None of the texts provide procedures for removing officials who prove to be biased or incompetent, or who would like to be relieved of their duties. In the case of biased or incompetent officials, Pv.XV.13.3-15 says that their bias or incompetence is enough to make them suffer as if they were carried off straight to hell, so there is no need for their fellow bhikkhus to punish them further. As for the bhikkhus who suffer injustice because of an official’s bias, they should use it as an opportunity to develop patience and equanimity. However, Pc 13 does allow for bhikkhus to complain about an official’s behavior if he is truly biased. What is not mentioned is how the Community should handle the complaint.

Technically, one could argue that the official’s bias or incompetence disqualified him from the position, and that the transaction appointing him—in lacking “validity of object”—was thus not fit to stand. Thus the Community acting in unity can appoint another bhikkhu to replace him. If, however, the biased official or any of his friends protests the new transaction, he cannot be replaced.

This problem is often circumvented in Thailand by having the abbot of the monastery appoint Community officials. Because these officials are not authorized by the Community (see Pc 13), they can be easily removed from office if they prove unworthy or want to resign. In a Community where officials are appointed in this way, the honorable practice—if bhikkhus have a complaint against a Community official—is to speak up in a Community meeting. (The dishonorable practice is to write anonymous letters to the abbot or to post anonymous notices around the monastery.) If the abbot agrees that the official’s behavior is truly biased, he may remove him from office and appoint another bhikkhu in his place. I personally know of a case, dating from three decades ago, in which a meal designator had such a personal animosity for a junior bhikkhu that he arranged for the junior bhikkhu to be excluded from the rosters for all the meals for which he, the official, was responsible. This situation lasted for several months, during which time the junior bhikkhu never voiced a complaint. Finally, when the abbot checked the rosters and realized what was happening, he persuaded the official to resign his position and replaced him with the junior bhikkhu. The latter has proved so unbiased—even to the official who had wronged him—that he has maintained the position ever since.

As for the case of a bhikkhu who wants to resign his position, the common practice in Thailand is for him to tender his resignation to the abbot. If the abbot accepts it, the official is freed from his duties. If not, he must continue in the office. At that point, if he is serious about wanting to be relieved of his duties, his only recourse is to leave the monastery and live elsewhere.

If an official authorized by the Community wants to resign his position, the humane policy would be to accept his resignation and find another bhikkhu to fill his place. However, so many variables can surround such a situation that the Canon is wise in not trying to legislate for it. Each Community must thus handle the case in whatever way seems fit.

Rules

Robe-cloth

“I allow that a bhikkhu endowed with five qualities be authorized as a robe-cloth receiver: whoever is not biased with the bias of desire, not biased with the bias of aversion, not biased with the bias of delusion, not biased with the bias of fear, and who knows what has and has not been received.”—Mv.VIII.5.1 (Repeated at Cv.VI.21.2)

Transaction statement—Mv.VIII.5.2 (Repeated at Cv.VI.21.2)

“I allow that a bhikkhu endowed with five qualities be authorized as a robe-cloth keeper: whoever is not biased with the bias of desire, not biased with the bias of aversion, not biased with the bias of delusion, not biased with the bias of fear, and who knows what has and has not been put away.”—Mv.VIII.6.1

Transaction statement—Mv.VIII.6.2

“I allow that a storehouse be authorized wherever the Community desires: a dwelling, a barrel-vaulted building, a multi-storied building, a gabled building, a cell.”—Mv.VIII.7.1

Transaction statement—Mv.VIII.7.2

“I allow that a bhikkhu endowed with five qualities be authorized as a storehouse guardian: whoever is not biased with the bias of desire, not biased with the bias of aversion, not biased with the bias of delusion, not biased with the bias of fear, and who knows what has and has not been guarded.”—Mv.VIII.8.1 (Repeated at Cv.VI.21.2)

Transaction statement—Mv.VIII.8.1 (Repeated at Cv.VI.21.2)

“I allow that a bhikkhu endowed with five qualities be authorized as a robe-cloth divider (distributor): whoever is not biased with the bias of desire, not biased with the bias of aversion, not biased with the bias of delusion, not biased with the bias of fear, and who knows what has and has not been divided.”—Mv.VIII.9.1 (Repeated at Cv.VI.21.2)

Transaction statement—Mv.VIII.9.1 (Repeated at Cv.VI.21.2)

General Rules for Dividing/distributing Cloth

“I allow that (robe-cloth) be divided up among the Community that is present.”—Mv.VIII.9.1

“I allow that, having first sorted the cloth (by type) and estimated it (by price), having combined the attractive with the unattractive (in each portion), having assembled the bhikkhus and gathered them in groups, a bundle of robe-cloth be set out… I allow that half a bundle be given to novices.”—Mv.VIII.9.2

“I allow that one who is going off be given his own portion… I allow that one be given more than his portion when he gives a compensation.”—Mv.VIII.9.3

“I allow that, having made up for any inequality, lots be cast with blades of kusa-grass.”—Mv.VIII.9.4

“There are these eight standards for the arising of robe-cloth:

1. One gives within the territory.

2. One gives within the agreement.

3. One gives where food is prepared.

4. One gives to the Community.

5. One gives to both sides of the Community.

6. One gives to the Community that has spent the Rains.

7. One gives having designated.

8. One gives to an individual.”—Mv.VIII.32

1. It is to be divided among however many bhikkhus are within the territory.

2. Many residences pool their gains. Whatever is given in one residence is given everywhere.

3. It is given where they do the constant business (upkeep) of the Community.

4. It is divided among the entire Community that is present.—Mv.VIII.32

“There is the case where a bhikkhu has entered the Rains alone. There, people (saying), ‘We are giving to the Community,’ give robe-cloths. I allow that those robe-cloths be just for him until the dismantling of the kaṭhina.”—Mv.VIII.24.2

“There is the case where a bhikkhu has entered the non-rainy season alone. There, people (saying), ‘We are giving to the Community,’ give robe-cloths. I allow that he determine the robe-cloths, ‘These robe-cloths are mine.’ If, when he has not yet determined the robe-cloths, another bhikkhu comes along, then an equal share is to be given to him. If, while those bhikkhus are dividing the cloth but have not yet drawn kusa-lots, another bhikkhu comes along, an equal share is to be given to him. If those bhikkhus dividing the cloth have drawn kusa-lots and another bhikkhu comes along, they do not have to give him a share if they don’t want to.”—Mv.VIII.24.4

Now at that time two elder brothers, Ven. Isidāsa and Ven. Isibhatta, having spent the Rains in Sāvatthī, went to a certain village monastery. People (saying), “At long last the elders have come,” gave food together with robe-cloths. The resident bhikkhus asked the elders, “Venerable sirs, these Community robe-cloths have arisen because of your coming. Will you consent to a portion?” The elders said, “As we understand the Dhamma taught by the Blessed One, these robe-cloths are yours alone until the dismantling of the kaṭhina.”—Mv.VIII.24.5

Now at that time three bhikkhus were spending the Rains in Rājagaha. There, people (saying), “We are giving to the Community,” gave robe-cloths. The thought occurred to the bhikkhus, “It has been laid down by the Blessed One that a Community is at least a group of four, but we are three people. Yet these people (saying), ‘We are giving to the Community,’ have given robe-cloths. So how are these to be treated by us?” Now at that time a number of elders—Ven. Nīlvāsī, Ven. Sāṇavāsī, Ven. Gopaka, Ven. Bhagu, and Ven. Phalidasandāna—were staying in Pāṭaliputta at the Rooster Park. So the bhikkhus, having gone to Pāṭaliputta, asked the elders. The elders said, “As we understand the Dhamma taught by the Blessed One, these robe-cloths are yours alone until the dismantling of the kaṭhina.”—Mv.VIII.24.6

5. Even if there are many bhikkhus and one bhikkhunī, she is to be given half. Even if there are many bhikkhunīs and one bhikkhu, he is to be given half. —Mv.VIII.32

6. It is to be divided among however many bhikkhus have spent the Rains in that residence. —Mv.VIII.32

“One who has entered the Rains in one place should not consent to a portion of robe-cloth in another place. Whoever should do so: an offense of wrong doing.”—Mv.VIII.25.3

“There is the case where a bhikkhu enters the Rains in two residences, (thinking), ‘In this way a great deal of robe-cloth will come to me.’ If he spends half the time here and half the time there, he should be given half a portion here and half a portion there. Or wherever he spends more time, he should be given a (full) portion there.”—Mv.VIII.25.4

“There is the case where a bhikkhu, having spent the Rains, goes away before robe-cloth arises. If there are appropriate receivers (in his place), it should be given to them.

“There is the case where a bhikkhu, having spent the Rains and before robe-cloth arises, renounces the training… dies… admits (§) to being a novice… to having renounced the training… to having committed an extreme offense. The Community is the owner.

“There is the case where a bhikkhu, having spent the Rains and before robe-cloth arises, admits (§) to being insane… possessed… delirious with pain… to having been suspended for not seeing an offense… to having been suspended for not making amends for an offense… to having been suspended for not relinquishing an evil view. If there are appropriate receivers (in his place), it should be given to them.

“There is the case where a bhikkhu, having spent the Rains and before robe-cloth arises, admits (§) to being a paṇḍaka… a person in affiliation through theft… a bhikkhu who has gone over to another religion… an animal… a matricide… a patricide… a murderer of an arahant… a molester of a bhikkhunī… a schismatic… one who has shed (a Tathāgata’s) blood… a hermaphrodite. The Community is the owner.”—Mv.VIII.30.2

Similarly if robe-cloth has arisen but not yet been divided up—Mv.VIII.30.3

“There is the case where bhikkhus have spent the Rains and the Community splits before robe-cloth arises. People give water to one faction and robe-cloth to the other faction, saying, ‘We are giving to the Community.’ That is for the (entire) Community… People give water to one faction and robe-cloth to the same faction, saying, ‘We are giving to the Community.’ That is for the (entire) Community. People give water to one faction and robe-cloth to the other faction, saying, ‘We are giving to the faction.’ That is just for the faction (to which the respective items were given). People give water to one faction and robe-cloth to the same faction, saying, ‘We are giving to the faction.’ That is just for the faction.”—Mv.VIII.30.4-5

“There is the case where bhikkhus have spent the Rains and, when robe-cloth has arisen but before it is divided, the Community splits. That is to be divided equally among them all.”—Mv.VIII.30.6

7. Conjey or meals or non-staple foods or robe-cloths or lodgings or medicines.—Mv.VIII.32

8. ‘I am giving this robe-cloth to so-and-so.’—Mv.VIII.32

Meals

Procedure and transaction statement for authorizing a meal designator. “I allow that food be appointed after having tied on a ticket or a leaf and having heaped up (the corresponding tickets, which are to be drawn by the bhikkhus—reading opuñjitvā with the Sri Lankan and Burmese editions).”—Cv.VI.21.1

“I allow a Community meal, a designated meal, an invitational meal, a lottery meal, a meal on (particular day(s) of) the fortnight, an uposatha meal, a day-after-the-uposatha meal.”—Cv.VI.21.1

“I allow meals for newcomers, meals for those going away, meals for the sick, meals for those tending the sick, constant conjey.”—Mv.VIII.15.15

Lodgings

Qualifications for a lodging bestower (senāsana-gāhāpaka): not biased with the bias of desire, aversion, delusion, or fear; knows what has and has not been bestowed. Procedure and transaction statement for authorizing a lodging bestower.—Cv.VI.11.2

Qualifications for a lodging assignor (senāsana-paññāpaka): not biased with the bias of desire, aversion, delusion, or fear; knows what has and has not been assigned. Procedure and transaction statement for authorizing a lodging assignor.—Cv.VI.21.2

“An ill bhikkhu should not be made to move. Whoever should make him move: an offense of wrong doing”…. (Group-of-six bhikkhus used their illness as an excuse to keep the best lodgings:) “I allow that an appropriate sleeping place be given to one who is ill”…. “A lodging should not be preempted on a slight pretext. Whoever should do so: an offense of wrong doing.”—Cv.VI.10.2

“A bhikkhu should not be evicted from a dwelling belonging to the Community by one who is angry and displeased. Whoever should evict him should be dealt with in accordance with the rule (Pc 17). I allow that lodgings be laid claim to (§).”—Cv.VI.11.1

“A storehouse guardian is not to be moved. Whoever should move him: an offense of wrong doing.”—Mv.VIII.8.2

How lodging claims are to be allotted: “I allow you first to count the bhikkhus, then to count the sleeping spaces, then to allot by sleeping spaces”… (Many sleeping spaces were left over:) “I allow you to allot by dwellings”… (Many dwellings were left over:) “I allow you to allot by areas”… (Many areas were left over:) “I allow you to give an extra share. When one has taken an extra share and another bhikkhu comes, one does not have to give it to him if one does not want to”… “A bhikkhu staying outside the (monastery) territory should not lay claim to a lodging. Whoever should do so: an offense of wrong doing”… “Having laid claim to a lodging, one should not preempt it for all seasons (§). Whoever should do so: an offense of wrong doing. I allow it to be claimed for the three months of the Rains, but not to be preempted for the (dry-) season-time.”—Cv.VI.11.3

“There are three lodging-claim-layings: earlier, later, and ‘free in the interval.’ The earlier is to be laid claim to the day after the full moon of Āsāḷhi; the later is to be laid claim to a month after Āsāḷhi; the ‘free in the interval’ is to be laid claim to a day after the Invitation, for the purpose of the coming Rains-residence.”—Cv.VI.11.4

“Two lodgings are not to be preempted by one (bhikkhu). Whoever should do so: an offense of wrong doing.”—Cv.VI.12

Building Responsibility

“I allow that building (responsibility) (§) be given. The builder bhikkhu will make an effort (thinking), ‘How can the dwelling be finished quickly?’ and will repair things that are broken down and dilapidated.”—Cv.VI.5.2

Procedure and transaction statement—Cv.VI.5.3

“Building responsibility should not be assigned simply for piling up lumps (of clay), smearing a wall, placing a door, making a post for the bolt, making a window-hole, plastering with white, plastering with black, plastering with ochre, thatching a roof, tying down a roof, erecting a cornice (reading bhaṇḍikādhāna- with the Thai edition of the Canon and the PTS edition of the Commentary), restoring broken-down and dilapidated parts, making a ledge. It should not be assigned for twenty years, thirty years, for life. Building responsibility for a completed dwelling until the time of one’s cremation should not be assigned. Whoever should do so: an offense of wrong doing. I allow that building responsibility be assigned for an unbuilt or unfinished dwelling. Having considered (inspected) the building work (§) in the case of a small dwelling, building responsibility may be assigned for five to six years. Having considered (inspected) the building work (§) in the case of a barrel-vaulted dwelling, building responsibility may be assigned for seven to eight years. Having considered (inspected) the building work (§) in the case of a large dwelling, building responsibility may be assigned for ten to twelve years.”—Cv.VI.17.1

“Building responsibility for an entire dwelling should not be given. Whoever should do so: an offense of wrong doing”… “Building responsibility for two (dwellings) should not be given to one (bhikkhu). Whoever should do so: an offense of wrong doing”… “Having taken on building responsibility, one should not have another one stay (there). Whoever should do so: an offense of wrong doing”… “Having taken on building responsibility, one should not preempt what belongs to the Community. Whoever should do so: an offense of wrong doing. I allow that one excellent sleeping place be taken”… “Building responsibility should not be given to one staying outside the (monastery) territory. Whoever should do so: an offense of wrong doing”… “Having taken on building responsibility, one should not preempt it (the excellent sleeping place) for all seasons (§). Whoever should do so: an offense of wrong doing. I allow it to be preempted for the three months of the Rains, but not to be preempted for the (dry-) season-time.”—Cv.VI.17.2

“There is the case where a bhikkhu, having taken on building responsibility, goes away. (Thinking,) ‘May what belongs to the Community not go to ruin,’ it (building responsibility) should be given to another. There is the case where a bhikkhu, having taken on building responsibility but leaving it unfinished, renounces the training… dies… admits (§) to being a novice… to having renounced the training… to having committed an extreme (pārājika) offense… to being insane… possessed… delirious with pain… suspended for not seeing an offense… suspended for not making amends for an offense… suspended for not relinquishing an evil view… a paṇḍaka… a person in affiliation through theft… a bhikkhu who has gone over to another religion… an animal… a matricide… a patricide… a murderer of an arahant… a molester of a bhikkhunī… a schismatic… one who has shed (a Tathāgata’s) blood… a hermaphrodite. (Thinking,) ‘May what belongs to the Community not go to ruin,’ it (building responsibility) should be given to another.

“There is the case where a bhikkhu, having taken on building responsibility but leaving it unfinished, goes away… admits (§) to being a hermaphrodite. (Thinking,) ‘May what belongs to the Community not go to ruin,’ it (building responsibility) should be given to another.

“There is the case where a bhikkhu, having taken on building responsibility, on finishing it goes away. It is his.

“There is the case where a bhikkhu, having taken on building responsibility, on finishing it renounces the training… admits (§) to having committed an extreme offense. The Community is the owner.

“There is the case where a bhikkhu, having taken on building responsibility, on finishing it admits (§) to being insane… possessed… delirious with pain… suspended for not seeing an offense… suspended for not making amends for an offense… suspended for not relinquishing an evil view. It is his.

“There is the case where a bhikkhu, having taken on building responsibility, on finishing it admits (§) to being a paṇḍaka… a hermaphrodite. The Community is the owner.”—Cv.VI.17.3

Various Officials

Procedure and transaction statements for appointing:

a lodging assignor (senāsana-paññāpaka)

a storeroom keeper

a robe-cloth receiver

a robe-cloth distributor

a conjey distributor

a fruit distributor

a non-staple food distributor —Cv.VI.21.2

Procedure and transaction statements for appointing a dispenser of minor items. Things to be given out to individuals: a needle, a small knife, a pair of sandals, a waistband, a shoulder strap, a straining cloth, a water strainer (§), pieces of cloth. If the Community has ghee, oil, honey, molasses, an individual is to be given one sip. If he has need of more, he is to be given another. If he has need of still more, he is to be given yet another (§).—Cv.VI.21.3

Procedure and transaction statements for appointing:

a bathing cloth bestower (§)

a bowl bestower (§)

a supervisor of monastery attendants

a supervisor of novices—Cv.VI.21.3

CHAPTER NINETEEN

Penance & Probation

As mentioned in Chapter 12, the procedures for settling the most complicated offense-issue—the incurring of a saṅghādisesa offense—involve a series of duty-issues, or Community transactions. In the conclusion to Chapter 5 of BMC1 we presented these procedures in a brief sketch. The purpose of this chapter is to provide a more complete outline of these procedures and to fill in the outline with enough detail to provide a guide for its practical application.

The procedures for settling an offense are called vuṭṭhāna-vidhī—literally, the course for getting up. The term “getting up” plays on the literal meaning of the Pali word for offense, āpatti, or “falling down.” The purpose of the vuṭṭhāna-vidhī is to enable a bhikkhu who has stumbled in his practice to get up and continue on his way. This is an important point to bear in mind and one we will encounter again in the following chapter: that these disciplinary measures are aimed not at retribution but at rehabilitation. In other words, they are not meant to make the offender suffer as a way of paying off his crimes, but to teach him the hiri and ottappa—the sense of shame and compunction—that he will need to keep from stumbling again.

The vuṭṭhāna-vidhī for a saṅghādisesa offense is as follows: A bhikkhu who commits a saṅghādisesa offense must, before dawnrise of the following day, inform a fellow bhikkhu of what he has done. A Community of at least four bhikkhus must then meet and, at his request, grant him a six-day (literally, six-night) period of penance (mānatta), during which he is deprived of certain rights and must observe certain duties. After he has completed his penance a Community of at least twenty bhikkhus must meet and—again at his request—rehabilitate him.

If, however, he originally concealed his offense for any number of days, he cannot undergo penance until he has completed a period of probation (parivāsa) equal to the number of days of concealment. As with penance, he must request a Community of at least four bhikkhus to grant him the period of probation; and, although there are slight differences in the details, probation further resembles penance in that it involves the curtailment of certain rights and the observance of certain duties.

If, at any time between the first Community meeting to grant penance or probation and the final meeting at which the bhikkhu is rehabilitated, he commits another saṅghādisesa offense, he must again inform another bhikkhu and then request a Community of at least four bhikkhus to “send him back to the beginning.” In other words, they must authorize him to begin the procedure all over again. If either the original or the new offense was concealed for any number of days, he must start with a period of probation equal to the number of days that the longest-concealed offense was concealed. Only when this probation is completed may he ask for penance.

Thus, to make amends for a saṅghādisesa offense, one must pass through at least two stages—observing penance and deserving (waiting for) rehabilitation—and in some cases up to five: observing probation, deserving to be sent back to the beginning, deserving penance, observing penance, and deserving rehabilitation. Each of these five stages involves certain duties and restrictions. Penance has a few duties and restrictions that are peculiar to it, whereas the other four stages all have the same duties and restrictions in common.

An individual bhikkhu’s path through these various stages depends on a number of contingencies: whether he has committed one or more than one offense; whether, if more than one, any of those offenses were committed while following the vuṭṭhāna-vidhī; whether any of those offenses were concealed; whether, if any of those offenses were concealed, he can remember the precise number of days they were concealed; whether, when reporting his offense(s) to the Community, he actually tells them the true number of offenses and days of concealment; and whether he commits his offense(s) alone or together with another bhikkhu.

The Canon lists the courses to be followed for these contingencies on a case-by-case model, without providing an overview of the entire subject. The Commentary, using the term “penance” to cover the entire course of a vuṭṭhāna-vidhī, provides an overview by dividing the various courses of vuṭṭhāna-vidhī into two major sets: apaṭicchanna-mānatta, penance for unconcealed offenses, and paṭicchanna-mānatta, penance for concealed offenses. Under the latter set it places a large sub-set, samodhāna-mānatta, penance for combined offenses—i.e., multiple offenses that are gathered together under a single course of penance—which it further divides into three types. Even this analysis, however, does not capture all the possible variations, for there are cases where multiple unconcealed offenses can be covered by a single penance, with no need for probation, and the overview ignores the last two contingencies mentioned in the previous paragraph.

Thus, although our discussion will borrow the Commentary’s terminology, we will have to adjust that terminology to provide a better fit for the contingencies actually mentioned in the Canon. After a few brief remarks about the formal statements and transactions used in the vuṭṭhāna-vidhī, we will discuss penance first and probation second. Because the only constant factors in each stage are (1) the duties a bhikkhu is to observe while in that stage and (2) the penalties for not observing them, the discussion for each of these two stages will begin with these topics, followed by a section on practicalities involved in the simplest course through that particular stage. Then we will discuss factors that can complicate the course through either stage.

Formal statements & transactions

There are four types of formal statements involved in the vuṭṭhāna-vidhī for saṅghādisesa offenses:

1) the statement by which the offender informs another bhikkhu of his offense;

2) his requests for penance, probation, rehabilitation, etc.;

3) the transaction statements recited as part of the Community transactions in imposing penance, etc.; and

4) the notifications that the offender is required to give to the Community during the course of his penance, probation, etc.

The Canon sets no pattern for type (1), while the Commentary provides two conflicting patterns. In commenting on Cv.II, it quotes the Kurundī as saying that, when informing the other bhikkhu, the offender may word his announcement to the effect that, “I inform you of an offense,” or, “I inform you of a heavy offense,” but not, “I inform you of a light offense.” In other words, one does not have to mention the class of offense (saṅghādisesa) or the grounds of the offense (e.g., intentional semen-emission), although Buddhaghosa mentions that one may mention them if one wants to. However, when commenting on the conclusion to the saṅghādisesa rules, the Commentary notes that “informing” means stating that one has committed an offense “of this name.” This would mean that one would have to mention the class of offense for the informing to be valid. Neither the Commentary nor the Sub-commentary notes the contradiction here, but—as Buddhaghosa himself states several times in the Commentary—when there are two valid but conflicting interpretations of a passage in the Canon, the wise policy is to hold to the stricter one. Thus, to be valid, the act of informing must be genuinely informative—i.e., it must mention either the class or the ground of the offense.

For the next two types of statements—requests and transaction statements—the Canon sets a pattern in which statements are tailor-made to the individual case, giving a history of the offense and of how the bhikkhu has handled his efforts to make amends for it. For instance, if a bhikkhu undergoes probation and penance but commits another saṅghādisesa offense while awaiting rehabilitation and so must go back to the beginning to observe probation and penance all over again, then from that point on his requests, the Community’s transaction statements, and his notifications to the Community must cite these facts each and every time.

As with the first type of statement, the Canon does not set a pattern for the fourth—acts of notification—but the Commentary to Cv.III gives an example that follows closely on the pattern for requests, again stating the history of the offense and the bhikkhu’s attempts at rehabilitation.

Examples of some of the more common patterns for these three types of statements, plus some of their common permutations, are given in Appendix III. A glance at these patterns will show that they require a great deal of memorization, both for the offender and for the bhikkhu(s) who will have to recite the transaction statements. On top of this, all the transaction statements in these procedures consist of a motion and three proclamations, the longest possible form. From these facts it is hard to escape the conclusion that these procedures are designed to be a burden both for the offender and for his fellow bhikkhus, and a special burden when an offender cannot behave himself properly in the course of undergoing the procedures. And from this it is hard to escape the further conclusion that this burden is intended to act as a deterrent to anyone who feels tempted to transgress or re-transgress any of the saṅghādisesa rules.

One special requirement here—which, according to the Commentary, applies only to transactions concerned with the vuṭṭhāna-vidhī—is that the quorum of bhikkhus performing any of the transactions may not be filled by another bhikkhu who is also undergoing any stage of the vuṭṭhāna-vidhī. In other words, if the meeting contains such bhikkhus but the quorum is filled without counting them, the validity of the assembly is still fulfilled. If such bhikkhus need to be included to fill the quorum, it is not.

If, for any reason, the Community transactions for imposing probation, sending back to the beginning, imposing penance, or giving rehabilitation are invalid, the bhikkhu undergoing the vuṭṭhāna-vidhī is not truly purified of his offense. Any aspects of the procedure that depended on an invalid transaction have to be repeated. For instance, if the only invalid transaction was the one giving rehabilitation, the only part of the procedure that has to be redone is the meeting for giving rehabilitation. If, however, the invalid transaction was the one giving probation, the Community must meet again to grant him a new probation, and the bhikkhu has to undergo probation, followed by all the subsequent steps, all over again. Thus the Community must be scrupulous in all its transactions in order to avoid saddling the bhikkhu in question with needless hardships.

Penance

The Canon states that penance should be observed for six nights, but there is some difference of opinion as to what this means. The Commentary follows the pattern given in Pc 5, Pc 49, etc., of counting nights as dawns. In other words, it maintains that one need observe the duties of penance only around the time of dawnrise for that night to count. The Vinaya-mukha, however, insists that the word night here means a full 24-hour period of night-and-day (following the definition of night in MN 131; see the discussion in the conclusion to Chapter 5 in BMC1). The Vinaya-mukha’s interpretation seems closer to the Canon, in that many of the restrictions placed on a bhikkhu observing penance deal with activities not normally done at dawn.

Duties

A bhikkhu who is to undergo penance must first request it from the Community. Having arranged his robe over one shoulder, he approaches the assembled Community, bows down to the feet of the senior bhikkhus, and then sits in the kneeling position with his hands in añjali and states the request for penance as given in Appendix III. One of the bhikkhus—experienced and competent—then recites the transaction statement granting penance as given in Appendix III. This pattern is followed in other steps of the vuṭṭhāna-vidhī as well: when a bhikkhu requests probation, asks to be sent back to the beginning, and requests rehabilitation.

Although the Canon is silent on the issue, the Commentary states that as soon as a bhikkhu has been granted penance he should formally recite one of the statements for undertaking penance. For the details of this procedure, see the discussion under “Practicalities,” below.

The duties for a bhikkhu undergoing penance fall into three major sections, with the second section composed of seven sub-sections. They are:

1) Issues of seniority

He should not consent to a regular bhikkhu’s performing any of the duties of respect for him. These include bowing to him, standing up to greet him, performing añjali to him; bringing him a seat, bedding, water for washing his feet, a foot stand, a foot wiper; receiving his bowl and robe; scrubbing his back while bathing. However, a senior bhikkhu undergoing penance may consent when a junior bhikkhu who is also undergoing penance performs these duties for him. There are five areas, though, where a bhikkhu undergoing penance still maintains his seniority vis-à-vis regular bhikkhus: the uposatha, the Invitation, rains-bathing cloths, the redirection of offerings, and meals.

According to the Commentary, regular bhikkhu here in section 1 and in section 2E means any regular bhikkhu except for a more junior one also undergoing penance. Thus the term includes more senior bhikkhus undergoing penance, as well as any bhikkhus undergoing probation, deserving to be sent back to the beginning, deserving penance, and deserving rehabilitation. This principle applies to all five of the stages that a bhikkhu might go through in the course of his vuṭṭhāna-vidhī: With regard to issues of seniority, bhikkhus in each group must treat the bhikkhus in any of the other four groups as they would regular bhikkhus.

The Commentary further notes that if a bhikkhu undergoing penance has any bhikkhus living in dependence on him, he should tell them, “Don’t perform your normal duties for me.” If, having been told this, they continue to perform those duties anyway he incurs no offense in allowing them to do so. This, however, would amount to consent under the pattern set in Pr 1—discussed in BMC1, Chapter 3—where consent means mental acquiescence together with its physical or verbal expression. Even if the bhikkhu does not give verbal consent but does show physical consent, it counts as consent nonetheless.

As for the five areas where one continues to maintain seniority vis-à-vis regular bhikkhus, the Commentary states that when participating in the uposatha or Invitation one should sit within hatthapāsa, but there are differences of opinion among the ancient commentaries as to whether one should sit in line with normal seniority—even though the Canon states clearly that seniority still obtains during these transactions. With regard to redirecting offerings, the Commentary states that this allowance applies to cases where a bhikkhu happens to receive a designated meal but has the expectation of a meal intended for him individually. He may then accept his designated meal and redirect it to another bhikkhu. On the following day he may then receive another designated meal. (This, according to the Kurundī, means that he should be first in line to receive the next day’s designated meals.) The right to redirect a meal in this way, the Commentary states, applies only to bhikkhus on probation, but because the Canon lists it as a right for bhikkhus in every stage of the vuṭṭhāna-vidhī, the Commentary’s statement here must be an oversight. As for seniority with regard to meals, the Commentary states that this principle applies to meals given or dedicated to the Community. Thus one maintains one’s seniority in the rosters for Community meals and designated meals. However, in line with the duties mentioned under 2B, if invited to an invitational meal one must sit at the end of the line of bhikkhus.

2) Proper conduct

A. A bhikkhu undergoing penance should not give Acceptance, should not give dependence, and should not have a novice attend to him. [The Commentary notes here that he may set his penance-duties aside (see below) to act as a preceptor or a reciting teacher in an ordination ceremony, but it is hard to imagine that the new bhikkhu would feel inspired on finding out, the day after his ordination, that his preceptor is undergoing penance. A wiser policy would be to wait until one has been rehabilitated before resuming one’s duties as preceptor. The Commentary adds that if one is undergoing penance, one should tell any pupils living in dependence on one to take dependence under another bhikkhu. However, as above, it says that if they continue to perform their duties to him anyway after being told this, he incurs no offense in consenting, but this last point does not seem in line with the Canon.]

A bhikkhu undergoing penance should not consent to an authorization to exhort the bhikkhunīs. Even when authorized, he should not exhort them.

Whatever offense he was granted penance for, he should not commit that offense, one of a similar sort, or one worse than that. He should not criticize the penance transaction or those who did it. [Here the Commentary gives an example of what passed for a clever criticism in its day: “Was that transaction (kamma) an example of farming (kasi-kamma) or an example of cow-herding (gorakkha-kamma)?”]

He should not cancel a regular bhikkhu’s uposatha, should not cancel an invitation, nor should he engage in the preliminaries to setting up accusation proceedings against another bhikkhu. [This is how the Commentary defines savācanīyaṁ, which it illustrates with two actions: placing a constraint on the other bhikkhu, telling him not to leave the monastery because one is planning to level an accusation; and giving him a summons to appear at the place where the accusation will be leveled.] He should also not set up accusation proceedings. [The Commentary, however, expands this prohibition (na anuvādo paṭṭhapetabbo) to mean that he should not function in the position of “chief of the Community” within the monastery, which it illustrates with such actions as reciting the Pāṭimokkha, inviting a fellow bhikkhu to give a Dhamma talk, or receiving formal authorization of any kind. This appears to be among the earliest references to the position of abbot, which did not exist in the time of the Canon.]

He should not get another bhikkhu to give him leave in order to make an accusation; should not make a formal charge; should not interrogate another bhikkhu (literally, “make him remember”) as part of settling a formal charge; should not join bhikkhus in disputing with bhikkhus.

AN 8:110 restates the above prohibitions beginning with, “Whatever offense he was granted penance for, he should not commit that offense,” to, “He should not join bhikkhus in disputing with bhikkhus,” under three headings: “He should not consent to any Community authorization, should not be established in a singular position, is not to be rehabilitated by means of that basis.” The precise meaning of these headings is obscure, as is the way in which they are supposed to subsume the above prohibitions, but the second heading may be the source for the Commentary’s expansive interpretation of the prohibition against setting up accusation proceedings.

B. A bhikkhu undergoing penance should not walk or sit in front of a regular bhikkhu. [The Commentary says that if he is walking along a road ahead of other bhikkhus, he should be at least six meters away from them.] He should not approach lay families with a regular bhikkhu as the contemplative who precedes him or follows him.

He should be presented with whatever is the Community’s last seat, bed, and dwelling place, and he should accept it. He is not allowed to undertake the wilderness-dweller’s practice or the alms-goer’s practice as a way of avoiding the embarrassment of having lay people see him staying in the last dwelling in the monastery or sitting in the last seat in the meal hall (in those days, an alms-goer would often take his meal at a quiet spot outside of the monastery). He should not, for the same reason, have almsfood sent to him (where he could eat it without having to go to the meal hall and sit in the last seat). The prohibition against undertaking the wilderness-dweller’s practice also serves to prevent him from living apart from a monastery where there is a full Community of bhikkhus. [The Commentary adds here that if one ordinarily goes for alms, it is all right to continue going. It is also allowable not to go for alms (i.e., to have food sent to one) if one is sick or has duties, such as construction work or duties to one’s mentor. If, in the village where one goes for alms, there are so many bhikkhus from other monasteries also going for alms that it is inconvenient to inform them all (see 2C, below), one may go to undergo penance at another, more secluded monastery where the bhikkhus are one’s friends. (This is the only passage in the texts indicating that a bhikkhu undergoing penance must inform not only the bhikkhus he encounters while in a monastery but also those he encounters while he is outside of a monastery. Because this statement comes in the Commentary, not all Communities follow it. In other words, they maintain—in line with the Canon—that a bhikkhu undergoing penance is duty-bound to inform only the bhikkhus he sees or hears while he is in what, in the Commentary’s terminology, is called the “precinct territory” of the monastery, either as a resident or as a visitor. See the next section.)]

C. When a bhikkhu undergoing penance has newly arrived at a monastery, he should notify the bhikkhus there of the fact that he is undergoing penance. He should also notify any bhikkhu who comes to the monastery where he is staying. [The Commentary notes that if the bhikkhus are staying in various places in the monastery rather than all in one place, he has to go inform each of them. If, after searching them out, he misses some of them, the day does not count toward his penance but he does not incur an offense. This principle applies both to the bhikkhu himself on his first day in the monastery and to any new bhikkhus coming to stay in the monastery about whom he does not yet know.] Then, every day of his penance, he must notify all the bhikkhus in the monastery again. On uposatha and Invitation days he should give his notification during the Community meeting. If he is too sick to go himself on any of these occasions, he may send a messenger to give notification in his stead. [Here the Commentary adds if one finds out after a visitor has left that he has come, one should go to notify him. If one can’t catch up with him, one’s day doesn’t count but there is no offense. Even if the incoming bhikkhu comes only into the precinct territory of the monastery (see the preceding chapter) and one knows he is there—for example, from hearing the sound of his umbrella or coughing—one must notify him. If one finds out later that he has passed through, then again one should go to notify him. If one is unable to catch up with him, one’s day doesn’t count but there is no offense. Even if simply seeing another bhikkhu from afar, one should shout out to notify him. On this point, however, the Commentary reports a disagreement: Ven. Saṅghasenābhaya Thera says that if it is impossible to catch up with a bhikkhu seen from afar, there is no offense and the day still counts; whereas Ven. Karavīkatissa Thera says that there is no offense but the day doesn’t count. If a visitor comes without one’s knowledge, the Commentary seems to assume that although one incurs no offense for not telling him, one’s day still doesn’t count. Thus, given the fact that one might have not known of a visitor who came, one should observe penance for a few extra days to compensate for such unknown quantities for, as the Kurundī warns, even an unknowing deficiency in the observance of one’s duties can invalidate one’s rehabilitation. The Sub-commentary adds further that even if a visiting bhikkhu is also on penance, each must notify the other. If one sends a messenger to notify the other bhikkhus in the monastery of one’s undergoing penance, the Commentary requires that the messenger be a bhikkhu.]

D-E. Except when there are obstructions, a bhikkhu undergoing penance should not go from a residence or non-residence where there are bhikkhus to a residence or non-residence where there are no bhikkhus (or bhikkhus of a separate affiliation) unless accompanied by a Community. [The Commentary defines obstructions here as the ten obstructions listed in Chapter 15, and Community as at least four bhikkhus not undergoing any stages of the vuṭṭhāna-vidhī. And, apparently, these bhikkhus must all be of one’s own affiliation. If, to escape from obstructions, one goes without being escorted by a Community, one’s day doesn’t count, but the Canon—according to the Commentary—is here counseling that it is wise to give up the counting of the day in order to escape the obstructions.] (Residence as used in this section, seems to mean “monastery,” but none of the texts discuss this point.)

F. A bhikkhu undergoing penance may go from a residence or non-residence where there are bhikkhus to a residence or non-residence where there are bhikkhus of the same affiliation if he knows, “I can get there today.”

G. A bhikkhu undergoing penance should not reside in a residence or non-residence under the same roof with a regular bhikkhu or with a more senior bhikkhu undergoing penance. [In explaining this point, the Commentary defines residence as used in this section as meaning any lodging built as a dwelling; and a non-residence as other buildings, such as a roof over a cetiya, a broom storeroom, a bathroom, or a gatehouse. One roof is determined by the line of rain dripping from the eaves of the building’s roof(s)—in other words, if the roofs overlap so that they do not form distinctly separate rain-drip lines on the ground, they count as one roof. If a single building has many “upacāras” (see Pc 5), one may not stay there if there is a regular bhikkhu in the building, even if he is in a separate upacāra; if one happens unknowingly to be lying down in a building at the same time as a regular bhikkhu is lying down there, one’s day doesn’t count but there is no offense. For some reason, the Commentary adds that if a junior and senior bhikkhu both undergoing penance are lying down under the same roof without knowing it, neither incurs an offense (which makes sense) but neither is allowed to count that day (which doesn’t make sense for the senior bhikkhu).]

On seeing a regular bhikkhu (or a more senior bhikkhu undergoing penance—this qualifying phrase applies to every mention of regular bhikkhu in this section) he should get up from his seat and offer it to the regular bhikkhu. [Here the Commentary says that a regular junior bhikkhu should not visit a senior bhikkhu on penance simply for the cheap gratification in seeing him get up in respect. The stipulation that the bhikkhu undergoing penance must offer his seat to the regular bhikkhu is to prevent him from simply running off when seeing a regular bhikkhu approach.] He should not sit on the same seat as a regular bhikkhu; if a regular bhikkhu is sitting on a low seat, he should not sit on a high seat [within six meters, says the Commentary]; if a regular bhikkhu is sitting on the ground, he should not sit on a seat. He should not walk back and forth on the same walking-meditation path as a regular bhikkhu; if a regular bhikkhu is walking back and forth on a low walking-meditation path, he should not walk back and forth on a higher one [within six meters and in plain view of the other path]; if a regular bhikkhu is walking back and forth on the ground, he should not walk back and forth on a constructed walking-meditation path. (The duties in this section apply to all five stages of the vuṭṭhāna-vidhī, which creates a problem of logistics. Because the bhikkhus in each stage must treat the bhikkhus in the four other stages as regular bhikkhus, the question arises: How are two bhikkhus to treat each other if, say, one is undergoing penance while the other is undergoing probation? Which one offers his seat to the other? The texts do not say, so this is an area where each Community may set its own standards based either on actual seniority or the level of progress through the vuṭṭhāna-vidhī (e.g., with a bhikkhu deserving rehabilitation considered higher on the ladder than a bhikkhu undergoing penance).)

3) Completing a quorum

This point was stated earlier in this chapter, but it bears repeating: If, with a bhikkhu undergoing penance as the fourth member, a Community grants probation, sends back to the beginning, grants penance; or as the twentieth, rehabilitates, the transaction is invalid. [Here the Commentary states that the bhikkhu may complete the quorum for other transactions. If the Community needs him to complete a quorum for imposing probation, etc., he should set his duties aside (see below) to complete the quorum—but a wise policy would be to grant this allowance only when absolutely necessary.]

Penalties

If a bhikkhu undergoing penance disobeys any of these duties or restrictions, he incurs a dukkaṭa. If, on any of the days of his penance, he commits any of the following “night-cutting (ratti-cheda)” activities, that day/night does not count toward the total of six:

1) living together, i.e., residing under the same roof as a regular bhikkhu or a more senior bhikkhu undergoing penance (according to the Sub-commentary, residing together here means lying down together; it does not forbid sitting, standing, or walking together);

2) living apart, i.e., residing in a place that has fewer than four regular bhikkhus (here, regular means regular bhikkhus not undergoing the vuṭṭhāna-vidhī; none of the texts mention this point, but residing here apparently means dwelling in general, regardless of whether one lies down or not);

3) not notifying the bhikkhus of his penance in line with the requirements under 2C; and

4) going about unaccompanied in defiance of the regulations under 2D-F.

As the Commentary points out, there are instances where one might commit a night-cutting activity without realizing it, so a wise policy is to observe penance for an extra day or two to ensure that one’s duties have been fulfilled.

Practicalities

Because a bhikkhu observing penance must notify every bhikkhu in the monastery of his penance, it is impractical for him to observe penance in a monastery with many bhikkhus in residence or coming and going on visits. Thus the texts agree that a wise policy is to choose a monastery where only a few (but no less than four) other congenial bhikkhus are living and where visiting bhikkhus are rare. If a large number of bhikkhus happens to come to stay at the monastery, one may set one’s penance aside. Approaching a regular bhikkhu, arranging his robe over one shoulder, kneeling down, placing his hands in añjali, he says,

“Mānattaṁ nikkhipāmi (I set aside the penance).”

“Vattaṁ nikkhipāmi (I set aside the duties).”

Cv.II.8, in explaining this procedure, says after each statement, “The penance is set aside.” The same pattern is followed in Cv.II.3 for the similar procedure in connection with probation. From this, the Commentary to Cv.II.3 reasons that saying either statement alone is sufficient to cover both setting aside probation/penance and setting aside one’s duties. The Vinaya-mukha does not agree with this conclusion and furthermore reverses the order of the statements on the grounds that one should set aside one’s duties before setting aside one’s penance/probation, but neither the Canon nor the commentaries support the Vinaya-mukha on these points.

When the large gathering has left, the bhikkhu may undertake his penance and duties again, following a similar procedure: Approaching a regular bhikkhu, arranging his robe over one shoulder, kneeling down, placing his hands in añjali, he says,

“Mānattaṁ samādiyāmi (I undertake the penance).” (and/or)

“Vattaṁ samādiyāmi (I undertake the duties).”

Although the Canon is silent about the issue, the Commentary to Cv.III.1 states that when a bhikkhu takes on penance without a prior probation he should also recite the statements for undertaking penance and its attendant duties. Thus it suggests that as soon as the transaction statement imposing penance is finished he should immediately undertake the penance and duties, following the formula given above. (If he requested penance after probation without having set his probation aside, the Commentary to Cv.II.3 says that there is no need for him to state that he is taking on penance, for his previous statement in taking on the duties of probation, still in force, covers the duties of penance as well.) Then he should state his first notification to the Community (as under section 2C, above) to the assembled bhikkhus. (Examples of notification statements are given in Appendix III.) If the monastery where he has been given the transaction statement is too large conveniently to observe penance and he is planning to observe it in a smaller monastery, he may then announce that he is setting his penance aside. The Sub-commentary adds that if he doesn’t give notification of his penance (following 2C) before setting his penance and duties aside, he incurs a dukkaṭa for breaking his duties.

When he has set his penance aside, he may go unaccompanied to the other monastery even if it is more than a day’s travel away, because technically he is a regular bhikkhu, but a wise policy followed in many Communities is to have at least one regular bhikkhu go along as a companion. When the bhikkhu who will be undergoing penance has arrived at the other monastery, he may undertake his penance and duties again, following the appropriate formulae, above.

Following the interpretation that night in the context of penance means “dawn,” the Commentary gives the following instructions for Bhikkhu X, who is observing penance in a monastery where the resident or visiting bhikkhus are too many to conveniently notify them every day:

After setting his duties and penance aside after initially receiving penance, X should wait until dawn is near. Then he should go with four or five other bhikkhus to a spot concealed by a fence or bushes, etc., outside the monastery, {SC: at least} two leḍḍupātas (approximately 36 meters) from its enclosure or, if there is no enclosure, from the edge of the monastery’s property. Resuming his penance and duties, he should then notify the assembled bhikkhus of his penance. If another bhikkhu happens to come past and X sees or hears him, X should notify him of his penance as well. If X neglects to notify him, the night doesn’t count and X earns a dukkaṭa for breaking his duties. If the other bhikkhu comes within six meters but X doesn’t know he’s there, the night doesn’t count, but there is no breaking of X’s duties.

Once X has notified the assembled bhikkhus, at least one of them should remain with him while the others may go off on whatever business they may have. When dawnrise comes, X should set aside his penance and duties in the presence of the remaining bhikkhu. If for some reason that bhikkhu goes off beforehand, X should set his penance and duties aside in the presence of the first bhikkhu he sees, whether that bhikkhu comes from X’s own monastery or is a visitor. Having set his penance and duties aside, X is a regular bhikkhu until he takes on the penance and duties again before the dawn of the next day.

Having done this for six nights, X qualifies for rehabilitation. Before asking for rehabilitation, if he has set aside his penance and duties in the interim, he should take them on again.

That is what the Commentary says. As we stated above, however, the duties for a bhikkhu undergoing penance cover many activities that a bhikkhu would not normally do at dawn, such as eating a meal, etc., so it seems highly unlikely that the authors of the Canon intended the word night to mean “dawn.” In particular, the Commentary’s recommendations here seem aimed at getting around many of the designed difficulties of penance simply on the basis of a technicality and so they have little to recommend them. If one happens to commit a saṅghādisesa offense while living in a large, busy monastery, the wise policy would be to find a smaller monastery of congenial bhikkhus where one can observe one’s penance in full.

On fully observing one’s penance, one enters the stage of deserving rehabilitation. This period may take any number of days and can be especially long in an area where the twenty bhikkhus needed for the quorum are hard to find. During this time, one must observe the duties for probation (see below), although in cases where convening the proper number of bhikkhus will take time one may put aside one’s duties until right before requesting rehabilitation. In some Communities, a bhikkhu deserving rehabilitation who has set his duties aside in this way will be directed to resume his duties every uposatha and Invitation day, and then to set them aside again after the uposatha and Invitation meetings are over. When a full quorum of twenty bhikkhus finally convenes for the purpose of one’s rehabilitation, one must first resume one’s duties before requesting rehabilitation.

Some Communities, perhaps for psychological impact, require a bhikkhu requesting rehabilitation to stay outside of the hatthapāsa of the meeting until after the transaction statement giving him rehabilitation has been recited. Only then is he allowed within the hatthapāsa. This, however, violates the stipulation in the Vibhaṅga to Pc 80 that a bhikkhu must be within the hatthapāsa of the meeting in order to be considered present (see the discussion in Chapter 12). So, for the rehabilitation transaction to be valid, the bhikkhu requesting rehabilitation must be within hatthapāsa while the transaction statement is being recited.

Probation

Probation shares many of the duties, penalties, and practicalities for penance, with the added practical issue of calculating the number of days a bhikkhu must undergo probation before he is eligible for penance.

Duties

The duties for probation are identical to the duties for penance, with the following exceptions:

—under 2C, although he needs to notify every visiting bhikkhu, he does not need to notify the other bhikkhus in the monastery every day; he need only notify them at the beginning of his probation and then every fortnight, during the uposatha or Invitation meetings.

—under 2D-F, he needs to be accompanied only by a single regular bhikkhu rather than a full Community when going to a place where there are no bhikkhus or bhikkhus of a separate affiliation. (Here, a regular bhikkhu means one not undergoing the vuṭṭhāna-vidhī for a saṅghādisesa offense; it also, apparently, means a bhikkhu of one’s own affiliation.)

—under 2G, all bhikkhus except for those under probation are to be treated as regular bhikkhus. The term regular bhikkhu in this section also extends to any senior bhikkhus who are also under probation.

Under 2C, the Vinaya-mukha argues that if a regular bhikkhu residing in the monastery has heard one’s notification and then, after going away, returns to the monastery, one must notify him as a “visiting” bhikkhu. Apparently, going away here means going to reside elsewhere for at least a night, but neither the Canon nor the commentaries mention this point.

Penalties

A bhikkhu undergoing probation has only three “night-cuttings”:

1) living together, i.e., lying down together under the same roof as a regular bhikkhu or a more senior bhikkhu undergoing probation;

2) living apart, i.e., residing alone in a place with less than one regular bhikkhu ;

3) not notifying the bhikkhus of his probation in line with the requirements under 2C.

In other words, unlike a bhikkhu undergoing penance, his nights are not cut if he goes about in defiance of the requirements of 2D, even though he does incur a dukkaṭa for doing so.

Practicalities

The procedures for requesting probation, for setting it aside, and for undertaking it (again) are similar to those for penance, with only slight changes in the wording.

One difference in the request for probation is that one must state the number of days the offense was concealed. The Commentary recommends that, if one has concealed one’s offense for up to 14 days, one should count the period of concealment in days; if fifteen days, say, “concealed for a fortnight”; if 16-29 days, say, “concealed for more than a fortnight”; if 30, say, “concealed for one month.” From that point on, count in months and “more than x month(s)” up to “more than eleven months.” From that point on, count in years and “more than x years” up to sixty years and beyond. Some examples of how to do this are given in Appendix III.

When setting probation aside, the announcement is:

“Parivāsaṁ nikkhipāmi (I set aside the probation).”

“Vattaṁ nikkhipāmi (I set aside the duties).”

When undertaking probation, the announcement is,

“Parivāsaṁ samādiyāmi (I undertake the probation).”

“Vattaṁ samādiyāmi (I undertake the duties).”

Because one’s nights can be “cut” without one’s knowledge, the Commentary recommends observing probation for a few extra days in order to provide for that contingency. Once probation is completed, one enters the stage of deserving penance. During this period, one must continue to observe one’s probation duties until penance has been granted.

Concealment

Of the practical issues associated specifically with probation, the first is the question of determining what qualifies as a concealed saṅghādisesa offense. The Canon does not systematically discuss this question, but in scattered places begins by stating that the offense must be an actual saṅghādisesa offense. If one assumes wrongly that a lesser offense is a saṅghādisesa offense, one is not subject to probation even if one conceals it. Nowhere does the Canon say that the person to be informed of the offense must be a bhikkhu, but perhaps this was an oversight. The origin story in Cv.III.1.1 suggests, by example, that bhikkhus were the proper people to be informed.

The Canon seems inconsistent in its treatment of perception under this topic. In some passages (such as Cv.III.23.2-4; Cv.III.25.2), it indicates that a bhikkhu who commits a saṅghādisesa and conceals it is guilty of concealment even if he doesn’t know, if he forgets, or if he is in doubt. However, other passages (such as Cv.III.23.5-6; Cv.III.25.3) indicate that the offender must remember and must know without doubt for his concealment to count as concealment. The syntax of the different passages is different, suggesting that two types of not knowing (and forgetting or being in doubt) are at work here. The Commentary follows this suggestion, resolving the issue by in effect defining two types of not knowing: (1) knowing that the action is an offense but not knowing that it is a saṅghādisesa; and (2) not even knowing that it is an offense. Its conclusion: Concealing a saṅghādisesa offense knowing that it is an offense but not knowing that it is a saṅghādisesa counts as concealment; concealing it not knowing that it is an offense does not. A similar principle applies to forgetting and being in doubt.

Cv.III.34.2 discusses a case in which two bhikkhus commit a saṅghādisesa offense, one of them deciding that he will inform another bhikkhu of the offense, the other deciding that he won’t. The verdict is that when dawn rises before the second bhikkhu has told another bhikkhu, his offense counts as concealed. This raises the question: What about the first bhikkhu? If he desires to inform another bhikkhu but for some reason doesn’t do so before dawnrise, does that count as concealment? The Canon does not say, although in other cases it notes extenuating circumstances under which an offense would not count as concealed: The offender forgets to inform another bhikkhu (Cv.III.23.6) or he goes insane, gets possessed, or becomes delirious with pain (Cv.III.30; Cv.III.34.2).

From these cases the commentators apparently derived a general principle that extenuating circumstances do make a difference in this case and so, after applying the Great Standards to find further legitimate exemptions and collecting the above points from the Canon, came up with the following list, setting the factors for concealment at ten, arranged in five pairs:

1. (a) One has committed a saṅghādisesa offense and (b) knows that it is an offense.

2. (a) One has not been suspended and (b) knows that one has not been suspended. (If one has been suspended, one may not accost a regular bhikkhu, so one may not approach him to inform him. See pair (4), below.)

3. (a) There are no obstructions and (b) one knows that there are none.

4. (a) One is able to inform another bhikkhu (who is suitable to be informed) and (b) knows that one is able to.

5. (a) One wants to conceal the offense and (b) conceals it.

The Commentary provides its own discussion of these factors, as follows:

Under pair 1: As long as the offense is a saṅghādisesa and one knows that it is an offense, this pair of factors is fulfilled. If it is a saṅghādisesa offense but—out of shamelessness—one confesses it as a light offense, it counts as neither confessed nor concealed (although it is hard to see how a misleading confession—a deliberate lie—would not count as concealment).

Under pair 3: “Obstructions” means any of the ten obstructions mentioned in Chapter 15.

Under pair 4: A small sore on the mouth, a toothache, “wind pains in the jaw,” etc., don’t qualify as excuses for “not being able.” As noted above, Cv.III.30 indicates that going insane, becoming possessed, or growing delirious with pain after committing the offense would count as “not being able to confess the offense.” A bhikkhu “not suitable to be informed” is one of a separate affiliation or one who is not on congenial terms, even if he is one’s own preceptor. In choosing the bhikkhu to inform, one should not choose another bhikkhu who has committed the same offense that one has committed. If one does so, one’s offense is not counted as concealed (see, however, the special case under “shared offenses,” below) but one still incurs a dukkaṭa. Therefore, one should choose a pure bhikkhu as the one to inform. According to the Sub-commentary, pure here means one who does not have to make amends for that particular saṅghādisesa offense.

Under pair 5: If at first one wants to conceal the offense but then before dawnrise develops a sense of shame and informs another bhikkhu, that is called “one wants to conceal the offense but doesn’t conceal it.” It doesn’t count as concealed. And, as noted in the cases from the Canon, if one plans to inform another bhikkhu but then forgets to do so, that would not count as “wanting to conceal.”

If any of these ten factors is not fulfilled, the offense does not count as concealed. For instance, if one has doubts as to whether it is an offense, there is no penalty for waiting until one can discuss the matter with a bhikkhu who is both congenial and knowledgeable enough to allay one’s doubts. Once those doubts are allayed, however, and the offense turns out to have been a saṅghādisesa, one must inform another bhikkhu before the following dawn.

Mid-course adjustments

Another practical issue in granting probation concerns what to do if a bhikkhu requesting probation understates the actual amount of time he concealed his offense—either through doubt, faulty memory, or shamelessness. If he later ends his doubt, remembers, or develops a sense of shame, he can request to have his probation extended to cover the actual time of concealment. The extended time period for the probation is counted from the time the original probation was begun. Thus, if he asked for a five-day probation and then, on the fourth day, realizes that the actual time of concealment was ten days, he can ask for a ten-day probation. The first four days of the original probation count toward the new one, so he has only six more days of probation to undergo.

If, however, his original request for probation understated the number of his offenses, then when he finally ends his doubt, remembers, or develops a sense of shame at the fact, he can request a probation for the offense(s) not included in the original request. This second probation begins on the day of the Community transaction granting it. Thus, for instance, having committed two offenses, each concealed for one month, suppose he asks for probation for only one of them and then on the tenth day of the probation remembers the second offense. He can then request a one-month probation for the second offense, which begins on the day it is granted. The first ten days of the first probation do not count toward the second one.

(The passages from the Canon stating this principle contain some dubious arithmetic. From the way they are phrased, they seem to imply that the second offense was hidden for one month at the time the bhikkhu requested the probation for the first offense. This raises two possibilities: Either (1) the number of days he continued to conceal the second offense while on probation for the first do not count as concealment; or (2) the compilers of the Canon were sloppy in their presentation and meant to indicate that the second offense had been concealed a full month counting back from the day he requested his second probation. Because the second interpretation calls for a longer probation, and because it is always safer to observe a probation that is too long rather than too short, the second interpretation seems preferable.)

Purifying probation

A third practical issue is what to do if a bhikkhu knows that he has committed a saṅghādisesa offense but doesn’t know, doesn’t remember, or is in doubt about the number of days he has concealed the offense. The Canon directs that he request and be granted a “purifying probation” (suddhanta-parivāsa), in which the length of the probation is determined by his best guess as to how long the offense has been concealed.

The Commentary divides this sort of probation into two sorts: lesser (cūḷa-suddhanta-parivāsa) and greater (mahā-suddhanta-parivāsa).

Lesser purifying probation, it says, is for cases when the offender can recall being pure, with certainty, up to a given date following his ordination. The probation is then granted for the number of days from that date up to the present. If, after being granted probation for a set period of time, he realizes that he under- or over-estimated the time of his purity, he may accordingly extend or reduce the length of the probation without having to ask the Community to formalize the change. This probation clears all offenses except for any he concealed but claimed not to have concealed, any he knowingly concealed for a greater amount of time than he claimed to have concealed them, and any he knowingly claimed to be fewer in number than they actually were.

Greater purifying probation is for cases when a bhikkhu cannot recall with certainty having been pure up to a given date. This probation equals the amount of time since his ordination. As with the lesser purifying probation, it may be shortened if he can later recall with certainty having been pure up to such-and-such a date; there is no need to ask the Community to formalize the change.

Multiple offenses

If a bhikkhu has committed more than one saṅghādisesa offense, he may make amends for all of them at the same time. The penance for multiple offenses is called concurrent or combined (samodhāna) penance; the probation, concurrent or combined probation. The Commentary summarizes the relevant cases in the Canon under three types of combination: aggha-samodhāna (value combination), odhāna-samodhāna (nullifying combination), and missaka-samodhāna (mixed combination). (The following discussion of these terms differs from that in the Vinaya-mukha, which is based on a misunderstanding of the Commentary.)

Value combination

Value combination covers cases where all the offenses were of the same base (i.e., all in defiance of the same rule) and were committed before one’s vuṭṭhāna-vidhī. If the offenses were unconcealed, one need simply request penance for two offenses (dve āpattiyo) or three (tisso āpattiyo). The Commentary suggests that a bhikkhu requesting a combined penance for more than three offenses should simply ask for a penance for many offenses (sambahulā āpattiyo).

If any of the offenses were concealed, one must first request probation for the length of time the longest-concealed offense was concealed. Thus, if one offense was concealed for two days and another for five, one must request and undergo a five-day probation before becoming eligible to request penance.

Nullifying combination

Nullifying combination covers cases where one has committed one or more saṅghādisesa offenses, of the same base as the original offense(s), in the course of one’s vuṭṭhāna-vidhī up through the period of awaiting rehabilitation. This is called “nullifying” because all the days that one has already observed probation, penance, etc., are nullified and one must request to be sent back to the beginning to start the vuṭṭhāna-vidhī all over again. If either the original offense(s) or the new offense(s) were concealed, one must first request a concurrent probation for the length of time the longest-concealed offense was concealed. If neither the original nor the new offense(s) were concealed, one may simply request a concurrent penance.

During the period after committing the new offense(s) and before requesting and receiving the Community transaction that sends one back to the beginning, one is in the stage of deserving to be sent back to the beginning, during which one must continue to observe one’s probation duties.

The Commentary maintains that if a bhikkhu commits a new offense when his probation or penance duties have been set aside, he should not be taken back to the beginning to undergo probation/penance concurrent with the earlier offense. Instead—as he counts as a “regular bhikkhu” during the time that the duties are set aside—he has to undergo another, separate penance/probation period after completing his first. The Commentary’s judgment here is interesting, as it serves as a warning against complacency on the part of a bhikkhu who has set his duties aside. However, this judgment may simply be based on the fact that the Canon does not contain any patterns for the formal statements to be used in a case like this. The easiest way out is thus to treat the new offense as uncombinable with the earlier offense(s) and to have the offender take a separate course through the vuṭṭhāna-vidhī.

Mixed combination

Mixed combination covers cases where the offenses are of different bases (e.g., one offense of intentional emission, one for lustful contact with a woman), and the combination may either be a value combination (for offenses committed before beginning a vuṭṭhāna-vidhī) or a nullifying combination (for extra offenses committed in the course of a vuṭṭhāna-vidhī).

Shared offenses

If two (or more) bhikkhus together commit the same saṅghādisesa offense, or if together they commit a saṅghādisesa mixed with another offense, they must undergo the vuṭṭhāna-vidhī together. Examples of a saṅghādisesa offense committed together would be building an unauthorized dwelling in which they both expect to live (see Sg 6 & 7), joining in groundlessly accusing another bhikkhu of a pārājika offense (Sg 8 & 9), or supporting a schismatic after being warned not to do so by the Community (Sg 11). An example of mixed offenses would be mutual masturbation: Each incurs a saṅghādisesa for getting the other to bring him to ejaculation, while—in bringing the other to ejaculation—each earns a dukkaṭa for lustful contact with a man.

The Canon’s discussion of shared offenses shows that, after committing the offense together, the two bhikkhus cannot simply inform each other of the fact and consider their offense unconcealed. They must inform another bhikkhu who is innocent of the offense. If one of them conceals the offense while the other one doesn’t, the first must confess the dukkaṭa for concealment, after which he is granted probation for the number of days the offense was concealed. Only when he is ready for penance can both bhikkhus be granted penance, which they must undergo at the same time.

Interruptions

If a bhikkhu commits a saṅghādisesa offense, disrobes before the Community meets to impose probation or penance on him, and then reordains, he is not exempted after his reordination from undergoing the vuṭṭhāna-vidhī for his original offense. The same holds true if, after committing the offense, he becomes a novice and then reordains, goes insane and then recovers, becomes possessed and then regains possession of himself, or becomes delirious with pain and then returns to his senses. (The Commentary’s discussion of concealment would indicate that the same principle would also apply to a bhikkhu who is suspended and then is restored to his status as a regular bhikkhu.) He is expected to inform his fellow bhikkhus on the day he reordains, etc., even if he already confessed the offense prior to disrobing. If he did not conceal the offense either before or after disrobing, etc., he is simply to be granted penance. If he did conceal the offense either before or after the interruption in his status, he is to be granted probation for the total number of days, before and after, that he concealed it. The time during which he was not a bhikkhu or not in possession of his sanity, etc., does not count as “concealing.” Thus if he concealed it five days before disrobing and then three days after reordaining, he is to be given an eight-day probation regardless of how much time elapsed between his disrobing and reordination.

A similar principle holds true if he disrobes, etc., while undergoing the vuṭṭhāna-vidhī and then later reordains, recovers, etc., (and here the Canon explicitly includes a bhikkhu who is suspended and then is restored to his status as a regular bhikkhu). Here, however, the issue of concealment after his reordination, etc., does not come up. For instance, if he waits three days after his reordination, etc., to tell his fellow bhikkhus of his interrupted vuṭṭhāna-vidhī, he does not have to undergo an added three-day probation. Nor in any case does the Community have to repeat the transaction(s) of imposing the vuṭṭhāna-vidhī on him. Whatever portion of his vuṭṭhāna-vidhī was already properly observed is still valid, and he is simply to resume his course through the vuṭṭhāna-vidhī where he left off.

Rules

Transactions

“If one on probation as the fourth should grant probation, send back to the beginning, or grant penance; if, as the twentieth, he should rehabilitate, it is not a (valid) transaction and is not to be performed.

“If one deserving to be sent back to the beginning…

“If one deserving penance…

“If one observing penance…

“If one deserving rehabilitation as the fourth should grant probation, send back to the beginning, or grant penance; if, as the twentieth, he should rehabilitate, it is not a (valid) transaction and is not to be performed.”—Mv.IX.4.6

Duties

“A bhikkhu under probation should not consent to a regular bhikkhu’s bowing down to him, standing up to greet him, saluting him with hands placed palm-to-palm over the heart, performing forms of respect due to superiors, bringing his seat, bringing his bedding, water for foot (-washing), foot stand, foot wiper; receiving his bowl and robe, scrubbing his back while bathing. Whoever should consent (to these things): an offense of wrong doing. I allow among bhikkhus who are also under probation bowing down, standing up to greet, saluting with hands placed palm-to-palm over the heart, performing forms of respect due to superiors, bringing a seat, bringing bedding, water for foot (-washing), foot stand, foot wiper; receiving of bowl and robe, and back-scrubbing while bathing in accordance with seniority. I allow for bhikkhus who are under probation five things in accordance with seniority: uposatha, Invitation, rains-bathing cloth, redirection (of offerings) (§), and meals (§).”—Cv.II.1.1

Proper conduct for a bhikkhu on probation:

A. He should not give Acceptance;

he should not give dependence;

a novice should not be made to attend to him;

authorization to exhort bhikkhunīs should not be consented to;

even when authorized, he should not exhort bhikkhunīs;

whatever offense he was granted probation for, he should not commit that offense, or one of a similar sort, or one worse than that;

he should not criticize the (probation) transaction;

he should not criticize those who did the transaction;

he should not cancel a regular bhikkhu’s uposatha;

he should not cancel an invitation (§);

he should not engage in words (prior to setting up an accusation proceeding against another bhikkhu) (§);

he should not set up an accusation proceeding (§);

he should not get someone else to give him leave;

he should not make a formal charge;

he should not make (another bhikkhu) remember (i.e., interrogate him about a formal charge);

he should not join bhikkhus in disputing with bhikkhus (§—reading na bhikkhū bhikkhūhi sampayojetabbaṁ with the Thai edition).

B. He should not walk in front of a regular bhikkhu;

he should not sit in front of a regular bhikkhu;

whatever is the Community’s last seat, sleeping place, dwelling place, that should be presented to him, and he should accept it;

he should not approach lay families with a regular bhikkhu as the contemplative who precedes him or follows him (§);

he should not undertake the wilderness-dweller’s practice;

he should not undertake the alms-goer’s practice;

he should not, on that account, have almsfood sent (to him) with the intent, “May they not know about me.”

C. When a bhikkhu undergoing probation has newly arrived, he should notify (the other bhikkhus of his probation);

he should notify any incoming bhikkhu;

he should notify (the bhikkhus) in the uposatha meeting;

he should notify (the bhikkhus) during the Invitation meeting;

if he is sick, he may notify them (of his probation) by means of a messenger.—Cv.II.1.2

D. A bhikkhu undergoing probation should not go from a residence where there are bhikkhus to a residence where there are no bhikkhus, unless accompanied by a regular bhikkhu, except when there are obstructions. (Replace ‘residence’ with ‘non-residence’ and ‘residence or non-residence.’)

E. A bhikkhu undergoing probation should not go from a residence where there are bhikkhus to a residence where there are bhikkhus of a separate affiliation, unless accompanied by a regular bhikkhu, except when there are obstructions. (Replace ‘residence’ with ‘non-residence’ and ‘residence or non-residence.’)

F. A bhikkhu undergoing probation may go from a residence where there are bhikkhus to a residence where there are bhikkhus of the same affiliation if he knows, ‘I can get there today.’ (Replace ‘residence’ with ‘non-residence’ and ‘residence or non-residence.’)—Cv.II.1.3

G.

A bhikkhu undergoing probation should not reside in a residence under the same roof with a regular bhikkhu; he should not reside in a non-residence under the same roof with a regular bhikkhu; he should not reside in a residence or non-residence under the same roof with a regular bhikkhu;

on seeing a regular bhikkhu he should get up from his seat; he should offer his seat to the regular bhikkhu;

he should not sit on the same seat as a regular bhikkhu; if a regular bhikkhu is sitting on a low seat, he should not sit on a high seat; if a regular bhikkhu is sitting on the ground, he should not sit on a seat;

he should not walk back and forth on the same walking-meditation path as a regular bhikkhu; if a regular bhikkhu is walking back and forth on a low walking-meditation path, he should not walk back and forth on a high walking-meditation path; if a regular bhikkhu is walking back and forth on the ground, he should not walk back and forth on a (constructed) walking-meditation path.

(G is then repeated, substituting “regular bhikkhu” with “senior bhikkhu undergoing probation,” “bhikkhu who deserves to be sent back to the beginning,” “bhikkhu who deserves penance,” “bhikkhu undergoing penance,” “bhikkhu who deserves rehabilitation.”)

If, with a bhikkhu undergoing probation as the fourth member, a Community grants probation, sends back to the beginning, grants penance; or as the twentieth, rehabilitates, it is not a (valid) transaction and is not to be performed.—Cv.II.1.4

“For a bhikkhu undergoing probation, there are three ‘day/night cuttings’: living together, living apart, not notifying.”—Cv.II.2

“I allow that probation be set aside.” Procedure: Approach a regular bhikkhu, arrange robe over one shoulder, kneel down, place hands palm-to-palm over the heart and say, ‘I set aside the probation’—the probation is set aside. ‘I set aside the duties’—the probation is set aside.—Cv.II.3.1

“I allow that probation be undertaken (resumed).” Procedure: Approach a regular bhikkhu, arrange robe over one shoulder, kneel down, place hands palm-to-palm over the heart and say, ‘I undertake the probation’—the probation is undertaken. ‘I undertake the duties’—the probation is undertaken.—Cv.II.3.2

Duties for a bhikkhu who deserves to be sent back to the beginning are the same as those for a bhikkhu undergoing probation except that, under G, “senior bhikkhu undergoing probation” is changed to, “bhikkhu undergoing probation” and “bhikkhu who deserves to be sent back to the beginning” is changed to, “senior bhikkhu who deserves to be sent back to the beginning.” (§)—Cv.II.4

Duties for a bhikkhu deserving penance are the same as those for a bhikkhu undergoing probation with a similar change as above—Cv.II.5

Duties for a bhikkhu undergoing penance are the same as those for a bhikkhu undergoing probation except that

—under C, add that he should notify the bhikkhus daily;

—under D & E, change “accompanied by a regular bhikkhu” to “accompanied by a Community”;

—under G, change “senior bhikkhu undergoing probation” to “bhikkhu undergoing probation”; and “bhikkhu undergoing penance” to “senior bhikkhu undergoing penance.”—Cv.II.6

“For a bhikkhu undergoing penance, there are four ‘day/night cuttings’: living together, living apart, not notifying, going about with less than a group.”—Cv.II.7

“I allow that penance be set aside.” Procedure: Approach a regular bhikkhu, arrange robe over one shoulder, kneel down, place hands palm-to-palm over the heart and say, ‘I set aside the penance’—the penance is set aside. ‘I set aside the duties’—the penance is set aside.

“I allow that penance be undertaken (resumed).” Procedure: Approach a regular bhikkhu, arrange robe over one shoulder, kneel down, place hands palm-to-palm over the heart and say, ‘I undertake the penance’—the penance is undertaken. ‘I undertake the duties’—the penance is undertaken.—Cv.II.8

Duties for a bhikkhu deserving rehabilitation are the same as those for a bhikkhu undergoing probation except that, under G, “senior bhikkhu undergoing probation” is changed to “bhikkhu undergoing probation” and “bhikkhu deserving rehabilitation” is changed to “senior bhikkhu deserving rehabilitation.” (§)—Cv.II.9

Nullifying Combination

“There is the case where a bhikkhu on probation commits many saṅghādisesa offenses—

not concealed, definite (§) [C: the type of offense can be determined]: he is to be sent back to the beginning…

concealed, definite: he is to be sent back to the beginning and he is to be granted combined probation with the first offense for however long his offenses were concealed (§)…

concealed & not concealed, definite: he is to be sent back to the beginning and he is to be granted combined probation with the first offense for however long his offenses were concealed…

not concealed, indefinite [C: the type of offense cannot be determined]: he is to be sent back to the beginning…

concealed, indefinite: he is to be sent back to the beginning, and he is to be granted combined probation with the first offense for however long his offenses were concealed…

concealed & not concealed, indefinite: he is to be sent back to the beginning and he is to be granted combined probation with the first offense for however long his offenses were concealed…

not concealed, definite & indefinite: he is to be sent back to the beginning…

concealed, definite & indefinite: he is to be sent back to the beginning, and he is to be granted combined probation with the first offense for however long his offenses were concealed…

concealed & not concealed, definite & indefinite: he is to be sent back to the beginning, and he is to be granted combined probation with the first offense for however long his offenses were concealed…

(Similarly for offenses committed while awaiting penance, while undergoing penance, and while awaiting rehabilitation.)—Cv.III.28

Shared Offenses

Two bhikkhus commit a saṅghādisesa offense, regard it as such; one conceals it, the other doesn’t; he who conceals it should be made to confess an offense of wrong doing; after he is granted probation, both are to be granted penance.

Two bhikkhus commit a saṅghādisesa offense, are in doubt as to whether it is such; one conceals it, the other doesn’t; he who conceals it should be made to confess an offense of wrong doing; after he is granted probation, both are to be granted penance.

Two bhikkhus commit a saṅghādisesa offense, regard it as a mixed offense; one conceals it, the other doesn’t; he who conceals it should be made to confess an offense of wrong doing; after he is granted probation, both are to be granted penance.

Two bhikkhus commit a mixed offense, regard it as a saṅghādisesa; one conceals it, the other doesn’t; he who conceals it should be made to confess an offense of wrong doing; after he is granted probation, both are to be granted penance.

Two bhikkhus commit a mixed offense, regard it as mixed; one conceals it, the other doesn’t; he who conceals it should be made to confess an offense of wrong doing; after he is granted probation, both are to be granted penance.

Two bhikkhus commit a slight offense, regard it as a saṅghādisesa; one conceals it, the other doesn’t; he who conceals it should be made to confess an offense of wrong doing; both should be dealt with in accordance with the rule.

Two bhikkhus commit a slight offense, regard it as such; one conceals it, the other doesn’t; he who conceals it should be made to confess an offense of wrong doing; both should be dealt with in accordance with the rule.—Cv.III.34.1

Two bhikkhus commit a saṅghādisesa offense, regard it as such; one decides to report it, the other, not to report it; if the latter waits until dawn rises, it counts as concealed; he who conceals it should be made to confess an offense of wrong doing; after he is granted probation, both are to be granted penance.

Two bhikkhus commit a saṅghādisesa offense, regard it as such; both decide to go to report it; along the way one of them changes his mind; if the latter waits until dawn rises, it counts as concealed; he who conceals it should be made to confess an offense of wrong doing; after he is granted probation, both are to be granted penance.

Two bhikkhus commit a saṅghādisesa offense, regard it as such; go insane; after recovering from insanity, one conceals it, the other doesn’t; he who conceals it should be made to confess an offense of wrong doing; after he is granted probation, both are to be granted penance.

Two bhikkhus commit a saṅghādisesa offense, learn during the recitation of the Pāṭimokkha that what they did is against the Pāṭimokkha; regard their offense as a saṅghādisesa; one conceals it, the other doesn’t; he who conceals it should be made to confess an offense of wrong doing; after he is granted probation, both are to be granted penance.—Cv.III.34.2

Interruptions before the Vuṭṭhāna-vidhī

A bhikkhu commits many saṅghādisesa offenses, disrobes without having concealed them, reordains not concealing them: he is to be granted penance.

… disrobes without having concealed them, reordains and conceals them: he is to be granted penance after having been granted probation for however long he at the later time concealed that heap of offenses.

… disrobes having concealed them, reordains not concealing them: he is to be granted penance after having been granted probation for however long he at the earlier time concealed that heap of offenses.

… disrobes having concealed them, reordains and conceals them: he is to be granted penance after having been granted probation for however long he at the earlier and the later times concealed that heap of offenses.—Cv.III.29.1

A bhikkhu commits many saṅghādisesa offenses, some concealed, some not; disrobes; reordains; doesn’t conceal the offenses he earlier didn’t conceal, doesn’t conceal the offenses that earlier he did: he is to be granted penance after having been granted probation for however long he at the earlier time concealed that heap of offenses (§—this case is missing in the PTS edition of the Canon).

… disrobes; reordains; conceals the offenses he earlier didn’t conceal, doesn’t conceal the offenses that earlier he did: he is to be granted penance after having been granted probation for however long he at the earlier and the later times concealed that heap of offenses.

… disrobes; reordains; doesn’t conceal the offenses he earlier didn’t conceal, conceals the offenses that earlier he did: he is to be granted penance after having been granted probation for however long he at the earlier and the later times concealed that heap of offenses.

… disrobes; reordains; conceals the offenses he earlier didn’t conceal, conceals the offenses that earlier he did: he is to be granted penance after having been granted probation for however long he at the earlier and the later times concealed that heap of offenses.—Cv.III.29.2

A bhikkhu commits many saṅghādisesa offenses, some he knows to be offenses, some not; conceals those he knows; does not conceal those he doesn’t know; disrobes; reordains; does not, on knowing, conceal the offenses earlier known and concealed; does not, on knowing, conceal the offenses earlier not known and not concealed: he is to be granted penance after having been granted probation for however long he at the earlier time concealed that heap of offenses.

… does not, on knowing, conceal the offenses earlier known and concealed; does, on knowing, conceal the offenses earlier not known and not concealed: he is to be granted penance after having been granted probation for however long he at the earlier and the later times concealed that heap of offenses.

… does, on knowing, conceal offenses earlier known and concealed; does not, on knowing, conceal offenses earlier not known and not concealed: he is to be granted penance after having been granted probation for however long he at the earlier and the later times concealed that heap of offenses.

… does, on knowing, conceal offenses earlier known and concealed; does, on knowing, conceal offenses earlier not known and not concealed: he is to be granted penance after having been granted probation for however long he at the earlier and the later times concealed that heap of offenses.—Cv.III.29.3

(Similar cases for remembering and not remembering; not being in doubt and being in doubt)—Cv.III.29.4-5

(These are followed by whole sets as above, replacing “disrobes” with: becomes a novice, goes insane, becomes possessed, becomes delirious with pain.)—Cv.III.30

A bhikkhu on probation commits many saṅghādisesa offenses; does not conceal them; disrobes; reordains; does not conceal them: he is to be sent back to the beginning.

… does not conceal them; disrobes; reordains; conceals them: he is to be sent back to the beginning, and is to be granted combined probation with the original offense for however long he concealed them.

… conceals them; disrobes; reordains; does not conceal them: he is to be sent back to the beginning, and is to be granted combined probation with the original offense for however long he concealed them.

… conceals them; disrobes; reordains; conceals them: he is to be sent back to the beginning, and is to be granted combined probation with the original offense for however long he concealed them.

(in detail as in Cv.III.29 & 30)—Cv.III.31

(Similar cases for one committing many saṅghādisesa offenses while awaiting penance, while undergoing penance, while awaiting rehabilitation and then disrobing)—Cv.III.32

(Similar cases for one committing many saṅghādisesa offenses definite & not concealed; indefinite & not concealed; of the same name & not concealed; of different names & not concealed; shared (sabhāga) & not concealed; not shared (visabhāga) & not concealed; disconnected (vavatthita) & not concealed; connected (sambhinna) & not concealed). [C: Sambhinna and vavatthita are another way of saying sabhāga and visabhāga.]—Cv.III.33

Interruptions during the Vuṭṭhāna-vidhī

“There is the case where a bhikkhu, while on probation, disrobes. The probation of one who has disrobed is not invalidated (§). If he reordains, his earlier granting of probation is as it was. Whatever probation was granted is (still) well-granted. Whatever probation was observed is well-observed (§). The remainder is to be observed.”

(Similar cases for one who becomes a novice and later reordains; goes insane, is possessed, is delirious with pain (§—this passage, here and below, is not in BD, although it is in the PTS edition of the Pali) and later recovers; is suspended—for not seeing an offense, for not making amends for an offense, for not relinquishing an evil view—and is later restored)—Cv.III.27.1

“There is the case where a bhikkhu deserving to be sent back to the beginning disrobes. The sending-back-to-the-beginning of one who has disrobed is not invalidated. If he reordains, his earlier granting of probation is as it was. Whatever probation was granted is (still) well-granted. The bhikkhu is to be sent back to the beginning.”

(Similar cases for one who becomes a novice and later reordains… (etc., as above)… is suspended… and is later restored)—Cv.III.27.2

“There is the case where a bhikkhu deserving penance disrobes. The awaiting of penance of one who has disrobed is not invalidated. If he reordains, his earlier granting of probation is as it was. Whatever probation was granted is (still) well-granted. Whatever probation was observed is well-observed (§). The bhikkhu is to be granted penance.”

(Similar cases for one who becomes a novice and later reordains… (etc., as above)… is suspended… and is later restored)—Cv.III.27.3

“There is the case where a bhikkhu observing penance disrobes. The penance-observation of one who has disrobed is not invalidated. If he reordains, his earlier granting of probation is as it was. Whatever probation was granted is (still) well-granted. Whatever probation was observed is well-observed (§). Whatever penance was granted is (still) well-granted. Whatever penance was observed is well-observed. The remainder is to be observed.”

(Similar cases for one who becomes a novice and later reordains… (etc., as above)… is suspended… and is later restored)—Cv.III.27.4

“There is the case where a bhikkhu deserving rehabilitation disrobes. The awaiting of rehabilitation of one who has disrobed is not invalidated. If he reordains, his earlier granting of probation is as it was. Whatever probation was granted is (still) well-granted. Whatever probation was observed is well-observed (§). Whatever penance was granted is (still) well-granted. Whatever penance was observed is well-observed. The bhikkhu is to be granted rehabilitation.”

(Similar cases for one who becomes a novice and later reordains… (etc., as above)… is suspended… and is later restored)—Cv.III.27.5

Purified & Unpurified

A bhikkhu commits many saṅghādisesa offenses—definite & indefinite; concealed & not concealed; of the same name & of different names; shared (sabhāga) & not shared (visabhāga); disconnected (vavatthita) & connected (sambhinna). He is granted combined probation. While on probation he commits many saṅghādisesa offenses—definite & not concealed. He is sent back to the beginning by a Community transaction that is Dhamma, irreversible, fit to stand. He is granted penance by a non-Dhamma transaction. He is granted rehabilitation by a non-Dhamma transaction: He is not purified of those offenses.

Similar cases:

definite & concealed;

definite, concealed & not concealed;

indefinite & not concealed;

indefinite & concealed;

indefinite, concealed & not concealed;

definite & indefinite, not concealed;

definite & indefinite, concealed;

definite & indefinite, concealed & not concealed.

—Cv.III.35

A bhikkhu in any of the cases in Cv.III.35 is sent back to the beginning by a Community transaction that is Dhamma, irreversible, fit to stand. He is granted penance by a Dhamma transaction. He is granted rehabilitation by a Dhamma transaction: He is purified of those offenses. (§—In all this, the Thai edition differs from the other editions. The Burmese and PTS editions, which also make sense, state: He is sent back to the beginning by a Community transaction that is not-Dhamma, reversible, not fit to stand. Is granted penance by a Dhamma transaction; is granted rehabilitation by a Dhamma transaction: He is not purified of those offenses. The Sri Lankan edition, however, agrees with the Thai edition that all the transactions are Dhamma transactions, but for some reason concludes that the bhikkhu is not purified of his offenses. This is the least likely of the three readings.)—Cv.III.36.1

A bhikkhu on probation commits many saṅghādisesa offenses, definite, not concealed. He is sent back to the beginning by a Community transaction that is not-Dhamma, reversible, not fit to stand. While he thinks he is on (proper) probation, he commits many saṅghādisesa offenses, definite & not concealed. Having reached this stage, he remembers earlier offenses committed meanwhile, remembers later offenses committed meanwhile. He realizes that his sending-back-to-the beginning was not Dhamma. He informs the Community. They send him back to the beginning for a combined probation to cover the newly remembered offenses by a Community transaction that is Dhamma, irreversible, fit to stand. He is granted penance by a Dhamma transaction. He is granted rehabilitation by a Dhamma transaction: He is purified of those offenses.—Cv.III.36.2

Similar cases:

definite & concealed;

definite, concealed & not concealed;

indefinite & not concealed*;

indefinite & concealed*;

indefinite, concealed & not concealed*;

definite & indefinite, not concealed;

definite & indefinite, concealed;

definite & indefinite, concealed & not concealed.

—Cv.III.36.3-4

(In the cases marked with asterisks, the Thai and Sri Lankan editions differ from the PTS, which says, “They send him back to the beginning for combined probation to cover the newly remembered offenses by a Community transaction that is not-Dhamma, reversible, not fit to stand. He is granted penance by a Dhamma transaction. He is granted rehabilitation by a Dhamma transaction: He is not purified of those offenses.” This reading also makes sense.)

Formal statements

Request for penance, one offense, not concealed—Cv.III.1.2

Transaction statement for granting penance, one offense, not concealed—Cv.III.1.3

Request for rehabilitation, one offense, not concealed—Cv.III.2.2

Transaction statement for granting rehabilitation, one offense, not concealed—Cv.III.2.3

Request for probation, one offense, concealed one day—Cv.III.3.2

Transaction statement for granting probation, one offense, concealed one day—Cv.III.3.3

Request for penance, one offense, concealed one day—Cv.III.4.2

Transaction statement for granting penance, one offense, concealed one day—Cv.III.4.3

Request for rehabilitation, one offense, concealed one day—Cv.III.5.2

Transaction statement for granting rehabilitation, one offense, concealed one day—Cv.III.5.3

Requests for probation, penance, rehabilitation; transaction statements for granting probation, penance, rehabilitation for one offense concealed for two, three, four, five days—Cv.III.6

Request for being sent back to the beginning, one offense, not concealed, while on probation—Cv.III.7.2

Transaction statement for sending back to the beginning, one offense, not concealed, while on probation—Cv.III.7.3

Request for being sent back to the beginning, one offense, not concealed, when probation is completed and one is deserving penance—Cv.III.8.2

Transaction statement for sending back to the beginning, one offense, not concealed, when probation is completed and one is deserving penance—Cv.III.8.3

Request for penance after one has completed the extra probation mentioned in Cv.III.8—Cv.III.9.2

Transaction statement for granting penance after having granted the extra probation mentioned in Cv.III.8—Cv.III.9.3

Request for being sent back to the beginning, one offense, not concealed, while undergoing penance. Transaction statement for sending back to the beginning, one offense, not concealed, while undergoing penance—Cv.III.10

Request for being sent back to the beginning, one offense, not concealed, while deserving rehabilitation. Transaction statement for sending back to the beginning, one offense, not concealed, while deserving rehabilitation—Cv.III.11

Request for rehabilitation covering cases in Cv.III.6-11—Cv.III.12.2

Transaction statement for rehabilitation covering cases in Cv.III.6-11—Cv.III.12.3

Request, transaction statement for a single offense concealed one half-month (as in Cv.III.3)—Cv.III.13

Combined Probation

Request for being sent back to the beginning, one offense, concealed five days, while on probation—Cv.III.14.2

Transaction statement for sending back to the beginning, one offense, concealed five days, while on probation, granting combined probation—Cv.III.14.3

Request for being sent back to the beginning, one offense, concealed five days, when probation is completed and one is deserving penance. Transaction statement for sending back to the beginning, one offense, concealed five days, when probation is completed and one is deserving penance, granting probation combined with that for the former offense—Cv.III.15

Request for penance after one has completed the extra probation mentioned in Cv.III.15. Transaction statement for granting penance after having granted the extra probation mentioned in Cv.III.15—Cv.III.16

Request to be sent back to the beginning for one offense, concealed five days, while undergoing penance for offenses mentioned in Cv.III.13-15: The Community is to send one back for probation combined with the first offense (one half-month), then grant penance. Transaction statement—Cv.III.17

Request to be sent back to the beginning for one offense, concealed five days, committed when penance is completed and one is awaiting rehabilitation: The Community is to send one back for probation combined with the first offense (one half-month), then grant penance. Transaction statement—Cv.III.18

Request and transaction statement for rehabilitation for offenses mentioned in Cv.III.13-18—Cv.III.19

Request and transaction statement for ten-day combined probation for several offenses, concealed for different lengths of time (ten days at most)—Cv.III.20

Request and transaction statement for combined probation for one offense concealed one day, two offenses for two… ten for ten—Cv.III.21 [BD’s note suggests that this is for ten times ten (one hundred) days. The Commentary says that the probation is for ten days.]

A bhikkhu commits two offenses each concealed two months; asks for probation for one offense concealed two months. While undergoing probation he feels shame. Request and transaction statement for a two-month probation for the second offense. The second probation begins from the date it is granted.—Cv.III.22.3-4

A bhikkhu commits two offenses each concealed two months; knows one of the offenses, does not know the other (is a saṅghādisesa). While undergoing probation he come to know the second offense (as a saṅghādisesa). He asks for a two-month probation for the second offense. The second probation begins from the date it is granted.—Cv.III.23.2

Similar cases for

—one who remembers the first offense, doesn’t remember the second offense—Cv.III.23.3

—one with no doubt about the first offense, doubtful about the second offense—Cv.III.23.4

A bhikkhu commits two offenses concealed for two months: knowingly conceals the first offense, unknowingly conceals the second offense; is granted a two-month probation for both. While undergoing probation a knowledgeable bhikkhu points out that the probation for the first offense is valid, whereas that for the second is invalid; the second offense deserves (only) penance.—Cv.III.23.5

Similar cases for a second offense concealed without remembering, when in doubt—Cv.III.23.6

A bhikkhu commits two offenses each concealed two months; asks for probation for two offenses concealed one month. While undergoing probation he feels shame. Request and transaction statement for a two-month probation for both offenses. Two-month probation begins from the date the first probation is granted.—Cv.III.24.3

(Repeat of Cv.III.24.3)—Cv.III.25.1

Similar cases for knowing one month, not knowing the other month; remembering one month, not the other; not doubtful about one month, doubtful about other: Two-month probation begins from the date the first probation is granted.—Cv.III.25.2

Similar cases for one month knowingly concealed, the other unknowingly concealed; one month concealed, remembering, one month concealed not remembering; one month concealed not in doubt, the other concealed in doubt—asks for and is granted a two-month probation. While undergoing probation a knowledgeable bhikkhu points out that the probation for the first month is valid, whereas that for the second is invalid.—Cv.III.25.3

Purifying Probation

A bhikkhu falls into several offenses: doesn’t know the maximum number of offenses, doesn’t know the maximum number of nights (concealed); doesn’t remember, is in doubt: he should be granted purifying probation—Cv.III.26.1

Request and transaction statement—Cv.III.26.2

Cases qualifying for purifying probation:

a.

doesn’t know the maximum number of offenses (x), of nights (concealed) (y);

doesn’t remember x & y;

is doubtful about x & y;

b.

knows x but not y;

remembers x but not y;

is not doubtful about x but is doubtful about y;

c.

knows x in some cases but not others, doesn’t know y; remembers x in some cases but not others, doesn’t remember y; is doubtful about x in some cases but not others, doubtful about y;

d.

doesn’t know x, knows y in some cases but not others; doesn’t remember x, remembers y in some cases but not others; is doubtful about x, is doubtful about y in some cases but not others;

e.

knows y in some cases but not others, doesn’t know x;

remembers y in some cases but not others, doesn’t remember x;

is doubtful about y in some cases but not others, doubtful about x;

f.

knows x in some cases but not others, knows y in some cases but not others; remembers x in some cases but not others, remembers y in some cases but not others; is doubtful about x in some cases but not others, is doubtful about y in some cases but not others.—Cv.III.26.3

Cases qualifying for regular probation:

a.

knows x & y;

remembers x & y;

is not doubtful about x & y;

b.

knows y but not x;

remembers y but not x;

is not doubtful about y but is doubtful about x;

c.

knows x in some cases but not others, knows y; remembers x in some cases but not others, remembers y; is doubtful about x in some cases but not others, is not doubtful about y.—Cv.III.26.4

CHAPTER TWENTY

Disciplinary Transactions

There are cases where the standard penalties are not enough to prevent a bhikkhu from committing repeated offenses. Either he does not cooperate with the penalty procedures or, even when cooperating, cannot bring himself to change his ways. There are also cases where a bhikkhu has wronged a lay person, or a lay person has wronged a bhikkhu, to the point where the Community must take action to prevent further damage. To deal with cases such as these, the Buddha authorized the Community to impose disciplinary measures on wrong-doers above and beyond the standard system of penalties.

Some writers have described these disciplinary measures as a Buddhist prototype for legal justice, either praising them for their insightful contribution to legal philosophy or criticizing them for their shortcomings as legal procedures. Both the praise and the criticism miss the point. Unlike most modern judicial procedures, these measures do not function as retributive justice. They are not retributive in that they are not ways of making the offender “pay” for his wrong doings (the principle of kamma will see to that); and, viewed in terms of retribution, they are unjust (or at least not necessarily fair) in that there is no concern that bhikkhus with equal offenses will undergo equal penalties. With the one exception of “further punishment” (see below), each allowance for imposing a disciplinary measure states that a Community if it wants to may impose the measure on a bhikkhu endowed with certain qualities. Only in the case of that exception do the texts say that it must do so.

A passage from the Bhaddāli Sutta (MN 65) indicates that, instead of functioning as retribution, the disciplinary measures serve primarily as means of instruction and rehabilitation: notifying the offender of the seriousness of his wrong doings and providing him with added motivation to mend his ways. If we were to look for the standard of justice operating here, it would have to be distributive justice: handing out different instructions to people in proportion to what they need and are capable of using to their benefit. As with any form of instruction, different people need to learn different lessons in different ways.

Here is the passage from the sutta:

Bhaddāli: “Lord, what is the cause, what is the reason, why there are cases where, with repeated pressure, they take action against a bhikkhu? And what is the cause, what is the reason, why there are cases where they don’t, with repeated pressure, take action against the same sort of bhikkhu?”

The Buddha: “Bhaddāli, there is the case where a certain bhikkhu is one with frequent offenses, many offenses. When the bhikkhus speak to him (about his offenses), he prevaricates, leads the talk astray, shows anger, aversion, and bitterness; does not behave properly, does not lower his hackles, does not mend his ways, does not say, ‘I will act so as to satisfy the Community.’ In that case, the thought occurs to the bhikkhus, ‘Friends, this bhikkhu is one with frequent offenses, many offenses. When the bhikkhus speak to him, he prevaricates, leads the talk astray, shows anger, aversion, and bitterness; does not behave properly, does not lower his hackles, does not mend his ways, does not say, ‘I will act so as to satisfy the Community.’ It would be good if the venerable ones were to investigate the issue involving this bhikkhu in such a way that it wouldn’t be quickly settled.’ And the bhikkhus investigate the issue involving him in such a way that it is not quickly settled.

“Then there is the case where a certain bhikkhu is one with frequent offenses, many offenses. When the bhikkhus speak to him (about his offenses), he does not prevaricate, does not lead the talk astray, does not show anger, aversion, or bitterness. He behaves properly, lowers his hackles, mends his ways, says, ‘I will act so as to satisfy the Community.’ In that case, the thought occurs to the bhikkhus, ‘Friends… it would be good if the venerable ones were to investigate the issue involving this bhikkhu in such a way that it would be quickly settled.’ And the bhikkhus investigate the issue involving him in such a way that it is quickly settled.

“Then there is the case where a certain bhikkhu is one with occasional offenses, few offenses. When the bhikkhus speak to him (about his offenses), he prevaricates, leads the talk astray… does not say, ‘I will act so as to satisfy the Community.’ In that case, the thought occurs to the bhikkhus, ‘Friends… it would be good if the venerable ones were to investigate the issue involving this bhikkhu in such a way that it wouldn’t be quickly settled.’ And the bhikkhus investigate the issue involving him in such a way that it is not quickly settled.

“Then there is the case where a certain bhikkhu is one with occasional offenses, few offenses. When the bhikkhus speak to him (about his offenses), he does not prevaricate…. He behaves properly, lowers his hackles, mends his ways, says, ‘I will act so as to satisfy the Community.’ In that case, the thought occurs to the bhikkhus, ‘Friends… it would be good if the venerable ones were to investigate the issue involving this bhikkhu in such a way that it would be quickly settled.’ And the bhikkhus investigate the issue involving him in such a way that it is quickly settled.

“Then there is the case where a certain bhikkhu keeps going with (only) a modicum of conviction, (only) a modicum of affection. In that case, the thought occurs to the bhikkhus, ‘Friends, this bhikkhu keeps going with (only) a modicum of conviction, (only) a modicum of affection. If we, with repeated pressure, were to take action against him, he would lose that modicum of conviction, that modicum of affection. Don’t let that happen.’ Just as if a man had only one eye, his friends and companions, kinsmen and relatives, would look after his one eye, (thinking,) ‘Don’t let him lose his one eye, too.’ In the same way… the thought occurs to the bhikkhus, ‘Friends… if we, with repeated pressure, were to take action against him, he would lose that modicum of conviction, that modicum of affection. Don’t let that happen.’

“Bhaddāli, this is the cause, this the reason, why there are cases where, with repeated pressure, they take action against a bhikkhu. And this is the cause, this the reason, why there are cases where they don’t, with repeated pressure, take action against the same sort of bhikkhu.”

In other words, the bhikkhus imposing any of these disciplinary transactions on an offender must take into consideration not only the external facts of the case but also the offender’s mental state. Does he need to be taught to take the Community seriously? If so, then even if his offenses are slight he may deserve harsher treatment than a bhikkhu with more offenses but more respect for the Community. On the other hand, is his faith in the practice so weak that a disciplinary transaction would drive him out of the Community? If so, the bhikkhus would be wise to put the matter of his offenses aside and work in other ways to strengthen his faith in the practice.

There are two reasons why these transactions cannot be taken as a guide to legal philosophy in general: (1) The penalties prescribed by these transactions—various levels of ostracism—have force only within the context of the Buddha’s teachings. As the Buddha observed to Ven. Ānanda, “Having admirable people as friends, companions, and colleagues is actually the whole of the holy life” (SN 45:2). Anyone who approaches the Dhamma seriously should realize that without the opportunity of associating with and learning from people who are experienced on the path, progress is extremely difficult. The bhikkhus are thus expected to respect the well-behaved members of the Community and to want to stay in good standing with them. The system of penalties imposed by these disciplinary transactions assumes that respect, for it revolves entirely around affecting the offender’s status in relation to the Community. For a person who did not value his standing vis-à-vis the Community, the penalties would have no effect.

(2) These penalties are intended only for bhikkhus who show some signs that they will respond favorably to them. As many have noted, the procedures for imposing these penalties make no provision for the case where a bhikkhu is known to have committed an act that constitutes an offense but denies having done it. This is a case of an out-and-out lie, and systems of retributive justice have procedures for making the offender pay for his wrong doing even when he is lying through his teeth. In fact, the underlying assumption of a great deal of legal procedure is that a wrong-doer, unless pressured, will rarely admit to doing wrong. Within the Community of bhikkhus there are procedures for applying pressure to an offender who denies his actions, but if he does not respond to such pressures he is considered beyond the pale, and no amount of disciplinary action will make him respect the Community or mend his ways. As the suttas point out, a person who feels no shame at telling a lie is totally devoid of the quality of a contemplative (MN 61), and there is no evil he might not do (Iti 25; Dhp 176). The only recourse is to leave him alone, in hopes that someday his conscience will get the better of him. As for the disciplinary transactions, they are designed to cover cases where the bhikkhu in question will at least admit to his actions even if he may not see them as offenses. When there is at least this much truth to him, he can be taught.

These disciplinary measures are thus designed for bhikkhus who have offenses in their past and present, but who show promise for reform in the future.

The following discussion divides the disciplinary transactions into two classes. The first are those disciplining an individual bhikkhu for his offenses. The second are those dealing with relations between the bhikkhus and the laity.

With regard to the first class, there are two separate discussions in the Khandhakas, in Mv.IX and Cv.I. The discussion in Mv.IX suggests that each disciplinary transaction is for a specific sort of offender—censure, for a maker of strife and quarrels within the Community; demotion, for a person with many offenses who lives in unbecoming association with householders; banishment, for a bhikkhu who corrupts families (see Sg 13); and suspension, for a bhikkhu who admits to an action that constitutes an offense but refuses to (a) recognize it as an offense or (b) make amends for it, or who refuses to relinquish an evil view. The discussion in Cv.I gives much longer lists of faults that would qualify a bhikkhu for each disciplinary transaction, with considerable overlap among the lists. The Commentary takes the second discussion as authoritative and re-writes the first (not very convincingly) to fit with the second. A better interpretation might be to regard the first discussion simply as a short-hand reference to the second. The effect of following the second discussion is to give the bhikkhus more latitude in dealing with an offender: If he does not respond to being placed under censure they can try more stringent penalties, up to suspension, to see what works in his particular case. In the following discussion, we will follow Cv.I. The transaction statements for imposing and rescinding these transactions are given in Appendix IV.

Discipline for offenses

There are five transactions in this class:

censure (tajjanīya-kamma),

further punishment (tassa pāpiyasikā-kamma),

demotion (niyasa-kamma—in some editions of the Canon this is called dependence (nissaya-kamma)),

banishment (pabbājanīya-kamma), and

suspension (ukkhepanīya-kamma).

Censure

The origin story here is as follows:

Now at that time, the followers of Paṇḍuka and Lohita (§)—who themselves were makers of quarrels, strife, disputes, dissension, and issues in the Community—approached other bhikkhus who were makers of strife, quarrels, disputes, dissension, and issues in the Community, and said, “Don’t let this one defeat you! Argue strongly, strongly! You are wiser and more competent and more learned and more clever than he. Don’t be afraid of him! We will be on your side!” Because of this, quarrels that had not yet arisen arose, and quarrels that had already arisen rolled on to become bigger and more abundant.

According to Cv.I, a Community—if it wishes—may impose a censure transaction on a bhikkhu endowed with the following qualities:

a) He is a maker of strife, quarrels, disputes, dissension, issues in the Community; he is inexperienced and incompetent, indiscriminately (§) full of offenses; he lives in the company of householders, in unbecoming association with householders.

b) He is one who, in light of heightened virtue (§), is defective in his virtue. He is one who, in light of heightened conduct (§), is defective in his conduct. He is one who, in light of higher view (§), is defective in his views.

c) He speaks in dispraise of the Buddha; speaks in dispraise of the Dhamma; speaks in dispraise of the Saṅgha.

The Commentary notes that a bhikkhu endowed with any one of these qualities qualifies for censure. There is no need for him to be endowed with all nine or a full sub-set of three.

Cv.I.1.4 states that, before giving him a censure transaction, the Community must meet to charge him with an offense. He must then be “made to remember”—i.e., interrogated about the events in question—and then to disclose the offense. Cv.I.2-3 adds that these steps are valid only if the bhikkhu actually has committed the offense, the offense is one entailing confession (as the Commentary notes, this rules out pārājika and saṅghādisesa offenses), and the bhikkhu has not confessed the offense. As with all transactions, censure is valid only if the accused is present in the meeting and the transaction is done in unity, conducted in accord with the Dhamma.

A bhikkhu who has been censured must observe the restrictions listed in section 2A of the restrictions placed on a bhikkhu undergoing penance and probation. In other words,

he should not give Acceptance;

he should not give dependence;

a novice should not be made to attend to him;

he should not consent to an authorization to exhort the bhikkhunīs;

even when authorized, he should not exhort bhikkhunīs;

whatever offense he was censured for, he should not commit that offense, or one of a similar sort, or one worse than that;

he should not criticize the censure transaction;

he should not criticize those who did the transaction;

he should not cancel a regular bhikkhu’s uposatha;

he should not cancel an invitation;

he should not engage in words (prior to setting up an accusation proceeding against another bhikkhu) (§);

he should not set up an accusation proceeding (§);

he should not get someone else to give him leave;

he should not make a formal charge;

he should not interrogate another bhikkhu (literally, “make him remember”) as part of settling a formal charge;

he should not join bhikkhus in disputing with bhikkhus.

For the commentaries’ remarks on these restrictions, see Chapter 19.

If a censured bhikkhu oversteps any of these restrictions, his censure is not to be rescinded. The Commentary to Pv.V.3 adds that if he shows no willingness to abide by them, the Community may suspend him. (The allowance for the Community to do this applies to bhikkhus who refuse to abide by the restrictions imposed by transactions of demotion, banishment, etc., as well.) If, however, the censured bhikkhu abides by the restrictions (for at least ten to twenty days, the Commentary says), he may ask to have it rescinded, and the Community may rescind it for him.

Further punishment

This transaction is discussed in BMC1, Chapter 11. In terms of formal procedure, it differs from censure in only three respects:

1) It is primarily intended for a bhikkhu who, when being interrogated about an offense, at first denies doing the action in question and then, only after being pressured, admits to it. However, it may also be imposed on any bhikkhu who meets the criteria for censure.

2) There is an apparent inconsistency in the Canon as to how mandatory this transaction is in settling an accusation against a bhikkhu actually guilty of the offense of which he is accused. Cv.IV.14.27 indicates that this transaction is the only way to settle such a case. In other words, if the bhikkhu in question is actually guilty of the offense, the Community has to impose this transaction on him. Cv.IV.12.3, however, indicates that the Community, if it wants to, may impose this transaction on any bhikkhu who meets the criteria for censure. This apparent inconsistency can be resolved by saying that the transaction is mandatory when a bhikkhu has confessed to an offense only after a formal inquiry into the accusation, but optional in the remaining cases.

3) The wording of the transaction statement differs slightly from the transaction statement for censure (see Appendix IV).

Demotion

The origin story here is as follows:

Now at that time Ven. Seyyasaka (see the origin story to Sg 1) was inexperienced, incompetent, indiscriminately (§) full of offenses. He lived in unbecoming association with householders—so much so that the bhikkhus were fed up with giving him probation, sending him back to the beginning, giving him penance, and rehabilitating him.

The traits that qualify a bhikkhu for demotion and the procedures for imposing it on him are identical with those for censure, although Cv.I.9.1 indicates that this transaction is for a bhikkhu who repeatedly commits saṅghādisesa offenses even when undergoing probation, etc. The restrictions he must observe, once demoted, are the same as those for a censured bhikkhu, with one addition: He must return to live in dependence under a mentor. If he adheres to his restrictions, the demotion may be rescinded. The commentaries are silent on the issue of the minimum length of time the restrictions should be imposed, but in this case ten to twenty days seems altogether too short. A wise policy would be to make sure that the dependence has had an effect and that the offender will not return to his old ways when released from dependence. If, when the demotion is rescinded, he does return to his old ways, he may be demoted again and placed under dependence for an indefinite length of time.

Banishment

The origin story here is identical with the origin story to Sg 13. The list of qualities that would qualify a bhikkhu for banishment is the same as the list for censure with the following additions:

he is endowed with bodily frivolity, verbal frivolity, bodily and verbal frivolity [C: this means that he plays—see the section on bad habits in Chapter 10];

he is endowed with bodily misbehavior, verbal misbehavior, bodily and verbal misbehavior [C: he breaks rules];

he is endowed with bodily injuriousness, verbal injuriousness, bodily and verbal injuriousness;

he is endowed with bodily wrong livelihood [C: e.g., he gives medicinal treatments], verbal wrong livelihood [C: e.g., he takes messages for lay people], bodily and verbal wrong livelihood.

The procedures for banishing a bhikkhu are identical with those for censure; and the restrictions he must observe, once banished, are the same as those for a censured bhikkhu, with one addition: He must not live in the same place he was living before banishment. According to the Commentary, this means that he has to leave not only the monastery but also its neighborhood, and must not associate with the lay people in the area.

Banishment differs from the other disciplinary measures in this chapter in that it has an entire saṅghādisesa rule—Sg 13—devoted to it, treating the case of a bhikkhu under banishment who criticizes those who imposed the transaction on him. For details, see the discussion under that rule.

If the banished bhikkhu adheres to his restrictions, the banishment may be rescinded on his request. The Commentary adds that, if he was banished for corrupting families with his behavior, then even after the revoking of the banishment he must refuse gifts from the families he had corrupted. If they ask him why, he may tell them. If they then explain that they are giving the gifts not because of his former behavior but because he has now mended his ways, he may then accept them.

Suspension

Suspension may be imposed on a bhikkhu who admits to an action that constitutes an offense but refuses to recognize it as an offense; who, admitting to an action that constitutes an offense, refuses to make amends for it; or who refuses to relinquish an evil view (under the conditions described in the Vibhaṅga to Pc 68). The procedures for suspending a bhikkhu are the same as those for censure. The question arises as to what, in this context, making him admit means: that the bhikkhu at first admits to his action and later, only after pressure from the Community, recognizes it as an offense? Or that even after pressure he will only admit to the action and not to the offense? The origin story indicates the latter alternative, for there is no mention of the bhikkhu in question (Ven. Channa—see Sg 12) admitting to an offense. This observation is confirmed by Mv.IX.5.6, which says that if a bhikkhu recognizes an act as an offense but then is suspended for not recognizing the offense, the transaction is not in accordance with the Dhamma. As for the former alternative—where the offender recognizes his offense only under pressure—it comes under the transaction for further punishment.

The Commentary to Cv.I.33 states that being a maker of strife under the prerequisites for this transaction applies to cases where the bhikkhu in question uses his unrelinquished view as a basis for making strife.

The restrictions placed on a suspended bhikkhu are the same as those for a censured bhikkhu except that he is told that he can have no communion (sambhoga) with the Bhikkhu Saṅgha. In terms of specific added restrictions, this means:

he should not consent to a regular bhikkhu’s bowing down to him, standing up to greet him, performing añjali to him, performing duties of respect, bringing his seat, bringing his bedding, water for foot-washing, a foot stand, a foot wiper; receiving his bowl and robe; scrubbing his back while bathing;

he should not accuse a regular bhikkhu of a defect in virtue, conduct, views, or livelihood;

he should not cause bhikkhus to break with bhikkhus;

he should not wear the distinctive clothing (“emblem”) of a householder or of the member of another religion; he should not associate himself with members of other religions; he should associate himself with bhikkhus (in other words, even though he has no communion with the bhikkhus, he should identify himself as a bhikkhu); he should train in the training of the bhikkhus;

he should not stay in a residence or non-residence under the same roof with a regular bhikkhu (residence here apparently means any building built for people to live in; non-residence, any other building);

on seeing a regular bhikkhu he should get up from his seat; he should not accost a regular bhikkhu inside or out (of the monastery, says the Commentary).

Pc 69 expands on the meaning of being in communion by stating that any bhikkhu who communes with a suspended bhikkhu by sharing Dhamma or material things with him incurs a pācittiya offense. It also states that a regular bhikkhu who joins a suspended bhikkhu in a Community transaction incurs a pācittiya offense. This implies—and the point is made explicit in Mv.X.1.10—that a suspended bhikkhu, for the duration of the suspension, has no common affiliation with other bhikkhus. In other words, he may not participate in any Community transactions.

If the suspended bhikkhu abides by the above restrictions, the Community may rescind his suspension at his request. The Canon adds one special note under the case of a bhikkhu suspended for not relinquishing an evil view: If he disrobes while under suspension, the Community should rescind the suspension.

Suspension is the most serious disciplinary transaction in that it not only removes the suspended bhikkhu from communion, but it can also put him in the position where—if he can gain followers—he can form the nucleus for a more lasting separate affiliation within the Saṅgha (see Appendix V). Because suspension touches directly on the grounds for disputes—what is and is not Dhamma, what is and is not an offense—it may prolong the strife that led to it, and even lead to schism. Therefore it should not be performed lightly. Mv.X.1.5-8 tells of how the Buddha, on learning that a bhikkhu suspended for not seeing an offense had gained a following, went first to the bhikkhus who had suspended him and told them to reflect on the dangers of suspending a bhikkhu: Not only would they be deprived of communion with him, but the act of suspension might be the cause of strife or schism in the Community. Then he went to the partisans of the suspended bhikkhu and told them to reflect in a similar way, adding that one who senses the gravity of schism (§—BD mistranslates this as “bent on schism”) should confess an offense “even if just out of faith in others” so as to avoid the dangers that suspension would entail both for himself and for the Community at large.

Relations with the laity

There are two disciplinary acts dealing with this area:

reconciliation (paṭisaraṇīya-kamma) and

“overturning the bowl” (patta-nikkujja-kamma).

Reconciliation

The origin story here is rather long. However, BD misses some of its implications—the name of the sesame sweet apparently contains a low-grade insult—so the story is worth re-translating in full. Here I follow the Thai edition, which differs in some details from the PTS:

Now at that time Ven. Sudhamma was a dweller in the monastery of Citta the householder in Macchikāsaṇḍa—an overseer of new construction, a receiver of constant meals. Whenever Citta wanted to invite a Community, a group, or an individual (to a meal), he would not do so without consulting Ven. Sudhamma.

Then many elder bhikkhus—Ven. Sāriputta, Ven. Mahā Moggallāna, Ven. Mahā Kaccāna, Ven. Mahā Koṭṭhita, Ven. Mahā Kappina, Ven. Cunda, Ven. Anuruddha, Ven. Revata, Ven. Upāli, Ven. Ānanda, Ven. Rāhula—wandering through Kāsī, reached Macchikāsaṇḍa. Citta heard, “They say that elder bhikkhus have arrived at Macchikāsaṇḍa.” So he went to the elder bhikkhus and, on arrival, having bowed down to them, sat to one side. As he was sitting there, Ven. Sāriputta instructed, urged, roused, and encouraged him with a talk on Dhamma. Then Citta—instructed, urged, roused, and encouraged with Ven. Sāriputta’s talk on Dhamma—said to the elder bhikkhus, “Venerable sirs, may the elder bhikkhus acquiesce to tomorrow’s newcomers’ meal (§) from me.”

The elder bhikkhus acquiesced by silence. Then Citta the householder, sensing the elder bhikkhus’ acquiescence, got up from his seat and, having bowed down to them, circumambulated them—keeping them to his right—and went to Ven. Sudhamma. On arrival, having bowed down to Ven. Sudhamma, he stood to one side. As he was standing there, he said to Ven. Sudhamma, “Ven. Sudhamma, may you acquiesce to tomorrow’s meal from me, together with the elder bhikkhus.”

Then Ven. Sudhamma—(thinking,) “Before, whenever Citta wanted to invite a Community, a group, or an individual to a meal, he would not do so without consulting me. But now, without consulting me, he has invited the elder bhikkhus. He is now corrupted, this Citta; he is indifferent, doesn’t care about me”—said to Citta, “No, householder, I won’t acquiesce.”

Then a second time… A third time, Citta said to Ven. Sudhamma, “Ven. Sudhamma, may you acquiesce to tomorrow’s meal from me, together with the elder bhikkhus.”

“No, householder, I won’t acquiesce.”

Then Citta—(thinking,) “What does it matter to me whether Ven. Sudhamma acquiesces or not?”—bowed down to him, circumambulated him, keeping him to his right, and went away.

Then Citta, toward the end of the night, had sumptuous staple and non-staple foods prepared for the elder bhikkhus. And Ven. Sudhamma—(thinking,) “What if I were to go see what Citta has prepared for the elder bhikkhus?”—put on his robes in the early morning and, taking his bowl and outer robe, went to Citta’s home. There he sat down on an appointed seat. Citta the householder went to him and, having bowed down to him, sat to one side. As he was sitting there, Ven. Sudhamma said to him, “Many are the staple and non-staple foods you have prepared, householder, but only one thing is missing: sesame-sucks.”

“And so many, venerable sir, are the treasures to be found in the Buddha’s words, yet this is all you have mentioned: ‘sesame-sucks.’ Once, sir, some merchants from the Deccan went to an eastern district (§), and from there they brought back a hen. The hen mated with a crow and gave birth to a chick. Whenever the chick wanted to caw like a crow, it cried ‘Cawww-ca-doodle-do!’ (§) Whenever it wanted to crow like a rooster, it cried, ‘Cockkk-a-doodle-caw!’ (§) In the same way, sir, so many are the treasures to be found in the Buddha’s words, yet this is all you have mentioned: ‘sesame-sucks.’”

“You are insulting me, householder. You are reviling me. This is your monastery, householder. I am leaving it.”

“Venerable sir, I am not insulting you. I am not reviling you. May master Sudhamma stay on in the delightful mango grove at Macchikāsaṇḍa. I will be responsible for master Sudhamma’s robes, almsfood, lodgings, and medicinal requisites.”

A second time, Ven. Sudhamma said to Citta the householder, “You are insulting me, householder. You are reviling me. This is your monastery, householder. I am leaving it.”

“Sir, I am not insulting you. I am not reviling you. May master Sudhamma stay on in the delightful mango grove at Macchikāsaṇḍa. I will be responsible for master Sudhamma’s robes, almsfood, lodgings, and medicinal requisites.”

A third time, Ven. Sudhamma said to Citta the householder, “You are insulting me, householder. You are reviling me. This is your monastery, householder. I am leaving it.”

“Where will master Sudhamma go?”

“I will go to Sāvatthī, householder, to see the Blessed One.”

“In that case, venerable sir, report to the Blessed One everything that was said by you and said by me. And this will not be surprising: that master Sudhamma will return to Macchikāsaṇḍa once more.”

[Ven. Sudhamma then packs his things and goes to see the Buddha. The latter upbraids him for having insulted Citta and tells the Community to impose a reconciliation transaction on him, forcing him to return to Macchikāsaṇḍa to ask Citta’s forgiveness.] (Cv.I.18.1-5)

The Community, if it wants to, may impose a reconciliation transaction on a bhikkhu endowed with any of the following qualities:

a) he strives for the material loss of householders, for the detriment of householders, for the non-residence of householders (so they can’t live in a certain place); he insults and reviles householders; he gets householders to break with householders;

b) he speaks in dispraise of the Buddha to householders, speaks in dispraise of the Dhamma to householders, speaks in dispraise of the Saṅgha to householders, ridicules and scoffs at householders about something low or vile, does not fulfill a righteous promise made to householders [C: this includes accepting an invitation for the Rains retreat or any other similar promise].

The procedure for imposing a reconciliation transaction is the same as for imposing censure. Once a bhikkhu has had the transaction imposed on him, he must follow the same duties as a censured bhikkhu, with one important addition: He must go to the lay person (or lay people) he has wronged and ask his/her/their forgiveness. The procedure for this is as follows. First another bhikkhu who has agreed to take on the role of companion is authorized to go with the offending bhikkhu to the lay person’s residence. None of the texts mention this point, but a wise policy would be to choose as the companion a bhikkhu who is on friendly terms with the lay person (or people).

1) When they arrive there, the offending bhikkhu should ask the lay person’s forgiveness, saying, “Forgive me, householder. I am making peace with you. (Or: I am amicable with you.)” If the lay person forgives him, well and good.

2) If not, the companion bhikkhu should say, “Forgive this bhikkhu, householder. He is making peace with you.” If the lay person forgives him, well and good.

3) If not, the companion bhikkhu should say, “Forgive this bhikkhu, householder. I am making peace with you.” If the lay person forgives him, well and good.

4) If not, the companion bhikkhu should say, “Forgive this bhikkhu, householder, at the request of the Community.” If the lay person forgives him, well and good.

5) If not, then without leaving sight or hearing of the lay person, the offending bhikkhu should arrange his upper robe over one shoulder, kneel down with his hands in añjali, and confess his offense to the companion bhikkhu.

When the offending bhikkhu has received the lay person’s forgiveness through any of the steps 1-4, or has confessed his offense in the lay person’s presence in step 5, and has observed his other restrictions properly, then at his request the Community may rescind the reconciliation transaction.

Overturning the bowl

Overturning the bowl is a symbolic phrase signifying the refusal to accept offerings from a particular person. The origin story for this transaction is a variation on the origin story for Sg 8. The followers of Mettiya and Bhummaja incite Vaḍḍha the Licchavi to accuse Ven. Dabba Mallaputta of having raped his wife. (They show no imagination at all and instruct him to phrase his accusation in the same terms they taught Mettiyā Bhikkhunī in the story to Sg 8: “The quarter without dread, without harm, without danger, is (now) the quarter with dread, with harm, with danger. From where there was calm, there is (now) a storm-wind. The water, as it were, is ablaze. My wife has been raped by Master Dabba Mallaputta.”) The Buddha convenes a meeting of the Community, at which Ven. Dabba—who attained arahantship at the age of seven—states truthfully that, “Ever since I was born, I am not aware of having engaged in sexual intercourse even in a dream, much less when awake.” The Buddha then instructs the Community to overturn its bowl to Vaḍḍha, so that none of the bhikkhus are to have communion with him. (This, according to the Commentary, means that none of the bhikkhus are to accept offerings from his household.) Ven. Ānanda, on his alms round the following day, stops off at Vaḍḍha’s house to inform him that the Community has overturned its bowl to him. On hearing this news, Vaḍḍha collapses in a faint. When he recovers, he goes with his relatives to confess his wrong doing to the Buddha. The Buddha accepts his confession and tells the Community to turn its bowl upright for Vaḍḍha, so that the bhikkhus may associate with him as before.

The Community, if it wants to, may overturn its bowl to a lay person endowed with the following eight qualities: He/she

strives for the bhikkhus’ material loss,

strives for the bhikkhus’ detriment,

strives for the bhikkhus’ non-residence (i.e., so that they can’t live in a certain place),

insults and reviles bhikkhus,

causes bhikkhus to split from bhikkhus;

speaks in dispraise of the Buddha,

speaks in dispraise of the Dhamma,

speaks in dispraise of the Saṅgha.

The Commentary adds that a lay person who has done any one of these things qualifies to have the bowl overturned. There is no need for him/her to have done all eight.

Unlike other disciplinary transactions (and unlike most Community transactions in general), the object of the transaction does not need to be present in the meeting at which the transaction is performed. This is apparently what the Commentary means when it says that the transaction may be performed within or without the territory. In other words, the lay person does not need to be in the same territory where the meeting is held.

The procedure is this: The Community meets and agrees to the transaction statement, which—in a motion and proclamation—explains the lay person’s wrong doing and announces that the Community is overturning its bowl to him/her, that there is to be no communion between him/her and the Community. (The word for communion, here as elsewhere, is sambhoga, which literally means “consuming together” or “sharing wealth.” An interesting anthropological study could be written on the implications of this word’s being used to describe a bhikkhu’s accepting alms.) The Commentary adds that the Community should then inform other Communities that they, too, are not to accept alms or offerings from the household of the lay person in question. And, as the origin story shows, the lay person should be informed of the transaction.

If the lay person mends his/her ways—in other words, stops doing the action for which the bowl was overturned in the first place and does not start doing any of the other actions that are grounds for overturning the bowl—the Community may then turn its bowl upright. The procedure here is that the person in question dresses respectfully, goes to the Community, bows down, and with hands palm-to-palm over the heart makes a formal request to have the bowl turned upright. The Commentary adds that the person should state the request three times and then leave the hatthapāsa of the Community’s meeting while the transaction statement uprighting the bowl is recited, although there is nothing in the Canon to indicate that this last step is necessary. After the recitation, the bhikkhus may again accept offerings at the person’s house. None of the texts mention this point, but the Community would seem honor bound to notify any of the other Communities who were informed of the bowl’s original overturning that the bowl has now been set upright.

Other disciplinary measures

Cv.VII.3.2-3 tells the story of how the Buddha, after having rebuked Ven. Devadatta for asking to be placed in charge of the Community, had the Community authorize Ven. Sāriputta to inform the people of Rājagaha that Devadatta was now a changed man whose actions no longer reflected the will of the Community. Although the passage contains the transaction statement for the Community’s authorization—called an information-transaction (pakāsanīya-kamma)—it contains none of the other necessary explanations that would allow for the transaction to become a generalized pattern. In other words, there is no list of the qualities with which the object should be endowed, no description of how he should behave, and no allowance for revoking the transaction. Thus it seems to have been intended as a one-time event and cannot be included in a Community’s repertoire of disciplinary measures.

Similarly, DN 16 tells the story of how the Buddha, shortly before passing away, imposed a brahma-punishment (brahma-daṇḍa) on Ven. Channa, which he defined by saying, “Channa may say what he wants but he is not to be spoken to, instructed, or admonished by the bhikkhus.” This was in response to Ven. Channa’s prideful unwillingness to accept admonishment from anyone (see the origin stories to Sg 12 and Pc 12). The Canon contains two accounts of how this punishment led to Ven. Channa’s final Awakening. The version in Cv.XI.1.15 states that he fainted on hearing the news of the punishment. Going into seclusion, “heedful, ardent, and resolute, he in no long time reached and remained in the supreme goal of the holy life,” thus becoming an arahant. He then went to Ven. Ānanda to request that his brahma-punishment be revoked, but the latter informed him that the punishment had been automatically lifted at the moment of his attaining arahantship. The version in SN 22:90, however, tells of how Channa, after learning of his punishment, sought instruction from other bhikkhus and finally gained Awakening on hearing the Kaccānagotta Sutta (SN 12:15) from Ven. Ānanda. None of these passages, however, describe the brahma-punishment as a Community transaction. Like the information-transaction, it is thus part of the Buddha’s repertoire but not the Community’s.

Abuse of the system

The Canon reports two instances where Communities wrongly subject bhikkhus to disciplinary transactions. In the first instance (Mv.IX.1), Ven. Kassapagotta goes out of his way to look after the needs of a group of visiting bhikkhus. After they are well-settled, he reflects that they are now able to look after themselves and so discontinues the special services he was performing for them. They, displeased, accuse him of an offense in not keeping up his special services. He does not see that he has committed an offense, and so they suspend him for not seeing an offense.

In the second instance (Cv.XII.1.1-7), Ven. Yasa Kākaṇḍakaputta visits Vesālī, where he finds that the local Vajjiputta bhikkhus have arranged for the lay followers to place money in a bowl, which is then divided up among the members of the Community. Ven. Yasa tries to convince the lay followers that this is wrong, but they do not listen to him. After the money has been donated, the Vajjiputta bhikkhus offer Yasa a share. He refuses to accept it and so the Vajjiputta bhikkhus—accusing him of insulting and reviling the lay followers—impose a reconciliation transaction on him. When he goes to visit the lay followers, though, instead of asking their forgiveness he quotes passages from the suttas and Vinaya showing that the Buddha did not allow bhikkhus to accept money. This time the lay followers are convinced by his arguments and announce that of all the bhikkhus in Vesālī, he is the only true son of the Sakyan. The Vajjiputta bhikkhus are upset and accuse him of an offense in revealing the Vinaya to the lay followers without their permission. As a result, they make plans to suspend him, but he, it turns out, has a few psychic powers at his command and so he levitates out of the city in search of elder bhikkhus who will put a stop to what the Vajjiputta bhikkhus are doing.

In both instances, the bhikkhus wrongly subjected to disciplinary transactions have recourse to higher authorities. In the first instance, Ven. Kassapagotta goes to the Buddha himself, who confirms that he has done no wrong and is not truly suspended. The second instance is more relevant to our situation at present, for it took place after the Buddha’s parinibbāna and so Ven. Yasa had to round up a group of respected elders to settle the issue. The story, which is too long to reproduce here in full, is worth reading for its depiction of the difficulties involved in settling an issue of this sort, especially as the Vajjiputta bhikkhus do their best to fight the case. (Anyone who has had experience with shameless bhikkhus at present will recognize, in the Vajjiputta bhikkhus’ behavior, strategies that have not gone out of date.) In brief, however, the story gives some broad guidelines for a bhikkhu who feels that he has been unjustly subjected to a disciplinary transaction:

Search out senior bhikkhus whose opinion will be respected by both sides of the issue.

Search out enough bhikkhus on the side of the Dhamma to outnumber those opposed to the Dhamma.

Have them meet in the location where the original transaction was imposed.

If, at the meeting, the bhikkhus respected by both sides declare on the basis of the Dhamma that one was wrongly ostracized, that ends the matter, for a bhikkhu wrongly ostracized never counted as ostracized at all. If the adjudicating bhikkhus agree—again, on the basis of the Dhamma—that the original decision was correct, one should observe one’s proper duties so that the disciplinary transaction will be rescinded. If, however, the adjudicating bhikkhus are swayed by non-Dhamma considerations, one may look for still other respected bhikkhus to reconsider the case.

Rules

Mx.IX.7 lists bhikkhus who deserve specific disciplinary transactions:

He is a maker of strife, quarrels, disputes, dissension, issues in the Community: Censure.

He is inexperienced and incompetent, indiscriminately full of offenses (§); lives in the company of householders, in unbecoming association with householders: Demotion.

He is a corrupter of families, a man of depraved conduct: Banishment.

He insults and reviles householders: Reconciliation.

He has committed an offense but refuses to see it: Suspension.

He has committed an offense but refuses to make amends: Suspension.

He does not want to relinquish an evil view: Suspension.

Censure

Procedure—charged (§), made to remember, made to disclose an offense—and transaction statement for censure—Cv.I.1.4

Qualities of a censure transaction that is not-Dhamma, not-Vinaya, poorly settled (§) (lists of threes):

a) done not face-to-face, done without an interrogation, done without (the accused’s) acknowledgement;

b) done without there having been an offense, there having been an offense not entailing confession, when an offense (entailing confession) has been confessed;

c) without having charged, without having made to remember, without having gotten (the offender) to disclose the offense;

d) done not face-to-face, done not in accordance with the Dhamma, factional;

e) done without an interrogation, done not in accordance with the Dhamma, factional;

f) done without (the accused’s) acknowledgement, done not in accordance with the Dhamma, factional;

g) done without there having been an offense, done not in accordance with the Dhamma, factional;

h) done for an offense not entailing confession, done not in accordance with the Dhamma, factional;

i) done when an offense (entailing confession) has been confessed, done not in accordance with the Dhamma, factional;

j) without having charged, done not in accordance with the Dhamma, factional;

k) without having made to remember, done not in accordance with the Dhamma, factional;

l) without having gotten (the offender) to disclose the offense, done not in accordance with the Dhamma, factional.—Cv.I.2

Qualities of a censure transaction that is Dhamma, Vinaya, well settled (§) (lists of threes):

a) done face-to-face, done with an interrogation, done with (the accused’s) acknowledgement;

b) done with there having been an offense, there having been an offense entailing confession, when an offense (entailing confession) has not been confessed;

c) having charged, having made to remember, having gotten (the offender) to disclose the offense;

d) done face-to-face, done in accordance with the Dhamma, united;

e) done with an interrogation, done in accordance with the Dhamma, united;

f) done with (the accused’s) acknowledgement, done in accordance with the Dhamma, united;

g) done with there having been an offense, done in accordance with the Dhamma, united;

h) done for an offense entailing confession, done in accordance with the Dhamma, united;

i) done when an offense (entailing confession) has not been confessed, done in accordance with the Dhamma, united;

j) having charged, done in accordance with the Dhamma, united;

k) having made to remember, done in accordance with the Dhamma, united;

l) having gotten (the offender) to disclose the offense, done in accordance with the Dhamma, united.—Cv.I.3

If a Community so desires, it may carry out a censure transaction against a bhikkhu endowed with (any of) three qualities:

a) he is a maker of strife, quarrels, disputes, dissension, issues in the Community; he is inexperienced and incompetent, full of offenses, and has not undergone the penalty for them; he lives in the company of householders, in unbecoming association with householders;

b) he is one who, in light of heightened virtue, is defective in his virtue; one who, in light of heightened conduct, is defective in his conduct; one who, in light of higher view, is defective in his views;

c) he speaks in dispraise of the Buddha; speaks in dispraise of the Dhamma; speaks in dispraise of the Saṅgha.

If a Community so desires, it may carry out a censure transaction against (any of) three bhikkhus:

a) one who is a maker of strife, quarrels, disputes, dissension, issues in the Community; one who is inexperienced and incompetent, full of offenses, and has not undergone the penalty for them; one who lives in the company of householders, in unbecoming association with householders;

b) one who, in light of heightened virtue, is defective in his virtue; one who, in light of heightened conduct, is defective in his conduct; one who, in light of higher view, is defective in his views;

c) one who speaks in dispraise of the Buddha; one who speaks in dispraise of the Dhamma; one who speaks in dispraise of the Saṅgha.—Cv.I.4

How a bhikkhu should behave if a censure transaction has been done to him:

he should not give Acceptance;

he should not give dependence;

a novice should not be made to attend to him;

authorization to exhort bhikkhunīs should not be consented to;

even when authorized, he should not exhort bhikkhunīs;

whatever offense he was censured for, he should not commit that offense, or one of a similar sort, or one worse than that;

he should not criticize the (censure) transaction;

he should not criticize those who did the transaction;

he should not cancel a regular bhikkhu’s uposatha;

he should not cancel an invitation (§);

he should not engage in words (prior to setting up an accusation proceeding against another bhikkhu) (§);

he should not set up an accusation proceeding (§);

he should not get someone else give him leave;

he should not make a formal charge;

he should not make (another bhikkhu) remember (i.e., interrogate him about a formal charge);

he should not join bhikkhus in disputing with bhikkhus (§) (reading na bhikkhū bhikkhūhi sampayojetabbaṁ with the Thai edition).       —Cv.I.5

A censure transaction should not be rescinded if the bhikkhu:

a) gives Acceptance, gives dependence, has a novice attend to him, consents to an authorization to exhort bhikkhunīs, exhorts bhikkhunīs even when authorized to do so;

b) commits the offense he was censured for, a similar one, or one worse than that; criticizes the (censure) transaction; criticizes those who did the transaction;

c) cancels a regular bhikkhu’s uposatha; cancels his invitation; engages in words (prior to setting up an accusation proceeding against another bhikkhu) (§); sets up an accusation proceeding (§); gets someone else to give him leave, makes a formal charge, makes (another) remember; joins bhikkhus in disputing with bhikkhus (§—following the Thai reading, as above).—Cv.I.6

A censure transaction may be rescinded if the bhikkhu:

a) does not give Acceptance, does not give dependence, does not have a novice attend to him, does not consent to an authorization to exhort bhikkhunīs, does not exhort bhikkhunīs even when authorized to do so;

b) does not commit the offense he was censured for, a similar one, or one worse than that; does not criticize the (censure) transaction; does not criticize those who did the transaction;

c) does not cancel a regular bhikkhu’s uposatha; does not cancel an invitation; does not engage in words (prior to setting up an accusation proceeding against another bhikkhu) (§); does not set up an accusation proceeding (§); does not get someone else to give him leave, does not make a formal charge, does not make (another) remember; does not join bhikkhus in disputing with bhikkhus.—Cv.I.7

Request and transaction statement for revoking censure—Cv.I.8

Further Punishment

Procedure—charged (§), made to remember, made to disclose an offense—and transaction statement for a further-punishment transaction—Cv.IV.11.2

Five requirements for a further-punishment transaction :

1) He (the bhikkhu in question) is impure;

2) he is unconscientious;

3) he stands accused (sānuvāda) (§);

4-5) the Community grants him a further-punishment transaction

—in accordance with the Dhamma,

—in unity.   —Cv.IV.12.1

Qualities of a further-punishment transaction that is not-Dhamma, not-Vinaya, poorly settled (§) (lists of threes) [ = Cv.I.2-3]—Cv.IV.12.2

Qualities of a bhikkhu against whom a further-punishment transaction may be carried out [ = Cv.I.4] (§ —BD omits sets (b) and (c), together with the passages indicating that any one of these qualities is enough to qualify for the transaction.)—Cv.IV.12.3

Duties of a bhikkhu against whom a further-punishment transaction has been carried out [ = Cv.I.5]—Cv.IV.12.4

(For some reason, none of the texts give a transaction statement for revoking a further-punishment transaction. This is apparently an oversight.)

Demotion

Procedure (similar to that for censure, preceded with the comment, “You are to live in dependence”) and transaction statement (including the statement, “You are to live in dependence”) for a demotion transaction—Cv.I.9.2

Conditions for imposing demotion, proper behavior when demotion has been imposed, conditions for revoking demotion—all the same as for censure—Cv.I.10-11

Request and transaction statement for revoking demotion—Cv.I.12

Banishment

Procedure (same as for censure) and transaction statement for banishment (includes the statement that the banished bhikkhu should not remain in x place)—Cv.I.13.7

Poorly settled, well settled banishment transaction (the same as for censure). If it so desires, a Community may impose banishment on a bhikkhu who is… (identical with those meriting censure, plus)—

he is endowed with bodily frivolity, verbal frivolity, bodily and verbal frivolity;

he is endowed with bodily misbehavior, verbal misbehavior, bodily and verbal misbehavior;

he is endowed with bodily injuriousness, verbal injuriousness, bodily and verbal injuriousness;

he is endowed with bodily wrong livelihood, verbal wrong livelihood, bodily and verbal wrong livelihood—Cv.I.14.1

Any of three bhikkhus who may be banished: One who is… (the same as for censure, plus the above additions)—Cv.I.14.2

Proper behavior for a bhikkhu who has been banished (the same as for censure)—Cv.I.15 (Cv.I.16 adds that a bhikkhu who has been banished may not stay in the same place he was living before banishment.)

Conditions for revoking and not revoking banishment (the same as for censure)—Cv.I.16

Request and transaction statement for revoking banishment—Cv.I.17

“There are these two expulsions [C: this refers to banishment transactions]. There is the individual who has not been subjected to expulsion (has not been expelled) who, if the Community expels him, in some cases is wrongly expelled and in some cases rightly expelled. And which is the individual who has not been subjected to expulsion who, if the Community expels him, is wrongly expelled? There is the case where a bhikkhu is pure and without offense. If he is expelled by the Community, he is wrongly expelled… And which is the individual who has not been subjected to expulsion who, if the Community expels him, is rightly expelled? There is the case where a bhikkhu is inexperienced and incompetent, indiscriminately (§) full of offenses, living in the company of householders, in unbecoming association with householders. If he is expelled by the Community, he is rightly expelled.”—Mv.IX.4.9

Suspension

“A pure bhikkhu, without offense, is not to be suspended without grounds, without reason. Whoever should suspend him: an offense of wrong doing.”—Mv.IX.1.8

A bhikkhu with no offense to be seen, who sees no offense in himself: if suspended for not seeing an offense—a non-Dhamma transaction.

A bhikkhu with no offense for which he should make amends: if suspended for not making amends for an offense—a non-Dhamma transaction.

A bhikkhu with no evil view: if suspended for not relinquishing an evil view—a non-Dhamma transaction.—Mv.IX.5.1

Combinations of the above factors—Mv.IX.5.2-5

A bhikkhu with an offense to be seen; sees it as an offense: if suspended for not seeing an offense—a non-Dhamma transaction.

A bhikkhu with an offense for which he should make amends; promises to make amends: if suspended for not making amends for an offense—a non-Dhamma transaction.

A bhikkhu holding an evil view; promises to relinquish it: if suspended for not relinquishing an evil view—a non-Dhamma transaction.—Mv.IX.5.6

Combinations of the above factors—Mv.IX.5.7

A bhikkhu with an offense to be seen; refuses to see it as an offense: if suspended for not seeing an offense—a Dhamma transaction.

A bhikkhu with an offense for which he should make amends; refuses to make amends: if suspended for not making amends for an offense—a Dhamma transaction.

A bhikkhu holding an evil view; refuses to relinquish it: if suspended for not relinquishing an evil view—a Dhamma transaction.—Mv.IX.5.8

Combinations of the above factors—Mv.IX.5.9

Suspension for not Seeing an Offense

Procedure (the same as for censure) and transaction statement for suspension (includes the statement that the suspended bhikkhu should not share in the life of the Community)—Cv.I.25.2

Poorly settled, well settled suspension transaction (the same as for censure). If it so desires, a Community may impose suspension on a bhikkhu who is… (the same as those meriting censure).—Cv.I.26

Proper behavior for a bhikkhu who has been suspended—the same as for censure plus (inserted between “he should not criticize those who did the transaction” and “he should not cancel a regular bhikkhu’s uposatha”):

he should not consent to a regular bhikkhu’s bowing down to him, standing up to greet him, performing añjali, performing duties of respect, bringing his seat, bringing his bedding, water for foot(-washing), foot stand, foot wiper; receiving his bowl and robe, scrubbing his back while bathing;

he should not accuse a regular bhikkhu of a defect in virtue, conduct, views, or livelihood;

he should not cause bhikkhus to break with bhikkhus;

he should not wear the distinctive clothing (“emblem”) of a householder or of a member of another religion; he should not associate himself with members of other sects; he should associate himself with bhikkhus (i.e., identify himself as a bhikkhu); he should train in the training of the bhikkhus;

he should not stay in a residence under the same roof with a regular bhikkhu; he should not stay in a non-residence under the same roof with a regular bhikkhu; he should not stay in a residence or non-residence under the same roof with a regular bhikkhu;

on seeing a regular bhikkhu he should get up from his seat; he should not accost (§) a regular bhikkhu inside or out.—Cv.I.27

Conditions for revoking and not revoking suspension (the same as for censure plus the added conditions mentioned in Cv.I.27)—Cv.I.28-29

Request and transaction statement for revoking suspension—Cv.I.30

Suspension for not making amends for an offense (I.31) and for not relinquishing an evil view (I.32-35)

The same as suspension for not seeing an offense, with one added note: if a bhikkhu suspended for not relinquishing an evil view disrobes, the suspension transaction is to be rescinded.—Cv.I.34.1

“There are these two grounds for being of a separate affiliation: Oneself makes oneself of a separate affiliation or a united Community suspends one for not seeing (an offense), for not making amends (for an offense), or for not relinquishing (an evil view). These are the two grounds for being of a separate affiliation. There are these two grounds for being of common affiliation: Oneself makes oneself of a common affiliation or a united Community restores one who has been suspended for not seeing (an offense), for not making amends (for an offense), or for not relinquishing (an evil view). These are the two grounds for being of common affiliation.”—Mv.X.1.10

Reconciliation

Procedure (same as for censure) and transaction statement for reconciliation (includes the statement that the named householder should be asked to forgive the errant bhikkhu on whom the transaction is imposed)—Cv.I.18.6

Poorly settled, well settled reconciliation transaction (the same as for censure)—Cv.I.19

If a Community so desires, it may carry out a reconciliation transaction against a bhikkhu endowed with (any one of) five qualities:

a) he strives for the material loss of householders, for the detriment of householders, for the non-residence of householders, he insults and reviles householders, he gets householders to break with householders;

Or (any one of) five further qualities:

b) he speaks in dispraise of the Buddha to householders; speaks in dispraise of the Dhamma to householders; speaks in dispraise of the Saṅgha to householders; ridicules and scoffs at a householder about something low/vile; does not fulfill (lit., “make true”) a righteous promise made to householders.

If a Community so desires, it may carry out a reconciliation transaction against (any of) five bhikkhus:

a) one who tries for the material loss of householders, one who tries for the detriment of householders, one who tries for the non-residence of householders, one who insults and reviles householders, one who gets householders to break with householders;

Or (any of) five further bhikkhus:

b) one who speaks in dispraise of the Buddha to householders; one who speaks in dispraise of the Dhamma to householders; one who speaks in dispraise of the Saṅgha to householders; one who ridicules and scoffs at a householder about something low/vile; one who does not fulfill a righteous promise made to householders.—Cv.I.20

Proper behavior for a bhikkhu who has been placed under reconciliation (the same as for censure)—Cv.I.21

Procedure and transaction statement for authorizing a companion to go with the bhikkhu when asking for forgiveness (the bhikkhu to be authorized must be asked first)—Cv.I.22.2

Procedure for asking for forgiveness:

Bhikkhu 1 asks forgiveness: “Forgive me, householder. I am making peace with you.” If the householder forgives him, well and good.

If not, Bhikkhu 2 says: “Forgive this bhikkhu, householder. He is making peace with you.” If the householder forgives him, well and good.

If not, Bhikkhu 2 says: “Forgive this bhikkhu, householder. I am making peace with you.” If the householder forgives him, well and good.

If not, Bhikkhu 2 says: “Forgive this bhikkhu, householder, at the request of the Community.” If the householder forgives him, well and good.

If not, then without leaving the sight or hearing of the householder, Bhikkhu 1 should be made to arrange his upper robe over one shoulder, kneel down with hands in añjali, and confess his offense (to Bhikkhu 2).—Cv.I.22.3

Conditions for revoking and not revoking the reconciliation transaction (the same as for censure)—Cv.I.23.2

Request and transaction statement for revoking the reconciliation transaction—Cv.I.24

Overturning the Bowl

(BD misses the meaning of this section): “The bowl may be overturned for a lay follower endowed with (any of) eight qualities: He/she strives for the bhikkhus’ material loss, strives for the bhikkhus’ detriment, strives for the bhikkhus’ non-residence, insults and reviles bhikkhus, causes bhikkhus to split from bhikkhus, speaks in dispraise of the Buddha, speaks in dispraise of the Dhamma, speaks in dispraise of the Saṅgha. I allow that the bowl be overturned for a lay follower endowed with (any of) these eight qualities.”—Cv.V.20.3

Procedure and transaction statement. There is to be no associating with him/her by the Community.—Cv.V.20.4

“The bowl may be set upright for a lay follower endowed with eight qualities: He/she doesn’t strive for the bhikkhus’ material loss, doesn’t strive for the bhikkhus’ detriment, doesn’t strive for the bhikkhus’ non-residence, doesn’t insult or revile bhikkhus, doesn’t cause bhikkhus to split from bhikkhus, doesn’t speak in dispraise of the Buddha, doesn’t speak in dispraise of the Dhamma, doesn’t speak in dispraise of the Saṅgha. I allow that the bowl be set upright for a lay follower endowed with these eight qualities.”—Cv.V.20.6

Procedure (the lay follower goes to the Community and makes the request) and transaction statement—Cv.V.20.7

CHAPTER TWENTY-ONE

Schism

A schism (saṅgha-bheda, literally a split in the Saṅgha) is a division in the Community in which two groups of bhikkhus of common affiliation, with at least five in one group and four in the other, conduct Community business separately in the same territory. The discussion under Sg 10 analyzes how schism comes about. Here we will discuss how bhikkhus, bhikkhunīs, and lay supporters should behave once a schism has started and how to bring it to an end.

The Buddha condemned schism in strong terms, saying that a person who starts or joins a schism in a Community originally united around a correct understanding of Dhamma and Vinaya, knowing or suspecting that he is not on the side of the Dhamma and Vinaya, is destined to be boiled for an eon in hell (AN 5:129; Cv.VII.5.3-4). The Buddha also formulated two saṅghādisesa rules (Sg 10 & 11) to help intercept attempts at schism, and gave special allowances for bhikkhus to try to avoid, prevent, or end schisms, even if it means breaking their Rains-residence (see Chapter 11). Nevertheless, the Khandhakas do not depict the Buddha as discouraging people from taking sides in a schism. Instead, he instructs them to look into the matter and to side with the faction on the side of the Dhamma. He also does not encourage a too-hasty healing of the schism. If a split Community tries to patch up its differences without getting to the root of the matter, the transaction with which unification is announced is invalid and the matter must be opened up again. Thus the Buddha does not advocate superficial unity for its own sake at the expense of the Dhamma, but instead encourages that the Dhamma be clearly defended against non-Dhamma and that the distinction between the two be kept clear.

Behavior during a schism

When a bhikkhu has learned that a dispute has led to a schism and he wants to get involved, he is to side with whichever faction sides with the Dhamma. According to Mv.X.5.4, a speaker of non-Dhamma is to be recognized as such if he “explains not-Dhamma as ‘Dhamma’… Dhamma as ‘not-Dhamma’… not-Vinaya as ‘Vinaya’… Vinaya as ‘not-Vinaya’… what was not spoken, not mentioned by the Tathāgata as ‘spoken, mentioned by the Tathāgata’… what was spoken, mentioned by the Tathāgata as ‘not spoken, not mentioned by the Tathāgata’… what was not regularly practiced by the Tathāgata as ‘regularly practiced by the Tathāgata’… what was regularly practiced by the Tathāgata as ‘not regularly practiced by the Tathāgata’… what was not formulated by the Tathāgata as ‘formulated by the Tathāgata’… what was formulated by the Tathāgata as ‘not formulated by the Tathāgata’… a non-offense as ‘an offense’… an offense as ‘a non-offense’… a light offense as ‘a heavy offense’… a heavy offense as ‘a light offense’… an incurable offense as ‘a curable offense’… a curable offense as ‘an incurable offense’… a serious offense as ‘a not-serious offense’… a not-serious offense as ‘a serious offense.’” A speaker of Dhamma is to be recognized as such if he explains not-Dhamma as “not-Dhamma,” Dhamma as “Dhamma,” and so forth.

Thus the ability to take sides requires that one be well-informed about the Buddha’s teachings. If one cannot clearly judge which side is right (it might be that both sides are wrong, or that they have split over a gray area where the texts leave room for various interpretations), it is best not to get involved. Mv.III.11.5 gives permission for a bhikkhu to break his Rains-residence if bhikkhus in his Community are striving for a schism and he does not want to be present at the final break. Arguing from this allowance, it would make sense that if a bhikkhu arrives at a Community where the break has occurred and he does not want to get involved in it, he would do well to go elsewhere.

Bhikkhunīs connected to a Community that has split should listen to both sides of the split and then give preference to whichever faction sides with the Dhamma. They should look to the Dhamma-faction for whatever services they expect from the Bhikkhu Saṅgha, such as the exhortation and the scheduling of the uposatha day (see Chapter 23). As for the laity, the texts quote the Buddha as saying that they should give gifts to both factions and listen to their Dhamma. Then, on consideration, they should give their preference to the Dhamma-faction. Notice, however, that in advising the laity to give preference to one faction over another, the Buddha does not say that only one faction should receive alms. After all, the laity may be misinformed about the Dhamma and in a poor position to tell the right faction from the wrong. At the same time, the Buddha has never been recorded as declaring a living being as unworthy of gifts, for that would be tantamount to saying that the being was unworthy to live. Still, there is the instructive tale contained in Mv.X, telling of the schism at Kosambī. After both sides had resisted the Buddha’s efforts to settle their differences, he left Kosambī. The lay supporters then forced a settlement by refusing to give alms to either side.

Practicalities

Although the two sides of a schism may be performing separate recitations of the Pāṭimokkha and other Community transactions within the same territory, the transactions of both sides are considered valid as long as they follow the correct motions and announcements appropriate for those acts. Neither side can invalidate or successfully protest the transactions of the other side, for they count as separate affiliations (see Mv.X.1.9-10; Mv.IX.4.7). However—although none of the texts discuss the connection between Mv.X.1.9-10 and Mv.IX.4.2, which deals with valid and invalid quorums—it would seem that if the quorums of one side have to be filled by including bhikkhus who joined their faction out of corrupt motives, knowing or suspecting that what they were doing was not on the side of the Dhamma, their transactions would be automatically invalid.

If the two sides of the schism are on bad terms, the bhikkhus of each side, whenever sitting down, should sit far enough apart from the members of the opposite side so that they will not act inappropriately toward one another (§). If the two sides are on courteous terms, though, a bhikkhu on one side may sit down near a bhikkhu on the other side, leaving the interval of one seat in between (§).

When a schismatic faction arrives at a monastery, the members should be given any lodgings that are vacant (§). If none are vacant, some are to be made vacant, although this should be arranged so that senior bhikkhus are not preempted from lodgings to make way for junior bhikkhus. The advantage of this arrangement is that the resident bhikkhus will not be implicated in the schism and will at the same time be provided some respite from the schismatics’ arguments. If two schismatic factions arrive at the same time, it would be wise—keeping the above injunction on sitting places in mind—to give them lodgings separate from each other.

Offerings given to the Community should be shared between both factions. This principle holds regardless of whether the offerings were given before or after the split. Offerings given to a particular faction after the split are for that faction only.

Ending schism

The Canon contains two patterns for resolving a schism, based on the different ways the two schisms during the Buddha’s lifetime were resolved. Generalizing from the two patterns, we can make the following observations:

A schism can be rightfully ended only if both sides are able to investigate the grounds (i.e., the point of dispute around which the schism crystallized), get to the root (the mind-states motivating the schism—see Cv.IV.14.3-4), and then resolve which side was right, based on the Dhamma and Vinaya. (See the instructions for settling a dispute in BMC1, Chapter 11.) After the issue has been resolved, all members of both factions are to meet: No one may send his consent, and even those who are ill must come to the meeting. One of the bhikkhus recites the transaction statement announcing the unification of the Community, and a unity-uposatha is then held (see Chapter 15). That ends the schism.

This method works only in cases where both factions were acting in good faith, each believing that it interpreted the Dhamma-Vinaya properly. In such cases, differences can be settled by appealing to bhikkhus whose knowledge of the Dhamma-Vinaya is authoritative. There are, however, cases where bhikkhus have started or joined a schism rooted in corrupted intent, knowing or suspecting that their views and actions deviate from the Dhamma-Vinaya. In these cases, full unification is impossible. Those who acted out of corrupt intent are to be expelled from the Saṅgha (Mv.I.67). Those who joined the schismatic faction through ignorance should be won over to the Dhamma side by explaining the true Dhamma-Vinaya to them. If they leave the faction and return to the Community, they are to confess a thullaccaya offense, and they are regular members of the Community as before.

Rules

Roots of Schism

Roots of disputes: three unskillful & three skillful

[A list is inserted giving six unskillful traits:] A bhikkhu who is:

1) easily angered & bears a grudge;

2) mean & spiteful;

3) jealous & possessive;

4) scheming & deceitful;

5) has evil desires & wrong views;

6) is attached to his own views, obstinate, unable to let them go.

Such a bhikkhu lives without deference or respect for the Buddha, the Dhamma, the Saṅgha; does not complete the training. When he causes a dispute in the Community, it comes to be for the harm, the unhappiness, the detriment of many people, for the harm and pain of human and divine beings.—Cv.IV.14.3

Three unskillful roots: states of mind that are covetous, corrupt, or confused. Three skillful roots: states of mind that are not covetous, corrupt, or confused.—Cv.IV.14.4

A Crack in the Community, a Split in the Community

Ven. Upāli: “‘A crack in the Community, a crack in the Community (saṅgha-rāji)’ it is said. To what extent is there a crack in the Community but not a split in the Community? To what extent is there a crack in the Community and a split in the Community?

The Buddha: “When there is one on one side and two on the other side, and a fourth makes a proclamation and makes them take a voting ticket: ‘This is the Dhamma. This is the Vinaya. This is the Teacher’s instruction. Take this. Approve of this.’ This is a crack in the Community but not a split in the Community. When there are two on one side and two on the other and a fifth makes a proclamation… When there are two on one side and three on the other and a sixth makes a proclamation… When there are three on one side and three on the other and a seventh makes a proclamation… When there are three on one side and four on the other and an eighth makes a proclamation… This is a crack in the Community but not a split in the Community. When there are four on one side and four on the other side, and a ninth makes a proclamation and makes them take a voting ticket: ‘This is the Dhamma. This is the Vinaya. This is the Teacher’s instruction. Take this. Approve of this.’ This is a crack in the Community and a split in the Community. With nine or more than nine there is a crack in the Community and a split in the Community.

“A bhikkhunī does not split a Community even if she strives for a split. A female trainee does not split a Community. A novice… A female novice… A male lay follower… A female lay follower does not split a Community even if she strives for a split. A regular bhikkhu, of common affiliation, standing in the same territory splits the Community.”—Cv.VII.5.1

Ven. Upāli: “‘A split in the Community, a split in the Community (saṅgha-bheda)’ it is said. To what extent is the Community split?”

The Buddha: “There is the case where they explain not-Dhamma as ‘Dhamma’… Dhamma as ‘not-Dhamma’… not-Vinaya as ‘Vinaya’… Vinaya as ‘not-Vinaya’… what was not spoken, not mentioned by the Tathāgata as ‘spoken, mentioned by the Tathāgata’… what was spoken, mentioned by the Tathāgata as ‘not spoken, not mentioned by the Tathāgata’… what was not regularly practiced by the Tathāgata as ‘regularly practiced by the Tathāgata’… what was regularly practiced by the Tathāgata as ‘not regularly practiced by the Tathāgata’… what was not formulated by the Tathāgata as ‘formulated by the Tathāgata’… what was formulated by the Tathāgata as ‘not formulated by the Tathāgata’… a non-offense as ‘an offense’… an offense as ‘a non-offense’… a light offense as ‘a heavy offense’… a heavy offense as ‘a light offense’… an offense leaving a remainder as ‘an offense leaving no remainder’… an offense leaving no remainder as ‘an offense leaving a remainder’… a serious offense as ‘a not-serious offense’… a not-serious offense as ‘a serious offense.’ On the basis of these eighteen grounds they pull away, pull apart, they perform a separate uposatha, perform a separate Invitation, perform a separate Community transaction. To this extent the Community is split.”—Cv.VII.5.2

Ven. Upāli: “‘Community-unity, Community-unity,’ it is said. To what extent is there Community-unity?”

The Buddha: “There is the case where they explain not-Dhamma as ‘not-Dhamma’… Dhamma as ‘Dhamma’… a serious offense as ‘a serious offense’… a not-serious offense as ‘a not-serious offense.’ On the basis of these eighteen grounds they do not pull away, they do not pull apart, they do not perform a separate uposatha, a separate Invitation, or a separate Community transaction. To this extent is there Community-unity.”—Cv.VII.5.3

Ven. Upāli: “Having split a Community that was united, what does one beget?”

The Buddha: “Having split a Community that was united, one begets an iniquity that lasts for an eon and is boiled in hell for an eon.…”

Ven. Upāli: “Having united a Community that was split, what does one beget?”

The Buddha: “Having united a Community that was split, one begets brahma-merit (reading brahma-puññaṁ with the Thai edition) that lasts for an eon and rejoices in heaven for an eon.…”—Cv.VII.5.4

Ven. Upāli: “Which schismatic is destined to deprivation, destined to hell, doomed for an eon, incurable?”

The Buddha: “There is the case where a bhikkhu explains not-Dhamma as Dhamma. Viewing that (explanation) as not-Dhamma, viewing a split as not-Dhamma, misrepresenting his view, misrepresenting his preference, misrepresenting his approval, misrepresenting his state (of mind), he makes an announcement, has (the bhikkhus) take voting tickets (saying), ‘This is the Dhamma, this is the Vinaya, this is the Teacher’s instruction. Take this. Approve of this.’ This is a schismatic destined to deprivation, destined to hell, doomed for an eon, incurable.

“Then again, a bhikkhu explains not-Dhamma as Dhamma. Viewing that (explanation) as not-Dhamma, viewing a split as Dhamma… viewing that (explanation) as not-Dhamma, doubtful about a split… viewing that (explanation) as Dhamma, viewing a split as not-Dhamma… viewing that (explanation) as Dhamma, doubtful about a split… doubtful about that (explanation), viewing a split as not-Dhamma… doubtful about that (explanation, doubtful about a split, misrepresenting his view, misrepresenting his preference, misrepresenting his approval, misrepresenting his state (of mind), he makes an announcement, has (the bhikkhus) take voting tickets (saying), ‘This is the Dhamma, this is the Vinaya, this is the Teacher’s instruction. Take this. Approve of this.’ This is a schismatic destined to deprivation, destined to hell, doomed for an eon, incurable. (Similarly for each of the remaining seventeen grounds for a schism.)”

Ven. Upāli: “And which schismatic is not destined to deprivation, not destined to hell, not doomed for an eon, not incurable?”

The Buddha: “There is the case where a bhikkhu explains not-Dhamma as Dhamma. Viewing that (explanation) as Dhamma, viewing a split as Dhamma, not misrepresenting his view, not misrepresenting his preference, not misrepresenting his approval, not misrepresenting his state (of mind), he makes an announcement, has (the bhikkhus) take voting tickets (saying), ‘This is the Dhamma, this is the Vinaya, this is the Teacher’s instruction. Take this. Approve of this.’ This is a schismatic not destined to deprivation, not destined to hell, not doomed for an eon, not incurable. (Similarly for each of the remaining seventeen grounds for a schism.)”—Cv.VII.5.5-6

During Schism

“When the Community is split and getting along in an uncourteous way, not in accordance with the Dhamma, then one should sit down in a seat (far enough apart from a member of the opposite faction) to the extent that (§), “We won’t exhibit any improper bodily action or verbal action to one another, we won’t seize (§) one another with the hands.’ When the Community is split and getting along in a courteous way in accordance with the Dhamma, one may sit down leaving the interval of a seat (§) (from a member of the opposite faction).”—Mv.X.2.1

Ven. Sāriputta: “How am I to behave with regard to these (schismatic) bhikkhus?”

The Buddha: “In that case, Sāriputta, take your stance in line with the Dhamma.”

Ven. Sāriputta: “And how should I know what is Dhamma and what is not-Dhamma?”—Mv.X.5.3

The Buddha: “There are these eighteen grounds by which a speaker of not-Dhamma is to be known. He explains not-Dhamma as ‘Dhamma’… Dhamma as ‘not-Dhamma’… not-Vinaya as ‘Vinaya’… Vinaya as ‘not-Vinaya’… what was not spoken, not mentioned by the Tathāgata as ‘spoken, mentioned by the Tathāgata’… what was spoken, mentioned by the Tathāgata as ‘not spoken, not mentioned by the Tathāgata’… what was not regularly practiced by the Tathāgata as ‘regularly practiced by the Tathāgata’… what was regularly practiced by the Tathāgata as ‘not regularly practiced by the Tathāgata’… what was not formulated by the Tathāgata as ‘formulated by the Tathāgata’… what was formulated by the Tathāgata as ‘not formulated by the Tathāgata’… a non-offense as ‘an offense’… an offense as ‘a non-offense’… a light offense as ‘a heavy offense’… a heavy offense as ‘a light offense’… an offense leaving a remainder as ‘an offense leaving no remainder’… an offense leaving no remainder as ‘an offense leaving a remainder’… a serious offense as ‘a not-serious offense’… a not-serious offense as ‘a serious offense.’ These are the eighteen grounds by which a speaker of not-Dhamma is to be known.—Mv.X.5.4

“There are these eighteen grounds by which a speaker of Dhamma is to be known. He explains not-Dhamma as ‘not-Dhamma’… Dhamma as ‘Dhamma’… not-Vinaya as ‘not-Vinaya’… Vinaya as ‘Vinaya’… what was not spoken, not mentioned by the Tathāgata as ‘not spoken, not mentioned by the Tathāgata’… what was spoken, mentioned by the Tathāgata as ‘spoken, mentioned by the Tathāgata’… what was not regularly practiced by the Tathāgata as ‘not regularly practiced by the Tathāgata’… what was regularly practiced by the Tathāgata as ‘regularly practiced by the Tathāgata’… what was not formulated by the Tathāgata as ‘not formulated by the Tathāgata’… what was formulated by the Tathāgata as ‘formulated by the Tathāgata’… a non-offense as ‘a non-offense’… an offense as ‘an offense’… a light offense as ‘a light offense’… a heavy offense as ‘a heavy offense’… an offense leaving a remainder as ‘an offense leaving a remainder’… an offense leaving no remainder as ‘an offense leaving no remainder’… a serious offense as ‘a serious offense’… a not-serious offense as ‘a not-serious offense.’ These are the eighteen grounds by which a speaker of Dhamma is to be known.”—Mv.X.5.5

Mahāpajāpatī Gotamī: “How am I to behave with regard to these (schismatic) bhikkhus?”

The Buddha: “In that case, Gotamī, listen to the Dhamma from both sides. Having listened to the Dhamma from both sides, give preference to the view, approval, preference, and belief of the side of those who speak Dhamma. And whatever the Community of bhikkhunīs expects from the Community of bhikkhus should all be expected from the side of those who speak Dhamma.”—Mv.X.5.7

Anāthapiṇḍika (and Visākhā): “How am I to behave with regard to these (schismatic) bhikkhus?”

The Buddha: “In that case, householder, give gifts to both sides. Having given gifts to both sides, listen to the Dhamma from both sides. Having listened to the Dhamma from both sides, give preference to the view, approval, preference, and belief of the side of those who speak Dhamma.”—Mv.X.5.8 (9)

Ven. Sāriputta: “How am I to act with regard to their lodgings?”

The Buddha: “In that case, Sāriputta, vacant (§) lodgings are to be given to them.”

Ven. Sāriputta: “And if there are no vacant lodgings, what should I do?”

The Buddha: “They are to be given after having made them vacant. But in no way do I say that a senior bhikkhu’s lodging should be preempted. Whoever should preempt it: an offense of wrong doing.”

Ven. Sāriputta: “And how am I to act with regard to material gifts?”

The Buddha: “Material gifts are to be divided equally among all.”—Mv.X.5.10

“There is the case where bhikkhus have spent the Rains and the Community splits before robe-cloth arises. People give water to one faction and robe-cloth to the other faction, saying, ‘We are giving to the Community.’ That is for the (entire) Community… People give water to one faction and robe-cloth to the same faction, saying, ‘We are giving to the Community.’ That is for the (entire) Community. People give water to one faction and robe-cloth to the other faction, saying, ‘We are giving to the faction.’ That is just for the faction. People give water to one faction and robe-cloth to the same faction, saying, ‘We are giving to the faction.’ That is just for the faction.”—Mv.VIII.30.4-5

“There is the case where bhikkhus have spent the Rains and, when robe-cloth has arisen but before it is divided up, the Community splits. That is to be divided equally among all.”—Mv.VIII.30.6

Ending Schism

Ven. Sāriputta (after retrieving, together with Ven. Moggallana, the newly-ordained bhikkhus who had ignorantly followed Devadatta in a schism): “Venerable sir, it would be good if the followers of the schismatic were to be re-accepted (reordained).”

The Buddha: “Enough, Sāriputta, of your preference for the re-acceptance of the followers of the schismatic. In that case, you should have the followers of the schismatic confess a grave offense.”—Cv.VII.4.4

Procedure for achieving unity in the Community: “One and all should gather together, the ill and the not-ill. Consent is not to be conveyed for anyone.” Transaction statement. “Immediately the uposatha is to be done, the Pāṭimokkha is to be recited.”—Mv.X.5.14

“When the Community, without having adjudicated the matter, without having gotten to the roots for a dispute in the Community… a schism in the Community, a split in the Community, a falling apart in the Community, a separation in the Community—performs a Community-unification, that is a non-Dhamma Community-unification.

“When the Community, having adjudicated the matter, having gotten to the roots for a dispute in the Community… a schism in the Community, a split in the Community, a falling apart in the Community, a separation in the Community—performs a Community-unification, that is a Dhamma Community-unification.”—Mv.X.6.1

CHAPTER TWENTY-TWO

Inheritance

Belongings

The Canon states that when a bhikkhu passes away, his belongings all go to the Community of bhikkhus. The Commentary adds that this principle holds regardless of where the bhikkhu dies. If he happens to die while visiting a nunnery, his belongings still go to the Community of bhikkhus. Similarly, if a bhikkhunī dies while visiting a monastery, her belongings go to the Community of bhikkhunīs. Furthermore, according to the Canon, the belongings of a dead male novice all go to the Community of bhikkhus; the belongings of a dead female trainee or female novice, to the Community of bhikkhunīs.

The Commentary to Cv.X.11 adds that even if the dying bhikkhu or novice says, “After my death, may my belongings go to so-and-so,” the request is invalid. Thus, from the point of view of the Vinaya, a bhikkhu’s last will and testament would have no force. The civil law in Buddhist countries recognizes the Community’s claim on a dead bhikkhu’s property, but this claim has yet to be adequately tested in courts of law in non-Buddhist countries. (If the highest court in the land were to rule against the Community’s claim here, this would be an appropriate area to apply the principle of “complying with kings,” stated in Mv.III.4.2, and not to further contest the issue.)

The Vinaya-mukha discusses a tradition, based on a loophole included in the Commentary to Mv.VIII.26, designed to get around the Commentary’s own ruling against last wills and testaments: A bhikkhu, on his death-bed, may say, “I give my belongings to so-and-so.” As long as he does not add the condition, “after my death,” the gift is valid. If he happens to recover from his illness after giving the gift, the recipient is free to return the items or not, as he sees fit. If the ill bhikkhu dies, the belongings go to the recipient and not to the Community. If, however, the bhikkhu adds the condition “after my death” to his statement, his belongings after his death go to the Community, and the intended recipient has no rights over them.

When the Community receives a dead bhikkhu’s belongings, it may bestow his bowl and three robes on those who cared for him, in honor of their service not only to him but also to the Community in fulfilling the bhikkhus’ obligation to care for one another (see Chapter 5). The procedure is as follows: One of the bhikkhus who acted as the dying bhikkhu’s nurses approaches the Community, carrying the dead bhikkhu’s robes and bowl. After he informs them of the death, he presents the robes and bowl to them. One of the members of the Community recites the transaction statement, consisting of a motion and proclamation, bestowing the robes and bowl on those who cared for the bhikkhu when he was sick. This statement is given in Appendix I.

The Commentary here discusses the question of who has a right to a share in the robes and bowl. If the whole Community had set up a roster for nurses, it says, there are differing opinions as to who counts as caring for the sick. Some teachers say that everyone in the Community deserves a share, even those who were not put on the roster. Others (and this makes more sense) say that shares should go only to those put on the roster who actually observed their duties. All sides agree that whoever helps—whether bhikkhu, novice, or lay person—should get a share. (The Canon states that each novice involved has a right to a share equal to that of a bhikkhu.) If one person took on a special burden in looking after the sick bhikkhu, he/she should get a special share. Bhikkhus who simply sent medicine don’t count as “caring for the sick.” Those who helped the nurses in washing robes, boiling medicine, etc., do.

As for the dead bhikkhu’s remaining belongings, the Canon says that all his light/inexpensive articles (lahubhaṇḍa) and light requisites should be divided among the Community that is present. His heavy/expensive articles (garubhaṇḍa)—this would include any buildings belonging to him—belong to the Saṅgha of all four directions, both those who have come and those who haven’t, so they are not to be divided up or distributed.

Here the Commentary adds that if the dead bhikkhu’s bowl and robes are of low value and the remaining goods of high value, the Community should take funds from the remaining goods to provide a decent bowl and set of robes to the nurse-bhikkhu. Belongings left by a dead bhikkhu in another monastery belong to the Community in that monastery. If he held ownership of items in common with someone else, those items go to the other owner, not to the Community.

The same principles hold true for the belongings of a dead novice.

One exemption to this arrangement is that if a bhikkhu has sent an item through a second bhikkhu to a third bhikkhu, saying, “Give this to so-and-so,” and then dies before the item reaches the hand of the third bhikkhu, the second bhikkhu may take the item as an inheritance from the first. Similarly, if the first bhikkhu sends the item saying, “I give this to so-and-so,” and the third bhikkhu dies before the second bhikkhu can get the item to him, the second bhikkhu can take the item as an inheritance from the third. For further details on this arrangement, see Pr 2.

Funerals

Unlike some of the other early Vinayas, the Pali Vinaya contains no rules on how to conduct the funeral of a dead bhikkhu or novice. Writers have speculated as to why this is so, but the speculation tends to say more about the writers than about the Vinaya. The practical upshot is that the Community (or the bhikkhu’s friends, relatives, etc.) may dispose of his body as they see fit in line with local custom and law. DN 16 states that an arahant, after death, deserves to have a stūpa built over his/her remains, but the Vinaya contains no rule to enforce this.

One issue that arises at present is the custom of willing one’s body to medical science. Because there is no rule that the bhikkhu’s body (as opposed to his belongings) belongs to the Community, if he has willed his body in this way his wishes may be honored.

Another issue arising at present is the cost of a funeral. In the Buddha’s time, funerals could cost nothing. The body would either be cremated, in which case wood was easy to find in the ubiquitous forest, or the body would be exposed in a charnel ground, which involved little effort and no expense. At present, with the high cost of funerals, the tradition in Thailand is a useful adaptation of the Vinaya’s rules. There, if no one else volunteers to sponsor a dead bhikkhu’s funeral, the Community itself is the sponsor, and the funds for the funeral come first from his belongings. Only if any of his light articles and requisites remain after the funeral are they divided among the Community’s members.

Rules

“The Community is the owner of the robes and bowl of a bhikkhu who has passed away. But those who tend to the sick are of great service. I allow that the Community give the three robes and the bowl to those who tend to the sick.” Transaction statement—Mv.VIII.27.2

“The Community is the owner of the robe and bowl of a novice who has passed away. But those who tend to the sick are of great service. I allow that the Community give the robe and bowl to those who tend to the sick.” Transaction statement—Mv.VIII.27.3

“I allow that a novice who tends to the sick be given an equal share.”—Mv.VIII.27.4

“I allow that the Community give the three robes and the bowl to those who tend to the sick. Whatever light goods and light requisites (§) are there may be divided among the Community that is present.

“Whatever heavy goods and heavy requisites are there are for the Community of the four directions, both those who have come and those who haven’t. They should not be transferred, they should not be divided up.”—Mv.VIII.27.5

“If a bhikkhunī, as she is dying, should say, ‘After I am gone, may my requisites belong to the Community,’ the Community of bhikkhus is not the owner there. They belong to the Community of bhikkhunīs. If a female trainee…. If a female novice, as she is dying, should say, ‘After I am gone, may my requisites belong to the Community,’ the Community of bhikkhus is not the owner there. They belong to the Community of bhikkhunīs.

“If a bhikkhu, as he is dying, should say, ‘After I am gone, may my requisites belong to the Community,’ the Community of bhikkhunīs is not the owner there. They belong to the Community of bhikkhus. If a male novice…. If a male lay follower…. If a female lay follower…. If anyone else, as he is dying, should say, ‘After I am gone, may my requisites belong to the Community,’ the Community of bhikkhunīs is not the owner there. They belong to the Community of bhikkhus.”—Cv.X.11

“There is the case where a bhikkhu sends robe-cloth in the hand of (another) bhikkhu, (saying,) ‘Give this robe-cloth to so-and-so.’ Along the way, he (the second bhikkhu) hears that he who sent it has died. If he determines it as inherited robe-cloth (§) from the one who sent it, it is rightly determined. If he takes it on trust (§) in the one for whom it was sent, it is wrongly taken.

“There is the case where a bhikkhu sends robe-cloth in the hand of a bhikkhu, (saying,) ‘Give this robe-cloth to so-and-so.’ Along the way, he (the second bhikkhu) hears that the one for whom it was sent has died. If he determines it as inherited robe-cloth from the one for whom it was sent, it is wrongly determined. If he takes it on trust in the one who sent it, it is rightly taken.

“There is the case where a bhikkhu sends robe-cloth in the hand of a bhikkhu, (saying,) ‘Give this robe-cloth to so-and-so.’ Along the way, he (the second bhikkhu) hears that both have died. If he determines it as inherited robe-cloth from the one who sent it, it is rightly determined. If he determines it as inherited robe-cloth from the one for whom it was sent, it is wrongly determined…

“There is the case where a bhikkhu sends robe-cloth in the hand of a bhikkhu, (saying,) ‘I give this robe-cloth to so-and-so.’ Along the way, he (the second bhikkhu) hears that he who sent it has died. If he determines it as inherited robe-cloth from the one who sent it, it is wrongly determined. If he takes it on trust in the one for whom it was sent, it is rightly taken.

“There is the case where a bhikkhu sends robe-cloth in the hand of a bhikkhu, (saying,) ‘I give this robe-cloth to so-and-so.’ Along the way, he (the second bhikkhu) hears that the one for whom it was sent has died. If he determines it as inherited robe-cloth from the one for whom it was sent, it is rightly determined. If he takes it on trust in the one who sent it, it is wrongly taken.

“There is the case where a bhikkhu sends robe-cloth in the hand of a bhikkhu, (saying,) ‘I give this robe-cloth to so-and-so.’ Along the way, he (the second bhikkhu) hears that both have died. If he determines it as inherited robe-cloth from the one who sent it, it is wrongly determined. If he determines it as inherited robe-cloth from the one for whom it was sent, it is rightly determined.”—Mv.VIII.31.2-3

part three

Co-religionists

CHAPTER TWENTY-THREE

Bhikkhunīs

Rules governing the life of the bhikkhunīs are scattered throughout the Vinaya. Here we will focus on the rules in Cv.X that govern the interaction of the bhikkhus with the bhikkhunīs. The rules in this Khandhaka that affect only the bhikkhunīs and not the bhikkhus are best understood in the context of the training rules in the Bhikkhunī Pāṭimokkha and so are not discussed here.

The rules governing relations between bhikkhus and bhikkhunīs fall into two categories: those governing formal relations between the two Communities, and those governing relations between individual bhikkhus and bhikkhunīs. Although some of these relations—those dealing with the sharing of material gains—are reciprocal, most of them favor the bhikkhus. To understand why, we should first consider the origin story of the founding of the Bhikkhunī Saṅgha.

According to the Commentary, the events in this story took place soon after the Buddha’s first return to Kapilavatthu shortly after his Awakening. The Commentary elsewhere states that Ven. Ānanda did not become the Buddha’s permanent attendant until twenty years after the Buddha’s Awakening. The Canon is silent on these points, but if the Commentary’s claims are true, then these events would have occurred when Ānanda was serving as a temporary attendant prior to his later permanent appointment to the post. However, given the Buddha’s references to Rains-residence, uposatha, and Invitation in this account, it is more likely that these events took place later in his career, after a fair number of rules and procedures for the bhikkhus had already been established.

Now at that time, the Awakened One, the Blessed One, was staying near Kapilavatthu in the Banyan Grove. Then Mahāpajāpatī Gotamī went to the Blessed One and, on arrival, having bowed to him, stood to one side. As she was standing there, she said to him: “It would be good, venerable sir, if women might obtain the Going-forth from the home life into homelessness in the Dhamma and discipline made known by the Tathāgata.”

“Enough, Gotamī. Don’t advocate women’s Going-forth from the home life into homelessness in the Dhamma and discipline made known by the Tathāgata (§).”

A second time…. A third time she said to him: “It would be good, venerable sir, if women might obtain the Going-forth from the home life into homelessness in the Dhamma and discipline made known by the Tathāgata.”

“Enough, Gotamī. Don’t advocate women’s Going-forth from the home life into homelessness in the Dhamma and discipline made known by the Tathāgata.”

So Mahāpajāpatī Gotamī, (thinking,) “The Blessed One does not allow women’s Going-forth from the home life into homelessness in the Dhamma and discipline made known by the Tathāgata”—sad and unhappy, crying, her face in tears—bowed to the Blessed One, circumambulated him, keeping him to her right, and then went away.

The Blessed One, having stayed as long as he liked in Kapilavatthu, set out for Vesālī. After wandering in stages, he arrived at Vesālī. There he stayed near Vesālī at the Gabled Hall in the Great Wood.

Then Mahāpajāpatī Gotamī, having had her hair cut off, having donned ochre robes, set out for Vesālī together with a large number of Sakyan women. After wandering in stages, she arrived at Vesālī and went to the Gabled Hall in the Great Wood. Then she stood there outside the porch, her feet swollen, her limbs covered with dust, sad and unhappy, crying, her face in tears. Ven. Ānanda saw her standing there… and so asked her, “Why, Gotamī, why are you standing here… your face in tears?”

“Because, venerable sir, the Blessed One does not allow women’s Going-forth from the home life into homelessness in the Dhamma and discipline made known by the Tathāgata.”

“In that case, Gotamī, stay right here for a moment (§) while I ask the Blessed One to allow women’s Going-forth from the home life into homelessness in the Dhamma and discipline made known by the Tathāgata.”

Then Ven. Ānanda went to the Blessed One and, on arrival, having bowed down to him, sat to one side. As he was sitting there he said to the Blessed One: “Venerable sir, Mahāpajāpatī Gotamī is standing outside the porch… her face in tears, because the Blessed One does not allow women’s Going-forth from the home life into homelessness in the Dhamma and discipline made known by the Tathāgata. It would be good if women might obtain the Going-forth from the home life into homelessness in the Dhamma and discipline made known by the Tathāgata.”

“Enough, Ānanda. Don’t advocate women’s Going-forth from the home life into homelessness in the Dhamma and discipline made known by the Tathāgata.”

A second time… A third time, Ven. Ānanda said, “… It would be good, venerable sir, if women might obtain the Going-forth from the home life into homelessness in the Dhamma and discipline made known by the Tathāgata.”

“Enough, Ānanda. Don’t advocate women’s Going-forth from the home life into homelessness in the Dhamma and discipline made known by the Tathāgata.”

Then the thought occurred to Ven. Ānanda, “The Blessed One does not allow women’s Going-forth from the home life into homelessness in the Dhamma and discipline made known by the Tathāgata. What if I were to find some other way to ask the Blessed One to allow women’s Going-forth…” So he said to the Blessed One, “Venerable sir, if a woman were to go forth from the home life into homelessness in the Dhamma and discipline made known by the Tathāgata, would she be able to realize the fruit of stream-entry, once-returning, non-returning, or arahantship?”

“Yes, Ānanda, she would.…”

“In that case, venerable sir, Mahāpajāpatī Gotamī has been of great service to the Blessed One. She was the Blessed One’s aunt, foster mother, nurse, giver of milk. When the Blessed One’s mother passed away, she gave him milk. It would be good if women might obtain the Going-forth from the home life into homelessness in the Dhamma and discipline made known by the Tathāgata.”

“Ānanda, if Mahāpajāpatī Gotamī accepts eight rules of respect (garu-dhamma), that will be her full Acceptance.

1) “A bhikkhunī who has been fully accepted even for more than a century must bow down, rise up from her seat, salute with hands palm-to-palm over her heart, and perform forms of respect due to superiors to a bhikkhu even if he has been fully accepted on that very day. This rule is to be honored, respected, revered, venerated, never to be transgressed as long as she lives.

2) “A bhikkhunī must not spend the Rains in a residence where there is no bhikkhu (nearby).…

3) “Every half-month a bhikkhunī should expect two things from the Bhikkhu Saṅgha: (permission to) ask for the date of the uposatha and (permission to) approach for an exhortation.…

4) “At the end of the Rains-residence, a bhikkhunī should invite (accusations from) both Saṅghas (the Bhikkhu and Bhikkhunī Saṅghas) on any of three grounds: what they have seen, what they have heard, what they have suspected.…

5) “A bhikkhunī who has broken any of the rules of respect must undergo penance for half a month under both Saṅghas.…

6) “Only after a female trainee has trained in the six precepts for two years can she request Acceptance from both Saṅghas.…

7) “A bhikkhu must not in any way be insulted or reviled by a bhikkhunī.…

8) “From this day forward, the admonition of a bhikkhu by a bhikkhunī is forbidden, but the admonition of a bhikkhunī by a bhikkhu is not forbidden. This rule, too, is to be honored, respected, revered, venerated, never to be transgressed as long as she lives.

“If Mahāpajāpatī Gotamī accepts these eight rules of respect, that will be her full Acceptance.”

Then Ven. Ānanda, having learned the eight rules of respect in the Blessed One’s presence, went to Mahāpajāpatī Gotamī and, on arrival, said to her, “Gotamī, if you accept these eight rules of respect, that will be your full Acceptance.…”

“Ven. Ānanda, just as if a young woman—or man—fond of ornamentation, with bathed head, having been given a garland of lotuses or jasmine or scented creepers, having accepted it in both hands, were to place it on her head, in the same way I accept the eight rules of respect, never to transgress them as long as I live.”

Then Ven. Ānanda returned to the Blessed One and, having bowed down, sat to one side. As he was sitting there he said, “Venerable sir, Mahāpajāpatī Gotamī has accepted the eight rules of respect. The Blessed One’s foster mother is fully accepted.”

“But, Ānanda, if women had not obtained the Going-forth from the home life into homelessness in the Dhamma and discipline made known by the Tathāgata, the holy life would have lasted long, the true Dhamma would have lasted 1,000 years. But now that they have gotten to go forth… this holy life will not last long, the true Dhamma will last only 500 years. Just as a clan in which there are many women and few men is easily plundered by robbers and thieves, in the same way, in whatever Dhamma and discipline women get to go forth from the home life into homelessness, the holy life does not last long… Just as a man might make an embankment in advance around a great reservoir to keep the waters from overflowing, in the same way I have set forth in advance the eight rules of respect for bhikkhunīs that they are not to transgress as long as they live.”—Cv.X.1

As the story makes clear, gender is not an issue in determining a person’s ability to practice the Dhamma and attain release. But from the Buddha’s point of view it was an issue in his design of the Saṅgha as an institution. DN 16 reports a conversation between the Buddha and Māra shortly after the Buddha’s Awakening in which the former declines to totally unbind until he has established both a Bhikkhu Saṅgha and a Bhikkhunī Saṅgha on a firm foundation. Thus, by the time he was asked to establish a Bhikkhunī Saṅgha, he had had time to give careful thought both to the design of the institution and to his strategy for having the design accepted.

His concerns were pragmatic and strategic, aimed at the long-term survival of two things: the true Dhamma and the holy life. As SN 16:13 explains, the survival of the true Dhamma meant not simply the brute survival of the teachings but the survival of the teachings unadulterated with “synthetic Dhamma” (saddhamma-paṭirūpa), later “improvements” that would call the authenticity of the true Dhamma into question. One possible example of this sort of adulteration—the early Prajñā-paramitā literature, with its teachings on the non-arising of dhammas—began to appear approximately 500 years after the Buddha’s lifetime, which indicates that his prophesy was remarkably prescient.

Why the existence of a women’s Community would speed up the appearance of synthetic Dhamma, the Buddha didn’t say. Given his powers of recollection, he may have learned from the experience of previous Buddhas. Still, he was willing to make the sacrifice entailed in founding a women’s Community so that women would have an improved chance to gain the noble attainments.

However, unlike the survival of the true Dhamma, the survival of the holy life is a matter of the simple survival of the practice, even after the true Dhamma no longer has total monopoly in the Community. The analogy of the clan predominantly female shows that, in the Buddha’s eyes, the survival of the holy life through wars, invasions, and the fall of civilizations required a Community predominantly male. Experience in Sri Lanka, India, and Burma has borne this point out: Bhikkhunī Communities were wiped out when these countries were invaded, whereas bhikkhus—if they could not survive in place—were able to flee and regroup elsewhere.

Thus the Buddha formulated the eight rules of respect to help prolong the survival of the holy life by favoring the gender more likely to survive. As for his delay in granting Acceptance to his aunt, it was an effective strategy to get her willingly to accept the eight rules; had he proposed these conditions at her first request, she would have probably turned them down. The need for a predominantly male Community also explains why the requirements for Acceptance in the Bhikkhunī Saṅgha were more difficult and complicated than the requirements for Acceptance in the Bhikkhu Saṅgha; and why some of the rules governing relationships between the two Communities favored the bhikkhus over the bhikkhunīs.

The early bhikkhunīs did not accept this situation docilely. Soon after vowing to adhere to the eight rules of respect for the rest of her life, Mahāpajāpatī Gotamī requested that the bhikkhunīs be relieved of the most onerous one—the first (Cv.X.3). The fact that she was asking to renege on her word to the Buddha doomed the request to failure. According to the Vibhaṅga to the Bhikkhunī Pāṭimokkha, individual bhikkhunīs at later dates disobeyed the second, third, fourth, sixth, and seventh rules of respect, leading the Buddha to add pācittiya rules forbidding these transgressions to their Pāṭimokkha (respectively, Bhikkhunī Pc 56, 59, 57, 63 (66), & 52). Cv.X.20 reports that bhikkhunīs tried to initiate accusations against bhikkhus in violation of the eighth rule of respect, leading the Buddha to declare such attempts invalid and to impose a dukkaṭa on them. The existence of these rules meant that any bhikkhunī who broke them would have to confess her transgression to her fellow bhikkhunīs. Because disciplinary transactions can be imposed only on those who confess their actions, the act of confessing these transgressions would thus open the way for both Saṅghas to impose penance on the offender in line with the fifth rule of respect.

Interestingly, the first rule of respect was enforced by a rule for the bhikkhus. Cv.X.3 imposes a dukkaṭa on a bhikkhu who bows down to a woman, rises up from his seat for her, salutes her with hands palm-to-palm over his heart, or performs forms of respect due to a superior to her. Thus if a bhikkhu broke this rule, he would have to confess the fact; the bhikkhunī in question would be confronted with his confession, thus setting in line proceedings that could lead to her observing penance.

Despite the imbalance in the relations between the two Communities, it is important to remember that, for more than a thousand years, the Bhikkhunī Saṅgha provided a living training tradition—stretching woman-to-woman back through Mahāpajāpatī Gotamī to the Buddha himself—that guided and supported countless women in reaching the noble attainments. No other institution can come near to matching that claim.

Communal relations

When the Bhikkhunī Saṅgha was first founded, the bhikkhus were instructed to teach them the Vinaya and to conduct their Community transactions. With time, however, problems arose, as people suspected the bhikkhus and bhikkhunīs of meeting for clandestine purposes. A typical story is this:

Now at that time bhikkhunīs, on seeing a bhikkhu along a main road, in a side road, or at a crossroads, having placed their bowls on the ground, having arranged their upper robes over one shoulder, kneeling down with hands raised palm-to-palm over the heart, confessed their offenses. People were offended and annoyed and spread it about, “Those are the mistresses of these; these are the lovers of those. Having scorned them last night, they are now asking their forgiveness.”

As a result, the Buddha forbade the bhikkhus from conducting the bhikkhunīs’ transactions, and placed the bhikkhunīs in charge of many of their own Community transactions. For instance, they chanted their own Pāṭimokkha and confessed their own offenses to one another. The bhikkhus‘ sole role in these transactions was to teach the bhikkhunīs how to do them.

In other areas, however, the bhikkhus continued to play a role in the bhikkhunī’s Community transactions. If the bhikkhunīs were planning to impose a disciplinary transaction on another bhikkhunī, they were to consult with the bhikkhus as to what the precise punishment should be and were bound by the bhikkhus’ decision. The Commentary to Cv.X.7 notes that if they imposed a different transaction from that determined by the bhikkhus, they incurred a dukkaṭa under Mv.IX.6.3.

Bhikkhunīs were not allowed to cancel the uposatha or invitation of a bhikkhu, or to set in motion or to participate in any investigation of a bhikkhu’s offense. Bhikkhus, however, were allowed to cancel the uposatha or invitation of a bhikkhunī, and could set in motion and participate in an investigation of a bhikkhunī’s offense.

Ordination

After receiving full Acceptance, Mahāpajāpatī Gotamī approached the Buddha and asked him what should be done with the 500 Sakyan women who had followed her in requesting ordination. The Buddha’s reply was to allow that bhikkhunīs be given full Acceptance by bhikkhus (Cv.X.2.1).

When this allowance was first given, it obviously meant that bhikkhus could give full Acceptance to lay women. Over time, however, as the Bhikkhunī Saṅgha developed, the pattern for full Acceptance changed until it arrived at the pattern set forth in the sixth rule of respect (Cv.X.17). In other words, the candidate for full Acceptance first formally requested training from the Bhikkhunī Saṅgha, after which she underwent a training period in which she was not to break any of the first six of the ten precepts for two years. (Apparently she did this as a ten-precept female novice, although this point is controversial.) If she broke any of these six precepts, the two-year training period was begun again. When she had completed two full years of this training without break, the Bhikkhunī Saṅgha—after authorizing her as having completed the training—would give her full Acceptance (Bhikkhunī Pc 63, 64, 66, 67, 72, & 73).

Unlike the Bhikkhu Saṅgha, where two or three candidates sharing the same preceptor could be ordained with a single transaction statement, only one candidate could be accepted as a bhikkhunī in a single transaction statement, inasmuch as one sponsor (pavattanī), the female equivalent of a preceptor, could not take on more than one student within a span of two consecutive years (Bhikkhunī Pc 82 & 83). For this reason, in any ordination where two or more candidates are accepted with one transaction statement, the statement would, in effect, be announcing that the Community was participating in the breaking of a rule. This would thus be classed as a non-Dhamma, non-Vinaya transaction under Mv.IX.3.2, which would invalidate the proceedings.

Immediately after her Acceptance in the Bhikkhunī Saṅgha, the candidate was to be taken to the Bhikkhu Saṅgha, where she was to be given full Acceptance a second time (Cv.X.17.8). If, however, there were dangers in taking her to the Bhikkhu Saṅgha, a messenger—an experienced, competent bhikkhunī—could be sent in her place (Cv.X.22). In either event, only when the candidate’s Acceptance had been ratified by the Bhikkhu Saṅgha was she considered fully ordained.

In establishing these procedures, the Buddha retained the earlier allowance for bhikkhus to give full Acceptance for bhikkhunīs but restricted it so that they could do so only to a candidate who had properly followed all the preliminary procedures, from requesting training to being given Acceptance by the Bhikkhunī Saṅgha (Cv.X.17.2-8).

It has been argued that because the original allowance for bhikkhus to ordain bhikkhunīs was never explicitly rescinded, it is still in place, so bhikkhus may ordain bhikkhunīs without the candidates’ having to go through the preliminary procedures. This argument is based on drawing a parallel to the way in which the Acceptance of bhikkhus changed in the early years of the Teaching. When the Buddha gave the allowance for the Community to give Acceptance by means of a transaction with one motion and three proclamations (Mv.I.28.3), he explicitly rescinded the earlier allowance (Mv.I.12.4) for groups of bhikkhus to give the Going-forth and Acceptance by means of the three goings for refuge. This, the argument claims, establishes a pattern that can be applied to bhikkhunī ordination as well. If the Buddha had meant for the allowance in Cv.X.2.1 to be fully rescinded, he would have said so in Cv.X.17.2.

However, the two cases are not really parallel. In the case of bhikkhu ordination, when the Buddha allowed groups of bhikkhus to give the Going-forth and Acceptance by means of the three goings for refuge, he spelled out the procedure for them to follow. Once this procedure had been explicitly allowed, he had to explicitly rescind it when he set out a new procedure in Mv.I.28.3-5. In the case of bhikkhunī ordination, though, he did not explicitly spell out a procedure for the bhikkhus to follow when he allowed them of give full Acceptance to bhikkhunīs in Cv.X.2.1. Because the only procedure available to the bhikkhus at that time was the procedure for bhikkhu ordination, it was apparently understood that this would be the fallback procedure to press into service until the Bhikkhunī Saṅgha was well established and could play a role in the double ordination, involving both Saṅghas, stipulated in the sixth rule of respect.

This means that the allowance in Cv.X.2.1 is incomplete. It doesn’t follow the pattern in other, similar allowances, where, once the Buddha has given the allowance, he immediately provides instructions for how to carry it out. At the same time, it only partially falls in line with the sixth rule of respect. In this sense, the allowance for double ordination given in Cv.X.17.2-8 simply completes the earlier, incomplete allowance. It doesn’t rescind the earlier allowance, because there is nothing in the earlier allowance that needs to be rescinded. Bhikkhus still give full Acceptance to bhikkhunīs, simply that they have to do so in line with the new procedures, which are fully in line with the sixth rule of respect.

Once these new procedures were spelled out, the earlier fallback procedure could no longer be used for that purpose from that time onward, as that would violate the new allowance.

The reasons for requiring double ordination for bhikkhunīs are not hard to see. As long as the Bhikkhunī Saṅgha was still in existence, Cv.X.17.2-8 ensured that bhikkhus could not add new members to the Bhikkhunī Saṅgha without the consent of the latter. In other words, bhikkhus could not force bhikkhunīs to accept into their Community new members they didn’t want. In the event that the original Bhikkhunī Saṅgha died out, Cv.X.17.2-8 prevents bhikkhus from granting Acceptance to women when they are unable to provide them with a properly trained Community of bhikkhunīs under which to train.

Exhortation

The third rule of respect was that the bhikkhunīs request permission to approach the bhikkhus for exhortation every half-month. A bhikkhunī who did not go—unless she was ill or her exhortation had been canceled (see below)—incurred an offense under bhikkhunīs’ Pc 58. The procedure was as follows: Two or three bhikkhunīs would approach a bhikkhu and, in the name of their Community, ask permission to approach one of the bhikkhus for the exhortation. The first bhikkhu, in turn, would join the bhikkhus who had met for the Pāṭimokkha and inform the bhikkhu who was reciting the Pāṭimokkha that the bhikkhunīs had requested permission to approach for an exhortation. Prior to his recitation (see Chapter 15), the bhikkhu reciting the Pāṭimokkha would first ask if there were any bhikkhus present who had already been authorized to exhort the bhikkhunīs. If there were, one of them was to exhort the bhikkhunīs. If there weren’t, the bhikkhus were to find out if any one among them was able and willing to exhort the bhikkhunīs (for the qualifications, see Pc 21). If there was such a bhikkhu, he was to be authorized. If not, the bhikkhunīs were to be told to “attain consummation (in the practice) in an amicable way.”

Once a bhikkhu had been authorized to exhort the bhikkhunīs, he incurred a dukkaṭa if he did not undertake the exhortation. The only bhikkhus exempt from this duty were those who were unqualified, those who were ill, and those setting out on a journey. (According to the Commentary, this last exemption applied only to a bhikkhu who planned to take a journey on the day of the uposatha or the day after.) If a bhikkhu, having undertaken the exhortation, did not have it announced to the bhikkhunīs or did not go to the exhortation as announced, he incurred a dukkaṭa. (BD states that these last two rules apply only in the case of a bhikkhu living alone in the wilderness, mentioned below, but the Commentary insists that they apply regardless of whether the exhortation has been arranged by a Community of bhikkhus or by a single bhikkhu.)

If a bhikkhu living alone in the wilderness was approached by bhikkhunīs requesting permission to approach for an exhortation, he was to make an appointment to meet them in a more appropriate location for giving the exhortation. Any bhikkhunīs who did not keep the appointment incurred a dukkaṭa as well. This last ruling does not seem to fit with bhikkhunīs’ Pc 58, which imposes a pācittiya on any bhikkhunī who does not attend an exhortation, but perhaps the pācittiya applies only when the exhortation has been arranged by a Community of bhikkhus. None of the texts discuss this point.

Invitation

The fourth rule of respect was that bhikkhunīs at the end of the Rains-residence would invite accusations both from their own Community and from the Community of bhikkhus. Not to invite among themselves was to incur a dukkaṭa offense; not to invite the bhikkhus was to incur an offense under bhikkhunis’ Pc 57. After experimenting with various ways of inviting together—including one instance when all the bhikkhus and all the bhikkhunīs held their Invitation as one, resulting in an uproar—the following procedure was worked out: After the bhikkhunīs had invited among themselves, they chose one of their members who was experienced and competent to go later in the day or on the next day to invite criticism from the Community of bhikkhus on behalf of the entire Community of bhikkhunīs.

Penance

The Canon records only one instance in which a bhikkhunī had to observe penance for breaking a rule of respect, and it treats only one issue that arose as a result: The duties of penance required that she stay alone, but Bhikkhunī Sg 3 forbade it. The solution was that another bhikkhunī be authorized by the Community of bhikkhunīs to act as her companion for the duration of the penance.

The Canon’s silence on other issues surrounding this penance implies that the procedures and duties here were to follow the pattern of penance for committing a saṅghādisesa offense. The Commentary to Cv.II makes this point explicit, providing examples of transaction statements following the model of a saṅghādisesa penance and treating additional issues arising from the fact that the garu-dhamma penance had to be observed in both Saṅghas. Most of the Commentary’s explanations here follow its general recommendation to reduce each day’s duties of penance to a short period around dawn, observed in a secluded area outside a monastery. As noted in Chapter 19, this pattern has little to recommend it even for a saṅghādisesa penance, and here it makes even less sense: Small groups of bhikkhus and bhikkhunīs meeting outside a monastery in the predawn darkness would be sure to raise suspicions. And if the bhikkhunī’s duties could have been reduced to just the period around dawn, there would have been no need to authorize another bhikkhunī to live with her as her companion.

The Commentary, however, does make two useful points: There was no period of probation for a bhikkhunī who concealed her breach of the rules of respect. And if the way from the bhikkhunīs’ residence to the bhikkhus’ monastery was considered dubious, two or three laymen were to accompany the bhikkhunī and her bhikkhunī companions when she went to give her daily notification to the Bhikkhu Saṅgha.

As for a bhikkhunī who had to undergo penance for a breach of a saṅghādisesa rule, she was still required to observe probation if she concealed her offense. And, given the nature of the duties of penance and probation, the Community of bhikkhunīs would have had to authorize another bhikkhunī to act as her companion both for the penance and for the probation.

Individual relations

Cv.X.3 repeats Cv.VI.6.5 to reinforce the first rule of respect: that a bhikkhu may not bow down, rise up to greet, perform añjali, or perform other forms of respect due to superiors to a woman, even if she is a bhikkhunī.

The etiquette if a bhikkhu and a bhikkhunī met on the road was that she was to step aside while still at a distance and make way for him. She was not to give him a blow. This rule was formulated when “a woman formerly from the Mallan clan (according to the Commentary, formerly the wife of a wrestler) went forth among the bhikkhunīs. Seeing a weak bhikkhu along the main road, she gave him a blow with the point of her shoulder and set him spinning (§).”

If both of them were out for alms, the bhikkhunī was to show her bowl to the bhikkhu (this rule followed on the origin story reported in BMC1 with regard to Pd 1). If, in order to insult him, she showed him her bowl upside down, she incurred a dukkaṭa. She was to offer him food from her bowl, but only under certain circumstances was he allowed to accept it (see Pd 1). The origin story to these rules indicates that this protocol was something of a policing action, to make sure that the bhikkhunīs were not carrying contraband.

One of the few rules of reciprocity was that a bhikkhu or bhikkhunī could not take gifts given for his/her own consumption and give them to a member of the other Community. (“People criticized and complained and spread it about, ‘How can the masters give to others what is given for the purpose of their own consumption? Don’t we know how to give a gift?’”) However, an over-abundance of food—belonging either to the Community itself or to individuals within the Community—could be given to the other Community. This allowance applied to stored-up food (food formally given on a previous day—see Pc 38) as well. The Commentary explains this latter part of the allowance by saying that food formally accepted by a member of one of the two Communities did not count as accepted for the other. Thus, for instance, food accepted yesterday by a bhikkhu did not count as “stored-up” from the point of view of a bhikkhunī who ate it today. The Commentary also states that if there were no unordained people around, the bhikkhus themselves could formally offer the food to the bhikkhunīs, and vice versa.

If the bhikkhus had an abundance of lodgings (i.e., furniture) while the bhikkhunīs had none, the lodgings could be given to the bhikkhunīs on a temporary basis.

The bhikkhunīs were not totally without recourse in case a bhikkhu mistreated them. The Bhikkhu Pāṭimokkha contains two rules—NP 4 and NP 17—to prevent bhikkhus from getting the bhikkhunīs to perform personal services for them. Bhikkhunīs were also protected from sexual harassment by the bhikkhus. A bhikkhu who, with lustful thoughts, touched a bhikkhunī, spoke lewd words to her, or spoke in praise of her having sexual intercourse with him, would incur a saṅghādisesa offense under the relevant rules (Sg 2-4). In addition, bhikkhunīs were allowed to inflict a formal punishment on a bhikkhu who had behaved toward a bhikkhunī in an unseemly manner. In the origin story to the relevant rules, some group-of-six bhikkhus had sprinkled muddy water on bhikkhunīs in hopes of attracting the bhikkhunīs to them (!); they had exposed their bodies, their thighs, and their genitals to the bhikkhunīs; had flirted with them or propositioned them. (According to the Commentary, this means that they suggested that the bhikkhunīs perform an indiscretion with them or with other men—although if they spoke lewd words or suggested sexual intercourse with themselves, they would be breaking the saṅghādisesa rules mentioned above.) In all of these cases, the bhikkhunīs were allowed to impose a punishment on the offending bhikkhu, even if he had performed any of these indiscretions with only one bhikkhunī: The Community of bhikkhunīs could formally agree that they would not pay homage to him.

Pv.XV.8 gives additional reasons why the Community of bhikkhunīs could impose this punishment on a bhikkhu:

a) he exposes both of his shoulders to bhikkhunīs,

b) he strives for the material loss of bhikkhunīs,

c) he strives for the detriment of bhikkhunīs,

d) he strives for the non-residence of bhikkhunīs,

e) he insults and reviles bhikkhunīs,

f) he gets bhikkhus to break with bhikkhunīs.

The Commentary explains that the bhikkhunīs were to meet in their nunnery and give notice, by means of an announcement stated three times, that they are not going to pay homage to the offender. The offender was then required to ask forgiveness of the bhikkhunīs, but he was not to do so directly. Instead, he was to go to the Community of bhikkhus or to an individual bhikkhu in his own monastery, bow down, and inform them/him that he asked the bhikkhunīs’ forgiveness. The messenger then went to the bhikkhunīs and informed them, which lifted the punishment. In other words, the bhikkhunīs had no voice in whether or not to accept the request for forgiveness—although if the bhikkhu misbehaved again, the bhikkhunīs could reimpose the punishment, and the bhikkhus could meet to impose a censure transaction on the offender.

However, if a bhikkhunī behaved in a similar manner to a bhikkhu—such as exposing her breasts, her genitals, or her thighs to a bhikkhu; striving for a bhikkhu’s material loss, etc.—the punishment was heavier. The Community of bhikkhus would meet to impose a restriction on her—forbidding her, for instance, from entering their monastery. If she didn’t abide by it, they could cancel her exhortation. According to the Commentary, the bhikkhus were not to go to the nunnery to announce this. Instead, when the bhikkhunīs came for the exhortation, they were to be told, “I cancel the exhortation of that bhikkhunī. Do not perform the Pāṭimokkha with her.” As the Canon says, the bhikkhunīs were then not allowed to include her in their Pāṭimokkha until the case was settled (which could involve a disciplinary transaction). There is a rule against an inexperienced, incompetent bhikkhu’s canceling a bhikkhunī’s exhortation, which implies that an individual bhikkhu, if knowledgeable and competent, was allowed to do so. There is also a rule against canceling a bhikkhunī’s exhortation without grounds. As long as the issue had not been settled, the bhikkhu in question could not go off on tour. He was duty-bound to reach a final verdict on the matter. If a disciplinary transaction was imposed on the bhikkhunī, this would require going before the rest of the bhikkhus to get their approval.

Finally, the Buddha provided one further protection against the bhikkhunīs’ being abused by bhikkhus or sāmaṇeras: Any man who had ever molested a bhikkhunī was, for the rest of his life, denied the opportunity of taking the Going-forth.

Rules

Communal Transactions

“I allow that the discipline be taught to bhikkhunīs by bhikkhus.”—Cv.X.8

“(Confessions of) bhikkhunīs’ offenses are not to be received by bhikkhus. I allow that (confessions of) bhikkhunīs’ offenses be received by bhikkhunīs”… “I allow bhikkhus to inform bhikkhunīs: ‘This is how (the confession of) an offense is to be received.’”—Cv.X.6.2

“The Pāṭimokkha is not to be recited to bhikkhunīs by bhikkhus. Whoever should recite it: an offense of wrong doing. I allow that the Pāṭimokkha be recited to bhikkhunīs by bhikkhunīs”…. “I allow bhikkhus to inform bhikkhunīs: ‘This is how the Pāṭimokkha is to be recited.’”—Cv.X.6.1

“Bhikkhunīs’ transactions [C: the seven disciplinary transactions beginning with censure] are not to be done by bhikkhus. I allow that bhikkhunīs’ transactions be done by bhikkhunīs”…. “I allow bhikkhus to inform bhikkhunīs: ‘This is how the transaction is to be done.’”—Cv.X.6.3

“I allow the bhikkhus, having determined the transaction, to give it over to the bhikkhunīs, and that the bhikkhunīs perform the transactions of the bhikkhunīs. I allow the bhikkhus, having determined the offense, to give it over to the bhikkhunīs, and that the bhikkhunīs acknowledge bhikkhunīs’ offenses.” (§)—Cv.X.7

“I allow that bhikkhunīs be given full Acceptance by bhikkhus.”—Cv.X.2.1

“I allow that one who has been given full Acceptance on one side and purified (of the 24 obstructing factors) in the Bhikkhunī Saṅgha be given full Acceptance in the Bhikkhu Saṅgha.”—Cv.X.17.2

Procedure and transaction statement for the acceptance of women into the Bhikkhunī Saṅgha—Cv.X.17 (See also Bhikkhunī Pc 63, 64, 66, 67, 72, 73, 75, 82, & 83.)

Procedure and transaction statement for accepting a bhikkhunī through a messenger—Cv.X.22

“A bhikkhunī should not cancel a bhikkhu’s uposatha. Even though she has canceled it, it is not (really) canceled. And for she who cancels it: an offense of wrong doing. A bhikkhunī should not cancel (a bhikkhu’s) invitation. Even though she has canceled it, it is not (really) canceled. And for she who cancels it: an offense of wrong doing. A bhikkhunī should not do an investigation (against a bhikkhu). Even though she has done it, it is not (really) done. And for she who does it: an offense of wrong doing. A bhikkhunī should not have an accusation set in motion (against a bhikkhu). Even though she has set it in motion, it is not (really) set in motion. And for she who sets it in motion: an offense of wrong doing. A bhikkhunī should not get (a bhikkhu) to give her leave. Even though she gets it, she has not (really) gotten it. And for she who gets it: an offense of wrong doing. A bhikkhunī should not make a formal charge (against a bhikkhu). Even though she has made it, it is not (really) made. And for she who makes it: an offense of wrong doing. A bhikkhunī should not make (a bhikkhu) remember (i.e., interrogate him about a formal charge). Even though she has made him remember, he is not (really) made to remember. And for she who makes him remember: an offense of wrong doing.

“I allow that a bhikkhu cancel a bhikkhunī’s uposatha. When he has canceled it, it is properly canceled. And for he who cancels it: no offense. I allow that a bhikkhu cancel (a bhikkhunī’s) invitation. When he has canceled it, it is properly canceled. And for he who cancels it: no offense. I allow that a bhikkhu do an investigation (against a bhikkhunī). When he has done it, it is properly done. And for he who does it: no offense. I allow that a bhikkhu have an accusation set in motion (against a bhikkhunī). When he has set it in motion, it is properly set in motion. And for he who sets it in motion: no offense. I allow that a bhikkhu get (a bhikkhunī) to give him leave. When he gets it, he has properly gotten it. And for he who gets it: no offense. I allow that a bhikkhu make a formal charge (against a bhikkhunī). When he has made it, it is properly made. And for he who makes it: no offense. I allow that a bhikkhu make (a bhikkhunī) remember. When he has made her remember, she is properly made to remember. And for he who makes her remember: no offense.”—Cv.X.20

Exhortation

“The entire Community of bhikkhunīs should not go for the exhortation. Whoever should do so: an offense of wrong doing”…. “I allow two or three bhikkhunīs to go for the exhortation. Approaching a single bhikkhu (!), arranging their robes over one shoulder, paying homage to his feet, kneeling with hands raised palm-to-palm over the heart, they are to say this: ‘Master, the Community of bhikkhunīs pays homage to the feet of the Community of bhikkhus and requests permission to approach for the exhortation (§). May the Community of bhikkhus grant permission to approach for the exhortation.’

“That bhikkhu should approach the bhikkhu reciting the Pāṭimokkha and say, ‘Venerable sir, the Community of bhikkhunīs pays homage to the feet of the Community of bhikkhus and requests permission to approach for the exhortation. May the Community of bhikkhus grant permission to approach for the exhortation.’ [This last sentence is missing in BD.] The bhikkhu reciting the Pāṭimokkha should say, ‘Is there a bhikkhu who has been authorized as the one who exhorts the Community of bhikkhunīs?’ If there is, the bhikkhu reciting the Pāṭimokkha should say, ‘The bhikkhu named such-and-such is authorized as the one who exhorts the Community of bhikkhunīs. The Community of bhikkhunīs may approach him.’

“If there is no bhikkhu who has been authorized as the one who exhorts the Community of bhikkhunīs, the bhikkhu reciting the Pāṭimokkha should say, ‘Which venerable one is able/willing to exhort the bhikkhunīs?’ If one is able/willing to exhort the bhikkhunīs and is endowed with the eight qualifications (see Pc 21), then having authorized him, he should say, ‘The bhikkhu named such-and-such is authorized as the one who exhorts the Community of bhikkhunīs. The Community of bhikkhunīs may approach him.’

“If there is no one able/willing to exhort the bhikkhunīs, the bhikkhu reciting the Pāṭimokkha should say, ‘There is no bhikkhu who has been authorized to exhort the bhikkhunīs. May the Community of bhikkhunīs strive for consummation in an amicable way.’”—Cv.X.9.4

“The exhortation is not not to be given. Whoever (i.e., the bhikkhu authorized to give it) should not give it: an offense of wrong doing”…. “I allow that the exhortation be given except by one who is incompetent, one who is ill, one who is setting out on a journey (§)”…. “I allow that a bhikkhu living in the wilderness give the exhortation, and that he make an appointment: ‘I will bring it (§) to that place’”…. “The exhortation is not not to be announced. Whoever does not announce it: an offense of wrong doing”…. “One is not not to bring the exhortation. Whoever does not bring it: an offense of wrong doing”…. “Bhikkhunīs should not not go to the appointment. Whoever should not go: an offense of wrong doing.”—Cv.X.9.5

“Having swept the area (for the exhortation), having set out water for drinking and washing, having arranged seats, having taken a companion (any male, according to the Commentary), the authorized bhikkhu is to sit down. The bhikkhunīs, having gone there, having bowed down to him, should sit to one side. The authorized bhikkhu is to ask them, ‘Have you all come, sisters?’ If they say, ‘We have all come,’ (he is to ask them) ‘Are the eight rules of respect memorized?’ If they say, ‘They are memorized,’ he is to present (the statement), ‘This, sisters, is the exhortation.’ If they say, ‘They are not memorized,’ he is to recite (the eight rules)… If they say, ‘We have all come’ and he speaks of another Dhamma: an offense of wrong doing. If they say, ‘We have not all come,’ and he speaks of the eight rules of respect: an offense of wrong doing. If, without having presented the exhortation, he speaks of another Dhamma: an offense of wrong doing.”—Pc 21

Invitation

“The bhikkhunīs should not not invite. Whoever does not invite: an offense of wrong doing”…. “The bhikkhunīs, having invited among themselves, should not not invite the Community of bhikkhus. Whoever does not invite is to be dealt with in accordance with the rule (bhikkhunīs’ Pc 57)”… Now at that time, bhikkhunīs inviting together as one (§) with the bhikkhus created an uproar…. “Bhikkhunīs should not invite together as one with the bhikkhus. Whoever should do so: an offense of wrong doing”…. “I allow the bhikkhunīs to invite after mealtime”…. “I allow them, having invited the Community of bhikkhunīs on one day, to invite the Community of bhikkhus the next day.”—Cv.X.19.1

“I allow that one bhikkhunī—experienced and capable—be authorized to invite the Community of bhikkhus on behalf of the Community of bhikkhunīs.” Procedure and transaction statement—Cv.X.19.2

Penance

(A bhikkhunī who had to undergo penance for breaking one of the rules of respect realized that the duties of penance required her to live alone, whereas Bhikkhunī Sg 3 forbade her from spending the night alone, and so she asked for advice as to the proper line of conduct) “I allow that one bhikkhunī, having been authorized, be given to that bhikkhunī as a companion.” Procedure and transaction statement—Cv.X.25.3

Inheritance

“If a bhikkhunī, as she is dying, should say, ‘After I am gone, may my requisites belong to the Community,’ the Community of bhikkhus is not the owner there. They belong to the Community of bhikkhunīs. If a female trainee… If a female novice, as she is dying, should say, ‘After I am gone, may my requisites belong to the Community,’ the Community of bhikkhus is not the owner there. They belong to the Community of bhikkhunīs.

“If a bhikkhu, as he is dying, should say, ‘After I am gone, may my requisites belong to the Community,’ the Community of bhikkhunīs is not the owner there. They belong to the Community of bhikkhus. If a male novice… If a male lay follower… If a female lay follower… If anyone else, as he is dying, should say, ‘After I am gone, may my requisites belong to the Community,’ the Community of bhikkhunīs is not the owner there. They belong to the Community of bhikkhus.”—Cv.X.11

Personal Relations

“Bowing down, rising up to greet, greeting with hands raised palm-to-palm over the heart, or performing other forms of respect due to superiors are not to be done to a woman. Whoever should do so: an offense of wrong doing.”—Cv.X.3 (See Cv.VI.6.5)

“A bhikkhunī should not give a blow to a bhikkhu. Whoever should give one: an offense of wrong doing. I allow that a bhikkhunī, on seeing a bhikkhu, should step aside while still at a distance and make way for him.”—Cv.X.12

“A bhikkhunī should not take a fetus in a bowl. Whoever should do so: an offense of wrong doing. I allow a bhikkhunī, when seeing a bhikkhu, to take out her bowl and show it to him.”—Cv.X.13.1

“I allow a bhikkhunī, when seeing a bhikkhu, to show him her bowl right side up. And she is to offer him whatever food there is in the bowl.”—Cv.X.13.2

Now at that time people gave food to the bhikkhus, and the bhikkhus gave it to the bhikkhunīs. The people were offended and annoyed and spread it about, “How can the masters give to others what is given for the purpose of their own consumption? Don’t we know how to give a gift?”…. “One should not give to others what is given for the purpose of one’s own consumption. Whoever should do so: an offense of wrong doing.”

Now at that time the bhikkhus had an abundance of food… “I allow that what belongs to the Community be given (§).” There was an even greater abundance. “I allow that what belongs to an individual be given.” Now at that time the bhikkhus had an abundance of stored up food. “I allow that it be consumed by the bhikkhunīs when the bhikkhus have arranged for them to formally accept it.”—Cv.X.15.1

Now at that time people gave food to the bhikkhunīs, and the bhikkhunīs gave it to the bhikkhus. The people were offended and annoyed and spread it about, “How can the ladies give to others what is given for the purpose of their own consumption? Don’t we know how to give a gift?”…. “One should not give to others what is given for the purpose of one’s own consumption. Whoever should do so: an offense of wrong doing.”

Now at that time the bhikkhunīs had an abundance of food…. “I allow that what belongs to the Community be given.” There was an even greater abundance. “I allow that what belongs to an individual be given.” Now at that time the bhikkhunīs had an abundance of stored up food. “I allow that it be consumed by the bhikkhus when the bhikkhunīs have arranged for them to formally accept it.”—Cv.X.15.2

Now at that time the bhikkhus had an abundance of lodgings while the bhikkhunīs had none…. “I allow that lodgings be given to the bhikkhunīs on a temporary basis.”—Cv.X.16.1

Punishments

“A bhikkhu should not sprinkle muddy water on a bhikkhunī. Whoever should do so: an offense of wrong doing. I allow that a punishment be inflicted on that bhikkhu…. He should not be paid homage by the Community of bhikkhunīs”…. “A bhikkhu, having exposed his body, should not show it to a bhikkhunī; having exposed his thigh… his genitals, he should not show them to a bhikkhunī. He should not flirt (§) with a bhikkhunī. He should not proposition (§) a bhikkhunī. Whoever should do so: an offense of wrong doing. I allow that a punishment be inflicted on that bhikkhu…. He should not be paid homage by the Community of bhikkhunīs.”—Cv.X.9.1

“A bhikkhunī should not sprinkle muddy water on a bhikkhu. Whoever should do so: an offense of wrong doing. I allow that a punishment be inflicted on that bhikkhunī… I allow that a restriction be placed on her.” (She didn’t abide by it) “I allow that the exhortation be canceled for her”…. “A bhikkhunī, having exposed her body, should not show it to a bhikkhu; having exposed her breast… her thigh… her genitals, she should not show them to a bhikkhu. She should not flirt (§) with a bhikkhu. She should not proposition (§) a bhikkhu. Whoever should do so: an offense of wrong doing. I allow that a punishment be inflicted on that bhikkhunī…. I allow that a restriction be placed on her.” (She didn’t abide by it) “I allow that the exhortation be canceled for her.”—Cv.X.9.2

“The bhikkhunīs should not carry out the uposatha together with a bhikkhunī whose exhortation has been canceled as long as the issue has not been settled”…. (BD has Ven. Upāli in the origin story for the following rule, whereas all four major editions of the Canon have Ven. Udāyin) “Having canceled (a bhikkhunī’s) exhortation, one should not set out on a tour. Whoever should do so: an offense of wrong doing”…. “(A bhikkhunī’s) exhortation is not to be canceled by an inexperienced, incompetent bhikkhu. Whoever should do so: an offense of wrong doing”…. “(A bhikkhunī’s) exhortation is not to be canceled without grounds, without reason. Whoever should do so: an offense of wrong doing”…. “Having canceled (a bhikkhunī’s) exhortation, one should not not give a final verdict. Whoever does not give one: an offense of wrong doing.”—Cv.X.9.3

CHAPTER TWENTY-FOUR

Novices

The word sāmaṇera—translated here as “novice”—literally means a young contemplative. When the Buddha discontinued the going-for-refuge as a method of admission into the Bhikkhu Saṅgha, he retained it as the method by which boys too young for Acceptance could go forth. Ven. Rāhula, the Buddha’s own son, was the first to receive the Going-forth in this way.

The qualifications and procedure for Going-forth are described in Chapter 14. As was mentioned there, the customary pattern is for the new novice, immediately after his Going-forth, to take the ten rules of training.

Training

The novice’s basic training consists of the ten training rules:

refraining from killing living beings,

refraining from taking what is not given,

refraining from sexual intercourse,

refraining from speaking lies,

refraining from alcohol and fermented liquors that cause heedlessness,

refraining from eating in the wrong time (after noon and before dawn),

refraining from watching dancing, singing, and music (see Chapter 10),

refraining from adorning oneself with garlands, scents, cosmetics, and ornaments (see Chapter 1),

refraining from high and great seats and beds (see Chapter 6),

refraining from accepting gold and silver (money).

According to the Commentary, a novice who breaks any of the first five training rules has cut himself off from the Triple Refuge, from his preceptor, from his right to Community gains, and from his right to a lodging in a monastery. He is still a novice, though, and if he sees the error of his ways and is determined to restrain himself in the future, he may take the Triple Refuge from his preceptor again and so be restored to his former status.

The customary practice is for novices also to receive training in the Sekhiya rules and Khandhaka protocols, but there is no established standard for imposing offenses on them for breaking any of these rules.

Dependence

A novice must live in dependence on a mentor. Both mentor and novice are expected to follow the appropriate protocols with regard to the other (see Chapter 9). One bhikkhu is allowed to have more than one novice attend to him only if he is competent to ensure that the novices do not misbehave with one another. (In the origin story to this rule, two novices attending on Ven. Upananda sexually molested each other; in a later story, one of them molested a bhikkhunī.) A bhikkhu is also forbidden from luring another bhikkhu’s following away. The Commentary states that following means student novices or bhikkhus. Even if the other bhikkhu is unvirtuous, it says, one may not directly lure his following away but one may make a statement so that they will realize the undesirability of staying on with their mentor. The example it offers shows that the indirect statement does not have to be subtle: “Your living in dependence on an unvirtuous person is like coming to bathe but smearing yourself with excrement.” If the people to whom this remark is addressed realize its truth and then ask to take dependence on one, one may accept them as one’s following without offense.

Punishment

There are five grounds for punishing a novice:

he strives for the bhikkhus’ loss,

he strives for the bhikkhus’ harm,

he strives for the bhikkhus’ non-dwelling,

he insults and reviles bhikkhus, or

he causes bhikkhus to split from bhikkhus.

Punishment is primarily the responsibility of the novice’s mentor. Another bhikkhu may inflict punishment on the novice only with the preceptor’s permission. The Commentary says that if the preceptor is informed three times of his pupil’s misbehavior and does nothing, one is allowed to make a prohibition oneself, but the Sub-commentary cautions that one should inform the Community before doing so.

The mode of punishment is to place a prohibition on the novice—in other words, to place certain locales off limits to him. One is not allowed to place the entire monastery off limits. Instead, one may place off limits the areas where the novice normally lives and normally congregates. Also, one should not impose a prohibition concerning food. The Commentary advises that other forms of punishment suitable to the novice’s offense—such as carrying water, carrying firewood, or carrying sand—are allowable. One may also promise food to the novice as a reward if he willingly undergoes the punishment. Punishment must be given with the intention, “He’ll reform. He’ll stop misbehaving.” It should not be given with such malicious intent as, “He’ll be done in. He’ll disrobe.” Cruel and unusual punishments, such as making him carry bricks or stones on his head, submerging him in water, etc., are forbidden.

The texts do not state how long the prohibition should be imposed. This is left up to the discretion of the bhikkhu imposing it. When he sees that the novice has learned his lesson and mended his ways, the punishment should be rescinded.

Physical punishment is not allowed. A bhikkhu may not hit or lift his hand against a novice any more than he can do so to any other unordained person (see Pc 74 & Pc 75). Even playful rough-housing is forbidden. A bhikkhu incurs a dukkaṭa under Pc 52 for tickling a novice, and a dukkaṭa under Cv.V.31.2 for flicking a novice with his tooth wood.

Expulsion

As stated under Pc 70, a misbehaving novice may be subject to two types of expulsion: expulsion from his status as a novice and expulsion as a punishment. As with punishment, expulsion is the responsibility of the novice’s mentor. Pc 70 covers the second form of expulsion. Here we will discuss the first.

There are ten grounds for a novice’s expulsion:

he is a taker of life,

he is a taker of what is not given,

he engages in uncelibacy,

he is a speaker of lies,

he is a drinker of intoxicants,

he speaks dispraise of the Buddha,

he speaks dispraise of the Dhamma,

he speaks dispraise of the Saṅgha,

he holds wrong views, or

he is a molester of a bhikkhunī.

The Commentary details the extent to which any of these acts would subject the novice to expulsion: with regard to the first precept, killing ants or smashing bed bug eggs; with regard to the second, stealing a blade of grass; with regard to the third, genital, anal, or oral intercourse; with regard to the fourth, telling a lie even in jest; with regard to the fifth, intentionally drinking alcohol. As stated above, a novice who commits any of these acts has broken his Triple Refuge. If he sees the error of his ways, he may take the Triple Refuge again. If not, he should be expelled from his status as a novice.

Dispraise of the Buddha, Dhamma, and Saṅgha, the Commentary says, means speaking in terms contradictory to those used in the standard chant of praise to the Triple Gem—asserting, for instance, that the Buddha’s Dhamma is poorly taught, or that his disciples practice crookedly. An offender in this case should be reprimanded. If he sees the error of his ways, he should be punished with an appropriate prohibition and then given the training rules again. If he doesn’t, he should be expelled. The same holds for a novice espousing wrong views—which, according to the Commentary, means espousing either the extreme of eternalism or the extreme of annihilationism. Only a molester of a bhikkhunī is automatically expelled without further ado. Such a novice also makes himself ineligible from taking the Going-forth or receiving Acceptance ever again in this lifetime.

Rules

Going-forth

“A boy less than 15 years old should not be given the Going-forth. Whoever should give it: an offense of wrong doing.”—Mv.I.50.1

“I allow that a boy less than 15 years old be given the Going-forth if he is capable of chasing crows away.”—Mv.I.51.1

“A son without permission from his parents should not be given the Going-forth. Whoever should give it: an offense of wrong doing.”—Mv.I.54.6

How a novice is to be ordained—Mv.I.54.3

“Bhikkhus, I allow the Going-forth for a novice by means of these three goings for refuge.”—Mv.I.54.3

Training Rules

“I allow these ten training rules for novices, and for novices to train in them.”—Mv.I.56.1

Attendance

“One (bhikkhu) should not get two novices to attend to him. Whoever should get them to attend to him: an offense of wrong doing.”—Mv.I.52.1

“I allow a single bhikkhu, if experienced and competent, to get two novices—or as many as he is capable of instructing and exhorting—to attend to him.”—Mv.I.55

“Another’s following should not be lured away. Whoever should lure it away: an offense of wrong doing.”—Mv.I.59

Punishment

“I allow a punishment to be imposed on a novice endowed with five qualities: He strives for the bhikkhus’ loss, he strives for the bhikkhus’ harm, he strives for the bhikkhus’ non-dwelling, he insults and reviles bhikkhus, he causes bhikkhus to split from bhikkhus. I allow a punishment to be imposed on a novice endowed with these five qualities.”—Mv.I.57.1

“I allow a prohibition (placing something off limits) to be made.” “The entire monastery of the Community is not to be made off limits. Whoever should make it off limits: an offense of wrong doing. I allow wherever he (normally) lives, wherever he (normally) returns to, to be made off limits.”—Mv.I.57.2

“A prohibition is not to be made regarding food to be taken by the mouth. Whoever should make (such a prohibition): an offense of wrong doing.”—Mv.I.57.3

“A prohibition is not to be made without having asked permission of (the novice’s/young bhikkhu’s) preceptor. Whoever should make (such a prohibition): an offense of wrong doing.”—Mv.I.58

“And novices are not to be flicked with tooth wood. Whoever should do so: an offense of wrong doing.”—Cv.V.31.2

Expulsion

“I allow a novice endowed with ten qualities to be expelled: He is a taker of life, he is a taker of what is not given, he engages in uncelibacy, he is a speaker of lies, he is a drinker of intoxicants, he speaks dispraise of the Buddha, he speaks dispraise of the Dhamma, he speaks dispraise of the Saṅgha, he holds wrong views, he is a molester of a bhikkhunī. I allow that a novice endowed with these ten qualities be expelled.”—Mv.I.60

Appendices

APPENDIX ONE

General Transaction Statements

A. Territories (sīmā)

To remove a ti-cīvara-avippavāsa: (Mv.II.12.5)

Suṇātu me bhante saṅgho. Yo so saṅghena ti-cīvarena avippavāso sammato, yadi saṅghassa pattakallaṁ, saṅgho taṁ ti-cīvarena avippavāsaṁ samūhaneyya. Esā ñatti.

Suṇātu me bhante saṅgho. Yo so saṅghena ti-cīvarena avippavāso sammato, saṅgho taṁ ti-cīvarena avippavāsaṁ samūhanati. Yass’āyasmato khamati, etassa ti-cīvarena avippavāsassa samugghāto, so tuṇh’assa. Yassa nakkhamati, so bhāseyya.

Samūhato so saṅghena ti-cīvarena avippavāso. Khamati saṅghassa, tasmā tuṇhī. Evam-etaṁ dhārayāmi.

Venerable sirs, may the Community listen to me. If the Community is ready, it should revoke what was (previously) authorized by the Community as not being apart from one’s triple robe. This is the motion.

Venerable sirs, may the Community listen to me. The Community is revoking what was (previously) authorized by the Community as not being apart from one’s triple robe. He to whom the revoking of the not being apart from one’s triple robe is agreeable should remain silent. He to whom it is not agreeable should speak.

The not being apart from one’s triple robe has been revoked by the Community. This is agreeable to the Community, therefore it is silent. Thus do I hold it.

To remove a territory of common community: (Mv.II.12.6)

Suṇātu me bhante saṅgho. Yā sā saṅghena sīmā sammatā samāna-saṁvāsā ek’uposathā, yadi saṅghassa pattakallaṁ, saṅgho taṁ sīmaṁ samūhaneyya. Esā ñatti.

Suṇātu me bhante saṅgho. Yā sā saṅghena sīmā sammatā samāna-saṁvāsā ek’uposathā, saṅgho taṁ sīmaṁ samūhanati. Yass’āyasmato khamati, etissā sīmāya samāna-saṁvāsāya ek’uposathāya samugghāto, so tuṇh’assa. Yassa nakkhamati, so bhāseyya.

Samūhatā sā sīmā saṅghena samāna-saṁvāsā ek’uposathā. Khamati saṅghassa, tasmā tuṇhī. Evam-etaṁ dhārayāmi.

Venerable sirs, may the Community listen to me. If the Community is ready, it should revoke the territory (previously) authorized by the Community as one of common affiliation, of a single uposatha. This is the motion.

Venerable sirs, may the Community listen to me. The Community is revoking the territory (previously) authorized by the Community as one of common affiliation, of a single uposatha. He to whom the revoking of the territory of common affiliation, of a single uposatha, is agreeable should remain silent. He to whom it is not agreeable should speak.

The territory of common affiliation, of a single uposatha, has been revoked by the Community. This is agreeable to the Community, therefore it is silent. Thus do I hold it.

Dhammayut version:

Suṇātu me bhante saṅgho. Yā sā saṅghena sīmā sammatā samāna-saṁvāsā ek’uposathā, yadi saṅghassa pattakallaṁ, saṅgho taṁ sīmaṁ samūhaneyya. Esā ñatti.

Suṇātu me bhante saṅgho. Yā sā saṅghena sīmā sammatā samāna-saṁvāsā ek’uposathā, saṅgho taṁ sīmaṁ samūhanati. Yass’āyasmato khamati, etissā sīmāya samugghāto, so tuṇh’assa. Yassa nakkhamati, so bhāseyya.

Samūhatā sā saṅghena sīmā. Khamati saṅghassa, tasmā tuṇhī. Evam-etaṁ dhārayāmi.

Noting the boundary markers: “In the —— direction, what is the marker?”

Eastern | Puratthimāya | disāya | kiṁ nimittaṁ.
Southeastern | Puratthimāya | anudisāya | kiṁ nimittaṁ.
Southern | Dakkhiṇāya | disāya | kiṁ nimittaṁ.
Southwestern | Dakkhiṇāya | anudisāya | kiṁ nimittaṁ.
Western | Pacchimāya | disāya | kiṁ nimittaṁ.
Northwestern | Pacchimāya | anudisāya | kiṁ nimittaṁ.
Northern | Uttarāya | disāya | kiṁ nimittaṁ.
Northeastern | Uttarāya | anudisāya | kiṁ nimittaṁ.
Eastern | Puratthimāya | disāya | kiṁ nimittaṁ.

Replies: “A ——, venerable sir.”

Stone: | Pāsāṇo, bhante
Hill: | Pabbato, bhante
Grove: | Vanaṁ, bhante
Tree: | Rukkho, bhante
Path: | Maggo, bhante
Termite nest: | Vammiko, bhante
River: | Nadī, bhante
Water: | Udakaṁ, bhante

Responses: “This —— is the marker.”

Stone: | Eso pāsāṇo nimittaṁ
Hill: | Eso pabbato nimittaṁ
Grove: | Etaṁ vanaṁ nimittaṁ
Tree: | Eso rukkho nimittaṁ
Path: | Eso maggo nimittaṁ
Termite nest: | Eso vammiko nimittaṁ
River: | Esā nadī nimittaṁ
Water: | Etaṁ udakaṁ nimittaṁ

Authorizing the territory: (Mv.II.6.2)

Suṇātu me bhante saṅgho. Yāvatā samantā nimittā kittitā, yadi saṅghassa pattakallaṁ, saṅgho etehi nimittehi sīmaṁ sammanneyya samāna-saṁvāsaṁ ek’uposathaṁ. Esā ñatti.

Suṇātu me bhante saṅgho. Yāvatā samantā nimittā kittitā, saṅgho etehi nimittehi sīmaṁ sammannati samāna-saṁvāsaṁ ek’uposathaṁ. Yass’āyasmato khamati, etehi nimittehi sīmāya sammati samāna-saṁvāsāya ek’uposathāya, so tuṇh’assa. Yassa nakkhamati, so bhāseyya.

Sammatā sīmā saṅghena etehi nimittehi, samāna-saṁvāsā ek’uposathā. Khamati saṅghassa, tasmā tuṇhī. Evam-etaṁ dhārayāmi.

Venerable sirs, may the Community listen to me. If the Community is ready, then—as far as those markers that have been determined all around—it should authorize within those markers a territory of common affiliation, of a single uposatha. This is the motion.

Venerable sirs, may the Community listen to me. As far as those markers that have been determined all around, the Community is authorizing within those markers a territory of common affiliation, of a single uposatha. He to whom the authorization of the territory within those markers as one of common affiliation, of a single uposatha, is agreeable, should remain silent. He to whom it is not agreeable should speak.

The territory within those markers has been authorized by the Community as one of common affiliation, of a single uposatha. This is agreeable to the Community, therefore it is silent. Thus do I hold it.

Dhammayut version (final paragraph):

Sammatā saṅghena sīmā etehi nimittehi, samāna-saṁvāsā ek’uposathā. Khamati saṅghassa, tasmā tuṇhī. Evam-etaṁ dhārayāmi.

Determining a ti-cīvara-avippavāsa: (Mv.II.12.4)

Suṇātu me bhante saṅgho. Yā sā saṅghena sīmā sammatā samāna-saṁvāsā ek’uposathā, yadi saṅghassa pattakallaṁ, saṅgho taṁ sīmaṁ ti-cīvarena-avippavāsaṁ sammanneyya ṭhapetvā gāmañca gāmūpacārañca. Esā ñatti.

Suṇātu me bhante saṅgho. Yā sā saṅghena sīmā sammatā samāna-saṁvāsā ek’uposathā, saṅgho taṁ sīmaṁ ti-cīvarena- avippavāsaṁ sammannati, ṭhapetvā gāmañca gāmūpacārañca. Yass’āyasmato khamati, etissā sīmāya ti-cīvarena-avippavāsassa sammati, ṭhapetvā gāmañca gāmūpacārañca, so tuṇh’assa. Yassa nakkhamati, so bhāseyya.

Sammatā sā sīmā saṅghena ti-cīvarena-avippavāso, ṭhapetvā gāmañca gāmūpacārañca. Khamati saṅghassa, tasmā tuṇhī. Evam-etaṁ dhārayāmi.

Venerable sirs, may the Community listen to me. If the Community is ready, it should authorize the territory—(already) authorized as one of common affiliation, of a single uposatha—except for any village or village area, as a (territory) of not being apart from one’s triple robe. This is the motion.

Venerable sirs, may the Community listen to me. The Community is authorizing the territory—(already) authorized as one of common affiliation, of a single uposatha—except for any village or village area, as a (territory) of not being apart from one’s triple robe. He to whom the authorization of the territory, except for any village or village area, as one of not being apart from one’s triple robe should remain silent. He to whom it is not agreeable should speak.

The territory, except for any village or village area, has been authorized by the Community as one of not being apart from one’s triple robe. This is agreeable to the Community, therefore it is silent. Thus do I hold it.

Dhammayut version (final paragraph):

Sammatā sā saṅghena sīmā ti-cīvarena-avippavāso, ṭhapetvā gāmañca gāmūpacārañca. Khamati saṅghassa, tasmā tuṇhī. Evam-etaṁ dhārayāmi.

B. Uposatha halls

Authorizing an uposatha hall: (Mv.II.8.2)

Suṇātu me bhante saṅgho. Yadi saṅghassa pattakallaṁ, saṅgho itthannāmaṁ vihāraṁ uposathāgāraṁ sammanneyya. Esā ñatti.

Suṇātu me bhante saṅgho. Saṅgho itthannāmaṁ vihāraṁ uposathāgāraṁ sammannati. Yass’āyasmato khamati, itthannāmassa vihārassa uposathāgārassa sammati, so tuṇh’assa. Yassa nakkhamati, so bhāseyya.

Sammato saṅghena itthannāmo vihāro uposathāgāraṁ. Khamati saṅghassa, tasmā tuṇhī. Evam-etaṁ dhārayāmi.

Venerable sirs, may the Community listen to me. If the Community is ready, then it should authorize the building of this name as the uposatha hall. This is the motion.

Venerable sirs, may the Community listen to me. The Community is authorizing the building of this name as the uposatha hall. He to whom the authorization of the building of this name as the uposatha hall is agreeable should remain silent. He to whom it is not agreeable should speak.

The building of this name has been authorized by the Community as the uposatha hall. This is agreeable to the Community, therefore it is silent. Thus do I hold it.

Revoking an uposatha hall: (Mv.II.8.4)

Suṇātu me bhante saṅgho. Yadi saṅghassa pattakallaṁ, saṅgho itthannāmaṁ uposathāgāraṁ samūhaneyya. Esā ñatti.

Suṇātu me bhante saṅgho. Saṅgho itthannāmaṁ uposathāgāraṁ samūhanati. Yass’āyasmato khamati, itthannāmassa uposathāgārassa samugghāto, so tuṇh’assa. Yassa nakkhamati, so bhāseyya.

Samūhataṁ saṅghena itthannāmaṁ uposathāgāraṁ. Khamati saṅghassa, tasmā tuṇhī. Evam-etaṁ dhārayāmi.

Venerable sirs, may the Community listen to me. If the Community is ready, then it should revoke the uposatha hall of this name. This is the motion.

Venerable sirs, may the Community listen to me. The Community is revoking the uposatha hall of this name. He to whom the revoking of the uposatha hall of this name is agreeable should remain silent. He to whom it is not agreeable should speak.

The uposatha hall of this name has been revoked by the Community. This is agreeable to the Community, therefore it is silent. Thus do I hold it.

Authorizing an area in front of the uposatha hall: (Mv.II.9.2)

Suṇātu me bhante saṅgho. Yāvatā samantā nimittā kittitā, yadi saṅghassa pattakallaṁ, saṅgho etehi nimittehi uposatha-pamukhaṁ* sammanneyya. Esā ñatti.

Suṇātu me bhante saṅgho. Yāvatā samantā nimittā kittitā, saṅgho etehi nimittehi uposatha-pamukhaṁ sammannati. Yass’āyasmato khamati, etehi nimittehi uposatha-pamukhassa sammati, so tuṇh’assa. Yassa nakkhamati, so bhāseyya.

Sammataṁ saṅghena etehi nimittehi uposatha-pamukhaṁ. Khamati saṅghassa, tasmā tuṇhī. Evam-etaṁ dhārayāmi.

Venerable sirs, may the Community listen to me. If the Community is ready, then—as far as those markers that have been determined all around—it should authorize within those markers an area in front of the uposatha (hall). This is the motion.

Venerable sirs, may the Community listen to me. As far as those markers that have been determined all around, the Community is authorizing within those markers an area in front of the uposatha (hall). He to whom the authorization of an area in front of the uposatha (hall) within those markers is agreeable should remain silent. He to whom it is not agreeable should speak.

The area in front of the uposatha (hall) within those markers has been authorized by the Community. This is agreeable to the Community, therefore it is silent. Thus do I hold it.

* Following the Sri Lankan, Burmese, and PTS editions. The Thai edition reads, “uposatha-mukhaṁ.”

C. A food storage place (Mv.VI.33.2)

Suṇātu me bhante saṅgho. Yadi saṅghassa pattakallaṁ, saṅgho itthannāmaṁ vihāraṁ kappiya-bhūmiṁ sammanneyya. Esā ñatti.

Suṇātu me bhante saṅgho. Saṅgho itthannāmaṁ vihāraṁ kappiya-bhūmiṁ sammannati. Yass’āyasmato khamati, itthannāmassa vihārassa kappiya-bhūmiyā sammati, so tuṇh’assa. Yassa nakkhamati, so bhāseyya.

Sammato saṅghena itthannāmo vihāro kappiya-bhūmi. Khamati saṅghassa, tasmā tuṇhī. Evam-etaṁ dhārayāmi.

Venerable sirs, may the Community listen to me. If the Community is ready, then it should authorize the dwelling (name) as an allowable place (to store food). This is the motion.

Venerable sirs, may the Community listen to me. The Community is authorizing the dwelling (name) as an allowable place (to store food). He to whom the authorization of the dwelling (name) as an allowable place (to store food) is agreeable should remain silent. He to whom it is not agreeable should speak.

The dwelling (name) has been authorized by the Community as an allowable place (to store food). This is agreeable to the Community, therefore it is silent. Thus do I hold it.

D. Community officials

In these and all the following statements in which a bhikkhu is mentioned by name, the word, Itthannāmo—“So-and-so”—should be replaced by the bhikkhu’s actual name. If he is a senior bhikkhu, the phrase, Itthannāmo bhikkhu should be replaced as follows (supposing that his name is Mahindo):

Itthannāmo bhikkhu | āyasmā Mahindo
Itthannāmaṁ bhikkhuṁ | āyasmantaṁ Mahindaṁ
Itthannāmassa bhikkhuno | āyasmato Mahindassa
Itthannāmena bhikkhuna | āyasmatā Mahindena

For the patterns to use when the bhikkhu’s name has a different stem-form (-i, -u, etc.), see the introduction to Appendix II.

Meal distributor: (Cv.VI.21.1)

Suṇātu me bhante saṅgho. Yadi saṅghassa pattakallaṁ, saṅgho Itthannāmaṁ bhikkhuṁ BHATTUDDESAKAṀ sammanneyya. Esā ñatti.

Suṇātu me bhante saṅgho. Saṅgho Itthannāmaṁ bhikkhuṁ BHATTUDDESAKAṀ sammannati. Yass’āyasmato khamati, Itthannāmassa bhikkhuno BHATTUDDESAKASSA sammati, so tuṇh’assa. Yassa nakkhamati, so bhāseyya.

Sammato saṅghena Itthannāmo bhikkhu BHATTUDDESAKO. Khamati saṅghassa, tasmā tuṇhī. Evam-etaṁ dhārayāmi.

Venerable sirs, may the Community listen to me. If the Community is ready, it should authorize Bhikkhu (name) as meal distributor. This is the motion.

Venerable sirs, may the Community listen to me. The Community is authorizing Bhikkhu (name) as meal distributor. He to whom the authorization of Bhikkhu (name) as meal distributor is agreeable should remain silent. He to whom it is not agreeable should speak.

Bhikkhu (name) has been authorized by the Community as meal distributor. This is agreeable to the Community, therefore it is silent. Thus do I hold it.

For other positions, replace BHATTUDDESAKAṀ / BHATTUDDESAKASSA / BHATTUDDESAKO with the appropriate name for the position, as follows:

Robe-cloth receiver: (Mv.VIII.5.2)

CĪVARA-PAṬIGGĀHAKAṀ / CĪVARA-PAṬIGGĀHAKASSA / CĪVARA-PAṬIGGĀHAKO

Robe-cloth keeper: (Mv.VIII.6.2)

CĪVARA-NIDĀHAKAṀ / CĪVARA-NIDĀHAKASSA / CĪVARA-NIDĀHAKO

Robe-cloth distributor: (Mv.VIII.9.1)

CĪVARA-BHĀJAKAṀ / CĪVARA-BHĀJAKASSA / CĪVARA-BHĀJAKO

Bathing cloth bestower: (Cv.VI.21.3)

SĀṬIYA-GĀHĀPAKAṀ / SĀṬIYA-GĀHĀPAKASSA / SĀṬIYA-GĀHĀPAKO

Lodging bestower: (Cv.VI.11.2)

SENĀSANA-GĀHĀPAKAṀ / SENĀSANA-GĀHĀPAKASSA / SENĀSANA-GĀHĀPAKO

Lodging assignor: (Cv.VI.21.2)

SENĀSANA-PAÑÑĀPAKAṀ / SENĀSANA-PAÑÑĀPAKASSA / SENĀSANA-PAÑÑĀPAKO

Storekeeper: (Mv.VIII.8.1)

BHAṆḌĀGĀRIKAṀ / BHAṆḌĀGĀRIKASSA / BHAṆḌĀGĀRIKO

Supervisor of monastery attendants: (Cv.VI.21.3)

ĀRĀMIKA-PESAKAṀ / ĀRĀMIKA-PESAKASSA / ĀRĀMIKA-PESAKO

Supervisor of novices: (Cv.VI.21.3)

SĀMAṆERA-PESAKAṀ / SĀMAṆERA -PESAKASSA / SĀMAṆERA -PESAKO

To appoint one person to more than one position at once:

Robe-cloth receiver, distributor, & keeper:

CĪVARA-BHĀJAKAÑCA CĪVARA-PAṬIGGĀHAKAÑCA CĪVARA-NIDĀHAKAÑCA / CĪVARA-BHĀJAKASSA CA CĪVARA-PAṬIGGĀHAKASSA CA CĪVARA-NIDĀHAKASSA CA / CĪVARA-BHĀJAKO CA CĪVARA-PAṬIGGĀHAKO CA CĪVARA-NIDĀHAKO CA

Storekeeper & dispenser of minor articles:

BHAṆḌĀGĀRIKAÑCA APPAMATTAKA-VISAJJAKAÑCA / BHAṆḌĀGĀRIKASSA CA APPAMATTAKA-VISAJJAKASSA CA / BHAṆḌĀGĀRIKO CA APPAMATTAKA-VISAJJAKO CA

Building responsibility: (Cv.VI.5.3)

Suṇātu me bhante saṅgho. Yadi saṅghassa pattakallaṁ, saṅgho Itthannāmassa gahapatino vihāraṁ Itthannāmassa bhikkhuno nava-kammaṁ dadeyya. Esā ñatti.

Suṇātu me bhante saṅgho. Saṅgho Itthannāmassa gahapatino vihāraṁ Itthannāmassa bhikkhuno nava-kammaṁ deti. Yass’āyasmato khamati, Itthannāmassa gahapatino vihārassa Itthannāmassa bhikkhuno nava-kammassa dānaṁ, so tuṇh’assa. Yassa nakkhamati, so bhāseyya.

Dinno saṅghena Itthannāmassa gahapatino vihāro Itthannāmassa bhikkhuno nava-kammaṁ. Khamati saṅghassa, tasmā tuṇhī. Evam-etaṁ dhārayāmi.

Venerable sirs, may the Community listen to me. If the Community is ready, it should give the dwelling of householder (donor’s name) to Bhikkhu (name) as his building responsibility. This is the motion.

Venerable sirs, may the Community listen to me. The Community is giving the dwelling of householder (donor’s name) to Bhikkhu (name) as his building responsibility. He to whom the giving of the dwelling of householder (donor’s name) to Bhikkhu (name) as his building responsibility is agreeable should remain silent. He to whom it is not agreeable should speak.

The dwelling of householder (donor’s name) has been given by the Community to Bhikkhu (name) as his building responsibility. This is agreeable to the Community, therefore it is silent. Thus do I hold it.

E. Kaṭhina

Optional preliminary statements:

Offering the cloth

Namo tassa bhagavato arahato sammā-sambuddhassa (three times).

Imaṁ bhante sapparivāraṁ kaṭhina-dussaṁ saṅghassa oṇojayāma. Sādhu no bhante saṅgho, imaṁ sapparivāraṁ kaṭhina-dussaṁ paṭiggaṇhātu, paṭiggahetvā ca iminā dussena kaṭhinaṁ attharatu, amhākaṁ dīgha-rattaṁ hitāya sukhāya.

Homage to the Blessed One, the Worthy One, the Rightly Self-awakened One.

Venerable sirs, we present this kaṭhina-cloth, together with its accessories, to the Community. It would be good if the Community would accept this kaṭhina-cloth together with its accessories, and having accepted it, would spread the kaṭhina with it, for our long-term welfare and happiness.

Formal consultation

First bhikkhu:

Idāni kho bhante idaṁ sapparivāraṁ kaṭhina-dussaṁ saṅghassa kaṭhinatthārāraha-kāleyeva uppannaṁ. Īdise ca kāle evaṁ uppannena dussena kaṭhinatthāro vassaṁ vutthānaṁ bhikkhūnaṁ bhagavatā anuññāto. Yena ākaṅkhamānassa saṅghassa pañca kappissanti: anāmantacāro, asamādānacāro, gaṇa-bhojanaṁ, yāva-d-attha-cīvaraṁ, yo ca tattha cīvaruppādo so nesaṁ bhavissati. Catūsupi hemantikesu māsesu cīvara-kālo mahantī-kato bhavissati. Idāni pana saṅgho ākaṅkhati nu kho kaṭhinatthāraṁ, udāhu nākaṅkhati.

Venerable sirs, this kaṭhina-cloth, together with its accessories, has arisen for the Community in the season appropriate for spreading the kaṭhina. And in a season like this, the spreading of the kaṭhina with a cloth arisen in this way has been allowed by the Blessed One for bhikkhus who have completed the Rains-residence. By this means, five things are proper for a Community that desires them: going without taking leave, going without one’s complete set of robes, a group meal, keeping robe-cloth as long as is wanted, and any robe-cloth arising there (in the residence where they spent the Rains) will be theirs. Also, the robe-season will be extended throughout the four months of the cold season. Now, does the Community want the spreading of the kaṭhina, or not?

The bhikkhus respond: Ākaṅkhāma, bhante.

(We want it, venerable sir.)

Second bhikkhu:

So kho pana bhante kaṭhinatthāro bhagavatā puggalassa atthāra-vasen’eva anuññāto. Nāññatra puggalassa atthārā atthataṁ hoti kaṭhinanti hi vuttaṁ bhagavatā. Na saṅgho vā gaṇo vā kaṭhinaṁ attharati. Saṅghassa ca gaṇassa ca sāmaggiyā puggalass’eva atthārā, saṅghassapi gaṇassapi tasseva puggalassapi atthataṁ hoti kaṭhinaṁ. Idāni kass’imaṁ kaṭhina-dussaṁ dassāma kaṭhinaṁ attharituṁ. Yo jiṇṇa-cīvaro vā dubbala-cīvaro vā, yo vā pana ussahissati ajj’eva cīvara-kammaṁ niṭṭhāpetvā, sabba-vidhānaṁ aparihāpetvā kaṭhinaṁ attharituṁ samattho bhavissati.

Venerable sirs, the Blessed One has allowed the spreading of the kaṭhina only by an individual, for he said, ‘Not otherwise than through the spreading by an individual is the kaṭhina spread.’ Neither a Community nor a group spreads the kaṭhina. Through the concord of the Community and the group, and through the spreading by the individual is the kaṭhina of the Community, the group, and the individual spread. Now, to whom do we give the kaṭhina-cloth to spread the kaṭhina? To whoever has an old robe or a threadbare robe, or to whoever will strive and—finishing the making of the robe today, without omitting any of the procedures—is capable of spreading the kaṭhina.

The bhikkhus remain silent.

Third bhikkhu:

Idha amhesu āyasmā Itthannāmo sabba-mahallako bahussuto dhamma-dharo vinaya-dharo, sabrahmacārīnaṁ sandassako samādapako samuttejako sampahaṁsako, bahunnaṁ ācariyo [vā upajjhāyo vā] hutvā, ovādako anusāsako, samattho ca taṁ taṁ vinaya-kammaṁ avikopetvā kaṭhinaṁ attharituṁ. Maññām’aham-evaṁ “Sabbo’yaṁ saṅgho imaṁ sapparivāraṁ kaṭhina-dussaṁ āyasmato Itthannāmassa dātu-kāmo, tasmiṁ kaṭhinaṁ attharante sabbo’yaṁ saṅgho samma-d-eva anumodissati.” Āyasmato Itthannāmasseva imaṁ sapparivāraṁ kaṭhina-dussaṁ dātuṁ, ruccati vā no vā sabbass’imassa saṅghassa.

Of us here, Venerable (name) is the senior. He is learned, one who remembers the Dhamma, who remembers the Vinaya, one who instructs, urges, rouses, and encourages his fellows in the holy life. Being the teacher [or preceptor] of many, he is one who teaches and expounds (to them). He is also capable of spreading the kaṭhina without spoiling any of the disciplinary requirements. I think that this entire Community wants to give this kaṭhina-cloth, together with its accessories, to Venerable (name), and that when the kaṭhina is spread, this entire Community will rightly give its approval. Is it pleasing to this Community to give this kaṭhina-cloth, together with its accessories, to Venerable (name), or is it not?

The bhikkhus respond: Ruccati, bhante.

(It is pleasing, venerable sir.)

Fourth bhikkhu:

Yadi āyasmato Itthannāmassa imaṁ sapparivāraṁ kaṭhina-dussaṁ dātuṁ, sabbass’imassa saṅghassa ruccati, sādhu bhante saṅgho imaṁ kaṭhina-dussa-parivāra-bhūtaṁ ti-cīvaraṁ vassāvāsikaṭṭhitikāya agāhetvā, āyasmato Itthannāmass’eva iminā apalokanena dadātu. Kaṭhina-dussaṁ pana apalokanena diyyamānam-pi na rūhati. Tasmā “Taṁ idāni ñatti-dutiyena kammena akuppena ṭhānārahena āyasmato Itthannāmassa demāti” kamma-sanniṭṭhānaṁ karotu.

If the giving of this kaṭhina-cloth, together with its accessories, to Venerable (name) is pleasing to this entire Community, it would (also) be good by means of this announcement to give Venerable (name) this set of three robes, which has come into being as part of the accessories of the kaṭhina cloth, without regard to the order for receiving Rains-retreat cloth. As for the kaṭhina-cloth, even if it were given by announcement it would not be effective. So may (the Community) make this transaction-resolution: ‘We now give it to Venerable (name) by means of a motion and seconding announcement that is irreversible and fit to stand.’

The bhikkhus respond: Sādhu, bhante.

(Very good, venerable sir.)

Transaction statement: (Mv.VII.1.4)

(Because the kaṭhina-cloth is usually given to a senior bhikkhu, the form for addressing a senior bhikkhu is given here.)

Suṇātu me bhante saṅgho. Idaṁ saṅghassa kaṭhina-dussaṁ uppannaṁ. Yadi saṅghassa pattakallaṁ, saṅgho imaṁ kaṭhina-dussaṁ āyasmato Itthannāmassa dadeyya, kaṭhinaṁ attharituṁ. Esā ñatti.

Suṇātu me bhante saṅgho. Idaṁ saṅghassa kaṭhina-dussaṁ uppannaṁ. Saṅgho imaṁ kaṭhina-dussaṁ āyasmato Itthannāmassa deti, kaṭhinaṁ attharituṁ. Yass’āyasmato khamati, imassa kaṭhina-dussassa āyasmato Itthannāmassa dānaṁ, kaṭhinaṁ attharituṁ, so tuṇh’assa. Yassa nakkhamati, so bhāseyya.

Dinnaṁ idaṁ saṅghena kaṭhina-dussaṁ āyasmato Itthannāmassa, kaṭhinaṁ attharituṁ. Khamati saṅghassa, tasmā tuṇhī. Evam-etaṁ dhārayāmi.

Venerable sirs, may the Community listen to me. This kaṭhina-cloth has arisen for the Community. If the Community is ready, it should give this kaṭhina-cloth to Venerable (name) to spread the kaṭhina. This is the motion.

Venerable sirs, may the Community listen to me. This kaṭhina-cloth has arisen for the Community. The Community is giving this kaṭhina-cloth to Venerable (name) to spread the kaṭhina. He to whom the giving of this kaṭhina-cloth to Venerable (name) to spread the kaṭhina is agreeable should remain silent. He to whom it is not agreeable should speak.

This kaṭhina-cloth is given by the Community to Venerable (name) to spread the kaṭhina. This is agreeable to the Community, therefore it is silent. Thus do I hold it.

Removing kaṭhina privileges: (Bhikkhunī Pc 30)

Suṇātu me bhante saṅgho. Yadi saṅghassa pattakallaṁ, saṅgho kaṭhinaṁ uddhareyya. Esā ñatti.

Suṇātu me bhante saṅgho. Saṅgho kaṭhinaṁ uddharati. Yass’āyasmato khamati, kaṭhinassa ubbhāro, so tuṇh’assa. Yassa nakkhamati, so bhāseyya.

Ubbhataṁ saṅghena kaṭhinaṁ. Khamati saṅghassa, tasmā tuṇhī. Evam-etaṁ dhārayāmi.

Venerable sirs, may the Community listen to me. If the Community is ready, it should dismantle the kaṭhina (rescind the kaṭhina privileges). This is the motion.

Venerable sirs, may the Community listen to me. The Community is dismantling the kaṭhina. He to whom the dismantling of the kaṭhina is agreeable should remain silent. He to whom it is not agreeable should speak.

The kaṭhina has been dismantled by the Community. This is agreeable to the Community, therefore it is silent. Thus do I hold it.

F. Giving robes & bowl to those who tended the sick

Announcement of the bhikkhu’s death: (Mv.VIII.27.2)

Itthannāmo bhante bhikkhu kāla-kato. Idaṁ tassa ti-cīvarañca patto ca.

Venerable sirs, Bhikkhu (name) has died. This is his triple-robe and bowl.

Transaction statement: (Mv.VIII.27.2)

Suṇātu me bhante saṅgho. Itthannāmo bhikkhu kāla-kato. Idaṁ tassa ti-cīvarañca patto ca. Yadi saṅghassa pattakallaṁ, saṅgho imaṁ ti-cīvarañca pattañca gilān’upaṭṭhākānaṁ dadeyya. Esā ñatti.

Suṇātu me bhante saṅgho. Itthannāmo bhikkhu kāla-kato. Idaṁ tassa ti-cīvarañca patto ca. Saṅgho imaṁ ti-cīvarañca pattañca gilānupaṭṭhākānaṁ deti. Yass’āyasmato khamati, imassa ti-cīvarassa ca pattassa ca gilān’upaṭṭhākānaṁ dānaṁ, so tuṇh’assa. Yassa nakkhamati, so bhāseyya.

Dinnaṁ idaṁ saṅghena ti-cīvarañca patto ca gilān’upaṭṭhākānaṁ. Khamati saṅghassa, tasmā tuṇhī. Evam-etaṁ dhārayāmi.

Venerable sirs, may the Community listen to me. Bhikkhu (name) has died. This is his triple-robe and bowl. If the Community is ready, it should give this triple-robe and bowl to those who tended the sick. This is the motion.

Venerable sirs, may the Community listen to me. Bhikkhu (name) has died. This is his triple-robe and bowl. The Community is giving this triple-robe and bowl to those who tended the sick. He to whom the giving of this triple-robe and bowl to those who tended the sick is agreeable should remain silent. He to whom it is not agreeable should speak.

This triple-robe and bowl has been given by the Community to those who tended the sick. This is agreeable to the Community, therefore it is silent. Thus do I hold it.

(In the case of a deceased novice, replace Itthannāmo bhikkhu with Itthannāmo sāmaṇero, and ti-cīvarañca with cīvarañca, both in the announcement and in the transaction statement.)

G. Complete motions for shortened community invitations

When many lay people have been bringing gifts: (Mv.IV.15.3)

Suṇātu me bhante saṅgho. Manussehi dānaṁ dentehi yebhuyyena ratti khepitā. Sace saṅgho te-vācikaṁ pavāressati, appavārito’va saṅgho bhavissati athāyaṁ ratti vibhāyissati. Yadi saṅghassa pattakallaṁ, saṅgho dve-vācikaṁ [eka-vācikaṁ] {samāna-vassikaṁ} pavāreyya.

Venerable sirs, may the Community listen to me. The night is almost spent with people giving gifts. If the Community invites with the threefold statement, the Community will not be (fully) invited by the time the night is over. If the Community is ready, it should invite with two statements [with one statement] {in the manner of equal Rains}.

When the bhikkhus have been engaged in many activities: (Mv.IV.15.4)

Follow the above pattern, changing “Manussehi dānaṁ dentehi,” with “Bhikkhūhi kalahaṁ karontehi,” which means, “with the bhikkhus making an uproar.”

When rains threatens, and there is not enough shelter for the bhikkhus: (Mv.IV.15.6)

Suṇātu me bhante saṅgho. Ayaṁ mahā-bhikkhu-saṅgho sannipatito, parittañca anovassikaṁ, mahā ca megho uggato. Sace saṅgho te-vācikaṁ pavāressati, appavārito va saṅgho bhavissati athāyaṁ megho pavassissati. Yadi saṅghassa pattakallaṁ, saṅgho dve-vācikaṁ [eka-vācikaṁ] {samāna-vassikaṁ} pavāreyya.

Venerable sirs, may the Community listen to me. This large Community of bhikkhus has met, but the shelter is small, and a large cloud has risen up. If the Community invites with the threefold statement, the Community will not be (fully) invited by the time the cloud rains. If the Community is ready, it should invite with two statements [with one statement] {in the manner of equal Rains}.

When there are obstructions: (Mv.IV.15.7)

Suṇātu me bhante saṅgho. Ayaṁ RĀJANTARĀYO. Sace saṅgho te-vācikaṁ pavāressati, appavārito va saṅgho bhavissati athāyaṁ RĀJANTARĀYO bhavissati. Yadi saṅghassa pattakallaṁ, saṅgho dve-vācikaṁ [eka-vācikaṁ] {samāna-vassikaṁ} pavāreyya.

Venerable sirs, may the Community listen to me. This is a king obstruction. If the Community invites with the threefold statement, the Community will not be (fully) invited when the king obstruction comes. If the Community is ready, it should invite with two statements [with one statement] {in the manner of equal Rains}.

For other obstructions, replace RĀJANTARĀYO with:

CORANTARĀYO: a thief obstruction

AGYANTARĀYO: a fire obstruction

UDAKANTARĀYO: a water obstruction

MANUSSANTARĀYO: a human being obstruction

AMANUSSANTARĀYO: a non-human being obstruction

VĀḶANTARĀYO: a beast obstruction

SIRIṀSAPANTARĀYO: a creeping-pest obstruction

JĪVITANTARĀYO: a life obstruction

BRAHMA-CARIYANTARĀYO: a celibacy obstruction

H. Invitation-delay

To delay the Invitation to the next full moon: (Mv.IV.18.3-4)

Suṇātu me bhante saṅgho. Amhākaṁ samaggānaṁ sammodamānānaṁ avivadamānānaṁ viharataṁ aññataro phāsu-vihāro adhigato. Sace mayaṁ idāni pavāressāma, siyāpi bhikkhū pavāretvā cārikaṁ pakkameyyuṁ, evaṁ mayaṁ imamhā phāsu-vihārā paribāhirā bhavissāma. Yadi saṅghassa pattakallaṁ, saṅgho pavāraṇā-saṅgahaṁ kareyya, idāni uposathaṁ kareyya pāṭimokkhaṁ uddiseyya, āgame KOMUDIYĀ CĀTU-MĀSINIYĀ pavāreyya. Esā ñatti.

Suṇātu me bhante saṅgho. Amhākaṁ samaggānaṁ sammodamānānaṁ avivadamānānaṁ viharataṁ aññataro phāsu-vihāro adhigato. Sace mayaṁ idāni pavāressāma, siyāpi bhikkhū pavāretvā cārikaṁ pakkameyyuṁ, evaṁ mayaṁ imamhā phāsu-vihārā paribāhirā bhavissāma. Saṅgho pavāraṇā-saṅgahaṁ karoti, idāni uposathaṁ karissati pāṭimokkhaṁ uddisissati, āgame KOMUDIYĀ CĀTU-MĀSINIYĀ pavāressati. Yass’āyasmato khamati, pavāraṇā-saṅgahassa karaṇaṁ, idāni uposathaṁ karissati pāṭimokkhaṁ uddisissati, āgame KOMUDIYĀ CĀTU-MĀSINIYĀ pavāressati, so tuṇh’assa. Yassa nakkhamati, so bhāseyya.

Kato saṅghena pavāraṇā-saṅgaho, idāni uposathaṁ karissati pāṭimokkhaṁ uddisissati, āgame KOMUDIYĀ CĀTU-MĀSINIYĀ pavāressati. Khamati saṅghassa, tasmā tuṇhī. Evam-etaṁ dhārayāmi.

Venerable sirs, may the Community listen to me. While we have been living together in unity, courteously, without dispute, a certain level of comfort has been achieved. If we were to invite now, and if there are bhikkhus who, having invited, would leave to go wandering, we would be deprived of our level of comfort. If the Community is ready, it should make an Invitation-delay so that it might now perform the uposatha and recite the Pāṭimokkha, and then invite when the “water-lily” fourth month arrives. This is the motion.

Venerable sirs, may the Community listen to me. While we have been living together in unity, courteously, without dispute, a certain level of comfort has been achieved. If we were to invite now, and if there are bhikkhus who, having invited, would leave to go wandering, we would be deprived of our level of comfort. The Community is making an Invitation-delay so that it will now perform the uposatha and recite the Pāṭimokkha, and then invite when the “water-lily” fourth month arrives. He to whom the making of an Invitation-delay—so that (the Community) will now perform the uposatha and recite the Pāṭimokkha, and then invite when the “water-lily” fourth month arrives—is agreeable should remain silent. He to whom it is not agreeable should speak.

An Invitation-delay has been made by the Community so that it will now perform the uposatha and recite the Pāṭimokkha, and then invite when the “water-lily” fourth month arrives. This is agreeable to the Community, therefore it is silent. Thus do I hold it.

To delay the Invitation to the new moon (see Mv.IV.17.4):

Replace KOMUDIYĀ CĀTU-MĀSINIYĀ with KĀḶE, “the dark (moon).”

I. An insanity authorization (Mv.II.25.3-4)

Suṇātu me bhante saṅgho. Itthannāmo bhikkhu ummattako sarati pi uposathaṁ na pi sarati, sarati pi saṅgha-kammaṁ na pi sarati, āgacchati pi uposathaṁ na pi āgacchati, āgacchati pi saṅgha-kammaṁ na pi āgacchati. Yadi saṅghassa pattakallaṁ, saṅgho Itthannāmassa bhikkhuno ummattakassa ummattaka- sammatiṁ dadeyya, sareyya vā Itthannāmo bhikkhu uposathaṁ na vā sareyya, sareyya vā saṅgha-kammaṁ na vā sareyya, āgaccheyya vā uposathaṁ na vā āgaccheyya, āgaccheyya vā saṅgha-kammaṁ na vā āgaccheyya, saṅgho saha vā Itthannāmena vinā vā Itthannāmena uposathaṁ kareyya saṅgha-kammaṁ kareyya. Esā ñatti.

Suṇātu me bhante saṅgho. Itthannāmo bhikkhu ummattako sarati pi uposathaṁ na pi sarati, sarati pi saṅgha-kammaṁ na pi sarati, āgacchati pi uposathaṁ na pi āgacchati, āgacchati pi saṅgha-kammaṁ na pi āgacchati. Saṅgho Itthannāmassa bhikkhuno ummattakassa ummattaka-sammatiṁ deti, sareyya vā Itthannāmo bhikkhu uposathaṁ na vā sareyya, sareyya vā saṅgha-kammaṁ na vā sareyya, āgaccheyya vā uposathaṁ na vā āgaccheyya, āgaccheyya vā saṅgha-kammaṁ na vā āgaccheyya, saṅgho saha vā Itthannāmena vinā vā Itthannāmena uposathaṁ karissati saṅgha-kammaṁ karissati. Yass’āyasmato khamati, Itthannāmassa bhikkhuno ummattakassa ummattaka-sammatiyā dānaṁ, sareyya vā Itthannāmo bhikkhu uposathaṁ na vā sareyya, sareyya vā saṅgha-kammaṁ na vā sareyya, āgaccheyya vā uposathaṁ na vā āgaccheyya, āgaccheyya vā saṅgha-kammaṁ na vā āgaccheyya, saṅgho saha vā Itthannāmena vinā vā Itthannāmena uposathaṁ karissati saṅgha-kammaṁ karissati, so tuṇh’assa. Yassa nakkhamati, so bhāseyya.

Dinnā saṅghena Itthannāmassa bhikkhuno ummattakassa ummattaka-sammati, sareyya vā Itthannāmo bhikkhu uposathaṁ na vā sareyya, sareyya vā saṅgha-kammaṁ na vā sareyya, āgaccheyya vā uposathaṁ na vā āgaccheyya, āgaccheyya vā saṅgha-kammaṁ na vā āgaccheyya, saṅgho saha vā Itthannāmena vinā vā Itthannāmena uposathaṁ karissati saṅgha-kammaṁ karissati. Khamati saṅghassa, tasmā tuṇhī. Evam-etaṁ dhārayāmi.

Venerable sirs, may the Community listen to me. Bhikkhu (name) is insane. He sometimes remembers the uposatha and sometimes doesn’t. He sometimes remembers a Community transaction and sometimes doesn’t. He sometimes comes to the uposatha and sometimes doesn’t. He sometimes comes to a Community transaction and sometimes doesn’t. If the Community is ready, it should give . Bhikkhu (name), who is insane, an insanity authorization, so that whether he remembers the uposatha or not, whether he remembers the Community transaction or not, whether he comes to the uposatha or not, whether he comes to the Community transaction or not, the Community may perform the uposatha, may perform a Community transaction, with (name) or without him. This is the motion.

Venerable sirs, may the Community listen to me. Bhikkhu (name) is insane. He sometimes remembers the uposatha and sometimes doesn’t. He sometimes remembers a Community transaction and sometimes doesn’t. He sometimes comes to the uposatha and sometimes doesn’t. He sometimes comes to a Community transaction and sometimes doesn’t. The Community is giving Bhikkhu (name), who is insane, an insanity authorization, so that whether he remembers the uposatha or not, whether he remembers the Community transaction or not, whether he comes to the uposatha or not, whether he comes to the Community transaction or not, the Community will perform the uposatha, will perform a Community transaction, with (name) or without him.

He to whom the giving of an insanity authorization to Bhikkhu (name), who is insane—so that whether he remembers the uposatha or not, whether he remembers the Community transaction or not, whether he comes to the uposatha or not, whether he comes to the Community transaction or not, the Community will perform the uposatha, will perform a Community transaction, with (name) or without him—is agreeable should remain silent. He to whom it is not agreeable should speak.

An insanity authorization has been given by the Community to Bhikkhu (name), who is insane, so that whether he remembers the uposatha or not, whether he remembers the Community transaction or not, whether he comes to the uposatha or not, whether he comes to the Community transaction or not, the Community will perform the uposatha, will perform a Community transaction, with (name) or without him. This is agreeable to the Community, therefore it is silent. Thus do I hold it.

APPENDIX TWO

Going-forth & Acceptance

This section includes only the fixed formulae for these transactions. Passages not from the Canon are given in brackets.

In the following example, Khemako is being accepted with Ven. Jotiko as his preceptor. In an actual ordination, these names should be replaced with the actual names of the applicant and preceptor, with the proper cases endings as follows:

-o | nominative case
-a | vocative case
-aṁ | accusative case
-assa | genitive case
-ena | instrumental case

If the stem of the name ends in –a, simply duplicate the case endings given in the example. If the stem has a different ending, decline the names as follows:

-i

nominative: | -i | Assaji
vocative: | -i | Assaji
accusative: | -iṁ | Assajiṁ
genitive: | -issa or -ino | Assajissa, Assajino
instrumental: | -inā | Assajinā

-in

nominative: | -ī | Vipassī
vocative: | -i | Vipassi
accusative: | -inaṁ | Vipassinaṁ
genitive: | -ino | Vipassino
instrumental: | -inā | Vipassinā

-u (-ū)

nominative: | -u (-ū) | Bhagu
vocative: | -u | Bhagu
accusative: | -uṁ | Bhaguṁ
genitive: | -ussa or -uno | Bhagussa, Bhaguno
instrumental: | -unā | Bhagunā

-ant

nominative: | -ā | Cakkhumā
vocative: | -ā or -a | Cakkhuma
accusative: | -antaṁ | Cakkhumantaṁ
genitive: | -ato | Cakkhumato
instrumental: | -atā | Cakkhumatā

A. Going-forth (Mv.I.54.3)

Buddhaṁ saraṇam gacchāmi.

I go to the Buddha for refuge.

Dhammaṁ saraṇam gacchāmi.

I go to the Dhamma for refuge.

Saṅghaṁ saraṇam gacchāmi.

I go to the Saṅgha for refuge.

Dutiyam-pi buddhaṁ saraṇam gacchāmi.

A second time, I go to the Buddha for refuge.

Dutiyam-pi dhammaṁ saraṇam gacchāmi.

A second time, I go to the Dhamma for refuge.

Dutiyam-pi saṅghaṁ saraṇam gacchāmi.

A second time, I go to the Saṅgha for refuge.

Tatiyam-pi buddhaṁ saraṇam gacchāmi.

A third time, I go to the Buddha for refuge.

Tatiyam-pi dhammaṁ saraṇam gacchāmi.

A third time, I go to the Dhamma for refuge.

Tatiyam-pi saṅghaṁ saraṇam gacchāmi.

A third time, I go to the Saṅgha for refuge.

Ten training rules: (Mv.I.56)

Pāṇātipātā veramaṇī,

Refraining from killing living beings,

Adinnādānā veramaṇī,

Refraining from taking what is not given,

Abrahma-cariyā veramaṇī,

Refraining from uncelibate conduct,

Musā-vādā veramaṇī,

Refraining from false speech,

Surā-meraya-majja-pamādaṭṭhānā veramaṇī,

Refraining from alcohol and fermented liquors that cause heedlessness,

Vikāla-bhojanā veramaṇī,

Refraining from eating at the wrong time,

Nacca-gīta-vādita-visūka-dassanā veramaṇī,

Refraining from dancing, singing, music, and going to see entertainments,

Mālā-gandha-vilepana-dhāraṇa-maṇḍana-vibhūsanaṭṭhānā veramaṇī,

Refraining from wearing garlands, using perfumes, and beautifying the body with cosmetics,

Uccāsayana-mahāsayanā veramaṇī,

Refraining from using high or large beds,

Jātarūpa-rajata-paṭiggahaṇā veramaṇī:

Refraining from accepting gold and silver [money]:

[Imāni dasa sikkhā-padāni samādiyāmi.

I undertake these ten training rules.]

B. Acceptance

Taking a Preceptor: (Mv.I.25.7)

Applicant:
Uppajjhāyo me bhante hohi. (Three times)
Venerable sir, be my preceptor.

Preceptor:
Sāhu. (Very well.) or
Lahu. (Certainly.) or
Opāyikaṁ. (All right.) or
Paṭirūpaṁ. (It is proper.) or
Pāsādikena sampādehi. (Attain consummation in an amicable way.)

Scrutiny of the robes & bowl: (Mv.I.76.3)

Ayan-te patto.

This is your bowl.

[Āma, bhante.

Yes, venerable sir.]

Ayaṁ saṅghāṭi.

This is the outer robe.

[Āma, bhante.

Yes, venerable sir.]

Ayaṁ uttarāsaṅgo.

This is the upper robe.

[Āma, bhante.

Yes, venerable sir.]

Ayaṁ antaravāsako.

This is the lower robe.

[Āma, bhante.

Yes, venerable sir.]

Gaccha amumhi okāse tiṭṭhāhi.

Go stand in that spot over there.

Appointing oneself to instruct the applicant: (Mv.I.76.5)

Suṇātu me bhante saṅgho. (Khemako) āyasmato (Jotikassa) upasampadāpekkho. Yadi saṅghassa pattakallaṁ, ahaṁ (Khemakaṁ) anusāseyyaṁ.

Venerable sirs, may the Community listen to me. (Khemako) is Venerable (Jotiko’s) applicant for Acceptance. If the Community is ready, I will instruct (Khemako).

Instructing the applicant outside the gathering: (Mv.I.76.7)

Suṇasi (Khemaka) ayan-te sacca-kālo bhūta-kālo. Yaṁ jātaṁ taṁ saṅgha-majjhe pucchante. Santaṁ atthīti vattabbaṁ. Asantaṁ n’atthīti vattabbaṁ. Mā kho vitthāsi. Mā kho maṅku ahosi. Evan-taṁ pucchissanti: Santi te evarūpā ābādhā?

Listen, Khemako. This is your time for the truth, your time for what is factual. They ask (§) in the midst of the Community about what has occurred. Whatever is so should be affirmed. Whatever is not should be denied. Do not be embarrassed. Do not be abashed. They will ask about that in this way: Do you have any diseases such as these?

Question: | Answer:
Kuṭṭhaṁ? | N’atthi, bhante.
Gaṇḍo? | N’atthi, bhante.
Kilāso? | N’atthi, bhante.
Soso? | N’atthi, bhante.
Apamāro? | N’atthi, bhante.
Manusso’si? | Āma, bhante.
Puriso’si? | Āma, bhante.
Bhujisso’si? | Āma, bhante.
Anaṇo’si? | Āma, bhante.
N’asi rāja-bhaṭo? | Āma, bhante.
Anuññāto’si mātā-pitūhi? | Āma, bhante.
Paripuṇṇa-vīsati vasso’si? | Āma, bhante.
Paripuṇṇan-te patta-cīvaraṁ? | Āma, bhante.
Kin-nāmo’si? | Ahaṁ bhante (Khemako) nāma.
Ko nāma te upajjhāyo? | Upajjhāyo me bhante āyasmā (Jotiko) nāma.

Question: | Answer:
Leprosy? | No, sir.
Boils? | No, sir.
Eczema? | No, sir.
Tuberculosis? | No, sir.
Epilepsy? | No, sir.
Are you a human being? | Yes, sir.
Are you a man? | Yes, sir.
Are you a free man? | Yes, sir.
Are you free from debt? | Yes, sir.
Are you exempt from government service? | Yes, sir.
Do you have your parents’ permission? | Yes, sir.
Are you fully 20 years old? | Yes, sir.
Are your bowl and robes complete? | Yes, sir.
What is your name? | Venerable sir, I am named (Khemako).
What is your preceptor’s name? | Venerable sir, my preceptor is named (Jotiko).

Calling the applicant into the gathering: (Mv.I.76.8)

Suṇātu me bhante saṅgho. (Khemako) āyasmato (Jotikassa) upasampadāpekkho. Anussiṭṭho so mayā. Yadi saṅghassa pattakallaṁ, (Khemako) āgaccheyya.

Āgacchāhi.

Venerable sirs, may the Community listen to me. (Khemako) is Venerable (Jotiko’s) applicant for Acceptance. He has been instructed by me. If the Community is ready, (Khemako) may come.

Come.

Requesting Acceptance: (Mv.I.76.8)

Saṅgham-bhante upasampadaṁ yācāmi. Ullumpatu maṁ bhante saṅgho anukampaṁ upādāya.

Dutiyam-pi bhante saṅghaṁ upasampadaṁ yācāmi. Ullumpatu maṁ bhante saṅgho anukampaṁ upādāya.

Tatiyam-pi bhante saṅghaṁ upasampadaṁ yācāmi. Ullumpatu maṁ bhante saṅgho anukampaṁ upādāya.

Venerable sirs, I request Acceptance from the Community. May the Community, out of sympathy, lift me up.

A second time… A third time, venerable sirs, I request Acceptance from the Community. May the Community, out of sympathy, lift me up.

Appointing oneself to question the applicant: (Mv.I.76.9)

Suṇātu me bhante saṅgho. Ayaṁ (Khemako) āyasmato (Jotikassa) upasampadāpekkho. Yadi saṅghassa pattakallaṁ, ahaṁ (Khemakaṁ) antarāyike dhamme puccheyyaṁ.

Venerable sirs, may the Community listen to me. This (Khemako) is Venerable (Jotiko’s) applicant for Acceptance. If the Community is ready, I will ask (Khemako) about the obstructing factors.

Suṇasi (Khemaka) ayan-te sacca-kālo bhūta-kālo. Yaṁ jātaṁ taṁ pucchāmi. Santaṁ atthīti vattabbaṁ. Asantaṁ n’attīti vattabbaṁ. Santi te evarūpā ābādhā?

Listen, (Khemako). This is the time for the truth, the time for what is factual. I ask you about things that have occurred. Whatever is so should be affirmed. Whatever is not should be denied. Do you have any diseases such as these?

(Questions and answers as before.)

Transaction statement: (Mv.I.76.10-12)

Suṇātu me bhante saṅgho. Ayaṁ (Khemako) āyasmato (Jotikassa) upasampadāpekkho. Parisuddho antarāyikehi dhammehi. Paripuṇṇ’assa patta-cīvaraṁ. (Khemako) saṅghaṁ upasampadaṁ yācati, āyasmatā (Jotikena) upajjhāyena. Yadi saṅghassa pattakallaṁ, saṅgho (Khemakaṁ) upasampādeyya, āyasmatā (Jotikena) upajjhāyena. Esā ñatti.

Suṇātu me bhante saṅgho. Ayaṁ (Khemako) āyasmato (Jotikassa) upasampadāpekkho. Parisuddho antarāyikehi dhammehi. Paripuṇṇ’assa patta-cīvaraṁ. (Khemako) saṅghaṁ upasampadaṁ yācati, āyasmatā (Jotikena) upajjhāyena. Saṅgho (Khemakaṁ) upasampādeti, āyasmatā (Jotikena) upajjhāyena. Yass’āyasmato khamati, (Khemakassa) upasampadā, āyasmatā (Jotikena) upajjhāyena, so tuṇh’assa. Yassa nakkhamati, so bhāseyya.

Dutiyam-pi etam-atthaṁ vadāmi. Suṇātu me bhante saṅgho. Ayaṁ (Khemako) āyasmato (Jotikassa) upasampadāpekkho. Parisuddho antarāyikehi dhammehi. Paripuṇṇ’assa patta-cīvaraṁ. (Khemako) saṅghaṁ upasampadaṁ yācati, āyasmatā (Jotikena) upajjhāyena. Saṅgho (Khemakaṁ) upasampādeti, āyasmatā (Jotikena) upajjhāyena. Yass’āyasmato khamati, (Khemakassa) upasampadā, āyasmatā (Jotikena) upajjhāyena, so tuṇh’assa. Yassa nakkhamati, so bhāseyya.

Tatiyam-pi etam-atthaṁ vadāmi. Suṇātu me bhante saṅgho. Ayaṁ (Khemako) āyasmato (Jotikassa) upasampadāpekkho. Parisuddho antarāyikehi dhammehi. Paripuṇṇ’assa patta-cīvaraṁ. (Khemako) saṅghaṁ upasampadaṁ yācati, āyasmatā (Jotikena) upajjhāyena. Saṅgho (Khemakaṁ) upasampādeti, āyasmatā (Jotikena) upajjhāyena. Yass’āyasmato khamati, (Khemakassa) upasampadā, āyasmatā (Jotikena) upajjhāyena, so tuṇh’assa. Yassa nakkhamati, so bhāseyya.

Upasampanno saṅghena (Khemako), āyasmatā (Jotikena) upajjhāyena. Khamati saṅghassa, tasmā tuṇhī. Evam-etaṁ dhārayāmi.

Venerable sirs, may the Community listen to me. This (Khemako) is Venerable (Jotiko’s) applicant for Acceptance. He is free of the obstructing factors. His bowl and robes are complete. (Khemako) requests Acceptance from the Community with Venerable (Jotiko) as preceptor. If the Community is ready, it should accept (Khemako) with Venerable (Jotiko) as preceptor. This is the motion.

Venerable sirs, may the Community listen to me. This (Khemako) is Venerable (Jotiko’s) applicant for Acceptance. He is free of the obstructing factors. His bowl and robes are complete. (Khemako) requests Acceptance from the Community with Venerable (Jotiko) as preceptor. The Community is accepting (Khemako) with Venerable (Jotiko) as preceptor. He to whom the Acceptance of (Khemako) with Venerable (Jotiko) as preceptor is agreeable should remain silent. He to whom it is not agreeable should speak.

A second time… A third time I speak of this matter. Venerable sirs, may the Community listen to me…. He to whom it is not agreeable should speak.

(Khemako) has been accepted by the Community, with Venerable (Jotiko) as preceptor. This is agreeable to the Community, therefore it is silent. Thus do I hold it.

C. Accepting a pair of applicants:

In the following passages, the phrases differing from those used for a single applicant are capitalized. In this example, Dhīro and Abhayo are being accepted with Ven. Suvaco as their preceptor.

Appointing oneself to instruct the applicants:

Suṇātu me bhante saṅgho. (DHĪRO) CA (ABHAYO) CA āyasmato (Suvacassa) UPASAMPADĀPEKKHĀ. Yadi saṅghassa pattakallaṁ, ahaṁ (DHĪRAÑCA ABHAYAÑCA) anusāseyyaṁ.

Calling the applicants into the gathering:

Suṇātu me bhante saṅgho. (DHĪRO) CA (ABHAYO) CA āyasmato (Suvacassa) UPASAMPADĀPEKKHĀ. ANUSIṬṬHĀ TE mayā. Yadi saṅghassa pattakallaṁ, (DHĪRO) CA (ABHAYO) CA ĀGACCHEYYUṀ.

ĀGACCHATHA.

Requesting Acceptance:

Saṅgham-bhante upasampadaṁ YĀCĀMA. Ullumpatu NO bhante saṅgho anukampaṁ upādāya.

Dutiyam-pi bhante saṅghaṁ upasampadaṁ YĀCĀMA. Ullumpatu NO bhante saṅgho anukampaṁ upādāya.

Tatiyam-pi bhante saṅghaṁ upasampadaṁ YĀCĀMA. Ullumpatu NO bhante saṅgho anukampaṁ upādāya.

Appointing oneself to question the applicants:

Suṇātu me bhante saṅgho. AYAÑCA (DHĪRO) AYAÑCA (ABHAYO) āyasmato (Suvacassa) UPASAMPADĀPEKKHĀ. Yadi saṅghassa pattakallaṁ, ahaṁ (DHĪRAÑCA ABHAYAÑCA) antarāyike dhamme puccheyyaṁ.

Transaction statement:

Suṇātu me bhante saṅgho. AYAÑCA (DHĪRO) AYAÑCA (ABHAYO) āyasmato (Suvacassa) UPASAMPADĀPEKKHĀ. PARISUDDHĀ antarāyikehi dhammehi. PARIPUṆṆAM-IMESAṀ patta-cīvaraṁ. (DHĪRO) CA (ABHAYO) CA saṅghaṁ upasampadaṁ YĀCANTI, āyasmatā (Suvacena) upajjhāyena. Yadi saṅghassa pattakallaṁ, saṅgho (DHĪRAÑCA ABHAYAÑCA) upasampādeyya, āyasmata (Suvacena) upajjhāyena. Esā ñatti.

Suṇātu me bhante saṅgho. AYAÑCA (DHĪRO) AYAÑCA (ABHAYO) āyasmato (Suvacassa) UPASAMPADĀPEKKHĀ. PARISUDDHĀ antarāyikehi dhammehi. PARIPUṆṆAM-IMESAṀ patta-cīvaraṁ. (DHĪRO) CA (ABHAYO) CA saṅghaṁ upasampadaṁ YĀCANTI, āyasmatā (Suvacena) upajjhāyena. Saṅgho (DHĪRAÑCA ABHAYAÑCA) UPASAMPĀDETI, āyasmatā (Suvacena) upajjhāyena. Yass’āyasmato khamati, (DHĪRASSA) CA (ABHAYASSA) CA upasampadā, āyasmatā (Suvacena) upajjhāyena, so tuṇh’assa. Yassa nakkhamati, so bhāseyya.

Dutiyam-pi etam-atthaṁ vadāmi. Suṇātu me bhante saṅgho. AYAÑCA (DHĪRO) AYAÑCA (ABHAYO) āyasmato (Suvacassa) UPASAMPADĀPEKKHĀ…. so bhāseyya.

Tatiyam-pi etam-atthaṁ vadāmi. Suṇātu me bhante saṅgho. AYAÑCA (DHĪRO) AYAÑCA (ABHAYO) āyasmato (Suvacassa) UPASAMPADĀPEKKHĀ…. so bhāseyya.

UPASAMPANNĀ saṅghena (DHĪRO) CA (ABHAYO) CA, āyasmatā (Suvacena) upajjhāyena. Khamati saṅghassa, tasmā tuṇhī. Evam-etaṁ dhārayāmi.

D. Admonition

[Anuññāsi kho bhagavā upasampādetvā cattāro nissaye cattāri ca akaraṇīyāni ācikkhituṁ.

The Blessed One has given permission that, when one as been accepted, one be told the four supports, together with the four things never to be done.]

The Four Supports: (Mv.I.77.1)

Alms-food

Piṇḍiyālopa-bhojanaṁ nissāya pabbajjā, tattha te yāva-jīvaṁ ussāho karaṇīyo. Atireka-lābho saṅgha-bhattaṁ uddesa-bhattaṁ nimantanaṁ salāka-bhattaṁ pakkhikaṁ uposathikaṁ pāṭipadikaṁ.

Going-Forth has alms-food as its support. For the rest of your life you are to endeavor at that. The extra allowances are: a meal for the Community, a meal for a specific number of bhikkhus, a meal for bhikkhus invited by name, a meal given by tickets, a meal given fortnightly, a meal on the uposatha day, a meal on the day after the uposatha.

Rag-robes

Paṁsukūla-cīvaraṁ nissāya pabbajjā, tattha te yāva-jīvaṁ ussāho karaṇīyo. Atireka-lābho khomaṁ kappāsikaṁ koseyyaṁ kambalaṁ sāṇaṁ bhaṅgaṁ.

Going-Forth has rag-robes as its support. For the rest of your life you are to endeavor at that. The extra allowances are: (robes made of) linen, cotton, silk, wool, jute, hemp.

Dwelling at the foot of a tree

Rukkha-mūla-senāsanaṁ nissāya pabbajjā, tattha te yāva-jīvaṁ ussāho karaṇīyo. Atireka-lābho vihāro aḍḍhayogo pāsādo hammiyaṁ guhā.

Going-Forth has dwelling at the foot of a tree as its support. For the rest of your life you are to endeavor at that. The extra allowances are: a dwelling, a barrel-vaulted building, a multi-storied building, a gabled building, a cell.

Fermented urine as medicine

Pūtimutta-bhesajjaṁ nissāya pabbajjā, tattha te yāva-jīvaṁ ussāho karaṇīyo. Atireka-lābho sappi navanītaṁ telaṁ madhu phāṇitaṁ.

Going-Forth has fermented urine medicine as its support. For the rest of your life you are to endeavor at that. The extra allowances are: ghee, fresh butter, oil, honey, sugar.

The Four Things Never to be Done: (Mv.I.78.2-5)

Sexual intercourse

Upasampannena bhikkhunā methuno dhammo na paṭisevitabbo, antamaso tiracchānagatāyapi. Yo bhikkhu methunaṁ dhammaṁ paṭisevati, assamaṇo hoti asakya-puttiyo.

Seyyathāpi nāma puriso sīsacchinno abhabbo tena sarīra-bandhanena jīvituṁ, evam-eva bhikkhu methunaṁ dhammaṁ paṭisevitvā assamaṇo hoti asakya-puttiyo. Tan-te yāva-jīvaṁ akaraṇīyaṁ.

A bhikkhu who has been accepted should not engage in sexual intercourse, even with a female animal. Any bhikkhu who engages in sexual intercourse is not a contemplative, not one of the sons of the Sakyan. Just as a person with his head cut off could not live with it fastened (back) on his body, in the same way a bhikkhu who has engaged in sexual intercourse is not a contemplative, not one of the sons of the Sakyan. You are not to do this for the rest of your life.

Taking what is not given

Upasampannena bhikkhunā adinnaṁ theyya-saṅkhātaṁ na ādātabbaṁ, antamaso tiṇa-salākaṁ upādāya. Yo bhikkhu pādaṁ vā pādārahaṁ vā atireka-pādaṁ vā adinnaṁ theyya-saṅkhātaṁ ādiyati, assamaṇo hoti asakya-puttiyo.

Seyyathāpi nāma paṇḍupalāso bandhana-pamutto abhabbo haritattāya, evam-eva bhikkhu pādaṁ vā pādārahaṁ vā atireka-pādaṁ vā adinnaṁ theyya-saṅkhātaṁ ādiyitvā assamaṇo hoti asakya-puttiyo. Tan-te yāva-jīvaṁ akaraṇīyaṁ.

A bhikkhu who has been accepted should not, in what is reckoned a theft, take what has not been given, even if it is only a blade of grass. Any bhikkhu who, in what is reckoned a theft, takes what has not been given—worth either one Pāda, the equivalent of one Pāda, or more—is not a contemplative, not one of the sons of the Sakyan. Just as a withered leaf removed from its stem can never become green again, in the same way a bhikkhu who, in what is reckoned a theft, has taken what has not been given—worth either one Pāda, the equivalent of one Pāda, or more—is not a contemplative, not one of the sons of the Sakyan. You are not to do this for the rest of your life.

Depriving a human being of life

Upasampannena bhikkhunā sañcicca pāṇo jīvitā na voropetabbo, antamaso kuntha-kipillikaṁ upādāya. Yo bhikkhu sañcicca manussa-viggahaṁ jīvitā voropeti, antamaso gabbha-pātanaṁ upādāya, assamaṇo hoti asakya-puttiyo.

Seyyathāpi nāma puthusilā dvidhā bhinnā appaṭisandhikā hoti, evam-eva bhikkhu sañcicca manussa-viggahaṁ jīvitā voropetvā, assamaṇo hoti asakya-puttiyo. Tan-te yāva-jīvaṁ akaraṇīyaṁ.

A bhikkhu who has been accepted should not deprive a living being of life, even if it is only a black or white ant. Any bhikkhu who intentionally deprives a human being of life, even to the extent of causing an abortion, is not a contemplative, not one of the sons of the Sakyan. Just as a solid block of stone broken in two cannot be joined together again, in the same way a bhikkhu who has intentionally deprived a human being of life is not a contemplative, not one of the sons of the Sakyan. You are not to do this for the rest of your life.

Claiming unfactual superior human states

Upasampannena bhikkhunā uttari-manussa-dhammo na ullapitabbo, antamaso suññāgāre abhiramāmīti. Yo bhikkhu pāpiccho icchā-pakato asantaṁ abhūtaṁ uttari-manussa-dhammaṁ ullapati, jhānaṁ vā vimokkhaṁ vā samādhiṁ vā samāpattiṁ vā maggaṁ vā phalaṁ vā, assamaṇo hoti asakya-puttiyo.

Seyyathāpi nāma tālo matthakacchinno abhabbo puna viruḷhiyā, evam-eva bhikkhu pāpiccho icchā-pakato asantaṁ abhūtaṁ uttari-manussa-dhammaṁ ullapitvā, assamaṇo hoti asakya-puttiyo. Tan-te yāva-jīvaṁ akaraṇīyaṁ.

A bhikkhu who has been accepted should not lay claim to a superior human state, even to the extent of saying, “I delight in an empty dwelling.” Any bhikkhu who—with evil desires, overwhelmed with greed—lays claim to a superior human state that is unfactual and non-existent in himself—absorption, freedom, concentration, attainment, path, or fruition—is not a contemplative, not one of the sons of the Sakyan. Just as a Palmyra palm cut off at the crown is incapable of further growth, in the same way a bhikkhu who—with evil desires, overwhelmed with greed—has lain claim to a superior human state that is unfactual and non-existent in himself is not a contemplative, not one of the sons of the Sakyan. You are not to do this for the rest of your life.

(When giving the Admonition to two or more new bhikkhus at the same time, change the word TE to VO throughout. Thus,

tattha te yāva-jīvaṁ → tattha vo yāva-jīvaṁ;

tan-te yāva-jīvaṁ → taṁ vo yāva-jīvaṁ.

E. Probation for an applicant previously ordained in another religion:

Request for probation: (Mv.I.38.3)

Ahaṁ bhante Itthannāmo añña-titthiya-pubbo imasmiṁ dhamma-vinaye ākaṅkhāmi upasampadaṁ. So’haṁ bhante saṅghaṁ cattāro māse parivāsaṁ yācāmi.

Ahaṁ bhante Itthannāmo añña-titthiya-pubbo imasmiṁ dhamma-vinaye ākaṅkhāmi upasampadaṁ. So’haṁ dutiyam-pi bhante saṅghaṁ cattāro māse parivāsaṁ yācāmi.

Ahaṁ bhante Itthannāmo añña-titthiya-pubbo imasmiṁ dhamma-vinaye ākaṅkhāmi upasampadaṁ. So’haṁ tatiyam-pi bhante saṅghaṁ cattāro māse parivāsaṁ yācāmi.

Venerable sirs, I—(name), previously a member of another religion—desire Acceptance into this Dhamma-vinaya. I ask the Community for probation for four months.

Venerable sirs, I—(name), previously a member of another religion—desire Acceptance into this Dhamma-vinaya. A second time… A third time, I ask the Community for probation for four months.

Transaction statement: (Mv.I.38.4)

Suṇātu me bhante saṅgho. Ayaṁ Itthannāmo añña-titthiya-pubbo imasmiṁ dhamma-vinaye ākaṅkhati upasampadaṁ. So saṅghaṁ cattāro māse parivāsaṁ yācati. Yadi saṅghassa pattakallaṁ, saṅgho Itthannāmassa añña-titthiya-pubbassa cattāro māse parivāsaṁ dadeyya. Esā ñatti.

Suṇātu me bhante saṅgho. Ayaṁ Itthannāmo añña-titthiya-pubbo imasmiṁ dhamma-vinaye ākaṅkhati upasampadaṁ. So saṅghaṁ cattāro māse parivāsaṁ yācati. Saṅgho Itthannāmassa añña-titthiya-pubbassa cattāro māse parivāsaṁ deti. Yass’āyasmato khamati, Itthannāmassa añña-titthiya-pubbassa cattāro māse parivāsassa dānaṁ, so tuṇh’assa. Yassa nakkhamati, so bhāseyya.

Dinno saṅghena Itthannāmassa añña-titthiya-pubbassa cattāro māse parivāso. Khamati saṅghassa, tasmā tuṇhī. Evam-etaṁ dhārayāmi.

Venerable sirs, may the Community listen to me. This (name), previously a member of another religion, desires Acceptance in this Dhamma- vinaya. He asks the Community for probation for four months. If the Community is ready, it should grant (name), previously a member of another religion, probation for four months. This is the motion.

Venerable sirs, may the Community listen to me. This (name), previously a member of another religion, desires Acceptance in this Dhamma-vinaya. He asks the Community for probation for four months. The Community is granting (name), previously a member of another religion, probation for four months. He to whom the granting of probation for four months to (name), previously a member of another religion, is agreeable should remain silent. He to whom it is not agreeable should speak.

Probation for four months has been granted by the Community to (name), previously a member of another religion. This is agreeable to the Community, therefore it is silent. Thus do I hold it.

APPENDIX THREE

Vuṭṭhāna-vidhī for Saṅghādisesa Offenses

It would be impossible to give examples for all the various permutations that could conceivably happen when a bhikkhu has committed a saṅghādisesa offense and must negotiate the vuṭṭhāna-vidhī. Here, only some of the more likely permutations are given. Others can be inferred from what is given here. The best way to use this appendix would be to read through the first few examples—which are given in full, with complete translations—to get a sense of their basic pattern. This pattern can then be applied to complete the later examples given in an incomplete form. For example, in some of the later cases, only the request for probation is given. The remaining statements for the vuṭṭhāna-vidhī in such cases can be inferred by comparing the request given in those cases with the request in an earlier, complete, example, noticing where the two differ, and then making appropriate adjustments in the remaining statements given in the complete example. Similarly, there are some cases where no translations are given. The translations here may be inferred from the translations included in earlier examples. For instance, the translation for the transaction statement granting penance for multiple unconcealed offenses may be inferred by comparing the translations given for the request for multiple unconcealed offenses with the translation for the transaction statement for granting penance for one unconcealed offense.

A. For one unconcealed offense

The basic example given here, and in most of the following cases, is for the offense of intentional emission of semen. The phrases specific to this offense are given in capital letters in the examples for one unconcealed offense. They are not capitalized in other examples, but should be recognizable. Variations for other offenses are given after the request. These may be inserted in the place of the capitalized phrases in the basic example. These variations can be used in other vuṭṭhāna-vidhī statements for single offenses as well.

Requesting penance (mānatta): (Cv.III.1.2)

Ahaṁ bhante ekaṁ āpattiṁ āpajjiṁ SAÑCETANIKAṀ SUKKA-VISAṬṬHIṀ apaṭicchannaṁ. So’haṁ bhante saṅghaṁ ekissā āpattiyā SAÑCETANIKĀYA SUKKA-VISAṬṬHIYĀ apaṭicchannāya chārattaṁ mānattaṁ yācāmi.

Ahaṁ bhante ekaṁ āpattiṁ āpajjiṁ SAÑCETANIKAṀ SUKKA-VISAṬṬHIṀ apaṭicchannaṁ. So’haṁ dutiyam-pi bhante saṅghaṁ ekissā āpattiyā SAÑCETANIKĀYA SUKKA-VISAṬṬHIYĀ apaṭicchannāya chārattaṁ mānattaṁ yācāmi.

Ahaṁ bhante ekaṁ āpattiṁ āpajjiṁ SAÑCETANIKAṀ SUKKA-VISAṬṬHIṀ apaṭicchannaṁ. So’haṁ tatiyam-pi bhante saṅghaṁ ekissā āpattiyā SAÑCETANIKĀYA SUKKA-VISAṬṬHIYĀ apaṭicchannāya chārattaṁ mānattaṁ yācāmi.

Venerable sirs, I have fallen into one offense, unconcealed, of intentional semen-emission. I ask the Community for the six-day penance for one offense, unconcealed, of intentional semen-emission.

Venerable sirs…. A second time…. A third time, I ask the Community for the six-day penance for one offense, unconcealed, of intentional semen-emission.

For other offenses:

bodily contact: KĀYA-SAṀSAGGAṀ / KĀYA-SAṀSAGGĀYA

lewd statement: DUṬṬHULLA-VĀCAṀ / DUṬṬHULLA-VĀCĀYA

a statement (recommending) ministering to one’s own sensual passion: ATTA-KĀMA-PĀRICARIYAṀ VĀCAṀ / ATTA-KĀMA-PĀRICARIYĀYA VĀCĀYA

acting as a go-between: SAÑCARITTAṀ / SAÑCARITTĀYA

Transaction statement for granting penance: (Cv.III.1.3)

Suṇātu me bhante saṅgho. Ayaṁ Itthannāmo bhikkhu ekaṁ āpattiṁ āpajji SAÑCETANIKAṀ SUKKA-VISAṬṬHIṀ apaṭicchannaṁ. So saṅghaṁ ekissā āpattiyā SAÑCETANIKĀYA SUKKA-VISAṬṬHIYĀ apaṭicchannāya chārattaṁ mānattaṁ yācati. Yadi saṅghassa pattakallaṁ, saṅgho Itthannāmassa bhikkhuno ekissā āpattiyā SAÑCETANIKĀYA SUKKA-VISAṬṬHIYĀ apaṭicchannāya chārattaṁ mānattaṁ dadeyya. Esā ñatti.

Suṇātu me bhante saṅgho. Ayaṁ Itthannāmo bhikkhu ekaṁ āpattiṁ āpajji SAÑCETANIKAṀ SUKKA-VISAṬṬHIṀ apaṭicchannaṁ. So saṅghaṁ ekissā āpattiyā SAÑCETANIKĀYA SUKKA-VISAṬṬHIYĀ apaṭicchannāya chārattaṁ mānattaṁ yācati. Saṅgho Itthannāmassa bhikkhuno ekissā āpattiyā SAÑCETANIKĀYA SUKKA-VISAṬṬHIYĀ apaṭicchannāya chārattaṁ mānattaṁ deti. Yass’āyasmato khamati, Itthannāmassa bhikkhuno ekissā āpattiyā SAÑCETANIKĀYA SUKKA-VISAṬṬHIYĀ apaṭicchannāya chārattaṁ mānattassa dānaṁ, so tuṇh’assa. Yassa nakkhamati, so bhāseyya.

Dutiyam-pi etam-atthaṁ vadāmi. Suṇātu me bhante saṅgho…. so bhāseyya.

Tatiyam-pi etam-atthaṁ vadāmi. Suṇātu me bhante saṅgho…. so bhāseyya.

Dinnaṁ saṅghena Itthannāmassa bhikkhuno ekissā āpattiyā SAÑCETANIKĀYA SUKKA-VISAṬṬHIYĀ apaṭicchannāya chārattaṁ mānattaṁ. Khamati saṅghassa, tasmā tuṇhī. Evam-etaṁ dhārayāmi.

Venerable sirs, may the Community listen to me. This Bhikkhu (name) has fallen into one offense, unconcealed, of intentional semen-emission. He asks the Community for the six-day penance for one offense, unconcealed, of intentional semen-emission. If the Community is ready, it should grant Bhikkhu (name) the six-day penance for one offense, unconcealed, of intentional semen-emission. This is the motion.

Venerable sirs, may the Community listen to me. This Bhikkhu (name) has fallen into one offense, unconcealed, of intentional semen-emission. He asks the Community for the six-day penance for one offense, unconcealed, of intentional semen-emission. The Community is granting Bhikkhu (name) the six-day penance for one offense, unconcealed, of intentional semen-emission. He to whom the granting of the six-day penance to Bhikkhu (name) for one offense, unconcealed, of intentional semen-emission is agreeable should remain silent. He to whom it is not agreeable should speak.

A second time… A third time I speak about this matter….

The six-day penance has been granted by the Community to Bhikkhu (name) for one offense, unconcealed, of intentional semen-emission. This is agreeable to the Community, therefore it is silent. Thus do I hold it.

Notifying other bhikkhus of one’s penance:

Ahaṁ bhante ekaṁ āpattiṁ āpajjiṁ SAÑCETANIKAṀ SUKKA-VISAṬṬHIṀ apaṭicchannaṁ. So’haṁ saṅghaṁ ekissā āpattiyā SAÑCETANIKĀYA SUKKA-VISAṬṬHIYĀ apaṭicchannāya chārattaṁ mānattaṁ yāciṁ. Tassa me saṅgho ekissā āpattiyā SAÑCETANIKĀYA SUKKA-VISAṬṬHIYĀ apaṭicchannāya chārattaṁ mānattaṁ adāsi. So’haṁ mānattaṁ carāmi. Vedayām’ahaṁ bhante, vedayatīti maṁ saṅgho dhāretu.

Venerable sirs, I have fallen into one offense, unconcealed, of intentional semen-emission. I asked the Community for the six-day penance for one offense, unconcealed, of intentional semen-emission. The Community granted me the six-day penance for one offense, unconcealed, of intentional semen-emission. I am undergoing penance. I notify you (of this), venerable sirs. May the Community remember me as one who has notified.

(When notifying three bhikkhus, say—instead of saṅgho dhāretu—āyasmanto dhārentu; for two bhikkhus, āyasmantā dhārentu; for a single bhikkhu, āyasmā dhāretu.)

Requesting rehabilitation (abbhāna): (Cv.III.2.2)

Ahaṁ bhante ekaṁ āpattiṁ āpajjiṁ SAÑCETANIKAṀ SUKKA-VISAṬṬHIṀ apaṭicchannaṁ. So’haṁ saṅghaṁ ekissā āpattiyā SAÑCETANIKĀYA SUKKA-VISAṬṬHIYĀ apaṭicchannāya chārattaṁ mānattaṁ yāciṁ. Tassa me saṅgho ekissā āpattiyā SAÑCETANIKĀYA SUKKA-VISAṬṬHIYĀ apaṭicchannāya chārattaṁ mānattaṁ adāsi. So’haṁ bhante ciṇṇa-mānatto saṅghaṁ abbhānaṁ yācāmi.

Ahaṁ bhante ekaṁ āpattiṁ āpajjiṁ SAÑCETANIKAṀ SUKKA-VISAṬṬHIṀ apaṭicchannaṁ…. So’haṁ bhante ciṇṇa-mānatto dutiyam-pi saṅghaṁ abbhānaṁ yācāmi.

Ahaṁ bhante ekaṁ āpattiṁ āpajjiṁ SAÑCETANIKAṀ SUKKA-VISAṬṬHIṀ apaṭicchannaṁ…. So’haṁ bhante ciṇṇa-mānatto tatiyam-pi saṅghaṁ abbhānaṁ yācāmi.

Venerable sirs, I have fallen into one offense, unconcealed, of intentional semen-emission. I asked the Community for the six-day penance for one offense, unconcealed, of intentional semen-emission. The Community granted me the six-day penance for one offense, unconcealed, of intentional semen-emission. I—having undergone penance—ask the Community for rehabilitation.

Venerable sirs…. A second time…. A third time, I—having undergone penance—ask the Community for rehabilitation.

Transaction statement for granting rehabilitation: (Cv.III.2.3)

Suṇātu me bhante saṅgho. Ayaṁ Itthannāmo bhikkhu ekaṁ āpattiṁ āpajji SAÑCETANIKAṀ SUKKA-VISAṬṬHIṀ apaṭicchannaṁ. So saṅghaṁ ekissā āpattiyā SAÑCETANIKĀYA SUKKA-VISAṬṬHIYĀ apaṭicchannāya chārattaṁ mānattaṁ yāci. Tassa saṅgho ekissā āpattiyā SAÑCETANIKĀYA SUKKA-VISAṬṬHIYĀ apaṭicchannāya chārattaṁ mānattaṁ adāsi. So ciṇṇa-mānatto saṅghaṁ abbhānaṁ yācati. Yadi saṅghassa pattakallaṁ, saṅgho Itthannāmaṁ bhikkhuṁ abbheyya. Esā ñatti.

Suṇātu me bhante saṅgho. Ayaṁ Itthannāmo bhikkhu ekaṁ āpattiṁ āpajji SAÑCETANIKAṀ SUKKA-VISAṬṬHIṀ apaṭicchannaṁ. So saṅghaṁ ekissā āpattiyā SAÑCETANIKĀYA SUKKA-VISAṬṬHIYĀ apaṭicchannāya chārattaṁ mānattaṁ yāci. Tassa saṅgho ekissā āpattiyā SAÑCETANIKĀYA SUKKA-VISAṬṬHIYĀ apaṭicchannāya chārattaṁ mānattaṁ adāsi. So ciṇṇa-mānatto saṅghaṁ abbhānaṁ yācati. Saṅgho Itthannāmaṁ bhikkhuṁ abbheti. Yass’āyasmato khamati, Itthannāmassa bhikkhuno abbhānaṁ, so tuṇh’assa. Yassa nakkhamati, so bhāseyya.

Dutiyam-pi etam-atthaṁ vadāmi. Suṇātu me bhante saṅgho…. so bhāseyya.

Tatiyam-pi etam-atthaṁ vadāmi. Suṇātu me bhante saṅgho…. so bhāseyya.

Abbhito saṅghena Itthannāmo bhikkhu. Khamati saṅghassa, tasmā tuṇhī. Evam-etaṁ dhārayāmi.

Venerable sirs, may the Community listen to me. This Bhikkhu (name) has fallen into one offense, unconcealed, of intentional semen-emission. He asked the Community for the six-day penance for one offense, unconcealed, of intentional semen-emission. The Community granted him the six-day penance for one offense, unconcealed, of intentional semen-emission. He—having undergone penance—asks the Community for rehabilitation. If the Community is ready, it should rehabilitate Bhikkhu (name). This is the motion.

Venerable sirs, may the Community listen to me. This Bhikkhu (name) has fallen into one offense, unconcealed, of intentional semen-emission. He asked the Community for the six-day penance for one offense, unconcealed, of intentional semen-emission. The Community granted him the six-day penance for one offense, unconcealed, of intentional semen-emission. He—having undergone penance—asks the Community for rehabilitation. The Community is rehabilitating Bhikkhu (name). He to whom the rehabilitation of Bhikkhu (name) is agreeable should remain silent. He to whom it is not agreeable should speak.

A second time… A third time I speak about this matter….

Bhikkhu (name) has been rehabilitated by the Community. This is agreeable to the Community, therefore it is silent. Thus do I hold it.

Alternate pattern:

Replace

ekaṁ āpattiṁ āpajji(ṁ) SAÑCETANIKAṀ SUKKA-VISAṬṬHIṀ apaṭicchannaṁ

with

ekaṁ saṅghādisesaṁ āpattiṁ āpajji(ṁ) apaṭicchannaṁ

(have/has fallen into one unconcealed saṅghādisesa offense)

and

ekissā āpattiyā SAÑCETANIKĀYA SUKKA-VISAṬṬHIYĀ apaṭicchannāya

with

ekissā saṅghādisesāya āpattiyā apaṭicchannāya

B. For one concealed offense

The basic pattern is for an offense concealed five days. The compound for “five days” is given in capital letters. This may be replaced with the compound forms for other time periods, as necessary, listed after the request. These time-period expressions can be used in other vuṭṭhāna-vidhī statements as well.

Requesting probation (parivāsa): (Cv.III.3.2)

Ahaṁ bhante ekaṁ āpattiṁ āpajjiṁ sañcetanikaṁ sukka-visaṭṭhiṁ PAÑCĀHA-paṭicchannaṁ. So’haṁ bhante saṅghaṁ ekissā āpattiyā sañcetanikāya sukka-visaṭṭhiyā PAÑCĀHA-paṭicchannāya PAÑCĀHA-parivāsaṁ yācāmi.

Ahaṁ bhante ekaṁ āpattiṁ āpajjiṁ sañcetanikaṁ sukka-visaṭṭhiṁ PAÑCĀHA- paṭicchannaṁ. So’haṁ dutiyam-pi bhante saṅghaṁ ekissā āpattiyā sañcetanikāya sukka-visaṭṭhiyā PAÑCĀHA-paṭicchannāya PAÑCĀHA-parivāsaṁ yācāmi.

Ahaṁ bhante ekaṁ āpattiṁ āpajjiṁ sañcetanikaṁ sukka-visaṭṭhiṁ PAÑCĀHA- paṭicchannaṁ. So’haṁ tatiyam-pi bhante saṅghaṁ ekissā āpattiyā sañcetanikāya sukka-visaṭṭhiyā PAÑCĀHA-paṭicchannāya PAÑCĀHA-parivāsaṁ yācāmi.

Venerable sirs, I have fallen into one offense of intentional semen-emission, concealed for five days. I ask the Community for a five-day probation for one offense of intentional semen-emission, concealed for five days.

Venerable sirs…. A second time…. A third time, I ask the Community for a five-day probation for one offense of intentional semen-emission, concealed for five days.

1 day: EKĀHA-

2 days: DVĪHA-

3 days: TĪHA-

4 days: CATŪHA-

5 days: PAÑCĀHA-

6 days: CHĀHA-

7 days: SATTĀHA-

8 days: AṬṬHĀHA

9 days: NAVĀHA-

10 days: DASĀHA-

11 days: EKĀDASĀHA-

12 days: DVĀDASĀHA-

13 days: TERASĀHA-

14 days: CUDDASĀHA-

A fortnight: PAKKHA-

More than a fortnight: ATIREKA-PAKKHA-

A month: MĀSA-

More than a month: ATIREKA-MĀSA-

2 months: DVI-MĀSA-

More than 2 months: ATIREKA-DVI-MĀSA-

(In each of the following examples, the option for “more than x” is expressed by adding the word ATIREKA- in front of x.)

3 months: TE-MĀSA-

4 months: CATU-MĀSA-

5 months: PAÑCA-MĀSA-

6 months: CHA-MĀSA-

7 months: SATTA-MĀSA-

8 months: AṬṬHA-MĀSA-

9 months: NAVA-MĀSA-

10 months: DASA-MĀSA-

11 months: EKĀDASA-MĀSA-

1 year: EKA-SAṀVACCHARA-

2 years: DVI-SAṀVACCHARA-

3 years: TE-SAṀVACCHARA-

Transaction statement for granting probation: (Cv.III.3.3)

Suṇātu me bhante saṅgho. Ayaṁ Itthannāmo bhikkhu ekaṁ āpattiṁ āpajji sañcetanikaṁ sukka-visaṭṭhiṁ PAÑCĀHA-paṭicchannaṁ. So saṅghaṁ ekissā āpattiyā sañcetanikāya sukka-visaṭṭhiyā PAÑCĀHA-paṭicchannāya PAÑCĀHA-parivāsaṁ yācati. Yadi saṅghassa pattakallaṁ, saṅgho Itthannāmassa bhikkhuno ekissā āpattiyā sañcetanikāya sukka-visaṭṭhiyā PAÑCĀHA-paṭicchannāya PAÑCĀHA-parivāsaṁ dadeyya. Esā ñatti.

Suṇātu me bhante saṅgho. Ayaṁ Itthannāmo bhikkhu ekaṁ āpattiṁ āpajji sañcetanikaṁ sukka-visaṭṭhiṁ PAÑCĀHA-paṭicchannaṁ. So saṅghaṁ ekissā āpattiyā sañcetanikāya sukka-visaṭṭhiyā PAÑCĀHA-paṭicchannāya PAÑCĀHA-parivāsaṁ yācati. Saṅgho Itthannāmassa bhikkhuno ekissā āpattiyā sañcetanikāya sukka-visaṭṭhiyā PAÑCĀHA-paṭicchannāya PAÑCĀHA-parivāsaṁ deti. Yass’āyasmato khamati, Itthannāmassa bhikkhuno ekissā āpattiyā sañcetanikāya sukka-visaṭṭhiyā PAÑCĀHA-paṭicchannāya PAÑCĀHA-parivāsassa dānaṁ, so tuṇh’assa. Yassa nakkhamati, so bhāseyya.

Dutiyam-pi etam-atthaṁ vadāmi. Suṇātu me bhante saṅgho…. so bhāseyya.

Tatiyam-pi etam-atthaṁ vadāmi. Suṇātu me bhante saṅgho…. so bhāseyya.

Dinno saṅghena Itthannāmassa bhikkhuno ekissā āpattiyā sañcetanikāya sukka-visaṭṭhiyā PAÑCĀHA-paṭicchannāya PAÑCĀHA-parivāso. Khamati saṅghassa, tasmā tuṇhī. Evam-etaṁ dhārayāmi.

Venerable sirs, may the Community listen to me. This Bhikkhu (name) has fallen into one offense of intentional semen-emission, concealed for five days. He asks the Community for a five-day probation for one offense of intentional semen-emission, concealed for five days. If the Community is ready, it should grant Bhikkhu (name) a five-day probation for one offense of intentional semen-emission, concealed for five days. This is the motion.

Venerable sirs, may the Community listen to me. This Bhikkhu (name) has fallen into one offense of intentional semen-emission, concealed for five days. He asks the Community for a five-day probation for one offense of intentional semen-emission, concealed for five days. The Community is granting Bhikkhu (name) a five-day probation for one offense of intentional semen-emission, concealed for five days. He to whom the granting of a five-day probation to Bhikkhu (name) for for one offense of intentional semen-emission, concealed for five days, is agreeable should remain silent. He to whom it is not agreeable should speak.

A second time… A third time I speak about this matter….

A five-day probation has been granted by the Community to Bhikkhu (name) for one offense of intentional semen-emission, concealed for five days. This is agreeable to the Community, therefore it is silent. Thus do I hold it.

Notifying other bhikkhus of one’s probation:

Ahaṁ bhante ekaṁ āpattiṁ āpajjiṁ sañcetanikaṁ sukka-visaṭṭhiṁ PAÑCĀHA-paṭicchannaṁ. So’haṁ saṅghaṁ ekissā āpattiyā sañcetanikāya sukka-visaṭṭhiyā PAÑCĀHA-paṭicchannāya PAÑCĀHA-parivāsaṁ yāciṁ. Tassa me saṅgho ekissā āpattiyā sañcetanikāya sukka-visaṭṭhiyā PAÑCĀHA-paṭicchannāya PAÑCĀHA-parivāsaṁ adāsi. So’haṁ parivasāmi. Vedayām’ahaṁ bhante, vedayatīti maṁ saṅgho dhāretu.

Venerable sirs, I have fallen into one offense of intentional semen-emission, concealed for five days. I asked the Community for a five-day probation for one offense of intentional semen-emission, concealed for five days. The Community granted me a five-day probation for one offense of intentional semen-emission, concealed for five days. I am undergoing probation. I notify you (of this), venerable sirs. May the Community remember me as one who has notified.

(When notifying three bhikkhus, say—instead of saṅgho dhāretu—āyasmanto dhārentu; for two bhikkhus, āyasmantā dhārentu; for a single bhikkhu, āyasmā dhāretu.)

Requesting penance: (Cv.III.4.2)

Ahaṁ bhante ekaṁ āpattiṁ āpajjiṁ sañcetanikaṁ sukka-visaṭṭhiṁ PAÑCĀHA-paṭicchannaṁ. So’haṁ saṅghaṁ ekissā āpattiyā sañcetanikāya sukka-visaṭṭhiyā PAÑCĀHA-paṭicchannāya PAÑCĀHA-parivāsaṁ yāciṁ. Tassa me saṅgho ekissā āpattiyā sañcetanikāya sukka-visaṭṭhiyā PAÑCĀHA-paṭicchannāya PAÑCĀHA-parivāsaṁ adāsi. So’haṁ bhante parivuttha-parivāso saṅghaṁ ekissā āpattiyā sañcetanikāya sukka-visaṭṭhiyā PAÑCĀHA-paṭicchannāya chārattaṁ mānattaṁ yācāmi.

Ahaṁ bhante ekaṁ āpattiṁ āpajjiṁ sañcetanikaṁ sukka-visaṭṭhiṁ PAÑCĀHA-paṭicchannaṁ…. So’haṁ bhante parivuttha-parivāso dutiyam-pi saṅghaṁ ekissā āpattiyā sañcetanikāya sukka-visaṭṭhiyā PAÑCĀHA-paṭicchannāya chārattaṁ mānattaṁ yācāmi.

Ahaṁ bhante ekaṁ āpattiṁ āpajjiṁ sañcetanikaṁ sukka-visaṭṭhiṁ PAÑCĀHA-paṭicchannaṁ…. So’haṁ bhante parivuttha-parivāso tatiyam-pi saṅghaṁ ekissā āpattiyā sañcetanikāya sukka-visaṭṭhiyā PAÑCĀHA-paṭicchannāya chārattaṁ mānattaṁ yācāmi.

Venerable sirs, I have fallen into one offense of intentional semen-emission, concealed for five days. I asked the Community for a five-day probation for one offense of intentional semen-emission, concealed for five days. The Community granted me a five-day probation for one offense of intentional semen-emission, concealed for five days. Having completed probation, I ask the Community for the six-day penance for one offense of intentional semen-emission, concealed for five days.

Venerable sirs…. A second time…. A third time, I ask the Community for the six-day penance for one offense of intentional semen-emission, concealed for five days.

Transaction statement for granting penance: (Cv.III.4.3)

Suṇātu me bhante saṅgho. Ayaṁ Itthannāmo bhikkhu ekaṁ āpattiṁ āpajji sañcetanikaṁ sukka-visaṭṭhiṁ PAÑCĀHA-paṭicchannaṁ. So saṅghaṁ ekissā āpattiyā sañcetanikāya sukka-visaṭṭhiyā PAÑCĀHA-paṭicchannāya PAÑCĀHA-parivāsaṁ yāci. Tassa saṅgho ekissā āpattiyā sañcetanikāya sukka-visaṭṭhiyā PAÑCĀHA-paṭicchannāya PAÑCĀHA-parivāsaṁ adāsi. So parivuttha-parivāso saṅghaṁ ekissā āpattiyā sañcetanikāya sukka-visaṭṭhiyā PAÑCĀHA-paṭicchannāya chārattaṁ mānattaṁ yācati. Yadi saṅghassa pattakallaṁ, saṅgho Itthannāmassa bhikkhuno ekissā āpattiyā sañcetanikāya sukka-visaṭṭhiyā PAÑCĀHA-paṭicchannāya chārattaṁ mānattaṁ dadeyya. Esā ñatti.

Suṇātu me bhante saṅgho. Ayaṁ Itthannāmo bhikkhu ekaṁ āpattiṁ āpajji sañcetanikaṁ sukka-visaṭṭhiṁ PAÑCĀHA-paṭicchannaṁ. So saṅghaṁ ekissā āpattiyā sañcetanikāya sukka-visaṭṭhiyā PAÑCĀHA-paṭicchannāya PAÑCĀHA-parivāsaṁ yāci. Tassa saṅgho ekissā āpattiyā sañcetanikāya sukka-visaṭṭhiyā PAÑCĀHA-paṭicchannāya PAÑCĀHA-parivāsaṁ adāsi. So parivuttha-parivāso saṅghaṁ ekissā āpattiyā sañcetanikāya sukka-visaṭṭhiyā PAÑCĀHA-paṭicchannāya chārattaṁ mānattaṁ yācati. Saṅgho Itthannāmassa bhikkhuno ekissā āpattiyā sañcetanikāya sukka-visaṭṭhiyā PAÑCĀHA-paṭicchannāya chārattaṁ mānattaṁ deti. Yass’āyasmato khamati, Itthannāmassa bhikkhuno ekissā āpattiyā sañcetanikāya sukka-visaṭṭhiyā PAÑCĀHA-paṭicchannāya chārattaṁ mānattassa dānaṁ, so tuṇh’assa. Yassa nakkhamati, so bhāseyya.

Dutiyam-pi etam-atthaṁ vadāmi. Suṇātu me bhante saṅgho…. so bhāseyya.

Tatiyam-pi etam-atthaṁ vadāmi. Suṇātu me bhante saṅgho…. so bhāseyya.

Dinnaṁ saṅghena Itthannāmassa bhikkhuno ekissā āpattiyā sañcetanikāya sukka-visaṭṭhiyā PAÑCĀHA-paṭicchannāya chārattaṁ mānattaṁ. Khamati saṅghassa, tasmā tuṇhī. Evam-etaṁ dhārayāmi.

Notifying other bhikkhus of one’s penance:

Ahaṁ bhante ekaṁ āpattiṁ āpajjiṁ sañcetanikaṁ sukka-visaṭṭhiṁ PAÑCĀHA-paṭicchannaṁ. So’haṁ saṅghaṁ ekissā āpattiyā sañcetanikāya sukka-visaṭṭhiyā PAÑCĀHA-paṭicchannāya PAÑCĀHA-parivāsaṁ yāciṁ. Tassa me saṅgho ekissā āpattiyā sañcetanikāya sukka-visaṭṭhiyā PAÑCĀHA-paṭicchannāya PAÑCĀHA-parivāsaṁ adāsi. So’haṁ bhante parivuttha-parivāso saṅghaṁ ekissā āpattiyā sañcetanikāya sukka-visaṭṭhiyā PAÑCĀHA-paṭicchannāya chārattaṁ mānattaṁ yāciṁ. Tassa me saṅgho ekissā āpattiyā sañcetanikāya sukka-visaṭṭhiyā PAÑCĀHA-paṭicchannāya chārattaṁ mānattaṁ adāsi. So’haṁ mānattaṁ carāmi. Vedayām’ahaṁ bhante, vedayatīti maṁ saṅgho dhāretu.

(When notifying three bhikkhus, say—instead of saṅgho dhāretu—āyasmanto dhārentu; for two bhikkhus, āyasmantā dhārentu; for a single bhikkhu, āyasmā dhāretu.)

Requesting rehabilitation: (Cv.III.5.2)

Ahaṁ bhante ekaṁ āpattiṁ āpajjiṁ sañcetanikaṁ sukka-visaṭṭhiṁ PAÑCĀHA-paṭicchannaṁ. So’haṁ saṅghaṁ ekissā āpattiyā sañcetanikāya sukka-visaṭṭhiyā PAÑCĀHA-paṭicchannāya PAÑCĀHA-parivāsaṁ yāciṁ. Tassa me saṅgho ekissā āpattiyā sañcetanikāya sukka-visaṭṭhiyā PAÑCĀHA-paṭicchannāya PAÑCĀHA-parivāsaṁ adāsi. So’haṁ bhante parivuttha-parivāso saṅghaṁ ekissā āpattiyā sañcetanikāya sukka-visaṭṭhiyā PAÑCĀHA-paṭicchannāya chārattaṁ mānattaṁ yāciṁ. Tassa me saṅgho ekissā āpattiyā sañcetanikāya sukka-visaṭṭhiyā PAÑCĀHA-paṭicchannāya chārattaṁ mānattaṁ adāsi. So’haṁ bhante ciṇṇa-mānatto saṅghaṁ abbhānaṁ yācāmi.

Ahaṁ bhante ekaṁ āpattiṁ āpajjiṁ sañcetanikaṁ sukka-visaṭṭhiṁ PAÑCĀHA-paṭicchannaṁ…. So’haṁ bhante ciṇṇa-mānatto dutiyam-pi saṅghaṁ abbhānaṁ yācāmi.

Ahaṁ bhante ekaṁ āpattiṁ āpajjiṁ sañcetanikaṁ sukka-visaṭṭhiṁ PAÑCĀHA-paṭicchannaṁ…. So’haṁ bhante ciṇṇa-mānatto tatiyam-pi saṅghaṁ abbhānaṁ yācāmi.

Transaction statement for granting rehabilitation: (Cv.III.5.3)

Suṇātu me bhante saṅgho. Ayaṁ Itthannāmo bhikkhu ekaṁ āpattiṁ āpajji sañcetanikaṁ sukka-visaṭṭhiṁ PAÑCĀHA-paṭicchannaṁ. So saṅghaṁ ekissā āpattiyā sañcetanikāya sukka-visaṭṭhiyā PAÑCĀHA-paṭicchannāya PAÑCĀHA-parivāsaṁ yāci. Tassa saṅgho ekissā āpattiyā sañcetanikāya sukka-visaṭṭhiyā PAÑCĀHA-paṭicchannāya PAÑCĀHA-parivāsaṁ adāsi. So parivuttha-parivāso saṅghaṁ ekissā āpattiyā sañcetanikāya sukka-visaṭṭhiyā PAÑCĀHA-paṭicchannāya chārattaṁ mānattaṁ yāci. Tassa saṅgho ekissā āpattiyā sañcetanikāya sukka-visaṭṭhiyā PAÑCĀHA-paṭicchannāya chārattaṁ mānattaṁ adāsi. So ciṇṇa-mānatto saṅghaṁ abbhānaṁ yācati. Yadi saṅghassa pattakallaṁ, saṅgho Itthannāmaṁ bhikkhuṁ abbheyya. Esā ñatti.

Suṇātu me bhante saṅgho. Ayaṁ Itthannāmo bhikkhu ekaṁ āpattiṁ āpajji sañcetanikaṁ sukka-visaṭṭhiṁ PAÑCĀHA-paṭicchannaṁ. So saṅghaṁ ekissā āpattiyā sañcetanikāya sukka-visaṭṭhiyā PAÑCĀHA-paṭicchannāya PAÑCĀHA-parivāsaṁ yāci. Tassa saṅgho ekissā āpattiyā sañcetanikāya sukka-visaṭṭhiyā PAÑCĀHA-paṭicchannāya PAÑCĀHA-parivāsaṁ adāsi. So parivuttha-parivāso saṅghaṁ ekissā āpattiyā sañcetanikāya sukka-visaṭṭhiyā PAÑCĀHA-paṭicchannāya chārattaṁ mānattaṁ yāci. Tassa saṅgho ekissā āpattiyā sañcetanikāya sukka-visaṭṭhiyā PAÑCĀHA-paṭicchannāya chārattaṁ mānattaṁ adāsi. So ciṇṇa-mānatto saṅghaṁ abbhānaṁ yācati. Saṅgho Itthannāmaṁ bhikkhuṁ abbheti. Yass’āyasmato khamati, Itthannāmassa bhikkhuno abbhānaṁ, so tuṇh’assa. Yassa nakkhamati, so bhāseyya.

Dutiyam-pi etam-atthaṁ vadāmi. Suṇātu me bhante saṅgho…. so bhāseyya.

Tatiyam-pi etam-atthaṁ vadāmi. Suṇātu me bhante saṅgho…. so bhāseyya.

Abbhito saṅghena Itthannāmo bhikkhu. Khamati saṅghassa, tasmā tuṇhī. Evam-etaṁ dhārayāmi.

Mid-course adjustment

Request for extending probation when the period of concealment was originally understated: (Cv.III.24.3)

Ahaṁ bhante ekaṁ āpattiṁ āpajjiṁ sañcetanikaṁ sukka-visaṭṭhiṁ DVEMĀSA-paṭicchannaṁ. Tassa me etadahosi. Ahaṁ kho ekaṁ āpattiṁ āpajjiṁ sañcetanikaṁ sukka-visaṭṭhiṁ DVEMĀSA-paṭicchannaṁ. Yannūnāhaṁ saṅghaṁ ekissā āpattiyā sañcetanikāya sukka-visaṭṭhiyā DVEMĀSA-paṭicchannāya EKAMĀSA-parivāsaṁ yāceyyanti. So’haṁ saṅghaṁ ekissā āpattiyā sañcetanikāya sukka-visaṭṭhiyā DVEMĀSA-paṭicchannāya EKAMĀSA-parivāsaṁ yāciṁ. Tassa me saṅgho ekissā āpattiyā sañcetanikāya sukka-visaṭṭhiyā DVEMĀSA-paṭicchannāya EKAMĀSA-parivāsaṁ adāsi. Tassa me parivasantassa lajji-dhammo okkami, ahaṁ kho ekaṁ āpattiṁ āpajjiṁ sañcetanikaṁ sukka-visaṭṭhiṁ DVEMĀSA-paṭicchannaṁ. Tassa me etadahosi. Ahaṁ kho ekaṁ āpattiṁ āpajjiṁ sañcetanikaṁ sukka-visaṭṭhiṁ DVEMĀSA-paṭicchannaṁ. Yannūnāhaṁ saṅghaṁ ekissā āpattiyā sañcetanikāya sukka-visaṭṭhiyā DVEMĀSA-paṭicchannāya EKAMĀSA-parivāsaṁ yāceyyanti. So’haṁ saṅghaṁ ekissā āpattiyā sañcetanikāya sukka-visaṭṭhiyā DVEMĀSA-paṭicchannāya EKAMĀSA-parivāsaṁ yāciṁ. Tassa me saṅgho ekissā āpattiyā sañcetanikāya sukka-visaṭṭhiyā DVEMĀSA-paṭicchannāya EKAMĀSA-parivāsaṁ adāsi. Tassa me parivasantassa lajji-dhammo okkami. Yannūnāhaṁ saṅghaṁ ekissā āpattiyā DVEMĀSA-paṭicchannāya itaram-pi MĀSA-parivāsaṁ yāceyyanti. So’haṁ bhante saṅghaṁ ekissā āpattiyā DVEMĀSA-paṭicchannāya itaram-pi MĀSA-parivāsaṁ yācāmi.

Ahaṁ bhante ekaṁ āpattiṁ āpajjiṁ sañcetanikaṁ sukka-visaṭṭhiṁ DVEMĀSA-paṭicchannaṁ…. So’haṁ dutiyam-pi bhante saṅghaṁ ekissā āpattiyā DVEMĀSA-paṭicchannāya itaram-pi MĀSA-parivāsaṁ yācāmi.

Ahaṁ bhante ekaṁ āpattiṁ āpajjiṁ sañcetanikaṁ sukka-visaṭṭhiṁ DVEMĀSA-paṭicchannaṁ…. So’haṁ tatiyam-pi bhante saṅghaṁ ekissā āpattiyā DVEMĀSA-paṭicchannāya itaram-pi MĀSA-parivāsaṁ yācāmi.

Venerable sirs, I have fallen into one offense of intentional semen-emission, concealed for two months. The thought occurred to me, “… What if I were to ask the Community for a one-month probation for one offense of intentional semen-emission concealed for two months?” I asked the Community for a one-month probation for one offense of intentional semen-emission, concealed for two months. The Community granted me a one-month probation for one offense of intentional semen-emission, concealed for two months. While undergoing probation, I was hit by a feeling of shame: “I actually fell into one offense of intentional semen-emission, concealed for two months…. The Community granted me a one-month probation for one offense of intentional semen-emission, concealed for two months. I have been hit by a feeling of shame. What if I were to ask the Community for an additional one-month probation for one offense of intentional semen-emission, concealed for two months.” I ask the Community for an additional one-month probation for one offense of intentional semen-emission, concealed for two months.

Venerable sirs…. A second time…. A third time, I ask the Community for an additional one-month probation for one offense of intentional semen-emission, concealed for two months.

C. Aggha-samodhāna-parivāsa (Combined Probation)

1. For multiple unconcealed offenses

The basic pattern is for “many” (SAMBAHULĀ) offenses, the pattern used for four offenses or more. This may be replaced with two (DVE) or three (TISSO) wherever appropriate. The name of the offense—in this case, intentional emission of semen—is given in capital letters. The plural forms for other offenses are listed after the request. These may be inserted in the place of the name of the offense in the basic example. These variations can be used in other vuṭṭhāna-vidhī statements for multiple offenses as well.

Requesting penance:

Ahaṁ bhante SAMBAHULĀ saṅghādisesā āpattiyo āpajjiṁ SAÑCETANIKĀYO SUKKA-VISAṬṬHIYO apaṭicchannāyo. So’haṁ bhante saṅghaṁ tāsaṁ āpattīnaṁ SAÑCETANIKĀNAṀ SUKKA-VISAṬṬHĪNAṀ apaṭicchannānaṁ chārattaṁ mānattaṁ yācāmi.

Ahaṁ bhante SAMBAHULĀ saṅghādisesā āpattiyo āpajjiṁ SAÑCETANIKĀYO SUKKA-VISAṬṬHIYO apaṭicchannāyo. So’haṁ dutiyam-pi bhante saṅghaṁ tāsaṁ āpattīnaṁ SAÑCETANIKĀNAṀ SUKKA-VISAṬṬHĪNAṀ apaṭicchannānaṁ chārattaṁ mānattaṁ yācāmi.

Ahaṁ bhante SAMBAHULĀ saṅghādisesā āpattiyo āpajjiṁ SAÑCETANIKĀYO SUKKA-VISAṬṬHIYO apaṭicchannāyo. So’haṁ tatiyam-pi bhante saṅghaṁ tāsaṁ āpattīnaṁ SAÑCETANIKĀNAṀ SUKKA-VISAṬṬHĪNAṀ apaṭicchannānaṁ chārattaṁ mānattaṁ yācāmi.

Venerable sirs, I have fallen into many offenses, unconcealed, of intentional semen-emission. I ask the Community for the six-day penance for many offenses, unconcealed, of intentional semen-emission.

Venerable sirs…. A second time…. A third time, I ask the Community for the six-day penance for many offenses, unconcealed, of intentional semen-emission.

bodily contact: KĀYA-SAṀSAGGĀYO / KĀYA-SAṀSAGGĀNAṀ

lewd statement: DUṬṬHULLA-VĀCĀYO / DUṬṬHULLA-VĀCĀNAṀ

statements (recommending) ministering to one’s own sensual passion: ATTA-KĀMA-PĀRICARIYĀYO VĀCĀYO / ATTA-KĀMA-PĀRICARIYĀNAṀ VĀCĀNAṀ

acting as a go-between: SAÑCARITTĀYO / SAÑCARITTĀNAṀ

Transaction statement for granting penance

Suṇātu me bhante saṅgho. Ayaṁ Itthannāmo bhikkhu SAMBAHULĀ saṅghādisesā āpattiyo āpajji SAÑCETANIKĀYO SUKKA-VISAṬṬHIYO apaṭicchannāyo. So saṅghaṁ tāsaṁ āpattīnaṁ SAÑCETANIKĀNAṀ SUKKA-VISAṬṬHĪNAṀ apaṭicchannānaṁ chārattaṁ mānattaṁ yācati. Yadi saṅghassa pattakallaṁ, saṅgho Itthannāmassa bhikkhuno tāsaṁ āpattīnaṁ SAÑCETANIKĀNAṀ SUKKA-VISAṬṬHĪNAṀ apaṭicchannānaṁ chārattaṁ mānattaṁ dadeyya. Esā ñatti.

Suṇātu me bhante saṅgho. Ayaṁ Itthannāmo bhikkhu SAMBAHULĀ saṅghādisesā āpattiyo āpajji SAÑCETANIKĀYO SUKKA-VISAṬṬHIYO apaṭicchannāyo. So saṅghaṁ tāsaṁ āpattīnaṁ SAÑCETANIKĀNAṀ SUKKA-VISAṬṬHĪNAṀ apaṭicchannānaṁ chārattaṁ mānattaṁ yācati. Saṅgho Itthannāmassa bhikkhuno tāsaṁ āpattīnaṁ SAÑCETANIKĀNAṀ SUKKA-VISAṬṬHĪNAṀ apaṭicchannānaṁ chārattaṁ mānattaṁ deti. Yass’āyasmato khamati, Itthannāmassa bhikkhuno tāsaṁ āpattīnaṁ SAÑCETANIKĀNAṀ SUKKA-VISAṬṬHĪNAṀ apaṭicchannānaṁ chārattaṁ mānattassa dānaṁ, so tuṇh’assa. Yassa nakkhamati, so bhāseyya.

Dutiyam-pi etam-atthaṁ vadāmi. Suṇātu me bhante saṅgho…. so bhāseyya.

Tatiyam-pi etam-atthaṁ vadāmi. Suṇātu me bhante saṅgho…. so bhāseyya.

Dinnaṁ saṅghena Itthannāmassa bhikkhuno tāsaṁ āpattīnaṁ SAÑCETANIKĀNAṀ SUKKA-VISAṬṬHĪNAṀ apaṭicchannānaṁ chārattaṁ mānattaṁ. Khamati saṅghassa, tasmā tuṇhī. Evam-etaṁ dhārayāmi.

Notifying other bhikkhus of one’s penance:

Ahaṁ bhante SAMBAHULĀ saṅghādisesā āpattiyo āpajjiṁ SAÑCETANIKĀYO SUKKA-VISAṬṬHIYO apaṭicchannāyo. So’haṁ saṅghaṁ tāsaṁ āpattīnaṁ SAÑCETANIKĀNAṀ SUKKA-VISAṬṬHĪNAṀ apaṭicchannānaṁ chārattaṁ mānattaṁ yāciṁ. Tassa me saṅgho tāsaṁ āpattīnaṁ SAÑCETANIKĀNAṀ SUKKA-VISAṬṬHĪNAṀ apaṭicchannānaṁ chārattaṁ mānattaṁ adāsi. So’haṁ mānattaṁ carāmi. Vedayām’ahaṁ bhante, vedayatīti maṁ saṅgho dhāretu.

(When notifying three bhikkhus, say—instead of saṅgho dhāretu—āyasmanto dhārentu; for two bhikkhus, āyasmantā dhārentu; for a single bhikkhu, āyasmā dhāretu.)

Requesting rehabilitation:

Ahaṁ bhante SAMBAHULĀ saṅghādisesā āpattiyo āpajjiṁ SAÑCETANIKĀYO SUKKA-VISAṬṬHIYO apaṭicchannāyo. So’haṁ saṅghaṁ tāsaṁ āpattīnaṁ SAÑCETANIKĀNAṀ SUKKA-VISAṬṬHĪNAṀ apaṭicchannānaṁ chārattaṁ mānattaṁ yāciṁ. Tassa me saṅgho tāsaṁ āpattīnaṁ SAÑCETANIKĀNAṀ SUKKA-VISAṬṬHĪNAṀ apaṭicchannānaṁ chārattaṁ mānattaṁ adāsi. So’haṁ bhante ciṇṇa-mānatto saṅghaṁ abbhānaṁ yācāmi.

Ahaṁ bhante SAMBAHULĀ saṅghādisesā āpattiyo āpajjiṁ SAÑCETANIKĀYO SUKKA-VISAṬṬHIYO apaṭicchannāyo. So’haṁ tāsaṁ āpattīnaṁ SAÑCETANIKĀNAṀ SUKKA-VISAṬṬHĪNAṀ apaṭicchannānaṁ chārattaṁ mānattaṁ yāciṁ. Tassa me saṅgho tāsaṁ āpattīnaṁ SAÑCETANIKĀNAṀ SUKKA-VISAṬṬHĪNAṀ apaṭicchannānaṁ chārattaṁ mānattaṁ adāsi. So’haṁ bhante ciṇṇa-mānatto dutiyam-pi saṅghaṁ abbhānaṁ yācāmi.

Ahaṁ bhante SAMBAHULĀ saṅghādisesā āpattiyo āpajjiṁ SAÑCETANIKĀYO SUKKA-VISAṬṬHIYO apaṭicchannāyo. So’haṁ tāsaṁ āpattīnaṁ SAÑCETANIKĀNAṀ SUKKA-VISAṬṬHĪNAṀ apaṭicchannānaṁ chārattaṁ mānattaṁ yāciṁ. Tassa me saṅgho tāsaṁ āpattīnaṁ SAÑCETANIKĀNAṀ SUKKA-VISAṬṬHĪNAṀ apaṭicchannānaṁ chārattaṁ mānattaṁ adāsi. So’haṁ bhante ciṇṇa-mānatto tatiyam-pi saṅghaṁ abbhānaṁ yācāmi.

Transaction statement for granting rehabilitation:

Suṇātu me bhante saṅgho. Ayaṁ Itthannāmo bhikkhu SAMBAHULĀ saṅghādisesā āpattiyo āpajji SAÑCETANIKĀYO SUKKA-VISAṬṬHIYO apaṭicchannāyo. So saṅghaṁ tāsaṁ āpattīnaṁ SAÑCETANIKĀNAṀ SUKKA-VISAṬṬHĪNAṀ apaṭicchannānaṁ chārattaṁ mānattaṁ yāci. Tassa saṅgho tāsaṁ āpattīnaṁ SAÑCETANIKĀNAṀ SUKKA-VISAṬṬHĪNAṀ apaṭicchannānaṁ chārattaṁ mānattaṁ adāsi. So ciṇṇa-mānatto saṅghaṁ abbhānaṁ yācati. Yadi saṅghassa pattakallaṁ, saṅgho Itthannāmaṁ bhikkhuṁ abbheyya. Esā ñatti.

Suṇātu me bhante saṅgho. Ayaṁ Itthannāmo bhikkhu SAMBAHULĀ saṅghādisesā āpattiyo āpajji SAÑCETANIKĀYO SUKKA-VISAṬṬHIYO apaṭicchannāyo. So saṅghaṁ tāsaṁ āpattīnaṁ SAÑCETANIKĀNAṀ SUKKA-VISAṬṬHĪNAṀ apaṭicchannānaṁ chārattaṁ mānattaṁ yāci. Tassa saṅgho tāsaṁ āpattīnaṁ SAÑCETANIKĀNAṀ SUKKA-VISAṬṬHĪNAṀ apaṭicchannānaṁ chārattaṁ mānattaṁ adāsi. So ciṇṇa-mānatto saṅghaṁ abbhānaṁ yācati. Saṅgho Itthannāmaṁ bhikkhuṁ abbheti. Yass’āyasmato khamati, Itthannāmassa bhikkhuno abbhānaṁ, so tuṇh’assa. Yassa nakkhamati, so bhāseyya.

Dutiyam-pi etam-atthaṁ vadāmi. Suṇātu me bhante saṅgho…. so bhāseyya.

Tatiyam-pi etam-atthaṁ vadāmi. Suṇātu me bhante saṅgho…. so bhāseyya.

Abbhito saṅghena Itthannāmo bhikkhu. Khamati saṅghassa, tasmā tuṇhī. Evam-etaṁ dhārayāmi.

2. For combined concealed & unconcealed offenses

For the concealed offense, request probation and notify the other bhikkhus of one’s probation as in the case of one concealed offense, above.

For two offenses, one unconcealed and one concealed for five days.

Requesting penance:

Ahaṁ bhante ekaṁ āpattiṁ āpajjiṁ sañcetanikaṁ sukka-visaṭṭhiṁ PAÑCĀHA-paṭicchannaṁ. So’haṁ saṅghaṁ ekissā āpattiyā sañcetanikāya sukka-visaṭṭhiyā PAÑCĀHA-paṭicchannāya PAÑCĀHA-parivāsaṁ yāciṁ. Tassa me saṅgho ekissā āpattiyā sañcetanikāya sukka-visaṭṭhiyā PAÑCĀHA-paṭicchannāya PAÑCĀHA-parivāsaṁ adāsi. So’haṁ parivuttha-parivāso.

Ahaṁ bhante ekaṁ āpattiṁ āpajjiṁ sañcetanikaṁ sukka-visaṭṭhiṁ apaṭicchannaṁ. So’haṁ bhante saṅghaṁ tāsaṁ āpattīnaṁ sañcetanikānaṁ sukka-visaṭṭhīnaṁ paṭicchannāya ca apaṭicchannāya ca chārattaṁ mānattaṁ yācāmi.

Ahaṁ bhante ekaṁ āpattiṁ āpajjiṁ sañcetanikaṁ sukka-visaṭṭhiṁ PAÑCĀHA-paṭicchannaṁ…. So’haṁ dutiyam-pi bhante saṅghaṁ tāsaṁ āpattīnaṁ sañcetanikānaṁ sukka-visaṭṭhīnaṁ paṭicchannāya ca apaṭicchannāya ca chārattaṁ mānattaṁ yācāmi.

Ahaṁ bhante ekaṁ āpattiṁ āpajjiṁ sañcetanikaṁ sukka-visaṭṭhiṁ PAÑCĀHA-paṭicchannaṁ…. So’haṁ tatiyam-pi bhante saṅghaṁ tāsaṁ āpattīnaṁ sañcetanikānaṁ sukka-visaṭṭhīnaṁ paṭicchannāya ca apaṭicchannāya ca chārattaṁ mānattaṁ yācāmi.

Venerable sirs, I have fallen into one offense of intentional semen-emission, concealed for five days. I asked the Community for a five-day probation for one offense of intentional semen-emission, concealed for five days. The Community granted me a five-day probation for one offense of intentional semen-emission, concealed for five days. I have completed probation.

Venerable sirs, I have fallen into one offense, unconcealed, of intentional semen-emission. I ask the Community for the six-day penance for those offenses of intentional semen-emission, concealed and unconcealed.

Venerable sirs…. A second time…. A third time, I ask the Community for the six-day penance for those offenses of intentional semen-emission, concealed and unconcealed.

Transaction statement for granting penance:

Suṇātu me bhante saṅgho. Ayaṁ Itthannāmo bhikkhu ekaṁ āpattiṁ āpajji sañcetanikaṁ sukka-visaṭṭhiṁ PAÑCĀHA-paṭicchannaṁ. So saṅghaṁ ekissā āpattiyā sañcetanikāya sukka-visaṭṭhiyā PAÑCĀHA-paṭicchannāya PAÑCĀHA-parivāsaṁ yāci. Tassa saṅgho ekissā āpattiyā sañcetanikāya sukka-visaṭṭhiyā PAÑCĀHA-paṭicchannāya PAÑCĀHA-parivāsaṁ adāsi. So parivuttha-parivāso.

Ayaṁ Itthannāmao bhikkhu ekaṁ āpattiṁ āpajji sañcetanikaṁ sukkha-visaṭṭhiṁ apaṭicchannaṁ. So saṅgham tāsaṁ āpattīnaṁ sañcetanikānaṁ sukka-visaṭṭhīnaṁ paṭicchannāya ca apaṭicchannāya ca chārattaṁ mānattaṁ yācati. Yadi saṅghassa pattakallaṁ, saṅgho Itthannāmassa bhikkhuno tāsaṁ āpattīnaṁ sañcetanikānaṁ sukka-visaṭṭhīnaṁ paṭicchannāya ca apaṭicchannāya ca chārattaṁ mānattaṁ dadeyya. Esā ñatti.

Suṇātu me bhante saṅgho. Ayaṁ Itthannāmo bhikkhu ekaṁ āpattiṁ āpajji sañcetanikaṁ sukka-visaṭṭhiṁ PAÑCĀHA-paṭicchannaṁ. So saṅghaṁ ekissā āpattiyā sañcetanikāya sukka-visaṭṭhiyā PAÑCĀHA-paṭicchannāya PAÑCĀHA-parivāsaṁ yāci. Tassa saṅgho ekissā āpattiyā sañcetanikāya sukka-visaṭṭhiyā PAÑCĀHA-paṭicchannāya PAÑCĀHA-parivāsaṁ adāsi. So parivuttha-parivāso.

Ayaṁ Itthannāmao bhikkhu ekaṁ āpattiṁ āpajji sañcetanikaṁ sukkha-visaṭṭhiṁ apaṭicchannaṁ. So saṅgham tāsaṁ āpattīnaṁ sañcetanikānaṁ sukka-visaṭṭhīnaṁ paṭicchannāya ca apaṭicchannāya ca chārattaṁ mānattaṁ yācati. Saṅgho Itthannāmassa bhikkhuno tāsaṁ āpattīnaṁ sañcetanikānaṁ sukka-visaṭṭhīnaṁ paṭicchannāya ca apaṭicchannāya ca chārattaṁ mānattaṁ deti. Yass’āyasmato khamati, Itthannāmassa bhikkhuno tāsaṁ āpattīnaṁ sañcetanikānaṁ sukka-visaṭṭhīnaṁ paṭicchannāya ca apaṭicchannāya ca chārattaṁ mānattassa dānaṁ, so tuṇh’assa. Yassa nakkhamati, so bhāseyya.

Dutiyam-pi etam-atthaṁ vadāmi. Suṇātu me bhante saṅgho…. so bhāseyya.

Tatiyam-pi etam-atthaṁ vadāmi. Suṇātu me bhante saṅgho…. so bhāseyya.

Dinnaṁ saṅghena Itthannāmassa bhikkhuno tāsaṁ āpattīnaṁ sañcetanikānaṁ sukka-visaṭṭhīnaṁ paṭicchannāya ca apaṭicchannāya ca chārattaṁ mānattaṁ. Khamati saṅghassa, tasmā tuṇhī. Evam-etaṁ dhārayāmi.

Notifying other bhikkhus of one’s penance:

Ahaṁ bhante ekaṁ āpattiṁ āpajjiṁ sañcetanikaṁ sukka-visaṭṭhiṁ PAÑCĀHA-paṭicchannaṁ. So’haṁ saṅghaṁ ekissā āpattiyā sañcetanikāya sukka-visaṭṭhiyā PAÑCĀHA-paṭicchannāya PAÑCĀHA-parivāsaṁ yāciṁ. Tassa me saṅgho ekissā āpattiyā sañcetanikāya sukka-visaṭṭhiyā PAÑCĀHA-paṭicchannāya PAÑCĀHA-parivāsaṁ adāsi. So’haṁ bhante parivuttha-parivāso.

Ahaṁ bhante ekaṁ āpattiṁ āpajjiṁ sañcetanikaṁ sukka-visaṭṭhiṁ apaṭicchannaṁ. So’haṁ saṅghaṁ tāsaṁ āpattīnaṁ sañcetanikānaṁ sukka-visaṭṭhīnaṁ paṭicchannāya ca apaṭicchannāya ca chārattaṁ mānattaṁ yāciṁ. Tassa me saṅgho tāsaṁ āpattīnaṁ sañcetanikānaṁ sukka-visaṭṭhīnaṁ paṭicchannāya ca apaṭicchannāya ca chārattaṁ mānattaṁ adāsi. So’haṁ mānattaṁ carāmi. Vedayām’ahaṁ bhante, vedayatīti maṁ saṅgho dhāretu.

Requesting rehabilitation:

Ahaṁ bhante ekaṁ āpattiṁ āpajjiṁ sañcetanikaṁ sukka-visaṭṭhiṁ PAÑCĀHA-paṭicchannaṁ. So’haṁ saṅghaṁ ekissā āpattiyā sañcetanikāya sukka-visaṭṭhiyā PAÑCĀHA-paṭicchannāya PAÑCĀHA-parivāsaṁ yāciṁ. Tassa me saṅgho ekissā āpattiyā sañcetanikāya sukka-visaṭṭhiyā PAÑCĀHA-paṭicchannāya PAÑCĀHA-parivāsaṁ adāsi. So’haṁ bhante parivuttha-parivāso.

Ahaṁ bhante ekaṁ āpattiṁ āpajjiṁ sañcetanikaṁ sukka-visaṭṭhiṁ apaṭicchannaṁ. So’haṁ saṅghaṁ tāsaṁ āpattīnaṁ sañcetanikānaṁ sukka-visaṭṭhīnaṁ paṭicchannāya ca apaṭicchannāya ca chārattaṁ mānattaṁ yāciṁ. Tassa me saṅgho tāsaṁ āpattīnaṁ sañcetanikānaṁ sukka-visaṭṭhīnaṁ paṭicchannāya ca apaṭicchannāya ca chārattaṁ mānattaṁ adāsi. So’haṁ bhante ciṇṇa-mānatto saṅghaṁ abbhānaṁ yācāmi.

Ahaṁ bhante ekaṁ āpattiṁ āpajjiṁ sañcetanikaṁ sukka-visaṭṭhiṁ PAÑCĀHA-paṭicchannaṁ…. So’haṁ bhante ciṇṇa-mānatto dutiyam-pi saṅghaṁ abbhānaṁ yācāmi.

Ahaṁ bhante ekaṁ āpattiṁ āpajjiṁ sañcetanikaṁ sukka-visaṭṭhiṁ PAÑCĀHA-paṭicchannaṁ…. So’haṁ bhante ciṇṇa-mānatto tatiyam-pi saṅghaṁ abbhānaṁ yācāmi.

Transaction statement for granting rehabilitation:

Suṇātu me bhante saṅgho. Ayaṁ Itthannāmo bhikkhu ekaṁ āpattiṁ āpajji sañcetanikaṁ sukka-visaṭṭhiṁ PAÑCĀHA-paṭicchannaṁ. So saṅghaṁ ekissā āpattiyā sañcetanikāya sukka-visaṭṭhiyā PAÑCĀHA-paṭicchannāya PAÑCĀHA-parivāsaṁ yāci. Tassa saṅgho ekissā āpattiyā sañcetanikāya sukka-visaṭṭhiyā PAÑCĀHA-paṭicchannāya PAÑCĀHA-parivāsaṁ adāsi. So parivuttha-parivāso.

Ayaṁ Itthannāmao bhikkhu ekaṁ āpattiṁ āpajji sañcetanikaṁ sukkha-visaṭṭhiṁ apaṭicchannaṁ. So saṅgham tāsaṁ āpattīnaṁ sañcetanikānaṁ sukka-visaṭṭhīnaṁ paṭicchannāya ca apaṭicchannāya ca chārattaṁ mānattaṁ yāci. Tassa saṅgho tāsaṁ āpattīnaṁ sañcetanikānaṁ sukka-visaṭṭhīnaṁ paṭicchannāya ca apaṭicchannāya ca chārattaṁ mānattaṁ adāsi. So ciṇṇa-mānatto saṅghaṁ abbhānaṁ yācati. Yadi saṅghassa pattakallaṁ, saṅgho Itthannāmaṁ bhikkhuṁ abbheyya. Esā ñatti.

Suṇātu me bhante saṅgho. Ayaṁ Itthannāmo bhikkhu ekaṁ āpattiṁ āpajji sañcetanikaṁ sukka-visaṭṭhiṁ PAÑCĀHA-paṭicchannaṁ. So saṅghaṁ ekissā āpattiyā sañcetanikāya sukka-visaṭṭhiyā PAÑCĀHA-paṭicchannāya PAÑCĀHA-parivāsaṁ yāci. Tassa saṅgho ekissā āpattiyā sañcetanikāya sukka-visaṭṭhiyā PAÑCĀHA-paṭicchannāya PAÑCĀHA-parivāsaṁ adāsi. So parivuttha-parivāso.

Ayaṁ Itthannāmao bhikkhu ekaṁ āpattiṁ āpajji sañcetanikaṁ sukkha-visaṭṭhiṁ apaṭicchannaṁ. So saṅgham tāsaṁ āpattīnaṁ sañcetanikānaṁ sukka-visaṭṭhīnaṁ paṭicchannāya ca apaṭicchannāya ca chārattaṁ mānattaṁ yāci. Tassa saṅgho tāsaṁ āpattīnaṁ sañcetanikānaṁ sukka-visaṭṭhīnaṁ paṭicchannāya ca apaṭicchannāya ca chārattaṁ mānattaṁ adāsi. So ciṇṇa-mānatto saṅghaṁ abbhānaṁ yācati. Saṅgho Itthannāmaṁ bhikkhuṁ abbheti. Yass’āyasmato khamati, Itthannāmassa bhikkhuno abbhānaṁ, so tuṇh’assa. Yassa nakkhamati, so bhāseyya.

Dutiyam-pi etam-atthaṁ vadāmi. Suṇātu me bhante saṅgho…. so bhāseyya.

Tatiyam-pi etam-atthaṁ vadāmi. Suṇātu me bhante saṅgho…. so bhāseyya.

Abbhito saṅghena Itthannāmo bhikkhu. Khamati saṅghassa, tasmā tuṇhī. Evam-etaṁ dhārayāmi.

3. Combining offenses concealed different lengths of time

For four offenses, one concealed one day, one concealed three days, one concealed five days, and one concealed seven days.

Requesting probation:

Ahaṁ bhante SAMBAHULĀ saṅghādisesā āpattiyo āpajjiṁ, ekā āpatti EKĀHA-paṭicchannā, ekā āpatti TĪHA-paṭicchannā, ekā āpatti PAÑCĀHA-paṭicchannā, ekā āpatti SATTĀHA-paṭicchannā. So’haṁ bhante saṅghaṁ tāsaṁ āpattīnaṁ, yā āpatti SATTĀHA-paṭicchannā, tassā agghena samodhāna-parivāsaṁ yācāmi.

Ahaṁ bhante SAMBAHULĀ saṅghādisesā āpattiyo āpajjiṁ…. So’haṁ dutiyam-pi bhante saṅghaṁ tāsaṁ āpattīnaṁ, yā āpatti SATTĀHA-paṭicchannā, tassā agghena samodhāna-parivāsaṁ yācāmi.

Ahaṁ bhante SAMBAHULĀ saṅghādisesā āpattiyo āpajjiṁ…. So’haṁ tatiyam-pi bhante saṅghaṁ tāsaṁ āpattīnaṁ, yā āpatti SATTĀHA-paṭicchannā, tassā agghena samodhāna-parivāsaṁ yācāmi.

Venerable sirs, I have fallen into many offenses of intentional semen-emission—one offense concealed for one day, one for three days, one for five days, one for seven days. I ask the Community for a combined probation for those offenses at the rate of the offense concealed for seven days.

Venerable sirs…. A second time…. A third time, I ask the Community for a combined probation for those offenses at the rate of the offense concealed for seven days.

Transaction statement for granting probation:

Suṇātu me bhante saṅgho. Ayaṁ Itthannāmo bhikkhu SAMBAHULĀ saṅghādisesā āpattiyo āpajji, ekā āpatti EKĀHA-paṭicchannā, ekā āpatti TĪHA-paṭicchannā, ekā āpatti PAÑCĀHA-paṭicchannā, ekā āpatti SATTĀHA-paṭicchannā. So saṅghaṁ tāsaṁ āpattīnaṁ, yā āpatti SATTĀHA-paṭicchannā, tassā agghena samodhāna-parivāsaṁ yācati. Yadi saṅghassa pattakallaṁ, saṅgho Itthannāmassa bhikkhuno tāsaṁ āpattīnaṁ, yā āpatti SATTĀHA-paṭicchannā, tassā agghena samodhāna-parivāsaṁ dadeyya. Esā ñatti.

Suṇātu me bhante saṅgho. Ayaṁ Itthannāmo bhikkhu SAMBAHULĀ saṅghādisesā āpattiyo āpajji, ekā āpatti EKĀHA- paṭicchannā, ekā āpatti TĪHA-paṭicchannā, ekā āpatti PAÑCĀHA-paṭicchannā, ekā āpatti SATTĀHA-paṭicchannā. So saṅghaṁ tāsaṁ āpattīnaṁ, yā āpatti SATTĀHA-paṭicchannā, tassā agghena samodhāna-parivāsaṁ yācati. Saṅgho Itthannāmassa bhikkhuno tāsaṁ āpattīnaṁ, yā āpatti SATTĀHA-paṭicchannā, tassā agghena samodhāna-parivāsaṁ deti. Yass’āyasmato khamati, Itthannāmassa bhikkhuno tāsaṁ āpattīnaṁ, yā āpatti SATTĀHA-paṭicchannā, tassā agghena samodhāna-parivāsassa dānaṁ, so tuṇh’assa. Yassa nakkhamati, so bhāseyya.

Dutiyam-pi etam-atthaṁ vadāmi. Suṇātu me bhante saṅgho…. so bhāseyya.

Tatiyam-pi etam-atthaṁ vadāmi. Suṇātu me bhante saṅgho…. so bhāseyya.

Dinno saṅghena Itthannāmassa bhikkhuno tāsaṁ āpattīnaṁ, yā āpatti SATTĀHA-paṭicchannā, tassā agghena samodhāna-parivāso. Khamati saṅghassa, tasmā tuṇhī. Evam-etaṁ dhārayāmi.

Notifying other bhikkhus of one’s probation:

Ahaṁ bhante SAMBAHULĀ saṅghādisesā āpattiyo āpajjiṁ, ekā āpatti EKĀHA-paṭicchannā, ekā āpatti TĪHA-paṭicchannā, ekā āpatti PAÑCĀHA-paṭicchannā, ekā āpatti SATTĀHA-paṭicchannā. So’haṁ saṅghaṁ tāsaṁ āpattīnaṁ, yā āpatti SATTĀHA-paṭicchannā, tassā agghena samodhāna-parivāsaṁ yāciṁ. Tassa me saṅgho tāsaṁ āpattīnaṁ, yā āpatti SATTĀHA-paṭicchannā, tassā agghena samodhāna-parivāsaṁ adāsi. So’haṁ parivasāmi. Vedayām’ahaṁ bhante, vedayatīti maṁ saṅgho dhāretu.

Requesting penance:

Ahaṁ bhante SAMBAHULĀ saṅghādisesā āpattiyo āpajjiṁ, ekā āpatti EKĀHA-paṭicchannā, ekā āpatti TĪHA-paṭicchannā, ekā āpatti PAÑCĀHA-paṭicchannā, ekā āpatti SATTĀHA-paṭicchannā. So’haṁ bhante saṅghaṁ tāsaṁ āpattīnaṁ, yā āpatti SATTĀHA-paṭicchannā, tassā agghena samodhāna-parivāsaṁ yāciṁ. Tassa me saṅgho tāsaṁ āpattīnaṁ, yā āpatti SATTĀHA-paṭicchannā, tassā agghena samodhāna-parivāsaṁ adāsi. So’haṁ bhante parivuttha-parivāso saṅghaṁ tāsaṁ āpattīnaṁ paṭicchannānaṁ chārattaṁ mānattaṁ yācāmi.

Ahaṁ bhante SAMBAHULĀ saṅghādisesā āpattiyo āpajjiṁ…. So’haṁ bhante parivuttha-parivāso dutiyam-pi saṅghaṁ tāsaṁ āpattīnaṁ paṭicchannānaṁ chārattaṁ mānattaṁ yācāmi.

Ahaṁ bhante SAMBAHULĀ saṅghādisesā āpattiyo āpajjiṁ…. So’haṁ bhante parivuttha-parivāso tatiyam-pi saṅghaṁ tāsaṁ āpattīnaṁ paṭicchannānaṁ chārattaṁ mānattaṁ yācāmi.

Transaction statement for granting penance:

Suṇātu me bhante saṅgho. Ayaṁ Itthannāmo bhikkhu SAMBAHULĀ saṅghādisesā āpattiyo āpajji, ekā āpatti EKĀHA-paṭicchannā, ekā āpatti TĪHA-paṭicchannā, ekā āpatti PAÑCĀHA-paṭicchannā, ekā āpatti SATTĀHA-paṭicchannā. So saṅghaṁ tāsaṁ āpattīnaṁ, yā āpatti SATTĀHA-paṭicchannā, tassā agghena samodhāna-parivāsaṁ yāci. Saṅgho Itthannāmassa bhikkhuno tāsaṁ āpattīnaṁ, yā āpatti SATTĀHA-paṭicchannā, tassā agghena samodhāna-parivāsaṁ adāsi. So parivuttha-parivāso saṅghaṁ tāsaṁ āpattīnaṁ paṭicchannānaṁ chārattaṁ mānattaṁ yācati. Yadi saṅghassa pattakallaṁ, saṅgho Itthannāmassa bhikkhuno tāsaṁ āpattīnaṁ paṭicchannānaṁ chārattaṁ mānattaṁ dadeyya. Esā ñatti.

Suṇātu me bhante saṅgho. Ayaṁ Itthannāmo bhikkhu SAMBAHULĀ saṅghādisesā āpattiyo āpajji, ekā āpatti EKĀHA-paṭicchannā, ekā āpatti TĪHA-paṭicchannā, ekā āpatti PAÑCĀHA-paṭicchannā, ekā āpatti SATTĀHA-paṭicchannā. So saṅghaṁ tāsaṁ āpattīnaṁ, yā āpatti SATTĀHA-paṭicchannā, tassā agghena samodhāna-parivāsaṁ yāci. Saṅgho Itthannāmassa bhikkhuno tāsaṁ āpattīnaṁ, yā āpatti SATTĀHA-paṭicchannā, tassā agghena samodhāna-parivāsaṁ adāsi. So parivuttha-parivāso saṅghaṁ tāsaṁ āpattīnaṁ paṭicchannānaṁ chārattaṁ mānattaṁ yācati. Saṅgho Itthannāmassa bhikkhuno tāsaṁ āpattīnaṁ paṭicchannānaṁ chārattaṁ mānattaṁ deti. Yass’āyasmato khamati, Itthannāmassa bhikkhuno tāsaṁ āpattīnaṁ paṭicchannānaṁ chārattaṁ mānattassa dānaṁ, so tuṇh’assa. Yassa nakkhamati, so bhāseyya.

Dutiyam-pi etam-atthaṁ vadāmi. Suṇātu me bhante saṅgho…. so bhāseyya.

Tatiyam-pi etam-atthaṁ vadāmi. Suṇātu me bhante saṅgho…. so bhāseyya.

Dinnaṁ saṅghena Itthannāmassa bhikkhuno tāsaṁ āpattīnaṁ paṭicchannānaṁ chārattaṁ mānattaṁ. Khamati saṅghassa, tasmā tuṇhī. Evam-etaṁ dhārayāmi.

Notifying other bhikkhus of one’s penance:

Ahaṁ bhante SAMBAHULĀ saṅghādisesā āpattiyo āpajjiṁ, ekā āpatti EKĀHA-paṭicchannā, ekā āpatti TĪHA-paṭicchannā, ekā āpatti PAÑCĀHA-paṭicchannā, ekā āpatti SATTĀHA-paṭicchannā. So’haṁ saṅghaṁ tāsaṁ āpattīnaṁ, yā āpatti SATTĀHA-paṭicchannā, tassā agghena samodhāna-parivāsaṁ yāciṁ. Tassa me saṅgho tāsaṁ āpattīnaṁ, yā āpatti SATTĀHA-paṭicchannā, tassā agghena samodhāna-parivāsaṁ adāsi. So’haṁ bhante parivuttha-parivāso saṅghaṁ tāsaṁ āpattīnaṁ paṭicchannānaṁ chārattaṁ mānattaṁ yāciṁ. Tassa me saṅgho tāsaṁ āpattīnaṁ paṭicchannānaṁ chārattaṁ mānattaṁ adāsi. So’haṁ mānattaṁ carāmi. Vedayām’ahaṁ bhante, vedayatīti maṁ saṅgho dhāretu.

Requesting rehabilitation:

Ahaṁ bhante SAMBAHULĀ saṅghādisesā āpattiyo āpajjiṁ, ekā āpatti EKĀHA-paṭicchannā, ekā āpatti TĪHA-paṭicchannā, ekā āpatti PAÑCĀHA-paṭicchannā, ekā āpatti SATTĀHA-paṭicchannā. So’haṁ bhante saṅghaṁ tāsaṁ āpattīnaṁ, yā āpatti SATTĀHA-paṭicchannā, tassā agghena samodhāna-parivāsaṁ yāciṁ. Tassa me saṅgho tāsaṁ āpattīnaṁ, yā āpatti SATTĀHA-paṭicchannā, tassā agghena samodhāna-parivāsaṁ adāsi. So’haṁ bhante parivuttha-parivāso saṅghaṁ tāsaṁ āpattīnaṁ paṭicchannānaṁ chārattaṁ mānattaṁ yāciṁ. Tassa me saṅgho tāsaṁ āpattīnaṁ paṭicchannānaṁ chārattaṁ mānattaṁ adāsi. So’haṁ bhante ciṇṇa-mānatto saṅghaṁ abbhānaṁ yācāmi.

Ahaṁ bhante SAMBAHULĀ saṅghādisesā āpattiyo āpajjiṁ…. So’haṁ bhante ciṇṇa-mānatto dutiyam-pi saṅghaṁ abbhānaṁ yācāmi.

Ahaṁ bhante SAMBAHULĀ saṅghādisesā āpattiyo āpajjiṁ…. So’haṁ bhante ciṇṇa-mānatto tatiyam-pi saṅghaṁ abbhānaṁ yācāmi.

Transaction statement for granting rehabilitation:

Suṇātu me bhante saṅgho. Ayaṁ Itthannāmo bhikkhu SAMBAHULĀ saṅghādisesā āpattiyo āpajji, ekā āpatti EKĀHA-paṭicchannā, ekā āpatti TĪHA-paṭicchannā, ekā āpatti PAÑCĀHA-paṭicchannā, ekā āpatti SATTĀHA-paṭicchannā. So saṅghaṁ tāsaṁ āpattīnaṁ, yā āpatti SATTĀHA-paṭicchannā, tassā agghena samodhāna-parivāsaṁ yāci. Saṅgho Itthannāmassa bhikkhuno tāsaṁ āpattīnaṁ, yā āpatti SATTĀHA-paṭicchannā, tassā agghena samodhāna-parivāsaṁ adāsi. So parivuttha-parivāso saṅghaṁ tāsaṁ āpattīnaṁ paṭicchannānaṁ chārattaṁ mānattaṁ yāci. Tassa saṅgho tāsaṁ āpattīnaṁ paṭicchannānaṁ chārattaṁ mānattaṁ adāsi. So ciṇṇa-mānatto saṅghaṁ abbhānaṁ yācati. Yadi saṅghassa pattakallaṁ, saṅgho Itthannāmaṁ bhikkhuṁ abbheyya. Esā ñatti.

Suṇātu me bhante saṅgho. Ayaṁ Itthannāmo bhikkhu SAMBAHULĀ saṅghādisesā āpattiyo āpajji, ekā āpatti EKĀHA-paṭicchannā, ekā āpatti TĪHA-paṭicchannā, ekā āpatti PAÑCĀHA-paṭicchannā, ekā āpatti SATTĀHA-paṭicchannā. So saṅghaṁ tāsaṁ āpattīnaṁ, yā āpatti SATTĀHA-paṭicchannā, tassā agghena samodhāna-parivāsaṁ yāci. Saṅgho Itthannāmassa bhikkhuno tāsaṁ āpattīnaṁ, yā āpatti SATTĀHA-paṭicchannā, tassā agghena samodhāna-parivāsaṁ adāsi. So parivuttha-parivāso saṅghaṁ tāsaṁ āpattīnaṁ paṭicchannānaṁ chārattaṁ mānattaṁ yāci. Tassa saṅgho tāsaṁ āpattīnaṁ paṭicchannānaṁ chārattaṁ mānattaṁ adāsi. So ciṇṇa-mānatto saṅghaṁ abbhānaṁ yācati. Saṅgho Itthannāmaṁ bhikkhuṁ abbheti. Yass’āyasmato khamati, Itthannāmassa bhikkhuno abbhānaṁ, so tuṇh’assa. Yassa nakkhamati, so bhāseyya.

Dutiyam-pi etam-atthaṁ vadāmi. Suṇātu me bhante saṅgho…. so bhāseyya.

Tatiyam-pi etam-atthaṁ vadāmi. Suṇātu me bhante saṅgho…. so bhāseyya.

Abbhito saṅghena Itthannāmo bhikkhu. Khamati saṅghassa, tasmā tuṇhī. Evam-etaṁ dhārayāmi.

Mid-course adjustments

Requesting increased probation (adding an offense not originally remembered):

Ahaṁ bhante SAMBAHULĀ saṅghādisesā āpattiyo āpajjiṁ, ekā āpatti EKĀHA-paṭicchannā, ekā āpatti TĪHA-paṭicchannā, ekā āpatti PAÑCĀHA-paṭicchannā, ekā āpatti SATTĀHA-paṭicchannā. So’haṁ bhante saṅghaṁ tāsaṁ āpattīnaṁ, yā āpatti SATTĀHA-paṭicchannā, tassā agghena samodhāna-parivāsaṁ yāciṁ. Tassa me saṅgho tāsaṁ āpattīnaṁ, yā āpatti SATTĀHA-paṭicchannā, tassā agghena samodhāna-parivāsaṁ adāsi. So’haṁ parivasanto itaram-pi āpattiṁ sariṁ DASĀHA-paṭicchannaṁ. So’haṁ bhante saṅghaṁ tāsaṁ āpattīnaṁ yā āpatti DASĀHA-paṭicchannā tassā agghena samodhāna-parivāsaṁ yācāmi.

Venerable sirs, I have fallen into many offenses of intentional semen-emission—one offense concealed for one day, one for three days, one for five days, one for seven days. I asked the Community for a combined probation for those offenses at the rate of the offense concealed for seven days. The Community granted me a combined probation for those offenses at the rate of the offense concealed for seven days. While undergoing probation I remembered an additional offense concealed for ten days. I ask the Community for a combined probation for those offenses at the rate of the offense concealed for ten days.

Venerable sirs…. A second time…. A third time, I ask the Community for a combined probation for those offenses at the rate of the offense concealed for ten days.

Transaction statement:

Suṇātu me bhante saṅgho. Ayaṁ Itthannāmo bhikkhu SAMBAHULĀ saṅghādisesā āpattiyo āpajji, ekā āpatti EKĀHA- paṭicchannā, ekā āpatti TĪHA-paṭicchannā, ekā āpatti PAÑCĀHA-paṭicchannā, ekā āpatti SATTĀHA-paṭicchannā. So saṅghaṁ tāsaṁ āpattīnaṁ, yā āpatti SATTĀHA-paṭicchannā, tassā agghena samodhāna-parivāsaṁ yāci. Saṅgho Itthannāmassa bhikkhuno tāsaṁ āpattīnaṁ, yā āpatti SATTĀHA-paṭicchannā, tassā agghena samodhāna-parivāsaṁ adāsi. So parivasanto itaram-pi āpattiṁ sari DASĀHA-paṭicchannaṁ. So saṅghaṁ tāsaṁ āpattīnaṁ yā āpatti DASĀHA-paṭicchannā tassā agghena samodhāna-parivāsaṁ yācati. Yadi saṅghassa pattakallaṁ, saṅgho Itthannāmassa bhikkhuno tāsaṁ āpattīnaṁ, yā āpatti DASĀHA-paṭicchannā, tassā agghena samodhāna-parivāsaṁ dadeyya. Esā ñatti.

Request for adding an offense not originally admitted (having originally asked for probation for one offense when in actuality having committed two offenses): (Cv.III.22.3)

Ahaṁ bhante DVE saṅghādisesā āpattiyo āpajjiṁ DVEMĀSA-paṭicchannāyo. Tassa me etadahosi, ahaṁ kho DVE saṅghādisesā āpattiyo āpajjiṁ DVEMĀSA-paṭicchannāyo. Yannūnāhaṁ saṅghaṁ ekissā āpattiyā DVEMĀSA-paṭicchannāya DVEMĀSA-parivāsaṁ yāceyyanti. So’haṁ saṅghaṁ ekissā saṅghādisesāya āpattiyā DVEMĀSA-paṭicchannāya DVEMĀSA-parivāsaṁ yāciṁ. Tassa me saṅgho ekissā saṅghādisesāya āpattiyā DVEMĀSA-paṭicchannāya DVEMĀSA-parivāsaṁ adāsi. Tassa me parivasantassa lajji-dhammo okkami, ahaṁ kho DVE saṅghādisesā āpattiyo āpajjiṁ DVEMĀSA-paṭicchannāyo. Tassa me etadahosi, ahaṁ kho DVE saṅghādisesā āpattiyo āpajjiṁ DVEMĀSA-paṭicchannāyo. Yannūnāhaṁ saṅghaṁ ekissā āpattiyā DVEMĀSA-paṭicchannāya DVEMĀSA-parivāsaṁ yāceyyanti. So’haṁ saṅghaṁ ekissā saṅghādisesāya āpattiyā DVEMĀSA-paṭicchannāya DVEMĀSA-parivāsaṁ yāciṁ. Tassa me saṅgho ekissā saṅghādisesāya āpattiyā DVEMĀSA-paṭicchannāya DVEMĀSA-parivāsaṁ adāsi. Tassa me parivasantassa lajji-dhammo okkami. Yannūnāhaṁ saṅghaṁ itarissā-pi āpattiyā DVEMĀSA-paṭicchannāya DVEMĀSA-parivāsaṁ yāceyyanti. So’haṁ bhante saṅghaṁ itarissā-pi āpattiyā āpattiyā DVEMĀSA-paṭicchannāya DVEMĀSA-parivāsaṁ yācāmi.

Ahaṁ bhante DVE saṅghādisesā āpattiyo āpajjiṁ DVEMĀSA-paṭicchannāyo…. So’haṁ dutiyam-pi bhante saṅghaṁ itarissā-pi āpattiyā āpattiyā DVEMĀSA-paṭicchannāya DVEMĀSA-parivāsaṁ yācāmi.

Ahaṁ bhante DVE saṅghādisesā āpattiyo āpajjiṁ DVEMĀSA-paṭicchannāyo…. So’haṁ tatiyam-pi bhante saṅghaṁ itarissā-pi āpattiyā āpattiyā DVEMĀSA-paṭicchannāya DVEMĀSA-parivāsaṁ yācāmi.

Venerable sirs, I have fallen into two offenses of intentional semen-emission, concealed for two months. The thought occurred to me, “… What if I were to ask the Community for a two-month probation for one offense of intentional semen-emission concealed for two months?” I asked the Community for a two-month probation for one offense of intentional semen-emission, concealed for two months. The Community granted me a two-month probation for one offense of intentional semen-emission, concealed for two months. While undergoing probation, I was hit by a feeling of shame: “I actually fell into two offenses of intentional semen-emission, concealed for two months…. The Community granted me a two-month probation for one offense of intentional semen-emission, concealed for two months. I have been hit by a feeling of shame. What if I were to ask the Community for a two-month probation for the additional one offense of intentional semen-emission, concealed for two months?” I ask the Community for a two-month probation for the additional one offense of intentional semen-emission, concealed for two months.

Venerable sirs…. A second time…. A third time, I ask the Community for a two-month probation for the additional one offense of intentional semen-emission, concealed for two months.

D. Missaka-samodhāna-parivāsa (Mixed Combination for Offenses of Different Bases)

Requesting probation (for one offense of lustful bodily contact, concealed two days, and one offense of lewd speech, concealed four days):

Ahaṁ bhante DVE āpattiyo āpajjiṁ EKAṀ KĀYA-SAṀSAGGAṀ DVĪHA-paṭicchannaṁ EKAṀ DUṬṬHULLA- VĀCAṀ CATŪHA-paṭicchannaṁ. So’haṁ bhante saṅghaṁ DVINNAṀ āpattīnaṁ nānā-vatthukānaṁ yā āpatti CATŪHA-paṭicchannā tassā agghena samodhāna-parivāsaṁ yācāmi.

Venerable sirs, I have fallen into two offenses, one of bodily contact, concealed for two days, and one of lewd words, concealed for four days. I ask the Community for a combined probation for those two offenses of different bases at the rate of the offense concealed for four days.

Venerable sirs…. A second time…. A third time, I ask the Community for a combined probation for those two offenses of different bases at the rate of the offense concealed for four days.

Alternate request:

Ahaṁ bhante DVE saṅghādisesā āpattiyo āpajjiṁ nānā-vatthukāyo EKĀ āpatti DVĪHA-paṭicchannaṁ EKĀ āpatti CATŪHA-paṭicchannaṁ. So’haṁ bhante saṅghaṁ DVINNAṀ āpattīnaṁ nānā-vatthukānaṁ yā āpatti CATŪHA-paṭicchannā tassā agghena samodhāna-parivāsaṁ yācāmi.

Venerable sirs, I have fallen into two saṅghādisesa offenses of different bases, one concealed for two days, and one concealed for four days. I ask the Community for a combined probation for those two offenses of different bases at the rate of the offense concealed for four days.

Venerable sirs…. A second time…. A third time, I ask the Community for a combined probation for those two offenses of different bases at the rate of the offense concealed for four days.

E. Odhāna-samodhāna (Nullifying Combination) ( = Mūlāya paṭikassanā—Sending Back to the Beginning)

1. For an unconcealed offense committed while undergoing penance for an unconcealed offense (Cv.III.10)

Request to be sent back to the beginning:

Ahaṁ bhante ekaṁ āpattiṁ āpajjiṁ SAÑCETANIKAṀ SUKKA-VISAṬṬHIṀ apaṭicchannaṁ. So’haṁ saṅghaṁ ekissā āpattiyā SAÑCETANIKĀYA SUKKA-VISAṬṬHIYĀ apaṭicchannāya chārattaṁ mānattaṁ yāciṁ. Tassa me saṅgho ekissā āpattiyā SAÑCETANIKĀYA SUKKA-VISAṬṬHIYĀ apaṭicchannāya chārattaṁ mānattaṁ adāsi. So’haṁ bhante mānattaṁ caranto antarā ekaṁ āpattiṁ āpajjiṁ SAÑCETANIKAṀ SUKKA-VISAṬṬHIṀ apaṭicchannaṁ. So’haṁ bhante saṅghaṁ antarā ekissā āpattiyā SAÑCETANIKĀYA SUKKA-VISAṬṬHIYĀ apaṭicchannāya mūlāya paṭikassanaṁ yācāmi.

Ahaṁ bhante ekaṁ āpattiṁ āpajjiṁ…. So’haṁ dutiyam-pi bhante saṅghaṁ antarā ekissā āpattiyā SAÑCETANIKĀYA SUKKA-VISAṬṬHIYĀ apaṭicchannāya mūlāya paṭikassanaṁ yācāmi.

Ahaṁ bhante ekaṁ āpattiṁ āpajjiṁ…. So’haṁ tatiyam-pi bhante saṅghaṁ antarā ekissā āpattiyā SAÑCETANIKĀYA SUKKA-VISAṬṬHIYĀ apaṭicchannāya mūlāya paṭikassanaṁ yācāmi.

Venerable sirs, I have fallen into one offense, unconcealed, of intentional semen-emission. I asked the Community for the six-day penance for one offense, unconcealed, of intentional semen-emission. The Community granted me the six-day penance for one offense, unconcealed, of intentional semen-emission. While undergoing penance I fell into one interim offense, unconcealed, of intentional semen-emission. I ask the Community for a sending-back-to-the-beginning for the one interim offense, unconcealed, of intentional semen-emission.

Venerable sirs…. A second time…. A third time, I ask the Community for a sending-back-to-the-beginning for the one interim offense, unconcealed, of intentional semen-emission.

Transaction statement for sending back to the beginning:

Suṇātu me bhante saṅgho. Ayaṁ Itthannāmo bhikkhu ekaṁ āpattiṁ āpajji SAÑCETANIKAṀ SUKKA-VISAṬṬHIṀ apaṭicchannaṁ. So saṅghaṁ ekissā āpattiyā SAÑCETANIKĀYA SUKKA-VISAṬṬHIYĀ apaṭicchannāya chārattaṁ mānattaṁ yāci. Tassa saṅgho ekissā āpattiyā SAÑCETANIKĀYA SUKKA-VISAṬṬHIYĀ apaṭicchannāya chārattaṁ mānattaṁ adāsi. So mānattaṁ caranto antarā ekaṁ āpattiṁ āpajji SAÑCETANIKAṀ SUKKA-VISAṬṬHIṀ apaṭicchannaṁ. So saṅghaṁ antarā ekissā āpattiyā SAÑCETANIKĀYA SUKKA-VISAṬṬHIYĀ apaṭicchannāya mūlāya paṭikassanaṁ yācati. Yadi saṅghassa pattakallaṁ, saṅgho Itthannānaṁ bhikkhuṁ antarā ekissā āpattiyā SAÑCETANIKĀYA SUKKA-VISAṬṬHIYĀ apaṭicchannāya mūlāya paṭikasseyya. Esā ñatti.

Suṇātu me bhante saṅgho. Ayaṁ Itthannāmo bhikkhu ekaṁ āpattiṁ āpajji SAÑCETANIKAṀ SUKKA-VISAṬṬHIṀ apaṭicchannaṁ. So saṅghaṁ ekissā āpattiyā SAÑCETANIKĀYA SUKKA-VISAṬṬHIYĀ apaṭicchannāya chārattaṁ mānattaṁ yāci. Tassa saṅgho ekissā āpattiyā SAÑCETANIKĀYA SUKKA-VISAṬṬHIYĀ apaṭicchannāya chārattaṁ mānattaṁ adāsi. So mānattaṁ caranto antarā ekaṁ āpattiṁ āpajji SAÑCETANIKAṀ SUKKA-VISAṬṬHIṀ apaṭicchannaṁ. So saṅghaṁ antarā ekissā āpattiyā SAÑCETANIKĀYA SUKKA-VISAṬṬHIYĀ apaṭicchannāya mūlāya paṭikassanaṁ yācati. Saṅgho Itthannānaṁ bhikkhuṁ antarā ekissā āpattiyā SAÑCETANIKĀYA SUKKA-VISAṬṬHIYĀ apaṭicchannāya mūlāya paṭikassati. Yass’āyasmato khamati, Itthannāmassa bhikkhuno antarā ekissā āpattiyā SAÑCETANIKĀYA SUKKA-VISAṬṬHIYĀ apaṭicchannāya mūlāya paṭikassanā, so tuṇh’assa. Yassa nakkhamati, so bhāseyya.

Dutiyam-pi etam-atthaṁ vadāmi. Suṇātu me bhante saṅgho…. so bhāseyya.

Tatiyam-pi etam-atthaṁ vadāmi. Suṇātu me bhante saṅgho…. so bhāseyya.

Paṭikassito saṅghena Itthannāmo bhikkhu antarā ekissā āpattiyā SAÑCETANIKĀYA SUKKA-VISAṬṬHIYĀ apaṭicchannāya mūlāya. Khamati saṅghassa, tasmā tuṇhī. Evam-etaṁ dhārayāmi.

Requesting penance: (Cv.III.12.2)

Ahaṁ bhante ekaṁ āpattiṁ āpajjiṁ SAÑCETANIKAṀ SUKKA-VISAṬṬHIṀ apaṭicchannaṁ. So’haṁ ekissā āpattiyā SAÑCETANIKĀYA SUKKA-VISAṬṬHIYĀ apaṭicchannāya chārattaṁ mānattaṁ yāciṁ. Tassa me saṅgho ekissā āpattiyā SAÑCETANIKĀYA SUKKA-VISAṬṬHIYĀ apaṭicchannāya chārattaṁ mānattaṁ adāsi. So’haṁ bhante mānattaṁ caranto antarā ekaṁ āpattiṁ āpajjiṁ SAÑCETANIKAṀ SUKKA-VISAṬṬHIṀ apaṭicchannaṁ. So’haṁ bhante saṅghaṁ antarā ekissā āpattiyā SAÑCETANIKĀYA SUKKA-VISAṬṬHIYĀ apaṭicchannāya mūlāya paṭikassanaṁ yāciṁ. Taṁ maṁ saṅgho antarā ekissā āpattiyā SAÑCETANIKĀYA SUKKA-VISAṬṬHIYĀ apaṭicchannāya mūlāya paṭikassi. So’haṁ bhante saṅghaṁ antarā ekissā āpattiyā SAÑCETANIKĀYA SUKKA-VISAṬṬHIYĀ apaṭicchannāya chārattaṁ mānattaṁ yācāmi.

Ahaṁ bhante ekaṁ āpattiṁ āpajjiṁ…. So’haṁ dutiyam-pi bhante saṅghaṁ antarā ekissā āpattiyā SAÑCETANIKĀYA SUKKA-VISAṬṬHIYĀ apaṭicchannāya chārattaṁ mānattaṁ yācāmi.

Ahaṁ bhante ekaṁ āpattiṁ āpajjiṁ…. So’haṁ tatiyam-pi bhante saṅghaṁ antarā ekissā āpattiyā SAÑCETANIKĀYA SUKKA-VISAṬṬHIYĀ apaṭicchannāya chārattaṁ mānattaṁ yācāmi.

2. For an unconcealed offense committed while undergoing probation for a concealed offense

(In the example, the original offense was concealed for a fortnight.)

Request to be sent back to the beginning: (Cv.III.7.2)

Ahaṁ bhante ekaṁ āpattiṁ āpajjiṁ SAÑCETANIKAṀ SUKKA-VISAṬṬHIṀ PAKKHA-paṭicchannaṁ. So’haṁ ekissā āpattiyā SAÑCETANIKĀYA SUKKA-VISAṬṬHIYĀ PAKKHA-paṭicchannāya PAKKHA-parivāsaṁ yāciṁ. Tassa me saṅgho ekissā… PAKKHA-paṭicchannāya PAKKHA-parivāsaṁ adāsi. So’haṁ bhante parivasanto antarā ekaṁ āpattiṁ āpajjiṁ SAÑCETANIKAṀ SUKKA-VISAṬṬHIṀ apaṭicchannaṁ. So’haṁ bhante saṅghaṁ antarā ekissā āpattiyā SAÑCETANIKĀYA SUKKA-VISAṬṬHIYĀ apaṭicchannāya mūlāya paṭikassanaṁ yācāmi.

Ahaṁ bhante ekaṁ āpattiṁ āpajjiṁ…. So’haṁ dutiyam-pi bhante saṅghaṁ antarā ekissā āpattiyā SAÑCETANIKĀYA SUKKA-VISAṬṬHIYĀ apaṭicchannāya mūlāya paṭikassanaṁ yācāmi.

Ahaṁ bhante ekaṁ āpattiṁ āpajjiṁ…. So’haṁ tatiyam-pi bhante saṅghaṁ antarā ekissā āpattiyā SAÑCETANIKĀYA SUKKA-VISAṬṬHIYĀ apaṭicchannāya mūlāya paṭikassanaṁ yācāmi.

Venerable sirs, I have fallen into one offense of intentional semen-emission, concealed for a fortnight. I asked the Community for a fortnight probation for one offense of intentional semen-emission, concealed for a fortnight. The Community granted me a fortnight probation for one offense of intentional semen-emission, concealed for a fortnight. While undergoing probation I fell into one interim offense, unconcealed, of intentional semen-emission. I ask the Community for a sending-back-to-the-beginning for the one interim offense, unconcealed, of intentional semen-emission.

Venerable sirs…. A second time…. A third time, I ask the Community for a sending-back-to-the-beginning for the one interim offense, unconcealed, of intentional semen-emission.

Transaction statement for sending back to the beginning: (Cv.III.7.3)

Suṇātu me bhante saṅgho. Ayaṁ Itthannāmo bhikkhu ekaṁ āpattiṁ āpajji SAÑCETANIKAṀ SUKKA-VISAṬṬHIṀ PAKKHA-paṭicchannaṁ. So saṅghaṁ ekissā āpattiyā SAÑCETANIKĀYA SUKKA-VISAṬṬHIYĀ PAKKHA-paṭicchannāya PAKKHA-parivāsaṁ yāci. Tassa saṅgho ekissā āpattiyā SAÑCETANIKĀYA SUKKA-VISAṬṬHIYĀ PAKKHA-paṭicchannāya PAKKHA-parivāsaṁ adāsi. So parivasanto antarā ekaṁ āpattiṁ āpajji SAÑCETANIKAṀ SUKKA-VISAṬṬHIṀ apaṭicchannaṁ. So saṅghaṁ antarā ekissā āpattiyā SAÑCETANIKĀYA SUKKA-VISAṬṬHIYĀ apaṭicchannāya mūlāya paṭikassanaṁ yācati. Yadi saṅghassa pattakallaṁ, saṅgho Itthannānaṁ bhikkhuṁ antarā ekissā āpattiyā SAÑCETANIKĀYA SUKKA-VISAṬṬHIYĀ apaṭicchannāya mūlāya paṭikasseyya. Esā ñatti.

Suṇātu me bhante saṅgho. Ayaṁ Itthannāmo bhikkhu ekaṁ āpattiṁ āpajji SAÑCETANIKAṀ SUKKA-VISAṬṬHIṀ PAKKHA-paṭicchannaṁ. So saṅghaṁ ekissā āpattiyā SAÑCETANIKĀYA SUKKA-VISAṬṬHIYĀ PAKKHA-paṭicchannāya PAKKHA-parivāsaṁ yāci. Tassa saṅgho ekissā āpattiyā SAÑCETANIKĀYA SUKKA-VISAṬṬHIYĀ PAKKHA-paṭicchannāya PAKKHA-parivāsaṁ adāsi. So parivasanto antarā ekaṁ āpattiṁ āpajji SAÑCETANIKAṀ SUKKA-VISAṬṬHIṀ apaṭicchannaṁ. So saṅghaṁ antarā ekissā āpattiyā SAÑCETANIKĀYA SUKKA-VISAṬṬHIYĀ apaṭicchannāya mūlāya paṭikassanaṁ yācati. Saṅgho Itthannānaṁ bhikkhuṁ antarā ekissā āpattiyā SAÑCETANIKĀYA SUKKA-VISAṬṬHIYĀ apaṭicchannāya mūlāya paṭikassati. Yass’āyasmato khamati, Itthannāmassa bhikkhuno antarā ekissā āpattiyā SAÑCETANIKĀYA SUKKA-VISAṬṬHIYĀ apaṭicchannāya mūlāya paṭikassanā, so tuṇh’assa. Yassa nakkhamati, so bhāseyya.

Dutiyam-pi etam-atthaṁ vadāmi. Suṇātu me bhante saṅgho…. so bhāseyya.

Tatiyam-pi etam-atthaṁ vadāmi. Suṇātu me bhante saṅgho…. so bhāseyya.

Paṭikassito saṅghena Itthannāmo bhikkhu antarā ekissā āpattiyā SAÑCETANIKĀYA SUKKA-VISAṬṬHIYĀ apaṭicchannāya mūlāya. Khamati saṅghassa, tasmā tuṇhī. Evam-etaṁ dhārayāmi.

Notifying the bhikkhus of one’s probation:

Ahaṁ bhante ekaṁ āpattiṁ āpajjiṁ SAÑCETANIKAṀ SUKKA-VISAṬṬHIṀ PAKKHA-paṭicchannaṁ. So’haṁ ekissā āpattiyā SAÑCETANIKĀYA SUKKA-VISAṬṬHIYĀ PAKKHA-paṭicchannāya PAKKHA-parivāsaṁ yāciṁ. Tassa me saṅgho ekissā… PAKKHA-paṭicchannāya PAKKHA-parivāsaṁ adāsi. So’haṁ bhante parivasanto antarā ekaṁ āpattiṁ āpajjiṁ SAÑCETANIKAṀ SUKKA-VISAṬṬHIṀ apaṭicchannaṁ. So’haṁ bhante saṅghaṁ antarā ekissā… apaṭicchannāya mūlāya paṭikassanaṁ yāci. Taṁ maṁ saṅgho antarā ekissā… apaṭicchannāya mūlāya paṭikassi. So’haṁ parivasāmi. Vedayām’ahaṁ bhante, vedayatīti maṁ saṅgho dhāretu.

Requesting penance: (Cv.III.9.2)

Ahaṁ bhante ekaṁ āpattiṁ āpajjiṁ SAÑCETANIKAṀ SUKKA-VISAṬṬHIṀ PAKKHA-paṭicchannaṁ. So’haṁ ekissā āpattiyā SAÑCETANIKĀYA SUKKA-VISAṬṬHIYĀ PAKKHA-paṭicchannāya PAKKHA-parivāsaṁ yāciṁ. Tassa me saṅgho ekissā… PAKKHA-paṭicchannāya PAKKHA-parivāsaṁ adāsi. So’haṁ bhante parivasanto antarā ekaṁ āpattiṁ āpajjiṁ SAÑCETANIKAṀ SUKKA-VISAṬṬHIṀ apaṭicchannaṁ. So’haṁ bhante saṅghaṁ antarā ekissā… apaṭicchannāya mūlāya paṭikassanaṁ yāci. Taṁ maṁ saṅgho antarā ekissā… apaṭicchannāya mūlāya paṭikassi. So’haṁ bhante parivuttha-parivāso saṅghaṁ dvinnaṁ āpattīnaṁ chārattaṁ mānattaṁ yācāmi.

Ahaṁ bhante ekaṁ āpattiṁ āpajjiṁ…. So’haṁ dutiyam-pi bhante parivuttha-parivāso saṅghaṁ dvinnaṁ āpattīnaṁ chārattaṁ mānattaṁ yācāmi.

Ahaṁ bhante ekaṁ āpattiṁ āpajjiṁ…. So’haṁ tatiyam-pi bhante parivuttha-parivāso saṅghaṁ dvinnaṁ āpattīnaṁ chārattaṁ mānattaṁ yācāmi.

3. For an unconcealed offense committed while undergoing penance after having undergone probation

(As in the preceding example, the original offense was concealed for a fortnight.)

Request to be sent back to the beginning:

Ahaṁ bhante ekaṁ āpattiṁ āpajjiṁ SAÑCETANIKAṀ SUKKA-VISAṬṬHIṀ PAKKHA-paṭicchannaṁ. So’haṁ ekissā āpattiyā SAÑCETANIKĀYA SUKKA-VISAṬṬHIYĀ PAKKHA-paṭicchannāya PAKKHA-parivāsaṁ yāciṁ. Tassa me saṅgho ekissā… PAKKHA-paṭicchannāya PAKKHA-parivāsaṁ adāsi. So’haṁ parivuttha-parivāso saṅghaṁ ekissā āpattiyā SAÑCETANIKĀYA SUKKA-VISAṬṬHIYĀ PAKKHA-paṭicchannāya chārattaṁ mānattaṁ yāciṁ. Tassa me saṅgho ekissā āpattiyā SAÑCETANIKĀYA SUKKA-VISAṬṬHIYĀ PAKKHA-paṭicchannāya chārattaṁ mānattaṁ adāsi. So’haṁ mānattaṁ caranto antarā ekaṁ āpattiṁ āpajjiṁ SAÑCETANIKAṀ SUKKA-VISAṬṬHIṀ apaṭicchannaṁ. So’haṁ bhante saṅghaṁ antarā ekissā āpattiyā SAÑCETANIKĀYA SUKKA-VISAṬṬHIYĀ apaṭicchannāya mūlāya paṭikassanaṁ yācāmi.

Ahaṁ bhante ekaṁ āpattiṁ āpajjiṁ… So’haṁ dutiyam-pi bhante saṅghaṁ antarā ekissā āpattiyā SAÑCETANIKĀYA SUKKA-VISAṬṬHIYĀ apaṭicchannāya mūlāya paṭikassanaṁ yācāmi.

Ahaṁ bhante ekaṁ āpattiṁ āpajjiṁ… So’haṁ tatiyam-pi bhante saṅghaṁ antarā ekissā āpattiyā SAÑCETANIKĀYA SUKKA-VISAṬṬHIYĀ apaṭicchannāya mūlāya paṭikassanaṁ yācāmi.

4. For a concealed offense committed while undergoing probation for a concealed offense

(In this example, the original offense was concealed for a fortnight, while the new offense was concealed for two days.)

Request to be sent back to the beginning: (Cv.III.14.2)

Ahaṁ bhante ekaṁ āpattiṁ āpajjiṁ SAÑCETANIKAṀ SUKKA-VISAṬṬHIṀ PAKKHA-paṭicchannaṁ. So’haṁ ekissā āpattiyā SAÑCETANIKĀYA SUKKA-VISAṬṬHIYĀ PAKKHA-paṭicchannāya PAKKHA-parivāsaṁ yāciṁ. Tassa me saṅgho ekissā… PAKKHA-paṭicchannāya PAKKHA-parivāsaṁ adāsi. So’haṁ bhante parivasanto antarā ekaṁ āpattiṁ āpajjiṁ SAÑCETANIKAṀ SUKKA-VISAṬṬHIṀ DVĪHA-paṭicchannaṁ. So’haṁ bhante saṅghaṁ antarā ekissā āpattiyā SAÑCETANIKĀYA SUKKA-VISAṬṬHIYĀ DVĪHA-paṭicchannāya mūlāya paṭikassanaṁ yācāmi.

Ahaṁ bhante ekaṁ āpattiṁ āpajjiṁ…. So’haṁ dutiyam-pi bhante saṅghaṁ antarā ekissā āpattiyā SAÑCETANIKĀYA SUKKA-VISAṬṬHIYĀ DVĪHA-paṭicchannāya mūlāya paṭikassanaṁ yācāmi.

Ahaṁ bhante ekaṁ āpattiṁ āpajjiṁ…. So’haṁ tatiyam-pi bhante saṅghaṁ antarā ekissā āpattiyā SAÑCETANIKĀYA SUKKA-VISAṬṬHIYĀ DVĪHA-paṭicchannāya mūlāya paṭikassanaṁ yācāmi.

Venerable sirs, I have fallen into one offense of intentional semen-emission, concealed for a fortnight. I asked the Community for a fortnight probation for one offense of intentional semen-emission, concealed for a fortnight. The Community granted me a fortnight probation for one offense of intentional semen-emission, concealed for a fortnight. While undergoing probation I fell into one interim offense of intentional semen-emission, concealed for two days. I ask the Community for a sending-back-to-the-beginning for the one interim offense of intentional semen-emission, concealed for two days.

Venerable sirs…. A second time…. A third time, I ask the Community for a sending-back-to-the-beginning for the one interim offense of intentional semen-emission, concealed for two days.

Requesting combined probation:

Ahaṁ bhante ekaṁ āpattiṁ āpajjiṁ SAÑCETANIKAṀ SUKKA-VISAṬṬHIṀ PAKKHA-paṭicchannaṁ. So’haṁ ekissā āpattiyā SAÑCETANIKĀYA SUKKA-VISAṬṬHIYĀ PAKKHA-paṭicchannāya PAKKHA-parivāsaṁ yāciṁ. Tassa me saṅgho ekissā… PAKKHA-paṭicchannāya PAKKHA-parivāsaṁ adāsi. So’haṁ bhante parivasanto antarā ekaṁ āpattiṁ āpajjiṁ SAÑCETANIKAṀ SUKKA-VISAṬṬHIṀ DVĪHA-paṭicchannaṁ. So’haṁ bhante saṅghaṁ antarā ekissā āpattiyā SAÑCETANIKĀYA SUKKA-VISAṬṬHIYĀ DVĪHA-paṭicchannāya mūlāya paṭikassanaṁ yāciṁ. Taṁ maṁ saṅgho antarā ekissā āpattiyā SAÑCETANIKĀYA SUKKA-VISAṬṬHIYĀ DVĪHA-paṭicchannāya mūlāya paṭikassi. So’haṁ bhante saṅghaṁ antarā ekissā āpattiyā SAÑCETANIKĀYA SUKKA-VISAṬṬHIYĀ DVĪHA-paṭicchannāya purimāya āpattiyā samodhāna-parivāsaṁ yācāmi.

Ahaṁ bhante ekaṁ āpattiṁ āpajjiṁ…. So’haṁ dutiyam-pi bhante saṅghaṁ antarā ekissā āpattiyā SAÑCETANIKĀYA SUKKA-VISAṬṬHIYĀ DVĪHA-paṭicchannāya purimāya āpattiyā samodhāna-parivāsaṁ yācāmi.

Ahaṁ bhante ekaṁ āpattiṁ āpajjiṁ…. So’haṁ tatiyam-pi bhante saṅghaṁ antarā ekissā āpattiyā SAÑCETANIKĀYA SUKKA-VISAṬṬHIYĀ DVĪHA-paṭicchannāya purimāya āpattiyā samodhāna-parivāsaṁ yācāmi.

Venerable sirs, I have fallen into one offense of intentional semen-emission, concealed for a fortnight. I asked the Community for a fortnight probation for one offense of intentional semen-emission, concealed for a fortnight. The Community granted me a fortnight probation for one offense of intentional semen-emission, concealed for a fortnight. While undergoing probation I fell into one interim offense of intentional semen-emission, concealed for two days. I asked the Community for a sending-back-to-the-beginning for the one interim offense of intentional semen-emission, concealed for two days. The Community gave me a sending-back-to-the-beginning for the one interim offense of intentional semen-emission, concealed for two days. I ask the Community for a combined probation for the one interim offense of intentional semen-emission, concealed for two days, together with the earlier offense.

Venerable sirs…. A second time…. A third time, I ask the Community for a combined probation for the one interim offense of intentional semen-emission, concealed for two days, together with the earlier offense.

F. Suddhanta-parivāsa (Purifying Probation)

1. Cūḷa-suddhanta

Requesting probation: (Cv.III.26.2)

Ahaṁ bhante sambahulā saṅghādisesā āpattiyo āpajjiṁ, āpatti-pariyantaṁ ekaccaṁ jānāmi ekaccaṁ na jānāmi, ratti-pariyantaṁ ekaccaṁ jānāmi ekaccaṁ na jānāmi, āpatti-pariyantaṁ ekaccaṁ sarāmi ekaccaṁ na sarāmi, ratti-pariyantaṁ ekaccaṁ sarāmi ekaccaṁ na sarāmi, āpatti-pariyante ekacce vematiko ekacce nibbematiko, ratti-pariyante ekacce vematiko ekacce nibbematiko. So’haṁ bhante saṅghaṁ tāsaṁ āpattīnaṁ suddhanta-parivāsaṁ yācāmi.

Ahaṁ bhante sambahulā saṅghādisesā āpattiyo āpajjiṁ…. ratti-pariyante ekacce vematiko ekacce nibbematiko. So’haṁ dutiyam-pi bhante saṅghaṁ tāsaṁ āpattīnaṁ suddhanta-parivāsaṁ yācāmi.

Ahaṁ bhante sambahulā saṅghādisesā āpattiyo āpajjiṁ…. ratti-pariyante ekacce vematiko ekacce nibbematiko. So’haṁ tatiyam-pi bhante saṅghaṁ tāsaṁ āpattīnaṁ suddhanta-parivāsaṁ yācāmi.

Venerable sirs, I have fallen into many saṅghādisesa offenses. I know the number of offenses in some cases, but not in others. I know the number of nights (concealed) in some cases, but not in others. I remember the number of offenses in some cases, but not in others. I remember the number of nights (concealed) in some cases, but not in others. I am doubtful about the number of offenses in some cases, but not in others. I am doubtful about the number of nights (concealed) in some cases, but not in others. I ask the Community for a purifying probation for those offenses.

Venerable sirs…. A second time…. A third time, I ask the Community for a purifying probation for those offenses.

Transaction statement for granting probation:

Suṇātu me bhante saṅgho. Ayaṁ Itthannāmo bhikkhu sambahulā saṅghādisesā āpattiyo āpajji, āpatti-pariyantaṁ ekaccaṁ jānāti ekaccaṁ na jānāti, ratti-pariyantaṁ ekaccaṁ jānāti ekaccaṁ na jānāti, āpatti-pariyantaṁ ekaccaṁ sarati ekaccaṁ na sarati, ratti-pariyantaṁ ekaccaṁ sarati ekaccaṁ na sarati, āpatti-pariyante ekacce vematiko ekacce nibbematiko, ratti-pariyante ekacce vematiko ekacce nibbematiko. So saṅghaṁ tāsaṁ āpattīnaṁ suddhanta-parivāsaṁ yācati. Yadi saṅghassa pattakallaṁ, saṅgho Itthannāmassa bhikkhuno tāsaṁ āpattīnaṁ suddhanta-parivāsaṁ dadeyya. Esā ñatti.

Suṇātu me bhante saṅgho. Ayaṁ Itthannāmo bhikkhu sambahulā saṅghādisesā āpattiyo āpajji, āpatti-pariyantaṁ ekaccaṁ jānāti ekaccaṁ na jānāti…. ratti-pariyante ekacce vematiko ekacce nibbematiko. So saṅghaṁ tāsaṁ āpattīnaṁ suddhanta-parivāsaṁ yācati. Saṅgho Itthannāmassa bhikkhuno tāsaṁ āpattīnaṁ suddhanta-parivāsaṁ deti. Yass’āyasmato khamati, Itthannāmassa bhikkhuno tāsaṁ āpattīnaṁ suddhanta-parivāsassa dānaṁ, so tuṇh’assa. Yassa nakkhamati, so bhāseyya.

Dutiyam-pi etam-atthaṁ vadāmi. Suṇātu me bhante saṅgho…. so bhāseyya.

Tatiyam-pi etam-atthaṁ vadāmi. Suṇātu me bhante saṅgho…. so bhāseyya.

Dinno saṅghena Itthannāmassa bhikkhuno tāsaṁ āpattīnaṁ suddhanta-parivāso. Khamati saṅghassa, tasmā tuṇhī. Evam-etaṁ dhārayāmi.

Notifying other bhikkhus of one’s probation:

Ahaṁ bhante sambahulā saṅghādisesā āpattiyo āpajjiṁ, āpatti-pariyantaṁ ekaccaṁ jānāmi ekaccaṁ na jānāmi…. ratti-pariyante ekacce vematiko ekacce nibbematiko. So’haṁ bhante saṅghaṁ tāsaṁ āpattīnaṁ suddhanta-parivāsaṁ yāciṁ. Tassa me saṅgho tāsaṁ āpattīnaṁ suddhanta-parivāsaṁ adāsi. So’haṁ parivasāmi. Vedayām’ahaṁ bhante, vedayatīti maṁ saṅgho dhāretu.

Requesting penance:

Ahaṁ bhante sambahulā saṅghādisesā āpattiyo āpajjiṁ, āpatti-pariyantaṁ ekaccaṁ jānāmi ekaccaṁ na jānāmi…. ratti-pariyante ekacce vematiko ekacce nibbematiko. So’haṁ bhante saṅghaṁ tāsaṁ āpattīnaṁ suddhanta-parivāsaṁ yāciṁ. Tassa me saṅgho tāsaṁ āpattīnaṁ suddhanta-parivāsaṁ adāsi. So’haṁ bhante parivuttha-parivāso saṅghaṁ tāsaṁ āpattīnaṁ paṭicchannānaṁ chārattaṁ mānattaṁ yācāmi.

Ahaṁ bhante sambahulā saṅghādisesā āpattiyo āpajjiṁ…. So’haṁ bhante parivuttha-parivāso dutiyam-pi saṅghaṁ tāsaṁ āpattīnaṁ paṭicchannānaṁ chārattaṁ mānattaṁ yācāmi.

Ahaṁ bhante sambahulā saṅghādisesā āpattiyo āpajjiṁ…. So’haṁ bhante parivuttha-parivāso tatiyam-pi saṅghaṁ tāsaṁ āpattīnaṁ paṭicchannānaṁ chārattaṁ mānattaṁ yācāmi.

Transaction statement for granting penance:

Suṇātu me bhante saṅgho. Ayaṁ Itthannāmo bhikkhu sambahulā saṅghādisesā āpattiyo āpajji, āpatti-pariyantaṁ ekaccaṁ jānāti ekaccaṁ na jānāti…. ratti-pariyante ekacce vematiko ekacce nibbematiko. So saṅghaṁ tāsaṁ āpattīnaṁ suddhanta-parivāsaṁ yāci. Saṅgho Itthannāmassa bhikkhuno tāsaṁ āpattīnaṁ suddhanta-parivāsaṁ adāsi. So parivuttha-parivāso saṅghaṁ tāsaṁ āpattīnaṁ chārattaṁ mānattaṁ yācati. Yadi saṅghassa pattakallaṁ, saṅgho Itthannāmassa bhikkhuno tāsaṁ āpattīnaṁ chārattaṁ mānattaṁ dadeyya. Esā ñatti.

Suṇātu me bhante saṅgho. Ayaṁ Itthannāmo bhikkhu sambahulā saṅghādisesā āpattiyo āpajji, āpatti-pariyantaṁ ekaccaṁ jānāti ekaccaṁ na jānāti…. ratti-pariyante ekacce vematiko ekacce nibbematiko. So saṅghaṁ tāsaṁ āpattīnaṁ suddhanta-parivāsaṁ yāci. Saṅgho Itthannāmassa bhikkhuno tāsaṁ āpattīnaṁ suddhanta-parivāsaṁ adāsi. So parivuttha-parivāso saṅghaṁ tāsaṁ āpattīnaṁ chārattaṁ mānattaṁ yācati. Saṅgho Itthannāmassa bhikkhuno tāsaṁ āpattīnaṁ chārattaṁ mānattaṁ deti. Yass’āyasmato khamati, Itthannāmassa bhikkhuno tāsaṁ āpattīnaṁ chārattaṁ mānattassa dānaṁ, so tuṇh’assa. Yassa nakkhamati, so bhāseyya.

Dutiyam-pi etam-atthaṁ vadāmi. Suṇātu me bhante saṅgho…. so bhāseyya.

Tatiyam-pi etam-atthaṁ vadāmi. Suṇātu me bhante saṅgho…. so bhāseyya.

Dinnaṁ saṅghena Itthannāmassa bhikkhuno tāsaṁ āpattīnaṁ chārattaṁ mānattaṁ. Khamati saṅghassa, tasmā tuṇhī. Evam-etaṁ dhārayāmi.

Notifying other bhikkhus of one’s penance:

Ahaṁ bhante sambahulā saṅghādisesā āpattiyo āpajjiṁ, āpatti-pariyantaṁ ekaccaṁ jānāmi ekaccaṁ na jānāmi…. ratti-pariyante ekacce vematiko ekacce nibbematiko. So’haṁ bhante saṅghaṁ tāsaṁ āpattīnaṁ suddhanta-parivāsaṁ yāciṁ. Tassa me saṅgho tāsaṁ āpattīnaṁ suddhanta-parivāsaṁ adāsi. So’haṁ bhante parivuttha-parivāso saṅghaṁ tāsaṁ āpattīnaṁ chārattaṁ mānattaṁ yāciṁ. Tassa me saṅgho tāsaṁ āpattīnaṁ chārattaṁ mānattaṁ adāsi. So’haṁ mānattaṁ carāmi. Vedayām’ahaṁ bhante, vedayatīti maṁ saṅgho dhāretu.

Requesting rehabilitation:

Ahaṁ bhante sambahulā saṅghādisesā āpattiyo āpajjiṁ, āpatti-pariyantaṁ ekaccaṁ jānāmi ekaccaṁ na jānāmi…. ratti-pariyante ekacce vematiko ekacce nibbematiko. So’haṁ bhante saṅghaṁ tāsaṁ āpattīnaṁ suddhanta-parivāsaṁ yāciṁ. Tassa me saṅgho tāsaṁ āpattīnaṁ suddhanta-parivāsaṁ adāsi. So’haṁ bhante parivuttha-parivāso saṅghaṁ tāsaṁ āpattīnaṁ chārattaṁ mānattaṁ yāciṁ. Tassa me saṅgho tāsaṁ āpattīnaṁ chārattaṁ mānattaṁ adāsi. So’haṁ bhante ciṇṇa-mānatto saṅghaṁ abbhānaṁ yācāmi.

Ahaṁ bhante sambahulā saṅghādisesā āpattiyo āpajjiṁ…. So’haṁ bhante ciṇṇa-mānatto dutiyam-pi saṅghaṁ abbhānaṁ yācāmi.

Ahaṁ bhante sambahulā saṅghādisesā āpattiyo āpajjiṁ…. So’haṁ bhante ciṇṇa-mānatto tatiyam-pi saṅghaṁ abbhānaṁ yācāmi.

Transaction statement for granting rehabilitation:

Suṇātu me bhante saṅgho. Ayaṁ Itthannāmo bhikkhu sambahulā saṅghādisesā āpattiyo āpajji, āpatti-pariyantaṁ ekaccaṁ jānāti ekaccaṁ na jānāti…. ratti-pariyante ekacce vematiko ekacce nibbematiko. So saṅghaṁ tāsaṁ āpattīnaṁ suddhanta-parivāsaṁ yāci. Saṅgho Itthannāmassa bhikkhuno tāsaṁ āpattīnaṁ suddhanta-parivāsaṁ adāsi. So parivuttha-parivāso saṅghaṁ tāsaṁ āpattīnaṁ chārattaṁ mānattaṁ yāci. Tassa saṅgho tāsaṁ āpattīnaṁ chārattaṁ mānattaṁ adāsi. So ciṇṇa-mānatto saṅghaṁ abbhānaṁ yācati. Yadi saṅghassa pattakallaṁ, saṅgho Itthannāmaṁ bhikkhuṁ abbheyya. Esā ñatti.

Suṇātu me bhante saṅgho. Ayaṁ Itthannāmo bhikkhu sambahulā saṅghādisesā āpattiyo āpajji, āpatti-pariyantaṁ ekaccaṁ jānāti ekaccaṁ na jānāti…. ratti-pariyante ekacce vematiko ekacce nibbematiko. So saṅghaṁ tāsaṁ āpattīnaṁ suddhanta-parivāsaṁ yāci. Saṅgho Itthannāmassa bhikkhuno tāsaṁ āpattīnaṁ suddhanta-parivāsaṁ adāsi. So parivuttha-parivāso saṅghaṁ tāsaṁ āpattīnaṁ chārattaṁ mānattaṁ yāci. Tassa saṅgho tāsaṁ āpattīnaṁ chārattaṁ mānattaṁ adāsi. So ciṇṇa-mānatto saṅghaṁ abbhānaṁ yācati. Saṅgho Itthannāmaṁ bhikkhuṁ abbheti. Yass’āyasmato khamati, Itthannāmassa bhikkhuno abbhānaṁ, so tuṇh’assa. Yassa nakkhamati, so bhāseyya.

Dutiyam-pi etam-atthaṁ vadāmi. Suṇātu me bhante saṅgho…. so bhāseyya.

Tatiyam-pi etam-atthaṁ vadāmi. Suṇātu me bhante saṅgho…. so bhāseyya.

Abbhito saṅghena Itthannāmo bhikkhu. Khamati saṅghassa, tasmā tuṇhī. Evam-etaṁ dhārayāmi.

2. Mahā-suddhanta

Requesting probation: (Cv.III.26.2)

Ahaṁ bhante sambahulā saṅghādisesā āpattiyo āpajjiṁ, āpatti-pariyantaṁ na jānāmi, ratti-pariyantaṁ na jānāmi, āpatti-pariyantaṁ na sarāmi, ratti-pariyantaṁ na sarāmi, āpatti-pariyante vematiko, ratti-pariyante vematiko. So’haṁ bhante saṅghaṁ tāsaṁ āpattīnaṁ suddhanta-parivāsaṁ yācāmi.

Ahaṁ bhante sambahulā saṅghādisesā āpattiyo āpajjiṁ…. ratti-pariyante vematiko. So’haṁ dutiyam-pi bhante saṅghaṁ tāsaṁ āpattīnaṁ suddhanta-parivāsaṁ yācāmi.

Ahaṁ bhante sambahulā saṅghādisesā āpattiyo āpajjiṁ…. ratti-pariyante vematiko. So’haṁ tatiyam-pi bhante saṅghaṁ tāsaṁ āpattīnaṁ suddhanta-parivāsaṁ yācāmi.

Venerable sirs, I have fallen into many saṅghādisesa offenses. I don’t know the number of offenses, I don’t know the number of nights (concealed). I don’t remember the number of offenses, I don’t remember the number of nights (concealed). I am doubtful about the number of offenses, I am doubtful about the number of nights (concealed). I ask the Community for a purifying probation for those offenses.

Venerable sirs…. A second time…. A third time, I ask the Community for a purifying probation for those offenses.

(The remaining statements for this option may be inferred from the statements for the cūḷa-suddhanta-parivāsa.)

APPENDIX FOUR

Disciplinary Transactions

The transaction statements the Canon gives for these disciplinary transactions follow closely the details of the origin stories leading up to the first allowance for each transaction. As the Commentary points out, these statements do not fit all the cases where a particular disciplinary transaction can be applied. Thus, it recommends— when imposing one of these transactions on an individual—adjusting the statement to fit the facts of the case, drawing on the list of allowable applications for the transaction as given in the Canon. In the following examples, the portions of the statement that can be adjusted to fit the facts of the case are given in capital letters. Variations that may be substituted for these portions are given after the example.

A. Censure

Transaction statement: (Cv.I.1.4)

Suṇātu me bhante saṅgho. Ayaṁ Itthannāmo bhikkhu BHAṆḌANA-KĀRAKO HOTI, KALAHA-KĀRAKO VIVĀDA-KĀRAKO BHASSA-KĀRAKO SAṄGHE ADHIKARAṆA-KĀRAKO. Yadi saṅghassa pattakallaṁ, saṅgho Itthannāmassa bhikkhuno tajjanīya-kammaṁ kareyya. Esā ñatti.

Suṇātu me bhante saṅgho. Ayaṁ Itthannāmo bhikkhu BHAṆḌANA-KĀRAKO HOTI, KALAHA-KĀRAKO VIVĀDA-KĀRAKO BHASSA-KĀRAKO SAṄGHE ADHIKARAṆA-KĀRAKO. Saṅgho Itthannāmassa bhikkhuno tajjanīya-kammaṁ karoti. Yass’āyasmato khamati, Itthannāmassa bhikkhuno tajjanīya-kammassa karaṇaṁ, so tuṇh’assa. Yassa nakkhamati, so bhāseyya.

Dutiyam-pi etam-atthaṁ vadāmi. Suṇātu me bhante saṅgho…. so bhāseyya.

Tatiyam-pi etam-atthaṁ vadāmi. Suṇātu me bhante saṅgho…. so bhāseyya.

Kataṁ saṅghena Itthannāmassa bhikkhuno tajjanīya-kammaṁ. Khamati saṅghassa, tasmā tuṇhī. Evam-etaṁ dhārayāmi.

Venerable sirs, may the Community listen to me. This Bhikkhu (name) is a maker of strife, quarrels, disputes, dissension, issues in the Community. If the Community is ready, it should impose a censure transaction on Bhikkhu (name). This is the motion.

Venerable sirs, may the Community listen to me. This Bhikkhu (name) is a maker of strife, quarrels, disputes, dissension, issues in the Community. The Community is imposing a censure transaction on Bhikkhu (name). He to whom the imposition of a censure transaction on Bhikkhu (name) is agreeable should remain silent. He to whom it is not agreeable should speak.

A second time…. A third time I speak about this matter. Venerable sirs, may the Community listen to me…. He to whom it is not agreeable should speak.

The Community has imposed a censure transaction on Bhikkhu (name). This is agreeable to the Community, therefore it is silent. Thus do I hold it.

Alternative reasons for imposing censure:

He is inexperienced and incompetent, full of offenses, and has not undergone the penalty for them:

BĀLO HOTI, ABYATTO ĀPATTI-BAHULO ANAPADĀNO

He lives in the company of householders, in unbecoming association with householders:

GIHI-SAṀSAṬṬHO VIHARATI, ANANULOMIKEHI GIHI-SAṀSAGGEHI

He is one who, in light of heightened virtue, is defective in his virtue:

ADHI-SĪLE SĪLA-VIPANNO HOTI

He is one who, in light of heightened conduct, is defective in his conduct:

AJJHĀCĀRE ĀCĀRA-VIPANNO HOTI

He is one who, in light of higher view, is defective in his views:

ATIDIṬṬHIYĀ DIṬṬHI-VIPANNO HOTI

He speaks in dispraise of the Buddha:

BUDDHASSA AVAṆṆAṀ BHĀSATI

He speaks in dispraise of the Dhamma:

DHAMMASSA AVAṆṆAṀ BHĀSATI

He speaks in dispraise of the Saṅgha:

SAṄGHASSA AVAṆṆAṀ BHĀSATI

B. Further punishment

Transaction statement: (Cv.IV.11.2)

Suṇātu me bhante saṅgho. Ayaṁ Itthannāmo bhikkhu SAṄGHA-MAJJHE ĀPATTIYĀ ANUYUÑJIYAMĀNO AVAJĀNITVĀ PAṬIJĀNĀTI, PAṬIJĀNITVĀ AVAJĀNĀTI, AÑÑENA AÑÑAṀ paṬICARATI, SAMPAJĀNA-MUSĀ BHĀSATI. Yadi saṅghassa pattakallaṁ, saṅgho Itthannāmassa bhikkhuno tassa-pāpiyasikā-kammaṁ kareyya. Esā ñatti.

Suṇātu me bhante saṅgho. Ayaṁ Itthannāmo bhikkhu SAṄGHA-MAJJHE ĀPATTIYĀ ANUYUÑJIYAMĀNO AVAJĀNITVĀ PAṬIJĀNĀTI, PAṬIJĀNITVĀ AVAJĀNĀTI, AÑÑENA AÑÑAṀ paṬICARATI, SAMPAJĀNA-MUSĀ BHĀSATI. Saṅgho Itthannāmassa bhikkhuno tassa-pāpiyasikā-kammaṁ karoti. Yass’āyasmato khamati, Itthannāmassa bhikkhuno tassa-pāpiyasikā-kammassa karaṇaṁ, so tuṇh’assa. Yassa nakkhamati, so bhāseyya.

Dutiyam-pi etam-atthaṁ vadāmi. Suṇātu me bhante saṅgho…. so bhāseyya.

Tatiyam-pi etam-atthaṁ vadāmi. Suṇātu me bhante saṅgho…. so bhāseyya.

Kataṁ saṅghena Itthannāmassa bhikkhuno tassa-pāpiyasikā-kammaṁ. Khamati saṅghassa, tasmā tuṇhī. Evam-etaṁ dhārayāmi.

Venerable sirs, may the Community listen to me. This Bhikkhu (name), having been accused of an offense, admits it after denying it, denies it after admitting it, evades the issue, tells a deliberate lie. If the Community is ready, it should impose further-punishment transaction on Bhikkhu (name). This is the motion.

Venerable sirs, may the Community listen to me. This Bhikkhu (name), having been accused of an offense, admits it after denying it, denies it after admitting it, evades the issue, tells a deliberate lie. The Community is imposing a further-punishment transaction on Bhikkhu (name). He to whom the imposition of further-punishment transaction on Bhikkhu (name) is agreeable should remain silent. He to whom it is not agreeable should speak.

A second time…. A third time I speak about this matter. Venerable sirs, may the Community listen to me…. He to whom it is not agreeable should speak.

The Community has imposed further-punishment transaction on Bhikkhu (name). This is agreeable to the Community, therefore it is silent. Thus do I hold it.

The above transaction statement follows the example given at Cv.IV.11.2. The basic prerequisite for this transaction, given at Cv.IV.12.1, is that the bhikkhu in question be impure, shameless, and stands accused of having committed an offense (§). In the transaction statement, this would be stated as follows:

He is impure, shameless, and stands accused of having committed an offense:

ASUCI CA HOTI ALAJJĪ CA SĀNUVĀDO CA

However, Cv.IV.12.3 maintains that under this general requirement, all the variations listed under censure would qualify a bhikkhu for this transaction as well. For some reason, BD omits the variations from, “he is one who, in light of heightened virtue, is defective in his virtue,” to, “he speaks in dispraise of the Saṅgha.”

C. Demotion

Transaction statement: (Cv.I.9.2)

Suṇātu me bhante saṅgho. Ayaṁ Itthannāmo bhikkhu BHAṆḌANA-KĀRAKO HOTI, KALAHA-KĀRAKO VIVĀDA-KĀRAKO BHASSA-KĀRAKO SAṄGHE ADHIKARAṆA- KĀRAKO. Yadi saṅghassa pattakallaṁ, saṅgho Itthannāmassa bhikkhuno niyasa-kammaṁ* kareyya, nissāya te vatthabbanti. Esā ñatti.

Suṇātu me bhante saṅgho. Ayaṁ Itthannāmo bhikkhu BHAṆḌANA-KĀRAKO HOTI, KALAHA-KĀRAKO VIVĀDA-KĀRAKO BHASSA-KĀRAKO SAṄGHE ADHIKARAṆA- KĀRAKO. Saṅgho Itthannāmassa bhikkhuno niyasa-kammaṁ karoti, nissāya te vatthabbanti. Yass’āyasmato khamati, Itthannāmassa bhikkhuno niyasa-kammassa karaṇaṁ, nissāya te vatthabbanti, so tuṇh’assa. Yassa nakkhamati, so bhāseyya.

Dutiyam-pi etam-atthaṁ vadāmi. Suṇātu me bhante saṅgho…. so bhāseyya.

Tatiyam-pi etam-atthaṁ vadāmi. Suṇātu me bhante saṅgho…. so bhāseyya.

Kataṁ saṅghena Itthannāmassa bhikkhuno niyasa-kammaṁ, nissāya te vatthabbanti. Khamati saṅghassa, tasmā tuṇhī. Evam-etaṁ dhārayāmi.

Venerable sirs, may the Community listen to me. This Bhikkhu (name) is a maker of strife, quarrels, disputes, dissension, issues in the Community. If the Community is ready, it should impose a demotion transaction on Bhikkhu (name), [saying,] “You are to live in dependence.” This is the motion.

Venerable sirs, may the Community listen to me. This Bhikkhu (name) is a maker of strife, quarrels, disputes, dissension, issues in the Community. The Community is imposing a demotion transaction on Bhikkhu (name), [saying,] “You are to live in dependence.” He to whom the imposition of a demotion transaction on Bhikkhu (name), [saying,] “You are to live in dependence,” is agreeable should remain silent. He to whom it is not agreeable should speak.

A second time…. A third time I speak about this matter. Venerable sirs, may the Community listen to me…. He to whom it is not agreeable should speak.

The Community has imposed a demotion transaction on Bhikkhu (name), [saying,] “You are to live in dependence.” This is agreeable to the Community, therefore it is silent. Thus do I hold it.

*Following the Thai edition. The Sri Lankan, Burmese, and PTS editions read, “nissaya-kammaṁ”: a dependence transaction.

The list of variations for this transaction is the same as that for censure.

D. Banishment

Transaction statement: (Cv.I.13.7)

Suṇātu me bhante saṅgho. Ayaṁ Itthannāmo bhikkhu KĀYIKA-VĀCASIKENA MICCHĀJĪVENA SAMANNĀGATO HOTI. Yadi saṅghassa pattakallaṁ, saṅgho Itthannāmassa bhikkhuno (name of place in ablative) pabbājanīya-kammaṁ kareyya, na Itthannāmena bhikkhuna (name of place in locative) vatthabbanti. Esā ñatti.

Suṇātu me bhante saṅgho. Ayaṁ Itthannāmo bhikkhu KĀYIKA-VĀCASIKENA MICCHĀJĪVENA SAMANNĀGATO HOTI. Saṅgho Itthannāmassa bhikkhuno (name of place in ablative) pabbājanīya-kammaṁ karoti, na Itthannāmena bhikkhuna (name of place in locative) vatthabbanti. Yass’āyasmato khamati, Itthannāmassa bhikkhuno (name of place in ablative) pabbājanīya-kammassa karaṇaṁ, na Itthannāmena bhikkhuna (name of place in locative) vatthabbanti, so tuṇh’assa. Yassa nakkhamati, so bhāseyya.

Dutiyam-pi etam-atthaṁ vadāmi. Suṇātu me bhante saṅgho…. so bhāseyya.

Tatiyam-pi etam-atthaṁ vadāmi. Suṇātu me bhante saṅgho…. so bhāseyya.

Kataṁ saṅghena Itthannāmassa bhikkhuno (name of place in ablative) pabbājanīya-kammaṁ, na Itthannāmena bhikkhuna (name of place in locative) vatthabbanti. Khamati saṅghassa, tasmā tuṇhī. Evam-etaṁ dhārayāmi.

Venerable sirs, may the Community listen to me. This Bhikkhu (name) is endowed with bodily and verbal wrong livelihood. If the Community is ready, it should perform a transaction banishing Bhikkhu (name) from (place), [saying,] “Bhikkhu (name) is not to live in (place).” This is the motion.

Venerable sirs, may the Community listen to me. This Bhikkhu (name) is endowed with bodily and verbal wrong livelihood. The Community is performing a transaction banishing Bhikkhu (name) from (place), [saying,] “Bhikkhu (name) is not to live in (place).” He to whom the performing of a transaction banishing Bhikkhu (name) from (place), [saying,] “Bhikkhu (name) is not to live in (place),” is agreeable should remain silent. He to whom it is not agreeable should speak.

A second time…. A third time I speak about this matter. Venerable sirs, may the Community listen to me…. He to whom it is not agreeable should speak.

The Community has performed a transaction banishing Bhikkhu (name) from (place), [saying,] “Bhikkhu (name) is not to live in (place).” This is agreeable to the Community, therefore it is silent. Thus do I hold it.

Alternative reasons for imposing banishment (in addition to those listed under censure):

He is endowed with bodily frivolity:

KĀYIKENA DAVENA SAMANNĀGATO HOTI

verbal frivolity:

VĀCASIKENA DAVENA SAMANNĀGATO HOTI

bodily and verbal frivolity:

KĀYIKA-VĀCASIKENA DAVENA SAMANNĀGATO HOTI

bodily misbehavior:

KĀYIKENA ANĀCĀRENA SAMANNĀGATO HOTI

verbal misbehavior:

VĀCASIKENA ANĀCĀRENA SAMANNĀGATO HOTI

bodily and verbal misbehavior:

KĀYIKA-VĀCASIKENA ANĀCĀRENA SAMANNĀGATO HOTI

bodily injuriousness:

KĀYIKENA UPAGHĀTIKENA SAMANNĀGATO HOTI

verbal injuriousness:

VĀCASIKENA UPAGHĀTIKENA SAMANNĀGATO HOTI

bodily and verbal injuriousness:

KĀYIKA-VĀCASIKENA UPAGHĀTIKENA SAMANNĀGATO HOTI

bodily wrong livelihood:

KĀYIKENA MICCHĀJĪVENA SAMANNĀGATO HOTI

verbal wrong livelihood:

VĀCASIKENA MICCHĀJĪVENA SAMANNĀGATO HOTI

bodily and verbal wrong livelihood:

KĀYIKA-VĀCASIKENA MICCHĀJĪVENA SAMANNĀGATO HOTI

E. Reconciliation

Transaction statement: (Cv.I.18.6)

Suṇātu me bhante saṅgho. Ayaṁ Itthannāmo bhikkhu (name of lay person in the genitive) ALĀBHĀYA PARISAKKATI. Yadi saṅghassa pattakallaṁ, saṅgho Itthannāmassa bhikkhuno paṭisāraṇīya-kammaṁ kareyya, (name of lay person in the nominative) te khamāpetabboti. Esā ñatti.

Suṇātu me bhante saṅgho. Ayaṁ Itthannāmo bhikkhu (name of lay person in the genitive)ALĀBHĀYA PARISAKKATI. Saṅgho Itthannāmassa bhikkhuno paṭisāraṇīya-kammaṁ karoti, (name of lay person in the nominative) te khamāpetabboti. Yass’āyasmato khamati, Itthannāmassa bhikkhuno paṭisāraṇīya-kammassa karaṇaṁ, (name of lay person in the nominative) te khamāpetabboti, so tuṇh’assa. Yassa nakkhamati, so bhāseyya.

Dutiyam-pi etam-atthaṁ vadāmi. Suṇātu me bhante saṅgho…. so bhāseyya.

Tatiyam-pi etam-atthaṁ vadāmi. Suṇātu me bhante saṅgho…. so bhāseyya.

Kataṁ saṅghena Itthannāmassa bhikkhuno paṭisāraṇīya-kammaṁ, (name of lay person in the nominative) te khamāpetabboti. Khamati saṅghassa, tasmā tuṇhī. Evam-etaṁ dhārayāmi.

Venerable sirs, may the Community listen to me. If the Community is ready, it should give Bhikkhu (name) to Bhikkhu Sudhamma as his companion to ask forgiveness of Citta the householder. This is the motion.

Venerable sirs, may the Community listen to me. The Community is giving Bhikkhu (name) to Bhikkhu Sudhamma as his companion to ask forgiveness of Citta the householder. He to whom the giving of Bhikkhu (name) to Bhikkhu Sudhamma as his companion to ask forgiveness of Citta the householder is agreeable should remain silent. He to whom it is not agreeable should speak.

A second time…. A third time I speak about this matter. Venerable sirs, may the Community listen to me…. He to whom it is not agreeable should speak.

The Community has imposed a reconciliation transaction on Bhikkhu (name), [saying,] “You are to ask forgiveness of (layperson’s name).” This is agreeable to the Community, therefore it is silent. Thus do I hold it.

If the lay person in question is a woman, change:

khamāpetabboti    to    khamāpetabbāti

Alternative reasons for imposing reconciliation:

He strives for the detriment of (layperson’s name):

(name of lay person in the genitive) ANATTHĀYA PARISAKKATI.

He strives for the non-residence of (layperson’s name):

(name of lay person in the genitive) ANĀVĀSĀYA PARISAKKATI.

He insults and reviles (layperson’s name):

(name of lay person in the accusative) AKKOSATI PARIBHĀSATI

He gets (layperson’s name) to break with householders:

(name of lay person in the accusative) GIHĪHI BHEDETI

He speaks in dispraise of the Buddha to (layperson’s name):

(name of lay person in the dative) BUDDHASSA AVAṆṆAṀ BHĀSATI

He speaks in dispraise of the Dhamma to (layperson’s name):

(name of lay person in the dative) DHAMMASSA AVAṆṆAṀ BHĀSATI

He speaks in dispraise of the Saṅgha to (layperson’s name):

(name of lay person in the dative) SAṄGHASSA AVAṆṆAṀ BHĀSATI

He ridicules and scoffs at (layperson’s name) about something low or vile:

(name of lay person in the accusative) HĪNENA KHUṀSETI HĪNENA VAMBHETI

He does not fulfill a righteous promise made to (layperson’s name):

(name of lay person in the dative) DHAMMIKAṀ PAṬISSAVAṀ NA SACCĀPETI

Transaction statement authorizing a companion: (Cv.I.22.2)

(In this example, a companion is being authorized to accompany a bhikkhu named Sudhamma to ask forgiveness of a householder named Citta.)

Suṇātu me bhante saṅgho. Yadi saṅghassa pattakallaṁ, saṅgho Itthannāmaṁ bhikkhuṁ SUDHAMMASSA BHIKKHUNO anudūtaṁ dadeyya, CITTAṀ GAHAPATIṀ khamāpetuṁ. Esā ñatti.

Suṇātu me bhante saṅgho. Saṅgho Itthannāmaṁ bhikkhuṁ SUDHAMMASSA BHIKKHUNO anudūtaṁ deti, CITTAṀ GAHAPATIṀ khamāpetuṁ. Yass’āyasmato khamati, Itthannāmassa bhikkhuno SUDHAMMASSA BHIKKHUNO anudūtaṁ dānaṁ, CITTAṀ GAHAPATIṀ khamāpetuṁ, so tuṇh’assa. Yassa nakkhamati, so bhāseyya.

Dinno saṅghena Itthannāmo bhikkhu SUDHAMMASSA BHIKKHUNO anudūto, CITTAṀ GAHAPATIṀ khamāpetuṁ. Khamati saṅghassa, tasmā tuṇhī. Evam-etaṁ dhārayāmi.

Venerable sirs, may the Community listen to me. If the Community is ready, it should give Bhikkhu (name) to Bhikkhu Sudhamma as his companion to ask forgiveness of Citta the householder.

He to whom the giving of Bhikkhu (name) to Bhikkhu Sudhamma as his companion to ask forgiveness of Citta the householder is agreeable should remain silent. He to whom it is not agreeable should speak.

Bhikkhu (name) has been given by the Community to Bhikkhu Sudhamma as his companion to ask forgiveness of Citta the householder. This is agreeable to the Community, therefore it is silent. Thus do I hold it.

F. Suspension for not seeing an offense

Transaction statement: (Cv.I.25.2)

Suṇātu me bhante saṅgho. Ayaṁ Itthannāmo bhikkhu āpattiṁ āpajjitvā na icchati āpattiṁ passituṁ. Yadi saṅghassa pattakallaṁ, saṅgho Itthannāmassa bhikkhuno āpattiyā adassane ukkhepanīya-kammaṁ kareyya, asambhogaṁ saṅghena. Esā ñatti.

Suṇātu me bhante saṅgho. Ayaṁ Itthannāmo bhikkhu āpattiṁ āpajjitvā na icchati āpattiṁ passituṁ. Saṅgho Itthannāmassa bhikkhuno āpattiyā adassane ukkhepanīya-kammaṁ karoti, asambhogaṁ saṅghena. Yass’āyasmato khamati, Itthannāmassa bhikkhuno āpattiyā adassane ukkhepanīya-kammassa karaṇaṁ, asambhogaṁ saṅghena, so tuṇh’assa. Yassa nakkhamati, so bhāseyya.

Dutiyam-pi etam-atthaṁ vadāmi. Suṇātu me bhante saṅgho…. so bhāseyya.

Tatiyam-pi etam-atthaṁ vadāmi. Suṇātu me bhante saṅgho…. so bhāseyya.

Kataṁ saṅghena Itthannāmassa bhikkhuno āpattiyā adassane ukkhepanīya-kammaṁ, asambhogaṁ saṅghena. Khamati saṅghassa, tasmā tuṇhī. Evam-etaṁ dhārayāmi.

Venerable sirs, may the Community listen to me. This Bhikkhu (name), having fallen into an offense, is not willing to see it. If the Community is ready, it should impose a suspension transaction on Bhikkhu (name) for not seeing an offense, so that he has no communion with the Community. This is the motion.

Venerable sirs, may the Community listen to me. This Bhikkhu (name), having fallen into an offense, is not willing to see it. The Community is imposing a suspension transaction on Bhikkhu (name) for not seeing an offense, so that he has no communion with the Community. He to whom the imposition of a suspension transaction on Bhikkhu (name) for not seeing an offense, so that he has no communion with the Community is agreeable should remain silent. He to whom it is not agreeable should speak.

A second time…. A third time I speak about this matter. Venerable sirs, may the Community listen to me…. He to whom it is not agreeable should speak.

The Community has imposed a suspension transaction on Bhikkhu (name) for not seeing an offense, so that he has no communion with the Community. This is agreeable to the Community, therefore it is silent. Thus do I hold it.

G. Suspension for not making amends for an offense

Transaction statement: (Cv.I.31)

Suṇātu me bhante saṅgho. Ayaṁ Itthannāmo bhikkhu āpattiṁ āpajjitvā na icchati āpattiṁ paṭikātuṁ. Yadi saṅghassa pattakallaṁ, saṅgho Itthannāmassa bhikkhuno āpattiyā appaṭikamme ukkhepanīya-kammaṁ kareyya, asambhogaṁ saṅghena. Esā ñatti.

Suṇātu me bhante saṅgho. Ayaṁ Itthannāmo bhikkhu āpattiṁ āpajjitvā na icchati āpattiṁ paṭikātuṁ. Saṅgho Itthannāmassa bhikkhuno āpattiyā appaṭikamme ukkhepanīya-kammaṁ karoti, asambhogaṁ saṅghena. Yass’āyasmato khamati, Itthannāmassa bhikkhuno āpattiyā appaṭikamme ukkhepanīya-kammassa karaṇaṁ, asambhogaṁ saṅghena, so tuṇh’assa. Yassa nakkhamati, so bhāseyya.

Dutiyam-pi etam-atthaṁ vadāmi. Suṇātu me bhante saṅgho…. so bhāseyya.

Tatiyam-pi etam-atthaṁ vadāmi. Suṇātu me bhante saṅgho…. so bhāseyya.

Kataṁ saṅghena Itthannāmassa bhikkhuno āpattiyā appaṭikamme ukkhepanīya-kammaṁ, asambhogaṁ saṅghena. Khamati saṅghassa, tasmā tuṇhī. Evam-etaṁ dhārayāmi.

Venerable sirs, may the Community listen to me. This Bhikkhu (name), having fallen into an offense, is not willing to make amends for it. If the Community is ready, it should impose a suspension transaction on Bhikkhu (name) for not making amends for an offense, so that he has no communion with the Community. This is the motion.

Venerable sirs, may the Community listen to me. This Bhikkhu (name), having fallen into an offense, is not willing to make amends for it. The Community is imposing a suspension transaction on Bhikkhu (name) for not making amends for an offense, so that he has no communion with the Community. He to whom the imposition of a suspension transaction on Bhikkhu (name) for not making amends for an offense, so that he has no communion with the Community is agreeable should remain silent. He to whom it is not agreeable should speak.

A second time…. A third time I speak about this matter. Venerable sirs, may the Community listen to me…. He to whom it is not agreeable should speak.

The Community has imposed a suspension transaction on Bhikkhu (name) for not making amends for an offense, so that he has no communion with the Community. This is agreeable to the Community, therefore it is silent. Thus do I hold it.

H. Suspension for not relinquishing an evil view

Transaction statement: (Cv.I.32.4)

Suṇātu me bhante saṅgho. Ayaṁ Itthannāmo bhikkhu pāpikaṁ diṭṭhiṁ nappaṭinissajjati. Yadi saṅghassa pattakallaṁ, saṅgho Itthannāmassa bhikkhuno pāpikāya diṭṭhiyā appaṭinissagge ukkhepanīya-kammaṁ kareyya, asambhogaṁ saṅghena. Esā ñatti.

Suṇātu me bhante saṅgho. Ayaṁ Itthannāmo bhikkhu pāpikaṁ diṭṭhiṁ nappaṭinissajjati. Saṅgho Itthannāmassa bhikkhuno pāpikāya diṭṭhiyā appaṭinissagge ukkhepanīya-kammaṁ karoti, asambhogaṁ saṅghena. Yass’āyasmato khamati, Itthannāmassa bhikkhuno pāpikāya diṭṭhiyā appaṭinissagge ukkhepanīya-kammassa karaṇaṁ, asambhogaṁ saṅghena, so tuṇh’assa. Yassa nakkhamati, so bhāseyya.

Dutiyam-pi etam-atthaṁ vadāmi. Suṇātu me bhante saṅgho…. so bhāseyya.

Tatiyam-pi etam-atthaṁ vadāmi. Suṇātu me bhante saṅgho…. so bhāseyya.

Kataṁ saṅghena Itthannāmassa bhikkhuno pāpikāya diṭṭhiyā appaṭinissagge ukkhepanīya-kammaṁ, asambhogaṁ saṅghena. Khamati saṅghassa, tasmā tuṇhī. Evam-etaṁ dhārayāmi.

Venerable sirs, may the Community listen to me. This Bhikkhu (name) will not relinquish an evil view. If the Community is ready, it should impose a suspension transaction on Bhikkhu (name) for not relinquishing an evil view, so that he has no communion with the Community. This is the motion.

Venerable sirs, may the Community listen to me. This Bhikkhu (name) will not relinquish an evil view. The Community is imposing a suspension transaction on Bhikkhu (name) for not relinquishing an evil view, so that he has no communion with the Community. He to whom the imposition of a suspension transaction on Bhikkhu (name) for not relinquishing an evil view, so that he has no communion with the Community is agreeable should remain silent. He to whom it is not agreeable should speak.

A second time…. A third time I speak about this matter. Venerable sirs, may the Community listen to me…. He to whom it is not agreeable should speak.

The Community has imposed a suspension transaction on Bhikkhu (name) for not relinquishing an evil view, so that he has no communion with the Community. This is agreeable to the Community, therefore it is silent. Thus do I hold it.

I. Rescinding disciplinary acts

Request: (Cv.I.8.1)

Ahaṁ bhante saṅghena TAJJANĪYA-kammakato, sammā vattāmi, lomaṁ pātemi, netthāraṁ vattāmi. TAJJANĪYA-kammassa paṭippassaddhiṁ yācāmi.

Ahaṁ bhante saṅghena TAJJANĪYA-kammakato, sammā vattāmi, lomaṁ pātemi, netthāraṁ vattāmi. Dutiyam-pi TAJJANĪYA-kammassa paṭippassaddhiṁ yācāmi.

Ahaṁ bhante saṅghena TAJJANĪYA-kammakato, sammā vattāmi, lomaṁ pātemi, netthāraṁ vattāmi. Tatiyam-pi TAJJANĪYA-kammassa paṭippassaddhiṁ yācāmi.

Venerable sirs, having had a censure transaction imposed on me by the Community, have behaved properly, have lowered my hackles, have mended my ways. I ask for the rescinding of the censure transaction.

Venerable sirs…. A second time…. A third time, I ask for the rescinding of the censure transaction.

Transaction statement: (Cv.I.8.2)

Suṇātu me bhante saṅgho. Ayaṁ Itthannāmo bhikkhu saṅghena TAJJANĪYA-kammakato, sammā vattati, lomaṁ pāteti, netthāraṁ vattati, TAJJANĪYA-kammassa paṭippassaddhiṁ yācati. Yadi saṅghassa pattakallaṁ, saṅgho Itthannāmassa bhikkhuno tajjanīya-kammaṁ paṭippassambheyya. Esā ñatti.

Suṇātu me bhante saṅgho. Ayaṁ Itthannāmo bhikkhu saṅghena TAJJANĪYA-kammakato, sammā vattati, lomaṁ pāteti, netthāraṁ vattati, TAJJANĪYA-kammassa paṭippassaddhiṁ yācati. Saṅgho Itthannāmassa bhikkhuno TAJJANĪYA-kammaṁ paṭippassambheti. Yass’āyasmato khamati, Itthannāmassa bhikkhuno TAJJANĪYA-kammassa paṭippassaddhi, so tuṇh’assa. Yassa nakkhamati, so bhāseyya.

Dutiyam-pi etam-atthaṁ vadāmi. Suṇātu me bhante saṅgho…. so bhāseyya.

Tatiyam-pi etam-atthaṁ vadāmi. Suṇātu me bhante saṅgho…. so bhāseyya.

Paṭippassaddhaṁ saṅghena Itthannāmassa bhikkhuno TAJJANĪYA-kammaṁ. Khamati saṅghassa, tasmā tuṇhī. Evam-etaṁ dhārayāmi.

Venerable sirs, may the Community listen to me. This Bhikkhu (name), having had a censure transaction imposed on him by the Community, has behaved properly, has lowered his hackles, has mended his ways. If the Community is ready, it should rescind Bhikkhu (name)’s censure transaction. This is the motion.

Venerable sirs, may the Community listen to me. This Bhikkhu (name), having had a censure transaction imposed on him by the Community, has behaved properly, has lowered his hackles, has mended his ways. The Community is rescinding Bhikkhu (name)’s censure transaction. He to whom the rescinding of Bhikkhu (name)’s censure transaction is agreeable should remain silent. He to whom it is not agreeable should speak.

A second time…. A third time I speak about this matter. Venerable sirs, may the Community listen to me…. He to whom it is not agreeable should speak.

The Community has rescinded Bhikkhu (name)’s censure transaction. This is agreeable to the Community, therefore it is silent. Thus do I hold it.

Alternate transactions:

Further punishment*: TASSA-PĀPIYASIKĀ-

Demotion: NIYASA- (or NISSAYA-)

Banishment: PABBĀJANĪYA-

Reconciliation: PAṬISĀRAṆĪYA-

Suspension:

for not seeing an offense: ĀPATTIYĀ ADASSANE UKKHEPANĪYA-

for not making amends for an offense: ĀPATTIYĀ APPAṬIKAMME UKKHEPANĪYA-

for not relinquishing an evil view: PĀPIKĀYA DIṬṬHIYĀ APPAṬINISSAGGE UKKHEPANĪYA-

* None of the texts mention the transaction for rescinding a further-punishment transaction. However, Cv.IV.12.4 contains instructions for how a bhikkhu on whom this transaction has been imposed should behave. (These instructions are identical with those for a censure transaction.) In every other instance where instructions of this sort are given, the bhikkhu—having followed the instructions—may then request that the transaction be rescinded. Thus, the silence of the texts on the rescinding of this transaction must be regarded as an oversight.

J. Overturning the bowl

Transaction statement: (Cv.V.20.4)

Suṇātu me bhante saṅgho. (Name of lay person in the nominative) BHIKKHŪNAṀ ALĀBHĀYA PARISAKKATI. Yadi saṅghassa pattakallaṁ, saṅgho (name of lay person in the dative) pattaṁ nikkujjeyya, asambhogaṁ saṅghena kareyya. Esā ñatti.

Suṇātu me bhante saṅgho. (Name of lay person in the nominative) BHIKKHŪNAṀ ALĀBHĀYA PARISAKKATI. Saṅgho (name of lay person in the dative) pattaṁ nikkujjati, asambhogaṁ saṅghena karoti. Yass’āyasmato khamati, (name of lay person in the dative) pattassa nikkujjanā, asambhogaṁ saṅghena karaṇaṁ, so tuṇh’assa. Yassa nakkhamati, so bhāseyya.

Nikkujjito saṅghena (name of lay person in the dative) patto, asambhogo saṅghena. Khamati saṅghassa, tasmā tuṇhī. Evam-etaṁ dhārayāmi.

Venerable sirs, may the Community listen to me. (Name) strives for the non-gain of bhikkhus. If the Community is ready, it should overturn the Community’s bowl to (name) and deny him communion with the Community. This is the motion.

Venerable sirs, may the Community listen to me. (Name) strives for the non-gain of bhikkhus. The Community is overturning the Community’s bowl to (name) and denying him communion with the Community. He to whom the overturning of the Community’s bowl and denial of communion with the Community to (name) is agreeable should remain silent. He to whom it is not agreeable should speak.

The Community has overturned the Community’s bowl to (name) and denied him communion with the Community. This is agreeable to the Community, therefore it is silent. Thus do I hold it.

For a woman, change:

asambhogo saṅghena    to    asambhogā saṅghena

He/she strives for the detriment of the bhikkhus:

BHIKKHŪNAṀ ANATHĀYA PARISAKKATI.

He/she strives for the non-residence of the bhikkhus:

BHIKKHŪNAṀ ANĀVĀSĀYA PARISAKKATI.

He/she insults and reviles the bhikkhus:

BHIKKHŪ AKKOSATI PARIBHĀSATI

He/she gets bhikkhus to break with bhikkhus:

BHIKKHŪ BHIKKHŪHI BHEDETI

He/she speaks in dispraise of the Buddha:

BUDDHASSA AVAṆṆAṀ BHĀSATI

He/she speaks in dispraise of the Dhamma:

DHAMMASSA AVAṆṆAṀ BHĀSATI

He/she speaks in dispraise of the Saṅgha:

SAṄGHASSA AVAṆṆAṀ BHĀSATI

Request to have the bowl turned upright (this does not have to be recited in Pali): (Cv.V.20.7)

Saṅghena me bhante patto nikkujjito, asambhogomhi saṅghena. So’haṁ bhante sammā vattāmi, lomaṁ pātemi, netthāraṁ vattāmi, saṅghaṁ patt’ukkujjanaṁ yācāmi.

Saṅghena me bhante patto nikkujjito, asambhogomhi saṅghena. So’haṁ bhante sammā vattāmi, lomaṁ pātemi, netthāraṁ vattāmi, dutiyam-pi saṅghaṁ patt’ukkujjanaṁ yācāmi.

Saṅghena me bhante patto nikkujjito, asambhogomhi saṅghena. So’haṁ bhante sammā vattāmi, lomaṁ pātemi, netthāraṁ vattāmi, tatiyam-pi saṅghaṁ patt’ukkujjanaṁ yācāmi.

Venerable sirs, the Community has overturned (its) bowl to me. I have no communion with the Community. I have behaved properly, have lowered my hackles, have mended my ways, and I ask that the Community set (its) bowl upright.

Venerable sirs…. A second time…. A third time, I ask that the Community set (its) bowl upright.

A woman should change:

asambhogomhi    to    asambhogāmhi

So’haṁ    to    Sā’haṁ

Transaction statement for turning the bowl upright: (Cv.V.20.7)

Suṇātu me bhante saṅgho. Saṅghena (name of lay person in the dative) patto nikkujjito asambhogo saṅghena. So sammā vattati, lomaṁ pāteti, netthāraṁ vattati, saṅghaṁ patt’ukkujjanaṁ yācati. Yadi saṅghassa pattakallaṁ, saṅgho (name of lay person in the dative) pattaṁ ukkujjeyya, sambhogaṁ saṅghena kareyya. Esā ñatti.

Suṇātu me bhante saṅgho. Saṅghena (name of lay person in the dative) patto nikkujjito asambhogo saṅghena. So sammā vattati, lomaṁ pāteti, netthāraṁ vattati, saṅghaṁ patt’ukkujjanaṁ yācati. Saṅgho (name of lay person in the dative) pattaṁ ukkujjati, sambhogaṁ saṅghena karoti. Yass’āyasmato khamati, (name of lay person in the dative) pattassa ukkujjanā, sambhogaṁ saṅghena karaṇaṁ, so tuṇh’assa. Yassa nakkhamati, so bhāseyya.

Ukkujjito saṅghena (name of lay person in the dative) patto, sambhogo saṅghena. Khamati saṅghassa, tasmā tuṇhī. Evam-etaṁ dhārayāmi.

Venerable sirs, may the Community listen to me. The Community has overturned (its) bowl to (name). He has no communion with the Community. He has behaved properly, has lowered his hackles, has mended his ways. If the Community is ready, it should set (its) bowl upright for (name) and should grant him communion with the Community. This is the motion.

Venerable sirs, may the Community listen to me. The Community has overturned (its) bowl to (name). He has no communion with the Community. He has behaved properly, has lowered his hackles, has mended his ways. The Community is setting (its) bowl upright for (name) and granting him in communion with the Community. He to whom the setting of the bowl upright for (name), granting him communion with the Community, is agreeable should remain silent. He to whom it is not agreeable should speak.

The Community has set (its) bowl upright for (name) and has granted him communion with the Community. This is agreeable to the Community, therefore it is silent. Thus do I hold it.

For a woman, change:

asambhogo saṅghena    to    asambhogā saṅghena

So sammā vattati    to    Sā sammā vattati

sambhogo saṅghena    to    sambhogā saṅghena

APPENDIX FIVE

Technical Terms

A. Sampatti: The Validity of Community Transactions

As stated in Chapter 12, the Khandhakas’ discussion of what constitutes a valid transaction divides the principle of “face-to-face” into two broad factors: The transaction must be in accordance with the Dhamma—in other words, the proper procedure is followed in issuing the statement; and it must be harmonious—the Community issuing the statement is qualified to do so.

The Parivāra (XIX.1.1) sets the requirements of a valid transaction at five “consummations” (sampatti):

consummation as to the object (vatthu-sampatti),

consummation as to the motion (ñatti-sampatti),

consummation as to the proclamation (anusāvanā-sampatti),

consummation as to the territory (sīmā-sampatti),

consummation as to the assembly (parisa-sampatti).

The first three of these consummations fit under the Khandhakas’ first factor, that the transaction be in accordance with the Dhamma. The last consummation is the same as the Khandhakas’ second factor, that the transaction be united.

The fourth consummation, however, does not fit neatly into either of the Khandhakas’ two factors. The Parivāra explains it simply by saying that the territory has been authorized in a valid way. The Commentary further explains that if the territory is not valid in this way, it is not a territory but is instead part of the abaddha-sīmā from which it was originally tied off. Furthermore, any transaction performed in such a territory is invalid.

The Vinaya-mukha objects to this interpretation on the grounds that a transaction performed in such a territory is not automatically invalidated, for in such a case the original abaddha-sīmā counts as the actual territory of the transaction. If all the bhikkhus in that territory are united in the transaction, the transaction is valid. The issue thus becomes one of how to judge the unity of the transaction, and this comes down to two questions:

1) What is the extent of the valid territory in which the transaction is held?

2) Are all the qualified bhikkhus in that territory participating in the transaction? (To be participating means that they must either be present at the transaction or have sent their consent, and no one who is qualified to do so protests the transaction while it is being carried out.)

To prevent these questions from overlapping with the questions coming under the consummation as to the assembly, the Vinaya-mukha proposes limiting that consummation to one question:

Is the minimum quorum for the transaction fulfilled?

And, for purposes of streamlining the discussion, it proposes combining the consummation as to the motion and the consummation as to the proclamation into one: the consummation as to the transaction statement (kamma-vācā-sampatti).

This gives four consummations:

consummation as to the object—the person or item forming the object of the transaction fulfills the qualities required for that particular transaction;

consummation as to the transaction statement—the statement issued follows the correct form for the transaction;

consummation as to the assembly—the meeting contains at least the full quorum of bhikkhus required to perform that particular transaction; and

consummation as to the territory—all the qualified bhikkhus in the territory where the meeting is being held are either taking part in the meeting or their consent has been conveyed there, and no one qualified to do so protests the transaction while it is being carried out.

The first two of these consummations come under the principle of acting in accordance with the Dhamma; the last two, under the principle of the unity of the Community.

This method of analysis seems clearer and more useful than that proposed in the Parivāra, and so it is the method I have adopted in this book.

B. Saṁvāsa: Separate & Common Affiliation

Several of the rules (e.g., Mv.II.34.10-13, Mv.II.35.4-5, Cv.VI.6.5) refer to bhikkhus of separate affiliation and of common affiliation. The basic distinction between the two is fairly simple: Bhikkhus of common affiliation will hold their uposatha and Invitation together; those of separate affiliations will not. The Canon mentions that bhikkhus of separate affiliation have their differences, and that if these differences can be resolved, they can become bhikkhus of common affiliation.

Mv.X.1.10 discusses the two grounds for becoming a member of a separate affiliation: Either one makes oneself a member of a separate affiliation or one is suspended by a united Community. The Commentary to Sg 10 terms the resulting bhikkhus respectively laddhi-nānā-saṁvāsaka, one of a separate affiliation through view or theory; and kamma-nānā-saṁvāsaka, one of a separate affiliation through a transaction. From the context of the statement at Mv.X.1.10—it occurs in the discussion of the dispute at Kosambī—it would appear that making oneself a member of a separate affiliation means joining in with a bhikkhu who has been suspended by the Community in the course of a dispute. This is how the Abhayagiri (or Dharmaruci) sect split off from the Mahāvihāra in the first century B.C.E.: The Mahāvihāra bhikkhus suspended Ven. Mahātissa for unbecoming association with a lay person (i.e., King Vaṭṭagāminī, who had built him the Abhayagiri Vihāra), but he was able to rally a large number of bhikkhus to his side, thus forming a separate affiliation that lasted more than a millennium.

The Sub-commentary to Sg 10 limits the meaning of laddhi-nānā-saṁvāsaka to this one possibility—siding with a suspended bhikkhu—but neither the Canon nor the Commentary defines what making oneself a member of a separate affiliation means, nor do they limit it to this one possibility. History, however, has shown that there are at least two other ways that bhikkhus may make themselves a separate affiliation, both of which can result from any of the nine questions that can form the bases for a dispute: over

what is and is not Dhamma;

what is and is not Vinaya;

what was and was not spoken by the Tathāgata;

what was and was not regularly practiced by the Tathāgata;

what was and was not formulated by the Tathāgata;

what is and is not an offense;

what is a heavy or a light offense;

what is an offense leaving a remainder and not leaving a remainder; and

what is and is not a serious offense.

If two groups within a Community are unable to resolve their disagreements over these issues, they can avoid the controversy of suspension or schism if one of the groups leaves the territory and establishes a separate Community elsewhere. Because the two groups would then be conducting separate Community transactions in separate territories, their split would not constitute a schism. This is how the Jetavana sect split off from the Abhayagiri sect in the fourth century C.E. A dispute had grown among the Abhayagirins as to whether the Mahāyāna sūtras should be accepted as the teaching of the Buddha—i.e., over what is Dhamma and is not Dhamma. When the majority decided to accept them, a smaller group led by Ven. Ussiliyātissa left the Community not with the intention of forming a separate affiliation but simply to avoid any association with what they saw as a major—and hoped to be a temporary—mistake. When the dispute became prolonged, however, the Jetavana side became a de facto separate affiliation, again for many centuries. This is the first alternative way in which a separate affiliation may form.

The second alternative way is a more formal variation of the first. Bhikkhus who, dismayed over the state of the practice in their Community, develop doubts as to the legitimacy of their ordination lineage: If the bhikkhus are misbehaving to this extent in public, what are they doing in private? Are the senior bhikkhus giving ordination true bhikkhus? If not, how can their students be true bhikkhus? Deciding that these doubts are legitimately in line with the Vinaya, they leave the Community and seek reordination in another Community whose conduct and claims to legitimacy they find more inspiring. To maintain the purity of their new ordination lineage, they make themselves a separate affiliation, a move that is often signaled by determining their own separate territories for Community transactions. This is how the nineteenth-century reform sects developed in Sri Lanka and Thailand.

Once separate affiliations have formed, the Canon provides guidelines for how they should behave toward one another. Because not all separations need to be based on a disagreement over what is and is not Dhamma, Cv.VI.6.5 requires that a bhikkhu show homage to a senior bhikkhu of a separate affiliation who speaks what is Dhamma. In this case, respect for the Dhamma overrides sectarian issues. If, however, the separation is based on a disagreement over Dhamma, a bhikkhu is forbidden to show homage to a senior bhikkhu of a separate affiliation who speaks what is not Dhamma. In this case, respect for the Dhamma overrides concern for superficial harmony.

A bhikkhu is allowed to sit in on most Community transactions of a separate affiliation and his presence does not invalidate the transaction as long as he does not have to be counted to complete the quorum (Mv.IX.4.2; Mv.IX.4.7). There are, however, two transactions that bhikkhus of separate affiliations are strictly forbidden from joining—knowing that their affiliation is separate and without having resolved their differences: the uposatha (Mv.II.34.10) and the Invitation (Mv.IV.13). Communities of separate affiliation are allowed to perform separate Community transactions within the same territory (Mv.X.1.9-10), but because this step would turn their de facto schism into a formal one, most Communities are loathe to take it.

Given that the separateness between two affiliations is defined around the questions that form the basis for a dispute, there is always the possibility that they can be reunited by the means for settling disputes discussed in BMC1, Chapter 11. Meanwhile, Mv.X.1.10 says that an individual who has been of separate affiliation from a group of bhikkhus can become one of common affiliation with them in one of two ways: If his separate affiliation came from being suspended, he becomes of common affiliation when the suspension is revoked. If his separate affiliation was of his own doing, he can make himself of common affiliation. Here again the Canon offers no explanation, but the Commentary does, saying that he can change affiliation simply by changing his mind on the disputed issue that had defined his affiliation. This is simple enough, but in the case of the second alternative basis for separate affiliations, mentioned above, there is one complication. If a bhikkhu ordained not in a reform sect wants to change his affiliation to that of the reform sect, he must accept their position that his original ordination is in doubt. This means that to adopt their affiliation he will have to reordain in their lineage.

C. Saṅghassa kaṭhinaṁ: The Community’s Kaṭhina

Pv.XIV.5 attempts to resolve a paradox. On the one hand, the kaṭhina is spread not by the Community but by the individual on whom the Community has bestowed the robe for that purpose. On the other hand, the passages for spreading the kaṭhina and approving of its spreading contain the phrase, “Atthataṁ… saṅghassa kaṭhinaṁ,” which—because of a peculiarity of the genitive case, can mean either, “The Community’s kaṭhina has been spread” or “The kaṭhina has been spread by the Community.” The authors of Pv.XIV.5 apparently adopt the second interpretation, and therein lies the paradox: The kaṭhina is not spread by the Community, and yet the kaṭhina is spread by the Community.

To get around the paradox, they offer an analogy:

“The Community does not recite the Pāṭimokkha, a group does not recite the Pāṭimokkha, an individual recites the Pāṭimokkha. If the Community does not recite the Pāṭimokkha, a group does not recite the Pāṭimokkha, an individual recites the Pāṭimokkha, then the Pāṭimokkha is not recited by the Community, the Pāṭimokkha is not recited by a group, the Pāṭimokkha is recited by an individual. But through the Community’s unity, the group’s unity, and the reciting by the individual, the Pāṭimokkha is recited by the Community… by the group… by the individual. In the same way, the Community does not spread the kaṭhina, a group does not spread the kaṭhina, an individual spreads the kaṭhina, but through the Community’s approval, the group’s approval, and the spreading by the individual, the kaṭhina is spread by the Community… by a group… by an individual.”

There are, however, two problems with this explanation. First, there is no reciting of a Pāṭimokkha by a group. If less than a full Community is present for the uposatha, the Pāṭimokkha cannot be recited, and the group must instead perform the uposatha ceremony appropriate for its number. Second, as stated in Pv.XIV.4, the spreading of the kaṭhina is accomplished even if only one bhikkhu approves of it. In this case, following the logic of Pv.XIV.5, the phrase expressing approval could not contain the word saṅghassa, for the Community has not given its approval. Thus the analogy, as explained, does not hold.

A preferable explanation would be to follow the first interpretation of the phrase, “Atthataṁ… saṅghassa kaṭhinaṁ: The Community’s kaṭhina has been spread.” To follow the analogy with the chanting of the Pāṭimokkha, even if only one bhikkhu approves the spreading, the word saṅghassa would be appropriate here on the basis of the Community’s unity in bestowing the robe for the purpose of spreading the kaṭhina in the first place.

D. Anāmāsa

The Vinaya-mukha contains the following passage on items that are anāmāsa, i.e., not to be touched. As it notes, the basic concept and the list of specific items are not to be found in the Canon (their provenance is the Commentary to Sg 2). Although the dukkaṭa for touching these things is not canonical, many Communities observe it, and so a wise policy is to know the list.

One is prohibited from touching items that are anāmāsa, i.e., not to be touched—which are classified as follows:

a. Women, their garments, and representations (pictures, statues) of the female form. Female animals would come under this class. Upper and lower garments that they have thrown away—which, for example, could be used as sitting cloths—no longer count as anāmāsa.

b. Gold, silver, and jewels. Here the Commentary mentions eight kinds of jewels by name: pearl, crystal, lapis-lazuli, coral, rubies, topaz, conch-shell, and stones. Together with gold and silver, these are called the ten valuables. Diamonds were known at the time, but I have no idea why they are not mentioned. Conch here I understand as meaning conch shells that are decorated with gold and jewels and used to anoint with water, as in brahmanical ceremonies. It may also include conchs used for blowing (as musical instruments), but not ordinary conch shells, as these are allowed for making buttons and fasteners. Stones here I understand as meaning items that are classified as rock but considered precious, such as jade or onyx. Perhaps they were used as ornaments from early times, as—for example—jade bracelets in China, or bead bracelets made of red stone alternating with gold beads, which originally were probably made of jade. This category does not include ordinary stones.

c. Weapons of all kinds that are used to hurt the body and destroy life. Sharp tools such as axes would not be included here.

d. Traps for animals, whether used on land or in the water.

e. Musical instruments of all kinds.

f. Grain and fruits still on their original plants.

The prohibition against touching these anāmāsa items does not come directly from the Canon. The compilers of the Commentary extrapolated from various passages in the Vinīta-vatthu and other passages (of the Canon) and established this custom. Nevertheless, the custom is still appropriate. For example, a bhikkhu abstains from taking life, so if he were to touch weapons or traps it would look unseemly. He abstains from making music, so if he were to touch musical instruments it would look unseemly as well. So we can conclude that the items classified as anāmāsa were probably forbidden to bhikkhus from the very beginning.

Not all Communities agree with the Vinaya-mukha’s conclusions here. Pc 84, for example, gives explicit permission for a bhikkhu to pick up valuables—including gold and silver—that have been left behind in his monastery. Still, many Communities do follow the Vinaya-mukha in general here, so a wise bhikkhu should be informed and sensitive about this issue.

E. Agocara: Improper Range

A standard passage in the discourses (e.g., MN 108; AN 4:37; AN 4:181; AN 8:2) describes a virtuous bhikkhu as follows:

He dwells restrained in accordance with the Pāṭimokkha, consummate in his behavior and range. He trains himself, having undertaken the training rules, seeing danger in the slightest fault.

The discourses do not explain the phrase, “consummate in behavior and range.” However, the second book in the Abhidhamma—the Vibhaṅga—defines consummate in behavior as avoiding bodily transgression, verbal transgression, and all forms of wrong livelihood. It defines consummate in range as follows:

There is (proper) range (gocara), there is improper range (agocara). Which, in this context, is improper range? There is the case where a certain (bhikkhu) has prostitutes as his range. Or he has widows (or divorced women), unmarried women, paṇḍakas, bhikkhunīs, or taverns as his range. Or he dwells in unbecoming association with kings, kings’ ministers, sectarians, or sectarians’ disciples. Or he associates with, frequents, and attends to families who are without faith or conviction, who are abusive and rude, who wish loss, harm, discomfort, and no freedom from the yoke for bhikkhus, bhikkhunīs, male lay followers, and female lay followers. This is called improper range. And which is (proper) range? There is the case where a certain (bhikkhu) does not have prostitutes as his range, does not have widows (or divorced women), unmarried women, paṇḍakas, bhikkhunīs, or taverns as his range. He does not dwell in unbecoming association with kings, kings’ ministers, sectarians, or sectarians’ disciples. He associates with, frequents, and attends to families who have conviction, who have confidence, who are like clear water, who are radiant with ochre robes, where the breeze of seers blows in and out, who wish profit, well-being, comfort, and freedom from the yoke for bhikkhus, bhikkhunīs, male lay followers, and female lay followers. This is called (proper) range. (Vibhaṅga 514)

In this passage, the phrase, “to have x as one’s range” seems to mean that one associates with that person or place in an unbecoming way. The first five of the individuals who are said to be improper range—prostitutes, widows (or divorced women), unmarried women, paṇḍakas, and bhikkhunīs—are drawn from the Mahāvagga’s list of individuals that a member of another sect, on probation prior to full Acceptance, should avoid (Mv.I.38.5). According to the Sub-commentary to that passage, associates means treating as a friend or intimate. The Commentary adds that it is all right to visit these people as long as one goes with bhikkhus on bhikkhu business. With regard to prostitutes, the Vinaya-mukha remarks: “It’s not the case that the Buddha totally abandoned women of this kind. One may accept proper invitations from them, as in the example (in the Commentary) of the bhikkhus who accepted invitations for food in the home of Lady Sirimā. But one should be mindful and careful so as not to mar one’s restraint.” The same principle would apply to the other individuals who are said to be improper range: widows, divorced women, unmarried women, paṇḍakas, and bhikkhunīs.

As for a tavern, this is not mentioned as improper range in the Vinaya or the Suttas, although its inclusion in the Abhidhamma’s list is probably drawn from the rule against drinking fermented or distilled liquors (Pc 51). The Vinaya-mukha defines a tavern as any place where alcohol is sold, served, or made, such as a bar, a nightclub, a brewery, or a distillery. It notes that opium dens did not exist in the time of the Buddha, but that such places would fall under the general category of “tavern” as an improper place for a bhikkhu to frequent. At present, when many restaurants serve alcoholic beverages, the line separating proper from improper places to eat is somewhat blurred, and a bhikkhu is left to his own discretion as to what sort of restaurant—defined by its advertising, name, and atmosphere—is appropriate for him to enter. Even in places that are unequivocally taverns, though, there are certain times and situations in which a bhikkhu may enter them, as when the owners wish to make merit and invite a number of bhikkhus for a meal. Still, the bhikkhus must be careful to maintain not only their propriety but also the appearance of propriety, so as to preserve the good reputation of the Saṅgha.

The second volume of the Vinaya-mukha concludes with the following advice: “A bhikkhu who avoids these six forms of improper range (prostitutes, widows/divorcees, unmarried women, paṇḍakas, bhikkhunīs, and taverns), who—when visiting other people or places—chooses those people and places wisely, who doesn’t go excessively, and who returns at seemly hours, who behaves in such a way that he does not arouse the suspicions of his fellow Dhamma-practitioners, is said to be gocara-sampanno, a person consummate in his range. This is a principle paired with good behavior in the standard passage on virtue, in the compound ācāra-gocara-sampanno, consummate in behavior and range. This is further paired with the principle, sīla-sampanno, consummate in virtue. A bhikkhu consummate in his virtue, behavior, and range adorns the religion and makes it shine.”

Glossary

Abbhantara: a unit for measuring distance, approximately equal to 14 meters.

Akkosa-vatthu: a topic for abuse. See BMC1, Pc 2 & 3.

Andhaka: one of the ancient Sinhalese commentaries on which Buddhaghosa based his work.

Añjali: a gesture of respect in which one places one’s hands palm-to-palm over one’s heart.

Bhikkhu: a male mendicant ordained in the Bhikkhu Saṅgha.

Bhikkhunī: a female mendicant, a member of the Bhikkhunī Saṅgha ordained by both the Bhikkhunī and the Bhikkhu Saṅghas.

Chanda: consent by proxy.

Deva (devatā): literally, a “shining one”—a terrestrial spirit or celestial being.

Dubbhāsita: wrong speech.

Dukkaṭa: wrong doing, the lightest grade of offense.

Garubhaṇḍa: a heavy or expensive article. Garubhaṇḍa belonging to the Saṅgha includes monasteries and monastery land; dwellings, land on which dwellings are built; furnishings such as couches, chairs, and mattresses; metal vessels and tools; building materials, including such things as rushes, reeds, grass, and clay; and articles made of pottery or wood.

Hatthapāsa: a distance of 2.5 cubits, or 1.25 meters.

Jhāna: mental absorption.

Kaṭhina: literally, a frame used in sewing a robe; figuratively, a period of time in which certain rules are rescinded for bhikkhus who have participated in a ceremony, held in the fourth month of the rainy season, in which they receive a gift of cloth from lay people, bestow it on one of their members, and then make it into a robe before dawn of the following day.

Kurundī: one of the ancient Sinhalese commentaries on which Buddhaghosa based his work.

Lahubhaṇḍa: a light or inexpensive article. Lahubhaṇḍa of the Saṅgha includes such things as cloth, food, and medicine; and small personal accessories such as scissors, sandals, and water strainers.

Leḍḍupāta: the distance a man of average height can toss a clod of dirt underarm—approximately 18 meters.

Mahā Aṭṭhakathā: one of the ancient Sinhalese commentaries on which Buddhaghosa based his work, and the one that he took as his primary authority.

Mahā Paccarī: one of the ancient Sinhalese commentaries on which Buddhaghosa based his work.

Mahāpadesa: Great Standard for deciding what is and is not in line with the Dhamma and Vinaya. See BMC1, Chapter 1.

Nāga: a special kind of serpent, classed as a common animal but having magical powers, including the ability to assume human appearance. Nāgas have long been regarded as protectors of the Buddha’s teachings.

Pabbajjā: Going-forth—ordination as a sāmaṇera or sāmaṇerī.

Pācittiya: entailing confession; one of the minor classes of offenses.

Palibodha: constraint.

Paṇḍaka: a eunuch or neuter person.

Pārājika: defeat, the most serious grade of offenses.

Pavāraṇā: (1) an invitation whereby a donor gives permission to a bhikkhu or a Community of bhikkhus to ask for requisites; (2) a ceremony, held at the end of the Rains-residence, in which each bhikkhu invites the rest of the Community to inform him of any transgressions they may have seen, heard, or suspected that he has committed.

Samaṇa: contemplative; monk. This word is derived from the adjective sama, which means “in tune” or “in harmony.” The samaṇas in ancient India were wanderers who tried through direct contemplation to find the true nature of reality—as opposed to the conventions taught in the Vedas—and to live in tune or in harmony with that reality. Buddhism is one of several samaṇa movements. Others included Jainism, Ajivakan fatalism, and Lokayata, or hedonism.

Sāmaṇera: literally, a small samaṇa—a novice monk observing ten precepts.

Saṅgha: Community. This may refer to the entire Community of bhikkhus or bhikkhunīs, or to the Community living in a particular location. In passages where the distinction between the two is important, I have used Saṅgha to denote the first, and Community the second.

Saṅghādisesa: involving the Community in the initial (ādi) and subsequent (sesa) acts required in making amends for the offense; the second most serious grade of offenses.

Sīmā: territory.

Sutta (suttanta): discourse.

Thullaccaya: grave offense, the most serious of the confessable offenses.

Upajjhāya: preceptor (literally, “supervisor” or “overseer”).

Upasampadā: Acceptance—full ordination as a bhikkhu or bhikkhunī.

Uposatha: (1) Observance day, the day of the new and of the full moon; traditionally, in India, a time of special spiritual practices. (2) The Observance—either the recitation of the Pāṭimokkha, the declaration of mutual purity, or determination of the day—that the bhikkhus and bhikkhunīs perform on this day.

Yojana: a distance of approximately ten miles or sixteen kilometers.

Select Bibliography

Primary sources

For the Pali Canon, I have used the Thai edition published in Bangkok by Mahāmakut Rajavidyalaya Press and the BUDSIR CD-ROM version prepared by Mahidol University; the European edition edited by Hermann Oldenberg and published in England by the Pali Text Society; and the version of the Sri Lankan edition made available online by the Journal of Buddhist Ethics. For readings from the Sixth Council Burmese edition, I have relied on the help of Thomas Patton.

For the Pali commentaries, I have used the Thai editions of the Samantapāsādikā, the Sāratthadīpanī, and the Atthayojanā published in Bangkok by Mahāmakut Rājavidyālaya Press; the Thai edition of the Vimati-vinodanī published in Bangkok by the Bhūmibalo Bhikkhu Foundation Press; the PTS edition of the Samantapāsādikā, edited by J. Takakusu, Makoto Nagai, and Kogen Mizuno; the PTS edition of the Kaṅkhā-vitaraṇī, edited by Dorothy Maskell; the Harvard Oriental Series’ edition of the Visuddhimagga, edited by Henry Clarke Warren and Dharmananda Kosambi; and the Thai edition of the Kaṅkhā-vitaraṇī-purāṇa-ṭīkā and the Kaṅkhā-vitaraṇ-abhinava-ṭīkā published in Bangkok by Mahāchulālongkorn Rājavidyālaya.

Secondary sources and translations

Adikaram, E. W. Early History of Buddhism in Ceylon. Dehiwala, Sri Lanka: The Buddhist Cultural Center, 1994.

Amarābhirakkhit (Amaro Koed), Phra. Pubbasikkhā-vaṇṇanā (in Thai). Bangkok: Mahāmakut Rājavidyālaya Press, 1970.

Buddhaghosa, Bhadantācariya. The Path of Purification (Visuddhimagga). Translated from the Pali by Bhikkhu Ñāṇamoli. Kandy: Buddhist Publication Society, 1975.

____________ Samanta-Pāsādikā. 7 vols. Translated from the Pali into Thai by H. H. the Supreme Patriarch, Juan Uṭṭhāyī Mahāthera. Bangkok: Mahāmakut Rājavidyālaya Press, 1974-85.

Dhirasekhera, Jotiya. Buddhist Monastic Discipline: A Study of its Origins and Development in Relation to the Sutta and Vinaya Pitakas. Colombo: M. D. Gunasena, 1982.

Frauwallner, E. The Earliest Vinaya and the Beginnings of Buddhist Literature. Rome: Instituto Italiano per il Medio ed Estremo Oriente, 1956.

Gombrich, Richard. “Making Mountains without Molehills: The Case of the Missing Stūpa,” Journal of the Pāli Text Society 15 (1990), 141-143.

Grero, C. Ananda. An Analysis of the Theravada Vinaya in the Light of Modern Legal Philosophy. Colombo: Karunaratne & Sons Ltd, 1996.

Hallisey, Charles. “The Pāli Vinaya as a Historical Document. A Reply to Gregory Schopen.” Journal of the Pāli Text Society 15 (1990), 197-208.

v. Hinüber, Oskar. A Handbook of Pāli Literature. Berlin: Walter deGruyter & Co., 1996.

v. Hinüber, Oskar. “Khandhakavatta. Loss of Text in the Pali Vinaya,” Journal of the Pāli Text Society 15 (1990), 127-138.

Holt, John C. Discipline: The Canonical Buddhism of the Vinayapiṭaka. Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1981.

Horner, I. B., trans. The Book of Discipline. 6 vols. London: Pali Text Society, 1970-86.

Norman, K. R. A Philological Approach to Buddhism. London: School of Oriental and African Studies, 1997.

Ratnapala, Nandasena. Crime and Punishment in the Buddhist Tradition. New Delhi: Mittal Publications, 1993.

Schopen, Gregory. Bones, Stones, and Buddhist Monks: Collected Papers on the Archaeology, Epigraphy, and Texts of Monastic Buddhism in India. Honolulu: University of Hawai’i Press, 1996.

Vajirañāṇavarorasa, Krom Phraya. The Entrance to the Vinaya (Vinayamukha). 3 vols. Translated from the Thai. Bangkok: Mahāmakut Rājavidyālaya Press, 1969-83.

____________. Ordination Procedure and Preliminary Duties of a New Bhikkhu. Translated from the Thai. Bangkok: Mahāmakut Rājavidyālaya Press, 1989.

____________ Vinaya-mukha (in Thai). 3 vols. Bangkok: Mahāmakut Rājavidyālaya Press, 1992.

Warder, A. K. Introduction to Pali. 2d. ed. London: Pali Text Society, 1974.

____________. Outline of Indian Philosophy. Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1971.

Wijayaratna, Mohan. Buddhist Monastic Life. Translated from the French by Claude Grangier and Steven Collins. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990.